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Monthly Archives: December 2013

What Texas Homeowners Needs to Know About Foreclosure in Texas

03 Tuesday Dec 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Banks and Lenders, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, Your Legal Rights

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Fannie Mae, Foreclosure, Internal Revenue Service, Lien, Notice of default, Real estate, Tax lien, Texas

Foreclosures may be judicial (ordered by a court following a judgment in a lawsuit) or non-judicial (“on the courthouse steps”). Most foreclosures in Texas are nonjudicial. These are governed by chapter 51 of the Property Code and are held on the first Tuesday of each month between 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. at a designated spot at the county courthouse. The effect of foreclosure is to cut off and eliminate junior liens, including mechanic’s liens, but not tax obligations.

The remedy of foreclosure is available in the event of a borrower’s monetary default (nonpayment) or technical default (e.g., failure to pay taxes or keep the property insured). In order to determine if there has been a default, the loan documents–the note, the deed of trust, the loan agreement, and so forth–should be carefully examined. Notice and opportunity to cure requirements contained in these documents must be strictly followed if a foreclosure is to be valid.

Notices of foreclosure sales must be filed with the county clerk and posted (usually on a bulletin board in the lobby of the courthouse) at least 21 calendar days prior to the intended foreclosure date. Notices are entitled “Notice of Trustee’s Sale” or “Notice of Substitute Trustee’s Sale.” They provide information about the debt, the legal description of the property, and designate a three-hour period during which the sale will be held. In larger metropolitan areas there are foreclosure listing services which publish a monthly list of properties posted for foreclosure.

Required Notices to the Borrower

Notices to the defaulting borrower must be given in accordance with Property Code sections 51.002 et seq. and the deed of trust. The content of foreclosure notices is technical and must be correct to insure a valid foreclosure that cannot later be attacked by a wrongful foreclosure suit. Clients often protest when their lawyer advises re-noticing the debtor–”But I’ve already sent them an email telling them they are in default.” Not good enough.

Usually, two certified mail notices to the borrower are required, the first being a “Notice of Default and Intent to Accelerate” which gives formal notice of the default and affords an opportunity for the borrower to cure it (at least 20 days for a homestead, although if the deed of trust is on the FNMA form, 30 days must be given). Note that S.B. 766 and S.B. 472, which did not make it out of committee in the 81st Legislature, would have extended the 20-day period. This legislation may be revived in the future. Many lawyers consider it best to routinely give a 30-day notice.

After the cure period has passed, a “Notice of Acceleration and Posting for Foreclosure” must be sent at least 21 days prior to the foreclosure date. This second letter must also specify the location of the sale and a three-hour period during which the sale will take place. A notice of foreclosure sale should be enclosed. This notice is also filed with the county clerk and physically posted at the courthouse. If there is going to be a change in trustees it is also necessary to file a written appointment of substitute trustee. Notices are addressed to the last known address of the borrower contained in the lender’s records (this is the legal requirement), but it is wise for the lender to double-check this to avoid later claims by the borrower that notice was defective. It is prudent to send notices by both first-class and certified mail. Why? The reason has to do with Texas’s mailbox rule, i.e., that a notice properly deposited in the U.S. mail is presumed to be delivered. “Common sense . . . dictates that regular mail is presumed delivered and certified mail enjoys no [such] presumption unless the receipt is returned bearing an appropriate notation.” McCray v. Hoag, 372 S.W.3d 237, 243 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2012, no pet. h.). A careful lender will send notices to all likely addresses where the borrower may be found.

Other lienholders (whether junior or senior) are not entitled to notice. Depending on the first lienholder’s strategy, however, it may be useful to discuss the issue with them.

If the borrower is able to cure, a reinstatement agreement should be executed unless the terms of the debt have been changed (e.g., payments have been lowered) in which case a hybrid reinstatement/modification agreement or even a new note may be appropriate.

Notice to the IRS

The best practice is to do a title search prior to foreclosure to determine if there is an IRS tax lien or other federal lien. If so, notice must be given to the IRS and/or the U.S. Attorney at least 25 days prior to the sale, not including the sale date. 26 U.S.C. § 7425(c)(1). If this is not done, any IRS tax lien on the property will not be extinguished by the sale. Note that the IRS also has 120 days following the sale to redeem the property, although this seldom happens. The successful bidder on an IRS-liened property is therefore not entitled to breathe a sigh of relief until the 121st day.

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.) requires that a borrower be given 30 days to request and obtain verification of the debt. The lender may give notice of default, accelerate the debt, and even post for foreclosure in less time, but the foreclosure sale itself should not be conducted until the 30-day debt verification period has expired.

There is also an equivalent state statute (the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act) contained in Finance Code chapter 392. Failure to provide verification of the debt when the borrower has requested it in writing has serious penalties under both laws.

Due Diligence by the Investor Prior to Foreclosure

Buying property at foreclosure sales is a popular form of investment but it contains traps for the unwary. The investor’s goal is to acquire instant equity in the property by paying a relatively modest sum at the foreclosure sale. However, apparent equity can evaporate if the property is loaded down with liens. It is advisable, therefore, to check the title of the property that will be sold. Is the lien being foreclosed a second or third lien? If so, then the first lien (usually a purchase-money lien held by a mortgage company) will continue in force. First liens are king. They are not extinguished by foreclosure on an inferior lien. What about IRS liens? Improvement liens? Liens imposed by homeowners associations? Any or all of these could consume whatever equity might otherwise have existed in the property. If an investor is unsure as to which liens will be wiped out in a foreclosure sale, then copies of each lien document should be pulled and taken to the investor’s real estate attorney for review. As far as researching title is concerned, every professional investor should ultimately acquire the skills to go to the real property records in the county clerk’s office and do this unaided. One should obtain copies of the warranty deed and any deeds of trust or other lien instruments. Alternatively, a down-date report from a title company may be requested.

If more information is needed about the property itself, one can contact the trustee named in the Notice of Trustee’s Sale. Trustees vary in their level of cooperation but are often willing to provide additional information if they have it. They may have a copy of an inspection report on the property which they may be willing to share. One might even be able to arrange to view the property if it is unoccupied.

The investor should also check the military status of the borrower, since Property Code section 51.015 prohibits non-judicial foreclosure of a dwelling owned by active duty military personnel or within 9 months after active duty ends. Knowingly violating this law is a Class A misdemeanor.

Property Condition

It goes without saying that the investor should physically inspect the property if at all possible, although one should not trespass on occupied property to do this. It is legal, however, to stand in the street (public property) and take photos.

When one buys at a foreclosure sale, it is “as is.” Property condition is therefore important. When buying residential properties in particular, an investor should be especially curious about condition of the foundation (learn to recognize signs of settlement), whether the property is flood-prone, and whether or not there may be environmental contamination (generally not a problem if the house is in a restricted subdivision). It is usually best to avoid any property that suffers from one or more of these deficiencies. Other items that involve significant expense are the roof and the HVAC system.

The past or continuing presence of hazardous substances can impose huge potential liability (particularly on commercial properties) since both Texas and federal law provide that any owner of property (including the investor) is jointly and severally liable with any prior owner for cleanup costs. The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”) maintains a web site at www.tceq.state.tx.us where the environmental history of a property can be researched.

Valuation

It is, of course, important not to bid more than the equity in the property (fair market value less the total dollar amount of the liens, if any, that will survive the foreclosure sale). So how does one discover fair market value? Again, it is a question of getting the right information. One of the best ways to do this is to obtain a comparative market analysis or broker price opinion (BPO) from a realtor.

Last-Minute Bankruptcies

Foreclosures can be rendered void by last-minute bankruptcy filings. Some professional investors will check with the bankruptcy clerk’s office the morning of the sale to make sure that the borrower has not filed under any chapter of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code before they bid on the property. Note that the bankruptcy clerk’s office opens at 9 a.m. and bidding commences at 10 a.m. Checking bankruptcy filings is a wise precaution if the borrower has previously filed or threatened bankruptcy. It can be cumbersome and inconvenient to get money back from a trustee on a void sale.

Conduct of the Sale

Foreclosure sales in the larger counties can seem chaotic, with many sales going on at once. There are two general types: sales by trustees (usually attorneys) for individual and institutional lenders and sales by the county sheriff for unpaid taxes. Sales are held at the location designated by the commissioners of the county where the property is located–often the courthouse steps or close by.

The sale is conducted by the named trustee unless a substitute trustee has been duly appointed and notice of the appointment has been filed of record. As a practical matter, the foreclosing trustee is usually the attorney for the lender.

There is no standard or required script for a trustee to follow in auctioning property, although trustees usually recite the details of the note and lien, the fact that the note went into default, proper notice was given, the note was subsequently accelerated, and the property is now for sale to the highest cash bidder. The trustee has a duty to conduct the sale fairly and impartially and to not discourage bidding in any way (this can result in “chilled bidding,” which is a defect). A trustee may set reasonable conditions for conducting the foreclosure sale and may set the terms of payment (e.g., by cash or cashier’s check). However, these conditions and terms must be stated prior to the opening of bidding for the first sale of the day held by that trustee.

Bidding at the Sale

The investor should remain in motion, talking to the trustees, until finding the right trustee with the right property. Caution: do not let the excitement of the sale cause you to exceed your preestablished maximum bid.

The lender often bids the amount of the debt plus accrued fees and costs, so this bid can be anticipated. If the sale generates proceeds in excess of the debt, the trustee must distribute the excess funds to other lienholders in order of seniority and the remaining balance, if any, to the borrower.

If the investor is the successful bidder, he or she should be prepared to make payment “without delay” or within a mutually agreed-upon time. In order to be prepared, seasoned bidders carry with them some cash plus an assortment of cashier’s checks in different amounts made payable to “Trustee.” If the high bidder is for any reason unable to complete the purchase, then the trustee will reopen the bidding and auction the property again. The successful bidder will, within a reasonable time, receive a trustee’s deed or substitute trustee’s deed which conveys the interest that was held by the borrower in the property–no more, no less.

Property Code section 51.009 states that a buyer at a foreclosure sale “acquires the foreclosed property ‘as is’ without any expressed or implied warranties, except as to warranties of title, and at the purchaser’s own risk; and is not a consumer.” The “consumer” part of that statement is meant to prevent any DTPA claims.

Elapsed Time

Compared to other states, Texas has a streamlined non-judicial foreclosure process that is nearly as quick as an eviction. The minimum amount of time from the first notice to the day of foreclosure is 41 days, unless the deed of trust is a FNMA form, in which case the time is 51 days, although it is never wise to cut these deadlines that close. Why risk a void sale or give the borrower a possible wrongful foreclosure claim?

The advantage of a foreclosure over an eviction is that there are no effective defenses to the foreclosure process except for the borrower to block it with a temporary restraining order or file bankruptcy. For either option, the buyer needs money and probably an attorney.

Deficiency Suits

In the event that proceeds of the foreclosure sale exceed the amount due on the note (including attorney’s fees and expenses), then surplus funds must be distributed to the borrower. More often, however, the price at which the property is sold is less than the unpaid balance on the loan, resulting in a deficiency. A suit may be brought by the lender to recover this deficiency any time within two years of the date of foreclosure. Tex. Prop. Code § 51.003. Federally insured lenders have four years. As part of a defense to a deficiency suit, the borrower may challenge the foreclosure sales price if it is below fair market value, and receive appropriate credit if it is not. Any money received by a lender from private mortgage insurance is credited to the account of the borrower. One case states that the purpose of this “is to prevent mortgagees from recovering more than their due.”

For borrowers, deficiencies can be as significant a loss as the foreclosure itself since the IRS deems the deficiency amount to be taxable ordinary income.

Servicemembers Civil Relief Act

The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”), 50 U.S.C. app. § 501, which was passed in 2003 completely rewrites the existing 1940 law by expanding protections for those serving in the armed forces. Except by court order, a landlord may not evict a servicemember or dependents from the homestead during military service. The SCRA provides criminal sanctions for persons who knowingly violate its provisions.

Right of Redemption

There is no general right of redemption by a borrower after a Texas foreclosure. The right of redemption is limited to:

(1) Sale for unpaid taxes. After foreclosure for unpaid taxes, the former owner of homestead or agricultural property has a two-year right of redemption (Tax Code section 34.21a). The investor is entitled to a redemption premium of 25% in the first year and 50% in the second year of the redemption period, plus recovery of certain costs that include property insurance and repairs or improvements required by code, ordinance, or a lease in effect on the date of sale. For other types of property (i.e., nonhomestead), the redemption period is 180 days and the redemption premium is limited to 25%.(2) HOA foreclosure of an assessment lien. Prop. Code section 209.011 provides that a homeowner may redeem the property until no “later than the 180th day after the date the association mails written notice of the sale to the owner and the lienholder under section 209.101.” A lienholder also has a right of redemption in these circumstances “before 90 days after the date the association mails written notice . . . and only if the lot owner has not previously redeemed.” These provisions are part of the Texas Residential Property Owners Protection Act designed to reign in the once arbitrary power of HOAs (Chapter 209 of the Code). Note that an HOA is not permitted to foreclose on a homeowner if its lien is solely for fines assessed by the association or attorney fees.

An investor should be prepared to hold the property and avoid either making substantial improvements to it or reselling it until after any applicable rights of redemption have expired.

Postforeclosure Eviction

Foreclosure gives the new owner title; the next step is to obtain possession, and the procedure for doing this is outlined in the previous chapter. It is generally necessary to give the usual 3-day notice to vacate and file a forcible detainer petition in justice court. After judgment, the new owner must wait until the constable posts a 48 hour notice on the door and then forcibly removes a former borrower if that person is otherwise unwilling to leave.

An investor should build eviction costs into the budget from the beginning. It is advisable to hire an attorney for the first couple of evictions, after which an investor will likely be prepared to handle them solo. Never, however, attempt to conduct an eviction appeal to county court without an attorney.

As discussed in the chapter on evictions, there are both state and federal protections for tenants. Both Property Code section 24.005(b) and the federal Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 require at least 90 days’ notice to vacate so long as a tenant continues to pay rent.

Stopping a Foreclosure Sale

It is a myth that lawyers can wave a wand and, with a phone call or nasty letter, stop foreclosure. Attorneys have no such power. It is a fact that foreclosure can be stopped, but the only sure way to do so is to file a lawsuit and successfully persuade a judge to issue a temporary restraining order prior to the foreclosure sale. After the sale occurs, the remedy that remains–a suit for wrongful foreclosure–is slightly different. Relief may be limited to a money judgment if the property was sold at foreclosure to a third party for cash (a bona fide purchaser or “BFP”). If a BFP is in the mix, the possibility that the property itself can be recovered by the borrower is near zero.

Clients will often report that they have been engaged in reinstatement negotiations with the lender, usually consisting of numerous phone calls and messages, and ask if that is sufficient to avoid a scheduled foreclosure. The answer is a resounding no. Unless there is payment of the arrearage and a signed reinstatement agreement, the foreclosure will almost certainly go forward, even if the client was talking settlement with the lender just the day before. Note that reinstatement agreements must be in writing and signed by both parties. Phone calls mean nothing in this business.

Clients will sometimes state that they don’t want to sue the lender; they just want to get a restraining order to stop the foreclosure. The lawyer must reply “Sorry, it doesn’t work that way, you can’t split the two.” A restraining order is an ancillary form of relief, meaning that it arises from an underlying suit. In other words, there must be an actual lawsuit in place to provide a basis for requesting a TRO. Fortunately, the suit and application for the TRO can be filed simultaneously and a hearing obtained usually within a day.

There is an additional issue: a borrower must have grounds for legal action or possibly face penalties for filing a frivolous suit. Some clients have difficulty understanding this. “Why,” they ask, “can’t you just go and get a TRO for me?” The answer is that the lawyer must give the judge at least some credible basis for granting equitable relief.

So why don’t more people sue to stop a foreclosure? Money. A person in financial distress will have difficulty coming up with cash. Here is the blunt truth: if a borrower or investor cannot readily write a substantial retainer check to an attorney for purposes of suing a lender, then that person has no business in the expensive world of litigation.

Wrongful Foreclosure Suits

After the sale, a suit for wrongful foreclosure can be filed if there are grounds for alleging that the loan documents (e.g., the note and deed of trust) were defective in some way; if the notices leading up to the foreclosure were done incorrectly; or if there was some alleged impropriety in the sale itself. Note that there is no requirement that the sales price be fair. A sale cannot be set aside because the consideration paid is allegedly inadequate because it is less than market value. Sauceda v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 268 S.W.3d 135, 139 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.). To prevail in a wrongful foreclosure suit based on inadequate sale price, three elements must be proven: (1) grossly inadequate consideration; (2) defective foreclosure notices or sale; and (3) a causal connection between the defect and the inadequate consideration. If the notices and sale were correctly done, then the sale will be valid even though the sales price was lower than market value.

As a general rule, it is far better for a borrower to obtain a restraining order to stop a foreclosure than it is to bring suit after the fact. Texas law favors the finality of foreclosures, making wrongful foreclosure suits an uphill battle. If the property was sold to a third party who has no knowledge of any claims or alleged defects there is little chance that the borrower will get the property back. The third party is a protected BFP, and any remedy for the borrower will therefore likely be limited to monetary damages. Bottom line? If in doubt about whether or not a foreclosure is going to occur, file suit and attempt to get a temporary restraining order to stop it. “Wait and see” is the worst possible strategy in this case, since it is always more difficult to correct the situation after the foreclosure sale has occurred. The judge will likely ask without much sympathy, “Why, since you knew about these various alleged defects, did you not take action to stop the foreclosure?”

If a wrongful foreclosure suit is being considered, it should be filed quickly so that notice of the suit (a notice of lis pendens) can be filed in the real property records. If the lender was the successful bidder, this notice may effectively prevent the lender from transferring the property to a BFP.

Note that the action available under Property Code section 51.004 (discussed above) is different from a wrongful foreclosure remedy per se. Relief is granted if the court finds that the fair market value is greater than the sale price, but only in the context of a deficiency claimed by the lender.

The cruel fact for borrowers is that wrongful foreclosure suits face challenges from the beginning. Is that fair? You decide. It is, however, undoubtedly the bias of Texas judges, whether one approves or not.

A plaintiff can realistically expect the following in a wrongful foreclosure lawsuit: (1) The lender will not rush to settle, since lenders pay high fees to large litigation firms to fight tooth and nail to avoid doing the right thing; (2) written discovery (interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admission) from the plaintiff will be nearly entirely objected to by lender’s counsel, so extensively as to make the responses essentially useless (a deposition will therefore be required); (3) lender’s counsel will remove the case from state court to federal court where judges are more conservative and lenders can use Federal Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the case. This rule permits dismissal if the borrower’s complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” which happens more often than one might think. A change of courts can also create complications for the attorney representing the borrower, who may be accustomed to practicing in state rather than federal court. The attorney may be an experienced state court lawyer, but may not even be licensed in federal court. This is common as federal practice becomes more of a specialty among lawyers.

Prolonged Negotiations for a Modification

Homeowners often report that they were engaged in prolonged negotiations to modify their existing loan prior to the foreclosure sale. Of course, these communications were conducted by phone and there is no signed written agreement binding the lender to stop the sale, so there is likely no basis for a wrongful foreclosure suit. Do lenders pursue this strategy intentionally, so as to make it appear that they are willing to be reasonable, when in fact it is in their interest to foreclose instead? Opinions vary.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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How Homeowners Can Find Their Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA)

02 Monday Dec 2013

Posted by BNG in Foreclosure Defense

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The Pooling and Servicing Agreement is the collections of rules that dictate what can and cannot be done with the trust.  This document is filed with the SEC for each Trust.  Trusts were developed by 1000′s of loan that were grouped together to form the trust.  These Trusts were sold on the market where 100-1000′s of unknown investors purchased pieces of the Trust.   Reviewing the PSA document and knowing more about your trust can provide useful information in determining  how to approach defending your home. If you see  MERS listed on your deed, your mortgage was placed in a Trust. There are some Deeds that actually list the name of the trust, yet there are many that are not.  If your’s is listed on your Deed, your work will be much easier.   Follow the directions below.

It may be very valuable to your case for you to have a certified copy of your Pooling and Servicing Agreement (“PSA”), your Prospectus and your Prospectus Supplement.  The bank worked hard to hide it from you, and their attorney will probably stonewall you in discovery and argue every reason in the world why it either doesn’t exist, is irrelevant or why the dog ate it, in which case it’s still available, but not very pretty.  Once you receive your PSA, you have to analyze it.  A PSA is typically between 150 – 700 pages long.  It takes us about one full day to completely analyze a PSA.

Finding a PSA and its related prospectus takes skill.  You can do this yourself if you have the time and investigative skills to figure it out.  Or, you can take the easy way out and do what we do – hire Mario Kenny to find it.  He typically charges $850 for that service.   If you are going to hire Mario Kenny, skip this and go to the bottom of the page to read something he wrote.  Otherwise, here is how to find your PSA:

If the securitization of your mortgage loan was public, these documents must be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). They are available to the public at http://www.sec.gov (EDGAR ONLINE)

Get your copy of the promissory note and the deed of trust. Look at these documents and find the name of the original lender and the date the mortgage loan was made (the date you signed it). Write that information down.

You may get lucky and find your PSA the easy way – by placing in your internet search box the name of your original lender followed by “8-K”, or a variant, such as “8k” or “8K” and hitting the search button. It would look something like this “Wells Fargo 8-k”. You should get hits with the names of securitized pools (trusts) frequently in a form similar to this – “X Mortgage Security Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates Series 200Y-Z”, where “X” is the name of the original lender, “Y” is the year you got your loan, and “Z” is the month you got your loan (“Z” may be up to four months after you got your loan as the trust closing date must be funded within 90 days of the trust’s “cut-off” date – not your closing date.)

If you get too many hits, narrow it down a bit by adding to your search terms different configurations of the year and month that the trust closed. The earliest the trust could have closed would be the year and month you got your loan. If you got your loan in January, 2006, you would write it like this: “2006-1”; or try this: “2006 1.” Because the trust could close up to 4 months later, also try it like this: “2006-2” or “2006 2” and “2006-3” or “2006 3” and “2006-4” or “2006 4.” The whole format would look something like this: “Wells Fargo 8-k 2006-2.” If the loan was taken out in December, 2006, you will search not only 2006, but 2007 as well.

If that’s not successful, go to http://www.sec.gov and click on “Search for Company Filings” under “Filing & Forms (EDGAR).” Under “General-Purpose Searches,” click on “Companies & other filers.” Then, in the “Enter your search information” box, type in the name of your original lender next to “Company name” and click on the “Find Companies” button. Companies’ names are often made up of more than one word, so you may have to try your search using the full name, as well as only part of the name. Try it every way you must to get a “hit.” Several companies may have similar names, so watch out for that.

You will see a long list of the names of securitized pools of loans. You will be looking for all the names that are similar to the name of your original lender. Once you find them, your next must narrow down the search to the right time period for your loan. If the trust “cut-off” date fell before your loan was signed, you’ve got the wrong trust. Because of this, you cannot rely simply on the “Y” and “Z” dates. You need to do a search within the PSA for the “cut-off” date to make sure you have the right trust. Your lender may have securitized several pools of loans within a short time frame, so the first one you find that seems like a match may not be correct.

Once you find a match – or matches – write down their names and the document numbers associated with them (called a CIK). Then click on the CIK. Click on that number. There will be a list of documents filed with the SEC that are related to this pool of loans. Search as you scroll down, looking for a document titled “Prospectus” and “Pooling and Servicing Agreement.” If you find them, save them to your computer and also bookmark the page you found them on. If you don’t see either of these, go to the Table of Contents and search again.

Once you find your PSA, you then need to contact the SEC and request a certified copy of it (along with a certified copy of your Prospectus and Prospectus Supplement (if a supplement exists).  You will need a certified copy because that certification makes it admissible into evidence if the document is relevant.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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How Homeowners Can Spot Fraudulent Mortgage Documents

02 Monday Dec 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Fraud, Judicial States, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Florida, MERS, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, National City Bank, Texas, Trust deed (real estate), United States, Wall Street

This post is designed to assist struggling homeowners who find themselves in an unfortunate situation of wrongful foreclosure by illegal entities who are foreclosing without legitimate documents. Most securitized loans are being wrongfully foreclosed by entities who does not have any interest in the properties they are foreclosing.

If MERS is listed on your Deed of Trust there’s a better chance than not that there is fraud involved in your mortgage documents. MERS was used by the Wall Street Banks to avoid paying county recorder fees and real estate transfer tax fees.   You will need to visit your County Recorder’s office to obtain copies of all of your real property records from the first filing on your current loan up to today.

1.     The Mortgage or Deed of Trust is assigned from the Originator directly to the Trustee for the Securitized Trust.

2.     The Mortgage or Deed of Trust is assigned months and sometimes years after the date of the origination of the underlying mortgage note.

3.     The Mortgage or Deed of Trust is assigned from the initial aggregator directly to the Securitized Trust with no assignments to the Depositor or the Sponsor for the Trust.

4.     The Mortgage or Deed of Trust is executed, dated or assigned in a manner inconsistent with the mandatory governing rules of Section 2.01 of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.

5.     The assignment of the Mortgage or Deed of Trust is executed by a legal entity that was no longer in existence on the date the document was executed.

6.     The assignment of the mortgage or Deed of Trust is executed by an entity whose name is different than the entity named in the original document (i.e., National City Bank Corporation in lieu of ABC Corporation as a division of National City Bank).

7.     The assignment was executed by a party pursuant to a Power of Attorney but no Power of Attorney is attached to the instrument or filed with the instrument or otherwise recorded with local land registry.

8.     The mortgage note is allegedly transferred in a single document along with the Mortgage or Deed of Trust (i.e., “Assignment of the Note and Mortgage”).  You cannot “assign” a mortgage note.  You can only “negotiate” a mortgage note under Article 3 of the UCC.

9.     The assignment is executed by a party who claims to be an “attorney in fact” for the assignor.

10.    The assignment is notarized by a notary in Dakota County, Minnesota.

11.    The assignment is notarized by a notary in Hennepin County, Minnesota.

12.    The assignment is notarized by a notary in Duval County, Florida.

13.    The assignment is executed by an officer or secretary of MERS.

14.    The assignment is notarized by a secretary or paralegal employed by the attorney for the mortgage servicer.

15.    The assignment is executed or notarized by an employee of MR Default Services, Promiss Solutions LLC, National Default Exchange, LP, LOGS Financial Services, or some similar third-party.

16.    The endorsement on the note is actually on an allonge affixed to the note.  In most states, an allonge cannot be used if there is a sufficient amount of room at the “foot” or the “bottom” of the original note for the endorsement.

17.    The allonge is not “permanently” affixed to the original note. The term permanent excludes the use of staples and tape and as a result you must use a sold fastener such as glue.  Allonges are commonly referred to “in the business” as “tear-off fraud papers.”

18.    The note proffered in evidence is not the original but a copy of the “certified copy” provided to the debtors at the closing.

19.    The note is endorsed in blank with no transfer and delivery receipts.  It is fine to endorse a note in blank, in which case it becomes “bearer” paper under the UCC.  However, in order to prove a true sale from the Sponsor to the Depositor you must have written delivery and transfer receipts and proof of pay outs and pay in transactions.

20.    The note proffered in evidence is not endorsed at the foot of the note or on an affixed allonge.

21.    The assignment of the mortgage or deed of trust post-dates the filing of the court pleading.

22.    The assignment of the mortgage or deed of trust is executed after the filing of the court pleadings but claims to be “legally effective” before the filing.  For example, the deed of trust is assigned on June 1, 2009, with an effective date of May 1, 2007.

23.    The parties who executed the assignment and who notarized the signature are in fact the same parties.

24.    The signor states that he or she is an “agent” for the executing entity.

25.    The signor states that he or she is an “attorney in fact” for the executing entity.

26.    The signor states that he or she is an employee of the executing entity but claims to have custody and control of the records of the entity.

27.    The signor of the document makes statements about the status of the mortgage debt based on his or her review of the “records of the plaintiff” or the “records of the moving party.”

28.    The proponent of the original note files an Affidavit of Lost Note.

29.    The signor claims that the allegations in the court pleading are correct but the assignment of the mortgage and/or delivery and transfer of the note occurs after the law suit or the motion for relief from stay was filed.

30.    One or more of the operative documents in the case is signed by one of the attorneys for the mortgage servicer.

31.    The default payment history filed in the case is prepared by the attorney for the mortgage servicer or a member of his or her staff.

32.    The affidavit filed in support of legal fees is not signed by an attorney with the firm involved in the case.

33.    The name of one or more of the signors is stamped on the document.

34.    The document is a form with standard “fill-in-the-blanks” for names and amounts.

35.    The signature of one or more parties on the document is not legible and looks like something a three year old might have done.

36.    The document is dated and signed years before the document is actually filed with the register of real estate documents or deeds or mortgages.

37.    The proffered document has the word C O P Y stamped on or embedded in the document.

38.    The document is executed by a notary in Denton County, Texas.

39.    The document is executed by a notary in Collin County, Texas.

40.    The document includes a legend “Hold for” a named law firm after recording.

41.    The document was drafted by a law firm representing the mortgage servicer in the pending case.

42.    The document includes any type of bar code that was not added by the local register or filing clerk for such instruments.

43.    The document includes a reference to an “instrument number.”

44.    The document includes a reference to a “form number.”

45.    The document does not include any reference to a Master Document Custodian.

46.    The document is not authenticated by any officer or authorized agent of a Master Document Custodian.

47.    The paragraph numbers on the document are not consistent (the last paragraph on page one is 7 and the first paragraph on page two starts with number 9).

48.    The endorsement of the note is not at the “foot” or “bottom” of the last page of the note.  For example, a few states allow an endorsement on the back of the last page of the note but the majority requires it at the foot of the note.

49.    The document purports to assign the mortgage or the deed of trust to the Trustee for the Securitized Trust before the Trust was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.  This type of registration is normally referred to as a “shelf registration.”

50.    The document purports to transfer the note to the Trustee for the Securitized Trust before the date the Trust provides for the origination date of instruments in the Trust.  The Prospectus, the Prospectus Supplement and the Pooling and Servicing Agreement will clearly state that the pool of notes includes those originated between date X and date Y.

51.    The document purports to transfer the note to the Trustee for the Securitized Trust after the cut-off date for the creating of such instruments for the Trust.

52.    The origination date on the mortgage note is not within the origination and cut-off dates provided for the by terms of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.

53.    The “Affidavit of a Lost Note” is not filed by the Master Document Custodian for the Trust but by the Servicer or some other third-party.

54.    The document is signed by a “bank officer” without any designation of the office held by the said officer.

55.    The affidavit includes the following language on the bottom of each page:  ”This is an attempt to collect a debt.  Any information obtained will be used for that purpose.”

56.    The document is signed by a person who identifies himself or herself as a “media supervisor” for the proponent.

57.    The document is signed by a person who identifies himself or herself as a “media coordinator” for the proponent.

58.    The document is signed by a person who identifies himself or herself as a “legal coordinator” for the movant.

59.    The date of the signature on the document and the date the signature was notarized are not the same.

60.    The parties who signed the assignment and who notarized the signature are located in different states or counties.

61.    The transferor and the transferee have the same physical address including the same street and post office box numbers.

62.    The assignor and the assignee have the same physical address including the same street and post office box numbers.

63.    The signor of the document states that he or she is acting “solely as nominee” for some other party.

64.    The document refers to a power of attorney but no power of attorney is attached.

65.    The document bears the following legend:  ”This is not a certified copy.”

66.    The document is signed by:  (these are just a few names, do site search from more robo-signers)

Jose Aguilar

Joseph Alvarado

Felix Amenumey

Natalie Anderson

Pam Anderson

Scott Anderson or by Scott W. Anderson

Pamela Ariano

Leticia Arias

Chris Arndt

Aimee Austin

Gina  Avila

Katrina Bailey

Fern Baker

Janice M. Baker

Lorraine Balara

Steve Ballman

Steve Bashmakov

Michael Bender

Jamie Bilot

Marnessa Birckett

Sarah Block

Janette Boatman

Michele Boiko

Sheri Bongaarts

Beth Borse

Christie Bouchard

Diane Bowser

Christopher Bray

Tammy Brooks-Saleh or Tammy Saleh

Sandy Broughton

Jenny Brouwer

Jacqueline Brown

Paul Bruha

Lins Bryce

Rita Bucolo

Judy Buseman

Butler & Hosch, P.A.

Becky Byrne

Rodney Cadwell

Robin Callahan

Carolyn Cari

Jeffrey P. Carlson

Nancy L. Carlson

Richard J. Carlson

Robin Carmody

Marvell Carmouche

Amy Jo Cauthern-Munoz

Kristi M. Caya

Kim Chambers

Carol Chapman

Keith Chapman

Hari Charagundla

Debra Chieffe

Christina Ching

Dave Chiodo

Jim Clark

Tara Clayton

John Cody

Robyn Colburn

Rebecca Colgan

Karen Cook

Frank Coon

Julie Coon

Julie Cordova

Jeremy Cox

Cathy Crawford

Kevin Crecco

Dave Cunningham

Michael Curry

Nanci Danekar

Amie Davis

Vickie Day

Yvette Day

Teresa DeBaker

Jody Delfs

Richard Delgado

Mike Dian

Dulce Diaz

Larry Dingmann

Kathleen Doherty

Jason Dreher

Jennifer Duncan

Kimbretta Duncan

Ronald Durant

Neil E. Dyson

Shirley Eads

Salena Edwards

Judy Faber

Sue Filiczkowski

Donna Fitton

Sean Flanagan

Angela L. Freckman

Verdine A. Freeman

Eric Friedman

Fedelis Fondungallah

Barb Frost

LeAllen Frost

Fanessa Fuller

Laura Furrick

Sarah Gacek

Judi Gambrel

Elizabeth Geretschlaeger

Peggy Glass

Dory or Dorey Goebel

Alma Gonzales

Eileen J. Gonzales

Kathleen Gowan

Kelly Graham

Steven Y. Green

Steven Grout

Cathy Hagstrom

Michelle Halyard

Craig Hanlon

Michael Hanna

Donna Harkness

Michael Hebling

Renee L. Hensley

May Her

Jim Herman

Laura Hescott

Dave Hillen

Joseph P. Hillery

Craig Hinson

Bob Hora

Teddi Horan

Robert L. Horn

Chrys Houston

JK Huey

Paul Hunt

Vickie Ingamells

Cassandra Inouye

Andrea Jenkins

Ashley Johnson

Mary B. Johnson

Janet Jones

Tina Jones

Peggy Jordon

Etsuko Kabeya

Jamil Kahin

Robert E. Kaltenbach

Pam Kammerer

Gloria Karau

Vishal Karingada

Rhonda Kastli

Andrew Keardy

Patricia Kelleher

Scott Keller

Bryan Kerr

John Kerr

Kim Kinney

Sandy Kinnunen

LeeAnne Kramer

Mutru Kumar

Martha Kunkle

Margie Kwaitanowski

Vicki Kyle

Sukhada Lad

Brian J. LaForest

Diane LaFrance

Patricia Lambengco

Kyurstina Lawton

Toccoa Lenair

Bharati Lengade

Lindsey Lesch

Whitney Lewis

Marie Lockwood

Stephanie Lowe

Todd Luckey

Michele Luszcz

Joseph Lutz

Hang Luu

Frank Madden

Lisa Magnuson

William Maguire

Michael G. Mand

Silvia Marchan

Charmaine Marchesi

Brock Martin

Joel Martinson

Denise A. Marvel

Mary Maxwell

Christopher Mayall

Patrick McClain

Mary McGrath

Hattie McLaughlin

Noel McNally

Donna McNaught

Michael Mead

Marcia Medley

Susan Meier

Marisa Menza

Pamela Michael

Linda Miller

Steve Moe

Nancy Mooney

Joanne Moore

Melody Moore

Taylor Moore

Ruth Morgan

Michael H. Moreland

Treva Moreland

Annmarie Morrison

Melissa Mosloski

Kim Mullins

Patricia Murray

Ginny Neidert

Steve A. Nielsen

Susan Nightingale

Colleen O’Donnell

Richard Olasande

Mitchell Oringer

Clothilde Ortega

Amy Payment

Dawn Peck

Bonnie Pelletier

Patte Peloquin

Joseph Pensabene

Kenneth R. Perkins

Jennifer Peters

Charity Peterson

Joyce Petty

Ann Pinto

Ingrid Pittman

Bernadette Polux

Tamara Price

Erika Puentes

Beverly Quaresima

Shivani L. Ram

Antonia Ramirez

Rona Ramos

Myron Ravelo

Peter Read

Keith S. Reno

Anthony N. Renzi

Dawn L. Reynolds

Jeff Rivas

Jose Rivera

Bill Rizzo

Paula Rosato

Margery A. Rotundo

Sarah Rubin or Sara Rubin

Paige Sahr

Tammy Saleh

Kendall Sanders

Cindy Sandoval

Dianna Sandoval

Kimberly Sanford

Josephine Sciarrino

Stephanie Scott

Jenee Simon

Laura Siess

Gregory Smallwood

Rosalie Solano

Erika Spencer

Joseph Spicer

Renae Stanton

Jeffrey Stephan

Maya Stevenson

Richard Stires

Judith Stone

September Stoudemire

Roy Stringfellow

Anne Sutcliffe

Rachel Switzer

Emmanuel Tabot

Mary Taylor

Varsha Thakkar

Bernice Thell

Keith Torok

Deb Twining

Kenneth Ugwuadu

R.P. Umali

Keo Maney Kue Vang

Jason Vecchio

Rebecca Verdeja

Vinod Vishwakarma

Fifi Volgarakis

Janet Vollmer

Kim Waldroff

Linda Walton

Lisa Watson

John Wesley

Katrina Whitfield-Bailey or by Katrina Whitfield or by Katrina Bailey

Joanne Wight

Cathy Williams

Paul Williams

Kristine Wilson

Mary Winbauer

Rebecca Wirtz

Danielle Woods

Janine Yamoah

Jerry Yang

Elizabeth Yeranosian

Mellisa Ziertman

Jan Zimmerman

Stephen Zindler

Katie Zrust

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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Why Homeowners Lose on Appeal – A Review of Wrongful Foreclosure Appeal Case

02 Monday Dec 2013

Posted by BNG in Appeal, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, MERS, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Arizona, Bank of America, Florida, MERS, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, New York, Washington, Wells Fargo

A CASE IN REVIEW (1)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-17364    D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00517-JAT

OLGA CERVANTES, an unmarried
woman; CARLOS ALMENDAREZ, a
married man; ARTURO MAXIMO, a
married man, individually and on
behalf of a class of similarly
situated individuals,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

OPINION
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., a
New York corporation; MORTGAGE
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS,
INC., a subsidiary of MERSCORP,
INC., a Delaware corporation; ý MERSCORP, INC.; FEDERAL HOME
LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION, a
foreign corporation, AKA Freddie
Mac; FEDERAL NATIONAL
MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, a foreign
corporation; GMAC MORTGAGE,
LLC, a Delaware corporation;
NATIONAL CITY MORTGAGE, a
foreign company and a division of
National City Bank, a foreign
company; J.P. MORGAN CHASE
BANK, N.A., a New York
corporation; CITIMORTGAGE, INC., a
New York corporation;

HSBC MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
U.S.A., a Delaware corporation;
AIG UNITED GUARANTY
CORPORATION, a foreign
corporation; WELLS FARGO BANK,
N.A., a California corporation,
DBA Wells Fargo Home Equity;
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., a foreign
corporation; GE MONEY BANK, a
foreign company; PNC FINANCIAL
SERVICES GROUP, INC., a
Pennsylvania corporation; No. 09-17364
NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION, a D.C. No. subsidiary of PNC Financial  Services Group; N 2:09-cv-00517-JAT ATIONAL CITY
BANK, a subsidiary of National OPINION
City Corporation; MERRILL LYNCH
& COMPANY, INC., a subsidiary of
Bank of America Corporation;
FIRST FRANKLIN FINANCIAL
CORPORATION, a subsidiary of
Merrill Lynch & Company, Inc.;
LASALLE BANK, N.A., a subsidiary
of Bank of America; TIFFANY &
BOSCO P.A., an Arizona
professional association,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
February 16, 2011—San Francisco, California
Filed September 7, 2011

Before: Richard C. Tallman, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,* and
Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Callahan

*Due to the death of the Honorable David R. Thompson, the Honorable
Johnnie B. Rawlinson, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit,
has been drawn to replace him on this panel. Judge Rawlinson has read
the briefs, reviewed the record, and listened to the audio recording of oral
argument held on February 16, 2011.

COUNSEL
William A. Nebeker and Valerie R. Edwards, Koeller
Nebeker Carlson & Haluck, LLP, Phoenix, Arizona, and Robert
Hager and Treva Hearne, Hager & Hearne, Reno, Nevada,
for the appellants.
Timothy J. Thomason, Mariscal Weeks McIntyre & Friedlander,
P.A., Phoenix, Arizona, Thomas M. Hefferon, Goodwin
Procter, LLP, Washington, DC, Howard N. Cayne,
Arnold & Porter, LLP, Washington, DC, Stephen E. Hart,
Federal Housing Finance Agency, Washington, DC, Mark S.
Landman, Landman Corsini Ballaine & Ford P.C., New York,
New York, and Robert M. Brochin, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius,
LLP, Miami, Florida, for the appellees.

OPINION

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:
This is a putative class action challenging origination and
foreclosure procedures for home loans maintained within the
Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS). The plaintiffs
appeal from the dismissal of their First Amended Complaint
for failure to state a claim. In their complaint, the
plaintiffs allege conspiracies by their lenders and others to use
MERS to commit fraud. They also allege that their lenders
violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601
et seq., and the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§ 44-1522, and committed the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress by targeting the plaintiffs for loans they
could not repay. The plaintiffs were denied leave to file their
proposed Second Amended Complaint, and to add a new
claim for wrongful foreclosure based upon the operation of
the MERS system.

On appeal, the plaintiffs stand by the sufficiency of some
of their claims, but primarily contend that they could cure any
pleading deficiencies with a newly amended complaint, which
would include a claim for wrongful foreclosure. We are
unpersuaded that the plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to
support their claims. Although the plaintiffs allege that
aspects of the MERS system are fraudulent, they cannot
establish that they were misinformed about the MERS system,
relied on any misinformation in entering into their home
loans, or were injured as a result of the misinformation. If
anything, the allegations suggest that the plaintiffs were
informed of the exact aspects of the MERS system that they
now complain about when they agreed to enter into their
home loans. Further, although the plaintiffs contend that they
can state a claim for wrongful foreclosure, Arizona state law
does not currently recognize this cause of action, and their
claim is, in any case, without a basis. The plaintiffs’ claim
depends upon the conclusion that any home loan within the MERS system is unenforceable through a foreclosure sale, but
that conclusion is unsupported by the facts and law on which
they rely. Because the plaintiffs fail to establish a plausible
basis for relief on these and their other claims raised on
appeal, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the complaint
without leave to amend.

     I.
The focus of this lawsuit—and many others around the
country—is the MERS system.

1. How MERS works
MERS is a private electronic database, operated by MERSCORP,
Inc., that tracks the transfer of the “beneficial interest”
in home loans, as well as any changes in loan servicers. After
a borrower takes out a home loan, the original lender may sell
all or a portion of its beneficial interest in the loan and change
loan servicers. The owner of the beneficial interest is entitled
to repayment of the loan. For simplicity, we will refer to the
owner of the beneficial interest as the “lender.” The servicer
of the loan collects payments from the borrower, sends payments
to the lender, and handles administrative aspects of the
loan. Many of the companies that participate in the mortgage
industry—by originating loans, buying or investing in the
beneficial interest in loans, or servicing loans—are members
of MERS and pay a fee to use the tracking system. See Jackson
v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487,
490 (Minn. 2009).

When a borrower takes out a home loan, the borrower executes
two documents in favor of the lender: (1) a promissory
note to repay the loan, and (2) a deed of trust, or mortgage,
that transfers legal title in the property as collateral to secure
the loan in the event of default. State laws require the lender
to record the deed in the county in which the property is located. Any subsequent sale or assignment of the deed must
be recorded in the county records, as well.

This recording process became cumbersome to the mortgage
industry, particularly as the trading of loans increased.
See Robert E. Dordan, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems
(MERS), Its Recent Legal Battles, and the Chance for a
Peaceful Existence, 12 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 177, 178 (2010).
It has become common for original lenders to bundle the beneficial
interest in individual loans and sell them to investors
as mortgage-backed securities, which may themselves be
traded. See id. at 180; Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490. MERS
was designed to avoid the need to record multiple transfers of
the deed by serving as the nominal record holder of the deed
on behalf of the original lender and any subsequent lender.
Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490.

At the origination of the loan, MERS is designated in the
deed of trust as a nominee for the lender and the lender’s
“successors and assigns,” and as the deed’s “beneficiary”
which holds legal title to the security interest conveyed. If the
lender sells or assigns the beneficial interest in the loan to
another MERS member, the change is recorded only in the
MERS database, not in county records, because MERS continues
to hold the deed on the new lender’s behalf. If the beneficial
interest in the loan is sold to a non-MERS member, the
transfer of the deed from MERS to the new lender is recorded
in county records and the loan is no longer tracked in the
MERS system.
In the event of a default on the loan, the lender may initiate
foreclosure in its own name, or may appoint a trustee to initiate
foreclosure on the lender’s behalf. However, to have the
legal power to foreclose, the trustee must have authority to act
as the holder, or agent of the holder, of both the deed and the
note together. See Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d
158, 167 (Kan. 2009). The deed and note must be held
together because the holder of the note is only entitled to repayment, and does not have the right under the deed to use
the property as a means of satisfying repayment. Id. Conversely,
the holder of the deed alone does not have a right to
repayment and, thus, does not have an interest in foreclosing
on the property to satisfy repayment. Id. One of the main
premises of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit here is that the MERS system
impermissibly “splits” the note and deed by facilitating
the transfer of the beneficial interest in the loan among lenders
while maintaining MERS as the nominal holder of the
deed.
The plaintiffs’ lawsuit is also premised on the fact that
MERS does not have a financial interest in the loans, which,
according to the plaintiffs, renders MERS’s status as a beneficiary
a sham. MERS is not involved in originating the loan,
does not have any right to payments on the loan, and does not
service the loan. MERS relies on its members to have someone
on their own staff become a MERS officer with the
authority to sign documents on behalf of MERS. See Dordan,
12 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. at 182; Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 491.
As a result, most of the actions taken in MERS’s own name
are carried out by staff at the companies that sell and buy the
beneficial interest in the loans. Id.

2. The named plaintiffs
The three named plaintiffs in this case, Olga Cervantes,
Carlos Almendarez, and Arturo Maximo, obtained home
loans or refinanced existing loans in 2006. All three signed
promissory notes with their lenders—Cervantes with Countrywide
Home Loans, and Almendarez and Maximo with First
Franklin. Each executed a deed of trust in favor of his or her
lender, naming MERS as the “beneficiary” and as the “nominee”
for the lender and lender’s “successors and assigns.”
All three plaintiffs are Hispanic, and Almendarez and Maximo
do not speak or read English. Almendarez and Maximo
negotiated the mortgage loans with their lenders in Spanish, but were provided with, and signed, copies of their loan documents
written in English.
The plaintiffs subsequently defaulted on their loans. Following
Cervantes’s default, trustee Recontrust Company initiated
non-judicial foreclosure proceedings by recording a
notice of a trustee’s sale in the county records. The parties
have not addressed the status of the noticed sale. Following
defaults by Almendarez and Maximo, their lender, First
Franklin, appointed LaSalle Bank as its trustee to initiate nonjudicial
foreclosure proceedings. MERS recorded documents
with the county assigning its beneficial interest in the deeds
of trust to La Salle Bank. Later, Michael Bosco of Tiffany &
Bosco was substituted in as First Franklin’s trustee. Michael
Bosco sold Almendarez’s house at public auction in February
2009. The sale of Maximo’s property was cancelled in April
2009.

3. Procedural history
Cervantes filed suit in March 2009. Almendarez and Maximo
joined the lawsuit, and the plaintiffs filed their First
Amended Complaint a few days later. The First Amended
Complaint names several defendants, including the plaintiffs’
lenders, the trustees for the lenders, MERS, and MERS members
who are named only as co-conspirators based on their
role in using the MERS system. The defendants filed several
motions to dismiss, prompting the plaintiffs to file a motion
for leave to amend, along with a proposed Second Amended
Complaint. The district court held a hearing on the various
motions, at which the plaintiffs orally proposed to amend their
complaint with a wrongful foreclosure claim. The district
court granted the motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint,
and denied the motion for leave to amend on the
ground that amendment would be futile. The plaintiffs appeal.

    II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097,
1102 (9th Cir. 2008). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Dismissal is proper when the complaint does
not make out a cognizable legal theory or does not allege sufficient
facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Mendiondo,
521 F.3d at 1104. A complaint that alleges only “labels and
conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of the
cause of action” will not survive dismissal. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

The district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Gompper v. VISX, Inc.,
298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002). Although leave to amend
should be given freely, a district court may dismiss without
leave where a plaintiff ’s proposed amendments would fail to
cure the pleading deficiencies and amendment would be
futile. See Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection
Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).1

1The plaintiffs have requested that we take judicial notice of orders of
the United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissing
complaints without prejudice in pending multidistrict litigation concerning
MERS. The plaintiffs imply that it was inconsistent for the same district
court to deny leave to amend here. We deny the requests because the
orders are not relevant.

                               III.
The plaintiffs challenge the dismissal of their complaint
without leave to amend but, on appeal, only address the district
court’s: (1) dismissal of their claim for conspiracy to
commit fraud through the MERS system; (2) failure to
address their oral request for leave to add a wrongful foreclosure
claim; (3) dismissal of trustee Tiffany & Bosco from the suit; (4) denial of leave to amend their pleadings regarding equitable tolling of their TILA and Arizona Consumer Fraud Act claims; and (5) dismissal of their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We address these claims in
turn, and do not consider the dismissed claims that are not
raised on appeal. Entm’t Research Group v. Genesis Creative
Group, 122 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We will not
consider any claims that were not actually argued in [appellant’s]
opening brief.”).

1. Conspiracy to commit fraud through the MERS
system
On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that they sufficiently
alleged a conspiracy among MERS members to commit fraud.
In count seven of the First Amended Complaint, they allege
that MERS members conspired to commit fraud by using
MERS as a sham beneficiary, promoting and facilitating predatory
lending practices through the use of MERS, and making
it impossible for borrowers or regulators to track the changes
in lenders.

[1] Under Arizona law, a claim of civil conspiracy must be
based on an underlying tort, such as fraud in this instance.
Baker ex rel. Hall Brake Supply, Inc. v. Stewart Title & Trust
of Phoenix, Inc., 5 P.3d 249, 256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). To
show fraud, a plaintiff must identify “(1) a representation; (2)
its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker’s knowledge of
its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) the speaker’s intent that
it be acted upon by the recipient in the manner reasonably
contemplated; (6) the hearer’s ignorance of its falsity; (7) the
hearer’s reliance on its truth; (8) the right to rely on it; [and]
(9) his consequent and proximate injury.” Echols v. Beauty
Built Homes, Inc., 647 P.2d 629, 631 (Ariz. 1982).

[2] The plaintiffs’ allegations fail to address several of
these necessary elements for a fraud claim. The plaintiffs have
not identified any representations made to them about the MERS system and its role in their home loans that were false
and material. None of their allegations indicate that the plaintiffs
were misinformed about MERS’s role as a beneficiary,
or the possibility that their loans would be resold and tracked
through the MERS system. Similarly, the plaintiffs have not
alleged that they relied on any misrepresentations about
MERS in deciding to enter into their home loans, or that they
would not have entered into the loans if they had more information
about how MERS worked. Finally, the plaintiffs have
failed to show that the designation of MERS as a beneficiary
caused them any injury by, for example, affecting the terms
of their loans, their ability to repay the loans, or their obligations
as borrowers. Although the plaintiffs allege that they
were “deprived of the right to attempt to modify their toxic
loans, as the true identity of the actual beneficial owner was
intentionally hidden” from them, they do not support this bare
assertion with any explanation as to how the operation of the
MERS system actually stymied their efforts to identify and
contact the relevant party to modify their loans. Thus, the
plaintiffs fail to state a claim for conspiracy to commit fraud
through the MERS system, and dismissal of the claim was
proper.

[3] While the plaintiffs’ allegations alone fail to raise a
plausible fraud claim, we also note that their claim is undercut
by the terms in Cervantes’s standard deed of trust, which
describe MERS’s role in the home loan.2 For example, the
plaintiffs allege they were defrauded because MERS is a
“sham” beneficiary without a financial interest in the loan, yet
the disclosures in the deed indicate that MERS is acting
“solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and
assigns” and holds “only legal title to the interest granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument.” Further, while the
plaintiffs indicate that MERS was used to hide who owned the
loan, the deed states that the loan or a partial interest in it “can
be sold one or more times without prior notice to Borrower,”
but that “[i]f there is a change in Loan Servicer, Borrower will
be given written notice of the change” as required by consumer
protection laws. Finally, the deed indicates that MERS
has “the right to foreclose and sell the property.” By signing
the deeds of trust, the plaintiffs agreed to the terms and were
on notice of the contents. See Kenly v. Miracle Props., 412 F.
Supp. 1072, 1075 (D. Ariz. 1976) (explaining that a deed of
trust is “an essentially private contractual arrangement”). In
light of the explicit terms of the standard deed signed by Cervantes,
it does not appear that the plaintiffs were misinformed
about MERS’s role in their home loans.

2Cervantes’s deed of trust, attached to MERSCORP’s reply in support
of its motion to dismiss, may be considered at the pleadings stage because the complaint references and relies on the deed, and its authenticity is unquestioned. See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

[4] Moreover, amendment would be futile. In their proposed
Second Amended Complaint, the plaintiffs seek to add
further detail concerning how MERS works in general and
how it has facilitated the trade in mortgage-backed securities.
But none of the new allegations cure the First Amended Complaint’s
deficiencies: the plaintiffs have not shown that they
received material misrepresentations about MERS that they
detrimentally relied upon. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s dismissal, without leave to amend, of the claim for
conspiracy to commit fraud through the MERS system.

2. Wrongful foreclosure
The plaintiffs contend that the district court abused its discretion
by dismissing their complaint without leave to add a
wrongful foreclosure claim. The only mention of a wrongful
foreclosure claim was during the hearing on the plaintiffs’
motion for leave to amend and the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
Although the plaintiffs expressed their intention to add
a wrongful foreclosure claim, they failed to include it in their
proposed Second Amended Complaint. Moreover, during the
hearing, the plaintiffs stated only a general theory of the claim: they posited that any foreclosure on a home loan tracked in the MERS system is “wrongful” because MERS is not a true beneficiary. As the plaintiffs describe it on appeal, their claim is that “the MERS system was used to facilitate wrongful foreclosure based on the naming of MERS as the
beneficiary on the deed of trust, which results in the note and
deed of trust being split and unenforceable.”

[5] The plaintiffs’ oral request to add a wrongful foreclosure
claim was procedurally improper and substantively
unsupported. The district court’s local rules require the plaintiffs
to submit a copy of the proposed amended pleadings
along with a motion for leave to amend. See D. Ariz. Civ. L.
R. 15.1. The plaintiffs failed to do so. Further, they failed to
provide the district court with an explanation of the legal and
factual grounds for adding the claim. It is particularly notable
here that Arizona state courts have not yet recognized a
wrongful foreclosure cause of action. Although a federal court
exercising diversity jurisdiction is “at liberty to predict the
future course of [a state’s] law,” plaintiffs choosing “the federal
forum . . . [are] not entitled to trailblazing initiatives
under [state law].” Ed Peters Jewelry Co. v. C & J Jewelry
Co., Inc., 124 F.3d 252, 262- 63 (1st Cir. 1997) (affirming
dismissal of a wrongful foreclosure claim when no such
action existed under state law). Under the circumstances, we
conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district
court to deny leave to amend without addressing the plaintiffs’
proposed claim for wrongful foreclosure. See Gardner
v. Martino (In re Gardner), 563 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2009)
(concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by denying leave to amend where the party seeking leave
failed to attach a proposed amended complaint in violation of
local rules and failed to articulate a factual and legal basis for
amendment).

[6] In any event, leave to amend would be futile because
the plaintiffs cannot state a plausible basis for relief. Looking
to states that have recognized substantive wrongful foreclosure claims, we note that such claims typically are available
after foreclosure and are premised on allegations that the borrower
was not in default, or on procedural issues that resulted
in damages to the borrower. See, e.g., Ed Peters Jewelry Co.,
124 F.3d at 263 n.8 (noting that the Massachusetts Supreme
Court recognized a claim for wrongful foreclosure where no
default had occurred in Mechanics Nat’l Bank of Worcester v.
Killeen, 384 N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (Mass. 1979)); Fields v. Millsap
& Singer, P.C., 295 S.W.3d 567, 571 (Mo. Ct. App.
2009) (stating that “a plaintiff seeking damages in a wrongful
foreclosure action must plead and prove that when the foreclosure
proceeding was begun, there was no default on its part
that would give rise to a right to foreclose” (internal alteration
and citation omitted)); Gregorakos v. Wells Fargo Nat’l
Ass’n, 647 S.E.2d 289, 292 (Ga. App. 2007) (“In Georgia, a
plaintiff asserting a claim of wrongful foreclosure must establish
a legal duty owed to it by the foreclosing party, a breach
of that duty, a causal connection between the breach of that
duty and the injury it sustained, and damages.” (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted)); Collins v. Union Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 662 P.2d 610, 623 (Nev. 1983) (“[T]he
material issue of fact in a wrongful foreclosure claim is
whether the trustor was in default when the power of sale was
exercised.”). Similarly, the case that the plaintiffs cite for the
availability of a wrongful foreclosure claim under Arizona
law, Herring v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 06-2622,
2007 WL 2051394, at *6 (D. Ariz. July 13, 2007), recognized
such a claim where the borrower was not in default at the time
of foreclosure. The plaintiffs have not alleged that Cervantes’s
or Maximo’s homes were sold and, in any event, all are
in default and have not identified damages. Thus, under the
established theories of wrongful foreclosure, the plaintiffs
have failed to state a claim.

Instead, the plaintiffs advance a novel theory of wrongful
foreclosure. They contend that all transfers of the interests in
the home loans within the MERS system are invalid because
the designation of MERS as a beneficiary is a sham and the system splits the deed from the note, and, thus, no party is in
a position to foreclose.

[7] Even if we were to accept the plaintiffs’ premises that
MERS is a sham beneficiary and the note is split from the
deed, we would reject the plaintiffs’ conclusion that, as a necessary
consequence, no party has the power to foreclose. The
legality of MERS’s role as a beneficiary may be at issue
where MERS initiates foreclosure in its own name, or where
the plaintiffs allege a violation of state recording and foreclosure
statutes based on the designation. See, e.g., Mortgage
Elec. Registration Sys. v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289, 294-97 (Me.
2010) (concluding that MERS cannot foreclose because it
does not have an independent interest in the loan because it
functions solely as a nominee); Landmark Nat’l Bank, 216
P.3d at 165-69 (same); Hooker v. Northwest Tr. Servs., No.
10-3111, 2011 WL 2119103, at *4 (D. Or. May 25, 2011)
(concluding that the defendants’ failure to register all assignments
of the deed of trust violated the Oregon recording laws
so as to prevent non-judicial foreclosure). But see Jackson,
770 N.W.2d at 501 (concluding that defendants’ failure to
register assignments of the beneficial interest in the mortgage
loan did not violate Minnesota recording laws so as to prevent
non-judicial foreclosure). This case does not present either of
these circumstances and, thus, we do not consider them.

[8] Here, MERS did not initiate foreclosure: the trustees
initiated foreclosure in the name of the lenders. Even if
MERS were a sham beneficiary, the lenders would still be
entitled to repayment of the loans and would be the proper
parties to initiate foreclosure after the plaintiffs defaulted on
their loans. The plaintiffs’ allegations do not call into question
whether the trustees were agents of the lenders. Rather, the
foreclosures against Almendarez and Maximo were initiated
by the trustee Tiffany & Bosco on behalf of First Franklin,
who is the original lender and holder of Almendarez’s and
Maximo’s promissory notes. Although it is unclear from the
pleadings who the current lender is on plaintiff Cervantes’s loan, the allegations do not raise any inference that the trustee
Recontrust Company lacks the authority to act on behalf of
the lender.

Further, the notes and deeds are not irreparably split: the
split only renders the mortgage unenforceable if MERS or the
trustee, as nominal holders of the deeds, are not agents of the
lenders. See Landmark Nat’l Bank, 216 P.3d at 167. Moreover,
the plaintiffs have not alleged violations of Arizona
recording and foreclosure statutes related to the purported
splitting of the notes and deeds.

[9] Accordingly, the plaintiffs have not raised a plausible
claim for wrongful foreclosure, and we conclude that dismissal
of the complaint without leave to add such a claim was
not an abuse of discretion.

3. Injunctive relief against Tiffany & Bosco
[10] The plaintiffs contend that the district court improperly
dismissed the trustee Tiffany & Bosco from this suit
under Arizona Revised Statute 33-807(E). Section 33-807(E)
provides that a “trustee is entitled to be immediately dismissed”
from any action other than one “pertaining to a
breach of the trustee’s obligations,” because the trustee is otherwise
bound by an order entered against a beneficiary for
actions that the trustee took on its behalf. The only breach that
the plaintiffs allege against Tiffany & Bosco is that it failed
to recognize that its appointment was invalid. According to
the plaintiffs, the appointment was invalid because MERS is
a sham beneficiary and lacks power to “appoint” a trustee.
However, a trustee such as Tiffany & Bosco has the “absolute
right” under Arizona law “to rely upon any written direction
or information furnished to him by the beneficiary.” Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 33-820(A). Thus, Tiffany & Bosco did not have
an obligation to consider whether its presumptively legal
appointment as trustee, which was recorded in the county
records, was invalid based on the original designation of MERS as a beneficiary. Accordingly, Tiffany & Bosco was
properly dismissed.

4. Equitable Tolling and Estoppel
The plaintiffs contend that the district court failed to
address the equitable tolling of their claims under TILA and
the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act and, in any event, abused its
discretion by denying the plaintiffs leave to amend their allegations
in support of equitable tolling and estoppel. A district
court may dismiss a claim “[i]f the running of the statute is
apparent on the face of the complaint.” Jablon v. Dean Witter
& Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). However, a district
court may do so “only if the assertions of the complaint, read
with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to
prove that the statute was tolled.” Id.

[11] The plaintiffs’ claims under TILA and the Arizona
Consumer Fraud Act are subject to one-year statutes of limitations.
15 U.S.C. § 1640(e); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-541(5). Both
limitations periods began to run when the plaintiffs executed
their loan documents, because they could have discovered the
alleged disclosure violations and discrepancies at that time.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (the one-year limitations period for
a TILA claim begins when the violation occurred); Alaface v.
Nat’l Inv. Co., 892 P.2d 1375, 1379 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (a
cause of action for consumer fraud under Arizona law accrues
“ ‘when the defrauded party discovers or with reasonable diligence
could have discovered the fraud’ ”). The running of the
limitations periods on both claims is apparent on the face of
the complaint because the plaintiffs obtained their loans in
2006, but commenced their action in 2009.

[12] The plaintiffs have not demonstrated a basis for equitable
tolling of their claims. “We will apply equitable tolling
in situations where, despite all due diligence, the party invoking
equitable tolling is unable to obtain vital information bearing
on the existence of the claim.” Socop-Gonzalez v. I.N.S., 272 F.3d 1176, 1193 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted). The plaintiffs suggest that their
TILA claim should have been tolled because Almendarez and
Maximo speak only Spanish, but received loan documents
written in English. However, the plaintiffs have not alleged
circumstances beyond their control that prevented them from
seeking a translation of the loan documents that they signed
and received. Thus, the plaintiffs have not stated a basis for
equitable tolling. See Hubbard v. Fidelity Fed. Bank, 91 F.3d
75, 79 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (declining to toll TILA’s
statute of limitations when “nothing prevented [the mortgagor]
from comparing the loan contract, [the lender’s] initial
disclosures, and TILA’s statutory and regulatory requirements”).

[13] In addition, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated a
basis for equitable estoppel. Equitable estoppel “halts the statute
of limitations when there is active conduct by a defendant,
above and beyond the wrongdoing upon which the plaintiff ’s
claim is filed, to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time.” See
Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The First Amended Complaint
alleges only that the defendants “fraudulently misrepresented
and concealed the true facts related to the items subject to disclosure.”
The plaintiffs, however, have failed to specify what
true facts are at issue, or to establish that the alleged misrepresentation
and concealment of facts is “above and beyond the
wrongdoing” that forms the basis for their TILA and Arizona
Consumer Fraud Act claims. Guerrero, 442 F.3d at 706.

[14] The district court therefore properly dismissed the
plaintiffs’ claims under both TILA and the Arizona Consumer
Fraud Act as barred by a one-year statute of limitations. The
plaintiffs did not add any new facts to the proposed Second
Amended Complaint, and do not suggest any on appeal, that
would support applying either equitable tolling or equitable
estoppel to their claims. Thus, the district court also did not
abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend.

5. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The plaintiffs contend that they sufficiently stated a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. When ruling on
a motion to dismiss such a claim under Arizona law, a district
court may determine whether the alleged conduct rises to the
level of “extreme and outrageous.” See Cluff v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 460 P.2d 666, 668 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969), overruled on
other grounds by Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.,
783 P.2d 781 (Ariz. 1989).

[15] Here, the plaintiffs fail to meet that threshold. They
allege that the lenders’ “actions in targeting Plaintiffs for a
loan, misrepresenting the terms and conditions of the loan,
negotiating the loan, and closing the loan” were “extreme and
outrageous because of the Plaintiffs’ vulnerability” and “because
the subject of the loan was each Plaintiff ’s primary residence.”
This conduct, though arguably offensive if true, is
not so outrageous as to go “beyond all possible bounds of
decency.” Lucchesi v. Frederic N. Stimmell, M.D., Ltd., 716
P.2d 1013, 1015 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc). The plaintiffs essentially
allege that the lenders offered them loans that the lenders
knew they could not repay; this is not inherently “extreme
and outrageous.” Moreover, the plaintiffs do not allege any
additional support for their claim in their proposed Second
Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the district court properly
dismissed, without leave to amend, the plaintiffs’ claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.

IV.
The district court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint without leave to amend. The plaintiffs’
claims that focus on the operation of the MERS system ultimately
fail because the plaintiffs have not shown that the
alleged illegalities associated with the MERS system injured
them or violated state law. As part of their fraud claim, the
plaintiffs have not shown that they detrimentally relied upon any misrepresentations about MERS’s role in their loans. Further,
even if we were to accept the plaintiffs’ contention that
MERS is a sham beneficiary and the note is split from the
deed in the MERS system, it does not follow that any attempt
to foreclose after the plaintiffs defaulted on their loans is necessarily
“wrongful.” The plaintiffs’ claims against their original
lenders fail because they have not stated a basis for
equitable tolling or estoppel of the statutes of limitations on
their TILA and Arizona Consumer Fraud Act claims, and
have not identified extreme and outrageous conduct in support
of their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Thus, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.

If you have been a victim of wrongful foreclosure and need help in saving your home from fraudulent foreclosure, you need to know the Foreclosure Fundamentals that will ensure that you stick it to these illegal entities rather than having your case thrown out by the courts that favors the deep pockets. To get the real arsenals that will blow the lids off of these crime pots – visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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