Why Homeowners Must Know these Important Points of Bankruptcy Appeal

23 Wednesday Sep 2015

Posted by BNG in Appeal, Bankruptcy, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Non-Judicial States

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Bankruptcy, bankruptcy appeal, bankruptcy court, homeowners, Plaintiff, Pro se legal representation in the United States

Every appeal requires an appellate advocate to understand and follow
a series of rules. When an appeal is from a decision by a federal
bankruptcy court, there is yet another layer of rules and complexity
to consider. This article briefly identifies a dozen important points
about bankruptcy appeals.

1. The Time for Filing a Notice of Appeal in a Bankruptcy Appeal Is Generally Shorter Than in Other Appeals.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rule”) 8002(a), a party seeking to appeal a decision by a bankruptcy court has 14 days to file its appeal.1 This is 16 days less than the 30 days a party generally is given under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (“F.R.A.P.”) to appeal from district court to a federal appellate court.2 As with F.R.A.P. 4(a)(5), the Bankruptcy Rules permit some leeway if an appellant misses its deadline. Under the Bankruptcy Rules, a bankruptcy court may allow an appellant who fails to timely file up to 20 additional days to file where that appellant can demonstrate “excusable neglect.”3 After 30 days, however, a bankruptcy appellant loses its right to appeal even if there is excusable neglect.4 Factors to be considered in determining whether there is excusable neglect include the danger of prejudice to the appellee; the length of delay and its impact on the judicial proceeding; the reason for the delay; whether the delay was in the movant’s control; and the movant’s good faith.5

2. An Appellant May Waive an Issue Not Raised at the Outset of its Bankruptcy Appeal.

Under Bankruptcy Rule 8006, within 14 days of filing its Notice of
Appeal, an appellant must file and serve a designation of the items to be
included in the record on appeal and a statement of issues to be presented
on appeal. If an appellant fails to include an issue in this Statement, the
issue is waived even if this had been raised and/or decided by the bankruptcy
court.6

3. Those Who Ignore Deadlines and Procedural Rules May Forfeit Their Appeal.

Bankruptcy Rule 8001(a) authorizes dismissal of a bankruptcy appeal when a party fails to take any required step other than filing its Notice of Appeal. Courts adjudicating bankruptcy appeals may dismiss appeals when a party fails to take a necessary step, such as filing its record designations, statement of issues or its brief.7
While the Bankruptcy Rules permit dismissal, however, certain circuits require the appellate court to weigh a series of factors before it dismisses a case in its entirety. For example, the Third Circuit requires the balancing of six factors before a case is dismissed. These are:
• The extent of the party’s personal responsibility;
• The prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling
orders;

• A history of dilatoriness;
• Whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad
faith;
• The effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an
analysis of alternative sanctions;
• The meritoriousness of the claim or defense.8

4. In Five Circuits, Bankruptcy Appeals May Be Heard in the First Instance by Two Different Types of Courts.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1), an appellant in an appeal from bankruptcy court may choose in the first instance to appeal either to a district court acting as an appellate court or, if the relevant circuit provides for one, to a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”). Even if the appellant chooses a BAP, however, any other party to the appeal may, no later than 30 days after service of the notice of appeal, ask to have the appeal heard by the relevant district court. The First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits each have a BAP. If an appeal is to a BAP, then the Bankruptcy
judge’s decision will be reviewed by fellow sitting bankruptcy judges.
Usually a BAP consists of three sitting bankruptcy judges in the circuit who are assembled for a particular day of argument. By their very nature, BAPs will consist of judges who have special expertise regarding bankruptcy issues, while district courts may not. The BAP may sit in different places in the circuit. For example, the Eighth Circuit BAP conducts hearing in Omaha, St. Louis, Kansas City, and other locations where its bankruptcy courts sit.

5. BAP Rules Vary by Circuit.

Just like the individual federal circuit courts of appeal, the various BAPs each have their own rules. These vary between each circuit. Any party in a BAP appeal, therefore should know the specifics and particularities of the specific BAP’s rules and should follow these.
Among these specialized rules, for example, are that, in the Eighth Circuit BAP, parties are limited to opening briefs of 6500 words.9 The Ninth Circuit BAP Rules provide that only those portions of transcripts included in the excerpts of the record will be considered in an appeal and that these must include excerpts necessary for the BAP to apply the required standard of review to a matter.10 The First Circuit BAP Rules generally limit argument to 15 minutes per side.11 The Tenth Circuit BAP requires that a brief include a statement of related cases—i.e., one that includes the same litigants and substantially the same fact pattern or legal issues – that are
pending in any other federal court.12 The Sixth Circuit BAP Rules provide
for a possible pre-argument conference and mediation.13

6. The Bankruptcy Rules Generally Govern Appeals to the District Court.

As noted in the prior section, BAPs have elaborate rules that govern all aspects of appeals before them. By the terms of the Bankruptcy Rules, these specific rules can supersede conflicting terms in the Bankruptcy Rules. However, when an appeal is to the district court, the Bankruptcy Rules generally apply in the absence of a local rule or district court rule specifically addressing bankruptcy appeals, which are much less common.
While not as comprehensive as the F.R.A.P., the Bankruptcy Rules have 20 provisions governing all aspects of appeals.14 These rules addresses appellate issues, including, among others, the filing and service of appellate papers;15 the filing and service of briefs and appendices;16 the form of briefs and their length;17 motions;18 oral argument;19 disposition of the appeal;20 costs;21 and rehearing,22 among others. (These rules also provide for the accelerated filing of district court appeals, as an appellant is to serve and file its brief within 15 days after entry of the appeal on the docket; the appellant is to serve its brief within 15 days after service of the appellant’s brief and the appellant is to serve its reply within 10 days after service of the appellee’s brief.)23 In the absence of rules to the contrary, opening briefs may be up to 50 pages and reply briefs up to 25 pages.
Under Bankruptcy Rule 8012, oral argument is to be generally allowed in all cases. In practice, however, oral argument is much less common before district courts. When an appeal is before district court, there is some question about whether its decision has precedential effect.24

7. Bankruptcy Appeals Often Include an Extra Tier of Review.

Generally, before an appeal reaches a federal circuit court of appeals, it is adjudicated by either a BAP or a district court. The findings of these first tier courts are not binding on the circuit court of appeals and, the appellate court owes no deference to the decisions by the BAP or district court.
Review by the circuit court of appeals is plenary.25 Nonetheless, some circuit courts have noted that the first tier of appeal acts as a helpful filter.26
An appellate court may reach issues brought up before but not decided by the district court or BAP.27

8. Direct Appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals Is Allowed in Limited Instances.

Pursuant to Section 1233 of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”), a circuit court of appeals has discretion to permit a direct appeal frombankruptcy court where there is uncertainty in the bankruptcy court, either due to the absence of a controlling legal decision or a conflicting decision on the issue and the issue is of great importance, or where the court finds it is patently obvious that the bankruptcy court’s decision either was correct or incorrect, such that the first tier of review in the district court or BAP is less efficient and helpful.28

9. At Each Tier of the Appeal, The Bankruptcy Court Is Given the Same Level of Deference and Same Form of Scrutiny.

Courts in bankruptcy appeals review issues of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error.29 Courts of appeal apply the same standard of review as do BAPs and district courts.30 Courts of appeal generally review issues of procedure under an abuse of discretion standard. These include motions to compromise or to lift a stay, for example.31

10. This Is a Greater Threat of Mootness in Bankruptcy Appeals Than in Other Federal Appeals.

A bankruptcy appeal may become constitutionally moot where events may occur that make it impossible for the appellate court to fashion effective relief.32 Thus, for example, if, while an appeal is pending, a plan is confirmed pursuant to which all assets are distributed, all creditors with allowed claims are paid in full, and the bankruptcy case is closed such that the debtor no longer exists, an appeal against that debtor is moot because there is no meaningful relief that may be granted.33 An appeal may also be considered “equitably moot” where a change in circumstances makes it inequitable for a court to consider the merits of an appeal.34
However, if there remains any possibility that an appeal may result in a tangible benefit to the appellant, it is not moot.35

11. Only Those Persons Aggrieved Have Standing to Bring a Bankruptcy Appeal.

Only those whose rights or interests are directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by an order of the bankruptcy court have standing to bring an appeal.36

12. Appellate Courts Take a Broader Notion of “Finality” in Bankruptcy Appeals Than in Other Appeals.

Because of the length of many bankruptcy proceedings and the waste of time and resources that may result if the court denied immediate appeals, federal courts of appeal apply a broader concept of “finality” when considering bankruptcy appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 than in considering non-bankruptcy appeals.37 Courts apply a number of factors in determining whether to assert appellate jurisdiction. These include:
1) the impact on the assets of the bankruptcy estate;
2) the necessity for further fact-finding on remand;
3) the preclusive effect of the court’s decision on the merits in further litigation,
and
4) the interest of judicial economy.38
Each of these issues, of course, could justify an article in itself. I hope
these provide some helpful thoughts and issues to consider when participating
in a bankruptcy appeal.

NOTE

1 Certain types of motions toll this time for filing until the last such motion
is disposed of. See Bankruptcy Rule 8002(b).
2 See F.R.A.P.4(a).
3 Bankruptcy Rule 8002(c)(2); Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b). Of course where
an appeal is from a district court to a federal circuit court on a bankruptcy
issue, F.R.A.P. 4’s 30-day rule applies.
4 See Shareholders v. Sound Radio, Inc., 109 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1997).
The law is unsettled as to whether bankruptcy appellate deadlines are “jurisdictional,”
such that objections to untimeliness may be waived if not promptly
made. See In re Fryer, 2007 WL 1667198 (3d Cir. June 11, 2007) (citing
Kontrick v. Ryan 540 U.S. 443 (2004), and Eberhart v United States, 546 U.S.
12 (2005)).
5 See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’Ship, 507 U.S. 380,
395 (1993).
6 See In re GGM, P.C., 165 F.3d 1026, 1032 (5th Cir. 1999). Of course, one
may not first raise new issues on appeal that were not presented before the
bankruptcy court. See In re Ginther Trusts, 238 F.3d 686, 689 & n.3. (5th Cir.
2001).
7 See, e.g., In re Lynch, 430 F.3d 600 (Cir. 2005); In re Braniff Airways, Inc.,
774 F.2d 1303, 1305 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985).

8 Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d. Cir. 1984).
See also In re Harris, 464 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2006) (failure to include required
transcript of oral argument did not warrant dismissal of appeal where lesser
sanctions were available); In re Beverly Mfg. Corp., 778 F.2d 666, 667 (11th
Cir. 1985) (“Dismissal typically occurs in cases showing consistently dilatory
conduct or the complete failure to take any steps other than the mere filing
of a notice of appeal.”).
9 8th Cir. BAP Rule 8010A.
10 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8006-1.
11 1st Cir. BAP Rule 8012-1.
12 10th Cir. BAP Rule 8010-1.
13 6th Cir. BAP Rule 8080-2.
14 Bankruptcy Rules 8001-8020.
15 Bankruptcy Rule 8008.
16 Bankruptcy Rule 8009.

17 Bankruptcy Rule 8010.
18 Bankruptcy Rule 8011.
19 Bankruptcy Rule 8012.
20 Bankruptcy Rule 8013.
21 Bankruptcy Rule 8014.
22 Bankruptcy Rule 8015.
23 Bankruptcy Rule 8009.
24 See In re Shattuck Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557, 565 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
25 See In re Best Prods. Co., 68 F.3d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1995).
26 See Weber v. United States Trustee, 484 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In many
cases involving unsettled areas of bankruptcy law, review by the district court
would be most helpful. Courts of appeal benefit immensely from reviewing
the efforts of the district court to resolve such questions”).
27 See Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2004).
28 See Weber, 484 F.3d at 157 (citing BAPCPA § 1233, 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(d)(2)(a)(i)-(iii)).
29 See In re ABC-Naco, Inc., 483 F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2007).
30 See In re Senior Cottages of Am., 482 F.3d 997, 1000-1001 (8th Cir. 2002)
31 See In re Martin, 222 Fed. Appx. 360, 362 (5th Cir. 2007).
32 See In re Focus Media Inc., 378 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004).
33 See In re State Line Hotel, Inc., 2007 WL 1961935 (9th Cir. July 5, 2007);
see also Gardens of Cortez v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 585 F.2d 975,
978 (10th Cir. 1978) (dismissal of bankruptcy petition moots appeal to lift
stay).

34 See Ederel Sport v. Gotcha, Int’l, L.P., 311 B.R. 250, 254 (9th Cir. BAP
2004).
35 See In re Howard’s Express, Inc., 151 Fed. Appx. 46 (Oct. 5, 2005) (conversion
from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 did not moot appeal because liquidation
was not complete and preference actions remained to be tried, which
could generate assets to satisfy claims of appellants).
36 See In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 249 (3d Cir. 2000).
37 See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 196, 203 (3d Cir. 2005).
38 Id.

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What Homeowners Must Know About Bankruptcy Appeals

23 Wednesday Sep 2015

Posted by BNG in Appeal, Bankruptcy, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Pro Se Litigation, Your Legal Rights

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Tags

Bankruptcy Appeals, bankruptcy court, homeowners, Pro se legal representation in the United States

When challenging Bankruptcy dismissals or Adversary proceeding on appeal, homeowners should bear the following in mind.
A district court may dismiss a bankruptcy appeal for any of a number of procedural reasons having nothing to do with the merits of the appeal.

Is the appeal timely?

Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a) requires that a notice of appeal be filed within
14 days of the bankruptcy court order or judgment at issue. A district court lacks
jurisdiction over an untimely appeal.

Shareholders v. Sound Radio, Inc., 109 F.3d 873, 878-79 (3d Cir. 1997).

Did the appellant refer to the order or judgment at issue in its notice of appeal?

A district court lacks jurisdiction over a bankruptcy court order or judgment that is not directly or indirectly referred to in the notice of appeal. In re Smith, WL 1716684 at *2 (3d Cir. June 22, 2006).

Is the bankruptcy court order final?

Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), a district court may hear appeals only from
final judgments, orders and decrees of a bankruptcy court. Although district courts liberally construe finality in bankruptcy appeals, an order in a bankruptcy case may be considered interlocutory, and hence, subject to dismissal, if the order does not implicate a discrete issue which in and of itself will determine the rights and liabilities of the parties concerned. Thus, for example, in In re Elsinore Shore Assocs., a district court lacked jurisdiction over an appeal from an order approving a disclosure statement. 82 B.R. 339, 341-42 (D.N.J. 1988). Moreover, the general antipathy toward piecemeal appeals still prevails in individual bankruptcy adversary proceedings. Thus, for example, in Natale
v. French & Pickering Creeks Conservation Trust, Inc. (In re Natale), the
Third Circuit held that an order granting summary judgment regarding the priority of competing liens, but not deciding whether the debtor could avoid a particular lien, was not a final appealable order. 295 F.3d 375, 379-80 (3d Cir. 2002).

Does the appellant meet the standard for interlocutory review?

If the appellant seeks review of an interlocutory bankruptcy court order, a district court may grant leave to hear an appeal from the order only upon the satisfaction of three elements: (i) the appeal involves a controlling question of law; (ii) the question is one on which a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists; and (iii) an immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Orr v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co. (In re Hollis), 2010 WL 336132 at **1-4 (D.N.J. Jan. 22, 2010).

Does the appellant have standing to appeal?

Only a party whose rights or interests are directly and adversely affected
in a pecuniary fashion by a bankruptcy court order may appeal from the order.
In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2000).

Is the appeal constitutionally moot?

Generally, a bankruptcy appeal, like an appeal in civil litigation, is dismissed as moot when events during the pendency of the appeal prevent the appellate
court from granting any effective relief.
So, for instance, in In re Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers Local Union No. 107,
the Third Circuit held that an appeal relating to an order granting relief from the
automatic stay to permit a debtor to move for reconsideration of a decision entered by a state court was rendered moot by an intervening state court judgment relieving the debtor of its liability to the appellants. 888 F.2d 293, 297-99 (3d Cir. 1989).

Is the appeal equitably moot?

A bankruptcy appeal is equitably moot when, even if the district court has jurisdiction to grant relief, implementation of such relief would result in an inequitable outcome. The doctrine usually applies in appeals involving a confirmed Chapter 11 plan of reorganization. In Nordhoff Invs. Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., the Third Circuit found an appeal from an order confirming a Chapter 11 plan equitably moot on the following grounds: (i) the plan had required 18 months of negotiation among several parties and implicated hundreds of millions of dollars, restructured debt, assets, and management of a major corporation; (ii) the plan had successfully rejuvenated the corporation; (iii) the appellants had not offered evidence that the plan could be reversed without great difficulty and inequity; (iv) the appellants had failed to seek a stay of the order; (v) third parties had relied on the order; and (vi) reversal would be contrary to the public policy of encouraging successful reorganizations. 258 F.3d 180, 184-91 (3d Cir. 2001).

Is the appeal moot under section 363(m)?

According to Bankruptcy Code section 363(m), a sale or lease to a good-faith purchaser or lessee under section 363(b) or (c), once consummated, cannot be reversed or modified on appeal absent a stay. In Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., the Third Circuit dismissed as moot a buyer’s appeal from an order approving a debtor’s sale of franchises because the buyer had failed to obtain a stay of the sale pending appeal, the sale had closed, and the relief sought would have impacted the validity of the sale. 141 F.3d 490, 499-500 (3d Cir. 1998).

Is the appeal moot under section 364(e)?

Under Bankruptcy Code section 364(e), an order authorizing a trustee or debtor to obtain credit or incur debt from, or granting a priority or lien to, a good-faith lender, once implemented, cannot be reversed or modified on appeal absent a stay. In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc. (In re Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc.), the Third Circuit held that an appeal from a post-petition financing order was moot because the proceeds of the loan had been immediately distributed to the debtor in possession, the district court had denied a stay of the order and the debtor in possession had apparently expended the loan proceeds. 16 F.3d 552, 559-63 (3d Cir. 1994).

Did the appellant fail to timely file a designation of record and statement of issues?

Bankruptcy Rule 8006 requires an appellant to file and serve, within 14 days after filing the notice of appeal or the entry of an order granting leave to appeal, a designation of items to be included in the appellate record and a statement of issues on appeal. Local Bankruptcy Rule 8006-1 requires the clerk to file and serve a certification of any failure to comply with the requirement. Such failure constitutes cause for dismissal of the appeal. In re Mondelli, 2009 WL 3358465 at **2-3 (3d Cir. Oct. 20, 2009).

Did the appellant fail to obtain a copy of the bankruptcy court hearing transcript?

If an appellant has designated a bankruptcy court hearing transcript as part of the record, Bankruptcy Rule 8006 requires the appellant to immediately deliver to the reporter and file with the clerk a written request for the transcript and to pay its cost. Failure to comply with this requirement constitutes cause for dismissal of the appeal. Orr v. Buccolo (In re Buccolo), 2009 WL 146528 at **1-2 (3d Cir. Jan. 22, 2009).

Did the appellant fail to designate any issues in its statement of issues?

An appellant waives its right to assert an issue on appeal if it fails to designate the issue in its statement of issues. Interface Group-Nevada, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (In re Trans World Airlines, Inc.), 145 F.3d 124, 132 (3d Cir. 1998).

Did the appellant fail to timely file its appellate brief?

Bankruptcy Rule 8009 requires an appellant to file its brief within 14 days after entry of the appeal on the docket. Failure to comply with this requirement constitutes cause for dismissal of the appeal. Nyholm v. Israel (In re Nyholm), 2009 WL 114884 at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 12, 2009).

Did the appellant fail to raise its argument before the bankruptcy court?

A district court generally may not consider in a bankruptcy appeal an argument that was not raised before the bankruptcy court. Buncher Co. v. Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of GenFarm Ltd. P’ship IV, 229 F.3d 245, 253 (3d Cir. 2000).

Did the appellant fail to make its argument in its appellate brief?

An appellant may waive its right to raise an argument before the district court if its fails to make the argument in its appellate brief. Interface Group-Nevada, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (In re Trans World Airlines, Inc.), 145 F.3d 124, 132-33 (3d Cir. 1998).

As a homeowner, once you follow these pointers, you’ll have a better chance of winning your Bankruptcy Appeal.

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

What Homeowners Need to Know About Bankruptcy Automatic Stay

22 Tuesday Sep 2015

Posted by BNG in Bankruptcy, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, Your Legal Rights

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automatic stay, Bankruptcy, bankruptcy court, chapter 13 bankruptcy, Federal Court, Foreclosure, homeowners, Pro se legal representation in the United States

A. Scope.

1. Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) contains a broad
statutory stay of litigation and lien enforcement, effective automatically on the commencement of a bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (“. . . a petition [commencing a case] . . . operates as a stay, applicable to all entities . . .”.)

2. Purpose – Time to Reorganize. This automatic stay gives a trustee or
chapter 11 debtor-in-possession1 a breathing spell from creditors by stopping all collection efforts, harassment, and all foreclosure actions, allowing a debtor to attempt a reorganization plan. See, e.g., In re Siciliano, 13 F.3d 748, 750 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[t]he purpose of the automatic stay provision is to afford the debtor a ‘breathing spell’ by halting the collection process. It enables the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan with an aim toward satisfying existing debt.”);
Maritime Electric Co., Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1991) (“automatic stay allows debtor breathing spell from creditors and stops collection efforts”); In re Peregrine Systems, Inc., 314 B.R. 31, 44 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 2005 WL 2401955 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2005) (automatic stay is a “fundamental protection provided to a debtor for the purpose of stopping all creditor collection efforts and harassment of the debtor and to provide … a fresh start.”); Shaw v. Ehrlich, 294 B.R. 260, 267 (W.D. Va. 2003), aff’d, 99 Fed. Appx. 466 (4th Cir. 2004) (“stay protects debtors, as well as creditors, by providing debtors a breathing spell from collection
efforts”).

3. Policy Rationale – Debtor Asset Protection. Behind the stay is a clear
policy rationale: “to grant complete, immediate, albeit temporary relief to the debtor from creditors, and also to prevent dissipation of the debtor’s assets before orderly distribution to creditors can be effected.” S.E.C. v. Brennan, 230 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 271 (3d Cir. 1984)). See also Reliant Energy Services, Inc. v. Enron Canada Corp., 349 F.3d 816, 825 (5th Cir. 2003) (“purposes of the bankruptcy stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 ‘are to protect the debtor’s assets, provide temporary relief from creditors, and further equity of distribution among the creditors by forestalling a race to the courthouse.'”) (quoting GATX Aircraft Corp. v. M/V Courtney Leigh, 768 F.2d 711, 716 (5th Cir. 1985)); Mann v. Chase
Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 316 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2003) (“automatic stay
provision is designed to forfend against the disorderly, piecemeal dismemberment of the debtor’s estate outside the bankruptcy proceedings”).

__________________________________

1 Code § 1107(a) gives a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession the “rights,” “duties” and “powers” of a trustee. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 517 n. 2 (1984). See also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9001(10) (“‘Trustee’ includes a debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 case.”).

4. Procedural Safeguards for Secured Creditors. The Code still imposes
procedural safeguards for the benefit of the secured creditor (e.g., “adequate protection” against erosion of collateral value; time limits on stay modification requests; limits on counterclaims against secured lender seeking stay modification). As shown below, it attempts to reconcile the rights of the secured creditor with the needs of the debtor and its unsecured creditors. See United Savings Assn. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.), 484 U.S. 365, 376 (1988) (“ . . . lack of any realistic prospect of effective reorganization will require” modification of stay of lien enforcement”).

II. The Automatic Stay.

A. When Effective.

1. The stay is automatic upon filing of the petition commencing a case under Code chapters 7 (liquidation), 9 (municipal debt adjustment), 11 (reorganization), 13 (individual debt adjustment), or chapter 15 (cross-border cases) with respect to foreign main proceedings. See e.g. Eskanos & Adler, P.C. v. Leetien, 309 F.3d 1210, 1214 (9th Cir. 2002) (“the automatic stay requires an immediate freeze of the status quo by precluding and nullifying post-petition actions”); Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 527 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[a]utomatic stay is effective immediately upon filing of bankruptcy petition”) (citing Shimer v. Fugazy (In re Fugazy Express, Inc., 982 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir. 1992));

2. The stay acts as a specific and definite court order to restrain creditors
from continuing the judicial process or collection efforts against debtor. See e.g. In re San Angelo Pro Hockey Club, Inc., 292 B.R. 118 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (automatic stay is self-executing injunction, constituting an order issuing from bankruptcy court); In re Bottone, 226 B.R. 290, 297 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998) (“as long as the Chapter 13 case is pending . . . the automatic stay … restrains postpetition creditors from taking action against property of the estate”) (quoting In re Woodall, 81 B.R. 17, 18 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1987)).

3. Unless modified by the court, the stay is effective for the duration of a
bankruptcy case, and generally cannot be waived by the debtor. Maritime Elec. Co., Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 1991) (held, because automatic stay serves interests of both debtors and creditors, it may not be waived and its scope may not be limited by debtor); In re Atrium High Point Ltd. Partnership, 189 B.R. 599 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1995) (before enforcing a debtor’s prepetition waiver of automatic stay bankruptcy court must look at circumstances under which prepetition waiver arose); but see In re Excelsior Henderson Motorcycle Mfg. Co., Inc., 273 B.R. 920 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2002) (court enforced prepetition agreement under which chapter 11 debtor waived automatic stay).

B. Jurisdictional Basis of Injunctive Power.

1. The district court has “exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property,
wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of [the] case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d). A bankruptcy court is a “unit of the district court.” 28 U.S.C. § 151. Section 362 implements this jurisdiction and is supplemented by § 105(a), which authorizes a court to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Code.

2. The broad jurisdictional base of Section 362 confirms the court’s inherent
power to protect property within its jurisdiction and to prevent any divestiture of that jurisdiction. Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 51 S. Ct. 270, 282 (1931) (held, jurisdiction of bankruptcy court respecting property of debtor’s estate having attached, actions brought in other courts could not affect it). See In re Mohawk Greenfield Motel Corp., 239 B.R. 15 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999) (“the automatic stay protects the bankruptcy court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor and its property”) (citing In re Soares, 107 F.3d 969, 975 (1st Cir. Mass. 1997)).

3. Section 362(a) stays, among other things:

a. a secured creditor from collecting accounts receivable of debtor.
Matter of Pernie Bailey Drilling Co., Inc., 993 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1993)
(account receivables were property of the estate; court must lift stay for
creditors to gain access to receivables);

b. a creditor’s dissolution of a debtor corporation. 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a)(3); Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Automobile Dealers’ Assoc.,
997 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1993) (held, dissolution proceeding constituted
exercise of control over debtor’s property);

c. foreclosure proceedings in other courts instituted against debtor’s
property prior to commencement of bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a)(1); see In re Vierkant, 240 B.R. 317, 322 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999)
(citing Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940); In re Soares, 107 F.3d
969 (1st Cir. 1997)) (post-petition state court default order signed by judge two weeks after bankruptcy filing violated automatic stay);

d. a landlord’s proceeding to recover possession of leased premises.
11 U.S.C. § 363(a)(5); 48th St. Steakhouse, Inc. v. Rockefeller Group, Inc.
(In re 48th St. Steakhouse, Inc.), 835 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1987) (serving
notice of termination on assignee of restaurant lease rather than on debtor, which still had interest in the property, violated automatic stay); and e. an IRS sale of property seized prior to commencement of case. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(8); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983) (IRS may also be compelled to turn over levied property under Code § 542).

f. arbitration proceedings that not only concern claims asserted
against the debtor, but also concern the debtor’s claims against a third
party. ACandS, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty and Surety Co., 425 F.3d 252
(3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2291 (2006). (although arbitration
was commenced by debtor, continuation of arbitration proceedings
violated automatic stay because, unlike trial, it is impossible in arbitration
to definitely classify arguments presented (i.e., claims and counterclaims);
arbitration award, which effectively terminated debtor’s insurance
coverage, is invalid because it diminishes estate property); In re Edwin
Epstein Jr. Operating Co., Inc., 314 B.R. 591 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004)
(held, automatic stay applied, not only to prevent non-debtor party to
arbitration proceedings from asserting claims against debtor for tortious
interference and slander of title, but also to prevent arbitrators from
hearing debtor’s claims to replace this non-debtor party as operator of oil
and gas wells based on debtor’s asserted ownership interests therein).

III. Scope and Duration of Stay.

A. Scope of Section 362.

1. Property of Estate. The bankruptcy court’s injunctive power is ordinarily
limited to protecting property belonging to a debtor. Property of the estate is defined in Code § 541(a)(1) (“. . . all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”). See In re Lankford, 305 B.R. 297, 301 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2004) (“All recognizable interests of the debtors or the estate are afforded the protection of § 362(a)…This includes a mere possessory interest in real property without any accompanying legal interest.”).
See also In re Moffett, 356 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2004) (held, chapter 13 debtor’s statutory right of redemption was sufficient interest in automobile that was repossessed prepetition to be included in estate property). But see In re Jasper, 325 B.R. 50, 55 (Bankr. D. Me. 2005) (credit union’s policy of revoking membership benefits of members who caused credit union a loss does not violate automatic stay); In re Santangelo, 325 B.R. 874 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. March 22, 2005) (district court did not violate automatic stay by approving class action settlement for claims against mortgage lender; rather, court gave prospective class members, including debtor choice of remaining class members or opting out of class); In re Medex Regional Laboratories, LLC, 314 B.R. 716 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2004) (proceeds of debtor’s directors’ and officers’ liability insurance policies were not property of estate and were not protected by automatic stay, even though policies also provided coverage to debtor for indemnification claims, because the debtor had not provided any indemnification to non-debtor insiders and such indemnification claims were merely hypothetical). Compare In re Arter & Hadden, L.L.P., 335 B.R. 666 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) (proceeds of debtor’s directors’ and officers’ liability insurance policies are property of estate because policies also provided coverage to debtor and there was no reason why direct suit against debtor is either practically or procedurally untenable).

a. Property Outside the Scope. The stay is not applicable to actions
against property that is neither the debtor’s nor the estate’s. Rodger v.
County of Munroe (In re Rodgers), 333 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2003) (debtor’s
mere possession of title to real property is not sufficient to find property to
be property of estate or to bar delivery of deed to purchaser by operation
of stay); Chugach Timber Corp. v. Northern Stevedoring & Handling
Corp. (In re Chugach Forest Prods., Inc.), 23 F.3d 241 (9th Cir. 1994)
(court refused to extend stay to boat that was not property of debtor’s
estate but on which assets of debtor had been transferred) (11 U.S.C.
§ 541(b)); In re Howell, 311 B.R. 173, 179 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2004)
(automatic stay does not preclude estranged spouse from seeking equitable distribution of non-estate property such as exempt property, postpetition earnings, property excluded from the estate, property abandoned by the trustee or debtor surplus); NLRB v. McDermott, 300 B.R. 40 (D. Col. 2003) (automatic stay did not protect property of debtor’s wife’s). Examples of property outside the stay’s scope are:

(i) Foreclosure. If a lender completes foreclosure before the bankruptcy filing, neither the debtor nor the estate has any interest in the property and the automatic stay does not apply. In re Theoclis, 213 B.R. 880 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (held, foreclosure sale had terminated debtor’s interest in property.); In re Williams, 247 B.R. 449 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000) (when foreclosure sale of debtor’s residence became final prior to commencement of chapter 13 case, residence did not become property of estate and was not protected by automatic stay);

(ii) Abandonment. Abandonment terminates the stay as to abandoned property. In re Holly’s, Inc., 140 B.R. 643 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) (once abandonment of debtor’s property is effectuated, or foreclosure of real and personal property is completed, taxing entity is entitled to enforce its statutory in rem rights against property.). But see In re Thompson-Mendez, 321 B.R. 814, 819 (Bankr. D. Md. 2005) (trustee’s deemed rejection of debtor’s residential lease by failure to timely assume it did constitute abandonment such that lease was no longer protected by
automatic stay).

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2. Entities Affected by the Stay. Section 362(a) applies “to all entities,”
including any “person, estate, trust, governmental unit.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(15).

This broad definition of “entity” eliminates the need to define who is a “creditor,” “secured creditor” or other person affected by the stay.

B. Duration of the Stay. Unless the court orders otherwise (i.e., unless creditor gets automatic stay modified), the stay “continues until such property is no longer property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1). The stay of all other acts continues until case is closed or dismissed, or, if debtor is an individual, until debtor is granted or denied a discharge. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(c)(2)(A), (B) and (C). See also In re Allen, 300 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 2002) (automatic stay “prohibits action against the bankruptcy estate only until the bankruptcy court confirms a plan reorganizing the debtor’s property”); Middle Tennessee News Co., Inc. v. Charnel of Cincinnati, Inc., 250 F.3d 1077 (7th Cir. 2001) (automatic stay remains in effect until bankruptcy court disposes of case or grants relief from stay); In re Spirtos, 221 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 2000) (“So long as there are assets in the estate, then, the stay remains in effect”); Eastern Refractories Co. Inc. v. Forty Eight Insulations Inc., 157 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998) (order “terminating” automatic stay operates from date of order’s entry); Lomagno v. Salomon Brothers Realty Corp., 320 B.R. 473, 481 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2005), aff’d, 429 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2005) (automatic stay not retroactively imposed when dismissal order set aside on due process grounds); In re Peregrine Systems, Inc., 314 B.R. 31, 44 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 2005 WL 2401955 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2005) (automatic stay “continues until the bankruptcy case is closed, dismissed, or discharge is granted or denied, or until the bankruptcy court grants some relief from the stay.”) (citing Maritime Elec. Co., Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.3d 1194, 1206 (3d Cir. 1991)); U.S. v. White, 466 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2006) (debtor discharged and automatic stay terminates on date of confirmation of debtor’s reorganization plan even when plan contains a later effective date). If a case is filed by or against a debtor who is an individual and a case of the debtor was pending within the preceding one year period but was dismissed, the automatic stay “with respect to any action taken with respect to a debt or property
securing such debt or with respect to any lease shall terminate with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later case.”

11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A). See Jumpp v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (In re Jumpp), 356 B.R. 789 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006) (interpreting § 362(c)(3)(A) automatic stay terminates only in regard to debtor; stay continues, though, in regard to property of estate).

• As of October 17, 2005, automatic stay terminates 60 days after a request for relief from stay unless final decision on request is rendered by court within the 60-day period or period is extended by agreement or by court for specific period of time found necessary for good cause.2

2 The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 was enacted on April 20, 2005, and many of its provisions became effective on October 17, 2005.

IV. Acts Stayed. Section 362(a) is broad in scope, but specifically lists eight categories that are subject to its injunctive power.

1. “Commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor . . . to recover on a prepetition claim against a debtor.”3 Code § 362(a)(l) (emphasis added):

a. Appeals: stay covers all proceedings originally brought against the
debtor, regardless of whether the debtor is appellant or appellee.4 Halmar
Robicon Group, Inc. v. Toshiba Int’l Corp., 127 Fed. Appx. 501, 503 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (automatic stay only operates as against actions in which debtor
is in defensive posture); Nielson v. Price, 17 F.3d 1276, 1277 (10th Cir.
1994) (“[t]he 362(a)(1) stay applies to actions that are ‘against the debtor’ at their inception, regardless of the subsequent appellate posture of the case”); Ellis v. Consolidated Diesel Elec. Corp., 894 F.2d 371, 373 (10th Cir. 1990) (operation of stay should not depend upon whether district
court finds for or against the debtor). But see In re Mid-City Parking,
Inc., 322 B.R. 798 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005) (debtor may unilaterally waive
protections of automatic stay by pursuing appeal without first obtaining
bankruptcy court order lifting stay; debtor could not be held liable for
damages to creditor-appellee arising from debtor’s alleged “willful stay
violation).

b. Administrative proceedings: See In re Krystal Cadillac Oldsmobile
GMC Truck, Inc., 142 F.3d 631 (3d Cir. 1998) (postpetition
determinations by Pennsylvania’s Board of Vehicle Manufacturers,
Dealers and Salespersons, ordering termination of franchise agreement
violated automatic stay); In re Best Payphones, Inc., 279 B.R. 92 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2002) (administrative law judge’s post-petition decision in
proceeding commenced pre-petition ‘but concluded after debtor’s chapter
11 filing’ was void and without effect because it violated automatic stay).
But see Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System v. MCorp
Financial, Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991) (Section 362(a) does not apply to
ongoing, nonfinal administrative/regulatory proceedings, and action of
Board of Governors was excepted from the stay under Section 362(b)(4)
of the Code (the “governmental unit” exception)).

c. Partnerships. Actions against partners and their property are not
protected in first instance by the filing of a partnership petition. Bankers
Trust (Delaware) v. 236 Beltway Inv., 865 F. Supp. 1186 (E.D. Va. 1994)
(automatic stay does not protect partnership debtor’s individual general
partners); O’Neill v. Boden-Wert Real Estate USA Funds I, Ltd., 599
So.2d 1045 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 1992) (held, automatic stay did not stop action against general partner in partnership debtor or against general partner’s general partner).

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3 “‘[C]laim against the debtor’ includes claim against property of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 102(2).
4 Actions against non-debtors and against co-defendants are not stayed. See sub-section (e) infra.

d. Shareholders of corporate debtor. Bankruptcy court has no jurisdiction
over stock of corporate debtor that belongs to third party shareholders.
See e.g. In re Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., 209 B.R. 832, 838 (D.
Del. 1997) (“automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are not
implicated by the exercise of shareholders’ corporate governance rights.”).

e. Actions against surety, co-debtor, or guarantor are not stayed.5 See
e.g. Reliant Energy Services, Inc. v. Enron Canada Corp., 349 F.3d 816,
825 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[by its terms the automatic stay applies only to the
debtor, not to co-debtors under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11”); In re Third
Eighty-Ninth Associates, 138 B.R. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (suit against
guarantors of chapter 11 debtor was not a “back-door” attempt to acquire
assets of debtor); In re Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc., 113 B.R. 610
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991) (automatic stay does not prevent creditors from
suing co-debtors).

f. Actions are not stayed against non-debtor co-defendants.6 See e.g.
Queenie, Ltd. v. Nygard Intl., 321 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 2003) (debtor’s
filing of bankruptcy petition stayed his appeal and that of his wholly owned corporation7, but not that of co-defendants); 555 M Mfg., Inc. v.
Calvin Klein, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (automatic stay
protection not available to debtor’s solvent co-defendant in breach of
contract case). But see Woodell v. Ormet Primary Aluminum Corp., 808
N.E.2d 402, 407 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (automatic stay applies to claims
against debtor’s employee co-defendants only to the extent that the causes of action against them arise from their status as employees of the debtor).

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5 In limited circumstances, courts have asserted their equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) to enjoin the continuation of litigation against non-debtors when the debtor’s trustee demonstrates that continuation of litigation against non-debtors imminently and irreparably threatens the debtor’s reorganization prospects. E.g. In re United Health Care Org., 210 B.R. 228, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (staying action against non-debtor principals and officers of debtor when enforcement of judgment imminently and irreparably threatened non-debtors’ ability to fund debtor’s plan); North Star Contracting Corp. v. McSpeedon (In re North Star Contracting Corp.), 125 B.R. 368, 370-71 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (staying action against non-debtor president of debtor when, among other things, continuation of action would distract vital non-debtor and there was no distinct cause of action against him, but merely an action commenced solely to circumvent the stay).

6 Courts may stay actions against a non-debtor third-party defendant under “unusual circumstances” when “there is such identity between the debtor and third-party defendant that the debtor may be said to be the real party defendant and that a judgment against the third-party defendant will in effect be a judgment … against the debtor.” A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cir. 1986). See also In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enter., 423 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2005) (commencement of civil action to recover accounts receivable held in collection account in debtor’s name violated automatic stay even though debtor was not named as defendant because action sought to recover estate property); Global Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. (In re Global Industrial
Technologies), 303 B.R. 753 (W.D. Pa. 2004), vacated in part, modified in part on other grounds, 2004 WL 555418 (Bankr. W.D.Pa. Mar. 19, 2004) (held, state court action brought by insurers for declaratory judgment regarding non-debtor’s rights in insurance policies it shared with debtor violated automatic stay even though debtor was not named as defendant in state court action because outcome of state action could affect debtor’s rights in shared insurance); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. of America v. Butler, 803 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1986) (referred to A.H. Robins decision as case with “unusual circumstances”). Compare In re Transervice Logistics, Inc., 304 B.R. 805 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2004) (declining to extend automatic stay to non-debtor co-defendants because, unlike situation in A.H. Robins, defendant-debtor only faced one suit, not thousands, and thus would not be barraged by discovery and litigation).

g. Proceedings or claims arising post-petition are not subject to automatic stay, although successful plaintiff must obtain relief from stay if it seeks to enforce judgment against estate.8 Bellini Imports, Ltd. v. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., 944 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1991) (automatic stay did not bar institution of action arising out of alleged postpetition breach of contract); Erickson v. Polk, 921 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1990) (lessor of farmland did not violate automatic stay when it retook possession of property following postpetition expiration of lease); In re Dominguez, 312 B.R. 499 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (prepetition lapse of debtor-taxpayer’s redemption period may constitute “cause” for lifting stay to allow tax authority to exercise its
rights in debtor’s real property; it did not relieve taxing authority’s obligation to move first for modification of stay).

h. Automatic stay does not apply to post-petition defensive actions in a
prepetition lawsuit brought by a debtor. Stanwyck v. Beilinson, 104 Fed.
Appx. 616 (9th Cir. 2004).

2. Enforcement of prepetition judgment against debtor or its property (11
U.S.C. § 362(a)(2)). See generally Delpit v. Commissioner, 18 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 1994) (held, appeal to enforce pre-petition judgment was subject to the automatic stay).

3. “[A]ny act” to obtain possession of debtor’s property, or to exercise
control over such property. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

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7 The court ignored its own precedent in coming to this bizarre result, but justified it by reasoning that adjudication of a claim against the wholly-owned corporation would have an “immediate adverse economic impact” on the debtor. But see Feldman v. Trustees of Beck Ind., Inc. (In re Beck Ind., Inc.), 725 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1973) (court cannot enjoin suit against solvent independent subsidiary of debtor merely because stock is held by debtor in reorganization); In re Unishops, Inc., 374 F.Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to grant a stay of court proceedings against subsidiaries).

8 Judiciary Code, 28 U.S.C. § 959(a), provides relief to holders of postpetition claims against a debtor from having to obtain leave from bankruptcy court to pursue claims arising from “acts or transactions in carrying on business connected with [estate] property.” 28 U.S.C. § 959. Section 959’s exception to the automatic stay is limited to postpetition claims arising from operation of the debtor’s business, and does not include acts associated with liquidation or administration of the bankruptcy estate. See In re Crown Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d 963, 971-72 (9th Cir. 2005) (postpetition claim against trustee arising from liquidation of estate not subject to § 959 because not related to business operation); Carter v. Rogers, 220 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2000); In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir. 1993) (malicious prosecution claims against trustee arising from avoidance actions are not based on acts arising from business operation and thus not subject to § 959).

a. A credit union that accepts and retains postpetition deductions from
chapter 13 debtor’s salary violates automatic stay. See, e.g., Town of
Hempstead Employees Federal Credit Union v. Wicks, 215 B.R. 316
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (credit union’s four-month-long administrative hold on
chapter 13 debtors’ savings accounts violated automatic stay).

b. Letters of Credit. See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 297 B.R. 525 (N.D. Ill.
2003) (letters of credit are not property of debtor’s estate subject to
automatic stay; beneficiary not prevented from drawing on letter of credit
when account party is in bankruptcy); In re A.J. Lane & Co., Inc., 115
B.R. 738 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (held, payment by third party on letter of
credit not stayed because it did not involve a transfer of debtor’s assets).

c. Creditors’ actions against debtor to obtain property fraudulently
transferred by debtor prior to bankruptcy are barred by the automatic stay.
See, e.g. Constitution Bank v. Tubbs, 68 F.3d 685 (3d Cir. 1995) (bank’s
action against guarantors for fraudulent conduct triggered automatic stay
when each guarantor filed a bankruptcy petition during fraud action).

d. Mortgagees’ postpetition foreclosure against real property subject to
deed naming debtor’s spouse a sole owner violated automatic stay because, although debtor only had arguable interest in the property, the
determination should be made by bankruptcy court before mortgagees
foreclosed. In re Chesnut, 422 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2005).

e. Debtor’s Tax Benefits. Circuits apparently are split regarding whether
a debtor’s tax benefits (e.g., net operating losses) are property of the estate, thus subject to the automatic stay. See In re UAL Corp., 412 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding bankruptcy court’s injunction restricting trading in debtor’s securities to protect tax benefits to be “problematic on the merits,” and questioning court’s reliance on Bankruptcy Code §§ 105(a) and 362 as basis for trading procedures order). Compare In Prudential Lines, Inc., 928 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding debtor’s tax benefits to be estate property, and that automatic stay thus enjoined debtor’s parent from taking worthless stock deduction on parent’s tax return).

4. Any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against debtor’s property
(but not the perfection of mechanic’s lien9 — §§ 362(b)(3) and 546(b) — or when perfection occurs within the 10-day period after the time of effective transfer of the property, under §§ 362(b)(3), and 547(e)(2)(A)). 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4).

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9 The mechanic’s lienor will ordinarily be able to perfect its lien after bankruptcy for work performed prior to bankruptcy. See generally, In re Yobe Electric, Inc., 728 F.2d 207, 208 (3d Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (service of notice of intent to file mechanic’s lien did not violate stay since under state statute “perfection of mechanic’s lien ‘relates back’ to the installation of the first material”); In re Lionel Corp., 29 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1994) (held, no automatic stay violation resulted from mechanics’ lienors’ post-petition serving notice of lien upon lessors and chapter 11 debtor lessee, when New York law permitted perfection of filed mechanics’ lien after another entity had acquired rights to the property).

See In re Fuller, 134 B.R. 945 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992) (held, automatic stay prevents creation or perfection of lien, even by operation of law).
a. Sections 362(b)(3) and 546(b)(1)(A), read together, set the
boundaries of this exception.

(i) Section 362(b)(3) subjects a creditor’s right to “perfect, or to maintain or continue the perfection of, an interest in property” to Section 546(b) of Code. 11 U.S.C. §362(b)(3).

(ii) In turn, Section 546(b) limits the trustee’s powers to avoid statutory liens by providing that they “are subject to any generally applicable law that permits perfection of an interest in property to be effective against an entity that acquires rights in such property before the date of perfection.” 11 U.S.C. §546(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see, e.g., In re AR Accessories Group, Inc., 345 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2003) (held, priming statute need not contain language expressly providing for retroactive perfection in order to trigger exception provided in 11 U.S.C. §546(b)(1)(A)); In re Hayden, 308 B.R. 428 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (held, towing operator did not violate automatic stay in refusing to surrender possession of debtor’s vehicle, which was towed prepetition, unless debtor first paid towing charges because towing operator was merely acting to maintain or continue possession of its lien, not to enforce it).

5. Any act to create, perfect, or enforce a lien against debtor’s property for
prepetition claims. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5). See, e.g., In re Birney, 200 F.3d 225 227 (4th Cir. 1999) (Section 362(a)(5) prohibits “any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title”).

6. “Any act to collect, assess, or recover a prepetition claim against the
debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 233 F.3d 417, 423 (6th Cir. 2000) (a course of conduct violates § 362(a)(6) if it “(1) could reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the debtor’s determination as to whether to repay, and (2) is contrary to what a reasonable person would consider to be fair under the circumstances”) (quoting In re Briggs, 143 B.R. 438 453 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992)); see also In re Diamond, 346 F.3d 224, 227-28 (1st Cir. 2003) (settlement negotiations challenging Chapter 7 debtor’s discharge do not violate the automatic stay per se, but creditor’s threat to seek revocation of debtor’s real estate license during negotiations was coercive, thus dismissal of
debtor’s complaint proper); In re Optel, Inc., 60 Fed.Appx. 390 (3d Cir. March 25, 2003) (sale agreement between creditor and debtor provided that debtor either pay $6 million lump sum payment or, if creditor requested, $10 million over time; held, automatic stay prohibited creditor from requesting the $10 million deferred payment, therefore creditor was only entitled to distribution on $6 million claim); In re Jamo, 283 F.3d 392, 399 (1st Cir. 2002) (“a creditor may engage in post petition negotiations pertaining to a bankruptcy-related reaffirmation agreement so long as the creditor does not engage in coercive or harassing tactics”).

7. Setoffs of any prepetition debt owing to the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7). See Newbery Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 95 F.3d 1392 (9th Cir. 1996) (right of setoff is subject to automatic stay provisions of chapter 11); Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995) (temporary administrative freeze by bank not a stay violation or setoff; intent to settle accounts permanently is required for setoff within meaning of automatic stay provisions). Compare Jimenez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 335 B.R. 450 (Bankr. D. N.M. Dec. 21, 2005) (temporary administrative freeze by bank, without right of setoff, violated automatic stay); In re Calvin, 329 B.R. 589 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (bank’s administrative freeze of debtor’s account violated automatic stay when bank was not creditor of debtor and thus had no right of setoff); In re Cullen, 329 BR. 52
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2005) (bank’s administrative freeze of account jointly held by debtor and debtor’s father violated automatic stay because freeze was intended to continue indefinitely until bankruptcy case was closed; bank did not have valid right of setoff because funds in account were property of debtor’s father and mutuality requirement for setoff thus was lacking).

a. N.B.: The automatic stay, however, does not prevent a creditor
from exercising its right of recoupment.10 See, e.g., In re Slater Health
Center, Inc., 398 F.3d 98 (1st Cir. 2005) (right of recoupment entitled
government to recoup prepetition overpayments to debtor-health care
provider by reducing postpetition payments to debtor); In re Holyoke
Nursing Home, 372 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004) (same); In re Anes, 195 F.3d
177 (3d Cir. 1999) (held, doctrine of recoupment did not apply so as to
permit pension plans to deduct loan payments from debtors’ postpetition
paychecks because the payments were not part of the same transaction); In re Delicruz, 300 B.R. 669 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003) (“recoupment reduces
or extinguish[es] a debt arising from the same transaction, and is not
stayed by the bankruptcy”). But see York Linings Int’l, Inc. v. Harbison-
Walker Refractories Co., 839 N.E.2d 766 (Ind. App. 2005) (although
automatic stay does not bar creditor from exercising right of recoupment,
stay does prevent creditor from asserting counterclaim for recoupment in
litigation because such a counterclaim seeks affirmative relief).

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10 “Recoupment” has been defined as follows: “. . . so long as the creditor’s claim arises out of the identical transaction as the debtor’s, that claim may be offset against the debt owed to the debtor, without concern” for the Code’s setoff limitations. In re University Medical Center, 973 F.2d 1065, 1080 (3d Cir. 1992). Recoupment in bankruptcy has been narrowly construed by courts because it violates the basic bankruptcy principle of equal distribution. In re B & L Oil Co., 782 F.2d 155, 158 (10th Cir. 1986) (“[a] fundamental tenet of bankruptcy law is that . . . [once] a petition is filed, debts that arose before the petition may not be satisfied through post-petition transactions. This is seen in bankruptcy restrictions on setoffs [and recoupment].”); In re McMahon, 129 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 1997) (“in light of the Bankruptcy Code’s strong policy favoring equal treatment of creditors, recoupment . . . should be narrowly construed”).

8. Commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(8). See, e.g., Halpern v. C.I., 96 T.C. 895 (U.S. Tax Ct. 1991) (held, automatic stay bars commencement or continuation of any proceeding in Tax Court, regardless of whether claim relates to prepetition or postpetition tax year deficiencies).

• As of October 17, 2005, § 362(a)(8) is limited to proceedings
concerning corporate debtor’s tax liability for taxable period the
bankruptcy court may determine or, if debtor is individual, to tax
for taxable period ending before date of order for relief.

9. Only affirmative acts are stayed. Section 362 applies only to affirmative
acts against the debtor or its estate.

a. The automatic stay does not affect, and the court may not exercise
its equitable powers to stay or toll, the automatic transfer of rights such as
that occurring by the expiration of a statutory period of redemption.
Canney v. Merchants Bank (In re Frazer), 284 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2002)
(did not stay mortgagee’s act of recording a certificate of non-redemption;
held, expiration of statutory period is not an “affirmative act” and
automatic stay did not apply).

b. Omissions and waivers are not stayed by the Code because they
are not affirmative acts. See e.g. Mann v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp.,
316 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003) (mortgagee’s failure to submit
preconfirmation request, pursuant to bankruptcy statute governing rights
of oversecured creditors, to have its postpetition attorney fees included in
its allowed secured claim was not sort of overt, affirmative act that
violates stay).

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Former ‘Foreclosure King’ Is Selling $32M Megamansion in Fort Lauderdale

20 Sunday Sep 2015

Posted by BNG in Foreclosure Defense

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David J. Stern, the Florida attorney who made millions during the mortgage crisis — and who was later disbarred after falsifying foreclosure documents at his law firm — is selling his megamansion in Fort Lauderdale, FL, for $32 million.

The 17,000-square-foot house sits on three lots on a private island. It has 500 feet of water frontage — ample space for yachts — and a few thousand square feet of outdoor terraces, according to listing agent Dennis Stevick of DND Associates.

“The outdoor entertaining opportunities are pretty much endless,” Stevick says.

Inside, the six-bedroom, seven-bathroom home is crammed with luxury. Much of the custom woodwork in the house is made from “wood pieced together by craftsmen from all over the world,” says Stevick.

The property also features a 12-seat home theater, five fireplaces, a gym, an executive office, an outdoor tennis court, a cabana, an infinity pool, and a six-car garage.

Stern had the home custom-built for him in 2007. At its peak in 2009, his law firm made over $260 million a year, earning him the ” Foreclosure King” moniker.

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

How Homeowners Can Effectively Challenge TILA Disclosures and Violations

17 Thursday Sep 2015

Posted by BNG in Foreclosure Defense

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PURPOSE OF THE TRUTH-IN-LENDING ACT (TILA)

TILA seeks to assure meaningful disclosure of credit terms and conditions that the consumer will be informed with accurate costs and benefits of their credit transaction, allowing them to shop for the best credit terms available on the market. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a).

STANDARD OF LAW

Since TILA specifically remedial in nature, its provisions must be strictly construed. A creditor must comply with TILA in all credit transactions and “misleading disclosure is as much a violation of TILA as a failure to disclose at all.” Smith v. Chapman, 614 F.2d 968, 977 (5th Cir. 1980). It is not sufficient to attempt to comply with the Act, but rather, creditors are required to strictly comply with all the requirements of the Act. There is no need to show that the consumer was misled or deceived by ambiguous credit terms in order to prevail. Noel v. Fleet Finance, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1997).

Congress did not intend for creditors to escape liability for merely technical violations, that even minor or technical violations impose liability upon the creditors. Huff v. Steward-Gwinn Furniture Co., 713 F.2d 67, 69 (4th Cir. 1983). See also, Washington v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 2006 W.L. 1980201 (N.D. Ill.).

SCOPE

TILA applies to most consumer credit transactions and was specifically enacted to ensure accurate and meaningful disclosure of the charges involved in a transaction, allowing consumers to make their own decisions about obtaining a loan.

A lawsuit for violation of TILA may be based upon a lenders failure to comply with disclosure requirements. U.S.C. §§ 1631-34. Most of TILA violations involve the creditor’s failure to charge the correct amount, failure to disclose all the material terms, or failure to provide necessary forms or documents required by the Act.
TILA does not apply to the following transactions:

1. Transactions that are made for business, commercial, or agricultural purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(1); Reg. Z § 226.3(a)(1).

2. Extensions of Credit to Organizations as opposed to natural persons. U.S.C. § 1603(1); Reg. Z. § 2026.3(a)(2).

3. Credit over $25,000 Not Secured by Real Property or a Dwelling. U.S.C. § 1603(3); Reg. Z. § 226.3(b).

4. Student Loans. U.S.C. § 1603(7); Reg. Z. § 226.3(f).

5. Transactions under Public Utility Tariffs. U.S.C. § 1603(4); Reg. Z. § 226.3(c).

6. Securities or Commodities transactions that are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. U.S.C. § 1603(2); Reg. Z. § 226.3(d).

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

When a violation of TILA occurs, the one-year limitations period applicable to actions for statutory and actual damages begins to run. U.S.C. § 1641(e).
A TILA violation may occur at the consummation of the transaction between a creditor and its consumer if the transaction is made without the required disclosures.

A creditor may also violate TILA by engaging in fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive practices that conceal the TILA violation occurring at the time of closing. Often consumers do not discover any violation until after they have paid excessive charges imposed by their creditors. Consumers who later learn of the creditor’s TILA violations can allege an equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. When the consumer has an extended right to rescind or pursue other statutory remedies because a violation occurs, the statute of limitations for all the damages the consumers seek extends to three years from the date the violation is revealed. McIntosh v. Irwin Union Bank & Trust Co., 215 F.R.D. 26, 30 (D. Mass. 2003).

TILA AND REGULATION Z

Congress delegated authority for the implementation of TILA to the Federal Reserve Board (FRB). The Board of Governors (the Board) of the FRB interpreted TILA and promulgated a detailed and comprehensive set of rules that sets out the Board’s interpretation known as Regulation Z. Regulation Z is an official set of rules and most pleadings alleging TILA violations also alleging violations of Regulation Z as well.

DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND VIOLATIONS

1. Form Of Disclosure

TILA requires specific disclosures before the closing of a credit transaction. Disclosures must be “clear and conspicuously, in writing, in a form that the consumer may keep.” § 1632(a); § 226.5(a)(1).

Disclosure statement is a written document that a creditor is required to provide the consumer prior to closing, which contains TILA required material terms# related to the costs of the credit transaction. In this statement, a creditor must disclose to the person who is obligated on a consumer credit transaction the information required under TILA.

The Act calls for disclosures to be made in a manner that is reasonably to understand by ordinary persons. Most courts agree that “sufficiency of TILA mandated disclosures is to be viewed from the standpoint of an ordinary consumer, not the perspective of a Federal Reserve Board member, federal judge, or English professor.” Smith v. Cash Store Mgmt., 195 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1999). Edmondson v. Allen-Russell Ford, Inc., 577 F.2d 291, 296 (5th Cir. 1978) (“we must assess the adequacy of disclosure […] by the audience for which disclosure was intended).

a. Required Disclosures Must be Clear and Conspicuous.

U.S.C. § 1632(a). Courts usually look at the particular Disclosure Statement and its content to determine whether it was sufficiently clear and conspicuous.

1) Creditor violates TILA for failure to clearly and conspicuously disclose the requirements by disclosing required information in fine print. There was “nothing in the disclosure statement that would call a person’s attention to the relevant clause.” Violation found when disclosures were buried near the bottom of the form. Re Wright, 11 B.R. 590, 592 (S.D. Miss. 1981).

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1 Material terms are annual percentage rate, finance charge, method of determining the finance charge and the balance, amount financed, total of payments, the number and amount of payments, due dates or periods of payments scheduled to repay the indebtedness. U.S.C. § 1602(u); Reg. Z. § 226.23 n. 48.

2) TILA violation found where a financial company fails to disclose the cost of credit life and disability insurance in the disclosure statement, making the interest of the loan appear less than its actual cost. Woods v. Beneficial Finance Co. of Eugene, 395 F. Supp. 9, 12 (DC Or 1975).

3) Disclosures are not clear and conspicuous when the disclosure statement includes contradicting terms. Varner v. Century Finance Co. Inc., 738 F.2d 1143 (11th Cir. 1984) (disclosing two different dollar amounts under the same heading is confusing). See also Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 240 F.R.D 612, 618 (E.D. Wis. 2007) (Disclosure found unclear where the Truth-In-Lending Disclosure Statement shows the APR is 4.047 percent and other disclosure that “strongly implie[s] that the cost of the loan expressed as a yearly rate” at 1.950 percent); Ralls v. Bank of N.Y., 230 B.R. 508, 516 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (where there is a contradiction between TILA disclosures and other information provided by the lender, the disclosures are unclear).

b. The terms “finance charge” and “annual percentage rate” (APR) shall be more conspicuous than any other terms.

U.S.C. § 1632(a). These terms can be disclosed more conspicuously by using a contrasting type size or boldness and/or placing borders around them. Commentary § 226.5(a)(2)-2.

1) Violate for printing the terms “finance charge” and annual percentage rate” in the same typeface as other material terms. Brown v. Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. Ill. 2000). See also, Herrera v. First Northern Sav. & Loan Asso’n, 805 F.2d 896, 898 (NM 1986) (TILA violated when the term “annual percentage rate” appeared on the disclosure statement in identical size, style, and boldness with over 30 other terms and phrases).

2) No violation where the term “annual percentage rate” appears in a bolded box and is highlighted by all capital and bolded letter.” Robinson v. First Franklin Financial Corp., 2006 WL 2540777 (E.D. Pa.).

c. TILA disclosures must be grouped together and segregated from all unrelated information.

U.S.C. § 1632(a). Disclosures must be organized in the contrast so that each section of the disclosure statement is complete without any extra information that confuses the consumers. Reg. Z. § 226.5(b)(1).

1) A paragraph at the bottom of the contract referring to the “property described above” is ambiguous and does not comply with the requirement that disclosures be grouped together. Leathers v. Toyota-Volvo, 824 F. Supp. 155 (C.D. Ill. 1993). See also, In re Cook, 76 B.R. 661, 663 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (information in the disclosure statement referred back and forth violates TILA, because the required disclosures must be simplified and grouped in a single location and segregated from everything else).

2) Failure to disclose time of payment in the disclosure statement violates TILA because “the timing of payments […] must be grouped with the other required disclosure” such as number of payments and amount of payments. Jones v. Ameriquest Mort. Co., 2006 WL 273545 (N.D. Ill.). See Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 240 F.R.D at 617 (the creditor listed the period of payments in a different place than the number and amount of payments violate TILA requires to group related information together).

d. Additional information.

Lenders can include additional information on the disclosure statement so long as the additional information relates to the required disclosures. U.S.C. § 1632(b).

1) Disclosure of an additional interest rate of 1.950 percent, which only applied to the first monthly payment, in the disclosure statement is violation, because it causes the loan to “appear more attractive than it actually was and serve no useful purpose.” Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 240 F.R.D at 620.

2) Additional information setting out the Note Rate disclosed on the Disclosure Statement found “helpful and important to consumers.” Smith v. Anderson, 801 F.2d 661, 663 (Ct. App. Va. 1986).

e. The home equity brochure published by the Board or a suitable substitute shall be provided.

U.S.C. § 1637A(e). Creditors are required to provide the consumer with a brochure prepared by the FRB describing the home equity plans. If a creditor provides a substitute brochure, the brochure must be comparable to the Board’s brochure in substance and comprehensiveness. Reg. Z. § 226.5b(e)-1. When a third party has provided the consumer with a brochure, the creditor does not have to give the consumer a second copy of the brochure. Reg. Z. § 226.5b(e)-2.

2. Time of Disclosures:

“The disclosures and brochure required … shall be provided at the time an application is provided to the consumer.”

a. Creditor failed to provide the consumer disclosure statement at the consummation of the credit transaction violates TILA. Family Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Davis, 172 B.R. 437 (D.C. 1994); In re Schweizer, 354 B.R. 272, 281 (Id. 2006).

b. No Violation where the creditor presents to the consumer, prior to the consummation of the credit transaction, a contract with multiple copies and allows the consumer to keep one of the copies before signing the contract. Queen v. Lynch Jewelers, LLC, 55 P.3d 914, 916 (Kan. App. 2002).

3. Required Disclosures for Open-End Credit Plan

TILA requires the following information to be disclosed, to the extent applicable. U.S.C. § 1637(a).

a. Disclosure of the Finance Charge Accrual Date:

The conditions under which a finance charge may be imposed together with either the time period, if any in which the customer may pay without incurring additional finance charges or there is no free ride period. Reg. Z. § 226.6(a)(1).

b. Disclosure of the Periodic Rate, Range of Balances, and APR:

For each period, a creditor must disclose the periodic rate that will be used to compute the finance charge; the balances to which the rate is applied; the corresponding nominal annual percentage rate; if deferent rates apply to different types of transactions, they must be disclosed; and penalty rate and possible conditions that trigger the penalty rate. Reg. Z. § 226.6(a)(2).

c. Disclosure of the Periodic Rate, Range of Balances, and APR:

The method used to determine the balance on which the finance charged is imposed, and a complex method calls for a more detailed explanation. Reg. Z. § 226.6(a)(3).

d. Disclosure of the Finance Charge Amount:

The method used to determine the amount of finance charge, including any minimum or fixed amount. Reg. Z. § 226.6(a)(4).

e. Disclosure of Charges Other than Finance Charge:

Identification of other charges which may be imposed and their method of computation in accordance with the FRB regulations. Significant charges such as membership fees, late charges, default charges, charges for exceeding the credit limit of an account, fee for providing copies of documents, taxes imposed on the credit transaction, real estate charges, and other charges must be disclosed. Reg. Z. §§ 226.6(b), 226.4.

f. Disclosure of Security Interest:

If a security interest will be secured in connection with the transaction, the collateral must be identified, even if the property is not owed by the consumer. Reg. Z. § 26.2(a)(25).

g. Disclosure of Billing Error Right:

A statement as to billing error rights and the right to assert claims and defenses in a form prescribed by the FRB must be provided to the consumer at the consummation of a transaction. Reg. Z. § 226.2(a)(d).

4. Required Disclosures of Residential Mortgage Transactions

Most home mortgages are subject to the disclosure requirements of TILA. U.S.C. § 1638. The required disclosures must be provided to the homeowner prior to the consummation of a credit transaction. Homeowners have the right to rescind most credit transactions, including home equity loans and home improvement loans, in which the home is taken as collateral.

a. Disclosure of the Creditor:

The name of the creditor must be provided and the address and/or telephone number are not required but may be included. U.S.C. § 1602(f); Reg. Z. § 226.2(a)(17). Failure to disclose of the creditor’s identity properly entitles the consumer only actual damages, if any.

b. Amount Financed:

This term must be used in disclosure statement, and a brief description of the amount financed must be provided. U.S.C. § 1638(a)(2)(A).

Failures to properly disclose the amount financed gives rise to statutory damages, attorney’s fees, and any actual damages. Reg. Z. § 1640(a)(3). Its violation may also extend the consumer’s right to rescind. U.S.C. § 1602(u); Reg. Z. § 226.23 n. 48.

c. Finance Charge:

The term “finance charge” must be used and A brief description must be provided. U.S.C. § 1638(a)(3); Reg. Z. § 226.18(d). It can be disclosed only as a total amount, and there is no requirement to itemize finance charge, and overstating finance charge does not violate TILA. Vandenbroeck v. Commonpoint Mortg. Co., 22 F.Supp. 2d 677 (W.D. Mich. 1998).

In real estate closing charges, fees may be excluded from the finance charge are real property and title-related fees; document fees; closing agent, attorney fees; and notary, appraisal, and credit report fees. U.S.C. § 1605(e); Reg. Z. § 226.4(c)(7).

d. APR:

The term must be used and disclosure must be accurate. U.S.C. §1638(a)(4); Reg. Z. §§ 226.18(e). The APR is accurately disclosed when it is not more than 1/8 of 1 percentage point (.125%) above or below the actual APR. In variable-rate transactions, the description must inform the consumer that the interest rate is subject to change. A historical example illustrating the effects of interest rate changes implemented according to the loan program may be provided to the borrowers. U.S.C. § 1638(a)(14); Reg. Z. § 226.18(f).

Improper disclosure of the APR is a material violation of TILA that extends the consumer’s right to rescind. U.S.C. § 1602(u); Reg. Z. § 226.23 n 48. Statutory damage, attorney’s fee, and actual damage are also available. U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3).

e. Payment Schedule:

Payment schedule includes the number of payments, the amount of each payment, and the timing of payments scheduled to repay the obligation. U.S.C. § 1638(5)-(6); Reg. Z. § 226.18(g). Failure to disclose that payments were due monthly violates TILA. Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 240 F.R.D. at 617.

Violation of these requirements entitles the consumer statutory damages, attorney’s fees, and actual damages. U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) Improper disclosure is also a material violation for purposes of rescission. U.S.C. § 1602(u); U.S.C. § 1602(u); Reg. Z. § 226.23 n 48.

f. Total Sale Price in a Sale of Property:

The total of the cash price of the property or services, additional charges, and the finance charge must be disclosed. U.S.C. § 1638(a)(7). Reg. Z. § 226.18(j). Actual damages may be available for violation to disclose this factor. U.S.C. § 1640(a)

g. A statement regarding the taking of the security interest in the property:

The creditor must disclose whether it acquires a security interest in the property being purchased, or in other property, as part of the transaction.
Violate this requirement will give rise to statutory damages, attorney’s fees, and actual damages. U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3).

h. Late charges:

The dollar amount or the percentage charge may be imposed for late charge. U.S.C. § 1638(a)(10); Reg. Z. § 226.18(l). Actual damages may be available for failure to state the late charges. U.S.C. § 1640(a).

i. Any Rebate Available:

Any funds given to the consumer must be disclose whether it is in the form of cash, check, deposit in a savings or checking account. Reg. Z. § 226.18(r). Actual damages may be available for this violation. U.S.C. § 1640(a).

j. Disclosure of Reference to Additional Documents:

Information regarding nonpayment, default, and the right to accelerate the maturity of the debt. Prepayment rebates and penalties are not required to be disclosed to simplify the closing process. Instead, the creditor can provide appropriate documents that consumer could refer to. Reg. Z. § 226.17(a)(4). Actual damages may be available for failure to disclose this requirement. U.S.C. § 1640(a).

5. Required Disclosures for Adjustable Rate Mortgages

Adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), which secured by the borrower’s principal dwelling with a maturity longer than one year, are required to be disclosed with additional information. To simplify disclosure requirements for variable rate loans, creditors may disclose any variable rate transaction applying the ARMs disclosure rule. However, the reverse is not allowed. Reg. Z. § 226.18(f); 52 Fed. Reg. 48665 (Dec. 24, 1987).

Failure to disclose properly and accurately the requirements of variable rate loans entitles the consumer statutory and actual damages and also rescission right. In re Fidler, 210 B.R. 411 (D. Mass. 1997).

a. Rate Cap Disclosure:

The maximum interest rate that may be imposed during the term of the obligation must be disclosed to the borrower. Reg. Z. § 226.30(a); Fed. Reg. 45611 (Dec. 1, 1987).

b. ARM brochure:

The Consumer Handbook on Adjustable Rate Mortgages, published by the Board and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, may be provided to the consumer to fulfill this requirement. Creditors can also provide a suitable consumer handbook that is comparable to the Board’s Consumer Handbook in substance and comprehensiveness. Reg. Z. § 226.19(b)(1).

c. Timing of Disclosures:

The required disclosures and the Consumer Handbook must be provided to the borrower when an application form is furnished or before the payment of a non-refundable fee is made, whichever earlier. Reg. Z. § 226.19(b). Where the borrower receives the application by mail or a third party agent, the required information must be placed in the mail or delivered within three business days. Reg. Z. § 226.19 (b), n. 45b.

d. Specific Disclosures Required for Variable Rate Loan:

Major aspects of the variable rate loan program, which the consumer is considering, must be specifically disclosed.

1) The Index: Identification of the index will be used to calculate the interest rate and a brief description of the method used in calculating the interest rate are required by the Regulation. § 226.19(b)(2)(ii).

2) Current Margin Value and Interest Rate:

A statement must be provided to the consumer suggesting the consumer ask for the current margin and interest rate. Reg. Z. § 226.19(b)(2)(iv).

3) Frequency of rate change and payment adjustment

Must be disclosed. Reg. Z. § 226.19(b)(2)(vi).

4) Negative Amortization:

A statement to inform the consumer the consequences of negative amortization. A creditor must disclose the rules relating to the option, including the effects of exercising the option such as the increase of interest rate will occur and the payment amount will increase. Reg. Z. § 226.19(b)(2)(vii); commentary § 226.19(2). Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 240 F.R.D at 620 (no violation found where the creditor informs the borrowers what will occur when the interest rate increases).

5) Conversion Feature:

If the loan has a conversion feature, the amount of fees will be charge and the method of the fixed rate interest to be determined must be disclosed. Reg. Z. § 226.19(b)(2)(vii)-3.

e. Historical Example Disclosure:

Creditors have the option to disclose the maximum interest rate and payment amount for a $10,000 loan amount or the historical example of changes in the index being used. U.S.C. § 1638; Reg. Z. 226.9(b)(2)(viii). If the former method is used, a statement that the periodic payment may increase or decrease substantially. Reg. Z. § 226.19(b)(2)(viii)(B).

f. Subsequent Disclosures:

Disclosures concerning rate adjustments are required for all variable rate loans. Reg. Z. § 226.19(b). Notice of the adjusted payment amount, interest rate, index rate, and loan balance is required to disclose to the borrower in a timely manner. Reg. Z. § 226.20(c)(1)-(4).

If payment adjustment may accompany interest rate adjustment, creditors are required to send borrowers notice at least 25, but not more than 120, days prior to the due date of a payment at the new interest rate. Notice is required to be sent to borrowers whenever there is an adjustment in interest rate. Reg. Z. § 226.20(c).

If interest rate adjustments are made without a corresponding payment adjustment, the notice can be sent to the borrower once a year. Id.

Incorrect adjustment or used of index value or incorrect disclosing the new payment amount that does not comport with the contract terms violate TILA requirements, giving rise to statutory and actual damages. U.S.C. § 1640(a).

Statue of limitations for an affirmative violation is “one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation” that starts running when the erroneous notice is sent. U.S.C. § 1604(e).

6. Required Disclosure of Rescission Rights:

Rescission rights arise when the transaction is a consumer credit transaction, in which a non-purchase lien or security interest is placed on the consumer’s principal dwelling unit. TILA rescission remedies reflect Congress’ intent to keep homeowners from placing their homes in jeopardy without a reasonably clear understanding of the financial risks and benefits of the transaction.

a. Rescission right is vested in the owner of the property that is the subject of the security interest. Reg. Z. §§ 226.15(a)(1)(i), 226.15(b), 226.23(a)(1).

b. The security interest must be the principal residence of the owner of the interest. Reg. Z. § 226.2(a)(11).

c. Time of Delivery: The rescission notice may be given after consummation, though the rescission period does not begin to run until it is effectively delivered. Official Staff Commentary § 226.23(b)-4. It is not effectively delivered until it is given in a form the consumer can keep. Reg. Z. § 226.15(b). A written acknowledgement of receipt of rescission notice creates a rebuttable presumption of delivery. Cole v. Lovett, 672 F. Supp. 947 (S.D. Miss. 1987).

d. Providing Rescission Notice: Each person who has the right to rescind a credit transaction must be provided two copies of rescission notice and the required disclosures in a credit transaction. U.S.C. § 1635(a); Reg. Z. §§ 226.5(b), 226.15(b). Notice of the right to rescind is also required for non-purchase money mortgages. U.S.C. § 1635(a). Giving the TILA notice and another notice of rescission at the same time, which have different rescission dates, confuses an ordinary consumer, violating the “clear and conspicuous” disclosure requirement. Jones v. Ameriquest.

e. Time to Exercise Rescission Right: The consumers have until midnight of the third business day following the delivery of the rescission notice, the transaction, or the receiving of the Truth-In-Lending statement, whichever occurs last. See, Jones v. Ameriquest. Right to rescind can be exercised prior to the consummation of the loan. Community Mutual Sav. Bank v. Gillen, 655 N.Y.S.2d 271 (City Ct. 1997) (the consumer properly rescinds her loan at closing recovering fees paid to the creditor).

If the creditor fails to deliver the required notice of material disclosures, the consumer’s right to rescind is automatically extended from three business days to three years. Reg. Z. § 226.23(a)(3).

f. Assignee’s Liability: An assignee is liable for statutory damages for violations by failure to disclosure TILA requirements by its predecessors and its own violation if it fails to respond properly to a rescission notice. Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2006) (“if a creditor does not respond to a rescission request within twenty days, the debtor may file suit in federal court to enforce the rescission right). See also U.S.C. § 1635(b).

g. Rescission Process: The consumer must send a written notice to the creditor to trigger the rescission process. When the notice of rescission has been mailed, the notice is considered given. Reg. Z. §§ 226.15(a)(2), 226.23(a)(2).
When the consumer rescinds, the security interest automatically becomes void. The consumer is relieved of any obligation to pay any finance charge or any other charge. U.S.C. § 1635(b); Reg. Z. §§ 226.15(d)(1), 226.23(d)(1). Rescission voids the mortgage and is a complete defense to foreclosure. Yslas v. K.K. Guenther Builders, Inc., 342 So.2d 859 (Fla.2d D.C.A. 1977). See Beach v. Great Western Bank, 670 So.2d 986 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1996).

The creditor has twenty days from receipt of the consumer’s rescission notice to return any money or property given to anyone and to take appropriate and necessary action to reflect the termination of the security interest. U.S.C. § 1635(b); Reg. Z. §§ 226.15(d)(2), 226.23(d)(2).

After the creditor has complied with the preceding mandate, the consumer tenders back to the creditor any money or property received. U.S.C. § 1635(b); Reg. Z. §§ 226.15(d)(3), 226.23(d)(3).

OTHER AVAILABLE REMEDIES

Only creditors are subject to the civil penalties of TILA. U.S.C. § 1640(a). Civil damages are appropriate when disclosure requirements have been violated, and liability is imposed despite the creditor’s alleged good faith and reasonableness. Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

1. Statutory Damages

Violations of the general requirements and rescission requirements give rise to statutory damage claims. U.S.C. § 1640(a). For open-end credit transactions, statutory damages are awarded in the amount twice of the amount of finance charge. If the action arises out of a credit transaction secured by a dwelling, the consumer is entitled to a minimum award of $200 but not more than $2,000. U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i-iii). Only one statutory recovery is allowed even there are multiple disclosure violations in a transaction. U.S.C. § 1640(g).

2. Attorney’s Fees

Consumers are awarded attorney’s fees in a successful action or when they are “determined to have a right of rescission under section 1635,” even if the consumer is not obligated to pay his or her attorney. U.S.C. § 1640(3); Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 240 F.R.D. at 621 (“because […] plaintiffs have a right of rescission, they are entitled to attorneys’ fees”); Kessler v. Associates Financial Servs. Co. of HI, Inc., 639 F.2d 498, 499 (C.A. Hi. 1981) (attorney’s fees are awarded even the plaintiffs are represented without charge by legal services attorneys). Attorney’s fees include the cost of the action and “a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” U.S.C. § 1640(3).

3. Actual Damages

A consumer is entitled for actual damages when a creditor fails to comply with the requirements imposed by TILA, in the amount equal to the sum of any actual damage sustained by the consumer as a result of the creditor’s violation. U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1).

Courts may require the consumer to show actual reliance upon the accuracy of the disclosures in order to claim actual damages. Perrone v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 232 F.3d 433, 435-439 (5th Cir. 2000); Peters v. Jim Lupient Oldsmobile Co., 220 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2000) (detrimental reliance is established when the plaintiff shows that she read and understood the disclosures and that if the disclosures have been accurate, she would have sought and obtained a lower loan).

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

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Monthly Archives: September 2015

Why Homeowners Must Know these Important Points of Bankruptcy Appeal

What Homeowners Must Know About Bankruptcy Appeals

What Homeowners Need to Know About Bankruptcy Automatic Stay

Former ‘Foreclosure King’ Is Selling $32M Megamansion in Fort Lauderdale

How Homeowners Can Effectively Challenge TILA Disclosures and Violations

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