What Homeowners With Business Should know About Federal Judgments and Chapter 11 Plans

16 Tuesday Jul 2019

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Bankruptcy, Borrower, Case Laws, Credit, Federal Court, Judgment, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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10 years, chapter 11, chapter 11 bankruptcy, Chapter 11 Plans, Consent decrees, dormant judgment, enforceability of judgment lien, enforceability of judgments, entry of judgment, execution method, execution on a judgment, extinguishment, federal courts, Federal Judgments, federal statute, homeowners, installment judgments, issuance of the remittitur, Judgment, judgment creditors, judgment expired, notice of entry of judgment, periodic payments, registered judgment, renewal of judgment, renewing a judgment, state law, Statute of Limitations, statute of limitations for judgment renewals, statute of repose, time-barred judgment, write of execution

What greeting card do you expect from the judgments warehoused in your file cabinets? Yes, those judgments can mail you a greeting card. Your first choice is the birthday card: “Happy 10th Year Anniversary. What a ride. Thanks for the renewal. See you in ten years.” Your other choice is the condolence card: “10 years? You waited too long. My dearest sympathy.”

Victory lasts forever, but not a federal judgment. “There is ‘no specific federal statute of limitations on how long [a federal] judgment is effective. (citation omitted) When no federal statute applied, state practices and procedures are utilized.”¹ State law provides a judgment creditor with the rights and remedies to enforce a federal money judgment under F.R.C.P. 69(a)(1), including the renewal of a money judgment.² The law of the state measures the life of a federal judgment. A pending appeal does not toll the enforceability period under C.C.P. § 683.020.³

The Law of the Domicile Measures the Life of a Federal Judgment

In In Re Levander,⁴ the Ninth Circuit held that the federal courts apply the law of the domicile in the enforcement of a judgment.⁵ Similarly, in McCarthy v. Johnson,⁶ the court held that Utah state law provided the mechanism for the renewal of a federal judgment. In Fidelity Nat. Fin. Inc. v. Friedman, the Ninth Circuit held that state law applies when measuring the life of judgments. Federal and bankruptcy courts apply state law when renewing a judgment because federal judgments lack a federal expiration date.⁷ While Fidelity dealt with a registered judgment, the principle that a registered judgment is deemed a judgment for all purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 1963 is nevertheless applicable.

The Ninth Circuit held that the federal courts are to apply state law in determining the statute of limitations.⁸ Likewise, the Fifth Circuit applied Texas state law in Andrews v. Roadway Express, Inc. (5th Cir. 2006) 473 F.3d 565, holding that a consent decree, arising from a class action suit, was time barred as a result of the plaintiffs’ failure to timely renew the judgment and raising the issue whether other judgment providing for payment to class bear a fixed life.⁹ Unless a federal statute provides otherwise, the practice relative to the revival of dormant judgment is governed by state law.¹⁰

Deader Than a Doornail: the Statue of Repose

Some states have held that a time-barred judgment is extinguished and ceases to exist (“statute of repose”), as opposed to having a procedural rule that bars recovery in the enforcement of judgments.¹¹ In United States v. Tacoma Gravel & Supply Inc.,¹² the Ninth Circuit, construing Washington state law, held that Washington state’s limit on the enforceability of judgments is a statute of extinguishment (i.e., a statute of repose),¹³ not a statute of limitations. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit unequivocally held that “this is not a statute of limitations but of extinguishment; after six years, a Washington judgment has no force or effect—it ceases to exist. [Collection of Washington state cases]”¹⁴ The Tacoma court applied Washington state law to bar enforcement brought by the United States, stating that the “Appellant had no judgment left to renew,” a conclusion predicated in part on the government’s filing in state court.¹⁵ The court did not leave the government empty-handed. It left open the prospect that the underlying claim was still viable under United States v. Summerlin.¹⁶ Tacoma is important because it demonstrates that a renewal statute is also a statute of repose that may extinguish the judgment completely.

Read the Manual

California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 683.110 through 683.220 provide for the renewal of a judgment consisting generally of the filing and service of an application for renewal [Sections 683.140 to 683.150]. Upon filing the application, the clerk shall enter the renewal in the court records.¹⁷ Section 683.150(a) authorizes renewal without the necessity of service of process of the renewal “package.” (Judicial Council Form Nos. EJ-190, EJ-195, and MC-012, and include a detailed declaration of interest).

To initiate enforcement, the judgment creditor must serve the renewal by mail. See C.C.P § 683.160(b). To maintain the judgment lien on the real property, the judgment creditor must record a certified copy of the application for renewal. SeeC.C.P § 683.180.¹⁸ Ten years is a long time and expect that the debtor might have conveyed the property, fraudulently or otherwise. The judgment creditor must personally serve the transferee and file proof of service within 90 days of the renewal filing. See §§ 683.180(b)(1) & (2) in prosecuting the renewal. This is a common error and title reports (modern parlance and much cheaper: litigation guaranty) are de riguer in identifying the transferee. In the online world, nearly every county recorder (except Los Angeles) will identify the grantee of the debtor under the “granter/grantee” index. Use Judicial Council Form EJ-190 for the Northern District of California, not the Central District, which requires a traditional filing.¹⁹
Chapter 11 Plans Are Money Judgments and Expire Like Any Other Federal Judgment

The fact that a class action [“Andrews”] judgment expired suggests that a confirmed Chapter 11 plan, providing for payment to the creditors, would likewise expire unless renewed pursuant to the domicile law. Chapter 11 plans are a blend of contract, judgment, and consent decree, offering payment to a group of creditors.²⁰ Chapter 11 plans assure payment equivalent to their recovery in a Chapter 7 liquidation²¹ and are subject to enforcement if breached.²² If a consent decree arising from a class action expires like any other federal judgment, the confirmed Chapter 11 plan, bearing the near-identical attributes (judgment, class of claimants, continuing supervision, claim filings procedures, and pro rata payment based on the consent decree), would likewise expire absent a renewal under state law.²³ The statute of repose would extinguish the plan obligations and reinvigorate a mediocre balance sheet. The plan discharge would recapitalize the debtor. Who would be beneficiary of the plan “kicking the bucket?” Answer: the shareholders who are the [pre-petition] creditors.

Is dumping the Chapter 11 plan a good deal and for whom? Answer: Yes, if stock of the debtor, freed of the plan and publicly traded, offers greater value to the creditors than payments under the plan. Expiring Chapter 11 plans recast the asbestos mega-cases24 whose plans bear a lifespan of 10 years plus and compensate claimants with debtor’s stock [through a claimant’s trust]. The statute of repose frees the debtor of plan obligations [billions], jumpstarts the stock, and puts real money in the hands of the claimants.

Federal Courts Are Eternal But Federal Judgments Are Not

The life of a federal judgment could easily exceed 10 years, given various appeals up to the Supreme Court. Consent decrees offering payment over time to claimants can run 10 years or more. Asbestos Chapter 11 plans readily exceed ten years and the Johns Manville plan is now in excess of 20 years. These plans [judgments or decrees] bear the risk of extinguishment if not renewed and, if expired, would upset settled social and political expectations.

Is a plan implosion a disaster? In a Chapter 11, the beneficiaries are the creditors as shareholders, anticipating an upswing in the stock value, would move to extinguish the plan and inherit a revived company. This result suggests that the plan extinguishment more efficiently compensates victims of the mass tort than the plan payments because the invisible hand of the marketplace reveals this outcome. The plan extinguishment will wipe out the plan and the market will rush to the stock.

^1. In re Fifarek (Stark v. Fifarek), 370 B.R. 754, 758 (Bankr. Court, W.D. Mich. 2007); In re Hunt (Lillie v. Hunt), 323 B.R. 665, 666 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2005) (“Since there is no specific statute of federal statute of limitations on how long this judgment is effective, the parties agree that we must look to Tennessee law [citation omitted])”.

^2. Fed R. Civ Pr. 69(a)(1)&(2)

^3. Fidelity Creditor Service, Inc. v. Browne (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 195, 201 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 854]: The period prescribed in Section 683.020 commences on the date of entry and is not tolled for any reason

⁴ In re Levander, 180 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 1999)

^5. Id. at 1121-1122, “We have held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) empowers federal courts to rely on state law to add judgment-debtors under Rule 69(a), which permits judgment creditors to use any execution method consistent with the practice and procedure of the state in which the district court sits.” citing to Cigna Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Polaris Pictures Corp., 159 F.3d 412, 421 (9th Cir.1998) (quoting Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 359 n. 7, 116 S.Ct. 862 [1996])(internal quotation marks omitted); see also, Andrews at 568; Crump v. Bank of America, 235 F.R.D. 113, 115 (D.D.C. 2006); RMA Ventures v. Sun Am. Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Once a federal district court issues a write of execution, a judgment creditor must follow the procedure on execution established by the laws of the state in which the district court sits. [Citations omitted] ***). Thus, as required by FRCP 69(a)(10), Defendants have turned here to the method of execution prescribed under Utah law.”

^6. McCarthy v. Johnson, 172 F.3d 63 (10th Cir. 1999). Unpublished Opinion

^7. Fed.R.Civ.Pro 69(a) et seq. incorporates the law of the state in enforcing money judgments, including the requirement of a renewal. McDaniel v. Signal Capital Corp., 198 B.R. 483, 486-487 (Bankr. S.D. Texas 1996); see also, In re Brink, 227 B.R. 94, 95-96 (Bankr. N.D. Texas, 1998); In re Davis, 323 B.R. 745, 748-749 (Bankr. D. Ariz, 2005); In re Hunt; (Lillie v. Hunt), 323 B.R. 665, 666-667 (Bankr. W.D. Texas 2005); In re Fifarek (Stark v. Fifark), 370 B.R. 754, 758 (Bankr. W. D. Mich. 2007). Also In re Romano (Romano v. LaVecchia), Westlaw cite unavailable [WESTLAW?] (9th Circuit BAP, 2009) (“Thus, state law governs the procedure for execution on a judgment in the absence of an applicable federal statute. There is no relevant federal statute we have been able to locate with regard to the renewal of judgment. The parties agree that Nevada law governs the enforcement of the judgment.” [6 years], aff’d 2010 Ap. Lex 5444 (9th Circuit, 2010).

^8. See Marx v. Go Publ. Co., Inc., 721 F.2d 1272, 1273 (1983); see also; Duchek v. Jacobi, 646 F.2d 415, 417 (1981).

^9. Andrews at 567-568 (collection of cases). Note the discussion whether the issue is the time limits for the issuance of a writ of execution is subject to state law and whether the judgment is extinguished.

^10. See Donellan Jerome Inc. v. Trylon Metals Inc., 996 F. Supp. 996 (USDC, N.D.Ohio 1967 (Collection of cases).

^11. Mississippi provides for statute of repose, not statute of limitations for judgment renewals. [Mississippi Code § Ann 15-1-43].

^12. United States v. Tacoma Gravel & Supply Co., 376 F.2d 343, 344-345 (9th Cir. 1967) (“Consequently, the judgment becomes inoperative for any purpose after expiration of six years.) Please note that, while Washington has extended the life of a judgment to ten years, the holding in Tacoma that the Washington statute is one of repose, extinguishing the judgment, still applies. Cf. RCW 4.16.020 and 4.56.210

^13. A statute of repose cuts off a right of action after a specified period time, irrespective of accrual or even notice that a legal right has been invaded. Giest v. Sequoia Ventures, 83 Cal.App.4th 300, 305 (Cal.App.1 Dist., 2000).

^14. Tacoma at 344.

^15. Id. at p. 345.

^16. In re Penberthy, 211 B.R. 391, 395 (Bankr.W.D. Wash. 1997).

^17. Goldman v. Simpson, 160 Cal.App.4th 255, 262: “The statutory renewal of judgment is an automatic, ministerial act accomplished by the clerk of the court; entry of the renewal of judgment does not constitute a new or separate judgment. ‘Filing the renewal application (and paying the appropriate filing fee, Gov.C. § 70626(b)) results in automatic renewal of the judgment. No court order or new judgment is required. The court clerk simply enters the renewal of judgment in the court records.’”

^18. Songer v. Cooney (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 387, 393, 264 Cal.Rptr. 1 [abstract of judgment ensures enforceability of judgment lien even though the debtor is bankrupt].

^19. If in state court, the alternative method (if timely) is to file a suit to renew the judgment. See Pratali vs. Gates (1992) 4 Cal App. 4th 632, 637-638 and Green vs. Zissis (1992) 5 Cal. App. 4th 1219, 1222; for more a detailed discussion, see Fredric Goldman vs. Orenthal James Simpson (O.J. Simpson) (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 255 [continuing jurisdiction over judgment debtor who absconds from California]. If the defendant departed the state, C.C.P. § 351 tolls the statute of limitations. Green vs. Zissis, supra., at 1222-1123. See also Kertesz vs. Ostrosky (2004) 115 Cal. App. 4th 369, 373. A California state court judgment becomes final upon expiration of the appeal time, or issuance of the remittitur. Green vs. Zissis, supra. p. 1223. If notice of judgment is service, the judgment becomes final in 60 days, and absent notice, 180 days. The notice of entry of judgment kicks off the 60-day clock under C.R.C. 8.104(a)(1) & (2) [60 days after notice from clerk or party], but under C.R.C. 8.104(a)(3), the judgment does not become final until 180 days after entry of judgment. A federal judgment, on the other hand, differs from state law, and is final upon entry. Eichman v Fotomat Corp. (9th Cir 1985) 759 F.2d 1434, 1439.

^20. In re Bruce Bartleson, 253 B.R. 75 (9th Cir. BAP 2000) at 78-79

^21. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) [Unsecured creditors should emerge from the Chapter 11 with equal or better than what would a Chapter 7 would pay]

22. See In re OORC Leasing, LLC (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2007) 359 B.R. 227 at 233.

^23. A statute of repose extinguishes the judgment. A statute of limitations on a judgment renders the judgment unenforceable. Consent decrees, Chapter 11 plans, and installment judgments provide for periodic payments, sometimes spanning more than ten years. Chapter 11 asbestos plans span decades. This article suggests that a statute of repose would extinguish the decree, plan, or judgment. The statute of limitations might render the decree, plan, or judgment unenforceable but the obligation might remain viable as a contract and enforceable by way of independent suit. Installment judgments have a separate clock under C.C.P. § 683.130(b)(1) based upon the accrual of the past-due payments. The math is left to another article.

^24. Nearly all publicly traded.

[The views expressed in this document are solely the views of the Author. This document is intended for informational purposes only and is not legal advice or a substitute for consultation with a licensed legal professional in a particular case or circumstance]

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/ “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will show you step-by-step litigation solutions helping you challenge these fraudsters and ultimately saving your home from foreclosure either through loan modification or “Pro Se” litigation visit: https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/

If you have received a Notice of Default “NOD”, take a deep breath, as this the time to start the FIGHT! and Protect your EQUITY!

If you do Nothing, you will see the WRONG parties WITHOUT standing STEAL your home right under your nose, and by the time you realize it, it might be too late! If your property has been foreclosed, use the available options on our package to reverse already foreclosed home and reclaim your most prized possession! You can do it by yourself! START Today — STOP Foreclosure Tomorrow!

If you are a homeowner already in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy and needs to proceed with Adversary Proceeding to challenge the validity of Security Interest or Lien on your home, Our Adversary Proceeding package may be just what you need.

What Are the Options for Homeowners During Foreclosure

07 Sunday Apr 2019

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Banks and Lenders, Foreclosure, Foreclosure Crisis, Judicial States, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Note - Deed of Trust - Mortgage, Your Legal Rights

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avoid foreclosure, Consequences of a Foreclosure, Deed in lieu of foreclosure, homeowners, housing counselor, Judicial, judicial foreclosures, mortgage, mortgage company, Non-judicial, nonjudicial foreclosures, Options, Process for a Foreclosure

When faced with foreclosure, it’s important to know your options and understand all the potential solutions that may be available to help you avoid foreclosure. It’s also important to understand what can happen if you fail to take action and foreclosure becomes unavoidable. The process can be stressful, embarrassing, and it can have long-lasting consequences.

Walking away from your home voluntarily, may seem like the best solution when your home is valued lower than what you owe. However, this action may lead to financial consequences in the future. In some states, you may be required to pay a portion of your mortgage debt even after the home has entered foreclosure. Also, the impact to your credit may make it difficult to rent or purchase a home in the future. It may be best to explore other options to foreclosure with your mortgage company before making a decision to leave your home.

Keep in mind, your mortgage company doesn’t want to foreclose on your home. Just like there are consequences for you, the foreclosure process is time-consuming and expensive for them. They want to work with you to resolve the situation. However, some homeowners simply don’t take advantage of the help available and foreclosure becomes the only option.

owing the mortgage company the deficiency balance of your mortgage (the deficiency balance is the remaining total mortgage balance after the sale price of the home)
lengthening the time you could receive a Fannie Mae mortgage to purchase your next home to at least 7 years

A foreclosure is the legal process where your mortgage company obtains ownership of your home (i.e., repossess the property). A foreclosure occurs when the homeowner has failed to make payments and has defaulted or violated the terms of their mortgage loan.

A foreclosure can usually be avoided—even if you already received a foreclosure notice. See the chart (in “Foreclosure Comparison”) to compare some other options: Short Sale and Mortgage Release (Deed-in-Lieu of Foreclosure). No matter the option, you must take action as soon as you can.

Eviction from your home—you’ll lose your home and any equity that you may have established
Stress and uncertainty of not knowing exactly when you will have to leave your home
Damage to your credit—impacting your ability to get new housing, credit, and maybe even potential employment, for many years
May owe a deficiency balance after the foreclosure sale
Lose any relocation assistance or leasing opportunities that may be available with other options
Forfeit ability to get a Fannie Mae mortgage to purchase another home for at least 7 years (Fannie Mae guidelines)

There are two main types of foreclosure:

Judicial – supervised by a court with formal legal proceedings (civil law suit)
Non-judicial – non-court supervised

In both types of foreclosure, the homeowner receives the legal notice of foreclosure, the legal notice is published in the local paper (in most cases), and the home is sold at public auction. (For judicial foreclosures, you’ll be served with legal notice of the pending action, and the court will approve or set the foreclosure date and sale.)

The process and timing of a foreclosure can vary by state laws, and many other factors. However, your mortgage company can begin preparing the default notice/foreclosure proceedings on your home as early as 60 days after you have missed your first payment. That’s why you should take action early to begin working with your mortgage company to resolve your payment problems immediately.

How Do You Avoid Foreclosure?
The most important thing—take action now. You have nothing to lose (and everything to gain) by working with your mortgage company to avoid foreclosure.

If foreclosure is imminent, other options may no longer be available. However, you may still be able to leave your home without having to go through foreclosure. This means you won’t have a foreclosure on your credit history and you may qualify for relocation assistance to ease your transition to new housing.

Gather your financial information—Make sure you have your basic financial and loan information on hand when you call your mortgage company. You’ll need:

your mortgage statements, including information on a second mortgage (if applicable)
your other monthly debt payments (e.g., car or student loans, credit card payments), and
your income details (pay stubs and income tax returns).

2. Explain your current situation—Be ready to outline your current hardship and explain why you are having trouble making your mortgage payment, why this is a long-term problem and confirm that you are ready to leave your home to avoid foreclosure. Your mortgage company will need to understand the reasons why you are having difficulty in order to find the right solution for you.

Contact Your Mortgage Company — Tell them you are interested in a Mortgage Release and you want to see if you qualify.

Your mortgage company wants to help you avoid foreclosure and, in most cases, will be willing to work with you. The biggest mistake you can make is to wait any longer to take action. Contact your mortgage company today to determine if you can avoid foreclosure. If you need further assistance (before or after contacting your mortgage company), contact a housing counselor.

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

If you have received a Notice of Default “NOD”, take a deep breath, as this the time to start the FIGHT! and Protect your EQUITY!

What Homeowners Must Know About the Residential Mortgage Lending Market

11 Wednesday Apr 2018

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Banks and Lenders, Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Mortgage fraud, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, RESPA, State Court, Your Legal Rights

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Areas of Liability, CFPB’s Response, Consumer Actions, Content, Contractual Liability, Forms, Governmental Liability, Lenders and Vendors, MBA Letter, Regulatory (CFPB), Residential Mortgage Lending Market, RESPA, Scope, Secondary Mortgage Market, The Dodd Frank Act and CFPB, The TRID Rule, Timing, Tolerance and Redisclosure

Introduction and Background

Residential mortgage lenders have long been required to disclose to their borrowers (i) the cost of credit to the consumer and (ii) the cost to the consumer of closing the loan transaction. These regulatory disclosure requirements arise from two statutes – the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA) and the Truth In Lending Act (TILA). The regulations were designed to protect consumers by disclosing to them the costs of a mortgage loan (TILA) and the cost of closing a loan transaction (RESPA). These disclosures have in the past been enforced by multiple federal agencies (the Federal Reserve Board, Housing and Urban Development, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the National Credit Union Administration) and provided to consumers on multiple forms with sometimes overlapping information (the Truth in Lending disclosures, the Good Faith Estimate, and the HUD-1 Settlement Statement).

The Dodd Frank Act and CFPB

In 2010, the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd Frank Act) created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), consolidated the consumer protection functions of the above-federal agencies in the CFPB, transferred rulemaking authority under the statutes to the CFPB, and amended section 4(a) of RESPA and section 105(b) of TILA requiring CFPB to issue an integrated disclosure rule, including the disclosure requirements under TILA and sections 4 and 5 of RESPA. The purpose of the integration was to streamline the process and ensure that the disclosures are easy to read and comprehend so that consumers can “understand the costs, benefits, and risks” associated with mortgage loan transactions, in light of the “facts and circumstances.” 12 U.S.C. 5532(a).

The TRID Rule

The CFPB issued a propose rule in July, 2012. The final TILA-RESPA integrated disclosure (TRID) rule was published in late 2013, amended in February, 2015, and went into effect on October 3, 2015. More than simply streamlining the existing process, the TRID rule replaced the entire disclosure structure, changing the form, timing, and content of the disclosures.

Scope – The TRID rule applies to most closed-end consumer mortgages, but not to home equity loans, reverse mortgages, or mortgages secured by anything other than real property (dwellings, mobile homes, etc). It does not apply to lenders who make five or less mortgage loans a year. It does, however, apply to most construction loans that are closed-end consumer credit transactions secured by real property, but not to those that are open-end or commercial loans.

Forms – The TRID rule replaced the forms that had been used for closing mortgage loans with two new, mandatory forms. The Loan Estimate or H-24 form (attached as Exhibit 1) replaces the former Good Faith Estimate and the early TILA disclosure form. The Closing Disclosure or H-25 form (attached as Exhibit 2) replaces the HUD-1 Settlement Statement and the final TILA disclosure form.

Content – Among other information, the three page Loan Estimate must contain (i) the loan terms, (ii) the projected payments, (iii) the itemized loan costs, (iv) any adjustable payments or interest rates, (v) the closing costs, and (vi) the amount of cash to close. If actual amounts are not available, lenders must estimate. Among other information, the Closing Disclosure must contain (i) loan terms, (ii) projected payments, (iii) loan costs, (iv) closing costs, (v) cash to close, and (vi) adjustable payments and adjustable rates as applicable. The required forms are rigid and require the disclosure of this information in a detailed and precise format.

Timing – The TRID rule requires a creditor (or mortgage broker) to deliver (in person, mail or email) a Loan Estimate (together with a copy of the CFPB’s Home Loan Toolkit booklet) within three business days of receipt of a consumer’s loan application and no later than seven business days before consummation of the transaction. A loan application consists of six pieces of information from the consumer: (i) name, (ii) income, (iii) social security number, (iv) property address, (v) estimated value of property, and (vi) amount of mortgage loan sought. 12 C.F.R. §1026.2 (a) (3)(ii). After receiving an application, a creditor may not ask for any additional information or impose any fees (other than a reasonable fee needed to obtain the consumer’s credit score) until it has delivered the Loan Estimate.

The TRID rule also requires a creditor (or settlement agent) to deliver (in person, mail or email) a Closing Disclosure to the consumer no later than three business days before the consummation of the loan transaction. The Closing Disclosure must contain the actual terms of the loan and actual cost of the transaction. Creditors are required to act in good faith and use due diligence in obtaining this information. Although creditors may rely on third-parties such as settlement agents for the information disclosed on the Loan Estimate and Closing Disclosure, the TRID rule makes creditors ultimately responsible for the accuracy of that information.

Tolerance and Redisclosure – If a charge ultimately imposed on the consumer is equal to or less than the amount disclosed on the Loan Estimate, it is generally deemed to be in good faith. If a charge ultimately imposed on the consumer is greater than the amount disclosed on the Loan Estimate, the disclosure is generally deemed not in good faith, subject to certain tolerance limitations. For example, there is zero tolerance for (i) any fee paid to the creditor, broker, or affiliate, and (ii) any fee paid to a third-party if the creditor did not allow the consumer to shop for the service. Creditors may charge more than the amount disclosed on the Loan Estimate for third-party service fees as long as the charge is not paid to an affiliate of the creditor, the consumer had is permitted to shop for the service, and the increase does not exceed 10 percent of the sum of all such third-party fees. Finally, creditors may charge an amount in excess of the amount disclosed on the Loan Estimate, without any limitation, for amounts relating to (i) prepaid interest, (ii) property insurance premiums, (iii) escrow amounts, (iv) third-party service providers selected by the consumer and not on the creditor’s list of providers or services not required by the creditor, (iv) and transfer taxes.¹ If the fees and charges imposed on the consumer at closing exceed the fees and charges disclosed on the Loan Estimate, subject to the tolerance levels, the creditor is required to refund the consumer within 60 days of consummation of the loan.

If the information disclosed on the Closing Disclosure changes prior to closing, the creditor is required to provide a corrected Closing Disclosure. An additional three-day waiting period is required with a corrected Closing Disclosure if there is an increase in the interest rate of more than 1/8 of a percent for fixed rate loans or 1/4 of a percent for adjustable rate loans, a change in loan product, or a prepayment penalty is added to the loan. For all other changes, the corrected Closing Disclosure must be provided prior to consummation. If a change to a fee occurs after consummation, then a corrected Closing Disclosure must be delivered to the consumer within 30 calendar days of receiving information of the change. If a clerical error is identified, then a corrected Closing Disclosure must be delivered to the consumer within 60 calendar days of consummation.

Impact on Relationships Between Lenders and Vendors

The TRID rule is detailed and highly technical and the CFPB has published very little official guidance as to the interpretation of the rule. As a result, the various members of the industry are interpreting the rule widely differently and applying it with the according lack of uniformity. An example of the kinds of disagreement arising is the issue of whether the final numbers can be massaged in order to avoid re-disclosure and delivery of a new Closing Disclosure at closing or after. This has led to significant conflicts between creditors and settlement agents as to what the TRID rule requires. Some have described it as a “battle field” with settlement agent’s following creditor’s varying instructions but documenting “everything.”

Impact on Secondary Mortgage Market

The implementation of the TRID rule has also apparently begun to cause delays in closing consumer mortgage loan transactions, with closing times up month over month and year over year since October. Loan originators are also reporting decreases in earnings and attributing some of that decrease to implementation of the TRID rule. Moreover, Moody’s has reported that, because some third-party due diligence companies have been strictly applying their own interpretations of the TRID rule in reviewing loan transactions for “technical” violations (i.e., inconsistent spelling conventions and failure to include a hyphen), these firms have found that up to 90% of reviewed loan transactions did not fully comply with the TRID rule requirements. The fact that most of these compliance issues appear to be technical and non- material has not dampened concerns.

MBA Letter

Indeed, these concerns were set forth by President and CEO of the Mortgage Bankers Association David Stevens in a letter to CFPB Director Richard Codray on December 21, 2015 (letter attached as Exhibit 3). In the letter, Stevens identified the problem, proposed a possible interim solution, and asked for ongoing guidance. The problem, according to Stevens, is that certain due diligence companies have adopted an “extremely conservative interpretation” of the TRID rule, resulting in up to a 90% non-compliance rate. This could put loan originators in the position of being unable to move loans to the secondary market or having to sell them at substantial discounts, and could ultimately lead to significant liquidity problems. It is also unknown how the government sponsored entities (GSEs) will interpret the TRID rule, and whether they too will adopt such conservative interpretations and ultimately demand loans be repurchased and seek indemnification for the lack of technical compliance. Stevens proposed written clarification on a lender’s ability to correct a variety of these technical errors, but also noted a significant need for ongoing guidance and additional written clarifications.

CFPB’s Response

On December 29, 2015, Director Cordray responded to Stevens’s letter, reassuring him that the “first few months” of examinations would be corrective, not punitive, and focused on whether creditors have made “good faith efforts to come into compliance with the rule.” Cordray also noted the GSEs have indicated that they do not intend to exercise repurchase or indemnification remedies where good faith efforts to comply are present.²Cordray also addressed the ability to issue a corrected closing disclosure in order to correct “certain non- numerical clerical errors” or “as a component of curing any violations of the monetary tolerance limits, if they exist.” Interestingly, in this context Cordray raised the issue of liability for statutory and class action damages, noting that “consistent with existing . . . TILA principles, liability for statutory and class action damages would be assessed with reference to the final closing disclosure issued, not to the loan estimate, meaning that a corrected closing disclosure could, in many cases, forestall any such private liability.”

Cordray went on to say that, despite the fact that TRID integrates the disclosures in TILA and RESPA, it did not change the “prior, fundamental principles of liability” under either statute and as a result that:

(i) there is no general assignee liability unless the violation is apparent on the face of the disclosure documents and the assignment is voluntary. 15 U.S.C. §1641(e).

(ii) By statute, TILA limits statutory damages for mortgage disclosures, in both individual and class actions to failure to provide a closed-set of disclosures. 15 U.S.C. §1640(a).

(iii) Formatting errors and the like are unlikely to give rise to private liability unless the formatting interferes with the clear and conspicuous disclosure of one of the TILA disclosures listed as giving rise to statutory and class action damages in 15 U.S.C. §1640(a).

(iv) The listed disclosures in 15 U.S.C. §1640(a) that give rise to statutory and class action damages do not include either the RESPA disclosures or the new Dodd-Frank Act disclosures, including the Total Cash to Close and Total Interest Percentage.

Cordray concluded his letter by noting that “the risk of private liability to investors is negligible for good-faith formatting errors and the like” and that “if investors were to reject loans on the basis of formatting and other minor errors . . . they would be rejecting loans for reasons unrelated to potential liability” associated with the disclosures required by the TRID rule.

While the promise of a good faith implementation period and the assurance that TRID does not expand TILA liability to RESPA disclosures offers some comfort to creditors, Cordray’s letter is not a compliance bulletin or supervisory memo, was not published in the Federal Register, and does not appear to be an official interpretation of the TRID rule that would bind the CFPB or any court. Moreover, his comments focus primarily on statutory damages and do not take into consideration potential liability for actual damages and, importantly, attorney’s fees.

Potential Areas of Liability

Despite these assurances, creditors still must concern themselves with potential liability for TRID violations. The following is list of the main sources of potential liability for TRID violations.

Regulatory (CFPB) – The CFPB has the ability investigate potential violations via its authority to issue civil investigative demands, a form of administrative subpoena. 12 U.C.C. §5562(c). Upon a determination of a violation, the CFPB can issues cease-and-desist orders, require creditors to adopt compliance and governance procedures, and order restitution and civil penalty damages. CFPB may impose penalties ranging from $5,000 per day to $1 million per day for knowing
violations.

(A) First tier – For any violation of a law, rule, or final order or condition imposed in writing by the Bureau, a civil penalty may not exceed $5,000 for each day during which such violation or failure to pay continues.

(B) Second tier – Notwithstanding paragraph (A), for any person that recklessly engages in a violation of a Federal consumer financial law, a civil penalty may not exceed $25,000 for each day during which such violation continues.

(C) Third tier – Notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) and (B), for any person that knowingly violates a Federal consumer financial law, a civil penalty may not exceed $1,000,000 for each day during which such violation continues.

12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(2).

Other Governmental Liability – Creditors could also face potential additional claims pursuant to the False Claims Act and the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA).

Consumer Actions – While statutory damages may be limited under TILA to $4,000 in individual suits and the lesser of 1% of company value or $1 million in class actions, that does not account for potential liability for actual damages and attorney’s fees.

Contractual Liability – Absent a specific contractual carve out for technical violations of TRID, originating lenders and creditors may also face potential liability for violation of contractual representations that the loans they are selling were originated “in compliance with law.”

Conclusion

The problem with the TRID rule is that, like the legendary metal bed of the Attic bandit Procrustes, it is a one size fits all regulation and industry participants are going to get stretched or lopped in the process of attempting to fit every transaction into the regulation’s apparently inflexible requirements. Time may well bring additional CFPB guidance, either in the form of the CFPB’s formal, binding interpretations of the rule or in the form of regulatory decisions. Such guidance may then give industry participants a better understanding of how to make and close mortgage loans and avoid liability in process. In the meantime, we can expect further delays, disagreements, and, ultimately, enforcement and litigation.

¹ There had been disagreement on whether transfer taxes (property taxes, HOA dues, condominium or cooperative fees) were subject to tolerances or not. On February 10, 2016, in a rare instance, the CFPB issued an amendment to the supplementary information to the TRID rule to correct a “typographical error” and clarify this issue, amending a sentence that had read that these charges “are subject to tolerances” to read that such charges “are not subject to tolerances” (emphasis added).

² In fact, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac both issued similar letters on October 6, 2015 advising that “until further notice” they would “not conduct routine post-purchase loan file reviews for technical compliance with TRID,” as long as creditors are using the correct forms and exercising good faith efforts to comply with the rule. In these letters, the GSEs further agreed not to “exercise contractual remedies, including repurchase” for non-compliance except where the required form is not used or if a practice impairs enforcement of the loan or creates assignee liability and a court, regulator, or other body determines that the practice violates TRID. Similarly, the Federal Housing Administration issued a letter that “expires” April 16, 2016, agreeing “not to include technical TRID compliance as an element of its routine quality control reviews,” but noting that it does expect creditors to use the required forms and use good faith efforts to comply with TRID.

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

What Homeowners Must Know About Mortgage Fraud Schemes

11 Sunday Mar 2018

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Banks and Lenders, Federal Court, Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Landlord and Tenant, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, Loan Modification, MERS, Mortgage Laws, Mortgage mediation, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, Scam Artists, Title Companies, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Appraiser, Asset Rental, Borrower, Builder Bailout, Buy and Bail, Buyer, Chunking, Closing/Settlement Agent, Double Selling, Equity Skimming, Fake Down Payment, Fictitious Loan, Fraudulent Appraisal, Fraudulent Documentation, Fraudulent Use of Shell Company, Identify Theft, Loan Modification and Refinance Fraud, Loan Servicer, Mortgage Servicing Fraud, Originator, Phantom Sale, Processor, Property Flip Fraud, Real Estate Agent, Reverse Mortgage Fraud, Seller, Short Sale Fraud, Straw/Nominee Borrower, Title Agent, Underwriter, Warehouse Lender

Mortgage fraud has continued to increase since the 2005. Declining economic conditions, liberal underwriting standards, and declining housing values contributed to the increased level of fraud. Market participants are perpetrating mortgage fraud by modifying old schemes, such as property flip, builder-bailout, and short sale fraud, as well as employing newer schemes, such as buy and bail, reverse mortgage fraud, loan modification, refinance fraud, and mortgage servicing fraud.

This Post defines schemes as the big picture or secret plan of action used to perpetrate a fraud. There are a variety of “schemes” by which mortgage fraud can take place. These schemes can involve individuals inside the financial institution or third parties. Various combinations of these schemes may be implemented in a single fraud. The descriptions provided below are examples of traditional and emerging schemes that are used to facilitate mortgage fraud.

Builder Bailout
This scheme is used when a builder, who has unsold units in a tract, subdivision, or condominium complex, employs various fraudulent schemes to sell the remaining properties.

Buy and Bail
This scheme typically involves a borrower who is current on a mortgage loan, but the value of the house has fallen below the amount owed. The borrower continues to make loan payments, while applying for a purchase money mortgage loan on a similar house that cost less due to the decline in market value. After obtaining the new property, the borrower “walks” or “bails” on the first loan.

Chunking
Chunking occurs when a third party convinces an uninformed borrower to invest in a property (or properties), with no money down and with the third party acting as the borrower’s agent. The third party is also typically the owner of the property or part of a larger group organizing the scheme. Without the borrower’s knowledge, the third party submits loan applications to multiple financial institutions for various properties. The third party retains the loan proceeds, leaving the borrower with multiple loans that cannot be repaid. The financial institutions are forced to foreclose on the properties.

Double Selling
Double selling occurs when a mortgage loan originator accepts a legitimate application and documentation from a buyer, reproduces or copies the loan file, and sends the loan package to separate warehouse lenders to each fund the loan.

Equity Skimming
Equity skimming is the use of a fraudulent appraisal that over-values a property, creating phantom equity, which is subsequently stripped out through various schemes.

Fictitious Loan
A fictitious loan is the fabrication of loan documents or use of a real person’s information to apply for a loan which the applicant typically has no intention of paying. A fictitious loan can be perpetrated by an insider of the financial institution or by external parties such as loan originators, real estate agents, title companies, and/or appraisers.

Loan Modification and Refinance Fraud
This scheme occurs when a borrower submits false income information and/or false credit reports to persuade the financial institution to modify or refinance the loan on more favorable terms.

Mortgage Servicing Fraud
This fraud is perpetrated by the loan servicer and generally involves the diversion or misuse of loan payments, proceeds from loan prepayments, and/or escrow funds for the benefit of the service provider.

Phantom Sale
This scheme generally involves an individual or individuals who falsely transfer title to a property or properties and fraudulently obtain funds via mortgage loans or sales to third parties.

Property Flip Fraud
A fraudulent property flip is a scheme in which individuals, businesses, and/or straw borrowers, buy and sell properties among themselves to artificially inflate the value of the property.

Reverse Mortgage Fraud
Reverse Mortgage Fraud involves a scheme using a reverse mortgage loan to defraud a financial institution by stripping legitimate or fictitious equity from the collateral property.

Short Sale Fraud
Fraud occurs in a short sale when a borrower purposely withholds mortgage payments, forcing the loan into default, so that an accomplice can submit a “straw” short-sale offer at a purchase price less than the borrower’s loan balance. Sometimes the borrower is truly having financial difficulty and is approached by a fraudster to commit the scheme. In all cases, a fraud is committed if the financial institution is misled into approving the short-sale offer, when the price is not reasonable and/or when conflicts of interest are not properly disclosed.

Two additional fraud schemes, which are briefly addressed below, are debt elimination and foreclosure rescue schemes. While these schemes are typically not perpetrated directly on financial institutions, and therefore not expanded upon to the same degree as the above-mentioned schemes, the end result of the scheme can have a negative impact on the financial institution.

COMMON MECHANISMS OF MORTGAGE FRAUD SCHEMES

This Post Paper defines mechanism as the process by which fraud is perpetrated. A single mortgage fraud scheme can often include one or more mechanisms and may involve collusion between two or more individuals working in unison to implement a fraud.

The following is a list of common mechanisms used to perpetrate mortgage fraud schemes:

Asset Rental
Cash or other assets are temporarily placed in the borrower’s account/possession in order to qualify for a mortgage loan. The borrower usually pays a “rental” fee for the temporary “use” of the assets.

Fake Down Payment
In order to meet loan-to-value requirements, a fake down payment through fictitious, forged, falsified, or altered documents is used to mislead the lender.

Fraudulent Appraisal
Appraisal fraud can occur when an appraiser, for various reasons, falsifies information on an appraisal or falsely provides an inaccurate valuation on the appraisal with the intent to mislead a third party.

Fraudulent Documentation
Fraudulent documentation consists of any forged, falsified, incomplete, or altered document that the financial institution relied upon in making a credit decision.

Fraudulent Use of Shell Company
A business entity that typically has no physical presence, has nominal assets, and generates little or no income is a shell company. Shell companies in themselves are not illegal and may be formed by individuals or business for legitimate purposes. However, due to lack of transparency regarding beneficial ownership, ease of formation, and inconsistent reporting requirements from state to state, shell companies have become a preferred vehicle for financial fraud schemes.

Identify Theft
Identity theft can be defined as assuming the use of another person’s personal information (e.g., name, SSN, credit card number, etc.) without the person’s knowledge and the fraudulent use of such knowledge to obtain credit.

Straw/Nominee Borrower
An individual used to serve as a cover for a questionable loan transaction.

COMMON PARTICIPANTS
Various individuals participate in mortgage fraud schemes. The following list consists of common participants in such schemes and each is linked to the glossary:

Appraiser – One who is expected to perform valuation services competently and in a manner that is independent, impartial, and objective.

Processor – The processor is an individual who assembles all the necessary documents to be included in the loan package.

Borrower – One who receives funds in the form of a loan with the obligation of repaying the loan in full with interest. The borrower may be purchasing property, refinancing an existing mortgage loan, or borrowing against the equity of the property for other purposes.

Real Estate Agent – An individual or firm that receives a commission for representing the buyer or seller, in a RE purchase transaction.

Buyer – A buyer is a person who is acquiring property.

Seller – Person offering to sell a piece of real estate.

Closing/Settlement Agent – An individual or company that oversees the consummation of a mortgage transaction at which the note and other legal documents are signed and the loan proceeds are disbursed. Title companies, attorneys, settlement agents, and escrow agents can perform this service. Local RE law may dictate the party conducting the closing.

Title Agent – The title agent is a person or firm that is authorized on behalf of a title insurer to conduct a title search and issue a title insurance report or title insurance policy.

Loan Servicer – A loan servicer is a public or private entity or individual engaged to collect and process payments on mortgage loans.

Underwriter – The credit decision-making process which can be automated, manual or a combination of both. In an automated process, application information is entered into a decision-making model that makes a credit determination based on pre-determined criteria. In a manual process an individual underwriter, usually an employee of the financial institution, makes the credit decision after evaluating all of the information in the loan package, including the credit report, appraisal, and verification of deposit, income, and employment. Financial institutions often use a combination of both, with the automated decision representing one element of the overall credit decision. In each case, the decision may include stipulations or conditions that must be met before the loan can close.

Originator – The individual or entity that gathers application data from the borrower. Alternatively, a person or entity, such as a loan officer, broker, or correspondent, who assists a borrower with the loan application.

Warehouse Lender – A short-term lender for mortgage bankers. Using mortgage loans as collateral, the warehouse lender provides interim financing until the loans are sold to a permanent investor.

CONCLUSION
Mortgage fraud continues to result in significant losses for financial institutions, as well as, the Homeowners. It is imperative that homeowners understand the nature of the various schemes and recognize red flags related to mortgage fraud. This knowledge and use of best practices will help with the prevention of mortgage fraud, and financial losses to the homeowner.

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

How Can Nevada Homeowners Effectively Handle Foreclosure Matters

08 Friday Apr 2016

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Pro Se Litigation

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Foreclosure, foreclosure defense, Mortgage loan, Nevada, Nevada Foreclosure, Nevada mortgage loans, Pro se legal representation in the United States

Why Is It Impportant For Nevada Homeowners to Protect their Homes?

In Nevada, homeowners must be aware of mortgage loans and foreclosure laws inorder to be few steps aheads of unscrupulous elements that would do whatever it takes to snatch away your home right under your nose.

Why You Need to Know About Nevada Mortgage Loans

When you take out a loan to purchase residential property in Nevada, you typically sign a promissory note and a deed of trust. A promissory note is basically an IOU that contains the promise to repay the loan, as well as the terms for repayment. The deed of trust provides security for the loan that is evidenced by a promissory note.

How Can you Handle the Issues of Missed Payments

If you miss a payment, most loans include a grace period of ten or fifteen days after which time the loan servicer will assess a late fee. (Loan servicers collect and process payments from homeowners, as well as handle loss mitigation applications and foreclosures for defaulted loans.)

The late fee is generally 5% of the overdue payment of principal and interest based on the terms of the note. To find out the late charge amount and grace period for your loan, look at the promissory note that you signed. This information can also be found on your monthly mortgage statement.

What Are Your Option About Missing Quite a Few Payments

If you miss a few mortgage payments, your mortgage servicer will probably send a letter or two reminding you to get caught up, as well as call you to try to collect the payments. Don’t ignore the phone calls and letters. This is a good opportunity to discuss loss mitigation options and attempt to work out an agreement (such as a loan modification, forbearance, or payment plan) so you can avoid foreclosure.

How Can You Handle Pre-Foreclosure Loss Mitigation Review Period

Under the federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau servicing rules that went into effect January 10, 2014, the mortgage servicer must wait until you are 120 days delinquent on payments before making the first official notice or filing for any nonjudicial or judicial foreclosure. This is to give you sufficient time to explore loss mitigation opportunities. (If a servicer’s sole purpose of providing a notice is to inform you that you are late on your payments and/or explain what your loss mitigation options are, the servicer can deliver the notice within this pre-foreclosure period.)

What About Deed of Trust, What You Need to Know

Nevada deeds of trust often contain a clause that requires the lender to send a notice, commonly called a breach letter or demand letter, informing you that your loan is in default before it can accelerate the loan and proceed with foreclosure. (The acceleration clause in the mortgage permits the lender to demand that the entire balance of the loan be repaid if the borrower defaults on the loan.)

The letter must specify:

the default
the action required to cure the default
a date (usually not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given to the borrower) by which the default must be cured, and
that failure to cure the default on or before the date specified in the notice may result in acceleration of the debt and sale of the property.

What Types of Foreclosure Procedures Is there In Nevada

In Nevada, most residential foreclosures are nonjudicial. This means the lender can foreclose without going to court as long as the deed of trust contains a power of sale clause.

What is Notice of Default and Election to Sell

In Nevada, Non-judicial proceedings is used to foreclose most home. The Nevada nonjudicial foreclosure process formally begins when the trustee, a third-party, records a Notice of Default and Election to Sell (NOD) in the office of the recorder in the county where the property is located, providing three months to cure the default.

A copy of the NOD must be sent to each person who has a recorded request for a copy and each person with an interest or claimed interest in the property by registered or certified mail within ten days after the NOD is recorded recordation.

What Are the Requirements for Posting NOD?

If a residential foreclosure, a copy of the NOD must be posted in a conspicuous place on the property 100 days before the date of sale.

Are there Any Affidavit Required

The trustee or beneficiary (lender) must record a notarized affidavit along with the NOD that states, based on a review of business records, including all of the following information.

The full name and business address of the current trustee or the current trustee’s personal representative or assignee, the current holder of the note secured by the deed of trust, the current beneficiary of record and the current servicer of the obligation or debt secured by the deed of trust.
That the beneficiary under the deed of trust, the successor in interest of the beneficiary or the trustee is in actual or constructive possession of the note secured by the deed of trust; or that the beneficiary or its successor in interest or the trustee is entitled to enforce the obligation or debt secured by the deed of trust.
That the beneficiary or its successor in interest, the servicer of the obligation or debt secured by the deed of trust or the trustee, or an attorney representing any of those persons, has sent to the borrower a written statement including the amount needed to cure the default, the principal amount of the debt, the accrued interest and late charges, a good faith estimate of all fees, contact information for obtaining the most current amounts due, and each assignee of the deed of trust.

What Other Alternatives Do I Have to Stop the Foreclosure?

You have 3 alternatives, sometimes 4.

Your alternatives are:

1). Try to call your alleged lender to see if you can get a reasonable person on the phone. Don’t panic, just be prepared as over 90% of the people you speak to on the phone are programmed to act certain way.i.e, if you are lucky as 99.9% you’ll get a recording and will have to leave a message, unfortunately, you have less that 20% of getting a call back response. You’ll know very early that the alleged lender, definitely not with your best interest at heart.

2). Nevada law requires that borrowers who are in foreclosure be given the option to participate in mediation if the property is owner-occupied.

The trustee must mail to the borrower (by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested) an Election to Mediate Form no later than ten days after recording the NOD. If the borrower wants to elect mediation, the form must be completed and returned within 30 days.

3). You can commence litigation to immediately stop the foreclosure, but you have to be prepared to whether the stop as you’ll experience various emotions during the litigation proceedings, but with time, you’ll get used to it.

3) Bamkruptcy is another method to stop foreclosure, but it will not be in your best interest if you just found yourself in foreclosure situation. We recommend Bankruptcy as the last resort and this is why?

If you are a homeowner with a mortgage payment, say like $1000/mth. If you have missed payment that is 1 year or more. Your Chapter 13 bankrupcty payments will be difficult for you to make once in bankrupcty because you will still make the Normal monthly payment and then some portion of the missed payments, which is sometimes, nealy half of the monthly payment. So if you make a payment of $1000 before the foreclosure began, you’ll now have to make ($1500 (Regular + Potion Payments) to catch up. So you ask yourself, if you can’t afford the original payment of $1000, before you went into foreclosure, how can you afford the higher payments.

In Nevada, You Have What is called Danger Notice

At least 60 days prior to the date of the sale, the trustee must provide the borrower(s) with a separate “Danger Notice” stating that they are in danger of losing their home to foreclosure, along with a copy of the original promissory note.

The notice must be:

personally served to the borrower
left with a person of suitable age and discretion (if the borrower is not available) and a copy mailed, or
if a person of suitable age and discretion is not available, then the notice may be posted in a conspicuous place on the property, left with a person residing in the property, and then mailed to the borrower.

What do you need to know about Notice of Sale

After expiration of the three-month period following the recording of the NOD, the trustee must give notice of the time and place of the sale by recording the notice of sale and by:

Providing the notice of sale to each required party by personal service or by mailing the notice by registered or certified mail to the last known address 20 days before sale.
Posting the notice of sale on the property 15 days before the sale.
Posting the notice of sale for 20 days successively in a public place in the county where the property is situated and on the property 15 days before sale.
Publishing a copy of the notice of sale three times, once each week for three consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the property is situated.

Notice to Tenants

If the property is tenant occupied, a separate notice must be posted in a conspicuous place on the property and mailed to the tenant no later than three business days after the notice of sale is given.

Reinstatement Before Sale

In the case of owner-occupied housing, the borrower gets a right to reinstate by paying the arrearage, costs, and fees. This right expires 5 days prior to the date of the foreclosure sale.

The Foreclosure Sale

The foreclosure sale must be between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. All sales of real property must be made:

at the courthouse in the county in which the property or some part thereof is situated (in counties with a population of less than 100,000), or
at the public location in the county designated by the governing body of the county for that purpose (in counties with a population of 100,000 or more).

The property will be:

sold to the highest third-party bidder or
revert to the foreclosing lender and become REO

Deficiency Judgment Following Sale

When a lender forecloses on a mortgage, the total debt owed by the borrower to the lender frequently exceeds the foreclosure sale price. The difference between the sale price and the total debt is called a “deficiency.” In some states, the lender can seek a personal judgment against the debtor to recover the deficiency. Generally, once the lender gets a deficiency judgment, the lender may collect this amount from the borrower.

In Nevada, a lender may obtain a deficiency judgment following foreclosure, but the amount of the judgment is limited to the lesser of:

the difference between the total debt and fair market value of the home, or
the difference between the total debt and foreclosure sale price.

For loans taken out after October 1, 2009, deficiencies are prohibited for purchase money loans (that have not been refinanced) held by a bank or other financial institution for single-family residences occupied continuously by the borrowers.

Redemption Period

A redemption period is the legal right of any mortgage borrower in foreclosure to pay off the total debt, including the principal balance, plus certain additional costs and interest, in order to reclaim the property. In Nevada, there is no redemption period following a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.

Eviction Following Foreclosure

If you don’t vacate the property following the foreclosure sale, the new owner will likely:

offer you a cash-for-keys deal (where the new owner offers you money in exchange for you agreeing to move out), or

give you a three-day notice to quit (leave) before filing an eviction lawsuit.

To learn more about foreclosure in general, ways to defend against foreclosure, and programs to help struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at http://www.fightforeclosure.net “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

What Florida Homeowners Should Expect in “Pro Se” Foreclosure Defense Litigation

12 Thursday Jun 2014

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Banks and Lenders, Case Laws, Case Study, Discovery Strategies, Federal Court, Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, Loan Modification, Mortgage Laws, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, RESPA, State Court, Title Companies, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Florida

When a Homeowner is approaching foreclosure on his/her property, there are numerous things the homeowner should bear in mind.

(This is Not Intended to be a Legal Advice and Nothing on this Post is to be Construed a Legal Advice).

I. HOMEOWNERS EXPECTATIONS

A. Realistic Expectations – Homeowners Should Expect to See ALL Original Mortgage Closing Documents.

1. Keep the Home – at some point lender will in all probability be entitled to foreclose either for the full amount due, small reduction or large reduction
2. Short Sale – No Buyers/No Money
3. Modify Mortgage – No Mandatory Programs:

Right now there is no program available that will compel a lender to renegotiate a loan, and you cannot force a cram down in bankruptcy. The program Congress passed in July effective Oct. 1, 2008 is a voluntary lender program. In order to be eligible, one must live in the home and have a loan that was issued between January 2005 and
June 2007. The provisions was later amended during the meltdown to include struggling homeowners in past few years. Additionally, the homeowner must be spending at least 31% of his gross monthly income on mortgage debt. The homeowner can be current with the existing mortgage or in default, but either way the homeowner must prove that he/she will not be able to keep paying their existing mortgage and attest that it is not a deliberate default just to obtain lower payments.

All second liens must be retired or paid such as a home equity loan or line of credit, or Condo or Home Owner Ass’n lien. So if the homeowner has a 2nd mortgage, he is not eligible for the program until that debt is paid. And, the homeowner cannot take out another home equity loan for at least five years, unless to pay for necessary upkeep on the home. The homeowner will need approval from the FHA to get the new home equity loan, and total debt cannot exceed 95% of the home’s appraised
value at the time. This means that the homeowner’s present lender must agree to reduce his payoff so that the new loan is not greater than 95% of appraised value. For example, if the present loan in default is $200,000.00 but the home appraises for $150,000.00 the new loan cannot exceed a little over $142,000.00, and the present lender has to agree to reduce the mortgage debt to that amount. You can contact your
current mortgage servicer or go directly to an FHA-approved lender for help. These lenders can be found on the Web site of the Department of Housing and Urban Development: http://www.hud.gov/ As I pointed out above, this is a voluntary program, so the present lender must agree to rework this loan before things can get started.

Also, homeowners should contact the city in which they reside or county to see if they have a homeowner’s assistance program. West Palm Beach will give up to $10,000 to keep its residents from going into default.

Over the years, we have seen FANNIE MAE and FREDDIE MAC announced that they will set aside millions to rewrite mortgage terms so its homeowner can remain in their home. Given the outcome of numerous modification attempts and denials of loan modifications, I do not know whether the terms or conditions for the modification was for the benefit of the lender or the borrower, though any prudent person will conclude it is for the former.

Bank of America, which includes Countrywide, and JP Morgan Chase also announced earlier, that they will set aside millions to rewrite mortgage terms so its home mortgagors can remain in their homes.

4. Stay in the home and try to defeat the foreclosure under TILA RESPA and Lost Note, etc.

II. DEFENDING A MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE

A. Homeowners Should Prepare Themselves for Litigation. (Using Foreclosure Defense Package found at http://fightforeclosure.net

1. Homeowners needed for 4 Events
a. Answer Interrogatories, Request to Produce
b. Homeowner’s Deposition
c. Mediation – Homeowners should understand that mortgage cases like most cases have a high percentage of settling.
d. Trial

2. Cases move slowly even more now because of the volume of foreclosures and the reduction of court budgets.

3. Cases move on a 30/60/90 day tickler system – one side does something the other side gets to respond or sets a hearing.

4. If the Homeowner fails to do any of the above timely or fails to appear for any of the events, he/she may lose his case automatically.

5. Because of the way the system works the Homeowner may not hear from the court for several weeks or months – that does not mean that the court is ignoring the case – that is just how the system works but feel free to call or write and ask questions.

6. If you have a lawyers, keep in contact with the lawyer and advise of changes in circumstances/goals and contact info. If you are representing yourself keep in contact with the court clerk and docket sheet.

7. Home in places like Florida as well as other States should understand that a Foreclosure is – The legal mechanism by which the mortgage lender ends the “equity of redemption” by having a judge determine the amount of debt and a specific date, usually in 30 or 60 days to pay the money, and if not paid by that date, the judge allows the clerk to auction the property. Fla. Stat. §697.02, which changed the old English common law notion that the mortgage gave the lender an interest in the borrower’s land, makes the mortgage a lien against title. Fla. Stat. §45.0315 tells the mortgage lender that the borrower has the right to redeem the property after final judgement of foreclosure, until shortly after the clerk conducts the auction, when the clerk issues the certificate of sale. The client still has legal, recorded title to the property throughout the foreclosure process until the clerk issues the certificate of sale (ends redemption) then the certificate of title (transfers title) 10 days after the clerk’s sale if no objection to sale filed.

8. Deficiency – The judgement will determine the amount of the debt. A deficiency is the difference between the debt owed and the fair market value of the home at the date of the clerk’s sale.

9. Homeowners without Attorneys should knows that the complaint must be answered in 20 days or he/she could automatically lose, unless he/she either files a motion to dismiss with the court or files a motion for leave to extend time to answer “showing good cause” why the answer was not given when due. In either event, the motion needs to be filed before the due date.

B. Read the Summons Complaint, the Mortgage, Note and the Assignments.

1. Check the Summons for proper service and if not prepare a motion to quash.

2. The vast majority of foreclosure complaints are filed by foreclosure factories and will generally have 2 counts – reestablish a lost mortgage and note and foreclose. Fertile area for a motion to dismiss (see the sample motions to dismiss in the package at http://fightforeclosure.net)

3. Homeowners with the foreclosure defense package at http://fightforeclosure.net can be assured that he/she will find a basis to make a good faith motion to dismiss most of the form mortgage foreclosure complaints.

4. Homeowners should endeavor to set the motion to dismiss for hearing 30 days out or so. Otherwise, let the opposing counsel’s office set the hearing.

5. Cannot reestablish a negotiable instrument under Fla. Stat. §71.011 must be Fla. Stat. §673.3091 and person suing to foreclose must have the right to foreclose and reestablish when he files the lawsuit – post lawsuit assignments establish the lender did not own at time of suit unless pre-suit equitable assignment. See: Mason v. Rubin, 727 So.2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); National Loan Invest. v. Joymar Ass.,
767 So.2d 549 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2000); State Street Bank v. Lord, 851 So.2d 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). For an example of how far courts will go to find mortgages enforceable see: State Street Bank v. Badra, 765 So.2d 251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), Mtg. Elec. Regis. Sys. v. Badra, 4D07-4605 (Fla. 4th DCA 10-15-2008).

C. Answer Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim

1. A general denial of allegations regarding the lost note is not enough. The foreclosure mill must specifically deny lost note allegations (see forms in the package at http://fightforeclosure.net).

2. Generally speaking Homeowners should be prepared to file a counterclaim with the affirmative defenses because the lender then cannot take a voluntary dismissal without court order and the
SOL (Statutes of Limitation) may expire for the TILA claims. You have more control over the suit, but now you must pay a filing fee for the counterclaim.

3. If Homeowners are not familiar with specific RESPA Yield Spread defense, they can review some of the articles in this blog because in 1995 or so FRB changed the regulations so that made the payment is not automatically a kickback for the referral of business (In my opinion this was the beginning of the mortgage mess we have now). Homeowners using Foreclosure Defense package found at http://fightforeclosure.net will find samples of well structured RESPA Yield Spread premium (YSP) defense within the package.

D. Discovery

1. In order to take more control over the case and shake up things from the beginning, homeowners using the Foreclosure Defense package at http://fightforeclosure.net should send out well constructed foreclosure Interrogatories and Request to Produce with the Answer. Homeowners in certain cases may also serve Notice of Taking P’s Deposition DT. See package for samples and for the wording. That will give Homeowners more control over the case, putting the Foreclosure Mill on its toes from the word go.

2. Usually the lenders firm will call and ask 3 things 1) “What do you really want – an extended sale date?” 2) “Can I have more time to answer discovery?” 3) “Can I have more time to find you a witness?” Answer to 1) “I really want to rescind the purported loan – do you want to agree to a rescission?” 2 & 3) “No problem as long as you
agree not to set any dispositive motion for hearing until a reasonable time after I get the discovery or take the deposition so that I can prepare and I do not incur an expedited deposition fee.”

3. Lender Depositions: There is rarely a need to actually depose the lender because their testimony rarely varies , and it can work to your disadvantage because if you actually take the pre-trial deposition for the lender or his servicing agent, you will have preserved the lender’s testimony for trial. If for some reason the lender cannot appear on the scheduled trial date, he will either take a voluntary dismissal or settle
the case. It is easier for Homeowners to win their cases or forced favorable settlements when the lender’s representative could not appear at the trial or meet up with the court deadlines.

4. Closing Agents depositions: Again, There is rarely a need to actually depose the closing because the testimony rarely varies and you will have preserved the testimony for trial. They either say: 1) “I do not remember the closing because I do hundreds and this was years ago, but it is my regular business practice to do A B and C and I followed my regular practice for this loan.” – the most credible and the usual
testimony; 2) 1) “I remember this closing and I gave all the required disclosures to the consumer and explained all the documents.” Not credible unless they tie the closing to an exceptional memorable event because the closing generally took place years and hundreds of closings earlier and you can usually catch them on cross “So name the next loan you closed and describe that closing” 3) 1) “I remember this closing and I gave the consumer nothing and explained nothing. Rare – though this has happened at one time. You do need the closing file so you can do a notice of production to non-party.

5. Mortgage Broker depositions: Again, there is rarely a need to actually depose the broker because the testimony rarely varies and you will have preserved the testimony for trial. They either say: 1) “I do not remember this borrower because I do hundreds and this was years ago, but it is my regular business practice to do A B and C and I followed my regular practice for this loan.” – the most credible and the usual
testimony; 2) 1) “I remember this borrower and I gave all the required disclosures to the consumer and explained all the documents.” Not credible unless they tie the borrower to an exceptional memorable event. 3) 1) “I remember this closing and I broke the mortgage brokerage laws and violated TILA. Rare – this has never
happened. You do need their application package so do a notice of production to nonparty.

6. Compare the documents in all of the closing packages: Lender’s underwriting, closing agent and mortgage broker. I have seen 3 different sets of documents. One in each package. The key is what was given to the Homeowner at the closing.

7. Homeowner’s deposition – very important if the case turns on a factual issue of what happened at the closing. Homeowner needs to be very precise and sure as to what occurred at the closing.

E. Motions to Strike

1. Lender’s counsel frequently moved to strike the defenses. These motions are generally not well taken, and simply prolong the case. See Response to Motion to Strike.

2. There are two rules for striking a party’s pleadings; one arises under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(f), and the other arises under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.150.

3. Under Rule 1.140(f): “A party may move to strike . . . redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter from any pleading at any time.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(f).

4. Under Rule 1.150, a party can move to strike a “sham pleading” at any time before trial. This rule requires the Court to hear the motion, take evidence of the respective parties, and if the motion is sustained, allows the Court to strike the pleading to which the motion is directed. The Rule 1.150(b) Motion to Strike as a sham must be verified and must set forth fully the facts on which the movant relies and may be supported by affidavit.

F. Lender’s Motions for Summary Judgment

1. The lender will no doubt file a motion for summary judgment, usually including the affidavit of a servicing agent who has reviewed the file, many times not attaching the documents that he is attesting are true and accurate. The court should rule that the affidavits are hearsay and lack a foundation or predicate because the affiant is summarizing the legal import of documents usually trust agreements and servicing agreements, without attaching copies. See another post in this Blog that deals with the Summary Judgment memorandum for the legal basis to object to the lender’s summary judgment.

III. TRUTH IN LENDING

A. Overview

1. Congress passed TIL to remedy fraudulent practices in the disclosure of the cost of consumer credit, assure meaningful disclosure of credit terms, ease credit shopping, and balance the lending scales weighted in favor of lenders. Beach v. Ocwen, 118 S.Ct.1408 (1998), aff’g Beach v. Great Western Bank, 692 So.2d 146,148-149 (Fla.1997), aff’g Beach v. Great Western, 670 So.2d 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), Dove v. McCormick, 698 So.2d 585, 586 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), Pignato v. Great Western Bank, 664 So.2d 1011, 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), Rodash v. AIB Mortgage, 16 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir.1994). {1}

2. TIL creates several substantive consumer rights. §1640(a)(1) gives consumers actual damages for TIL errors in connection with disclosure of any information. §1640(a)(2)(A)(iii) gives consumers statutory damages of twice the amount of any finance charge, up to $2,000.00 for errors in connection with violations of §1635 or §1638(a)(2) through (6), or (9), and the numerical disclosures, outside of the $100.00 error tolerance. See Beach, 692 So.2d p.148-149, Kasket v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
695 So.2d 431,434 (Fla.4 DCA 1997) [Kasket I,] Dove, p.586-587, Pignato, p.1013, Rodash, p.1144. {2} See also §1605(f)(1)(A). {3}

3. §1635(a) allows a consumer to rescind home secured non-purchase credit for any reason within 3 business days from consummation. If a creditor gives inaccurate required information, TIL extends the rescission right for 3 days from the date the creditor delivers the accurate material TIL disclosures and an accurate rescission notice, for up to three years from closing. Pignato, p.1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (“TILA permits the borrower to rescind a loan transaction until midnight of the third business day following delivery of all of the disclosure materials or the completion
of the transaction, whichever occurs last.”]. See also: Beach, cases, supra, Rodash, Steele v Ford Motor Credit, 783 F.2d 1016,1017 (11th Cir.1986), Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. S&L, 791 F.2d 699, 701-702 (9th Cir. 1986).

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{1} All 11th Circuit TIL decisions and pre- 11th Circuit 5th Circuit cases are binding in Florida. Kasket v. Chase Manhattan Mtge. Corp., 759 So.2d 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (Kasket, II) [11th Circuit TIL decisions binding in Florida]

{2} §1640’s last paragraph has the §1640(a)(2) damage limit: “In connection with the disclosures referred to in section 1638 of this title, a creditor shall have a liability determined under paragraph (2) only for failing to comply with the requirements of section 1635 of this title or of paragraph (2) (insofar as it requires a disclosure of the “amount financed”), (3), (4), (5), (6), or (9) of section of this title…”

{3} This subsection provides that numerical disclosures in connection with home secured loans shall be treated as being accurate if the amount disclosed as the finance charge does not vary from the actual finance charge by more than $100, or is greater than the amount required to be disclosed. See also Williams v. Chartwell Financial Services, Ltd., 204 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2000). (Over-disclosure can also be a violation under certain circumstances.)

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4. HOEPA loans (Also called a §1639 or Section 32 loan.) TIL requires additional disclosures and imposes more controls on loans that meet either the “T-Bill Trigger” or “Points and Fees Trigger” set forth at §1602(aa). §1639, Reg Z 226.31 & Reg Z 226.32, require the creditor for a §1602(aa) loan to give additional early [3 days before consummation] disclosures to the consumer and prohibits loans from containing certain terms [i.e. a prohibition on certain balloon payments]. It also has
a special actual damage provision at §1640(a)(4). (HOEPA can make a lender a TIL creditor for the first HOEPA loan). (The trigger for Florida’s Fair Lending Act is based on the HOEPA triggers. This may affect a larger number of loans and may provided post 3 year rescission. See Fla. Stat. §494.00792(d)).

5. Zamarippa v. Cy’s Car Sales, 674 F.2d 877, 879 (11th Cir. 1982), binding in Florida under, Kasket II, hods: “An objective standard is used to determine violations of the TILA, based on the representations contained in the relevant disclosure, documents; it is unnecessary to inquire as to the subjective deception or misunderstanding of particular consumers.”

6. In 1995, Congress created a defensive right to rescind when a lender sues a consumer to foreclose the mortgage. See §1635(a) & (i)[1995], Reg. Z 226.23(a)(3) & (h) [1996]. The §1635(i) amendment triggers the consumer’s defensive right to rescind when the creditor overstates the amount financed by more than $35.00, or errs in the Notice of Right to Cancel form, and the claim is raised to defend a foreclosure. See also Reg Z 226.23(h).

7. Florida defers to the FRB’s interpretation of TIL and its own regulations. Beach, 692 So.2d p.149, Pignato, p.1013, Kasket, I p.434. The U.S. Supreme Court requires deference to the FRB’s interpretations of the Statute and its own regulations. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 560, 565-570 (1980). TIL is remedial, so courts expansively and broadly apply and interpret TIL in favor of the consumer.
Rodash, p. 1144; Schroder v. Suburban Coastal Corp., 729 F.2d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir. 1984); Kasket II, W.S. Badcock Corp. v. Myers 696 So.2d 776, p. 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) adopting Rodash, p.1144: “TIL is remedial legislation. As such, its language must be liberally construed in favor of the consumer.”

8. Pignato, p. 1013 also holds: “Creditors must strictly comply with TILA. Rodash, 16 F.3d at1144; In re Porter, 961 F.2d 1066, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). A single violation of TILA gives rise to full liability for statutory damages, which include actual damages incurred by the debtor plus a civil penalty. 15 U.S.C.A. §§1640(a)(1)(2)(A)(i). Moreover, a violation may permit a borrower to rescind a loan transaction, including a rescission of the security interest the creditor has in the borrower’s principal dwelling. 15 U.S.C.A. §§1635(a).” See also the Beach cases.
This is in harmony with W.S. Badcock, p. 779, which holds: “Violations of the TILA are determined on an objective standard, based on the representations in the relevant disclosure documents, with no necessity to establish the subjective misunderstanding or reliance of particular customers.”

B. Assignee Liability

1. §1641(a)(1) and §1641(e)(1)-(2) provides that assignees are liable for §1640(a) damages if the disclosure errors are apparent on the face of the disclosure statement and other documents assigned. Congress statutorily designated the TIL disclosure statement, the TIL notice of right to cancel, and any summary of the closing costs as documents assigned. See §1641(e)(2).

2. §1641(c) provides that assignees are liable for §1635 rescission regardless of the apparent on the face of the “documents assigned” standard for damages claims. Belini v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, 412 F.3d 17, p. 28 (1st Cir. 2005).

3. You must make sure that you rescind as to the correct “creditor.” See: Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2002).

C. Right to Rescind

1. Each consumer with the right to rescind must receive one [1] copy of the correct TIL Disclosure Statement and two [2] copies of a correct Notice of Right to Cancel form. If not, the consumer can rescind for up to 3 years after closing. See: Reg Z 226.23(a)(3), fn 48; Beach v. Ocwen, 118 S.Ct.1408 (1998), aff’g Beach v. Great Western Bank, 692 So.2d 146,148-149 (Fla.1997), aff’g Beach v. Great Western Bank, 670 So.2d 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Rodash v. AIB Mortgage, 16 F.3d 1142
(11th Cr.1994); Steele v Ford Motor Credit, 783 F.2d 1016 (11th Cir.1986), all binding here under Kasket v. Chase Manhattan Mtge. Corp., 759 So.2d 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (11th Circuit cases on federal TIL issues are binding on Florida courts).

2. The error must be a “material error” which is defined at Reg Z 226.23 fn 48: “The term “material disclosures” means the required disclosures of the annual percentage rate, the finance charge, the amount financed, the total payments, the payment schedule, and the disclosures and limitations referred to in sections 226.32(c) and (d).”

3. A HOEPA loan requires additional disclosures 3 days before consummation. See: Reg Z 226.31(c)(1) (“The creditor shall furnish the disclosures required by section 226.32 at least three business days prior to consummation of a mortgage transaction covered by section 226.32.”). The failure to deliver the HOEPA forms is an additional TIL material disclosure which extends the right to rescind for violations. See: Reg Z 226.23(a)(3): “The consumer may exercise the right to rescind until midnight of the third business day following consummation, delivery of the notice required by paragraph (b) of this section, or delivery of all material disclosures, [fn]48 whichever occurs last. If the required notice or material disclosures are not delivered, the right to rescind shall expire 3 years after consummation….” See also fn 48 above.

4. Florida’s Fair Lending Act is based on the HOEPA triggers and appears to adopt TIL right to rescind without the 3 year limit. See: Fla. Stat. §494.00792(d). This theory has not been tested in any appellate court.

5. Most creditor’s closing/underwriting files will have a signed acknowledgment that the consumer received 2 copies of the TIL notice of right to cancel. Under TIL 15 U.S.C. 1635(c) this creates a rebuttable presumption of receipt: “Notwithstanding any rule of evidence, written acknowledgment of receipt of any disclosures required under this subchapter by a person to whom information, forms, and a statement is
required to be given pursuant to this section does no more than create a rebuttable presumption of delivery thereof.” Once the consumer’s affidavit or interrogatory answer or deposition stares that the consumer did not receive the 2 notices, this rebuts the presumption of receipt in the acknowledgment and presents a question of fact for trial. See: Cintron v. Bankers Trust Company, 682 So.2d 616 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1996).

6. The critical issue is what did each consumer receive not what is in the creditor’s underwriting or closing file. Make sure that the TIL Right to Rescind form is correctly filled out and the loan closed on the date it purports to have closed. If the lender directs the consumer to deliver the notice of right to cancel form to a post office box, this should extend the right to rescind.

D. Material Errors

1. The TIL Disclosure Statement “Federal Box” will contain the following “material information”. These numbers are taken from the Norwest v. Queen Martin trial memorandum: {4}

Annual Percentage Rate Finance Charge Amount Financed
11.227% $176,073.12 $70,708.16

Total of Payments
$246,781.28

PAYMENTS: Your payment schedule will be:
Number of Payments Amount of Payments When Payments Are Due

Monthly beginning
359 685.52 10/01/99

1 679.60 09/01/29

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{4} The disclosures are interrelated. If one multiplies the monthly payment amounts by the number of payments, and adds the sums, this equals the total of payments. Adding the finance charge to the amount financed equals the total of payments. The annual percentage rate is the percent of these figures, based on 360 monthly payments, using either the American or actuarial method.

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2. At the bottom of the TIL Disclosure Statement, usually just inside the bottom part of the federal box, you will see a place for the creditor to place an “X” next to: “‘e’ means an estimate;” and a second box to place an “X” next to: “all dates and numerical disclosures except the late payment disclosures are estimates.” Estimated disclosures violate TIL.

3. If no Reg Z 226.18(c) required Itemization of Amount Financed (not a material disclosure error) one “work backwards” to determine how the creditor arrived at the TIL disclosures. First, one must deduct the $70,708.16 “amount financed” from the face amount of the note. Lets assume this note was for a $76,500.00 loan. Therefore the creditor had to use $5,791.84 as the total of “prepaid finance charges.” In order
to arrive at the disclosed $70,708.16 “amount financed.” Then one must examine the HUD-1 charges to find the charges that equal the $5,791.84 “prepaid finance charges” to determine the items from the HUD-1 that the creditor included in the $5,791.84 prepaid finance charges to determine if $5,791.84 correct reflects all the prepaid finance charges. See: §1638(a)(2)(A); Reg Z 226.18(b): “The amount financed is calculated by: (1) Determining the principal loan amount or the cash price
(subtracting any downpayment); (2) Adding any other amounts that are financed by the creditor and are not part of the finance charge (usually not applicable); and, (3) Subtracting any prepaid finance charge.”

4. The Norwest/Martin Trial memo has a great deal of detail with respect to the specific charges and violations.

F. Truth in Lending Remedies

1. §1635(b) and Reg Z 226.23(d)(1-4) rescission; and, 2) §1640 damages.

2. Semar v. Platte Valley Federal S & L Ass’n, 791 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1986) is the leading case used by virtually all courts to impose TIL’s §1635(b) and Reg Z 226.23(d)(1-4) rescission remedy in a non-§1639, non-vesting case.

3. Semar, interpreted Reg Z 226.23(d)(1) “Effects of rescission: When a consumer rescinds a transaction, the security interest giving rise to the right of rescission becomes void and the consumer shall not be liable for any amount, including any finance charge.” The Semar, Court accepted the consumer’s rescission formula under Reg Z 226.23(d)(1), added all the “finance charges” listed on the HUD-1, plus the 2 $1,000.00 maximum statutory damage awards ($1,000.00 for the initial error and $1,000.00 for the improper response to rescission, increased to $2,000.00 in 1995),
plus all the mortgage payments made, then deducted this sum from the face amount of the Semar, note to arrive at the net debt owed the creditor.

4. §1640(a)(2)(A)(iii) Statutory Damages $2,000.00 for initial errors and $2,000.00 for the improper response to rescission. See: 15 U.S.C. §1635(g); 15 U.S.C. §1640 (a)15 U.S.C. §1640(g); Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat. Bank, 575 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1978), binding in the 11th Circuit under Bonner. (TIL statutory damages available for initial TIL error and improper response to demand to rescind).

5. §1640(a)(1) Actual Damages for any errors: Hard to prove need to establish “detrimental reliance” on an erroneous disclosure.

6. §1640(a)(4) Enhanced HOEPA Damages: §1640(a)(4) enhances the damages: “in the case of a failure to comply with any requirement under section 1639 of this title, an amount equal to the sum of all finance charges and fees paid by the consumer, unless the creditor demonstrates that the failure to comply is not material.”

5. Equitable Modification under §1635(b) and Reg Z 226.23(d)(4). Williams v. Homestake Mortg. Co., 968 F.2d 1137 (11th Cir. 1992) allows for equitable modification of TIL, Burden on lender to prove facts that justify the equitable modification. If not, Florida courts must follow Yslas v. D.K Guenther Builders, Inc., 342 So.2d 859, fn 2 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1977), which holds:

“The statutory scheme to effect restoration to the status quo provides that within ten days of receipt of the notice of rescission the creditor return any property of the debtor and void the security interest in the debtor’s property. The debtor is not obligated to tender any property of the creditor in the debtor’s possession until the creditor has performed his obligations. If the creditor does not perform within ten days of the notice or does not take possession of his property within ten days of the
tender, ownership of the creditor’s property vests in the debtor without further obligation.” [emphasis added].

The 2nd District recently reaffirmed Yslas in Associates First Capital v. Booze, 912 So.2d 696 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2005). Associates, involved a partial §1635(b) and Reg Z 226.23(d)(1-4) rescission because the consumer refinanced with the same creditor, and the refinance included an additional advance of credit. In the Associates, the consumer can rescind only the additional advance. Important here, the Associates,
consumer argued, and the Court agreed that the lender failed to perform a condition precedent to equitably modify TIL by failing to respond to his rescission notice within 20 days, as required by §1635(b) and Reg Z 226.23(d)(2):

“If a lender fails to respond within twenty days to the notice of rescission, the ownership of the property vests in the borrowers and they are no longer required to pay the loan. See § 1635(b); Staley v. Americorp Credit Corp., 164 F. Supp. 2d 578, 584 (D. Md. 2001); Gill v. Mid-Penn Consumer Disc. Co., 671 F.Supp. 1021 (E.D.Pa. 1987). However, because 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(f)(2) provides only a partial right of rescission where there is a refinancing, when the Lender failed to respond to
the notice of rescission within twenty days, ownership of only the property subject to the right of rescission — the $994.01 loaned for property taxes — vested in the Borrowers without further obligation.” Associates, p. 698.

G. Truth in Lending Supplements State Remedies & Both Apply

1. Williams v. Public Finance Corp., 598 F.2d 349, rehearing denied with opinion at 609 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1980), binding here under Bonner, holds that a consumer can get both TIL damages and usury damages because state usury laws and the Federal Truth in Lending Act provide separate remedies to rectify separate wrongs based on separate unrelated statutory violations. The 5th Circuit rejected the creditor’s “double penalty” argument by holding that if it accepted the argument, it would give special lenient treatment to the creditor when his loan violates 2 separate statutes, one state and one federal, designed to remedy 2 separate wrongs:

“Moreover, we eschew an analysis of these statutory cases limited by the
common law doctrines of compensation for breach of contract. These cases involve penal statutes, and we are compelled to enforce their clear and direct commands whether or not they seem to be overcompensating in a contract or tort analysis. There is nothing inherently wrong, excessive, or immoral in a borrower receiving two bounties for catching a lending beast who has wronged him twice — first, by sneaking up on him from behind, and then by biting him too hard. The private attorney general who exposes and opposes these credit wolves is not deemed unduly enriched when his valor is richly rewarded and his vendor harshly rebuked. Nor does the state’s punishment for the usurious bite interfere with Congress’s punishment for the wearing of sheep’s clothing.”

“We have come, or gone, a long way from Shakespeare’s ancient caution, “Neither a borrower, nor a lender be.” In today’s world borrowing and lending are daily facts of life. But that a fact becomes diurnal does not mean it has been cleansed of its dire potential. We still heed the Bard’s advice, but in our own modern way — by strict regulation of the strong and careful protection of the weak and unwary. While the well-intended efforts of our many sovereigns may at times sound more like discordant and competing solos than mellifluous duets, we, as judges, must restrain
our impulse to stray from the score.” Williams, 609 F.2d pg. 359-360.

In case the first opinion was unclear on this point, the Williams, rehearing opinion repeated and reaffirmed its “lending wolf” analysis:

“Noting that the effect of appellants’ argument was to ask for “special lenient treatment to lenders who violate two laws instead of just one,” we rejected the approach to the question proposed by the appellants and defined our inquiry in the following terms:

[W]e think the real question in this case is a relatively standard one of statutory interpretation. More specifically, we think the question is whether Congress intended that the TIL Act would apply to loans which violated state usury laws punishable by forfeiture. At the outset we note that no exception for such loans is made explicitly in the TIL Act. Moreover, since the Act is to be construed liberally to effect its remedial purposes, Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture Co., 479 F.2d 740, 748 (5th
Cir. 1973), we are generally disinclined to read into the Act an implicit exception which benefits lenders at the expense of borrowers. However, the real test of whether this exception was intended or not must start with the question of whether it serves or disserves the purposes of the Act. In this analysis resides the real focus of our decision. The ILA and TIL Act provide separate remedies to rectify separate wrongs.
The ILA limits what a lender subject to its provisions can charge for the use of its money; the TIL Act provisions involved here are designed to penalize and deter an independent wrong arising from nondisclosure. [fn5] We did not believe, and do not believe, that it subserves the purposes of the TIL Act to read into it an implied exception for loans which violate unrelated state usury laws. As we have already said, we do not think it especially unfair or unjust to order two punishments for a
lender who violates two laws. And more to the point, we think it would be directly contrary to the purposes and policies of the TIL Act to excuse a violator from federal penalty simply because he is also liable for a state penalty, especially where that state penalty may often be less harsh than the federal penalty…….”

“…… Appellants petition for rehearing have taken offense at our characterization of lenders who violate the ILA as “credit wolves” and as wearers of “sheep’s clothing” when they also violate the disclosure provisions of the TIL Act. They suggest that such labels have obscured our analysis of the legal issues here. Such most certainly is not the case. Our analysis was and is based on our perception of the proper
construction of the federal and state policies, even though their meshing is not nearly as perfect as we and appellants could wish. Nonetheless, as we read the ILA and the TIL Act, appellants have violated both and are subject to the penalties of both. Although appellants’ predations may be technical and they may feel we have cried “wolf” too readily, the fact remains that as we read the statutes appellants are guilty of the violations charged.” Williams, 598 F.2d pg. 1181-1184.

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at http://www.fightforeclosure.net “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

How Homeowners Can Effectively Use RESPA in their Foreclosure Defense

11 Wednesday Jun 2014

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Banks and Lenders, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Non-Judicial States, RESPA, Your Legal Rights

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It is important for every homeowner to use the RESPA provisions in their foreclosure defense.

Most Homeowners often wonder what is RESPA. This post is designed to enlighten homeowners as to what RESPA is and how the provisions of RESPA can help them in the foreclosure fight.

So What is RESPA!

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)

1. RESPA initially applied to loans subject to a first lien on residential property of one to four units. In 1992, it was amended to apply to subordinate loans on such property as well. The implementing regulations are contained in Regulation X, 24 C.F.R. § 3500, as well as in Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.19.

2. RESPA requires good faith estimates of Truth In Lending Act disclosures before consummation or within three business days after the creditor receives the consumer’s written application, whichever occurs earlier. Re-disclosure is required no later than consummation or settlement. According to § 226.19(b), when dealing with variable-rate loans a booklet on adjustable rate mortgages must be provided along with other detailed disclosures specified in the regulations.

3. RESPA prohibits mortgage transaction servicers from giving and creditors from accepting “any portion, split or percentage” of any charge made or received for settlement services “other than for services actually performed. 12 U.S.C. § 2607(b). High and unearned fees that are not actionable under RESPA, are still subject to challenge as unconscionable and that it is an unfair and deceptive practice to represent a charge as for a specific purpose, when the actual cost of that item is much less.

4. RESPA also requires servicers of covered mortgages to respond to written requests from the borrower or the borrower’s agent for information or disputes concerning the servicing of the loan, and to either make appropriate corrections or, after investigation, explain why the account is correct. Failure to comply with the response requirements gives rise to liability for actual damages, statutory damages up to $1000 in case of a pattern or practice of noncompliance and attorneys’ fees and costs, with special class action provisions.

5. The provisions of RESPA which deal with mortgage servicing are generally found in either 12 U.S.C. § 2605 or § 2609. Section 2605, known as the “Servicer Act,” requires servicers to respond to borrower requests for information and to correct account errors (referred to as “qualified written requests”), § 2605(e); disclose information relating to the transfer of servicing operations, §§ 2605(a) and (b); and make timely payments out of escrow accounts. § 2605(g); Section 2609 deals
exclusively with escrow accounts and limits the amount servicers can demand to be deposited in an escrow account and requires an escrow analysis be conducted to determine the proper escrow payment. § 2609(a); It also requires servicers to provide an annual escrow statement § 2609(c) and a notice of escrow shortages or deficiencies.
§ 2609(b)

6. There is one requirement imposed by § 2605 that does not apply if the borrower is behind on payments. Section 2505(g) requires a servicer to make payments from an escrow account for taxes, insurance and other charges “in a timely manner as such payments become due.” As long as the borrower’s mortgage payment is not more than thirty days late, the servicer must pay escrow items such as taxes and insurance in a timely manner even if there are not sufficient funds in the escrow account to cover the items. Reg. X, 24 C.F.R. § 3500.17(k)(2). RESPA creates an express right of action for a servicer’s failure to make payments from an escrow account for taxes, insurance and other charges “in a timely manner as such payments become due.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(g). Regulation X provides that this obligation to make timely disbursements out of escrow does not apply when the “borrower’s payment is more than 30 days overdue.” Reg. X, 24 C.F.R. § 3500.17(k)(1), (2) The regulation has no explanation of this limitation. It could be interpreted to mean that a servicer has no obligation to timely disburse payments for taxes and insurance or other charges whenever the home owner’s mortgage payment is more than thirty days late at the time the disbursement becomes due, even if there are sufficient funds in the escrow account to cover the disbursement.

7. The regulation should not give an exemption to a servicer who wrongly claimed that the borrower was late with payments at the time the disbursement was required, or if timely payments are being made under a forbearance or repayment agreement. If the exemption does not apply, the servicer must pay escrow items such as taxes and insurance timely even if there are not sufficient funds in the escrow account to cover the
items.[ Reg. X, 24 C.F.R. § 3500.17(k)(2) The application of the regulation denies a servicer an opportunity to force-placed insurance from another carrier in this situation. The servicer is required to pay the insurance premium on the borrower’s policy when due by advancing funds. Any escrow deficiency resulting from the advance is paid by the borrower through an adjustment to future escrow payments following an escrow
account analysis.

It is important for homeowners to know that;

RESPA – provides a private cause of action for violation of its prohibitions against misuse of escrowed funds, kickbacks from companies providing settlement services, and steering borrowers to title insurance companies. Either treble or statutory damages plus attorney’s fees are available for violations. RESPA also requires advance disclosures (Good Faith Estimate), and disclosure at settlement of settlement costs in real estate transactions. While the statute does not create a private cause of
action for disclosure violations, analyzing the disclosures often reveals Truth in Lending and HOEPA violations.

The bankruptcy mentors say that to avoid the Reg X 30-day default exception, an argument can be made that the exception does not apply after confirmation of the plan. The reason is that the confirmation designates the account as reinstated. In re Jones, 2007 WL 1112047 (Bankr.E.D.La. Apr 13, 2007)(plan confirmation “recalibrates” the
amounts due as of the petition date); In re Wines, 239 B.R. 703 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1999) (post-petition mortgage debt treated like a current mortgage and consists of those payments which come due after the bankruptcy petition is filed. Ongoing postpetition payments, including escrow amounts and timely disbursements, should be treated under the terms of the note and mortgage as if no default exist. The Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Single-Family Uniform Instrument for a mortgage or deed of trust
(Section 3, entitled “Funds for Escrow Items”), requires the servicer to maintain the escrow account in compliance with RESPA. A provision in the plan can require the servicer to comply with the RESPA escrow account requirements during the administration of the plan.

The general RESPA preemption provision provides that state laws are
preempted only to the extent of their inconsistency with RESPA. 12 U.S.C. § 2616. State laws providing greater protections to borrowers than RESPA that are not inconsistent with RESPA are not preempted.

– Citation: 12 U.S.C. §2601, et seq. 24 C.F.R. Part 3500 (Regulation X) 64 Fed. Reg. 10079 (HUD Policy Statement on lender paid broker fees)

– Liable Parties: Lender Broker, if not exclusive agent or lender,
Servicer, Title Company

– Actionable Wrongs: Failure to give Good Faith Estimate; disclose other credit-related information and give HUD-1 Settlement Statement and servicing statements; Payment or acceptance of kickbacks or referral
fees; Making charges for which no identifiable services are provided; Improper servicing of loan.

– Remedies: Three times amount of illegal charges Attorney fees

– Limitations: 1 year to bring an affirmative claim No limit if raised by way of recoupment

Hirsch v. Bank of America, 328 F. 3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2003). (provides a two-part test in analyzing RESPA kickback violations involving a mortgage broker. First, the court must “determine whether the broker has provided goods or services of the kind typically associated with a mortgage transaction.” Then, the court must “determine whether the total compensation paid to the broker is reasonably related to the total value of the goods or services actually provided.”

Recently followed by: Culpepper v. Irwin Mortg. Corp., 20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 824 (11th Cir. Ala. July 2, 2007) (applying two part test)

§ 203.508 Providing information.

(a) Mortgagees shall provide loan information to mortgagors and arrange for individual loan consultation on request. The mortgagee must establish written procedures and controls to assure prompt responses to inquiries.

(c) Within thirty days after the end of each calendar year, the mortgagee shall furnish to the mortgagor a statement of the interest paid, and of the taxes disbursed from the escrow account during the preceding year. At the mortgagor’s request, the mortgagee shall furnish a statement of the escrow account sufficient to enable the mortgagor to reconcile the account.

(d) Mortgagees must respond to HUD requests for information concerning individual accounts.

(e) Each servicer of a mortgage shall deliver to the mortgagor a written notice of any assignment, sale, or transfer of the servicing of the mortgage. The notice must be sent in accordance with the provisions of § 3500.21(e)(1) of this title and shall contain the information required by § 3500.21(e)(2) of this title. Servicers must respond to mortgagor inquiries pertaining to the transfer of servicing in accordance with §3500.21(f) of this title.

§ 203.550 Escrow accounts.
It is the mortgagee’s responsibility to make escrow disbursements before bills become delinquent. Mortgagees must establish controls to insure that bills payable from the escrow fund or the information needed to pay such bills is obtained on a timely basis. Penalties for late payments for items payable from the escrow account must not be charged to the mortgagor unless it can be shown that the penalty was the direct
result of the mortgagor’s error or omission. The mortgagee shall use the procedures set forth in § 3500.17 of this title, implementing Section 10 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (12 U.S.C. 2609), to compute the amount of the escrow, the methods of collection and accounting, and the payment of the bills for which the money has been escrowed.

In the case of escrow accounts created for purposes of § 203.52 or § 234.64 of this chapter, mortgagees may estimate escrow requirements based on the best information available as to probable payments that will be required to be made from the account on a periodic basis throughout the period during which the account is maintained.

The mortgagee shall not institute foreclosure when the only default of the mortgagor occupant is a present inability to pay a substantial escrow shortage, resulting from an adjustment pursuant to this section, in a lump sum.

When the contract of mortgage insurance is terminated voluntarily or because of prepayment in full, sums in the escrow account to pay the mortgage insurance premiums shall be remitted to HUD with a form approved by the Secretary for reporting the voluntary termination of prepayment. Upon prepayment in full sums held in escrow for taxes and hazard insurance shall be released to the mortgagor promptly.

When Homeowners good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at http://www.fightforeclosure.net “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

How Homeowners Can Effectively Defend Their Foreclosure

07 Tuesday Jan 2014

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, MERS, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, RESPA, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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If you have found yourself in an unfortunate situation of having to challenge a foreclosure lawsuit. Before you file your answer, I recommend that you have the Plaintiff’s attorney verify your debt. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, or FDCPA for short, states that any borrower undergoing a foreclosure proceeding against them has the opportunity to question the amounts owed, as long as the request for verification is made within thirty days of the Complaint being filed. It is very important to act quickly. The FDCPA verification letter does more than just verify the amount of money you owe; it also acts like a pause button to the foreclosure action.

The Plaintiff’s attorney may not proceed with the foreclosure until they verify your debt by sending the FDCPA debt verification letter to the same address where you were originally served, or to a different address that you specify. The production and mailing of this letter usually takes about a month, so you just bought yourself thirty days just by mailing a letter to the Plaintiff’s attorney. In this game, time is more valuable than money. Any stall tactics we can successfully implement are priceless.

If you’ve been served with a foreclosure lawsuit or expect one in the near future, it’s essential to know what foreclosure defenses may be available to help you dismiss, delay or win your case.

Because foreclosure laws differ from state to state and sometimes county to county within each state, we strongly urge you to hire a lawyer in your area to handle the case if at all possible. Whether you hire an attorney or defend your own foreclosure lawsuit, the more you know the more likely you’ll succeed so learn all you can about the foreclosure phases in your state as well as possible foreclosure defenses applicable to your situation.

Types of Foreclosure Defenses

There are six general categories of foreclosure defenses, also known as “affirmative defenses” in Florida and other states – defective service of the lawsuit documents, loan closing related defenses, breach of contract, standing/chain of title issues, fraud and misrepresentation and “catch all” defenses that may protect your rights if other defenses fail.

Once you identify your foreclosure defenses, you’ll either list them in the Answer to Your Foreclosure Lawsuit, as part of a Motion to Dismiss before filing your answer or as grounds for a counterclaim against the bank. Depending on the foreclosure defense involved, you may be able to use a combination of two and even all three of these options.

1. Defective Service of Process

In Judicial Foreclosure states which require the use of the court system to process foreclosures, the lawsuit itself and a summons must be personally delivered to you by a licensed process server. Referred to as “service of process”, there will be at least two documents involved consisting of the actual lawsuit and a summons for each defendant with instructions when and where to respond.

If the process server makes several legitimate but unsuccessful attempts to serve you, they’ll simply serve you by publishing notice of the lawsuit in the local newspaper so its generally better to accept the papers than hiding and hoping it goes away. The process server only gets paid if you get served so don’t expect them to give up and it’s safer to know what’s going on than missing important court deadlines because you never saw the legal notice in your newspaper.

Although it sounds pretty basic, sloppy paperwork and fraudulent practices have once again conspired to make this an important foreclosure defense for homeowners who were never served or served improperly. Defective service of process obviously includes instances when you were never served despite living in the property, but can also be when the process server didn’t take all the state required steps to find you, served a minor or the house next door, files false affidavits in court about who they served and when, forged signatures or backdated documents and a host of similar intentional and unintentional actions that may justify dismissing the lawsuit.

If this defense applies to you, it may be grounds for a motion to dismiss the foreclosure lawsuit and/or part of your answer to the lawsuit as an affirmative defense. Consult with an attorney in your area familiar with the local requirements for process servers if possible and include the defense as part of your lawsuit answer by stating something similar to “As a first affirmative defense, the service of process was defective.” This is just an example that should be modified in accordance with the local pleading rules for each county and state to make sure you meet the local requirements.

2. Loan Closing Related Defenses

There are several related foreclosure defenses we’ve grouped under this category that arise from federal disclosure requirements under the Truth in Lending Act(“TILA”)and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act(“RESPA”).

Each of these federal laws were created to help consumers by forcing lenders to disclose the material terms of your loan including the actual dollar amount of all finance charges over the life of your loan, a good faith estimate of potential closing costs provided to you prior to closing, an explanation of your three day right to cancel the entire loan transaction and other essential disclosure requirements that may result in the actual rescission of your loan documents under certain circumstances.

Because this is a very technical area requiring expertise in evaluating your HUD-1 closing statement and related documents that is beyond the scope of this discussion, we strongly suggest that you retain an attorney or experienced realtor to help you analyze your loan documents and determine if violations exist. If you suspect that there are deficiencies, there are several critical steps that must be taken to protect your rights including sending a “Notice of Rescission” to your lender before the lender corrects the defects.

3. Breach of Contract

Breach of Contract is one of the strongest foreclosure defenses available to homeowners and investors and may also be grounds for a motion to dismiss or counterclaim against the bank. Although the specific allegations can be similar to those made in other foreclosure defenses, breach of contract claims should almost always be used as a stand alone defense if sufficient facts exist.

Without providing a seminar on contract law, there are three basic elements to every breach of contract claim-a valid contract, breach of some obligation imposed by that contract, and damages specifically resulting from the breach itself. For example,your obligation as borrower under the contract (the loan documents) is to make timely payments of the amount you’ve agreed to pay, while the bank must also comply with its contractual requirements.

One of the most frequent breaches by the bank is purchasing “forced placed” insurance that is either unnecessary, overly expensive or both. The damage from the breach is your inability to make monthly payments because of the higher insurance costs and as a result, you would not have breached your obligation to make monthly payments if the bank hadn’t first breached its obligations by forcing you to pay more than your contract requires.

Other possible breaches by the bank include failing to comply with its own underwriting requirements in giving you loan terms that were unfair or not supported by your income. By offering no interest or adjustable rate loans that later skyrocketed upwards, balloon payments due in the midst of an economic crisis or even providing too much money for a loan they knew you couldn’t afford, the bank breached its contractual obligations in many respects.

Finally, additional examples include breach of the disclosure requirements in RESPA or TILA discussed above or failing to provide adequate notice of default and its intent to accelerate the payment requirements as specified in paragraph 22 or 23 of most mortgages.

No matter where you allege the breach of contract – in a motion to dismiss, answer or counterclaim – you need to be very specific about the facts. Thus, breach of contract as a defense in your answer should read something like “As a third affirmative defense, the bank breached the contract by purchasing forced place insurance that was either unnecessary or too expensive” or ” by failing to provide proper notice of its intent to accelerate the loan as required by paragraph 22/23 of my mortgage.”

Of course modify these examples to reflect your specific circumstances and to comply with local court rules and procedure. Even if you decide not to hire an attorney to defend your case, you can always hire a lawyer for an hour or two to help you meet local requirements.

4. Lack of Standing/Defective Chain of Title

Ask homeowners who owns their mortgage and most will confidently tell you its the company they pay each month. However, the answer is much more complicated as the original loan was almost certainly transferred several times since closing and at best you’re likely paying the loan servicing company not the original owner.

The importance of this defense – called “lack of standing” or “defective chain of title” – can’t be overstated as several courts have found fraudulent, backdated and inadequate loan documents in many cases and have actually dismissed foreclosure lawsuits with prejudice as a result. Lack of standing to sue and/or not owning the loan documents can be the grounds for a motion to dismiss, an affirmative defense in your answer or the basis for a counterclaim against the bank.

There are at least three important documents to review before deciding if this defense can help you – the mortgage or deed of trust, the promissory note and any assignments involved in transferring the loan from one bank to another. The current owner of your loan must have physical possession of each of these original “wet ink” documents and every transfer must be properly endorsed on the documents and recorded in the county where the property is located together with payment of recording and doc stamp fees. Finally, make sure the current assignment was dated prior to the the date the foreclosure lawsuit is filed with the court.

With the huge number of mortgages transactions, many banks have no idea where the original documents are, most failed to properly record each transfer or assignment and in too many situations actually forged or backdated documents in an effort to meet legal requirements. In fact a recent Reuters investigation involved a random review of foreclosure files from five different states and found more than 1000 questionable mortgage assignments, promissory notes with missing or faulty endorsements and foreclosure lawsuits containing multiple inaccurate facts.

During the early stages of the foreclosure crisis, the bank’s strategy of filing lawsuits without proper documentation worked well and many people unnecessarily lost their homes as a result. However, recent court decisions have refused to endorse these illegal bank schemes and have required compliance with basic evidence standards instead. To proceed with foreclosure lawsuits, most courts now require proof that the banks have physical possession of the original documents and further require evidence to show how they got the documents and that the chain of title is not defective.

A couple of additional issues to watch out for are any cases involving “MERS” as the plaintiff in your foreclosure lawsuit and whether or not a loan servicing company has authority from the mortgage owner to file suit and confirming that the owner even has authority to do so. MERS stands for the “Mortgage Electronic Registration System” banks created in an attempt to hide mortgage transactions from public scrutiny and avoid paying recording fees for each transfer. Most courts have finally decided that MERS has no standing to sue homeowners so be sure to raise any and all defenses related to this issue.

For more information on MERS and the illegal and fraudulent actions of banks and lenders involved in the foreclosure fiasco, we strongly recommend an excellent site by Greg Hunter called USA Watchdog.com which contains numerous interesting and well researched articles on the subject overall.

As you can see from this very brief discussion, lack of standing and figuring out who owns your mortgage is both an important defense and complicated subject. As a result, we strongly urge you to retain an attorney to handle your case if these issues arise or at minimum consult with a lawyer for a couple of hours to help you focus on the right issues and discuss strategies to get documents the banks refuse to provide.

When raising this issue as an affirmative defense in your answer, it should read something like “As a fourth affirmative defense, the plaintiff lacks standing to sue as a result of a defective chain of title and related issues.” As always, modify this example to reflect your specific circumstances and to comply with local court rules.

5. “Catch All” Foreclosure Defenses

“Catch All” foreclosure defenses refer to procedural devices and general defenses to make sure you raise all possible issues that may help you and/or to supplement other applicable defenses that are missing one or more of their required elements.

The first defense in this category is called “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” and the second is “the failure to comply with conditions precedent.”

The failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is similar in concept to the breach of contract and lack of standing defenses raised above and generally addresses deficiencies in the required documentation and whether or not the plaintiff is the actual owner of your loan and has the right to sue you. The defense can be used as grounds for a motion to dismiss or as an affirmative defense in your answer, but is rarely used to support a counterclaim against the bank. Even though the defense may overlap with other applicable defenses, it’s almost always worthwhile to list as an additional affirmative defense.

The second “catch all” defense is the failure to comply with conditions precedent and covers issues ranging from the failure to provide proper and timely notice of default and the bank’s intention to accelerate your loan payments and/or failing to properly attach the required documents to the foreclosure lawsuit. Again, it’s almost always worthwhile to list this as an additional affirmative defense to cover areas you may have missed.

6. Fraud and Misrepresentation Foreclosure Defenses

The final category of defenses addressed in this article are fraud and misrepresentation by the bank, the loan servicing company or the mortgage broker on behalf of the bank. Although this defense may be right on point for many of the improper actions by the bank, the pleading requirements are much more difficult for anything related to fraud and thus require far more detail than the defenses raised above.

This doesn’t mean you shouldn’t use this defense if sufficient grounds exist, but be prepared to state the exact nature of the fraud or misrepresentation, when it occurred and in what context as well as any additional information you may have. Because many of these issues require discovery and review of bank documents you may not have at the time you respond to the foreclosure lawsuit, courts may dismiss your defense until you have more information. Remember you can always amend your answer at a later date once you have the necessary information, so make sure you have enough evidence initially before deciding to include this as a defense. The idea is not to throw everything in and hope something works as the bank and courts will see through this strategy and minimize your credibility even though legitimate defenses exist.

Your affirmative defense should read something like “As a sixth affirmative defense, the bank is guilty of fraud and misrepresentation in the following manner” and then include the facts necessary to support your allegations. If possible, meet with an attorney to help you identify any potential fraud and help comply with local court pleading requirements.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will help you challenge these fraudsters and save your home from foreclosure visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

Foreclosure Defenses v Motion to Dismiss Strategy

28 Saturday Dec 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Your Legal Rights

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Affirmative defense, Complaint, Defendant, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Lawsuit, Motions, Summary judgment, United States federal courts

§ 6.5 Motions to Dismiss Generally

(a) Motions to Dismiss: Strategy

Why is discussion of motions to dismiss placed before the section on answering the complaint? The reason is that every complaint must at one point be evaluated to determine whether or not dismissal would be appropriate, even though many such motions fail. If a strong motion to dismiss can be made, it should be seriously considered. This is especially true where the motion is to be based on a fundamental insufficiency in the complaint, such that little factual investigation is required by the defense, and where answering the complaint and preparing affirmative defenses, counterclaims, cross claims or third party complaints would be a substantial undertaking.

There is also a conceptual reason: the idea of a motion to dismiss is that the complaint — or more specifically, the claim — is so lacking in merit that no answer is necessary. Certainly if that is the case, and it seems likely that the judge can be made to agree that dismissal is appropriate, there is no reason to start drafting an answer.

(b) Practical Considerations

Successful motions to dismiss a complaint are a rarity, more the subject of law school civil procedure classes than actual practice. There are several reasons for this. One is the modern doctrine mandating liberal pleadings standards. In effect this means that courts will look not so much at the artfulness in the drafting of the complaint as much as the substance of the purported claim. There is also a corollary to this doctrine: The courts have a general policy of determining actions on the merits.

The effect of these approaches must be fully appreciated when considering the seeming promise of motions to dismiss, especially motions for failure to state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6). Too often a brilliant motion to dismiss the complaint that ruthlessly exposes holes and inconsistencies in the pleadings results only in the plaintiff’s filing, at the court’s invitation, an amended complaint now free of all the deficiencies pointed out in the motion. All that is accomplished substantively is that the plaintiff has been forced to focus on its case and, with the assistance of the court’s decision on the dismissal motion, recast areas in which its complaint was weak. In the process the defendant has helped the plaintiff eliminate sinkholes and traps in the complaint that may have been useful to the defense on a later summary judgment motion or at trial. Furthermore, judges sometimes become de facto “advocates” of claims “revived” in their opinions denying motions to dismiss.

For these reasons a motion to dismiss a fundamentally meritorious claim based on technical deficiencies may not be worth the price of the motion and of the defense’s credibility with the judge. Faced with obvious weaknesses in the plaintiff’s case, it may be worth considering whether a stronger motion may be brought as a summary judgment application following a limited amount of discovery. In this instance keep in mind that many judges will not permit summary judgment motions prior to the close of discovery because of their wariness of “dueling affidavits” as a basis for making substantive rulings.

None of this is to say that there is no place for Rule 12(b) motions. There are times when the defendant simply should not have to appear in federal court, or at least not in the venue where suit has been brought. Perhaps there is an arbitration clause, bargained for at some cost, on which the defendant is entitled to rely. Some complaints are just too lacking in merit to be worthy of the defendant’s time and money. And though the phrase has become a cliche, in the right circumstance there is something to be said for “educating the judge” about a case by bringing a Rule 12 motion early on, even if, while meritorious, the motion may not be enough to end the proceedings.

§ 6.6 FRCP 12(b) Motions to Dismiss

(a) Time to Move

Just as with any other response to a complaint, a motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b) must be made within 20 days of receipt of the summons and complaint. Making the motion stops the clock on the answer itself, pursuant to FRCP 12(a)(4). This applies to the whole of the pleadings, regardless of what part of the complaint is the subject of the motion to dismiss. Therefore, it has been held that a motion to dismiss one count of a 10-count complaint stays the time to answer the entire complaint. Note, however, that this fact should not give rise to “creative” approaches to obtaining more time to answer the complaint. Courts have defaulted parties for filing frivolous FRCP 12 motions solely to extend time. If the motion is denied or postponed, the answer is due within 10 days of receiving notice of the court’s action.

As usual, an eye must be kept on discovery. Here local rules may govern whether discovery is stayed; or the judge may have a policy that is embodied in a standing order or that is simply stated to the parties when the motion is filed. The parties also may seek from the court either a stay of discovery or permission to proceed.

(b) Strategy: Defenses vs. Motions to Dismiss

FRCP 12(b) requires all defenses to be asserted in the answer, but directs that the following seven of them may be resolved by motion or merely left as defenses:

1. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction

2. Lack of personal jurisdiction

3. Improper venue

4. Insufficiency of process

5. Insufficiency of service of process

6. Failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted

7. Failure to join a party under Rule 19.

These seven are the Rule 12 bases for motions to dismiss. The question arises whether they should be invoked in such a motion, asserted as a defense, or both.

These grounds for dismissal should always be asserted as defenses if available in good faith, regardless of whether motion practice is intended when the answer is filed or even if motions have been brought and have failed on these bases. Ultimately, however, FRCP 12(d) requires that the merits of FRCP 12 defenses must be decided at some point before trial, unless the court decides otherwise. The exception to this is where the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, discussed in the next section.

(c) Subject Matter Jurisdiction, FRCP 12(b)(1)

As discussed in Chapter 1 “Subject Matter Jurisdiction” supra, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The complaint must state that the requirements of subject matter jurisdiction are met in the matter. More importantly, they must actually be met. If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it simply has no authority to decide the case — even if the parties are willing to waive objection or stipulate to the federal court’s jurisdiction.

For this reason, a challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction may be brought at any time, even after final judgment is entered and regardless of the prejudice that would result by dismissing the action after proceedings have been under way. On a motion challenging jurisdiction, the court tests the existence of subject matter jurisdiction as of the date the lawsuit was filed, not later. It is not a useful strategy, therefore, to attempt to deprive the court of jurisdiction in a diversity case after the suit is filed by having the defendant move its domicile to the same state as the plaintiff.

As the party invoking the federal court’s jurisdiction, the plaintiff must show that it has the right to do so. Therefore, once the defendant attacks the basis of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it has shifted the burden of coming forward to the plaintiff.

§ 6.7 Motions to Dismiss Under FRCP 12(b)(6)

(a) Introduction

The successful FRCP 12(b)(6) application is the home run of motions. It is a challenge made at the very beginning of a case and strikes at the very heart of the lawsuit. It is a statement that even if the plaintiff were given every benefit of the doubt and everything it claimed were true, the plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed — either because it is not legally cognizable or because sufficient facts have not been alleged to make out a cognizable claim.

When considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the court presumes that all the allegations of the complaint are true; it resolves all doubts or inferences in the plaintiff’s favor; and it reads the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Needless to say, the burden of proof on such a motion is on the party making it. No material from outside the pleadings may be considered or the motion will be considered one for summary judgment (see Section 6.7(d), infra).

Given all these benefits and the liberal pleading requirements of the Rules, all the plaintiff has to do to survive the motion is make out some sort of claim for which a court might provide relief. For every home run, therefore, there are innumerably more strikeouts or at best routine hits (i.e., when partial dismissal is granted as to some claims). The purpose of this section is to assist in picking the right pitches, and to consider when a “long out” (see Section 6.7(c)(3), “Educating the Judge,” infra) can have the desired effect, even though the ball stays in the park.

(b) Issues to Raise with Clients

There is little that is more satisfying in commercial litigation defense than winning a dramatic 12(b)(6) motion on behalf of a defendant eager to end a potentially expensive and vexatious court case. Conversely, the attorney should visualize the expression on the client representative’s face as he realizes the implications of an unsuccessful 12(b)(6) motion in a commercial case — unless he has been adequately counseled about the potential costs, risks and rewards involved in the undertaking.

Because the plaintiff is given every benefit of the doubt in both law and fact, the 12(b)(6) motion theoretically requires the movant to “play out” every factual scenario demonstrate that the pleading alleges enough facts to state a claim to relief that is “plausible” within the four corners of the complaint. Similarly, every plausible legal theory that might provide relief to the plaintiff, based on the facts pleaded, must be considered.

For this reason the 12(b)(6) motion can, in some instances, be more costly and difficult than a summary judgment motion, though the motion to dismiss does not usually involve extensive affidavits as does a summary judgment application. In the latter proceeding, however, it is easier to limit the factual scenario that must be considered by submission of competent evidence that circumscribes the possibilities sketched out by the pleadings. That is harder to do under 12(b)(6), though much depends on the judge’s inclinations.

Indeed, as a final caveat to the 12(b)(6) approach, practitioners should advise their clients that granting the motion takes a certain level of judicial confidence that not every court can muster. The number of cases overturning 12(b)(6) dismissals surely dwarfs those that affirm such rulings, and it is the path of least resistance simply to decree that it would be more appropriate to decide the issues after “some discovery” has been taken. This seems to the judge like not deciding the motion, and in a sense it is; yet it is a denial of the motion, for the effects of which the defendant must be prepared.

Still and all there is a place for the judicious use of a 12(b)(6) motion. That place is not only the obvious case where the complaint puts forth a cause of action that is plainly not justifiable (e.g., seeking damages for invasion of privacy arising from the defendant’s alleged use of microwave beams to read the plaintiff’s mind5). The scenarios in which a 12(b)(6) motion is appropriate will be discussed below in Section 6.7(c). The critical point is to lay out the risks, rewards and benefits clearly for the client to allow a maximally informed choice about whether to proceed.

(c) Reasons to Bring a 12(b)(6) Motion

Despite the long odds, there are several reasons why a defendant might bring a 12(b)(6) motion, only one of which is that it might succeed in full:

(1) Elimination of Plainly Nonjusticiable Cases

It should go without saying that a 12(b)(6) motion is the appropriate vehicle for certain lawsuits that, on simple inspection, do not make out claims for legal relief. There is some point where even the minimal pleading requirements are not met, where even given every benefit of the doubt, the facts alleged cannot in any way be scrambled to create a cause of action. Identifying the line between the obvious and the less obvious candidates for inclusion in this category requires a certain amount of experience, but it can fairly be said that some complaints fall into the category of “I [the judge] know it when I see it.”

This must be contrasted, however, with the situation where the plaintiff has pleaded facts that in themselves may add up to a valid legal claim but has set forth inappropriate legal theories as the basis for recovery. Dismissal will not be granted when this is the case, though if the complaint is truly incomprehensible, the defendant may be entitled to relief under FRCP 12(e), a motion for a more definite statement (see Section 6.8(c), infra).

(2) Cutting off Novel Legal Theories

Faced with a complaint, some commercial clients may have an interest, eminently reasonable, in “snuffing out” novel legal theories put forth or even suggested by the complaint. Such theories of recovery may pose a larger threat to some defendants’ interests than the immediate pending litigation. In such cases clients might put a very high premium on delivering a crashing blow to the plaintiff and discouraging similar litigation by those similarly situated.

These are the situations, however, where fully apprising the client of the range of possibilities under 12(b)(6) is essential. The unsuccessful 12(b)(6) motion in this situation may be far worse than no motion at all and will, in all likelihood, have precisely the opposite effect from the one intended because the judge may help the plaintiff articulate the theory better. Since most 12(b)(6) motions are unsuccessful, taking this approach is one of the more daring maneuvers in commercial litigation.

The risk of this preemptive strike strategy, great as it is inherently, is heightened by a line of authority stating that it is precisely where novel legal theories are proffered that dismissal is inappropriate, on the theory that development in discovery — the bugaboo of motions to dismiss — can help the court assess the propriety of the claim.

(3) “Educating the Judge”

There may be some situations, as discussed in Section 6.5(b), supra, where a 12(b)(6) motion is an appropriate vehicle to put the defendant’s prima facie case in front of the judge, even though it is not likely to prevail. (Of course, it must still be brought in good faith, i.e., counsel must believe that it could prevail.) For example, a motion driven by the “educating the judge” goal could be useful if a fairly short track until trial is anticipated and collateral issues, or some “straw man” in the complaint, could unduly sway the court to the plaintiff’s point of view, affecting interlocutory decisions or even the trial. Similarly, the 12(b)(6) motion could clarify for the court early on just how high a burden of proof the plaintiff will have to meet to make its case. Here the 12(b)(6) motion is a way of amplifying and framing the defense in a way that the answer, even with properly crafted affirmative defenses, cannot do.

There are risks in this strategy. One is that judges can usually recognize it from afar and may not appreciate what may seem like manipulation. Another is the likelihood that in complex litigation a long discovery and motion schedule, and the attendant involvement of a magistrate, stand between the pleadings stage and trial. In that case the judge’s preliminary opinion on the merits of the respective parties will matter less than the magistrate’s view of the proper scope of interrogatories.

(4) Educating the Adversary

When facing a plaintiff whose litigation posture is vulnerable, a forceful motion may be the right tactic. Even a less assailable plaintiff may greet a motion to dismiss, and the attendant effort required to defend against it, with a new sense of realism about the ultimate sustainability of its claim or its desire to proceed as well as about the defendant’s resources and abilities.

(5) Partial Dismissal

Finally, the utility of a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) should be considered in light of the availability of partial dismissal, i.e., dismissal of only part of a complaint or of some but not all counts of a complaint.

This tool can be very powerful in the defense of commercial cases. Many cases involving multiple counts, often including fraud, conspiracy or RICO claims, merely come down to a basic dispute over a contract. Besides providing spurious bases for federal jurisdiction, illegitimate counts such as those are added because they make available punitive, treble or other enhanced damages as well as attorneys’ fees, none of which are normally available in contract actions. Often these “add ons” can be eliminated early, even before discovery, because many such claims have specific pleading requirements that act as gatekeepers at the earliest stage of the litigation. If it is successful with a partial dismissal motion, the defendant can:

– close off potentially dangerous or unreasonably burdensome areas of discovery;

– knock the wind out of a complaint’s sails and perhaps cause the plaintiff to question its counsel’s judgment; and

– fulfill the “education of the judge” function by undermining the credibility of the plaintiff’s claims as well as its way of presenting them to the court.

(d) Conversion into Summary Judgment Motion

If materials extrinsic to the pleadings are submitted to the court in support of or in opposition to a 12(b)(6) motion, the court does not have to consider them. Under FRCP 12(b), however, once the court does consider such matter the motion is automatically “converted” to a motion for summary judgment pursuant to FRCP 56.

Material does not literally have to be bound into the complaint to be considered “intrinsic” to it and a proper part of the consideration of a 12(b)(6) motion, without a “conversion” taking place. Courts have considered, on motions under 12(b)(6), SEC filings and other public records, legislative histories, concurrently or earlier filed pleadings and papers not part of the motion, and any documents incorporated by reference in the pleadings. It can fairly be said that any oral or written evidence not already “in the record” — public or court, physically or by reference — is regarded as “extrinsic” and will spur a conversion.

If the court does convert the 12(b)(6) motion to a summary judgment motion, it opens the door for all parties to submit their own evidence in support of the motion. [Update: It must therefore give the parties an opportunity to make the appropriate submissions.] Rather than entertain a full blown summary judgment motion at this stage, most judges will simply deny the motion until “the record is developed.”

(e) Procedure

Motion practice in general is discussed in Chapter 24 “Motion Practice,” infra. Regarding the 12(b)(6) motion in particular, take note of FRCP 12(d) which authorizes, subject to the court’s discretion, the motion hearing that is the essence of 12(b)(6) practice.

Wrongful Foreclosure Homeowner Wins – State Law Prevailed While Securitizatiion Failed

22 Sunday Dec 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, Loan Modification, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, Securitization, State Court, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Bank of America, California Court of Appeal, Deed of Trust, Foreclosure, Glaski, New York, Thomas Glaski, Washington Mutual

CASE STUDY:

INTRODUCTION

Many of the loans went into default, which led to nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings.

Some of the foreclosures generated lawsuits, which raised a wide variety of claims.

The allegations that the instant case shares with some of the other lawsuits are that

(1) documents related to the foreclosure contained forged signatures of Deborah Brignac and (2) the foreclosing entity was not the true owner of the loan because its chain of ownership had been broken by a defective transfer of the loan to the securitized trust established for the mortgage-backed securities. Here, the specific defect alleged is that the attempted transfers were made after the closing date of the securitized trust holding the pooled mortgages and therefore the transfers were ineffective.

In this appeal, the borrower contends the trial court erred by sustaining defendants’ demurrer as to all of his causes of action attacking the nonjudicial foreclosure. We conclude that, although the borrower’s allegations are somewhat confusing and may contain contradictions, he nonetheless has stated a wrongful foreclosure claim under the lenient standards applied to demurrers. We conclude that a borrower may challenge the securitized trust’s chain of ownership by alleging the attempts to transfer the deed of trust to the securitized trust (which was formed under New York law) occurred after the trust’s closing date. Transfers that violate the terms of the trust instrument are void under New York trust law, and borrowers have standing to challenge void assignments of their loans even though they are not a party to, or a third party beneficiary of, the assignment agreement.

H. Causes of Action Stated Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Glaski’s fourth cause of action has stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure. It follows that Glaski also has stated claims for quiet title (third cause of action), declaratory relief (fifth cause of action), cancellation of instruments (eighth cause of action), and unfair business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200 (ninth cause of action).

We therefore reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

THOMAS A. GLASKI, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION et al. Defendants and Respondents.

No. F064556.
Court of Appeals of California, Fifth District.
Filed July 31, 2013.
Publish order August 8, 2013.
Law Offices of Richard L. Antognini and Richard L. Antognini; Law Offices of Catarina M. Benitez and Catarina M. Benitez, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

AlvaradoSmith, Theodore E. Bacon, and Mikel A. Glavinovich, for Defendants and Respondents.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
OPINION

FRANSON, J.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Before Washington Mutual Bank, FA (WaMu) was seized by federal banking regulators in 2008, it made many residential real estate loans and used those loans as collateral for mortgage-backed securities.[1] Many of the loans went into default, which led to nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. Some of the foreclosures generated lawsuits, which raised a wide variety of claims. The allegations that the instant case shares with some of the other lawsuits are that (1) documents related to the foreclosure contained forged signatures of Deborah Brignac and (2) the foreclosing entity was not the true owner of the loan because its chain of ownership had been broken by a defective transfer of the loan to the securitized trust established for the mortgage-backed securities. Here, the specific defect alleged is that the attempted transfers were made after the closing date of the securitized trust holding the pooled mortgages and therefore the transfers were ineffective.

We therefore reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS – The Loan

Thomas A. Glaski, a resident of Fresno County, is the plaintiff and appellant in this lawsuit. The operative second amended complaint (SAC) alleges the following: In July 2005, Glaski purchased a home in Fresno for $812,000 (the Property). To finance the purchase, Glaski obtained a $650,000 loan from WaMu. Initial monthly payments were approximately $1,700. Glaski executed a promissory note and a deed of trust that granted WaMu a security interest in the Property (the Glaski deed of trust). Both documents were dated July 6, 2005. The Glaski deed of trust identified WaMu as the lender and the beneficiary, defendant California Reconveyance Company (California Reconveyance) as the trustee, and Glaski as the borrower.

Paragraph 20 of the Glaski deed of trust contained the traditional terms of a deed of trust and states that the note, together with the deed of trust, can be sold one or more times without prior notice to the borrower. In this case, a number of transfers purportedly occurred. The validity of attempts to transfer Glaski’s note and deed of trust to a securitized trust is a fundamental issue in this appeal.

Paragraph 22—another provision typical of deeds of trust—sets forth the remedies available to the lender in the event of a default. Those remedies include (1) the lender’s right to accelerate the debt after notice to the borrower and (2) the lender’s right to “invoke the power of sale” after the borrower has been given written notice of default and of the lender’s election to cause the property to be sold. Thus, under the Glaski deed of trust, it is the lender-beneficiary who decides whether to pursue nonjudicial foreclosure in the event of an uncured default by the borrower. The trustee implements the lender-beneficiary’s decision by conducting the nonjudicial foreclosure.[2]

Glaski’s loan had an adjustable interest rate, which caused his monthly loan payment to increase to $1,900 in August 2006 and to $2,100 in August 2007. In August 2008, Glaski attempted to work with WaMu’s loan modification department to obtain a modification of the loan. There is no dispute that Glaski defaulted on the loan by failing to make the monthly installment payments.

Creation of the WaMu Securitized Trust

In late 2005, the WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-AR17 Trust was formed as a common law trust (WaMu Securitized Trust) under New York law. The corpus of the trust consists of a pool of residential mortgage notes purportedly secured by liens on residential real estate. La Salle Bank, N.A., was the original trustee for the WaMu Securitized Trust.[3] Glaski alleges that the WaMu Securitized Trust has no continuing duties other than to hold assets and to issue various series of certificates of investment. A description of the certificates of investment as well as the categories of mortgage loans is included in the prospectus filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on October 21, 2005. Glaski alleges that the investment certificates issued by the WaMu Securitized Trust were duly registered with the SEC.

The closing date for the WaMu Securitized Trust was December 21, 2005, or 90 days thereafter. Glaski alleges that the attempt to assign his note and deed of trust to the WaMu Securitized Trust was made after the closing date and, therefore, the assignment was ineffective. (See fn. 12, post.)

WaMu’s Failure and Transfers of the Loan

In September 2008, WaMu was seized by the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed as a receiver for WaMu. That same day, the FDIC, in its capacity as receiver, sold the assets and liabilities of WaMu to defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., (JP Morgan). This transaction was documented by a “PURCHASE AND ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT WHOLE BANK” (boldface and underlining omitted) between the FDIC and JP Morgan dated as of September 25, 2008. If Glaski’s loan was not validly transferred to the WaMu Securitized Trust, it is possible, though not certain, that JP Morgan acquired the Glaski deed of trust when it purchased WaMu assets from the FDIC.[4] JP Morgan also might have acquired the right to service the loans held by the WaMu Securitized Trust.

In September 2008, Glaski spoke to a representative of defendant Chase Home Finance LLC (Chase),[5] which he believed was an agent of JP Morgan, and made an oral agreement to start the loan modification process. Glaski believed that Chase had taken over loan modification negotiations from WaMu.

On December 9, 2008, two documents related to the Glaski deed of trust were recorded with the Fresno County Recorder: (1) an “ASSIGNMENT OF DEED OF TRUST” and (2) a “NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND ELECTION TO SELL UNDER DEED OF TRUST” (boldface omitted; hereinafter the NOD). The assignment stated that JP Morgan transferred and assigned all beneficial interest under the Glaski deed of trust to “LaSalle Bank NA as trustee for WaMu [Securitized Trust]” together with the note described in and secured by the Glaski deed of trust.[6]

Notice of Default and Sale of the Property

The NOD informed Glaski that (1) the Property was in foreclosure because he was behind in his payments[7] and (2) the Property could be sold without any court action. The NOD also stated that “the present beneficiary under” the Glaski deed of trust had delivered to the trustee a written declaration and demand for sale. According to the NOD, all sums secured by the deed of trust had been declared immediately due and payable and that the beneficiary elected to cause the Property to be sold to satisfy that obligation.

The NOD stated the amount of past due payments was $11,200.78 as of December 8, 2008.[8] It also stated: “To find out the amount you must pay, or to arrange for payment to stop the foreclosure, … contact: JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, at 7301 BAYMEADOWS WAY, JACKSONVILLE, FL 32256, (877) 926-8937.”

Approximately three months after the NOD was recorded and served, the next official step in the nonjudicial foreclosure process occurred. On March 12, 2009, a “NOTICE OF TRUSTEE’S SALE” was recorded by the Fresno County Recorder (notice of sale). The sale was scheduled for April 1, 2009. The notice stated that Glaski was in default under his deed of trust and estimated the amount owed at $734,115.10.

The notice of sale indicated it was signed on March 10, 2009, by Deborah Brignac, as Vice President for California Reconveyance. Glaski alleges that Brignac’s signature was forged to effectuate a fraudulent foreclosure and trustee’s sale of his primary residence.

Glaski alleges that from March until May 2009, he was led to believe by his negotiations with Chase that a loan modification was in process with JP Morgan.

Despite these negotiations, a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the Property was conducted on May 27, 2009. Bank of America, as successor trustee for the WaMu Securitized Trust and beneficiary under the Glaski deed of trust, was the highest bidder at the sale.

On June 15, 2009, another “ASSIGNMENT OF DEED OF TRUST” was recorded with the Fresno County Recorder. This assignment, like the assignment recorded in December 2008, identified JP Morgan as the assigning party. The entity receiving all beneficial interest under the Glaski deed of trust was identified as Bank of America, “as successor by merger to `LaSalle Bank NA as trustee for WaMu [Securitized Trust]. …”[9] The assignment of deed of trust indicates it was signed by Brignac, as Vice President for JP Morgan. Glaski alleges that Brignac’s signature was forged.

The very next document filed by the Fresno County Recorder on June 15, 2009, was a “TRUSTEE’S DEED UPON SALE.” (Boldface omitted.) The trustee’s deed upon sale stated that California Reconveyance, as the duly appointed trustee under the Glaski deed of trust, granted and conveyed to Bank of America, as successor by merger to La Salle NA as trustee for the WaMu Securitized Trust, all of its right, title and interest to the Property. The trustee’s deed upon sale stated that the amount of the unpaid debt and costs was $738,238.04 and that the grantee, paid $339,150 at the trustee’s sale, either in lawful money or by credit bid.

PROCEEDINGS

In October 2009, Glaski filed his original complaint. In August 2011, Glaski filed the SAC, which alleged the following numbered causes of action:

(1) Fraud against JPMorgan and California Reconveyance for the alleged forged signatures of Deborah Brignac as vice president for California Reconveyance and then as vice president of JPMorgan;

(2) Fraud against all defendants for their failure to timely and properly transfer the Glaski loan to the WaMu Securitized Trust and their representations to the contrary;

(3) Quiet title against Bank of America, Chase, and California Reconveyance based on the broken chain of title caused by the defective transfer of the loan to the WaMu Securitized Trust;

(4) Wrongful foreclosure against all defendants, based on the forged signatures of Deborah Brignac and the failure to timely and properly transfer the Glaski loan to the WaMu Securitized Trust;

(5) Declaratory relief against all defendants, based on the above acts by defendants;

(8) Cancellation of various foreclosure documents against all defendants, based on the above acts by the defendants; and

(9) Unfair practices under California Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq., against all defendants.

Among other things, Glaski raised questions regarding the chain of ownership, by contending that the defendants were not the lender or beneficiary under his deed of trust and, therefore, did not have the authority to foreclose.

In September 2011, defendants filed a demurrer that challenged each cause of action in the SAC on the grounds that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a claim for relief. With respect to the wrongful foreclosure cause of action, defendants argued that Glaski failed to allege (1) any procedural irregularity that would justify setting aside the presumptively valid trustee’s sale and (2) that he could tender the amount owed if the trustee’s sale were set aside.

To support their demurrer to the SAC, defendants filed a request for judicial notice concerning (1) Order No. 2008-36 of the Office of Thrift Supervision, dated September 25, 2008, appointing the FDIC as receiver of Washington Mutual Bank and (2) the Purchase and Assumption Agreement Whole Bank between the FDIC and JP Morgan dated as of September 25, 2008, concerning the assets, deposits and liabilities of Washington Mutual Bank.[10]

Glaski opposed the demurrer, arguing that breaks in the chain of ownership of his deed of trust were sufficiently alleged. He asserted that Brignac’s signature was forged and the assignment bearing that forgery was void. His opposition also provided a more detailed explanation of his argument that his deed of trust had not been effectively transferred to the WaMu Securitized Trust that held the pool of mortgage loans. Thus, in Glaski’s view, Bank of America’s claim as the successor trustee is flawed because the trust never held his loan.

On November 15, 2011, the trial court heard argument from counsel regarding the demurrer. Counsel for Glaski argued, among other things, that the possible ratification of the allegedly forged signatures of Brignac presented an issue of fact that could not be resolved at the pleading stage.

Later that day, the court filed a minute order adopting its tentative ruling. As background for the issues presented in this appeal, we will describe the trial court’s ruling on Glaski’s two fraud causes of action and his wrongful foreclosure cause of action.

The ruling stated that the first cause of action for fraud was based on an allegation that defendants misrepresented material information by causing a forged signature to be placed on the June 2009 assignment of deed of trust. The ruling stated that if the signature of Brignac was forged, California Reconveyance “ratified the signature by treating it as valid.” As an additional rationale, the ruling cited Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1149 (Gomes) for the proposition that the exhaustive nature of California’s nonjudicial foreclosure scheme prohibited the introduction of additional requirements challenging the authority of the lender’s nominee to initiate nonjudicial foreclosure.

As to the second cause of action for fraud, the ruling noted the allegation that the Glaski deed of trust was transferred to the WaMu Securitized Trust after the trust’s closing date and summarized the claim as asserting that the Glaski deed of trust had been improperly transferred and, therefore, the assignment was void ab initio. The ruling rejected this claim, stating: “[T]o reiterate, Gomes v. Countrywide, supra holds that there is no legal basis to challenge the authority of the trustee, mortgagee, beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents to initiate the foreclosure process citing Civil Code § 2924, subd. (a)(1).”

The ruling stated that the fourth cause of action for wrongful foreclosure was “based upon the invalidity of the foreclosure sale conducted on May 27, 2009 due to the `forged’ signature of Deborah Brignac and the failure of Defendants to `provide a chain of title of the note and the mortgage.’” The ruling stated that, as explained earlier, “these contentions are meritless” and sustained the general demurrer to the wrongful foreclosure claim without leave to amend.

Subsequently, a judgment of dismissal was entered and Glaski filed a notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court sustained the demurrer to the SAC on the ground that it did “not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) The standard of review applicable to such an order is well settled. “[W]e examine the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory. …” (McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415.)

When conducting this de novo review, “[w]e give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] Further, we treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citations.]” (City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 865.) Our consideration of the facts alleged includes “those evidentiary facts found in recitals of exhibits attached to a complaint.” (Satten v. Webb (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 365, 375.) “We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.” (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a) [use of judicial notice with demurrer].) Courts can take judicial notice of the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents, but do not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents. (Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, overruled on other grounds in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1262.) We note “in passing upon the question of the sufficiency or insufficiency of a complaint to state a cause of action, it is wholly beyond the scope of the inquiry to ascertain whether the facts stated are true or untrue” as “[t]hat is always the ultimate question to be determined by the evidence upon a trial of the questions of fact.” (Colm v. Francis (1916) 30 Cal.App. 742, 752.))

II. FRAUD
A. Rules for Pleading Fraud

The elements of a fraud cause of action are (1) misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of the falsity or scienter, (3) intent to defraud—that is, induce reliance, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damages. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) These elements may not be pleaded in a general or conclusory fashion. (Id. at p. 645.) Fraud must be pled specifically—that is, a plaintiff must plead facts that show with particularity the elements of the cause of action. (Ibid.)

In their demurrer, defendants contended facts establishing detrimental reliance were not alleged.

B. First Cause of Action for Fraud, Lack of Specific Allegations of Reliance

B. First Cause of Action for Fraud, Lack of Specific Allegations of Reliance

Glaski’s first cause of action, which alleges a fraud implemented through forged documents, alleges that defendants’ act “caused Plaintiff to rely on the recorded documents and ultimately lose the property which served as his primary residence, and caused Plaintiff further damage, proof of which will be made at trial.”

This allegation is a general allegation of reliance and damage. It does not identify the particular acts Glaski took because of the alleged forgeries. Similarly, it does not identify any acts that Glaski did not take because of his reliance on the alleged forgeries. Therefore, we conclude that Glaski’s conclusory allegation of reliance is insufficient under the rules of law that require fraud to be pled specifically. (Lazar v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 645.)

The next question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the demurrer to the first fraud cause of action without leave to amend.

In March 2011, the trial court granted Glaski leave to amend when ruling on defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court indicated that Glaski’s complaint had jumbled together many different statutes and theories of liability and directed Glaski to avoid “chain letter” allegations in his amended pleading.

Glaski’s first amended complaint set forth two fraud causes of action that are similar to those included in the SAC.

Defendants demurred to the first amended complaint. The trial court’s minute order states: “Plaintiff is advised for the last time to plead each cause of action such that only the essential elements for the claim are set forth without reincorporation of lengthy `general allegations’. In other words, the `facts’ to be pleaded are those upon which liability depends (i.e., `the facts constituting the cause of action’).”

After Glaski filed his SAC, defendants filed a demurrer. Glaski then filed an opposition that asserted he had properly alleged detrimental reliance. He did not argue he could amend to allege specifically the action he took or did not take because of his reliance on the alleged forgeries.

Accordingly, Glaski failed to carry his burden of demonstrating he could allege with the requisite specificity the elements of justifiable reliance and damages resulting from that reliance. (See Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 [the burden of articulating how a defective pleading could be cured is squarely on the plaintiff].) Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied leave to amend as to the SAC’s first cause of action for fraud.
C. Second Fraud Cause of Action, Lack of Specific Allegations of Reliance

Glaski’s second cause of action for fraud alleged that WaMu failed to transfer his note and deed of trust into the WaMu Securitized Trust back in 2005. Glaski further alleged, in essence, that defendants attempted to rectify WaMu’s failure by engaging in a fraudulent scheme to assign his note and deed of trust into the WaMu Securitized Trust. The scheme was implemented in 2008 and 2009 and its purpose was to enable defendants to fraudulently foreclosure against the Property.

The second cause of action for fraud attempts to allege detrimental reliance in the following sentence: “Defendants, and each of them, also knew that the act of recording the Assignment of Deed of trust without the authorization to do so would cause Plaintiff to rely upon Defendants’ actions by attempting to negotiate a loan modification with representatives of Chase Home Finance, LLC, agents of JP MORGAN.” The assignment mentioned in this allegation is the assignment of deed of trust recorded in June 2009—no other assignment of deed of trust is referred to in the second cause of action.

The allegation of reliance does not withstand scrutiny. The act of recording the allegedly fraudulent assignment occurred in June 2009, after the trustee’s sale of the Property had been conducted. If Glaski was induced to negotiate a loan modification at that time, it is unclear how negotiations occurring after the May 2009 trustee’s sale could have diverted him from stopping the trustee’s sale. Thus, Glaski’s allegation of reliance is not connected to any detriment or damage.

Because Glaski has not demonstrated how this defect in his fraud allegations could be cured by amendment, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the second cause of action in the SAC.
III. WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE BY NONHOLDER OF THE DEED OF TRUST
A. Glaski’s Theory of Wrongful Foreclosure

Glaski’s theory that the foreclosure was wrongful is based on (1) the position that paragraph 22 of the Glaski deed of trust authorizes only the lender-beneficiary (or its assignee) to (a) accelerate the loan after a default and (b) elect to cause the Property to be sold and (2) the allegation that a nonholder of the deed of trust, rather than the true beneficiary, instructed California Reconveyance to initiate the foreclosure.[11]

In particular, Glaski alleges that (1) the corpus of the WaMu Securitized Trust was a pool of residential mortgage notes purportedly secured by liens on residential real estate; (2) section 2.05 of “the Pooling and Servicing Agreement” required that all mortgage files transferred to the WaMu Securitized Trust be delivered to the trustee or initial custodian of the WaMu Securitized Trust before the closing date of the trust (which was allegedly set for December 21, 2005, or 90 days thereafter); (3) the trustee or initial custodian was required to identify all such records as being held by or on behalf of the WaMu Securitized Trust; (4) Glaski’s note and loan were not transferred to the WaMu Securitized Trust prior to its closing date; (5) the assignment of the Glaski deed of trust did not occur by the closing date in December 2005; (6) the transfer to the trust attempted by the assignment of deed of trust recorded on June 15, 2009, occurred long after the trust was closed; and (7) the attempted assignment was ineffective as the WaMu Securitized Trust could not have accepted the Glaski deed of trust after the closing date because of the pooling and servicing agreement and the statutory requirements applicable to a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) trust.[12]
B. Wrongful Foreclosure by a Nonholder of the Deed of Trust

The theory that a foreclosure was wrongful because it was initiated by a nonholder of the deed of trust has also been phrased as (1) the foreclosing party lacking standing to foreclose or (2) the chain of title relied upon by the foreclosing party containing breaks or defects. (See Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 764; Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th 1366 [Deutsche Bank not entitled to summary judgment on wrongful foreclosure claim because it failed to show a chain of ownership that would establish it was the true beneficiary under the deed of trust]; Guerroro v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. (9th Cir. 2010) 403 Fed.Appx. 154, 156 [rejecting a wrongful foreclosure claim because, among other things, plaintiffs “have not pleaded any facts to rebut the unbroken chain of title”].)

In Barrionuevo v. Chase Bank, N.A. (N.D.Cal. 2012) 885 F.Supp.2d 964, the district court stated: “Several courts have recognized the existence of a valid cause of action for wrongful foreclosure where a party alleged not to be the true beneficiary instructs the trustee to file a Notice of Default and initiate nonjudicial foreclosure.” (Id. at p. 973.) We agree with this statement of law, but believe that properly alleging a cause of action under this theory requires more than simply stating that the defendant who invoked the power of sale was not the true beneficiary under the deed of trust. Rather, a plaintiff asserting this theory must allege facts that show the defendant who invoked the power of sale was not the true beneficiary. (See Herrera v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1506 [plaintiff failed to plead specific facts demonstrating the transfer of the note and deed of trust were invalid].)
C. Borrower’s Standing to Raise a Defect in an Assignment

One basis for claiming that a foreclosing party did not hold the deed of trust is that the assignment relied upon by that party was ineffective. When a borrower asserts an assignment was ineffective, a question often arises about the borrower’s standing to challenge the assignment of the loan (note and deed of trust)—an assignment to which the borrower is not a party. (E.g., Conlin v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (6th Cir. 2013) 714 F.3d 355, 361 [third party may only challenge an assignment if that challenge would render the assignment absolutely invalid or ineffective, or void]; Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services of Nebraska (1st Cir. 2013) 708 F.3d 282, 291 [under Massachusetts law, mortgagor has standing to challenge a mortgage assignment as invalid, ineffective or void]; Gilbert v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (E.D.Cal., May 28, 2013, No. 1:13-CV-265 AWI SKO) 2013 WL 2318890.)[13]

California’s version of the principle concerning a third party’s ability to challenge an assignment has been stated in a secondary authority as follows:

“Where an assignment is merely voidable at the election of the assignor, third parties, and particularly the obligor, cannot … successfully challenge the validity or effectiveness of the transfer.” (7 Cal.Jur.3d (2012) Assignments, § 43.)

This statement implies that a borrower can challenge an assignment of his or her note and deed of trust if the defect asserted would void the assignment. (See Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (5th Cir. 2013) ___ F.3d ___ [2013 WL 3480207 at p. *3] [following majority rule that an obligor may raise any ground that renders the assignment void, rather than merely voidable].) We adopt this view of the law and turn to the question whether Glaski’s allegations have presented a theory under which the challenged assignments are void, not merely voidable.

We reject the view that a borrower’s challenge to an assignment must fail once it is determined that the borrower was not a party to, or third party beneficiary of, the assignment agreement. Cases adopting that position “paint with too broad a brush.” (Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services of Nebraska, supra, 708 F.3d at p. 290.) Instead, courts should proceed to the question whether the assignment was void.

D. Voidness of a Post-Closing Date Transfers to a Securitized Trust

Here, the SAC includes a broad allegation that the WaMu Securitized Trust “did not have standing to foreclosure on the … Property, as Defendants cannot provide the entire chain of title of the note and the [deed of trust].”[14]

More specifically, the SAC identifies two possible chains of title under which Bank of America, as trustee for the WaMu Securitized Trust, could claim to be the holder of the Glaski deed of trust and alleges that each possible chain of title suffers from the same defect—a transfer that occurred after the closing date of the trust.

First, Glaski addresses the possibility that (1) Bank of America’s chain of title is based on its status as successor trustee for the WaMu Securitized Trust and (2) the Glaski deed of trust became part of the WaMu Securitized Trust’s property when the securitized trust was created in 2005. The SAC alleges that WaMu did not transfer Glaski’s note and deed of trust into the WaMu Securitized Trust prior to the closing date established by the pooling and servicing agreement. If WaMu’s attempted transfer was void, then Bank of America could not claim to be the holder of the Glaski deed of trust simply by virtue of being the successor trustee of the WaMu Securitized Trust.

Second, Glaski addresses the possibility that Bank of America acquired Glaski’s deed of trust from JP Morgan, which may have acquired it from the FDIC. Glaski contends this alternate chain of title also is defective because JP Morgan’s attempt to transfer the Glaski deed of trust to Bank of America, as trustee for the WaMu Securitized Trust, occurred after the trust’s closing date. Glaski specifically alleges JP Morgan’s attempted assignment of the deed of trust to the WaMu Securitized Trust in June 2009 occurred long after the WaMu Securitized Trust closed (i.e., 90 days after December 21, 2005).

Based on these allegations, we will address whether a post-closing date transfer into a securitized trust is the type of defect that would render the transfer void. Other allegations relevant to this inquiry are that the WaMu Securitized Trust (1) was formed in 2005 under New York law and (2) was subject to the requirements imposed on REMIC trusts (entities that do not pay federal income tax) by the Internal Revenue Code.

The allegation that the WaMu Securitized Trust was formed under New York law supports the conclusion that New York law governs the operation of the trust. New York Estates, Powers & Trusts Law section 7-2.4, provides: “If the trust is expressed in an instrument creating the estate of the trustee, every sale, conveyance or other act of the trustee in contravention of the trust, except as authorized by this article and by any other provision of law, is void.”[15]

Because the WaMu Securitized Trust was created by the pooling and servicing agreement and that agreement establishes a closing date after which the trust may no longer accept loans, this statutory provision provides a legal basis for concluding that the trustee’s attempt to accept a loan after the closing date would be void as an act in contravention of the trust document.

We are aware that some courts have considered the role of New York law and rejected the post-closing date theory on the grounds that the New York statute is not interpreted literally, but treats acts in contravention of the trust instrument as merely voidable. (Calderon v. Bank of America, N.A. (W.D.Tex., Apr. 23, 2013, No. SA:12-CV-00121-DAE) ___ F.Supp.2d ___, [2013 WL 1741951 at p. *12] [transfer of plaintiffs’ note, if it violated PSA, would merely be voidable and therefore plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge it]; Bank of America National Association v. Bassman FBT, L.L.C. (Ill.Ct.App. 2012) 981 N.E.2d 1, 8 [following cases that treat ultra vires acts as merely voidable].)

Despite the foregoing cases, we will join those courts that have read the New York statute literally. We recognize that a literal reading and application of the statute may not always be appropriate because, in some contexts, a literal reading might defeat the statutory purpose by harming, rather than protecting, the beneficiaries of the trust. In this case, however, we believe applying the statute to void the attempted transfer is justified because it protects the beneficiaries of the WaMu Securitized Trust from the potential adverse tax consequence of the trust losing its status as a REMIC trust under the Internal Revenue Code. Because the literal interpretation furthers the statutory purpose, we join the position stated by a New York court approximately two months ago: “Under New York Trust Law, every sale, conveyance or other act of the trustee in contravention of the trust is void. EPTL § 7-2.4. Therefore, the acceptance of the note and mortgage by the trustee after the date the trust closed, would be void.” (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Erobobo (Apr. 29, 2013) 39 Misc.3d 1220(A), 2013 WL 1831799, slip opn. p. 8; see Levitin & Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, supra, 28 Yale J. on Reg. at p. 14, fn. 35 [under New York law, any transfer to the trust in contravention of the trust documents is void].) Relying on Erobobo, a bankruptcy court recently concluded “that under New York law, assignment of the Saldivars’ Note after the start up day is void ab initio. As such, none of the Saldivars’ claims will be dismissed for lack of standing.” (In re Saldivar (Bankr.S.D.Tex., Jun. 5, 2013, No. 11-10689) 2013 WL 2452699, at p. *4.)

We conclude that Glaski’s factual allegations regarding post-closing date attempts to transfer his deed of trust into the WaMu Securitized Trust are sufficient to state a basis for concluding the attempted transfers were void. As a result, Glaski has a stated cognizable claim for wrongful foreclosure under the theory that the entity invoking the power of sale (i.e., Bank of America in its capacity as trustee for the WaMu Securitized Trust) was not the holder of the Glaski deed of trust.[16]

We are aware that that some federal district courts sitting in California have rejected the post-closing date theory of invalidity on the grounds that the borrower does not have standing to challenge an assignment between two other parties. (Aniel v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC (N.D.Cal., Nov. 2, 2012, No. C 12-04201 SBA) 2012 WL 5389706 [joining courts that held borrowers lack standing to assert the loan transfer occurred outside the temporal bounds prescribed by the pooling and servicing agreement]; Almutarreb v. Bank of New York Trust Co., N.A. (N.D.Cal., Sept. 24, 2012, No. C 12-3061 EMC) 2012 WL 4371410.) These cases are not persuasive because they do not address the principle that a borrower may challenge an assignment that is void and they do not apply New York trust law to the operation of the securitized trusts in question.
E. Application of Gomes

The next question we address is whether Glaski’s wrongful foreclosure claim is precluded by the principles set forth in Gomes, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, a case relied upon by the trial court in sustaining the demurrer. Gomes was a pre-foreclosure action brought by a borrower against the lender, trustee under a deed and trust, and MERS, a national electronic registry that tracks the transfer of ownership interests and servicing rights in mortgage loans in the secondary mortgage market. (Id. at p. 1151.) The subject trust deed identified MERS as a nominee for the lender and that MERS is the beneficiary under the trust deed. After initiation of a nonjudicial forclosure, borrower sued for wrongful initiation of foreclosure, alleging that the current owner of the note did not authorize MERS, the nominee, to proceed with the foreclosure. The appellate court held that California’s nonjudicial foreclosure system, outlined in Civil Code sections 2924 through 2924k, is a “`comprehensive framework for the regulation of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale’” that did not allow for a challenge to the authority of the person initiating the foreclosure. (Gomes, supra, at p. 1154.)

In Naranjo v. SBMC Mortgage (S.D.Cal., Jul. 24, 2012, No. 11-CV-2229-L(WVG)) 2012 WL 3030370 (Naranjo), the district court addressed the scope of Gomes, stating:

“In Gomes, the California Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff does not have a right to bring an action to determine the nominee’s authorization to proceed with a nonjudicial foreclosure on behalf of a noteholder. [Citation.] The nominee in Gomes was MERS. [Citation.] Here, Plaintiff is not seeking such a determination. The role of the nominee is not central to this action as it was in Gomes. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that the transfer of rights to the WAMU Trust is improper, thus Defendants consequently lack the legal right to either collect on the debt or enforce the underlying security interest.” (Naranjo, supra, 2012 WL 3030370, at p. *3.)

Thus, the court in Naranjo did not interpret Gomes as barring a claim that was essentially the same as the post-closing date claim Glaski is asserting in this case.

Furthermore, the limited nature of the holding in Gomes is demonstrated by the Gomes court’s discussion of three federal cases relied upon by Mr. Gomes. The court stated that the federal cases were not on point because none recognized a cause of action requiring the noteholder’s nominee to prove its authority to initiate a foreclosure proceeding. (Gomes, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1155.) The Gomes court described one of the federal cases by stating that “the plaintiff alleged wrongful foreclosure on the ground that assignments of the deed of trust had been improperly backdated, and thus the wrong party had initiated the foreclosure process. [Citaiton.] No such infirmity is alleged here.” (Ibid.; see Lester v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (N.D.Cal., Feb. 20, 2013) ___ F.Supp.2d ___, [2013 WL 633333, p. *7] [concluding Gomes did not preclude the plaintiff from challenging JP Morgan’s authority to foreclose].) The Gomes court also stated it was significant that in each of the three federal cases, “the plaintiff’s complaint identified a specific factual basis for alleging that the foreclosure was not initiated by the correct party.” (Gomes, supra, at p. 1156.)

The instant case is distinguishable from Gomes on at least two grounds. First, like Naranjo, Glaski has alleged that the entity claiming to be the noteholder was not the true owner of the note. In contrast, the principle set forth in Gomes concerns the authority of the noteholder’s nominee, MERS. Second, Glaski has alleged specific grounds for his theory that the foreclosure was not conducted at the direction of the correct party.

In view of the limiting statements included in the Gomes opinion, we do not interpret it as barring claims that challenge a foreclosure based on specific allegations that an attempt to transfer the deed of trust was void. Our interpretation, which allows borrowers to pursue questions regarding the chain of ownership, is compatible with Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th 1366. In that case, the court concluded that triable issues of material fact existed regarding alleged breaks in the chain of ownership of the deed of trust in question. (Id. at p. 1378.) Those triable issues existed because Deutsche Bank’s motion for summary judgment failed to establish it was the beneficiary under that deed of trust. (Ibid.)
F. Tender

Defendants contend that Glaski’s claims for wrongful foreclosure, cancellation of instruments and quiet title are defective because Glaski failed to allege that he made a valid and viable tender of payment of the indebtedness. (See Karlsen v. American Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 112, 117 [“valid and viable tender of payment of the indebtedness owing is essential to an action to cancel a voidable sale under a deed of trust”].)

Glaski contends that he is not required to allege he tendered payment of the loan balance because (1) there are many exceptions to the tender rule, (2) defendants have offered no authority for the proposition that the absence of a tender bars a claim for damages,[17] and (3) the tender rule is a principle of equity and its application should not be decided against him at the pleading stage.

Tender is not required where the foreclosure sale is void, rather than voidable, such as when a plaintiff proves that the entity lacked the authority to foreclose on the property. (Lester v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, supra, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, [2013 WL 633333, p. *8]; 4 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2003) Deeds of Trust, § 10:212, p. 686.)

Accordingly, we cannot uphold the demurrer to the wrongful foreclosure claim based on the absence of an allegation that Glaski tendered the amount due under his loan. Thus, we need not address the other exceptions to the tender requirement. (See e.g., Onofrio v. Rice (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 413, 424 [tender may not be required where it would be inequitable to do so].)
G. Remedy of Setting Aside Trustee’s Sale

Defendants argue that the allegedly ineffective transfer to the WaMu Securitized Trust was a mistake that occurred outside the confines of the statutory nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding and, pursuant to Nguyen v. Calhoun (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 445, that mistake does not provide a basis for invalidating the trustee’s sale.

First, this argument does not negate the possibility that other types of relief, such as damages, are available to Glaski. (See generally, Annot., Recognition of Action for Damages for Wrongful Foreclosure—Types of Action, supra, 82 A.L.R.6th 43.)

Second, “where a plaintiff alleges that the entity lacked authority to foreclose on the property, the foreclosure sale would be void. [Citation.]” (Lester v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, supra, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, [2013 WL 633333, p. *8].)

Consequently, we conclude that Nguyen v. Calhoun, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th 428 does not deprive Glaski of the opportunity to prove the foreclosure sale was void based on a lack of authority.
H. Causes of Action Stated

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Glaski’s fourth cause of action has stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure. It follows that Glaski also has stated claims for quiet title (third cause of action), declaratory relief (fifth cause of action), cancellation of instruments (eighth cause of action), and unfair business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200 (ninth cause of action). (See Susilo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (C.D.Cal. 2011) 796 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1196 [plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure claims served as predicate violations for her UCL claim].)
IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE
A. Glaski’s Request for Judicial Notice

When Glaski filed his opening brief, he also filed a request for judicial notice of (1) a Consent Judgment entered on April 4, 2012, by the United States District Court of the District of Columbia in United States v. Bank of America Corp. (D.D.C. No. 12-CV-00361); (2) the Settlement Term Sheet attached to the Consent Judgment; and (3) the federal and state release documents attached to the Consent Judgment as Exhibits F and G.

Defendants opposed the request for judicial notice on the ground that the request violated the requirements in California Rules of Court, rule 8.252 because it was not filed with a separate proposed order, did not state why the matter to be noticed was relevant to the appeal, and did not state whether the matters were submitted to the trial court and, if so, whether that court took judicial notice of the matters.

The documents included in Glaski’s request for judicial notice may provide background information and insight into robo-signing[18] and other problems that the lending industry has had with the procedures used to foreclose on defaulted mortgages. However, these documents do not directly affect whether the allegations in the SAC are sufficient to state a cause of action. Therefore, we deny Glaski’s request for judicial notice.
B. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice of Assignment

The “ASSIGNMENT OF DEED OF TRUST” recorded on December 9, 2008, that stated JP Morgan transferred and assigned all beneficial interest under the Glaski deed of trust to “LaSalle Bank NA as trustee for WaMu [Securitized Trust]” together with the note described in and secured by the Glaski deed of trust was not attached to the SAC as an exhibit. That document is part of the appellate record because the respondents’ appendix includes a copy of defendants’ request for judicial notice that was filed in June 2011 to support a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

In ruling on defendants’ request for judicial notice, the trial court stated that it could only take judicial notice that certain documents in the request, including the assignment of deed of trust, had been recorded, but it could not take judicial notice of factual matters stated in those documents. This ruling is correct and unchallenged on appeal. Therefore, like the trial court, we will take judicial notice of the existence and recordation of the December 2008 assignment, but we “do not take notice of the truth of matters stated therein.” (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1375.) As a result, the assignment of deed of trust does not establish that JP Morgan was, in fact, the holder of the beneficial interest in the Glaski deed of trust that the assignment states was transferred to LaSalle Bank. Similarly, it does not establish that LaSalle Bank in fact became the owner or holder of that beneficial interest.

Because the document does not establish these facts for purposes of this demurrer, it does not cure either of the breaks in the two alternate chains of ownership challenged in the SAC. Therefore, the December 2008 assignment does not provide a basis for sustaining the demurrer.
DISPOSITION

The judgment of dismissal is reversed. The trial court is directed to vacate its order sustaining the general demurrer and to enter a new order overruling that demurrer as to the third, fourth, fifth, eighth and ninth causes of action.

Glaski’s request for judicial notice filed on September 25, 2012, is denied.

Glaski shall recover his costs on appeal.

Wiseman, Acting P.J. and Kane, J., concurs.
ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION

As the nonpublished opinion filed on July 31, 2013, in the above entitled matter hereby meets the standards for publication specified in the California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), it is ordered that the opinion be certified for publication in the Official Reports.

KANE, J., concur.

[1] Mortgage-backed securities are created through a complex process known as “securization.” (See Levitin & Twomey, Mortgage Servicing (2011) 28 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 13 [“a mortgage securitization transaction is extremely complex”].) In simplified terms, “securitization” is the process where (1) many loans are bundled together and transferred to a passive entity, such as a trust, and (2) the trust holds the loans and issues investment securities that are repaid from the mortgage payments made on the loans. (Oppenheim & Trask-Rahn, Deconstructing the Black Magic of Securitized Trusts: How the Mortgage-Backed Securitization Process is Hurting the Banking Industry’s Ability to Foreclose and Proving the Best Offense for a Foreclosure Defense (2012) 41 Stetson L.Rev. 745, 753-754 (hereinafter, Deconstructing Securitized Trusts).) Hence, the securities issued by the trust are “mortgage-backed.” For purposes of this opinion, we will refer to such a trust as a “securitized trust.”

[2] Civil Code section 2924, subdivision (a)(1) states that a “trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents” may initiate the nonjudicial foreclosure process. This statute and the provision of the Glaski deed of trust are the basis for Glaski’s position that the nonjudicial foreclosure in this case was wrongful—namely, that the power of sale in the Glaski deed of trust was invoked by an entity that was not the true beneficiary.

[3] Glaski’s pleading does not allege that LaSalle Bank was the original trustee when the WaMu Securitized Trust was formed in late 2005, but filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission identify LaSalle Bank as the original trustee. We provide this information for background purposes only and it plays no role in our decision in this appeal.

[4] Another possibility, which was acknowledged by both sides at oral argument, is that the true holder of the note and deed of trust cannot be determined at this stage of the proceedings. This lack of certainty regarding who holds the deed of trust is not uncommon when a securitized trust is involved. (See Mortgage and Asset Backed Securities Litigation Handbook (2012) § 5:114 [often difficult for securitized trust to prove ownership by showing a chain of assignments of the loan from the originating lender].)

[5] It appears this company is no longer a separate entity. The certificate of interested entities filed with the respondents’ brief refers to “JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. as successor by merger to Chase Home Finance, LLC.”

[6] One controversy presented by this appeal is whether this court should consider the December 9, 2008, assignment of deed of trust, which is not an exhibit to the SAC. Because the trial court took judicial notice of the existence and recordation of the assignment earlier in the litigation, we too will consider the assignment, but will not presume the matters stated therein are true. (See pt. IV.B, post.) For instance, we will not assume that JP Morgan actually held any interests that it could assign to LaSalle Bank. (See Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375 [taking judicial notice of a recorded assignment does not establish assignee’s ownership of deed of trust].)

[7] Specifically, the notice stated that his August 2008 installment payment and all subsequent installment payments had not been made.

[8] The signature block at the end of the NOD indicated it was signed by Colleen Irby as assistant secretary for California Reconveyance. The first page of the notice stated that recording was requested by California Reconveyance. Affidavits of mailing attached to the SAC stated that the declarant mailed copies of the notice of default to Glaski at his home address and to Bank of America, care of Custom Recording Solutions, at an address in Santa Ana, California. The affidavits of mailing are the earliest documents in the appellate record indicating that Bank of America had any involvement with Glaski’s loan.

[9] Bank of America took over La Salle Bank by merger in 2007.

[10] The trial court did not explicitly rule on defendants’ request for judicial notice of these documents, but referred to matters set forth in these documents in its ruling. Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, we will infer that the trial court granted the request.

[11] The claim that a foreclosure was conducted by or at the direction of a nonholder of mortgage rights often arises where the mortgage has been securitized. (Buchwalter, Cause of Action in Tort for Wrongful Foreclosure of Residential Mortgage, 52 Causes of Action Second (2012) 119, 149 [§ 11 addresses foreclosure by a nonholder of mortgage rights].)

[12] This allegation comports with the following view of pooling and servicing agreements and the federal tax code provisions applicable to REMIC trusts. “Once the bundled mortgages are given to a depositor, the [pooling and servicing agreement] and IRS tax code provisions require that the mortgages be transferred to the trust within a certain time frame, usually ninety dates from the date the trust is created. After such time, the trust closes and any subsequent transfers are invalid. The reason for this is purely economic for the trust. If the mortgages are properly transferred within the ninety-day open period, and then the trust properly closes, the trust is allowed to maintain REMIC tax status.” (Deconstructing Securitized Trusts, supra, 41 Stetson L.Rev. at pp. 757-758.)

[13] “Although we may not rely on unpublished California cases, the California Rules of Court do not prohibit citation to unpublished federal cases, which may properly be cited as persuasive, although not binding, authority.” (Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 238, 251, fn. 6, citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115.)

[14] Although this allegation and the remainder of the SAC do not explicitly identify the trustee of the WaMu Securitized Trust as the entity that invoked the power of sale, it is reasonable to interpret the allegation in this manner. Such an interpretation is consistent with the position taken by Glaski’s attorney at the hearing on the demurrer, where she argued that the WaMu Securitized Trust did not obtain Glaski’s loan and thus was precluded from proceeding with the foreclosure.

[15] The statutory purpose is “to protect trust beneficiaries from unauthorized actions by the trustee.” (Turano, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York, Book 17B, EPTL § 7-2.4.)

[16] Because Glaski has stated a claim for relief in his wrongful foreclosure action, we need not address his alternate theory that the foreclosure was void because it was implemented by forged documents. (Genesis Environmental Services v. San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control Dist. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 597, 603 [appellate inquiry ends and reversal is required once court determines a cause of action was stated under any legal theory].) We note, however, that California law provides that ratification generally is an affirmative defense and must be specially pleaded by the party asserting it. (See Reina v. Erassarret (1949) 90 Cal.App.2d 418, 424 [ratification is an affirmative defense and the defendant ordinarily bears the burden of proof]; 49A Cal.Jur.3d (2010) Pleading, § 186, p. 319 [defenses that must be specially pleaded include waiver, estoppel and ratification].) Also, “[w]hether there has been ratification of a forged signature is ordinarily a question of fact.” (Common Wealth Ins. Systems, Inc. v. Kersten (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 1014, 1026; see Brock v. Yale Mortg. Corp. (Ga. 2010) 700 S.E.2d 583, 588 [ratification may be expressed or implied from acts of principal and “is usually a fact question for the jury”; wife had forged husband’s signature on quitclaim deed].)

[17] See generally, Annotation, Recognition of Action for Damages for Wrongful Foreclosure—Types of Action (2013) 82 A.L.R.6th 43 (claims that a foreclosure is “wrongful” can be tort-based, statute-based, and contract-based).

[18] Claims of misrepresentation or fraud related to robo-signing of foreclosure documents is addressed in Buchwalter, Cause of Action in Tort for Wrongful Foreclosure of Residential Mortgage, 52 Causes of Action Second, supra, at pages 147 to 149.

INDEPENDENT REVIEW & COMMENTS:

Glaski v Bank of America: Mortgagor’s Defense Based on Lender’s Failure to Properly Securitize a Loan

Roger Bernhardt

Golden Gate University – School of Law

September 29, 2013

CEB 36 Real Property Law Reporter 111, September 2013

Abstract:

Commentary on a recent California decision holding that a lender might be unable to enforce an improperly securitized loan.

Accepted Paper Series

Glaski v Bank of America: Mortgagor’s Defense Based on Lender’s Failure to Properly Securitize a Loan.
Glaski v Bank of America (2013) 218 CA4th 1079 Before being placed into receivership, Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu) established a pool of residential loans as collateral for mortgage-backed securities. New York law governed the resulting securitized trust. According to the lender, the trust included Borrower’s defaulted loan. Bank of America, which claimed it was successor trustee and beneficiary of the trust, purchased Borrower’s property at the trustee’s sale. There were two possible chains of title through which Bank of America could have claimed
to be successor trustee. (Notably, at the demurrer stage, the parties acknowledged that they could not be certain who truly held Borrower’s note.) Borrower challenged both conceivable chains of title as having
been assigned after the trust closing date. The trial court sustained Bank of America’s demurrer without leave to amend.
The court of appeal reversed in part. The court ruled that a borrower may challenge an assignment as being void even if that borrower was not a party to, or a third party beneficiary of, that assignment. Such a
challenge effectively states a claim for wrongful foreclosure. Disagreeing with Texas and Illinois courts, the court literally and strictly construed the applicable New York statute, which states that any act by a trustee in contravention of the trust document is void (218 CA4th at 1096): Because the WaMu Securitized Trust was created by the pooling and servicing agreement and that agreement establishes a closing date after which the trust may no longer accept loans, this statutory provision provides a legal basis for concluding that the trustee’s attempt to accept a loan after the closing date would be void as an act in contravention of the trust document.
This is significant because the borrower need not tender payment of indebtedness when the foreclosure sale is void.
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: If some lenders are reacting with shock and horror to this decision, that is probably only because they reacted too giddily to Gomes v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 CA4th 1149 (reported at 34 CEB RPLR 66 (Mar. 2011)) and similar decisions that they took to mean that their nonjudicial foreclosures were completely immune from judicial review. Because I think that Glaski simply holds that some borrower foreclosure challenges may warrant factual investigation (rather than outright dismissal at the pleading stage), I do not find this decision that earth-shaking.
Two of this plaintiff’s major contentions were in fact entirely rejected at the demurrer level: —That the foreclosure was fraudulent because the statutory notices looked robosigned (“forged”); and —That the loan documents were not truly transferred into the loan pool.
Only the borrower’s wrongful foreclosure count survived into the next round. If the bank can show that the documents were handled in proper fashion, it should be able to dispose of this last issue on summary
judgment.
Bank of America appeared to not prevail on demurrer on this issue because the record did include two deed of trust assignments that had been recorded outside the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) period and did not include any evidence showing that the loan was put into the securitization pool within the proper REMIC period. The court’s ruling that a transfer into a trust that is made too late may constitute a void rather than voidable transfer (to not jeopardize the tax-exempt status of the other assets in the trust) seems like a sane conclusion. That ruling does no harm to securitization pools that were created with proper attention to the necessary timetables. (It probably also has only slight effect on loans that were improperly securitized,
other than to require that a different procedure be followed for their foreclosure.)

In this case, the fact that two assignments of a deed of trust were recorded after trust closure proves almost nothing about when the loans themselves were actually transferred into the trust pool, it having been a common practice back then not to record assignments until some other development made recording appropriate. I suspect that it was only the combination of seeing two “belatedly” recorded assignments and also seeing no indication of any timely made document deposits into the trust pool that led to court to say that the borrower had sufficiently alleged an invalid (i.e., void) attempted transfer into the trust. Because that seemed to be a factual possibility, on remand, the court logically should ask whether the pool trustee was the rightful party to conduct the foreclosure of the deed of trust, or whether that should have been done by someone else.

While courts may not want to find their dockets cluttered with frivolous attacks on valid foreclosures, they are probably equally averse to allowing potentially meritorious challenges to wrongful foreclosures to be rejected out of hand. —Roger Bernhardt

From CEB 36 Real Property Law Reporter 111, September 2013, © The Regents of the University of California, reprinted with permission of CEB.”

B. First Cause of Action for Fraud, Lack of Specific Allegations of Reliance – See more at: http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2013/08/01/glaski-v-bank-of-america-ca5-5th-appellate-district-securitization-failed-ny-trust-law-applied-ruling-to-protect-remic-status-non-judicial-foreclosure-statutes-irrelevant-because-sa/#sthash.jRAaLypz.dpuf

II. FRAUD

A. Rules for Pleading Fraud

We therefore reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings. – See more at: http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2013/08/01/glaski-v-bank-of-america-ca5-5th-appellate-district-securitization-failed-ny-trust-law-applied-ruling-to-protect-remic-status-non-judicial-foreclosure-statutes-irrelevant-because-sa/#sthash.jRAaLypz.dpuf

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II. FRAUD

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“What happens if my home is foreclosed on?”

For example, foreclosure could result in you:

What is a Foreclosure?

What are the consequences of a Foreclosure?

What is the process for a Foreclosure?

Next steps

How is home ownership transferred?

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Why Is It Impportant For Nevada Homeowners to Protect their Homes?

Why You Need to Know About Nevada Mortgage Loans

What Are Your Option About Missing Quite a Few Payments

What is Notice of Default and Election to Sell

What Are the Requirements for Posting NOD?

In Nevada, You Have What is called Danger Notice

What do you need to know about Notice of Sale

Notice to Tenants

Reinstatement Before Sale

The Foreclosure Sale

Deficiency Judgment Following Sale

Redemption Period

Eviction Following Foreclosure

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II. FRAUD

A. Rules for Pleading Fraud

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