• About
  • Buy Bankruptcy Adversary Package
  • Buy Foreclosure Defense Package
  • Contact Us
  • Donation
  • FAQ
  • Services

FightForeclosure.net

~ Your "Pro Se" Foreclosure Fight Solution!

FightForeclosure.net

Category Archives: Securitization

How Homeowners Can Find Who Owns Their Mortgage Loans

17 Tuesday Jul 2018

Posted by BNG in Banks and Lenders, Judicial States, Loan Modification, MERS, Mortgage Laws, Mortgage Servicing, Non-Judicial States, RESPA, Securitization, Your Legal Rights

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Fannie Mae, Finance, Freddie Mac, HAMP, homeowners, Loan servicing, MERS, mortgage, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Mortgage loan, Mortgage modification, Mortgage servicer, Promissory note, Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, RESPA, Securitization

A mortgage loan is typically assigned several times during its term, and may be held by one entity but serviced by another. Different disclosure requirements apply depending upon whether information is sought about the ownership of the mortgage loan or its servicing. Knowing exactly who owns and services the mortgage is a critical first step to negotiating a binding workout or loan modification. The information is needed to send a notice of rescission under the Truth in Lending Act, to identify the proper party to name and serve in a lien avoidance proceeding, and to identify other potential parties in litigation. This information may also provide a defense to foreclosure or stay relief in bankruptcy if these proceedings are not initiated by a proper party. 

1. Send a TILA § 1641(f)(2) Request to the Servicer

The Truth in Lending Act requires the loan servicer to tell the borrower who the actual holder of the mortgage really is.3 Upon written request from the borrower, the servicer must state the name, address, and telephone number of the owner of the obligation or the master servicer of the obligation.

One problem with this provision’s enforcement had been the lack of a clear remedy for the servicer’s non-compliance. However, the Helping Families Save Their HomesAct of 20095 amends TILA to explicitly provide that violations may be remedied byTILA’s private right of action found in § 1640(a), which includes recovery of actualdamages, statutory damages, costs and attorney fees.6 The amendment adds the ownerdisclosure provision found in § 1641(f)(2) to the list of TILA requirements that give rise to a cause of action against the creditor if there is a failure to comply.

See NCLC Foreclosures (2d ed. 2007 and Supp.), § 4.3.4.  

15 U.S.C. § 1641(f)(2). The provision should require disclosure to the borrower’s advocate with a properly signed release form. See NCLC Foreclosures, Appx. A, Form 3, infra.

If the servicer provides information about the master servicer, a follow-up requestshould be made to the master servicer to provide the name, address, and telephone number of the owner of the obligation. Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 404 (May 20, 2009). See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a).

1640(a) refers to “any creditor who fails to comply,” by specifically adding as an actionable requirement a disclosure provision which Congress knew is directed toservicers and therefore involves compliance by creditors through their servicers,

Congress chose to make creditors liable to borrowers for noncompliance by servicers.The TILA provision does not specify how long the servicer has to respond to the request. Perhaps because no parties were directly liable under § 1640(a) for violations of the disclosure requirement before the 2009 amendment, no case law had developed on what is a reasonable response time. In the future, courts may be guided by recent regulations issued by the Federal Reserve Board requiring servicers to provide payoff statements within a reasonable time after request by the borrower. In most circumstances, a reasonable response time is within five business days of receipt.

Applying this benchmark to § 1641(f)(2) requests would seem appropriate since surely no more time is involved in responding to a request for ownership information than preparing a payoff statement. Alternatively, a 30-day response period should be the outer limit for timeliness since that is the time period Congress used in § 1641(g).

2. Review Transfer of Ownership Notices

The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 also added a new provision in TILA which requires that whenever ownership of a mortgage loan securing a consumer’s principal dwelling is transferred, the creditor that is the new owner or assignee must notify the borrower in writing, within 30 days after the loan is sold or assigned, of the following information:

• the new creditor’s identity, address, and telephone number;

• the date of transfer;

• location where the transfer is recorded;

• how the borrower may reach an agent or party with authority to act on

behalf of the new creditor; and

• any other relevant information regarding the new owner.9

The new law applies to any transfers made after the Act’s effective date, which was

May 20, 2009. The Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) recently

announced a program to implement the new law.

Reg Z § 226.36(c)(1(iii); NCLC Truth in Lending, § 9.9.3 (6th ed. 2007 and

2008  Supp.).

Official Staff Commentary § 226.36(c)(1)(iii)-1.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g)(1)(A)–(E).

Under “MERS InvestorID,” notices will be automatically generated whenever a“Transfer of Beneficial Rights” occurs on the MERS system. A sample Transfer Noticeand “Training Bulletin” are available for download at http://www.mersinc.org/news. MERS is taking the position, based on the wording of the statute (which refers to “place where ownership of the debt is recorded”), that it can comply by disclosing only the location where the original security instrument is recorded because the note is not a “recordable Attorneys should request that clients provide copies of any ownership notices they have received based on this new law. Assuming that there has been compliance with the statute, the attorney may be able to piece together a chain of title as to ownership of the mortgage loan (for transfers after May 20, 2009) and verify whether any representations made in court pleadings or foreclosure documents are accurate. Failure to comply with the disclosure requirement gives rise to a private right of action against the creditor/new owner that failed to notify the borrower.

3. Send a “Qualified Written Request” under RESPA

Any written request for identification of the mortgage owner sent to the servicer will not only trigger rights under 15 U.S.C. § 1641(f) discussed earlier, but will also be a “qualified written request” under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. Under RESPA, a borrower may submit a “qualified written request” to request information concerning the servicing of the loan or to dispute account errors. Because the servicer acts as an agent for the mortgage owner in its relationship with the borrower, a request for information about the owner should satisfy the requirement that the request be related to loan servicing. The request may be sent by the borrower’s agent, and this has been construed to include a trustee in a bankruptcy case filed by the borrower. Details about how to send the request are covered in § 8.2.2 of NCLC Foreclosures. The servicer has 20 business days after receipt to acknowledge the request, and must comply within 60 business days of receipt. Damages, costs and attorneys fees are available for violations, as well as statutory damages up to $1,000 in the case of a pattern and practice of noncompliance. 

4. Review the RESPA Transfer of Servicing Notices

Finding the loan servicer is generally easier because the borrower is likely getting regular correspondence from that entity. Still, the law requires that formal servicing transfer notices are to be provided to borrowers, and reviewing these can provide helpful information. RESPA provides that the originating lender must disclose at the time of loan application whether servicing of the loan may be assigned during the term of the mortgage. In addition, the borrower must be notified when loan servicing is transferred document.” If MERS members do not agree with this interpretation, they can opt out of MERS InvestorID and presumably send their own notice.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a).

12 U.S.C. § 2605(e). See also NCLC Foreclosures, § 8.2.2.

12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A); In re Laskowski, 384 B.R. 518 (Bankr.N.D.Ind. 2008

(chapter 13 trustee, as agent of consumer debtor, and the debtor each have standing to send a qualified written request).

12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2).

12 U.S.C. § 2605(f).

12 U.S.C. § 2650(a). See NCLC Foreclosures, § 8.2.3.

after the loan is made. Failure of the servicer to comply with the servicing transfer requirements subjects the servicer to liability for actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorney fees.18 Unlike the TILA requirement discussed earlier, RESPA is limited to the transfer of servicing; it does not require notice of any transfers of ownership of the note and mortgage. 

5. Go to Fannie and Freddie’s Web Portals

To facilitate several voluntary loan modification programs implemented by the U.S.Treasury, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac allow borrowers to contact them to determine if they own a loan. Borrowers and advocates can either call a toll-free number or enter the property’s street address, unit, city, state, and ZIP code on a website. The website information, however, sometimes refers to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac as “owners” when in fact their participation may have been as the party that had initially purchased the loans on the secondary market and later arranged for their securitization and transfer to a trust entity which ultimately holds the loan. 

6. Check the Local Registry of Deeds

Checking the local registry where deeds and assignments are recorded is another way to identify the actual owner. But do not rely solely on the registry of deeds to identify the obligation’s current holder of the obligation, as many assignments are not recorded. In fact, if MERS is named as the mortgagee, typically as “nominee” for the lender and its assigns, then mortgage assignments will not be recorded in the registry of deeds. A call to MERS is not helpful as MERS currently will only disclose the name of the servicer and not the owner. In addition, some assignments may be solely for the administrative convenience of the servicer, in which case the servicer may appear as the owner of the mortgage loan.

12 U.S.C. § 2650(b). See NCLC Foreclosures, § 8.2.3.

12 U.S.C. § 2650(f). See NCLC Foreclosures, § 8.2.6.

See, e.g., Daw v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 5 Fed.Appx. 504 (7th Cir. 2001).

See 27 NCLC REPORTS, Bankruptcy and Foreclosures Ed., Mar/Apr 2009.

For Fannie Mae call 1-800-7FANNIE (8 a.m. to 8 p.m. EST); Freddie Mac call 1-800-

FREDDIE (8 a.m. to 8 p.m. EST).

Fannie Mae Loan Lookup, at http://www.fanniemae.com/homeaffordable; Freddie Mac Self-

Service Lookup, at http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate.

See NCLC Foreclosures, § 4.3.4A.

The telephone number for the automated system is 888-679-6377. When calling MERS to obtain information on a loan, you must supply MERS with the MIN number or a Social Security number. The MIN number should appear on the face of the mortgage.

You may also search by property address or by other mortgage identification numbers by using MERS’s online search tool at http://www.mers-servicerid.org. 68700-001

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/ “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will show you step-by-step litigation solutions helping you challenge these fraudsters and ultimately saving your home from foreclosure either through loan modification or “Pro Se” litigation visit: https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/

Advertisement

Share this:

  • Twitter
  • Facebook

Like this:

Like Loading...

How Homeowners Can Use Ibanez Case to Fight a Wrongful Foreclosure

26 Monday Mar 2018

Posted by BNG in Bankruptcy, Banks and Lenders, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, Loan Modification, MERS, Mortgage Laws, Mortgage mediation, Mortgage Servicing, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, Securitization, State Court, Your Legal Rights

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

bank forecloses, bankruptcy court, Foreclosure, homeowners, Ibanez Case, Loan, Massachusetts, MERS, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Pro se legal representation in the United States, US Bank, wrongful foreclosure

Many homeowners who found themselves in wrongful foreclosure situation may have a valid defense, against the perpetrators of these crimes.

How much does it cost to get justice, when a bank forecloses on your house illegally? Thousands of ex-homeowners don’t pursue their rights to a financial settlement because they assume they couldn’t pay the legal fees.

In fact, it costs less than you fear. Consumer lawyers take a few cases at no charge. More likely, you’ll pay fees — upfront or on a monthly plan — tied to the lawyer’s estimate of the time it will take and your ability to pay. If they win your case, they’ll collect from the financial institution, too.

Before readers attack the “greedy lawyers” for defending “deadbeat” clients who couldn’t repay their mortgage loans, let me quote from a groundbreaking decision of 2011 by the Massachusetts Supreme Court. The court reversed two foreclosures because the banks — Wells Fargo and U.S. Bancorp, acting as trustees for investors — couldn’t prove that they actually owned the mortgages. Judge Robert J. Cordy excoriated them for their “utter carelessness.” The fact that the borrowers owed the money was “not the point,” he wrote. The right to deprive people of their property is a powerful one and banks have to prove they have the legal standing to do so.

American law cannot allow property seizures based on backdated, incomplete, or fraudulent documentation, no matter what the circumstances are. Otherwise, no one’s home is safe. Courts enforce private property rights through the cases brought before them. In other words, lawyers.

The Massachusetts case began not with consumers, but with the banks themselves. They asked the courts to affirm that the foreclosures were valid so they could get title insurance. That pulled the borrowers — Antonio Ibanez and Mark and Tammy LaRace — into the fray. When the horrified courts looked at how the foreclosures had gone down, they said, “no way,” and gave the former owners their property back.

Ibanez, a special ed teacher, bought the home for investment in 2005 and defaulted in 2007 on a $103,500 loan, according to the court papers. Even since, the house has been boarded up. Ibanez filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, so he now has title to the home and no obligation on the debt. The mortgage investors will take the loss.

The LaRaces borrowed $103,200 to buy their home in 2005 and also defaulted in 2007. They had an offer on their home, but the servicer foreclosed anyway. (During the trial, the foreclosing law firm admitted that servicers are graded on how quickly they can liquidate a mortgage.)

The LaRaces have moved back into their long-unattended home, but first they had to clean up mold, fix plumbing, and make other repairs. They would gladly resume payments on the mortgage, their lawyer Glenn Russell says. But the trustee bank doesn’t own the loan. The investors don’t own it because the mortgage was never transferred properly. The original lender, Option One, no longer exists. So whom do they pay?

This important case opens the door to thousands of foreclosure do-overs in Massachusetts at the time, and continuing and equally influenced courts in other states, as well. But there hasn’t been a rush by lawyers to get involved, probably because the field is complex and not especially remunerative. No class actions have been certified, as at that time or shortly thereafter, so the cases proceeded one by one. The financial trail can be hard to track (the Massachusetts documents were unwound by mortgage-fraud specialist Marie McDonnell).  The lawyer — often, a sole practitioner — is up against the awesome resources of major financial institutions.

Neither Ibanez nor the LaRaces were charged for their lawyer’s services. Collier had file a claim for wrongful foreclosure and was paid from any settlement. Russell did the same. At the time, Russell also thinks the LaRaces are owed something for the cost of repairing their home.

Very few cases start as pro bono, however. Lawyers who defend consumers have bills to pay, just as the banks’ corporate attorneys do. You may opt to fight it Pro Se using the package from our website, or if you want to fight an unfair foreclosure, you might be offered one of several arrangements:

An upfront fee. “Many of my clients were formerly very successful individuals,” Russell says. On average, the value of the homes of the people who contact him is “somewhat north of $500,000.” He suggests a fee based on their means.

Monthly payments. If you’re not making monthly mortgage payments, some portion of that money could be applied to legal expenses. Collier says he puts the payments into escrow and retains them if he gets the house back (he says he always does, in predatory lending cases).

Bankruptcy payment plans. The clients of North Carolina bankruptcy attorney Max Gardner are usually in a Chapter 13 monthly repayment plan. Each state sets the maximum attorney’s fee, payable as part of the plan.

Mostly, the attorneys get paid by suing the financial institutions, who settle claims or suffer court judgements due to their own illegal activity. People who beat up on consumer lawyers scream that they bring frivolous cases just for the fees. But consumer lawyers only get paid if their case is good, so they’re pretty rigorous about whom they choose to represent. “I was called crazy for practicing in this area of law, as in ‘I would be broke’ by not getting enough fees,” Russell says. “Three years later, I am still here and still living my motto of helping people first.”

Most homeowners are successful fighting there case Pro Se using the package we offer for fighting Foreclosure, as your interest is at stake, and you have the most to lose, not Attorneys. They gets paid whether you win or lose. However, homeowners equally have options when fighting wrongful foreclosure.

If you think you have a case, your toughest challenge isn’t fees, it’s finding a lawyer with the expertise to press your claim successfully, Gardner says. If you don’t have a personal reference for a qualified lawyer, the best place to look is the website of  the National Association of Consumer Advocates. Next best: the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys. In either case, ask if the lawyer has won other securitization, mortgage servicing, and foreclosure cases. “They have to know what documents to ask for,” Gardner says. That’s what wins.

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/ “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will show you step-by-step litigation solutions helping you challenge these fraudsters and ultimately saving your home from foreclosure either through loan modification or “Pro Se” litigation visit: https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/

 

Share this:

  • Twitter
  • Facebook

Like this:

Like Loading...

Wrongful Foreclosure Homeowner Wins – State Law Prevailed While Securitizatiion Failed

22 Sunday Dec 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, Loan Modification, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, Securitization, State Court, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Bank of America, California Court of Appeal, Deed of Trust, Foreclosure, Glaski, New York, Thomas Glaski, Washington Mutual

CASE STUDY:

INTRODUCTION

Before Washington Mutual Bank, FA (WaMu) was seized by federal banking regulators in 2008, it made many residential real estate loans and used those loans as collateral for mortgage-backed securities.1

Many of the loans went into default, which led to nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings.

Some of the foreclosures generated lawsuits,  which raised a wide variety of claims.

The allegations that the instant case shares with some of the other lawsuits are that

(1) documents related to the foreclosure contained forged signatures of Deborah Brignac and (2) the foreclosing entity was not the true owner of the loan because its chain of ownership had been broken by a defective transfer of the loan to the securitized trust established for the mortgage-backed securities. Here, the specific defect alleged is that the attempted transfers were made after the closing date of the securitized trust holding the pooled mortgages and therefore the transfers were ineffective.

In this appeal, the borrower contends the trial court erred by sustaining defendants’ demurrer as to all of his causes of action attacking the nonjudicial foreclosure. We conclude that, although the borrower’s allegations are somewhat confusing and may contain contradictions, he nonetheless has stated a wrongful foreclosure claim under the lenient standards applied to demurrers. We conclude that a borrower may challenge the securitized trust’s chain of ownership by alleging the attempts to transfer the deed of trust to the securitized trust (which was formed under New York law) occurred after the trust’s closing date. Transfers that violate the terms of the trust instrument are void under New York trust law, and borrowers have standing to challenge void assignments of their loans even though they are not a party to, or a third party beneficiary of, the assignment agreement.

H. Causes of Action Stated Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Glaski’s fourth cause of action has stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure. It follows that Glaski also has stated claims for quiet title (third cause of action), declaratory relief (fifth cause of action), cancellation of instruments (eighth cause of action), and unfair business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200 (ninth cause of action).

We therefore reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

THOMAS A. GLASKI, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION et al. Defendants and Respondents.

No. F064556.
Court of Appeals of California, Fifth District.
Filed July 31, 2013.
Publish order August 8, 2013.
Law Offices of Richard L. Antognini and Richard L. Antognini; Law Offices of Catarina M. Benitez and Catarina M. Benitez, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

AlvaradoSmith, Theodore E. Bacon, and Mikel A. Glavinovich, for Defendants and Respondents.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
OPINION

FRANSON, J.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Before Washington Mutual Bank, FA (WaMu) was seized by federal banking regulators in 2008, it made many residential real estate loans and used those loans as collateral for mortgage-backed securities.[1] Many of the loans went into default, which led to nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. Some of the foreclosures generated lawsuits, which raised a wide variety of claims. The allegations that the instant case shares with some of the other lawsuits are that (1) documents related to the foreclosure contained forged signatures of Deborah Brignac and (2) the foreclosing entity was not the true owner of the loan because its chain of ownership had been broken by a defective transfer of the loan to the securitized trust established for the mortgage-backed securities. Here, the specific defect alleged is that the attempted transfers were made after the closing date of the securitized trust holding the pooled mortgages and therefore the transfers were ineffective.

In this appeal, the borrower contends the trial court erred by sustaining defendants’ demurrer as to all of his causes of action attacking the nonjudicial foreclosure. We conclude that, although the borrower’s allegations are somewhat confusing and may contain contradictions, he nonetheless has stated a wrongful foreclosure claim under the lenient standards applied to demurrers. We conclude that a borrower may challenge the securitized trust’s chain of ownership by alleging the attempts to transfer the deed of trust to the securitized trust (which was formed under New York law) occurred after the trust’s closing date. Transfers that violate the terms of the trust instrument are void under New York trust law, and borrowers have standing to challenge void assignments of their loans even though they are not a party to, or a third party beneficiary of, the assignment agreement.

We therefore reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS – The Loan

Thomas A. Glaski, a resident of Fresno County, is the plaintiff and appellant in this lawsuit. The operative second amended complaint (SAC) alleges the following: In July 2005, Glaski purchased a home in Fresno for $812,000 (the Property). To finance the purchase, Glaski obtained a $650,000 loan from WaMu. Initial monthly payments were approximately $1,700. Glaski executed a promissory note and a deed of trust that granted WaMu a security interest in the Property (the Glaski deed of trust). Both documents were dated July 6, 2005. The Glaski deed of trust identified WaMu as the lender and the beneficiary, defendant California Reconveyance Company (California Reconveyance) as the trustee, and Glaski as the borrower.

Paragraph 20 of the Glaski deed of trust contained the traditional terms of a deed of trust and states that the note, together with the deed of trust, can be sold one or more times without prior notice to the borrower. In this case, a number of transfers purportedly occurred. The validity of attempts to transfer Glaski’s note and deed of trust to a securitized trust is a fundamental issue in this appeal.

Paragraph 22—another provision typical of deeds of trust—sets forth the remedies available to the lender in the event of a default. Those remedies include (1) the lender’s right to accelerate the debt after notice to the borrower and (2) the lender’s right to “invoke the power of sale” after the borrower has been given written notice of default and of the lender’s election to cause the property to be sold. Thus, under the Glaski deed of trust, it is the lender-beneficiary who decides whether to pursue nonjudicial foreclosure in the event of an uncured default by the borrower. The trustee implements the lender-beneficiary’s decision by conducting the nonjudicial foreclosure.[2]

Glaski’s loan had an adjustable interest rate, which caused his monthly loan payment to increase to $1,900 in August 2006 and to $2,100 in August 2007. In August 2008, Glaski attempted to work with WaMu’s loan modification department to obtain a modification of the loan. There is no dispute that Glaski defaulted on the loan by failing to make the monthly installment payments.

Creation of the WaMu Securitized Trust

In late 2005, the WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-AR17 Trust was formed as a common law trust (WaMu Securitized Trust) under New York law. The corpus of the trust consists of a pool of residential mortgage notes purportedly secured by liens on residential real estate. La Salle Bank, N.A., was the original trustee for the WaMu Securitized Trust.[3] Glaski alleges that the WaMu Securitized Trust has no continuing duties other than to hold assets and to issue various series of certificates of investment. A description of the certificates of investment as well as the categories of mortgage loans is included in the prospectus filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on October 21, 2005. Glaski alleges that the investment certificates issued by the WaMu Securitized Trust were duly registered with the SEC.

The closing date for the WaMu Securitized Trust was December 21, 2005, or 90 days thereafter. Glaski alleges that the attempt to assign his note and deed of trust to the WaMu Securitized Trust was made after the closing date and, therefore, the assignment was ineffective. (See fn. 12, post.)

WaMu’s Failure and Transfers of the Loan

In September 2008, WaMu was seized by the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed as a receiver for WaMu. That same day, the FDIC, in its capacity as receiver, sold the assets and liabilities of WaMu to defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., (JP Morgan). This transaction was documented by a “PURCHASE AND ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT WHOLE BANK” (boldface and underlining omitted) between the FDIC and JP Morgan dated as of September 25, 2008. If Glaski’s loan was not validly transferred to the WaMu Securitized Trust, it is possible, though not certain, that JP Morgan acquired the Glaski deed of trust when it purchased WaMu assets from the FDIC.[4] JP Morgan also might have acquired the right to service the loans held by the WaMu Securitized Trust.

In September 2008, Glaski spoke to a representative of defendant Chase Home Finance LLC (Chase),[5] which he believed was an agent of JP Morgan, and made an oral agreement to start the loan modification process. Glaski believed that Chase had taken over loan modification negotiations from WaMu.

On December 9, 2008, two documents related to the Glaski deed of trust were recorded with the Fresno County Recorder: (1) an “ASSIGNMENT OF DEED OF TRUST” and (2) a “NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND ELECTION TO SELL UNDER DEED OF TRUST” (boldface omitted; hereinafter the NOD). The assignment stated that JP Morgan transferred and assigned all beneficial interest under the Glaski deed of trust to “LaSalle Bank NA as trustee for WaMu [Securitized Trust]” together with the note described in and secured by the Glaski deed of trust.[6]

Notice of Default and Sale of the Property

The NOD informed Glaski that (1) the Property was in foreclosure because he was behind in his payments[7] and (2) the Property could be sold without any court action. The NOD also stated that “the present beneficiary under” the Glaski deed of trust had delivered to the trustee a written declaration and demand for sale. According to the NOD, all sums secured by the deed of trust had been declared immediately due and payable and that the beneficiary elected to cause the Property to be sold to satisfy that obligation.

The NOD stated the amount of past due payments was $11,200.78 as of December 8, 2008.[8] It also stated: “To find out the amount you must pay, or to arrange for payment to stop the foreclosure, … contact: JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, at 7301 BAYMEADOWS WAY, JACKSONVILLE, FL 32256, (877) 926-8937.”

Approximately three months after the NOD was recorded and served, the next official step in the nonjudicial foreclosure process occurred. On March 12, 2009, a “NOTICE OF TRUSTEE’S SALE” was recorded by the Fresno County Recorder (notice of sale). The sale was scheduled for April 1, 2009. The notice stated that Glaski was in default under his deed of trust and estimated the amount owed at $734,115.10.

The notice of sale indicated it was signed on March 10, 2009, by Deborah Brignac, as Vice President for California Reconveyance. Glaski alleges that Brignac’s signature was forged to effectuate a fraudulent foreclosure and trustee’s sale of his primary residence.

Glaski alleges that from March until May 2009, he was led to believe by his negotiations with Chase that a loan modification was in process with JP Morgan.

Despite these negotiations, a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the Property was conducted on May 27, 2009. Bank of America, as successor trustee for the WaMu Securitized Trust and beneficiary under the Glaski deed of trust, was the highest bidder at the sale.

On June 15, 2009, another “ASSIGNMENT OF DEED OF TRUST” was recorded with the Fresno County Recorder. This assignment, like the assignment recorded in December 2008, identified JP Morgan as the assigning party. The entity receiving all beneficial interest under the Glaski deed of trust was identified as Bank of America, “as successor by merger to `LaSalle Bank NA as trustee for WaMu [Securitized Trust]. …”[9] The assignment of deed of trust indicates it was signed by Brignac, as Vice President for JP Morgan. Glaski alleges that Brignac’s signature was forged.

The very next document filed by the Fresno County Recorder on June 15, 2009, was a “TRUSTEE’S DEED UPON SALE.” (Boldface omitted.) The trustee’s deed upon sale stated that California Reconveyance, as the duly appointed trustee under the Glaski deed of trust, granted and conveyed to Bank of America, as successor by merger to La Salle NA as trustee for the WaMu Securitized Trust, all of its right, title and interest to the Property. The trustee’s deed upon sale stated that the amount of the unpaid debt and costs was $738,238.04 and that the grantee, paid $339,150 at the trustee’s sale, either in lawful money or by credit bid.

PROCEEDINGS

In October 2009, Glaski filed his original complaint. In August 2011, Glaski filed the SAC, which alleged the following numbered causes of action:

(1) Fraud against JPMorgan and California Reconveyance for the alleged forged signatures of Deborah Brignac as vice president for California Reconveyance and then as vice president of JPMorgan;

(2) Fraud against all defendants for their failure to timely and properly transfer the Glaski loan to the WaMu Securitized Trust and their representations to the contrary;

(3) Quiet title against Bank of America, Chase, and California Reconveyance based on the broken chain of title caused by the defective transfer of the loan to the WaMu Securitized Trust;

(4) Wrongful foreclosure against all defendants, based on the forged signatures of Deborah Brignac and the failure to timely and properly transfer the Glaski loan to the WaMu Securitized Trust;

(5) Declaratory relief against all defendants, based on the above acts by defendants;

(8) Cancellation of various foreclosure documents against all defendants, based on the above acts by the defendants; and

(9) Unfair practices under California Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq., against all defendants.

Among other things, Glaski raised questions regarding the chain of ownership, by contending that the defendants were not the lender or beneficiary under his deed of trust and, therefore, did not have the authority to foreclose.

In September 2011, defendants filed a demurrer that challenged each cause of action in the SAC on the grounds that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a claim for relief. With respect to the wrongful foreclosure cause of action, defendants argued that Glaski failed to allege (1) any procedural irregularity that would justify setting aside the presumptively valid trustee’s sale and (2) that he could tender the amount owed if the trustee’s sale were set aside.

To support their demurrer to the SAC, defendants filed a request for judicial notice concerning (1) Order No. 2008-36 of the Office of Thrift Supervision, dated September 25, 2008, appointing the FDIC as receiver of Washington Mutual Bank and (2) the Purchase and Assumption Agreement Whole Bank between the FDIC and JP Morgan dated as of September 25, 2008, concerning the assets, deposits and liabilities of Washington Mutual Bank.[10]

Glaski opposed the demurrer, arguing that breaks in the chain of ownership of his deed of trust were sufficiently alleged. He asserted that Brignac’s signature was forged and the assignment bearing that forgery was void. His opposition also provided a more detailed explanation of his argument that his deed of trust had not been effectively transferred to the WaMu Securitized Trust that held the pool of mortgage loans. Thus, in Glaski’s view, Bank of America’s claim as the successor trustee is flawed because the trust never held his loan.

On November 15, 2011, the trial court heard argument from counsel regarding the demurrer. Counsel for Glaski argued, among other things, that the possible ratification of the allegedly forged signatures of Brignac presented an issue of fact that could not be resolved at the pleading stage.

Later that day, the court filed a minute order adopting its tentative ruling. As background for the issues presented in this appeal, we will describe the trial court’s ruling on Glaski’s two fraud causes of action and his wrongful foreclosure cause of action.

The ruling stated that the first cause of action for fraud was based on an allegation that defendants misrepresented material information by causing a forged signature to be placed on the June 2009 assignment of deed of trust. The ruling stated that if the signature of Brignac was forged, California Reconveyance “ratified the signature by treating it as valid.” As an additional rationale, the ruling cited Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1149 (Gomes) for the proposition that the exhaustive nature of California’s nonjudicial foreclosure scheme prohibited the introduction of additional requirements challenging the authority of the lender’s nominee to initiate nonjudicial foreclosure.

As to the second cause of action for fraud, the ruling noted the allegation that the Glaski deed of trust was transferred to the WaMu Securitized Trust after the trust’s closing date and summarized the claim as asserting that the Glaski deed of trust had been improperly transferred and, therefore, the assignment was void ab initio. The ruling rejected this claim, stating: “[T]o reiterate, Gomes v. Countrywide, supra holds that there is no legal basis to challenge the authority of the trustee, mortgagee, beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents to initiate the foreclosure process citing Civil Code § 2924, subd. (a)(1).”

The ruling stated that the fourth cause of action for wrongful foreclosure was “based upon the invalidity of the foreclosure sale conducted on May 27, 2009 due to the `forged’ signature of Deborah Brignac and the failure of Defendants to `provide a chain of title of the note and the mortgage.’” The ruling stated that, as explained earlier, “these contentions are meritless” and sustained the general demurrer to the wrongful foreclosure claim without leave to amend.

Subsequently, a judgment of dismissal was entered and Glaski filed a notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court sustained the demurrer to the SAC on the ground that it did “not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) The standard of review applicable to such an order is well settled. “[W]e examine the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory. …” (McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415.)

When conducting this de novo review, “[w]e give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] Further, we treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citations.]” (City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 865.) Our consideration of the facts alleged includes “those evidentiary facts found in recitals of exhibits attached to a complaint.” (Satten v. Webb (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 365, 375.) “We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.” (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a) [use of judicial notice with demurrer].) Courts can take judicial notice of the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents, but do not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents. (Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, overruled on other grounds in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1262.) We note “in passing upon the question of the sufficiency or insufficiency of a complaint to state a cause of action, it is wholly beyond the scope of the inquiry to ascertain whether the facts stated are true or untrue” as “[t]hat is always the ultimate question to be determined by the evidence upon a trial of the questions of fact.” (Colm v. Francis (1916) 30 Cal.App. 742, 752.))

II. FRAUD
A. Rules for Pleading Fraud

The elements of a fraud cause of action are (1) misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of the falsity or scienter, (3) intent to defraud—that is, induce reliance, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damages. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) These elements may not be pleaded in a general or conclusory fashion. (Id. at p. 645.) Fraud must be pled specifically—that is, a plaintiff must plead facts that show with particularity the elements of the cause of action. (Ibid.)

In their demurrer, defendants contended facts establishing detrimental reliance were not alleged.

B. First Cause of Action for Fraud, Lack of Specific Allegations of Reliance

B. First Cause of Action for Fraud, Lack of Specific Allegations of Reliance

Glaski’s first cause of action, which alleges a fraud implemented through forged documents, alleges that defendants’ act “caused Plaintiff to rely on the recorded documents and ultimately lose the property which served as his primary residence, and caused Plaintiff further damage, proof of which will be made at trial.”

This allegation is a general allegation of reliance and damage. It does not identify the particular acts Glaski took because of the alleged forgeries. Similarly, it does not identify any acts that Glaski did not take because of his reliance on the alleged forgeries. Therefore, we conclude that Glaski’s conclusory allegation of reliance is insufficient under the rules of law that require fraud to be pled specifically. (Lazar v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 645.)

The next question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the demurrer to the first fraud cause of action without leave to amend.

In March 2011, the trial court granted Glaski leave to amend when ruling on defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court indicated that Glaski’s complaint had jumbled together many different statutes and theories of liability and directed Glaski to avoid “chain letter” allegations in his amended pleading.

Glaski’s first amended complaint set forth two fraud causes of action that are similar to those included in the SAC.

Defendants demurred to the first amended complaint. The trial court’s minute order states: “Plaintiff is advised for the last time to plead each cause of action such that only the essential elements for the claim are set forth without reincorporation of lengthy `general allegations’. In other words, the `facts’ to be pleaded are those upon which liability depends (i.e., `the facts constituting the cause of action’).”

After Glaski filed his SAC, defendants filed a demurrer. Glaski then filed an opposition that asserted he had properly alleged detrimental reliance. He did not argue he could amend to allege specifically the action he took or did not take because of his reliance on the alleged forgeries.

Accordingly, Glaski failed to carry his burden of demonstrating he could allege with the requisite specificity the elements of justifiable reliance and damages resulting from that reliance. (See Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 [the burden of articulating how a defective pleading could be cured is squarely on the plaintiff].) Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied leave to amend as to the SAC’s first cause of action for fraud.
C. Second Fraud Cause of Action, Lack of Specific Allegations of Reliance

Glaski’s second cause of action for fraud alleged that WaMu failed to transfer his note and deed of trust into the WaMu Securitized Trust back in 2005. Glaski further alleged, in essence, that defendants attempted to rectify WaMu’s failure by engaging in a fraudulent scheme to assign his note and deed of trust into the WaMu Securitized Trust. The scheme was implemented in 2008 and 2009 and its purpose was to enable defendants to fraudulently foreclosure against the Property.

The second cause of action for fraud attempts to allege detrimental reliance in the following sentence: “Defendants, and each of them, also knew that the act of recording the Assignment of Deed of trust without the authorization to do so would cause Plaintiff to rely upon Defendants’ actions by attempting to negotiate a loan modification with representatives of Chase Home Finance, LLC, agents of JP MORGAN.” The assignment mentioned in this allegation is the assignment of deed of trust recorded in June 2009—no other assignment of deed of trust is referred to in the second cause of action.

The allegation of reliance does not withstand scrutiny. The act of recording the allegedly fraudulent assignment occurred in June 2009, after the trustee’s sale of the Property had been conducted. If Glaski was induced to negotiate a loan modification at that time, it is unclear how negotiations occurring after the May 2009 trustee’s sale could have diverted him from stopping the trustee’s sale. Thus, Glaski’s allegation of reliance is not connected to any detriment or damage.

Because Glaski has not demonstrated how this defect in his fraud allegations could be cured by amendment, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the second cause of action in the SAC.
III. WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE BY NONHOLDER OF THE DEED OF TRUST
A. Glaski’s Theory of Wrongful Foreclosure

Glaski’s theory that the foreclosure was wrongful is based on (1) the position that paragraph 22 of the Glaski deed of trust authorizes only the lender-beneficiary (or its assignee) to (a) accelerate the loan after a default and (b) elect to cause the Property to be sold and (2) the allegation that a nonholder of the deed of trust, rather than the true beneficiary, instructed California Reconveyance to initiate the foreclosure.[11]

In particular, Glaski alleges that (1) the corpus of the WaMu Securitized Trust was a pool of residential mortgage notes purportedly secured by liens on residential real estate; (2) section 2.05 of “the Pooling and Servicing Agreement” required that all mortgage files transferred to the WaMu Securitized Trust be delivered to the trustee or initial custodian of the WaMu Securitized Trust before the closing date of the trust (which was allegedly set for December 21, 2005, or 90 days thereafter); (3) the trustee or initial custodian was required to identify all such records as being held by or on behalf of the WaMu Securitized Trust; (4) Glaski’s note and loan were not transferred to the WaMu Securitized Trust prior to its closing date; (5) the assignment of the Glaski deed of trust did not occur by the closing date in December 2005; (6) the transfer to the trust attempted by the assignment of deed of trust recorded on June 15, 2009, occurred long after the trust was closed; and (7) the attempted assignment was ineffective as the WaMu Securitized Trust could not have accepted the Glaski deed of trust after the closing date because of the pooling and servicing agreement and the statutory requirements applicable to a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) trust.[12]
B. Wrongful Foreclosure by a Nonholder of the Deed of Trust

The theory that a foreclosure was wrongful because it was initiated by a nonholder of the deed of trust has also been phrased as (1) the foreclosing party lacking standing to foreclose or (2) the chain of title relied upon by the foreclosing party containing breaks or defects. (See Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 764; Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th 1366 [Deutsche Bank not entitled to summary judgment on wrongful foreclosure claim because it failed to show a chain of ownership that would establish it was the true beneficiary under the deed of trust]; Guerroro v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. (9th Cir. 2010) 403 Fed.Appx. 154, 156 [rejecting a wrongful foreclosure claim because, among other things, plaintiffs “have not pleaded any facts to rebut the unbroken chain of title”].)

In Barrionuevo v. Chase Bank, N.A. (N.D.Cal. 2012) 885 F.Supp.2d 964, the district court stated: “Several courts have recognized the existence of a valid cause of action for wrongful foreclosure where a party alleged not to be the true beneficiary instructs the trustee to file a Notice of Default and initiate nonjudicial foreclosure.” (Id. at p. 973.) We agree with this statement of law, but believe that properly alleging a cause of action under this theory requires more than simply stating that the defendant who invoked the power of sale was not the true beneficiary under the deed of trust. Rather, a plaintiff asserting this theory must allege facts that show the defendant who invoked the power of sale was not the true beneficiary. (See Herrera v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1506 [plaintiff failed to plead specific facts demonstrating the transfer of the note and deed of trust were invalid].)
C. Borrower’s Standing to Raise a Defect in an Assignment

One basis for claiming that a foreclosing party did not hold the deed of trust is that the assignment relied upon by that party was ineffective. When a borrower asserts an assignment was ineffective, a question often arises about the borrower’s standing to challenge the assignment of the loan (note and deed of trust)—an assignment to which the borrower is not a party. (E.g., Conlin v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (6th Cir. 2013) 714 F.3d 355, 361 [third party may only challenge an assignment if that challenge would render the assignment absolutely invalid or ineffective, or void]; Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services of Nebraska (1st Cir. 2013) 708 F.3d 282, 291 [under Massachusetts law, mortgagor has standing to challenge a mortgage assignment as invalid, ineffective or void]; Gilbert v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (E.D.Cal., May 28, 2013, No. 1:13-CV-265 AWI SKO) 2013 WL 2318890.)[13]

California’s version of the principle concerning a third party’s ability to challenge an assignment has been stated in a secondary authority as follows:

“Where an assignment is merely voidable at the election of the assignor, third parties, and particularly the obligor, cannot … successfully challenge the validity or effectiveness of the transfer.” (7 Cal.Jur.3d (2012) Assignments, § 43.)

This statement implies that a borrower can challenge an assignment of his or her note and deed of trust if the defect asserted would void the assignment. (See Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (5th Cir. 2013) ___ F.3d ___ [2013 WL 3480207 at p. *3] [following majority rule that an obligor may raise any ground that renders the assignment void, rather than merely voidable].) We adopt this view of the law and turn to the question whether Glaski’s allegations have presented a theory under which the challenged assignments are void, not merely voidable.

We reject the view that a borrower’s challenge to an assignment must fail once it is determined that the borrower was not a party to, or third party beneficiary of, the assignment agreement. Cases adopting that position “paint with too broad a brush.” (Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services of Nebraska, supra, 708 F.3d at p. 290.) Instead, courts should proceed to the question whether the assignment was void.

D. Voidness of a Post-Closing Date Transfers to a Securitized Trust

Here, the SAC includes a broad allegation that the WaMu Securitized Trust “did not have standing to foreclosure on the … Property, as Defendants cannot provide the entire chain of title of the note and the [deed of trust].”[14]

More specifically, the SAC identifies two possible chains of title under which Bank of America, as trustee for the WaMu Securitized Trust, could claim to be the holder of the Glaski deed of trust and alleges that each possible chain of title suffers from the same defect—a transfer that occurred after the closing date of the trust.

First, Glaski addresses the possibility that (1) Bank of America’s chain of title is based on its status as successor trustee for the WaMu Securitized Trust and (2) the Glaski deed of trust became part of the WaMu Securitized Trust’s property when the securitized trust was created in 2005. The SAC alleges that WaMu did not transfer Glaski’s note and deed of trust into the WaMu Securitized Trust prior to the closing date established by the pooling and servicing agreement. If WaMu’s attempted transfer was void, then Bank of America could not claim to be the holder of the Glaski deed of trust simply by virtue of being the successor trustee of the WaMu Securitized Trust.

Second, Glaski addresses the possibility that Bank of America acquired Glaski’s deed of trust from JP Morgan, which may have acquired it from the FDIC. Glaski contends this alternate chain of title also is defective because JP Morgan’s attempt to transfer the Glaski deed of trust to Bank of America, as trustee for the WaMu Securitized Trust, occurred after the trust’s closing date. Glaski specifically alleges JP Morgan’s attempted assignment of the deed of trust to the WaMu Securitized Trust in June 2009 occurred long after the WaMu Securitized Trust closed (i.e., 90 days after December 21, 2005).

Based on these allegations, we will address whether a post-closing date transfer into a securitized trust is the type of defect that would render the transfer void. Other allegations relevant to this inquiry are that the WaMu Securitized Trust (1) was formed in 2005 under New York law and (2) was subject to the requirements imposed on REMIC trusts (entities that do not pay federal income tax) by the Internal Revenue Code.

The allegation that the WaMu Securitized Trust was formed under New York law supports the conclusion that New York law governs the operation of the trust. New York Estates, Powers & Trusts Law section 7-2.4, provides: “If the trust is expressed in an instrument creating the estate of the trustee, every sale, conveyance or other act of the trustee in contravention of the trust, except as authorized by this article and by any other provision of law, is void.”[15]

Because the WaMu Securitized Trust was created by the pooling and servicing agreement and that agreement establishes a closing date after which the trust may no longer accept loans, this statutory provision provides a legal basis for concluding that the trustee’s attempt to accept a loan after the closing date would be void as an act in contravention of the trust document.

We are aware that some courts have considered the role of New York law and rejected the post-closing date theory on the grounds that the New York statute is not interpreted literally, but treats acts in contravention of the trust instrument as merely voidable. (Calderon v. Bank of America, N.A. (W.D.Tex., Apr. 23, 2013, No. SA:12-CV-00121-DAE) ___ F.Supp.2d ___, [2013 WL 1741951 at p. *12] [transfer of plaintiffs’ note, if it violated PSA, would merely be voidable and therefore plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge it]; Bank of America National Association v. Bassman FBT, L.L.C. (Ill.Ct.App. 2012) 981 N.E.2d 1, 8 [following cases that treat ultra vires acts as merely voidable].)

Despite the foregoing cases, we will join those courts that have read the New York statute literally. We recognize that a literal reading and application of the statute may not always be appropriate because, in some contexts, a literal reading might defeat the statutory purpose by harming, rather than protecting, the beneficiaries of the trust. In this case, however, we believe applying the statute to void the attempted transfer is justified because it protects the beneficiaries of the WaMu Securitized Trust from the potential adverse tax consequence of the trust losing its status as a REMIC trust under the Internal Revenue Code. Because the literal interpretation furthers the statutory purpose, we join the position stated by a New York court approximately two months ago: “Under New York Trust Law, every sale, conveyance or other act of the trustee in contravention of the trust is void. EPTL § 7-2.4. Therefore, the acceptance of the note and mortgage by the trustee after the date the trust closed, would be void.” (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Erobobo (Apr. 29, 2013) 39 Misc.3d 1220(A), 2013 WL 1831799, slip opn. p. 8; see Levitin & Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, supra, 28 Yale J. on Reg. at p. 14, fn. 35 [under New York law, any transfer to the trust in contravention of the trust documents is void].) Relying on Erobobo, a bankruptcy court recently concluded “that under New York law, assignment of the Saldivars’ Note after the start up day is void ab initio. As such, none of the Saldivars’ claims will be dismissed for lack of standing.” (In re Saldivar (Bankr.S.D.Tex., Jun. 5, 2013, No. 11-10689) 2013 WL 2452699, at p. *4.)

We conclude that Glaski’s factual allegations regarding post-closing date attempts to transfer his deed of trust into the WaMu Securitized Trust are sufficient to state a basis for concluding the attempted transfers were void. As a result, Glaski has a stated cognizable claim for wrongful foreclosure under the theory that the entity invoking the power of sale (i.e., Bank of America in its capacity as trustee for the WaMu Securitized Trust) was not the holder of the Glaski deed of trust.[16]

We are aware that that some federal district courts sitting in California have rejected the post-closing date theory of invalidity on the grounds that the borrower does not have standing to challenge an assignment between two other parties. (Aniel v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC (N.D.Cal., Nov. 2, 2012, No. C 12-04201 SBA) 2012 WL 5389706 [joining courts that held borrowers lack standing to assert the loan transfer occurred outside the temporal bounds prescribed by the pooling and servicing agreement]; Almutarreb v. Bank of New York Trust Co., N.A. (N.D.Cal., Sept. 24, 2012, No. C 12-3061 EMC) 2012 WL 4371410.) These cases are not persuasive because they do not address the principle that a borrower may challenge an assignment that is void and they do not apply New York trust law to the operation of the securitized trusts in question.
E. Application of Gomes

The next question we address is whether Glaski’s wrongful foreclosure claim is precluded by the principles set forth in Gomes, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, a case relied upon by the trial court in sustaining the demurrer. Gomes was a pre-foreclosure action brought by a borrower against the lender, trustee under a deed and trust, and MERS, a national electronic registry that tracks the transfer of ownership interests and servicing rights in mortgage loans in the secondary mortgage market. (Id. at p. 1151.) The subject trust deed identified MERS as a nominee for the lender and that MERS is the beneficiary under the trust deed. After initiation of a nonjudicial forclosure, borrower sued for wrongful initiation of foreclosure, alleging that the current owner of the note did not authorize MERS, the nominee, to proceed with the foreclosure. The appellate court held that California’s nonjudicial foreclosure system, outlined in Civil Code sections 2924 through 2924k, is a “`comprehensive framework for the regulation of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale’” that did not allow for a challenge to the authority of the person initiating the foreclosure. (Gomes, supra, at p. 1154.)

In Naranjo v. SBMC Mortgage (S.D.Cal., Jul. 24, 2012, No. 11-CV-2229-L(WVG)) 2012 WL 3030370 (Naranjo), the district court addressed the scope of Gomes, stating:

“In Gomes, the California Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff does not have a right to bring an action to determine the nominee’s authorization to proceed with a nonjudicial foreclosure on behalf of a noteholder. [Citation.] The nominee in Gomes was MERS. [Citation.] Here, Plaintiff is not seeking such a determination. The role of the nominee is not central to this action as it was in Gomes. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that the transfer of rights to the WAMU Trust is improper, thus Defendants consequently lack the legal right to either collect on the debt or enforce the underlying security interest.” (Naranjo, supra, 2012 WL 3030370, at p. *3.)

Thus, the court in Naranjo did not interpret Gomes as barring a claim that was essentially the same as the post-closing date claim Glaski is asserting in this case.

Furthermore, the limited nature of the holding in Gomes is demonstrated by the Gomes court’s discussion of three federal cases relied upon by Mr. Gomes. The court stated that the federal cases were not on point because none recognized a cause of action requiring the noteholder’s nominee to prove its authority to initiate a foreclosure proceeding. (Gomes, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1155.) The Gomes court described one of the federal cases by stating that “the plaintiff alleged wrongful foreclosure on the ground that assignments of the deed of trust had been improperly backdated, and thus the wrong party had initiated the foreclosure process. [Citaiton.] No such infirmity is alleged here.” (Ibid.; see Lester v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (N.D.Cal., Feb. 20, 2013) ___ F.Supp.2d ___, [2013 WL 633333, p. *7] [concluding Gomes did not preclude the plaintiff from challenging JP Morgan’s authority to foreclose].) The Gomes court also stated it was significant that in each of the three federal cases, “the plaintiff’s complaint identified a specific factual basis for alleging that the foreclosure was not initiated by the correct party.” (Gomes, supra, at p. 1156.)

The instant case is distinguishable from Gomes on at least two grounds. First, like Naranjo, Glaski has alleged that the entity claiming to be the noteholder was not the true owner of the note. In contrast, the principle set forth in Gomes concerns the authority of the noteholder’s nominee, MERS. Second, Glaski has alleged specific grounds for his theory that the foreclosure was not conducted at the direction of the correct party.

In view of the limiting statements included in the Gomes opinion, we do not interpret it as barring claims that challenge a foreclosure based on specific allegations that an attempt to transfer the deed of trust was void. Our interpretation, which allows borrowers to pursue questions regarding the chain of ownership, is compatible with Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th 1366. In that case, the court concluded that triable issues of material fact existed regarding alleged breaks in the chain of ownership of the deed of trust in question. (Id. at p. 1378.) Those triable issues existed because Deutsche Bank’s motion for summary judgment failed to establish it was the beneficiary under that deed of trust. (Ibid.)
F. Tender

Defendants contend that Glaski’s claims for wrongful foreclosure, cancellation of instruments and quiet title are defective because Glaski failed to allege that he made a valid and viable tender of payment of the indebtedness. (See Karlsen v. American Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 112, 117 [“valid and viable tender of payment of the indebtedness owing is essential to an action to cancel a voidable sale under a deed of trust”].)

Glaski contends that he is not required to allege he tendered payment of the loan balance because (1) there are many exceptions to the tender rule, (2) defendants have offered no authority for the proposition that the absence of a tender bars a claim for damages,[17] and (3) the tender rule is a principle of equity and its application should not be decided against him at the pleading stage.

Tender is not required where the foreclosure sale is void, rather than voidable, such as when a plaintiff proves that the entity lacked the authority to foreclose on the property. (Lester v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, supra, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, [2013 WL 633333, p. *8]; 4 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2003) Deeds of Trust, § 10:212, p. 686.)

Accordingly, we cannot uphold the demurrer to the wrongful foreclosure claim based on the absence of an allegation that Glaski tendered the amount due under his loan. Thus, we need not address the other exceptions to the tender requirement. (See e.g., Onofrio v. Rice (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 413, 424 [tender may not be required where it would be inequitable to do so].)
G. Remedy of Setting Aside Trustee’s Sale

Defendants argue that the allegedly ineffective transfer to the WaMu Securitized Trust was a mistake that occurred outside the confines of the statutory nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding and, pursuant to Nguyen v. Calhoun (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 445, that mistake does not provide a basis for invalidating the trustee’s sale.

First, this argument does not negate the possibility that other types of relief, such as damages, are available to Glaski. (See generally, Annot., Recognition of Action for Damages for Wrongful Foreclosure—Types of Action, supra, 82 A.L.R.6th 43.)

Second, “where a plaintiff alleges that the entity lacked authority to foreclose on the property, the foreclosure sale would be void. [Citation.]” (Lester v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, supra, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, [2013 WL 633333, p. *8].)

Consequently, we conclude that Nguyen v. Calhoun, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th 428 does not deprive Glaski of the opportunity to prove the foreclosure sale was void based on a lack of authority.
H. Causes of Action Stated

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Glaski’s fourth cause of action has stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure. It follows that Glaski also has stated claims for quiet title (third cause of action), declaratory relief (fifth cause of action), cancellation of instruments (eighth cause of action), and unfair business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200 (ninth cause of action). (See Susilo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (C.D.Cal. 2011) 796 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1196 [plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure claims served as predicate violations for her UCL claim].)
IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE
A. Glaski’s Request for Judicial Notice

When Glaski filed his opening brief, he also filed a request for judicial notice of (1) a Consent Judgment entered on April 4, 2012, by the United States District Court of the District of Columbia in United States v. Bank of America Corp. (D.D.C. No. 12-CV-00361); (2) the Settlement Term Sheet attached to the Consent Judgment; and (3) the federal and state release documents attached to the Consent Judgment as Exhibits F and G.

Defendants opposed the request for judicial notice on the ground that the request violated the requirements in California Rules of Court, rule 8.252 because it was not filed with a separate proposed order, did not state why the matter to be noticed was relevant to the appeal, and did not state whether the matters were submitted to the trial court and, if so, whether that court took judicial notice of the matters.

The documents included in Glaski’s request for judicial notice may provide background information and insight into robo-signing[18] and other problems that the lending industry has had with the procedures used to foreclose on defaulted mortgages. However, these documents do not directly affect whether the allegations in the SAC are sufficient to state a cause of action. Therefore, we deny Glaski’s request for judicial notice.
B. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice of Assignment

The “ASSIGNMENT OF DEED OF TRUST” recorded on December 9, 2008, that stated JP Morgan transferred and assigned all beneficial interest under the Glaski deed of trust to “LaSalle Bank NA as trustee for WaMu [Securitized Trust]” together with the note described in and secured by the Glaski deed of trust was not attached to the SAC as an exhibit. That document is part of the appellate record because the respondents’ appendix includes a copy of defendants’ request for judicial notice that was filed in June 2011 to support a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

In ruling on defendants’ request for judicial notice, the trial court stated that it could only take judicial notice that certain documents in the request, including the assignment of deed of trust, had been recorded, but it could not take judicial notice of factual matters stated in those documents. This ruling is correct and unchallenged on appeal. Therefore, like the trial court, we will take judicial notice of the existence and recordation of the December 2008 assignment, but we “do not take notice of the truth of matters stated therein.” (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1375.) As a result, the assignment of deed of trust does not establish that JP Morgan was, in fact, the holder of the beneficial interest in the Glaski deed of trust that the assignment states was transferred to LaSalle Bank. Similarly, it does not establish that LaSalle Bank in fact became the owner or holder of that beneficial interest.

Because the document does not establish these facts for purposes of this demurrer, it does not cure either of the breaks in the two alternate chains of ownership challenged in the SAC. Therefore, the December 2008 assignment does not provide a basis for sustaining the demurrer.
DISPOSITION

The judgment of dismissal is reversed. The trial court is directed to vacate its order sustaining the general demurrer and to enter a new order overruling that demurrer as to the third, fourth, fifth, eighth and ninth causes of action.

Glaski’s request for judicial notice filed on September 25, 2012, is denied.

Glaski shall recover his costs on appeal.

Wiseman, Acting P.J. and Kane, J., concurs.
ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION

As the nonpublished opinion filed on July 31, 2013, in the above entitled matter hereby meets the standards for publication specified in the California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), it is ordered that the opinion be certified for publication in the Official Reports.

KANE, J., concur.

[1] Mortgage-backed securities are created through a complex process known as “securization.” (See Levitin & Twomey, Mortgage Servicing (2011) 28 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 13 [“a mortgage securitization transaction is extremely complex”].) In simplified terms, “securitization” is the process where (1) many loans are bundled together and transferred to a passive entity, such as a trust, and (2) the trust holds the loans and issues investment securities that are repaid from the mortgage payments made on the loans. (Oppenheim & Trask-Rahn, Deconstructing the Black Magic of Securitized Trusts: How the Mortgage-Backed Securitization Process is Hurting the Banking Industry’s Ability to Foreclose and Proving the Best Offense for a Foreclosure Defense (2012) 41 Stetson L.Rev. 745, 753-754 (hereinafter, Deconstructing Securitized Trusts).) Hence, the securities issued by the trust are “mortgage-backed.” For purposes of this opinion, we will refer to such a trust as a “securitized trust.”

[2] Civil Code section 2924, subdivision (a)(1) states that a “trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents” may initiate the nonjudicial foreclosure process. This statute and the provision of the Glaski deed of trust are the basis for Glaski’s position that the nonjudicial foreclosure in this case was wrongful—namely, that the power of sale in the Glaski deed of trust was invoked by an entity that was not the true beneficiary.

[3] Glaski’s pleading does not allege that LaSalle Bank was the original trustee when the WaMu Securitized Trust was formed in late 2005, but filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission identify LaSalle Bank as the original trustee. We provide this information for background purposes only and it plays no role in our decision in this appeal.

[4] Another possibility, which was acknowledged by both sides at oral argument, is that the true holder of the note and deed of trust cannot be determined at this stage of the proceedings. This lack of certainty regarding who holds the deed of trust is not uncommon when a securitized trust is involved. (See Mortgage and Asset Backed Securities Litigation Handbook (2012) § 5:114 [often difficult for securitized trust to prove ownership by showing a chain of assignments of the loan from the originating lender].)

[5] It appears this company is no longer a separate entity. The certificate of interested entities filed with the respondents’ brief refers to “JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. as successor by merger to Chase Home Finance, LLC.”

[6] One controversy presented by this appeal is whether this court should consider the December 9, 2008, assignment of deed of trust, which is not an exhibit to the SAC. Because the trial court took judicial notice of the existence and recordation of the assignment earlier in the litigation, we too will consider the assignment, but will not presume the matters stated therein are true. (See pt. IV.B, post.) For instance, we will not assume that JP Morgan actually held any interests that it could assign to LaSalle Bank. (See Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375 [taking judicial notice of a recorded assignment does not establish assignee’s ownership of deed of trust].)

[7] Specifically, the notice stated that his August 2008 installment payment and all subsequent installment payments had not been made.

[8] The signature block at the end of the NOD indicated it was signed by Colleen Irby as assistant secretary for California Reconveyance. The first page of the notice stated that recording was requested by California Reconveyance. Affidavits of mailing attached to the SAC stated that the declarant mailed copies of the notice of default to Glaski at his home address and to Bank of America, care of Custom Recording Solutions, at an address in Santa Ana, California. The affidavits of mailing are the earliest documents in the appellate record indicating that Bank of America had any involvement with Glaski’s loan.

[9] Bank of America took over La Salle Bank by merger in 2007.

[10] The trial court did not explicitly rule on defendants’ request for judicial notice of these documents, but referred to matters set forth in these documents in its ruling. Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, we will infer that the trial court granted the request.

[11] The claim that a foreclosure was conducted by or at the direction of a nonholder of mortgage rights often arises where the mortgage has been securitized. (Buchwalter, Cause of Action in Tort for Wrongful Foreclosure of Residential Mortgage, 52 Causes of Action Second (2012) 119, 149 [§ 11 addresses foreclosure by a nonholder of mortgage rights].)

[12] This allegation comports with the following view of pooling and servicing agreements and the federal tax code provisions applicable to REMIC trusts. “Once the bundled mortgages are given to a depositor, the [pooling and servicing agreement] and IRS tax code provisions require that the mortgages be transferred to the trust within a certain time frame, usually ninety dates from the date the trust is created. After such time, the trust closes and any subsequent transfers are invalid. The reason for this is purely economic for the trust. If the mortgages are properly transferred within the ninety-day open period, and then the trust properly closes, the trust is allowed to maintain REMIC tax status.” (Deconstructing Securitized Trusts, supra, 41 Stetson L.Rev. at pp. 757-758.)

[13] “Although we may not rely on unpublished California cases, the California Rules of Court do not prohibit citation to unpublished federal cases, which may properly be cited as persuasive, although not binding, authority.” (Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 238, 251, fn. 6, citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115.)

[14] Although this allegation and the remainder of the SAC do not explicitly identify the trustee of the WaMu Securitized Trust as the entity that invoked the power of sale, it is reasonable to interpret the allegation in this manner. Such an interpretation is consistent with the position taken by Glaski’s attorney at the hearing on the demurrer, where she argued that the WaMu Securitized Trust did not obtain Glaski’s loan and thus was precluded from proceeding with the foreclosure.

[15] The statutory purpose is “to protect trust beneficiaries from unauthorized actions by the trustee.” (Turano, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York, Book 17B, EPTL § 7-2.4.)

[16] Because Glaski has stated a claim for relief in his wrongful foreclosure action, we need not address his alternate theory that the foreclosure was void because it was implemented by forged documents. (Genesis Environmental Services v. San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control Dist. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 597, 603 [appellate inquiry ends and reversal is required once court determines a cause of action was stated under any legal theory].) We note, however, that California law provides that ratification generally is an affirmative defense and must be specially pleaded by the party asserting it. (See Reina v. Erassarret (1949) 90 Cal.App.2d 418, 424 [ratification is an affirmative defense and the defendant ordinarily bears the burden of proof]; 49A Cal.Jur.3d (2010) Pleading, § 186, p. 319 [defenses that must be specially pleaded include waiver, estoppel and ratification].) Also, “[w]hether there has been ratification of a forged signature is ordinarily a question of fact.” (Common Wealth Ins. Systems, Inc. v. Kersten (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 1014, 1026; see Brock v. Yale Mortg. Corp. (Ga. 2010) 700 S.E.2d 583, 588 [ratification may be expressed or implied from acts of principal and “is usually a fact question for the jury”; wife had forged husband’s signature on quitclaim deed].)

[17] See generally, Annotation, Recognition of Action for Damages for Wrongful Foreclosure—Types of Action (2013) 82 A.L.R.6th 43 (claims that a foreclosure is “wrongful” can be tort-based, statute-based, and contract-based).

[18] Claims of misrepresentation or fraud related to robo-signing of foreclosure documents is addressed in Buchwalter, Cause of Action in Tort for Wrongful Foreclosure of Residential Mortgage, 52 Causes of Action Second, supra, at pages 147 to 149.

INDEPENDENT REVIEW & COMMENTS:

Glaski v Bank of America: Mortgagor’s Defense Based on Lender’s Failure to Properly Securitize a Loan


Roger Bernhardt


Golden Gate University – School of Law

September 29, 2013

CEB 36 Real Property Law Reporter 111, September 2013


Abstract:     

Commentary on a recent California decision holding that a lender might be unable to enforce an improperly securitized loan.

Accepted Paper Series

Glaski v Bank of America: Mortgagor’s Defense Based on Lender’s Failure to Properly Securitize a Loan.
Glaski v Bank of America (2013) 218 CA4th 1079 Before being placed into receivership, Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu) established a pool of residential loans as collateral for mortgage-backed securities. New York law governed the resulting securitized trust. According to the lender, the trust included Borrower’s defaulted loan. Bank of America, which claimed it was successor trustee and beneficiary of the trust, purchased Borrower’s property at the trustee’s sale. There were two possible chains of title through which Bank of America could have claimed
to be successor trustee. (Notably, at the demurrer stage, the parties acknowledged that they could not be certain who truly held Borrower’s note.) Borrower challenged both conceivable chains of title as having
been assigned after the trust closing date. The trial court sustained Bank of America’s demurrer without leave to amend.
The court of appeal reversed in part. The court ruled that a borrower may challenge an assignment as being void even if that borrower was not a party to, or a third party beneficiary of, that assignment. Such a
challenge effectively states a claim for wrongful foreclosure. Disagreeing with Texas and Illinois courts, the court literally and strictly construed the applicable New York statute, which states that any act by a trustee in contravention of the trust document is void (218 CA4th at 1096): Because the WaMu Securitized Trust was created by the pooling and servicing agreement and that agreement establishes a closing date after which the trust may no longer accept loans, this statutory provision provides a legal basis for concluding that the trustee’s attempt to accept a loan after the closing date would be void as an act in contravention of the trust document.
This is significant because the borrower need not tender payment of indebtedness when the foreclosure sale is void.
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: If some lenders are reacting with shock and horror to this decision, that is probably only because they reacted too giddily to Gomes v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 CA4th 1149 (reported at 34 CEB RPLR 66 (Mar. 2011)) and similar decisions that they took to mean that their nonjudicial foreclosures were completely immune from judicial review. Because I think that Glaski simply holds that some borrower foreclosure challenges may warrant factual investigation (rather than outright dismissal at the pleading stage), I do not find this decision that earth-shaking.
Two of this plaintiff’s major contentions were in fact entirely rejected at the demurrer level: —That the foreclosure was fraudulent because the statutory notices looked robosigned (“forged”); and —That the loan documents were not truly transferred into the loan pool.
Only the borrower’s wrongful foreclosure count survived into the next round. If the bank can show that the documents were handled in proper fashion, it should be able to dispose of this last issue on summary
judgment.
Bank of America appeared to not prevail on demurrer on this issue because the record did include two deed of trust assignments that had been recorded outside the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) period and did not include any evidence showing that the loan was put into the securitization pool within the proper REMIC period. The court’s ruling that a transfer into a trust that is made too late may constitute a void rather than voidable transfer (to not jeopardize the tax-exempt status of the other assets in the trust) seems like a sane conclusion. That ruling does no harm to securitization pools that were created with proper attention to the necessary timetables. (It probably also has only slight effect on loans that were improperly securitized,
other than to require that a different procedure be followed for their foreclosure.)

In this case, the fact that two assignments of a deed of trust were recorded after trust closure proves almost nothing about when the loans themselves were actually transferred into the trust pool, it having been a common practice back then not to record assignments until some other development made recording appropriate. I suspect that it was only the combination of seeing two “belatedly” recorded assignments and also seeing no indication of any timely made document deposits into the trust pool that led to court to say that the borrower had sufficiently alleged an invalid (i.e., void) attempted transfer into the trust. Because that seemed to be a factual possibility, on remand, the court logically should ask whether the pool trustee was the rightful party to conduct the foreclosure of the deed of trust, or whether that should have been done by someone else.

While courts may not want to find their dockets cluttered with frivolous attacks on valid foreclosures, they are probably equally averse to allowing potentially meritorious challenges to wrongful foreclosures to be rejected out of hand.  —Roger Bernhardt

From CEB 36 Real Property Law Reporter 111, September 2013, © The Regents of the University of California, reprinted with permission of CEB.”

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package  that will help you challenge these fraudsters and save your home from foreclosure visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

B. First Cause of Action for Fraud, Lack of Specific Allegations of Reliance – See more at: http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2013/08/01/glaski-v-bank-of-america-ca5-5th-appellate-district-securitization-failed-ny-trust-law-applied-ruling-to-protect-remic-status-non-judicial-foreclosure-statutes-irrelevant-because-sa/#sthash.jRAaLypz.dpuf

II. FRAUD

A. Rules for Pleading Fraud

We therefore reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings. – See more at: http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2013/08/01/glaski-v-bank-of-america-ca5-5th-appellate-district-securitization-failed-ny-trust-law-applied-ruling-to-protect-remic-status-non-judicial-foreclosure-statutes-irrelevant-because-sa/#sthash.jRAaLypz.dpuf
0.000000 0.000000

Share this:

  • Twitter
  • Facebook

Like this:

Like Loading...

Who Has Standing To Foreclose? – A Review of Massachusettes Case & Other Jurisdictions

09 Friday Aug 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Banks and Lenders, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, MERS, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Note - Deed of Trust - Mortgage, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, Securitization, State Court, Your Legal Rights

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Fannie Mae, Foreclosure, Ibanez, Massachusetts, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, U.S. Bancorp, Uniform Commercial Code, US Bank

                                            Introduction

As a result of the collapse of the housing market in this country in or around 2008, the number of residential foreclosures has increased exponentially, putting unprecedented strains on the system.

Although most foreclosures are uncontested, since there is rarely any doubt that the borrower has defaulted in repayment of the debt, in the past several years a cottage industry has developed challenging the creditor’s “standing” to foreclose, sometimes colloquially known as the “show me the Note” defense.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has seen its share of this phenomenon, maybe more than its share.

This post will briefly review the string of Massachusetts judicial decisions over the past several years addressing various aspects of the foreclosure standing question, and will use those cases to “issue-spot” and frame questions that practitioners in every state should consider and perhaps need to answer before moving ahead with foreclosures or to defend past foreclosures in litigation, whether in defense of borrowers’ lawsuits or in eviction proceedings. Other notables decisions will also be surveyed to flesh out the issues and arguments further, without attempting to be exhaustive of the subject or to present the proverbial 50-State survey.

                                   The Massachusetts Story

We begin with the Massachusetts foreclosure story. In early 2009, a judge on Massachusetts specialized Land Court called into question a title standard of the State’s Real Estate Bar Association that had been relied upon by the Massachusetts foreclosure Bar. REBA Title Standard No. 58 said that a foreclosure was not defective so long as an assignment of the mortgage was obtained at any time before or after the foreclosure. In other words, the title could be cleared by obtaining an assignment even after the conduct of the foreclosure auction sale. Land Court Judge Keith Long in U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Ibanez, 2009 WL 795201 (Mass. Land Ct. Mar. 26, 2009), held that the title standard did not correctly state Massachusetts law, and that under the Massachusetts foreclosure statute, M.G.L. c. 244, a creditor had to be the mortgagee to foreclose. In 2011, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637 (2011), affirmed, holding that a foreclosing entity, if not the original mortgagee, must hold an assignment of the mortgage at the time it first published the notice of sale.

If the assignment of the mortgage was obtained after publication of the notice, a subsequently-completed foreclosure is unlawful and void.

Because Massachusetts is a non-judicial foreclosure jurisdiction, the foreclosing creditor does not have available ares judicata defense to a post-foreclosure challenge to title or possession.

Thus, the Massachusetts Court has held that a borrower or other defendant in an eviction action can defend by contesting the validity of a purchaser’s title if it stems from an invalid foreclosure, even if the mortgagor had done nothing to contest the foreclosure itself. Bank of New York v. Bailey, 460 Mass. 327 (2011).

The plaintiffs in Ibanez were securitization trustees and while the evidence in the record was incomplete, contributing to the result, the trustees were presumed to have held the notes in the respective loan pools, including the defendants’ notes, for the benefit of the investors. The Ibanez Court required the mortgagee to hold an assignment, and implicitly found that it would not be sufficient to confer standing to foreclose to hold the note without also holding the mortgage or obtaining an assignment, but nothing in the decision presaged a requirement that the mortgagee possess the note.

The argument that the mortgagee must also hold the note to foreclose was pressed to the Massachusetts high court almost immediately in the wake of Ibanez. This issue arises in Massachusetts because, contrary to the majority and longstanding American rule that the mortgage is mere security for the note and follows the note as a matter of law, Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271 (1872), Massachusetts is a title-theory state that allows for the note and mortgage to be held separately. Under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), a note can be transferred by delivery of possession of an endorsed note, but Massachusetts, as a title theory state, requires a signed instrument to convey a mortgage, “which represents legal title to someone’s home.” Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 649. Comparable to the equity of redemption residing in the mortgagor, to reclaim legal title by repaying the debt and redeeming the mortgage, the owner of the note under Massachusetts law holds beneficial ownership of the mortgage and has the right to compel an assignment of the mortgage by the mortgagee, who holds the mortgage in trust for the holder of the note, in what has been described as a resulting trust implied by law. Id. at 652.

In Eaton v. Fannie Mae, 462 Mass. 569 (2012), the Court laid down a new rule that foreclosing mortgagees must either (a) hold the note, or (b) be acting on behalf of the note holder. In other words, the Court held that “one who, although not the note holder himself, acts as the authorized agent of the note holder,” may exercise the power of sale. Id. at 586. Notably, unlike in Ibanez where the Court rejected entreaties for prospective application of its decision, the Eaton court chose to apply its holding prospectively only to foreclosures noticed after the date of the decision out of “concern for litigants and others who have relied on existing precedents,” this being a “new rule.” Id. at 588.

Massachusetts courts, like courts elsewhere, have also considered the standing of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) to foreclose mortgages and to assign mortgages for foreclosure. MERS, discussed in greater detail below, holds title to mortgages as nominee for MERS Members. The Eaton court discussed MERS in several footnotes, see 462 Mass. 569 nn. 5, 7, 27 & 29, and implicitly accepted MERS’ pre-foreclosure assignment of the mortgage to the mortgage servicer.

In a federal court appeal earlier this year, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Boston held expressly that MERS has the authority to assign mortgages it holds as nominee. Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services, — F.3d —-, 2013 WL 563374 (1st Cir., Feb. 15, 2013). Indeed, in the District Court decision the Court of Appeals affirmed, District Judge William Young remarked that “the MERS system fits perfectly into the Massachusetts model for the separation of legal and beneficial ownership of mortgages.” Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services, 826 F. Supp. 2d 352, 371 (D. Mass. 2011).

The recent Massachusetts mortgage foreclosure decisions were surprising, bordering on shocking, both to lenders and the Massachusetts real estate and foreclosure bars. In Ibanez, the Court disapproved a title standard of the well-respected statewide real estate bar group that conveyancers and others looked to for guidance, and in Eaton the Massachusetts Court for the first time announced a requirement that a foreclosing mortgagee be able to demonstrate its relationship to the mortgage note notwithstanding that there is no requirement under Massachusetts law to record or file notes or note transfers. 462 Mass. at 586;see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. McKenna , 2011 WL 6153419, at *2 n.1 (Mass. Land Ct. Dec. 8, 2011) (“There never has been recording of notes at the registries of deeds at any time. Notes are never recorded—not (as they may be in some other states) when the initial mortgage is recorded, nor at any time after that, including at the time, following the auction sale, when the foreclosure deed and

affidavit are put on at the registry.”). Whether the greater numbers of foreclosures and the perceived financial excesses and highly publicized alleged “sloppiness” of the mortgage industry have caused some courts to be more “pro-consumer,” or it is only that some of the legal doctrines underlying foreclosure standing had not been closely examined in a century or more, the rulings were unexpected. In part, they may represent the challenge of adapting historical, and in some cases ancient, property law to modern commerce, or vice versa. But they point out the critical need to understand state law, and to not take for granted that traditional custom and practice will be upheld, or that courts will not struggle applying that law or those established customs and practice to non-traditional modern mortgage ownership structures.

Mortgage notes, representing the debt for which the mortgages are collateral, will generally qualify as negotiable instruments whose ownership and transfer is governed by the principles of Article 3 of the UCC, adopted largely intact in most American jurisdictions. But despite the efforts of the UCC Commissioners to harmonize the law of security interests, including in some respects in real property, mortgage law and mortgage foreclosure in particular remains predominantly a creature of local state law. Thus, for mortgage foreclosure purposes, where the foreclosing creditor stands, in the legal vernacular, may depend on where the house sits. The discussion below frames some of the key standing inquiries suggested by the Massachusetts experience, and surveys some recent case law from across the country addressing the same or similar questions, and compares and contrasts the judicial precedents.

Although subsidiary questions such as whether the state is a title theory or lien theory jurisdiction, and whether the mortgage is deemed to follow the note as a matter of law, may affect how the questions are answered in any particular state, the core questions remain the same and can generally be framed in the following terms:

1. What relationship must the foreclosing entity have to the mortgage (or to the corresponding deed of trust in jurisdictions that know the security instrument by that terminology), and at what time must it hold or have it?

2. What relationship, if any, must the foreclosing entity have to the promissory note secured by the mortgage (or by the deed of trust), and at what time?

3. Does MERS when it holds the mortgage as nominee (or when it is named as beneficiary under a deed of trust) have standing to foreclose, or the ability to assign the mortgage (or deed of trust) to the lender, trustee or servicer for foreclosure?

4. Who has standing to foreclose in the securitization context, given the legal relationships under the standard Pooling and Servicing Agreement between and among the securitization trustee, the mortgage servicer and, where applicable, MERS as nominee under the mortgage (or deed of trust)?

There is a large body of case law nationwide on all of these questions, with additional decisions being handed down on virtually a daily basis; what follows below is only a representative sampling intended to illustrate the more significant issues and arguments, to inform the analysis of applicable local state law.

        1. Relationship Between Foreclosing Entity and Mortgage.

In U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637 (2011), as discussed above, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a foreclosing entity must hold an assignment of the mortgage at the time of the publication of the notice of sale. Other states differ on whether they require a foreclosing party to hold the mortgage either at the time of the foreclosure sale itself or when notice is issued.

In considering any question of a party’s status in the foreclosure process, it is first important to note whether jurisdictions are judicial or non-judicial jurisdictions:

– Judicial  foreclosure states require the foreclosing party to initiate a court proceeding in order to foreclose. The foreclosure complaint seeks permission from the court to foreclose on the secured property.

– Non-judicial foreclosure jurisdictions do not require court involvement. Instead, the foreclosing entity must follow certain practices as set by state statute, such as mailing notices of acceleration and default, and publishing notice in the local papers. That entity often is the deed of trust trustee, under state law. If the borrower wishes to contest the sale, he or she may seek to enjoin it before the sale occurs.

Twenty-two states are considered judicial foreclosure jurisdictions, whereas 28 are deemed non-judicial.

In New York, where foreclosures are conducted judicially, one court recently stated that “a plaintiff has standing where it is both the holder or assignee of the subject mortgage and the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time the action is commenced.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Wine, 90 A.D.3d 1216, 1217 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2011).

To a similar effect, one Florida court has said a party must “present evidence that it owns and holds the note and mortgage in question in order to proceed with a foreclosure action.” Gee v. U.S. Bank N.A., 72 So. 3d 211, 213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2011). But a different Florida appellate court has held that an assignment of the mortgage may not be necessary at the time a complaint is filed. Standing to bring a judicial foreclosure requires “either an assignment or an equitable transfer of the mortgage prior to the filing of the complaint.” McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., 79 So. 3d 170, 172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2012). Because ownership of a mortgage follows an assignment of the debt under that case, the mortgage does not need to be assigned to the plaintiff before the Complaint is filed if it proves ownership of the note at that time.

New Jersey, also a judicial state, has said that if a foreclosing creditor bases standing to foreclose on assignment of the mortgage, the assignment must precede filing of the foreclosure complaint; however, if the foreclosing creditor held the note at the time of filing the complaint, assignment of the mortgage is unnecessary to establish standing to foreclose. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 222-25 (App. Div. 2011). There, although Deutsche Bank had not proved its standing because the mortgage assignment it relied on was executed a day after it filed its complaint, the Court remanded to allow Deutsche Bank to demonstrate standing by proving that it possessed the note prior to filing the complaint. Contrast state filing rules with the law of a non-judicial state like Michigan, which allows a foreclosing party to be “either the owner of the indebtedness or of an interest in the indebtedness secured by the mortgage or the servicing agent of the mortgage.” MCL 600.3204(1)(d)). Thus, under the statute, a loan servicer is expressly authorized to foreclose regardless of whether it holds the note or mortgage. However, by the date of the foreclosure sale, the mortgage must be assigned to the foreclosing party if it is not the original mortgagee. MCL 600.3204(3).

Where an assignment of the mortgage may be required in order to foreclose, there are differences regarding whether the assignment of mortgage is required to be recorded.

– Massachusetts: In U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637 (2011), although the Court required the foreclosing entity to hold the mortgage, it notably did not require the assignment of mortgage be recorded – or even be in recordable form.

– California, likewise, does not require that assignments of a deed of trust be recorded prior to foreclosure, despite a statutory pre-foreclosure recording requirement for mortgage assignments (mortgages are uncommon in California). Calvo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 199 Cal. App. 4th 118, 122-2 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2011).

– New York, recording is also not required. See, e.g., Bank of NY v. Silverberg, 86 A.D.3d 274, 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 2nd Dep’t 2011) (rejecting contention that absence of recorded assignment allowed inference that plaintiff did not own the note and mortgage; “an assignment of a note and mortgage need not be in writing and can be effectuated by physical delivery”).

But some non-judicial states require that assignments of deeds of trusts or mortgages be recorded before a foreclosure can occur:

– Oregon: Ore. Rev. Stat. § 86.735(1)

– Idaho: Idaho Stat. § 45-1505(1)

– Minnesota: Minn. Stat. § 580.02(3)

– Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 71-1-313(1)

– Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. § 34-4-103(a)(iii)

Regardless of any requirement, assignees typically record mortgage assignments to put the world on notice of their interest. See MetLife Home Loans v. Hansen, 48 Kan. App. 2d 213 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (“The assignment of the Mortgage was merely recorded notice of a formal transfer of the title to the instrument as required by recording statutes, which are primarily designed to protect the mortgagee against other creditors of the mortgagor for lien-priority purposes, not to establish the rights of the mortgagee vis-à-vis the mortgagor.”

                           Need for Correct Corporate Names

When an assignment of mortgage is required, it must also be assigned to the correct corporate entity. Confusion over corporate names can impede foreclosures.

For example, the servicer of a loan filed a judicial foreclosure action alleging that it was the assignee of the original lender. Bayview Loan Servicing, L.L.C. v. Nelson, 382 Ill. App. 3d 1184 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2008). Reversing the trial court’s judgment in favor of the servicer (Bayview Loan Servicing, L.L.C.), the Court of Appeals held that the servicer was not allowed to foreclose because the mortgage was not assigned to it. Rather, the mortgage had been assigned to an affiliated entity, Bayview Financial Trading Group, L.P. Id. at 1187. Without any evidence that the foreclosing entity held the note or mortgage, the fact that it was servicer was insufficient to allow it to foreclose. Id. at 1188.

But the situation was different in a judicial foreclosure filed in the same state by Standard Bank, which was the successor to the originator of the loan as a result of several mergers and name changes. Std. Bank & Trust Co. v. Madonia, 964 N.E.2d 118 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2011). The mortgagors argued that the plaintiff bank was required to show a mortgage assignment or endorsement of the note to it. Rejecting that argument, the Court held that the plaintiff bank retained all of the interests of the originator, including those under the note and mortgage, as a result of the mergers. Id. at 123.

A court may require proof of a merger. The note and mortgage in this case were assigned to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. deBree, 2012 ME 34 (Me. 2012). Upon the borrowers’ default, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. filed a complaint as “Successor by Merger to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.” The trial court granted summary judgment for Wells Fargo Bank. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that Wells Fargo Bank had not proved its ownership of the mortgage note and mortgage because there was no evidence that it, as opposed to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., owned the instruments. Id. at ¶ 9. The Court rejected the Bank’s arguments that the borrowers had waived their argument, and it declined to take judicial notice that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage had merged into Wells Fargo Bank. Id.at ¶¶ 9-10. The showing of ownership was necessary for the Bank to prevail on summary judgment, so the foreclosure judgment was vacated. Id. at ¶ 11.

                 2. Relationship Between Foreclosing Entity and Note

In Eaton v. Fannie Mae, 462 Mass. 569 (2012), discussed above, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court announced a new rule, applicable to foreclosures noticed after June 22, 2012 (the date of the decision), requiring that foreclosing mortgagees must either (a) hold the note; or (b) be acting on behalf of the noteholder, at the time of foreclosure. In other words, the Court held that “one who, although not the note holder himself, acts as the authorized agent of the note holder” may exercise the power of sale.

Various courts in other states are split as to whether a foreclosing entity must hold the note.

California, for example, allows by statute non-judicial foreclosure by the “trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents.” Debrunner v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 204 Cal. App. 4th 433, 440 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 2012) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 2924(a)(1)). The party foreclosing need not have possession of or a beneficial interest in the note because no such prerequisite appears in comprehensive statutory framework. Id. at 440-42.

In Idaho, a non-judicial foreclosure state, the state supreme court expressly rejected the idea that a party must have ownership of the note and mortgage. Trotter v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 152 Idaho 842, 861-62 (2012). Rather, “the plain language of the [deed of trust foreclosure] statute makes it clear that the trustee may foreclose on a deed of trust if it complies with the requirements contained within the Act.” Id. at 862.

Despite these states’ rejections of any requirement to hold the note, some courts in other jurisdictions do seem to require the foreclosing party to also be the noteholder, for example, or perhaps at least an agent or authorized person:

– New York: According to this intermediate appellate division, judicial foreclosure plaintiff must both hold the note and the mortgage at the time the action is commenced. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Wine, 90 A.D.3d 1216, 1217 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2011).

– Florida: In Florida, the holder of a note, or its representative, may foreclose. Gee v. U.S. Bank N.A., 72 So. 3d 211, 213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2011). If the plaintiff is not the payee of the note, it must be endorsed to the plaintiff or in blank. Id.

– Maryland: The transferee of an unendorsed promissory note has the burden of establishing its rights under the note by proving the note’s prior transfer history, especially where the mortgagor requests an injunction to stop foreclosure. Anderson v. Burson, 424 Md. 232, 245 (2011). Thus, the Court held that although the agent of the substitute trustee under the mortgage had physical possession of the note, it was not a holder of the note because there was no valid endorsement; it could nevertheless still enforce the note based on concessions from the mortgagors. Id. at 251-52.

– Oklahoma: “To commence a foreclosure action in Oklahoma, a plaintiff must demonstrate it has a right to enforce the note and, absent a showing of ownership, the plaintiff lacks standing.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Heath, 2012 OK 54, ¶ 9 (Okla. 2012).

– Washington: Under Washington’s non-judicial foreclosure statute, the trustee is required to “have proof that the beneficiary is the owner of any promissory note or other obligation secured by the deed of trust.” RCW61.24.030(7)(a). Note, however, that borrowers cannot bring a judicial action based on a beneficiary or trustee’s failure to prove to the borrower that the beneficiary owns the note. Frazer v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 2012 WL 1821386, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 18, 2012) (“[T]he Washington Deed of Trust Act requires that a foreclosing lender demonstrate its ownership of the underlying note to the trustee, not the borrower.”).

Some jurisdictions more clearly take an either/or approach to foreclosing. In Michigan, for example, the foreclosing entity must be “either the owner of the indebtedness or of an interest in the indebtedness secured by the mortgage or the servicing agent of the mortgage.” Residential Funding Co., LLC v. Saurman, 490 Mich. 909 (2011) (quoting MCL 600.3204(1)(d)). The question in Saurman was whether foreclosures by MERS, as a mortgagee that did not hold the note, were proper. The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the foreclosures because the mortgagee’s interest in the note—even though not an ownership interest—was a sufficient interest in the indebtedness to allow it to foreclose.

There are other state courts that follow the either/or approach as well, for example:

– Ohio: In CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Patterson, 2012 Ohio 5894 (Ohio Ct. App., Cuyahoga County Dec. 13, 2012), the Ohio Court of Appeals held that a party has standing if “at the time it files its complaint of foreclosure, it either (1) has had a mortgage assigned or (2) is the holder of the note.” Id. at ¶ 21. Thus, the plaintiff in Patterson had standing because it possessed the note when it filed its complaint, even though the mortgagewas not assigned until later. Id. at ¶ 22.

– Alabama: In Sturdivant v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, — So.3d —-, 2011 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 361 (Ala. Civ. App. Dec. 16, 2011), the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals ruled that a party lacked standing to foreclose because it was not yet the assignee of a mortgage when it initiated foreclosure. In Perry v. Fannie Mae, 100 So. 3d 1090 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012), the Court explained that the mortgage need not be assigned to a foreclosing party at the time it initiates foreclosure if it is a holder of the note. Because the evidence showed that the foreclosing party held the note at the time it initiated foreclosure proceedings, the foreclosure was proper. Id. at 1094-96.

– New Jersey: As noted in the preceding section, New Jersey recognizes standing to file a complaint to foreclose based on either assignment of the mortgage or possession of the note. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 222 (App. Div. 2011).

MERS is a system for electronically tracking interests in mortgages that are traded on the secondary market. MERS members (approximately 6,000) agree that MERS serves as mortgagee or beneficiary, and when loan ownership or servicing rights are sold from one MERS member to another, MERS remains the titleholder to the security.

                                   3. Standing of MERS

                                         What is MERS?

MERS is a system for electronically tracking interests in mortgages that are traded on the secondary market. MERS members (approximately 6,000) agree that MERS serves as mortgagee or beneficiary, and when loan ownership or servicing rights are sold from one MERS member to another, MERS remains the titleholder to the security instrument as nominee on behalf of whomever owns the loan. MERS is modeled on the “book entry system” used to track ownership in stock exchanges.

The use of nominees predates MERS: “The use of a nominee in real estate transactions, and as mortgagee in a recorded mortgage, has long been sanctioned as a legitimate practice.” In re Cushman Bakery, 526 F. 2d 23, 30 (1st Cir. 1975) (collecting cases). However, the concept of a nominee serving as agent for one member of a group of possible principals—where the principal may change in a way not reflected in the public record—has fostered arange of reactions, from commendation to criticism to confusion, but ultimately MERS (and its members) have repeatedly prevailed in foreclosure challenge litigation.

                               Authority of MERS to Foreclose

Most courts to consider the issue have ruled that MERS may serve as mortgagee or beneficiary and foreclose, for example:

– Texas: Athey v. MERS, 314 S.W. 3d 161, 166 (Tex. App. 2010) (MERS could foreclose, though it never held the note).

– Utah: Burnett v. MERS, 2009 WL 3582294 (D. Utah Oct. 27, 2009) (“MERS had authority under the Deed of Trust to initiate foreclosure proceedings”).

– Nevada: Croce v. Trinity Mortg. Assurance Corp. 2009 WL 3172119, at 3 (D. Nev. Sept. 28, 2009) (collecting cases from Georgia, California, Florida, and Colorado rejecting argument “that MERS does not have standing as a beneficiary under the Note and Deed of Trust, and therefore, is not authorized to participate in the foreclosure proceedings.”); see also Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon,286 P.3d 249, 254 (Nev. 2012) (“The deed of trust also expressly designated MERS as the beneficiary… it is an express part of the contract that we are not at liberty to disregard, and it is not repugnant to the remainder of the contract.”).

– Michigan: Residential Funding Corp. v. Saurman, 805 N.W. 2d 183 (Mich. 2011) held that MERS had a sufficient interest to foreclose because it owned “legal title to a security lien whose existence is wholly contingent on the satisfaction of the indebtedness.”

In addition, at least two states—Minnesota (Minn. Stat. § 507.413) and Texas (Tex. Prop. Code § 51.0001)—have enacted statutes recognizing that MERS can foreclose.

Some state courts, nevertheless, have raised various questions about MERS’s role as it relates to foreclosures.

– Oregon: In Niday v. GMAC Mortg., 284 P. 3d 1157 (Or. App. 2012), the Oregon Court of Appeals ruled that MERS did not meet Oregon’s statutory definition of “beneficiary,” disagreeing with the majority of trial court rulings that had ruled MERS could serve as beneficiary.

Niday is on appeal to the Supreme Court of Oregon; oral argument was heard January 8, 2013.

– Maine: The Maine Supreme Court has ruled that MERS cannot meet its definition of “mortgagee,” and thus had no standing to foreclose judicially. MERS v. Saunders, 2 A. 3d 289 (Me. 2010) (“MERS is not in fact a ‘mortgagee’ within the meaning of our foreclosure statute”).

– Washington: Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Group, Inc., 285 P.3d 34, 46 (Wash. 2012) ruled that MERS did not meet the statutory definition of deed of trust beneficiary, though Bain did not explain whether this impaired foreclosure proceedings.

 Nearly two years ago, MERS changed its rules of membership to provide that the noteholder must arrange for an assignment to be executed from MERS to the foreclosing entity prior to commencement of any foreclosure proceeding, judicial or non-judicial. So, this issue may be a legacy question after all.

                         Authority of MERS to Assign Mortgage

Even before the change in the membership rules, MERS often assigned mortgages to the foreclosing entity so that entity could foreclose. Some borrowers have argued that, as nominee, MERS does not have the power to assign the mortgage. These challenges have been almost universally rejected, as the security instruments expressly authorize MERS, as nominee, to take any action required of its principal and refer to the mortgagee or beneficiary as MERS and its “successors and assigns.” Indeed the First Circuit recently rejected this very argument. See Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services, — F.3d —-, 2013 WL 563374 (1st Cir., Feb. 15, 2013).

Likewise, the fact that an assignment of the security instrument may occur after the transfer of the note is not problematic, and makes sense under the MERS model: “[MERS] members often wait until a default or bankruptcy case is filed to have a mortgage or deed of trust assigned to them so that they can take steps necessary to seek stay relief and/or to foreclose…. [T]he reason they wait is that, if a note is paid off eventually, as most presumably are, MERS is authorized to release the [deed of trust] without going to the expense of ever recording any assignments.”Edelstein, 286 P.3d at 254.

Borrowers have also claimed that MERS lacks authority to assign the note. Since MERS typically does not hold notes, language in MERS assignments referencing the note in addition to the mortgage likely reflects a lack of precision. Insofar as MERS did not hold a note the issue is immaterial.

                             Splitting” the Note and Mortgage

Some borrowers have alleged that the naming of MERS as holder of title to the mortgage, while the lender holds title to the note, separates the note from the security instrument thereby rendering assignments void and the security instrument unenforceable. As one court has colorfully described it, the debt is the cow, and the mortgage the cow’s tail—while the debt can survive without the security instrument, the instrument has no independent vitality without the debt. See Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. MERS, 263 p.3d 397, 403 (Utah App. 2011).

As noted, in Massachusetts, those arguments have been squarely rejected as Massachusetts permits the note and mortgage to be held separately. Indeed the District of Massachusetts remarked that the “MERS system fits perfectly into the Massachusetts model for the separation of legal and beneficial ownership of mortgages.” Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services, 826 F. Supp. 2d 352, 371 (D. Mass. 2011), aff’d — F.3d —-, 2013 WL 563374 (1st Cir. Feb. 15, 2013).

This theory has typically been rejected elsewhere as well, as, if successful, it would “confer[] an unwarranted windfall on the mortgagor.” Id. (citing Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Mortgages § 5.4 cmt. a). In Edelstein, 286 P.3d 249, 255 (Nev. 2012), for example, the court held that in Nevada, “to have standing to foreclose, the current beneficiary of the deed of trust and the current holder of the promissory note must be the same.” However, under the MERS system, the parties agree that MERS holds the security instrument while the note is transferred among its members—as long as the two instruments are united in the foreclosing entity prior to foreclosure, the Nevada court held, the foreclosing entity has standing to foreclose in that state.

Along similar lines, some borrowers allege that operation of MERS makes it impossible to identify who the proper noteholder is, because only the security instrument (not the note) was assigned by MERS. “A ‘show me the note’ plaintiff typically alleges a foreclosure is invalid unless the foreclosing entity produces the original note.” Stein v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 662 F. 3d 976, 978 (8th Cir. 2011). Of course, when the foreclosing entity is able to produce the note, the claim is typically defeated on summary judgment, id., and many courts considering “show me the note” arguments in the MERS context have dismissed them as a matter of law without any inquiry into note ownership. E.g., Diessner v. MERS, 618 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1187 (D. Ariz. 2009) (“district courts have routinely held that Plaintiff’s ‘show me the note’ argument lacks merit”) (collecting cases from California, Nevada, and Arizona) (internal quotations omitted).

                             Unrecorded Assignment Theories

Some states (including Massachusetts after November 1, 2012)statutorily require that, in order to bring a non-judicial foreclosure, all assignments of thesecurity instrument must be recorded.  E.g., ORS 86.735(1) (Oregon) (trustee sale may proceed only if “any assignments of the trust deed by the trustee or the beneficiary … are recorded”). In Oregon, a few borrowers have successfully argued that, because the security follows the debt as a matter of law, transfers of the debt while MERS remains lienholder of record result in assignments that go unrecorded, precluding non-judicial foreclosure.  See Niday, 284 P. 3d at 1169 (“any assignments” language in ORS 86.735(1) includes “assignment by transfer of the note, ” and that all such assignments from the initial lender to subsequent lenders must be recorded prior to commencement of a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding).  Niday is under review by the Supreme Court of Oregon, which heard oral argument on January 8, 2013.

Other courts considering the same argument have rejected it. For instance, Minnesota, Idaho, and Arizona have the same statutory requirement that assignments must be recorded, but have not found note transfers to trigger an obligation to create and record an assignment of the corresponding security instrument. E.g., Jackson v. MERS, 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009) (answering “no” to certified question: “Where an entity, such as defendant MERS, serves as mortgagee of record as nominee for a lender and that lender’s successors and assigns and there has been no assignment of the mortgage itself, is an assignment of the ownership of the underlying indebtedness for which the mortgage serves as security an assignment that must be recorded prior to the commencement of a mortgage foreclosure by advertisement under Minn. Stat. ch. 580?”); Homeyer v. Bank of America, N.A.,2012 WL 4105132, at *4 (D. Idaho Aug. 27, 2012) (“Idaho law does not require recording each assignment of a trust deed based upon transfer of the underlying note.”); Ciardi v. Lending Co., Inc., 2010 WL 2079735, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2010) (“Plaintiffs have failed to cite any Arizona statute that requires the recording of a promissory note or even the assignment of a promissory note.”). These cases ruled that a transfer of a promissory note does not create an “assignment” for purposes of those statutes.

                                         4. Securitization Standing

                                           What is Securitization?

Securitization is the packaging of debt into instruments broadly referred to as “mortgage-backed securities”; one court has described it with analogies: “One could analogize this process to taking raw ingredients and combining them to make bread then selling the slices individually, or putting different kinds of meat into a sausage grinder then selling the individual sausages. What is born from this process are new debt instruments, sold on the open market, that have pooled-and-sliced home loans as their ingredients. Different debt instruments work in different ways, but the basic concept is that home loan debt gets repackaged and sold to other investors rather than being held by the bank that originated the loan.” Bisson v. Bank of America, N.A., — F.Supp.2d —-, 2013 WL 325262, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 15, 2013). The securitization market emerged to facilitate the inflow of capital to fund home loans, and it “allows banks to spread mortgage risk across the financial system rather than hold it all themselves.”  Id.

Although securitization has fallen well off its peak of approximately $1 trillion in originations in 2006, it is projected to rise from $4 billion in 2012 to $25-30 billion in 2013.

There are several parties to a securitization agreement, but the borrower is not one of them. A typical securitization arrangement involves the following parties:

· Originator: The originator is the party identified as “lender” on note and mortgage (or deed of trust).

· Depositor: The depositor is either the originator or someone that buys loans from originators and pools them into securities pursuant to a Pooling and Servicing Agreement (“PSA”) to which the depositor, trustee, and master servicer are parties.

· Trust: Entity into which loans are pooled (e.g., “Structured Asset Securities Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-Z”). Sometimes referred to as a “Special Purpose Vehicle,” “Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit” or “REMIC,” orsimply a “Mortgage-Backed Security.”

· Trustee/Custodian: The trustee of the securitization trust (not to be confused with the trustee of a deed of trust, which conducts non-judicial foreclosure sales in deed of trust states) holds loans on behalf of the individual security holders, receiving the borrower’s payments from the loan servicer.

· Individual Investors: Shares of mortgage-backed securities are purchased by investors who, when loans are paid on schedule, ultimately benefit from borrowers’ mortgage payments.

· Master Servicer: The master servicer under the PSA services the individual loans in the pool, interfacing with borrowers, collecting loan payments and transferring them to the trust, and often handling foreclosures and post-foreclosure property management.

           The Effect of Securitization on Foreclosure

Securitization adds complexity to chain of title to the mortgage, and chain of ownership of the note. See, e.g., In re Almeida, 417 B.R. 140, 142-45 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) (describing chain of title to a mortgage securing a securitized note); In re Samuels, 415 B.R. 8, 16-22 (considering challenge to direct assignment of mortgage from originator to trustee, not including an intervening assignment to the trust).

Some borrowers have claimed that insurance contracts or credit default swap agreements preclude default—i.e., the trust was insured against loss, collected the insurance when the borrower defaulted, and should not be allowed to foreclose as well because such foreclosure would grant a “double recovery.” Larota-Florez v. Goldman Sachs Mortg. Co., 719 F. Supp. 2d 636, 642 (E.D. Va. 2010). These arguments have not gained traction. Horvath v. Bank of N.Y., N.A., 641 F.3d 617, 626 n.2 (4th Cir. 2011) (rejecting argument that trustee of securitization trust “should not have been able to foreclose on his property because they did not suffer any losses from his default,” because “that defense does not allow individuals in default on a mortgage to offset their outstanding obligations by pointing to the mortgagee’s unrelated investment income”); Commonwealth, 2011 UT App 232 ¶¶ 3, 10 (rejecting argument “that defendants, having been paid off in the sale of the loan, could not seek a second payoff by foreclosure of the Trust Deed” as a “mere conclusory allegation” that could not sustain a viable claim).

Other borrowers have commissioned “securitization audits,” which purportedly trace the history of the loan in an attempt to cast doubt upon whether the foreclosing entity has standing. These arguments have also generally failed. E.g., Norwood v. Bank of America, 2010 WL 4642447 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 25, 2010); Dye v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 2012 WL 1340220 (D. Or. Apr. 17, 2012) (granting motion to dismiss despite findings of “Mortgage Securitization Audit”). Still other borrowers have challenged the foreclosing entity’s compliance with the PSA. As noted above, borrowers are not parties to these agreements; as such, courts have generally found that borrowers do not have standing to challenge the foreclosing entity’s compliance or lack thereof with it. See, e.g., In re Correia, 452 B.R. 319, 324 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2011) (stating that debtors, who were not parties to the PSA or third-party beneficiaries thereof, lacked standing to challenge defendants’ compliance with PSA); Sami v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2012 WL 967051, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2012) (rejecting claim “that Wells Fargo failed to transfer or assign the note or Deed of Trust to the Securitized Trust by the ‘closing date,’ and that therefore, ‘under the PSA, any alleged assignment beyond the specified closing date’ is void”).

                       Which Securitization Parties May Foreclose?

As discussed above, there are several parties to a securitization. The parties most likely to be involved in a foreclosure are the trustee and servicer. On occasion, foreclosures have been conducted in the name of MERS.

As the party interfacing with the borrowers on a day-to-day basis, the servicer is often in best practical position to handle foreclosure proceedings, but may be required, under some states’ laws, to demonstrate its entitlement to foreclose on behalf of the securitization trustee. So, for example, in Maine, a judicial foreclosure state, the servicer must show its authority to enforce the note. See Bank of America, N.A. v. Cloutier, 2013 WL 453976, at *3 (Me. Feb. 7, 2013) (foreclosure plaintiff must “identify the owner or economic beneficiary of the note and, if the plaintiff is not the owner, to indicate the basis for the plaintiff’s authority to enforce the note pursuant to Article 3-A of the UCC”).

Most non-judicial states do not apply special requirements to loan servicers; the only significant inquiry is whether the trustee of the deed of trust was properly appointed by the beneficiary of record. In Utah, for example, “the statute governing non-judicial foreclosure in Utah does not contain any requirement that the trustee demonstrate his or her authority in order to foreclose. The court declines to create a requirement where the legislature chose not to include one. Therefore, the court holds that, under the terms of the relevant documents and the current statute, [a trustee] is not required to demonstrate its authority to foreclose before initiating a foreclosure proceeding.” Hoverman v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86968, at *16-17 (D. Utah Aug. 4, 2011); see also Trotter, 275 P.3d at 861 (Idaho 2012) (“A trustee is not required to prove it has standing before foreclosing on a deed of trust” as long as “the Appointment of Successor Trustee, Notice of Default, and Notice of Trustee’s Sale complied with the statutoryrequirements and were recorded as specified in the statute”).

The situation can change, however, if the loan becomes involved in a judicial proceeding, such as a bankruptcy. To move for relief from stay in bankruptcy—even in a deed of trust state—a servicer must somehow show authority to enforce the note, though assignment of the security instrument may not be necessary. E.g., In re Tucker, 441 B.R. 638, 645 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2010) (“even if, as here, the deed of trust is recorded in the name of the original lender…, the holder of the note, whoever it is, would be entitled to foreclose, even if the deed of trust had not been assigned to it.”). And, conversely, failure to show authority to enforce the note can lead to denial of motions for relief from stay. E.g., In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) (denying relief from stay to group of movants that included both servicers and securitization trustees because they presented insufficient proof that they owned the notes in question); In re Mims, 438 B.R. 52, 57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (servicer that held title to themortgage but did not show it had been assigned the note was not a “real party in interest” in proceeding to lift stay).

In addition to the servicer, the trustee is often the foreclosing party. As the party holding title to the loan on behalf of the loan investors, the trustee is certainly a proper party to foreclose—if it has the right to do so under state law, which may require that it have been formally assigned the mortgage.

In Massachusetts, for instance—and as discussed more above—the trustee must also hold an assignment of the mortgage. In Ibanez, the trustee commenced foreclosures before they had been assigned the mortgages, and did not record assignments until after the foreclosure was completed. The trustee argued it had already received the note when the loan had been securitized years earlier, and that gave it all it needed to foreclose. The court rejected that argument—Massachusetts, as a “title theory” state, requires assignment of mortgage to foreclose. Securitization may have showed intent to assign mortgages, but was not an actual assignment.

Lien-theory states often take a different position, and do not require a trustee to also hold the mortgage, which is nothing more than the right to enforce a lien. See, e.g., Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 286 P.3d 249, 254 (Nev. 2012);KCB Equities, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. , 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 4418, at *4-5 (Tex. App.—Dallas).

                                       Conclusion

The recent Massachusetts foreclosure case law is likely some what atypical, driven as it has been by some relatively unusual aspects of Massachusetts law.

But the questions the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has been called upon to answer, concerning the necessary relationship between the lien of the security interest, the debt and the foreclosing creditor, are universal and have been the subject of considerable litigation across the country during the recent “foreclosure crisis.” And the questions are controlled for the most part by state law, and state property and foreclosure law are much less uniform than the law governing the notes themselves as negotiable instruments. This paper has identified the principal issues and arguments so practitioners can ask the right questions and try to determine the law in their particular jurisdiction before proceeding.

For More Information How You Can Use Solid Augments To Effective Challenge and Save Your Home Visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

Share this:

  • Twitter
  • Facebook

Like this:

Like Loading...

Understanding Mortgage Fraud ~ A Comprehensive Guide For Homeowners

31 Wednesday Jul 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Banks and Lenders, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, MERS, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Notary, Note - Deed of Trust - Mortgage, Pro Se Litigation, Scam Artists, Securitization, State Court, Your Legal Rights

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Blank endorsement, Business, MER, mortgage, Mortgage loan, Negotiable instrument, Real estate, Securitization

How Homeowners Can Effectively Determine Various Forms of Fraud in their Mortgage Loan With Defective mortgage documents.

A) Why Titles of Home Foreclosure Sale To Buyers Are Often Defective.

                    How Can We Deal With the Problem?

Securitization Flow Chart and Structure

sec1

sec2

B) Transfer of Promissory Note

 – –   Negotiable instrument under Article 3 of the UCC

–  Transferred by:

•   Endorsement

•   Delivery of the instrument

•   Acceptance of delivery

•   Negotiation = Endorsement + Delivery + Acceptance

C) Transfer of Mortgage

– – Mortgage is a real estate instrument

Subject to the statute of frauds

Must comply local real estate law

– Transferred by:

•   Written assignment

•   Delivery of the instrument

•   Acceptance of delivery

•   Recording of transferred mortgage

•   “Assignment” = Written Transfer/Assignment + Delivery + Acceptance + Recording

D)  Notarization Requirements

•   Most state laws require “strict” compliance

•   Signer must admit, by oath or affirmation, in the PRESENCE of notary to having voluntarily signed the document, and signer’s capacity

•   Signer must make the OATH or AFFIRMATION before signing

•   Must identify the signer by a federal or state issued photographic ID

•   Penalties include civil and criminal

•   Felony in most states to take a false acknowledgement

•   Document is invalid with improper notarization

E) The Alphabet Problem With Securitized Transfers

•   The loan closed in the name of the Broker/Lender

•   Broker is funded by Warehouse Line of Credit
Warehouse Lender then sells paper to a Special Investment Vehicle (SIV)

•   SIV then sells paper the Sponsor/Depositor

•   Sponsor or Depositor then transfers to Trust

F)  How Many Transfers

•   A-Transfer: Consumer to Broker

•   B-Transfer: Broker to Warehouse Lender

•   C-Transfer: Warehouse Lender to SIV

•   D-Transfer: SIV to the Depositor or Sponsor

•   E-Transfer: Depositor or Sponsor to Trust

G) How Many Documents

•   Four assignments and deliveries and acceptances of the Mortgage

•   Four endorsements and deliveries of the Note

•   Eight separate notarizations

•   Eight UCC-1 financing statements

•   Four recordings

•   Four filing and transfer fees

H) The Allonge

•   A paper attached to a negotiable note

•   Purpose is to provide written endorsement

•   Only used when back of negotiable instrument is FULL (no room)

•   No need for notarization

•   Simple signature and title sufficient,as with endorsement on note

I) Similar ABCDE Problem With the Mortgage Instrument

•   A. Consumer must sign and deliver to Broker

•   B. Broker must assign and deliver to the Warehouse Lender

•   C. Warehouse Lender must assign and deliver to the SIV

•   D. SIV must assign and deliver to the Depositor

•   E. Depositor must assign and deliver to the Trust

•   And all these assignments must be recorded!

J)  Who Holds the Bearer Paper and Mortgages for the Trust?

•   Normally a third-party bank that provides document custody services to the trust

•   Provides trailing document filings

•   Provides custody chambers for all members

•   Executes assignments for members

•   Execute endorsements for members

•   Executes deliveries and acceptances

•   Provide on-line document status certifications

K) What Does Trust Really Hold?

•   Electronic data with loan numbers & collateral descriptions

•   Electronic image of the original deed of trust

•   Electronic image of the original mortgage note

•   Rights in the documents by way of UCC-1 financing statements and the pooling & servicing agreements

L) The 3d-PartyOutsource Providers

•   Fidelity National Default Services

•   First American National Default Services

•   National Default Exchange, LP(Barrett Burke Owned Entity

•   Promiss Default Solutions(McCalla Raymer Owned Entity)

•   National Trustee Services(Morris Schneider Owned Entity)

•   LOGS Financial Services(Gerald Shapiro Owned Entity)

M) What Do the Outsource Providers Do for the Servicers?

•   Create Assignments

•   Create Allonges

•   Create Endorsements

•   Sign documents as if they were the VP or Secretary of a Bank, SIV, Depositor, Sponsor or the Trust

•   Notarize these documents

•   Create Lost Note Affidavits

•   Create Lost Assignment Affidavits

•   Create Lost Allonge Affidavits

•   Draft court pleadings and notices

•   Draft default correspondence, reports, etc.

N) How to Identify a Defective Endorsement or Allonge

•   Allonge can never be used to transfer a mortgage

•   Allonge can never be used if there is enough room on the original mortgage note for the written endorsement

•   Note is endorsed and not assigned

•   Date of the endorsement is before or after the date of the registration of trust

•   And much more …

O) Defective Endorsements

•   Notary is from Dakota County, Minnesota

•   Notary is from Hennepin County, Minnesota

•   Notary is from Jacksonville, Florida

•   Signor’s company has no offices in notary’s state

•   Date of endorsement and date of notarization are different

•   Signor’s name is stamped –not written in script

•   Signor claims to have signing authority but no authority attached

P) What About the Mortgages?

•   Assignments and delivery follow same model as with the notes

•   MERS is used to avoid registration of each assignment with local register of deeds

•   MERS claims no beneficial interest in the note

•   MERS claims no ownership rights in note or mortgage

•   MERS claims it is nominee for true owner

•   MERS delegates signing authority to all MERS members to sign documents as officers of MERS

•   MERS does not supervise any of it’s designated signors

•   MERS is not registered as a foreign corporation in most states

Q) How Does Trust Establish Lawful Ownership?

•   Unbroken chain of note endorsements and acceptances from A to B, B to C, C to D, and D to E

•   Unbroken chain of mortgage assignments and deliveries and acceptances from A to B, B to C, C to D, and D to E

•   Unbroken chain of UCC-1 financing filings throughout the chain

•   Unbroken chain of recorded mortgage assignments

R) But What Is Filed In a Typical Foreclosure?

•   Complaint alleging that the borrower (A) executed a note and mortgage in favor of the plaintiff (E)

•   Note and mortgage from borrower (A) to originating lender (B) attached

•   Sometimes a purported mortgage assignment from (B) to (E) attached, also purporting to assign the note

•   This assignment always defective, often not recorded

S) The Paper Trail and The Lack of Truth in Labeling

•   Electronic data

•   Fake dates & forged signatures

•   False notarization

•   False assignments

•   Fake endorsements

•   Fraudulent lost note affidavits

•   Recreated documents & records

•   Allonges and more

T)  Is the Trust Really Secured?

•   MAYBE –But it would be very difficult for any securitized trust to produce a valid set of original and unbroken assignments and endorsements

•   Even if the trust produces ALLof the required documents, there is still the issue of the legality of the role of MERS on all required documents for recording

To Learn How You Can Effectively Use Some of These As Solid Arguments to Effectively Defend and Save Your Home Visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

Share this:

  • Twitter
  • Facebook

Like this:

Like Loading...

A Unique Anti-MERS Decision!

09 Tuesday Jul 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Litigation Strategies, MERS, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, Securitization

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Clerk (municipal official), MERS, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Motion (legal), Nelva Gonzales Ramos, Nueces County, Nueces County Texas, Texas

gonzalesjudgenelva

The judge’s denial of MERS/BoA’s Motion to Dismiss in the case of Nueces County v.  MERS et al. is AMAZING!  Not because it’s novel, but because it actually follows the law!   Some of our customers are now using many of these same arguments–any sane, reasonable person would have!  You have got to read this decision!

Normally I might be tempted to highlight a sentence or two from the judge’s order and then mumble through my understanding of it, but with this brilliant order, all that needs to be done is to provide the blockbuster, bombshell quotes from it (for those who may not have the time or inclination to read it).  The quotes themselves are commentary enough, so here goes:

1. “MERS does not, however, hold any beneficial interest in the deeds of trust, and it is not a beneficiary of the deeds of trust.  It is merely an agent or nominee of the beneficiary.” (p. 14)

2. “By having itself designated as the “beneficiary under the security instrument” in the deeds of trust presented to the County Clerk for recordation in the County’s property records, knowing that it would be listed as the grantee of the security interest in the property, it appears that MERS asserted a legal right in the properties.  The Court concludes that, viewing the FAC’s allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, one could plausibly infer that the recorded deeds of trust [naming MERS as “beneficiary”] constituted fraudulent liens or claims against real property or an interest in real property. ” (p. 14)

3.  “While Defendants may not have acted with the actual purpose or motive to cause harm to the County, the FAC alleges that through their creation of MERS, Defendants intended to establish their own recording system in order to avoid having to record transfers or assignments with the County and paying the associated filing fees. (FAC ¶¶ 2, 3, 17.)  Accordingly, one can reasonably infer from the allegations set forth in the FAC that Defendants were aware of the harmful effects the fraudulent liens would have on the County.  That is sufficient to establish intent.” (p. 16)

4. “Accordingly, the Court concludes that the FAC sets forth sufficient facts to give rise to a plausible inference that Defendants made false statements to the County regarding their rights under the deeds of trust and their relationships to the borrowers in the mortgages issued by MERS members.” (p. 22)

5. “County records as having a security interest in the properties.  Accordingly, viewing the allegations of the FAC in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that one could plausibly infer that Defendants made material misrepresentations of fact to Plaintiff in the deeds of trust presented to the County for filing.” (p. 23)

We’re so excited we can hardly contain ourselves!  This judge gets it EXACTLY right!  She even defers to Carpenter v. Longan!  There is obviously a major schism in the Texas federal judiciary, and this judge–Nelva Gonzales Ramos (an Obama appointee)–comes down on exactly the right side!

For More Information How You Can Use Well Crafted Arguments that Resulted to Major Ruling Against MERS Visit http://www.Fightforeclosure.net

Share this:

  • Twitter
  • Facebook

Like this:

Like Loading...

What Homeowners Needs To Know About MERS

03 Wednesday Jul 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Litigation Strategies, MERS, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Securitization, Trial Strategies

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Lien, MERS, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Mortgage law, Mortgage loan, Promissory note, Real property, United States

In 1993, key residential mortgage lending industry participants1 gathered in order to bring then current developments in technology to the forefront in the establishment of a central, electronic registry for tracking interests in mortgage loans, thereby facilitating the transfer, acquisition and identification of those interests for custodians, servicers, investors and other participants in the industry. The goal was to eliminate the need and administrative expense for paper assignments of various mortgage-related rights as much as possible. The result of these efforts was the creation of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, known as the MERS® System.2

Prior to the development of the MERS® System, when an interest in a mortgage loan was transferred, the parties would often change the mortgagee by assigning and recording the security instrument in the land records.3 Mortgage loans were frequently originated in the name of one lender and then transferred to aggregators, which might transfer contractual servicing rights to still another party. In each case, an assignment was recorded so that the purchaser or servicer would appear in the land records4 so that they would receive service of process and other legal notices as the lienholder in the public land records. To complicate matters further, when the servicing remained with the seller, the seller often remained mortgagee of record. If servicing changed hands, the land records were updated only if the new servicer wanted to receive service of process.5 This process could take a long time to complete—up to six months for a modest loan portfolio. County recorder offices struggled to manage the volume of filings, which threatened the integrity of the land title recordation system and jeopardized the ability of consumers to obtain residential mortgage loans. Error rates as high as 33% were common, with assignments recorded in the wrong sequence or missing altogether—clouding title to properties.6

The founders of the MERS® System intended for it to be a system that was open and available to mortgage industry participants, applying information technology to reduce costs and streamline the process, similar to implementation by the securities industry of book entry systems.

The stated benefits of the initially proposed MERS® System concept7 were:

a. Elimination of the need for subsequent assignments of the mortgage lien following closing of a loan.

b. Significant simplification of the loan tracking process.

c. Improvement of the lien release process.

d. Assistance in fraud reduction.

e. Simplification of procedures for delivering legal notices to mortgagees by providing an accurate database of beneficial owners of mortgage rights.

f. Cost reduction through voluntary immobilization of the mortgage note.8

The MERS® System was put into effect with the organization of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS Inc.”), which serves as “mortgagee”, “grantee” or “beneficiary” (depending on state law; we will use the term “mortgagee” to refer to all three) in the security instrument, as nominee for the original lender and subsequent beneficial owners of the secured note. MERS Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of MERSCORP Holdings, Inc. (“MERSCORP Holdings”), which is owned by certain member financial institutions that utilize its services. The industry leaders, having worked hard to develop and achieve these laudable and practical goals, clearly had no idea what would befall the residential mortgage industry, nor how their motives and intentions would be twisted and vilified by critics in the current economic downturn.9

The Principles of MERS

The principles behind the MERS® System were derived from similar principles governing the establishment and function of the book entry registration and transfer system for securities established by The Depository Trust Company (“DTC”). Like the MERS® System, DTC is a member-owned institution that was created for the benefit of broker-dealer participants to facilitate transfers of securities in the securities markets. The benefits to the efficiency of securities transfers brought about by DTC have been clearly demonstrated and widely accepted.10 Much as “Cede & Co.” (the nominee holder of title to securities for DTC) does for beneficial owners of securities in the securities markets, MERS Inc. acts as the nominee of the lender (and its successors and assigns), who are beneficial owners of mortgage loans in the mortgage industry. In so doing, MERS Inc. becomes the mortgagee or beneficiary of record for the related mortgages and/or deeds of trust, for the benefit of the lender participants in the MERS® System.

To understand how the MERS® System operates, it is important to clarify the basic elements of a mortgage loan, which typically consists of two documents: (i) a promissory note between the lender and the borrower that sets forth the terms of the loan and establishes the obligation of the borrower to repay the loan secured by real property; and, (ii) a security instrument, which may be called a “mortgage,” “deed of trust” or a “security deed” (depending on state law; we will use the term “mortgage” to refer to all three), evidencing the pledge of the purchased or refinanced property as collateral or security for the loan. The mortgage is recorded in the real property records in order to provide public notice to third parties of the security interest encumbering the property. Sometimes the terms “note” and “mortgage” have been used interchangeably, resulting in confusion. They represent two different documents with separate but interrelated functions. For that reason, as discussed below and based on long-standing case law and regulations, it is not necessary that both documents be in the name of the same person or entity.

It is also important to understand what the MERS® System is and what it is not. Under the MERS® System, MERS Inc. and its parent, MERSCORP Holdings, serve two distinct functions. First, MERSCORP Holdings owns, operates and maintains the MERS® System, which is an electronic database or registry of mortgage loans that tracks changes in servicing rights and beneficial ownership interests in residential mortgage loans. Second, MERS Inc. serves as the mortgagee or beneficiary of record, or holder of the mortgage lien, in the public land records for the benefit of its members.

MERS Inc. claims no right to retain payments made on the promissory notes. It is not a mortgage banker. MERS Inc. does not take applications, underwrite loans, make decisions on whether to extend credit, collect mortgage payments, hold escrows for taxes and insurance or provide any loan servicing functions. MERS Inc. does not lend money or acquire the right to receive payments on mortgage loans. MERS Inc. does not receive compensation from consumers, just fees from its members.11

The bifurcation of roles and parties was not instituted by MERS Inc., rather it has a long history in mortgage finance and other developing commercial operations and in fact has been incorporated into state laws and regulations as will be discussed below.12 Where the mortgage (or an assignment thereof) names MERS Inc. as the mortgagee (or assignee of the mortgagee), then MERS Inc. has legal title13 to the real estate interest serving as collateral for the repayment of the loan, and the owner(s) of the note owns the beneficial interest in the loan secured by the mortgage. In such capacity, MERS Inc. remains the mortgagee of record, and pursuant to its contractual agreements with its members who are owners of the notes or servicers acting on behalf of the owners, any transfer of ownership or servicing must be communicated to the MERS® System to enable it to track such changes in order to provide the owner and servicer with filings and communications that MERS Inc. receives in its capacity as mortgagee of record. The borrower deals with the loan servicer—not MERS Inc.—in all matters of payment, modification or default on the loan.

In mortgage (non-deed of trust) states, the operative document defining MERS Inc.’s rights and functions is the mortgage. MERS Inc. is neither a party to, nor named in, the promissory note. Representative language can be found in a typical form of mortgage naming MERS Inc. as the original mortgagee14, which identifies three parties: the borrower, the lender and MERS Inc. MERS Inc. is further described as a separate corporation that is acting as mortgagee solely as a nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns. Under the mortgage, the borrower mortgages, grants and conveys to MERS Inc. (solely as nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns) and to the successors and assigns of MERS Inc., the property described therein. Furthermore, the mortgage includes an acknowledgment from the borrower that MERS Inc. holds only legal title15 to the interests granted by the borrower, but if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS Inc. (as nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the rights to foreclose and sell the mortgaged property; and to take any action required of the lender, including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling the mortgage. Thus, the express language of the mortgage instrument authorizes MERS Inc. to act on behalf of the lender in serving as the legal titleholder and exercising any of the rights granted to the lender thereunder.

In deed of trust states, the operative document defining MERS Inc.’s rights and functions is the deed of trust. Representative language can be found in a typical form of deed of trust naming MERS Inc. as the original beneficiary16, which identifies four parties: the borrower, the lender, the trustee and MERS Inc. MERS Inc. is described as a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns. In addition, MERS Inc. and the successors and assigns of MERS Inc. are further designated as the beneficiary of the deed of trust (solely as nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns). Under the deed of trust, the borrower grants and conveys to the trustee, in trust, with power of sale, the property described therein. Furthermore, the deed of trust includes an acknowledgment from the borrower that MERS Inc. holds only legal title to the interests granted by the borrower, but if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS Inc. (as nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the rights to foreclose and sell the property; and to take any action required of the lender, including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling the deed of trust. Thus, the express language of the deed of trust also authorizes MERS Inc. to act on behalf of the lender in serving as the legal titleholder and exercising any of the rights granted to the lender thereunder.

The Myths of MERS

In this section, we will address some of the more prevalent myths surrounding the MERS® System that have been perpetuated by various MERS’ critics and we will explain the facts and legal analysis that clarify and dispel such myths.

MYTH: The MERS® System is fraudulent and illegal.

FACT: The MERS® System is based upon sound legal principles and its legal validity has been upheld by a vast majority of the courts.17 The MERS® System relies on established principles of real property law, the law of negotiable instruments, and basic contract law that will be discussed herein.18 Rules governing security interests in personal property under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) also support the legal model for the MERS® System.19 Courts have long recognized the validity of using a nominee or agent as mortgagee as may appear in the mortgage instrument for recording purposes on behalf of the note owner.20 Agency relationships may be established by private contract, and common law principles of principal and agent shall supplement the rules governing secured transactions pursuant to UCC §1-103(b). Under Article 9 of the UCC, it is not necessary to record a mortgage assignment when the mortgage note is transferred or sold.21 Moreover, under real estate law, legal title can remain in a mortgagee (such as MERS Inc.) without invalidating the security instrument even though another party owns or holds the related promissory note.22 Significantly, the original recorded mortgage remains in place and provides sufficient notice of the lien to third parties, which is the primary purpose of such lien recording provisions.23

State legislatures have also recognized the validity and appropriateness of the MERS® System. For example, as a result of questions raised about the MERS® System, the Minnesota Legislature passed an amendment to the Minnesota Recording Act that expressly permits nominees to record “[a]n assignment, satisfaction, release, or power of attorney to foreclose.”24 The amendment, frequently called “the MERS statute,” went into effect on August 1, 2004.25

The Minnesota “MERS statute” provides that:

“An assignment, satisfaction, release, or power of attorney to foreclose is entitled to be recorded in the office of the county recorder or filed with the registrar of titles and is sufficient to assign, satisfy, release, or authorize the foreclosure of a mortgage if:

(1) a mortgage is granted to a mortgagee as nominee or agent for a third party identified in the mortgage, and the third party’s successors and assigns;

(2) a subsequent assignment, satisfaction, release of the mortgage, or power of attorney to foreclose the mortgage, is executed by the mortgagee or the third party, its successors or assigns; and

(3) the assignment, satisfaction, release, or power of attorney to foreclose is in recordable form.”26

In addition, under the Texas Property Code, the definition of “mortgagee” expressly includes a “book entry system,” which is defined as a national book entry system for registering a beneficial interest in a security instrument that acts as a nominee for the grantee, beneficiary, owner, or holder of the security instrument and its successors and assigns. 27 The definition of “book entry system” has been construed by several Texas courts to specifically include the MERS® System.28

MYTH: MERS Inc. lacks authority to act as mortgagee/beneficiary of record.

FACT: The authority of MERS Inc. to act as mortgagee/beneficiary of record is delegated by MERS’ members pursuant to well-established principles of property and agency law. Under general agency law, an agent has authority to act on behalf of its principal where the principal “manifests assent” to the agent “that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests or otherwise consents to so act.”29 Under the terms of the FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Security Instrument form of mortgage, MERS Inc. has the right to exercise any or all rights of the lender and its successors and assigns, including, but not limited to, the rights to foreclose and sell the mortgaged property, and to take any action required of the lender including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling the mortgage. Courts throughout the country have recognized that a lender who holds the beneficial interest in a loan may lawfully designate MERS Inc. as its nominee to hold legal title to the mortgage and serve as mortgagee of record, and have routinely enforced the provisions of mortgages in which MERS Inc. is named the mortgagee of record.30

MYTH: MERS Inc. does not have standing or authority to foreclose or seek relief from an automatic stay in bankruptcy.31

FACT: The concept of standing means that a party must have a legal interest or claim or the right to seek judicial enforcement of an obligation or action for relief in order to initiate a lawsuit or proceed in a legal action. Numerous courts have considered whether MERS Inc. is a real party in interest with standing to foreclose on a property or to move for relief from the automatic stay in bankruptcy (which prohibits creditors from pursuing any remedies upon a debtor’s bankruptcy filing). MERS Inc. has such interest and authority both (1) by express contractual terms, and (2) by law. First, the form of mortgage that appoints MERS as mortgagee and the MERS member agreement each grants MERS Inc. the authority to take action on behalf of a lender and its successors and assigns, including the enforcement of the rights and remedies under the mortgage. Specifically, the express language of a typical mortgage (where MERS Inc. is the mortgagee) provides that “if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS Inc. (as nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the [mortgaged property]; and to take any action required of lender including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this [mortgage].” Second, Section 5.4(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) specifically provides that “[a] mortgage may be enforced only by, or on behalf of, a person who is entitled to enforce the obligation the mortgage secures”.32 Courts throughout the country have routinely and consistently held that MERS Inc. has both standing and authority to foreclose and seek relief on behalf of the beneficial owners of mortgage loans.33 The court in In re Huggins identified four reasons why MERS Inc. has standing to seek relief from an automatic stay in bankruptcy. “First, MERS is acting as nominee for [the noteholder], which holds the note . . . second, MERS is the record mortgagee under the Mortgage with the powers expressly set forth therein, including the power of sale . . . third, the Massachusetts foreclosure statute expressly authorizes the exercise of sale powers by a mortgagee, or person authorized to sell, precisely the position occupied by MERS . . . finally, a denial of MERS foreclosure right as mortgagee would lead to anomalous and perhaps inequitable results, to wit, if MERS cannot foreclose though named as mortgagee, then either [the noteholder] can foreclose though not named as a mortgagee or no one can foreclose, outcomes not reasonably or demonstrably intended by the parties.”34

However, there are also several minority decisions that, in some form, have taken issue with MERS Inc.’s authority to foreclose.35 None of them, to our knowledge, has invalidated a mortgage for which MERS is the nominee, and none of these decisions has challenged MERS Holdings’ ability to operate as a central system to track changes in the ownership and servicing of loans. Several decisions adverse to MERS Inc. have been reversed upon appeal, vacated or clarified by other court decisions.36

Notwithstanding the foregoing, in July 2011, MERS revised its Rules of Membership to prohibit the initiation of foreclosures in the name of MERS Inc. Under the revised rule37, MERS members are required to cause MERS Inc., through a MERS signing officer, to execute an assignment of the mortgage lien from MERS Inc. to the servicer, investor or a third party, prior to the initiation of a foreclosure proceeding or the commencement of an action for relief of an automatic stay in bankruptcy.

MYTH: The MERS® System creates an impermissible “split” between the mortgage and the note.

FACT: There is no “split” between the mortgage and the note because MERS Inc. holds the mortgage as mortgagee and nominee or agent for the Lender and its successors and assigns.38 MERS Inc. only appears in the security instrument and acts as a mortgagee of record in a nominee or agency capacity for the beneficial owner of the note.39

While litigants and critics continue to raise the issue that the use of MERS Inc. results in a purported impermissible split of the note from the mortgage, thereby rendering both unenforceable, their arguments have been consistently rejected by the courts. For example, in a recent Ninth Circuit case, Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc., et al.,40 the plaintiff class alleged conspiracies by their respective lenders and others to use MERS Inc. to commit fraud as a sham beneficiary, among other things. The court found that plaintiffs failed to identify any representations made about the MERS® System and its role in their loans that were false and material; none of the plaintiffs’ allegations indicated that they were misinformed either about MERS Inc.’s role as a beneficiary or the possibility that their loans would be resold and tracked through the MERS® System; and they failed to show that the designation of MERS Inc. as beneficiary caused them any injury by, for example, affecting the terms of their loans, their ability to repay the loans or their obligations as borrowers.41 The court reviewed the express language of the documents the borrowers signed containing the substance of disclosure explained above and found that by executing the documents the plaintiffs agreed to the terms and were on notice of their content.42 “[T]he notes and deeds [mortgages] are not irreparably split: the split only renders the mortgage unenforceable if MERS or the trustee, as nominal holders of the deeds, are not agents of the lenders.”43 This distinction goes to the crux of the argument and the MERS critics. If a debt represented by a note is secured by collateral, then such collateral may not be separated from the note; although it may be held in the name of a different party as nominee or agent for the owner of the note; that is, the security follows the debt and in fact is released upon payment in full of such debt. MERS Inc. does not contend it acts in any capacity other than as mortgagee holding as agent or nominee for the lender. In a similar vein, recently a multi-district litigation (MDL) case involving MERS Inc. in Arizona was dismissed, citing in part the plaintiffs’ express agreement in the mortgages that MERS Inc. is the lienholder of record as agent for the lender and its assigns.44

The use of an agent to hold legal title in the mortgage while another holds a beneficial interest in the mortgage loan has a long history in the residential housing industry. For example, starting in the 1930s, mortgage lenders would originate and sell mortgage loans to investors under the Federal Housing Administration’s (“FHA”) insured loan program. The originating lenders would service and hold the mortgage loans, as mortgagee of record on behalf of the beneficial owners, whose names were not recorded in the county land records. Prior to the advent of residential mortgage securitization in the 1960s, it was common for two or more savings and loan associations to acquire a portfolio of mortgage loans and take participation interests therein. The participated mortgage loans were typically serviced by a mortgage loan servicer, as mortgagee of record on behalf of the various participants, whose names were also not recorded in the county land records. With the development of residential mortgage securitization in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Ginnie Mae, under its guarantee agreement, became the equitable owner of pooled loans while the originator or aggregator of the loans either remained or became the mortgagee of record and serviced the loans as an independent contractor for the benefit of investors in the Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed securities.45 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac followed suit using a similar model.

In addition, the Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) confirms that an agent may be used to enforce a mortgage on behalf of a note owner and even instructs that “[c]ourts should be vigorous in seeking to find such [an agency] relationship, since the result is otherwise likely to be a windfall for the mortgagor and the frustration of [the note owner’s] expectation of security.”46

Moreover, even the U.S. Bankruptcy Code accounts for this bifurcated structure by making it clear that a mortgage that is recorded in the name of a servicer that becomes a debtor in bankruptcy while it holds bare legal title to the mortgage does not become an asset of that servicer/debtor’s bankruptcy estate: “property in which a debtor holds . . . only legal title and not an equitable interest, such as a mortgage secured by real property, or an interest in such mortgage, sold by the debtor but as to which the debtor retains legal title to service or supervise . . . becomes property of the estate . . . only to the extent of the debtor’s legal title to such property, but not to the extent of any equitable interest in such property that the debtor does not hold.”47

MYTH: A transfer of the note requires a corresponding assignment of the mortgage.

FACT: A transfer of the mortgage note does not require a corresponding assignment of the mortgage. Under the MERS® System, MERS Inc. is named in the mortgage as nominee for the lender and its successors and assigns. The UCC, which has been adopted, with slight variations, by all 50 states, governs the transfer or sale of notes (whether they are determined to be negotiable or non-negotiable).48 However, the recordation of mortgages and requirements for their enforcement are governed by real estate law. This bifurcation of applicable law does not render their application mutually exclusive; rather, both the UCC and applicable real estate law in the respective jurisdiction must be complied with in order to have an enforceable note representing an obligation to pay, and an enforceable lien on the real property that is collateral for the note.

Under the UCC, a note sale or transfer is effective and enforceable upon meeting three criteria: (i) the buyer giving value, (ii) to a seller with rights in the note and (iii) execution of a security or purchase agreement that either describes the note or is accompanied by possession of the note.49

Once the note is sold or transferred such that the conveyance is enforceable or “attaches” as described above, there is a corresponding automatic transfer of the seller’s interest in the mortgage to the buyer. Section 9.203(g) of the UCC states “The attachment of a security interest [which includes the right of a buyer of the note] in a right to payment or performance secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property is also attachment of a security interest in the security interest, mortgage or other lien.”50 These UCC rules do not address priorities of the security interest in the underlying property, enforcement of the mortgage, or the impact of filing or non-filing.51 Those issues are governed by the real estate law of the jurisdiction in which the property is located. But it is clear that under the UCC, the transfer or sale of the note includes conveyance of seller’s interest in the underlying mortgage.52 In order for the buyer of the note to be comfortable about its ability to foreclose or take any other necessary steps to realize on the collateral, it must have a contractual relationship with the mortgagee of record. Under the MERS® System, that contractual relationship exists, and MERS Inc. has been granted the right and authority to act on behalf of the owner(s) of the note as well as the servicer of the note. The roles are outlined by contract among the parties which specifies their duties and responsibilities under both the UCC framework as well as the real property recordation system.

MYTH: The MERS® System makes it harder for home owners to identify the servicer and beneficial owners of their mortgage loans.

FACT: The MERS® System actually makes it easier for home owners to identify the servicer and beneficial owner of loans that are registered on the MERS® System. The servicer is the party primarily responsible for negotiating loan modifications and conducting foreclosure proceedings. If a mortgage loan has been securitized, the “owner” of the mortgage loan will typically be a trust, which under the terms of the related pooling and servicing agreement, has delegated all loan servicing authority to the servicer. Consequently, the servicer is the crucial contact for homeowners seeking to modify or renegotiate the terms of their loans due to financial hardships, and the identity of the servicer is readily available to troubled borrowers if their mortgage loan is registered with the MERS® System. The MERS® System maintains a toll-free number (888.679.6377) and an Internet website (www.mers-servicerid.org) that enable borrowers to identify the servicer, and in most cases, the beneficial owner of their mortgage loan, if their mortgage loan is registered on the MERS® System.53 New servicers and beneficial owners of a loan are required to identify themselves on the MERS® System within days of the actual transfer of interests.

In addition, homeowners have other statutorily-mandated access to such information. Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)54, mortgage loan servicers are required to notify borrowers when the servicing of their loan changes, and under recent changes to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)55, transferees of mortgage loans are now required to notify borrowers when the ownership of their mortgage loan changes. This seems axiomatic since otherwise the borrower would not know where to send payments. Furthermore, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act56 amended RESPA to require mortgage loan servicers to respond to qualified written requests from borrowers for the identity and address of the owner, or assignee, of their loan within ten business days after receipt thereof.57 These legislative and regulatory provisions validate and preserve the goals and intent of the original MERS system concept.

MYTH: MERS signing officers lack authority to act on behalf of MERS Inc.

FACT: MERS Inc. is a Delaware corporation and its actions are governed by its bylaws and the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). Under the DGCL, there is no requirement that an officer of a corporation be an employee of that corporation.58 In addition, under the DGCL, there is no requirement that individuals serving as officers of a corporation be employed or compensated by that corporation.

Under Delaware law, a corporation may by board resolution appoint officers to carry out the corporation’s business.59 In addition, Section 142(a) of the DGCL provides that “any number of offices may be held by the same person unless the certificate of incorporation or bylaws otherwise provide.”

Since MERS Inc. has no employees, a majority of the actions taken by MERS Inc. in its capacity as mortgagee under mortgages and/or deeds of trust are taken by designated officers commonly referred to as “certifying or signing officers.” The signing officers are generally officers of MERS’ members that are responsible for carrying out servicing functions on behalf of such MERS members.

The MERS Inc. signing officers are appointed pursuant to a corporate resolution, duly adopted pursuant to authority granted by the Board of Directors of MERS Inc. Pursuant to the corporate resolution, these signing officers are appointed as assistant secretaries, assistant vice presidents and vice presidents of MERS Inc. and their authority is limited to: (1) executing lien releases, (2) executing mortgage assignments, (3) executing foreclosure documents, (4) executing proofs of claims and other bankruptcy related documents (e.g., motions for relief of the automatic stay), (5) executing modification and subordination agreements needed for refinancing activities, (6) endorsing over checks made payable to MERS Inc. (in error) by borrowers, (7) taking such other actions and executing documents necessary to fulfill the MERS member’s servicing duties, and (8) taking such ministerial actions and, in such ministerial capacity, executing and delivering all such instruments and documents as the officer(s) of MERS Inc. deem necessary or appropriate in order to effectuate fully the purpose of each and all of the foregoing powers, in each case only with respect to the loan owned by the related member.60 In order to be eligible for appointment as a signing officer of MERS Inc., a person must demonstrate a basic knowledge of the MERS® System and pass an annual certifying examination administered by MERSCORP Holdings.

We are not aware of any relevant case law that would suggest that the MERS Inc. business model of appointing signing officers is either inappropriate or illegal. In fact, several courts have upheld the MERS Inc. signing officer business model.61

The propriety of the MERS Inc. signing officer business model has also been upheld in an ethics opinion from the New York State Bar Association62 which found that no conflict of interest exists in violation of New York state bar professional conduct rules when an attorney serves as an officer of the mortgagee of record/assignor for the purpose of executing a mortgage assignment and also represents the assignee in the prosecution of the subsequent foreclosure action.

Courts have consistently upheld the authority of MERS Inc., in its capacity as mortgagee, to assign mortgages.63 When plaintiffs have challenged the authority of MERS Inc. signing officers to execute assignments in connection with foreclosure or bankruptcy proceedings, courts have consistently found that such plaintiffs lack standing to challenge such assignments because they are not parties thereto and are not the intended beneficiaries thereof.64 Significantly, such plaintiffs have failed to articulate any correlation between the alleged lack of authority and a resulting harm to the plaintiff occasioned thereby.

MYTH: The MERS® System creates a cloud on real estate titles.

FACT: The servicer (acting on behalf of the beneficial owner(s) of the note) is the entity responsible for initiating and completing foreclosure actions and, as such, the servicer (not MERS Inc.) is the entity that is responsible for assuring that mortgage assignments and mortgage notes are properly assigned to the real party in interest (i.e., the servicer or the note owner) prior to the commencement of foreclosure proceedings. MERS® System members have a substantial interest in providing accurate and current information because they rely on the MERS® System to obtain current information about note owners and servicers, as well as to obtain or receive legal notices served on MERS Inc. as mortgagee of record.65 Using MERS Inc. as the mortgagee of record actually reduces the possibility of missed or incorrect assignments that would create an unclear “chain of title” as to who is the actual mortgagee or beneficiary of the security instrument. When MERS Inc. serves as mortgagee, the recorded chain of title to the mortgage starts with MERS Inc. at origination and ends with MERS Inc. when it either releases the lien or assigns the lien to another entity.66 The MERS® System also streamlines the lien release process, reducing research time and recording fees.

MYTH: The MERS® System usurps the function of local recording officials to track changes in ownership of real property.

FACT: The land records have never been an authoritative source for who owns beneficial interests in and servicing rights to mortgages.67 The primary purpose of land records was not to track mortgage loan ownership rights, but to provide public notice of liens filed against the property in order to protect the lienholder (and not the debtor).68 A mortgage and any assignment of mortgage is typically recorded to protect the lienholder, and is generally not required by the county; rather there are incentives to record and disincentives for not recording.69 When a loan is registered on the MERS® System, the MERS member is required to record the mortgage (or assignment of mortgage) in the name of MERS Inc., at the loan owner’s expense, in the appropriate recording office.70 Thus, the public is placed on notice that MERS Inc. is the mortgagee of record for the benefit of its members, and MERS Inc., in its capacity as lienholder, holds a perfected security interest in the real property that is valid against other lenders, judgment creditors or potential purchasers of the mortgaged property. More importantly, the role of the MERS® System is not to record or track changes in ownership of real property; rather the MERS® System tracks non-recordable contract interests in servicing rights and ownership of promissory notes secured by the related property for the benefit of MERS Inc. members. Consequently, the land records system continues to perform the services of recording ownership changes without usurpation by MERS Inc., and MERS Inc. performs the functions its members designed and created, both of which facilitate real estate ownership and financing by fulfilling their separate but interrelated roles.

One court considering the allegation of usurpation of a government function concluded: “Since the law does not require payment of a recording fee when new assignments are not recorded, and since the public is not using the ‘MERS private recording system’ to determine the true nature of encumbrances upon real estate, MERS is not usurping any governmental authority or power.”71

MYTH: The MERS® System is a revenue evasion tool that deprives counties of needed revenues.

FACT: Recording fees are paid upon filing the original mortgage naming MERS Inc. as mortgagee. The MERS® System merely reduces the need to pay additional recording fees associated with subsequent transfers of mortgage loans or mortgage loan servicing rights among MERS members. Avoidance of these fees (which is not illegal) does not constitute revenue evasion. Fees are paid in exchange for a service. If the service is not required or necessary, then there is no “lost” revenue.72 As even one of the most vocal critics of MERS acknowledges, the real property records have become voluminous and difficult and expensive to search.73 Many county recording offices have not kept up with advances in technology or efficiency as other industries have, and simply were unable to efficiently and effectively handle the increasing volume of mortgage transactions as access to capital markets gave more consumers the ability to buy homes. Thus spawned the innovations and creativity of the private market and the development of the MERS® System. However, it is also important to note that the transaction volume for which county recorders would receive a fee should not decrease due to the use of the MERS® System from pre-securitization levels. MERS facilitates transfers of the note from originator to aggregator to depositor to trust—a minimum of three transfers in a short period of time—that did not occur prior to the development of the securitization market. A new mortgage or a release of mortgage must still be recorded any time that the borrower refinances or pays off her mortgage. Therefore, filing fees will still be paid for the several ongoing transactions requiring a filing in the public records. In a recent case brought against MERS Inc. by a county to recover damages for alleged intentional failure to record assignments and claiming unjust enrichment and civil conspiracy, the District Court held that, “There is simply no requirement to record assignments under Iowa law. To the extent the County’s claims rely on such a requirement, they fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”74

MYTH: The MERS® System created or enabled securitization.

FACT: Securitization existed long before the development of the MERS® System. The earliest securitized transactions date back to the early 1970s and were the sales of pooled mortgage loans by the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae). These transactions were followed by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) in the early 1980s. The MERS® System did not originate until the mid-1990s. It is true that the MERS® System has facilitated the ease and efficiency with which securitization transactions are conducted, and this has been positive for bringing affordable financing options to more people. Securitization itself is not an evil to be vilified or destroyed. As Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said in announcing the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) in February 2009, “No financial recovery plan will be successful unless it helps restart securitization markets for sound loans made to consumers and businesses.”75

The Merits of MERS

To hear some commentators characterize the MERS® System,76 one might think that it is a nefarious scheme of the financial oligarchy to obfuscate real property records, deprive tax-paying citizens of knowledge concerning the ownership of their mortgage loans and divest overburdened county recorders of direly needed revenue from recording fees. That is simply not the case. The MERS® System is a perfectly legal and valid system for the electronic registration and tracking of beneficial ownership of mortgage loans and servicing rights. It was created by some of the leading participants in the mortgage industry77 for the purpose of facilitating the operation of the secondary mortgage market. It has substantially increased the efficiency of mortgage loan transfers within the secondary mortgage market, and has played a significant role in establishing the U.S. housing market, despite recent troubles, as the envy of the free market world.78

Since its inception in 1995, the MERS® System has become a critical component of the American mortgage finance industry.79 More than 74 million mortgages have been recorded in the name of MERS Inc., of which 27 million are currently active. The MERS® System has streamlined the way residential and commercial mortgage loans are sold, traded and securitized by eliminating the need to prepare and record separate assignments of the mortgage lien. By doing so, the MERS® System has saved consumers, investors, and the mortgage industry millions of dollars each year in recording fees and related costs as well as reduced the problems and errors associated with multiple filings, and reduced delays in transactions.80

In addition to providing an electronic registration and tracking system to track conveyances of mortgage loans and servicing rights in the secondary market, the MERS® System creates accountability and transparency, helps reduce recordation costs (which may ultimately benefit the borrower), reduces the risk of errors in recordkeeping, eliminates breaks in the chain of title and makes it easier to keep track of liens as loans are sold to other investors.81 In addition, the MERS® System fills an information void that county recorders cannot provide—the identity of the current servicer and beneficial owner of the mortgage loan. Furthermore, the current and easily accessible information on the MERS® System assists homeowners, lenders and title insurers in arranging for consolidations, loan modifications, payoff statements, deeds in lieu of foreclosure, short sales and releases.

The MERS Mortgage Identification Number, or “MIN”, which assigns a unique identifying number to each loan for the life of the loan, and the MERS® System have been fully integrated into the U.S. mortgage loan industry, and together they are the single most important existing tools for tracking loan level data in the home loan process.82 Through its use of MIN, the MERS® System helps:

Identify for homeowners the servicer and, in most cases, the beneficial owner of their mortgage loans;
Investors and credit rating agencies analyze the credit quality of mortgaged-backed securities;
Regulators monitoring compliance with the law;
Public agencies track housing and economic trends;
Local governments identify the parties responsible for maintaining vacant properties in connection with neighborhood preservation efforts;83
Keep distressed borrowers in their homes by speeding up the modification process; and
Law enforcement officials fight fraud by tracking down criminals who attempt to obtain multiple loans secured by the same property.

Conclusion

While the recent recession brought one of the worst economic calamities experienced in several generations, it is disingenuous to attribute its cause, even in part, to a process and structure designed to facilitate efficiency and home ownership and bring about modernization long overdue in the mortgage finance industry, particularly one that had been modeled after a similar system successfully implemented by DTC in the securities industry. Homeowners who are facing foreclosure for failure to pay their respective mortgage loans may present a sympathetic cause, but the fact of the matter is that many participants in the residential mortgage process share in the blame for an overheated and unsustainable market. But none of this should overshadow the legitimate benefits brought to the mortgage industry by the MERS® System.

In sum, through thousands of lawsuits, many of which were held to be without merit, MERS Inc. has established that the process and structure of the MERS® System are based upon sound legal principles. Mistakes have been made, and improvements to the process have been implemented to ensure that the MERS® System will continue to serve and advance the goal of providing efficient and effective mortgage tracking. But those detractors who allege deceptive practices, flawed systems, and conspiracies have been, and will continue to be, proven without merit. In some cases, they seem to be more interested in obfuscating the issue of a lender pursuing its rightful claim to collateral upon default of a loan rather than bringing transparency or improvement to a process that, while not perfect, functioned fairly well. In those areas where deficiencies have been discovered or improvements identified, MERS Inc. and its members have been quick to respond. We would all do well to learn the lessons from the recent fiscal calamity and work to bring about prudent and appropriate changes to rebuild a vibrant and transparent mortgage finance market that continues to include, and benefit from, the MERS® System.

1. Participants included the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).

2. See Phyllis K. Slesinger & Daniel McLaughlin, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 31 Idaho Law Review 805 (1995).

3. Allen H. Jones, Setting the Record Straight on MERS, MORTGAGE BANKING 34 (May 2011).

4. Slesinger & Mclaughlin, supra note 2, at 809.

5. Jones, supra note 3 at 36.

6. R.K. Arnold, Yes, There is Life on MERS, 11 PROB. & PROP. 33, 34 (1997); Jones, supra note 3, at 36.

7. Slesinger & Mclaughlin, supra note 2, at 817.

8. Id. Under the initial MERS concept, the mortgage note would be immobilized through the development of standardized document custodian eligibility requirements or ratings to increase confidence in any particular custodian. Due to resistance by mortgage loan servicers, this aspect of the MERS concept was eliminated.

9. See Christopher L. Peterson, Two Faces: Demystifying the Mortgage Electronic Registration System’s Land Title Theory, 53 William and Mary Law Review 1 (October 2011); see also, Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 University of Cincinnati Law Review 4 (Summer 2010); David. E. Woolley and Lisa D. Herzog, MERS: The Unreported Effects of Lost Chain of Title on Real Property Owners, 8 Hastings Business Law Journal, 365 (Summer 2012).

10. According to its website (www.dtcc.com/about/business), DTC provides custody and asset servicing for more than 3.6 million securities issues from the United States and 121 other countries and territories, valued at US$36.5 trillion. In 2010, DTC settled nearly US$1.66 quadrillion in securities transactions.

11. See Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance, 704 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Neb. Oct. 21, 2005).

12. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.

13. As described below, in deed of trust states, the trustee technically holds legal title to the property, in trust, and MERS Inc. is named as beneficiary in the deed of trust, in a nominee capacity for the owner of the note. For purposes of this discussion, it is important to understand that one party may hold legal title to a mortgage while another party owns the beneficial interest therein. See infra note 15 and notes 38-47 and accompanying text.

14. A sample form of the FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Instrument with MERS as original mortgagee is available on the FHLMC’s website at http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifmers.html.

15. According to BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), “legal title” is “a [form of] title that evidences apparent authority but does not necessarily signify full and complete title or beneficial interest” in property. This differs from equitable title, or beneficial ownership, which gives the holder thereof the right to the use and economic benefit of the property.

16. A sample form of the FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Instrument with MERS as original beneficiary is available on the FHLMC’s website at http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifmers.html.

17. See, e.g., MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81 (N.Y. 2006) (N.Y. court of appeals found that recording MERS instruments did not violate New York recording statutes and ordered the county clerk to accept MERS mortgages, MERS assignments and other MERS instruments); Jackson v. Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009) (court held that case law establishes that a party can hold legal title to the security instrument without owning the promissory note; the cases demonstrate that an assignment of only the promissory note, which carries with it an equitable assignment of the security instrument, is not an assignment of legal title that must be recorded for purposes of a foreclosure [under the Minnesota statutory foreclosure scheme]); In re Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) Litigation, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1029 (D. Ariz. 2010) (court dismissed plaintiff’s claims alleging that the MERS system was fraudulent and that the MERS system facilitated fraudulent activity); In re Tucker, 441 B.R. 638 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2010) (finding that the language of the deed of trust clearly authorized MERS to act on behalf of the lender in serving as the legal title holder); Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc., et. al., 656 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011) (court upheld that MERS is a legitimate system for tracking transfers of home mortgage loans and that MERS’ interposition as record title holder to the deed of trust does not invalidate the transaction); Taylor v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 44 So. 3d 618 (Fla. 5th DCCA 2010) (found that the mortgage granted to MERS legal status as mortgagee, which MERS could assign to the foreclosing bank under the UCC); Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Bellestri, 2010 WL 2720802 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (finding that Bellistri’s failure to provide notice to MERS violated MERS’ constitutional due process rights); Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Traxler, 2010-Ohio-3940 (court recognized MERS’ authority to assign mortgage when designated as both nominee and mortgagee); Fuller v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys. Inc., United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division (Case No. 3:11-cv-1153-J-20MCR) (June 27, 2012) (court found that “MERS has not committed an unlawful act, or a lawful act by unlawful means” and that “the Florida courts have consistently affirmed the use of MERS as the designated mortgagee of record and the principle that MERS may serve as mortgagee or as nominee for the lender and the lender’s successors and assigns.”); Smith v. Saxon Mortgage, 446 Fed. Appx. 239 (11th Cir. 2011) (appellate court found that district court correctly held that the Security Deed granted MERS the power of sale and the authority to assign the security deed); Volkes v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, 2012 WL 642673 (appellate court found that district court correctly held that the MERS assignment was valid).

18. Clark and Clark, MERS Under Attack: Perspective on Recent Decisions from Kansas and Minnesota, CLARKS’ SECURED TRANSACTIONS MONTHLY, February 2010, at p.2.

19. Id.

20. Id. at 2, citing In re Cushman Bakery, 526 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 937 (1976). See also, Residential Funding Co., v. Saurman, 490 Mich. 909; 805 N.W.2d 183 (Mich. 2011) (“It has never been necessary that the mortgage should be given directly to the beneficiaries. The security is always made in trust to secure obligations, and the trust and the beneficial interest need not be in the same hands. The choice of a mortgagee is a matter of convenience.”) (quoting Adams v. Niemann, 46 Mich. 135, 137 (Mich. 1881)); Jackson v. MERS, Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009) (“A party can hold legal title to the security instrument without holding an interest in the promissory note.”); Boruchoff v. Ayvasian, 323 Mass. 1, 10 (Mass. 1948) (“[W]here a mortgage and the obligation secured thereby are held by different persons, the mortgage is regarded as an incident to the obligation, and, therefore, held in trust for the benefit of the owner of the obligation.”); First Nat’l Bank v. Nat’l Grain Corp., 131 A. 404, 406-07 (Conn. 1925) (“[A] mortgage may be held for the security of the real creditor, whether he is the party named as mortgagee or some other party, for the provisions of a mortgage are not necessarily personal to the mortgagee named. The real party in interest may be an assignee of the mortgagee or someone subrogated to his rights under the mortgage, or even a third person not answering either of these descriptions.”); Commercial Germania Trust and Sav. Bank v. White, 81 SO. 753, 754 (La. 1919) (“a mortgagor may make a mortgage in favor of a nominal . . . mortgagee”); Ogden State Bank v. Barker, 40 P. 769, 769 (Utah 1895) (“The mere fact that the mortgagee was not the real owner of the notes, but was simply a trustee or agent for the owners, does not affect the validity of the mortgage.”); Lawrenceville Cement Co. v. Parker, 15 N.Y.S. 577, 578 (Sup.Ct. 1891) (holding that bank official could hold mortgage, as mortgagee, for bank, which held the underlying promissory note).

21. See §9-203(g) of the UCC, which codifies the common law principle that the “mortgage follows the note.” In addition, by analogy, §9-310(c) of the UCC provides that if a secured party assigns a perfected security interest, an Article 9 filing is not required to continue the perfected status of the security interest against creditors from the original debtor. The original filing provides sufficient notice of the lien.

22. See infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.

23. See Clark and Clark, supra note 18, at p. 3; Plymouth County, Iowa v. Merscorp, Inc. et. al. (Case No. C-12-4022-MWB) (U.S. Dist. Ct., No. Dist. of Iowa, Western Div.) (Aug. 21, 2012) (there is no statute in Iowa that requires the recording of mortgages or assignments of mortgages, but the failure to record will render the mortgage or assignment void in favor of subsequent purchasers and existing creditors who are without notice). See also infra note 68 and accompanying text.

24. Act of Apr. 6, 2004, ch. 153, §2, 2004 Minn. Laws 76, 76-77 (codified at Minn. Stat. §507.413 (2008)).

25. Id.

26.  Minn. Stat. §507.413(a).

27. See Tex. Prop. Code §§51.0001(4) and 51.0001(1).

28.  See e.g., Richardson v. CitiMortgage, 2010 WL 4818556 (E.D.Tex. Nov. 22, 2010).

29.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §1.01 (2006).

30. See, e.g., Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 97 (MERS is a “proper mortgagee” and MERS Mortgages are “proper conveyance[s]’ for purposes of the recording statute.”); Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pietranico, 928 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cty. 2011) (The mortgage “expressly grants MERS the right to act on behalf of the lender as required by law and custom, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the property and the right to take any action required of the Lender such as releasing and canceling the mortgage.”); U.S. Bank N.A. v. Flynn, 897 N.Y.S.2d 855, 857 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cty. 2010) (“MERS is acting as the nominee of the owner of the note and mortgage in which MERS is additionally designated as the mortgagee of record.”); Trent v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., Inc., 288 F. Appx. 571 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[MERS] is the mortgagee.”); In re MERS Litig., 744 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1027 (D. Ariz. 2010) (“”[F]rom the very language of the deeds of trust, to which Plaintiffs agreed in entering into their home loan transaction, MERS is still acting as the nominee for the current holder of the promissory note . . . Nevada case law universally holds that [MERS security instruments] are enforceable.”); Calif. ex. rel. Bates v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., 2011 WL 892646, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011) (The mortgage is “recorded in the public land records, making MERS the mortgagee of record.”); In re Tucker, 441 B.R. 638, 645 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2010) (“The language of the recorded Deed of Trust clearly authorizes MERS to act on behalf of the Lender in serving as the legal title holder to the beneficial interest under the Deed of Trust and exercising any of the rights granted to the Lender thereunder.”); Wade v. Meridias Cap., Inc., 2011 WL 997161, at *2 (D. Utah Mar. 17, 2011) (“MERS was appointed as the beneficiary and nominee for the Lender and its successors and assigns and granted power to act in their stead.”); Ciardi v. Lending Co., 2010 WL 2079735, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2010) (“To the extent Plaintiffs rely on a theory that the beneficiary must have an interest in the actual note, Plaintiffs have failed to cite any law so requiring.”).

31.  As of July 22, 2011, MERS formally amended and implemented its Rules of Membership to provide that members are no longer authorized to initiate foreclosures in the name of MERS Inc. and an assignment of the mortgage from MERS Inc. to the foreclosing party must be recorded (informally suspended in February 2011).

32. Supra note 29 (emphasis added).

33. See, e.g., Eaton v. Federal National Mortgage Association, SJC-11041, 2012 WL 2349008 (Mass. June 22, 2012) (In order to exercise the statutory power of sale in Massachusetts, a mortgagee must either be the holder of the underlying promissory note or be acting under the authority of the note holder; physical possession of the mortgage note is not required in order to foreclose); Residential Funding Co. v. Saurman, 490 Mich. 909; 805 N.W.2d 183 (2011) (MERS Inc. is the owner of an interest in the indebtedness secured by the mortgage for purposes of Michigan statutory requirements and may thus conduct nonjudicial foreclosures by advertisement); Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1149, at 1156-57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (The court concluded that even if there was a legal basis for an action to determine if MERS had the authority to initiate foreclosure, the language in the deed of trust granted MERS authority to initiate a nonjudicial foreclosure); Payette v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. PC-2009-5875 (R.I. Supp. Ct. Aug. 22, 2011) (As a matter of contract, the mortgage signed by plaintiffs recognized MERS’ rights to act as nominee for IndyMac and for IndyMac’s “successors and assigns”); In re Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc. (MERS) Litig., No. 2:09-md-2119, 2010 WL 4038788, at *8 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2010) (“Plaintiffs have not cited any legal authority where the naming of MERS . . . was cause to enjoin a non-judicial foreclosure as wrongful.”); Commonwealth Property Advocates, LLC v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., Nos. 10-4182, 10-4193, 10-4215, 2011 WL 6739431, at *7 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2011) (affirming that MERS may foreclose as nominee for lender and its successors and assigns); Trent v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., Inc., 288 Fed. Appx. 571, 572 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Under the mortgage contracts, [MERS] has the legal right to foreclose on the debtors’ property. [MERS] is the mortgagee.”); Johnson v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., Inc., 252 Fed. Appx. 293, 294 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming summary judgment to MERS on foreclosure of plaintiff’s property); Nicholson v. OneWest Bank, 2010 WL 2732325, at *4 (N.D. Ga. April 20, 2010) (“[T]he nominee of the lender has the ability to foreclose on a debtor’s property even if such nominee does not have a beneficial interest in the note secured by the mortgage.”); Orzoff v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 2009 WL 4643229, at *9-10 (D. Nev. March 26, 2009) (“This Court has previously determined that MERS does have such standing [to participate in foreclosure proceedings, and] . . . Courts around the country have held the same.”); Swanson v. EMC Mort. Corp., Case No. CV F 09-1507 LJO DLB (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2009) (“MERS correctly notes that as [deed of trust] beneficiary, MERS is empowered to commence foreclosure proceedings . . .”); In re: Sina, No. A06-200, 2006 WL 2729544, at *2 (Minn. App., Sept. 26, 2006) (“Because MERS is the record assignee of the mortgage, we conclude that MERS had standing to foreclose); Silvas v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, No. CV-09-265-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 4573234, at *8 (D. Ariz. Jan. 5, 2010) (MERS empowered to foreclose where MERS is designated on deed of trust as beneficiary); Diessner v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1187-91 (D. Ariz. 2009) (MERS and trustee under deed of trust are authorized to institute non-judicial foreclosure proceeding); Reynoso v. Paul Financial, LLC, No. 09-3225 SC, 2009 WL 3833298, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2009) (naming of MERS as initial beneficiary under deed of trust, as nominee for the lender, and the subsequent transfer of the deed of trust from MERS to a transferee was effective and did not hinder transferee’s right to foreclose); Blau v. America’s Servicing Co., No. CV-08-773, 2009 WL 3174823, at *8 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2009) (MERS authorized under deed of trust to act on behalf of lender and transfer its interests); Farahani v. Cal-Western Recon. Corp., No. 09-194, 2009 WL 1309732, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. May, 2009) (MERS authorized to pursue non-judicial foreclosure action); Vazquez v. Aurora Loan Servs., No 2:08-cv-01800-RCJRJJ, 2009 WL 1076807, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 20, 2009) (loan documents sufficiently demonstrate MERS’ standing “with respect to the loan and the foreclosure”); Pfannenstiel v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., No. CIV S-08-2609, 2009 WL 347716, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2009) (dismissing plaintiff ’s claim that MERS lacked authority to foreclose); Trent v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., Inc., 288 Fed. Appx. 571, 572 (11th Cir. 2008) (MERS “has the legal right to foreclose on the debtors’ property” and “is the mortgagee”); Peyton v. Recontrust Co., No. TC021868, Notice of Ruling, at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. County of Los Angeles S. Cent. Dist. Oct. 15, 2008) (MERS may foreclose under California law); Johnson v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., 252 Fed. Appx. 293, 294 (11th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment for MERS on its action for foreclosure of plaintiff ’s property); In re Smith, 366 B.R. 149, 151 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007) (MERS has standing to conduct foreclosure on behalf of the beneficiary); Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Revoredo, 955 So.2d 33, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“Because, however, it is apparent – and we so hold – that no substantive rights, obligations or defenses are affected by use of the MERS device, there is no reason why mere form should overcome the salutary substance of permitting the use of this commercially effective means of business.”); Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Ventura, CV054003168S, 2006 WL 1230265, at *1 (Conn. Super. Apr. 20, 2006) (MERS is proper party in foreclosure); King v. American Mortgage Network, et. al., Case No. 1:09-CV-125 TS (D. Utah, Aug. 16, 2010) (court, interpreting the language of the deed of trust, held that MERS had the authority to initiate foreclosure proceedings, appoint a trustee and foreclosure and sell the mortgaged property); Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Coakley, 41 A.D.3d 674 (NY App. 2007) (court held that MERS had right to foreclose pursuant to the clear and unequivocal terms of the mortgage instrument).

34. 357 B.R. 180, 183 (Bank. D.Mass. 2006).

35. See Niday v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, Case No. A147430 (Or. Ct. App., Jul. 18, 2012) (appellate court held that, in connection with a non-judicial foreclosure, Oregon law requires a beneficiary of a trust deed to be a party to whom the underlying loan repayment obligations is owed) (Editor’s Note: as of the date of this article, the Niday case is on appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court); Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Graham, 44 Kan. App. 2d 547, 229 P.3d 420 (Kan. App. 2010) (having suffered no injury, MERS lacked standing to bring a foreclosure action); Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289, 297 (Me. 2010) (finding that MERS could not enforce the note and that the substitution of Deutsche Bank for MERS was proper); In re Box, No. 10-20086, 2010 WL 2228289, at *5 (Bankr W.D. Mo. June 3, 2010) (finding that MERS, as beneficiary and nominee under the deed of trust lacked authority to assign the mortgage note because it never “held” the note itself); In re Hawkins, No. BK-S-07-13593-LBR, 2009 WL 901766, at *3 (Bankr. D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2009) (finding that MERS was not a true “beneficiary” under a deed of trust, that, under the UCC, MERS was not entitled to enforce the note, and that “[i]n order to foreclose, MERS must establish there has been a sufficient transfer of both the note and deed of trust, or that it has authority under state law to act for the note’s holder”); Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage Group, Inc. et. al. and Selkowitz v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP et. al. (No. 86206-1) (Wash. August 16, 2012). The Washington Supreme Court held that MERS Inc. is not a lawful beneficiary under the Washington Deed of Trust Act because it is not “the holder of the instrument or document evidencing the obligations secured by the deed of trust” as required thereunder; that is, if MERS Inc. never held the note, then it is not a lawful beneficiary. However, in response to MERS Inc.’s argument that lenders and their assigns may name it as their agent, the court stated, “That is likely true and nothing in this opinion should be construed to suggest that an agent cannot represent the holder of a note. Washington law, and the deed of trust act itself, approves of the use of agents.” No doubt that point will be made forcefully when the lower court proceeding resumes.

36. See, e.g., Residential Funding Corporation v. Saurman, 292 Mich. App. 321, 807 N.W.2d 412 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2011) (court held that MERS did not meet the requirements to non-judicially foreclose by advertisement because MERS did not own an “interest in the indebtedness” as required by the foreclosure statute), rev’d, 490 Mich. 909, 805 N.W.2d 183 (Mich., 2011); Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. v. George Azize, et. al., NO. 2D05-4544 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. Sept. 19, 2005) (trial court held that MERS was not a proper party to bring a foreclosure action), rev’d, 965 So.2d 151 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. Feb. 21, 2007); Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. v. Oscar Revoredo, et. al., NO. 3D05-2572 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. Nov. 4, 2005) (trial court held that MERS must establish ownership of the note in order to have standing to foreclose), rev’d, 955 So.2d 33 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. Mar 14, 2007); U.S. Bank National Association v. Salazar, 448 B.R. 814 (S.D. Ca. Apr. 12, 2011) (bankruptcy court concluded a foreclosure sale was void because MERS, as record deed of trust beneficiary, failed to record a deed of trust assignment to U.S. Bank prior to the foreclosure sale and U.S. Bank was identified on the trustee’s deed as the “foreclosing beneficiary”), rev’d, 470 B.R. 557 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2012); In re Agard, 444 B.R. 231 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb 10, 2011) (bankruptcy court found that the language of the mortgage document itself and MERS role as mortgagee did not provide MERS with the authority to “effectuate a valid assignment of mortgage”), vacated in part by Agard v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 2012 WL 1043690 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2012); see also, U.S. Bank v. Howie, infra note 43 (interpreting the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler).

37. See MERSCORP, Inc. Rules of Membership, Rule 8 – Required Assignments for Foreclosure and Bankruptcy, Section 1(e).

38. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROPERTY (MORTGAGES), §5.4, comment e (1997). See also Residential Funding Co. v. Saurman, 490 Mich. 909; 805 N.W.2d 183 (2011) (Michigan Supreme Court held that a mortgage and note are to be construed together and that “the trust and the beneficial interest need not be in the same hands . . . The choice of mortgagee is a matter of convenience.”); Horvath v. Bank of New York, N.A., et al., No. 1:09-cv-1129, Dkt No. 38 (E.D. Va. Jan. 29, 2010) (aff’d., 4th Cir., No. 10-1528, May 19, 2011) (court held that “the ‘split’ of [Plaintiff’s] promissory notes from the deeds of trust does not render the deeds of trust unenforceable. The deeds of trust continue to grant a promissory note holder security . . .”).

39. See Joyce Palomar, 3 Patton & Palomar on Land Titles §5.67.50 (3d ed. 2009) (“[C]ourts have accepted MERS as reconciling modern lending practices with traditional real property law” and “recognize the entity serving as nominee or agent as the record holder of the encumbrance.”).

40. 656 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011).

41. Id. at 1042.

42. Id.

43. Id. at 1044, citing Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158, 167 (Kan. 2009). See also, U.S. Bank v. Howie, No. 106,415 (Kans. App. June 8, 2012) in which an appellate court interpreted the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in Landmark as supporting MERS Inc.’s role as agent of the lender under the plain language of the mortgage. The Howie court further held that because MERS Inc. was acting as agent of the lender, the mortgage and the note were never severed and the lender, as present holder of both the note and mortgage, was entitled to foreclose on the mortgage. Some people misunderstand the term “unenforceable” as confirming fraudulent or illegal behavior on the part of the lender. But this is not necessarily the case. A mortgage may be declared unenforceable due to a mistake or unanticipated occurrence without fault by the lender, with the inequitable result that the lender/creditor who lent money to the borrower secured by a mortgaged property would be unable to foreclose and realize on its collateral.

44. In re MERS Litigation, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D. Ariz. 2010); see also Martinez v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. (In re Martinez), 444 B.R. 192 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2011) (the court found that the language in the mortgage, the MERS membership agreement, and the affidavit of MERS’ treasurer, were sufficient to establish that MERS was clearly acting as an agent for Countrywide at all relevant times while holding the mortgage; the mortgage and the note were never split and remained enforceable); Drake v. Citizens Bank of Effingham (In re Corley), 447 B.R. 375 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011) (the note and the mortgage were not split; they were executed together at inception and remain linked via the language in the documents that contemplate the agency relationship formed by the designation of MERS as nominee).

45. See, e.g., Consol. Mortg. & Fin. Corp. v. Landrieu, 493 F. Supp. 1284, 1286-87 (D. D.C. 1980) (discussing the Mortgage Backed Securities Program and Ginnie Mae’s role).

46. Supra note 38.

47. See U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §541(d).

48. See UCC §§9.109(b); 3.102 and 3.201-204.

49.  See UCC §9.203. For a thorough review of the issues under the UCC discussing rights of the “owner” of a note, the party entitled to enforce the note, transfer of the note, and the impact of transfer on the underlying mortgage, see Report of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code ― Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to Selected Issues Relating to Mortgage Notes (Nov. 14, 2011), Amer. Law Institute and National Conf. on Uniform State Laws.

50. UCC §9.203(g) (emphasis added); See also UCC §9.308(e), providing the same rule for perfection.

51. See Official Comment 6 to UCC §9.308.

52. For an excellent discussion and survey of relevant state case law on this issue, see Transfer and Assignment of Residential Mortgage Loans in the Secondary Market, ASF White Paper Series (November 16, 2011) at http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF_White_Paper_11_16_10.pdf.

53.  Although the disclosure of the identity of the note owner is optional, 97% of the over 3,000 MERS® System members make such disclosure.

54. See 24 C.F.R. §3500.21(d).

55. See 12 C.F.R. §226.39.

56.  Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173.

57. See 12 U.S.C. §2605(k) (1) (D).

58. See Haft v. Dart Group Corp., 841 F. Supp. 549, 572 (D.Del. 1993).

59. Del. Code. Ann. Title 8, Sections 122 and 142.

60. Exercise of authority granted under clauses (3) and (4) is subject to rule changes effective July 22, 2011, limiting the member’s ability to initiate foreclosures and make filings in bankruptcy proceedings in the name of MERS Inc.

61. See Bain v. Metro Mortg. Grp., 2010 WL 891585, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2010) (holding that MERS’s designation of Members’ employees as “vice president” and “assistant vice president” was not deceptive within the meaning of the Washington State Consumer Protection Act). See also Jackman v. Hasty, 2011 WL 5599075, at *3 (N.D. Ga., Nov. 15, 2011) (Defendants “were appointed as agents of MERS by a corporate resolution . . . According to the resolution, [Defendants] have authority to, among other things, “[a]ssign the lien of any mortgage loan registered on the MERS® System’ . . . and “[e]xecute any and all documents necessary to foreclose upon the property securing any mortgage loan registered on the MERS® System’ . . . The evidence thus shows that Defendants . . . although not employees of MERS, were duly appointed agents of MERS who had authority to assign the Security Deed to LaSalle on behalf of MERS. LaSalle thus had legal authority to foreclose on the Property.”); Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC v. Kroening, 2011 WL 5130357, at *5 (D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2011) (“The assignment was executed for MERS by Scott Anderson. Anderson is an employee of Ocwen, but was designated by Corporate Resolution as an assistant secretary and vice president of MERS, and as such had the authority to assign any mortgage naming MERS as the mortgagee.”).

62. New York State Bar Association, Committee on Professional Ethics, Formal Opinion #847 (12/21/2010).

63. See, e.g., Davis v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2012 WL 642544 (Nev. Feb. 24, 2012); Bertrand v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., 2011 WL 1113421, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 23, 2011) (stating that the language in the Deed of Trust “grants MERS the power to initiate foreclosure and to assign its beneficial interest . . .”); Wade v. Meridias Cap., Inc., 2011 WL 997161, at *2 (D. Utah Mar. 17, 2011) (“Under the plan terms of the Trust Deed, . . . MERS was appointed as the beneficiary and nominee for the Lender and its successors and assigns and granted power to act in their stead, including making assignments and instituting foreclosure.”) (emphasis in original); Germon v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 2011 WL 719591, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011) (stating that under the Deed of Trust “MERS had the legal right to initiate nonjudicial foreclosures and could assign such right.”); Saxon Mortg Servs., Inc. v. Coakley, 921 N.Y.S.2d. 552, 553 (App. Div. 2011) (rejecting foreclosure defendant’s contention that MERS’s assignment of mortgage was improper); Perry v. Nat’l Default Serv’g Corp., 2010 WL 3325623, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2010) (observing that numerous courts have held that “MERS had the right to assign its beneficial interest to a third party.”); Rogan v. CitiMortgage, Inc. (In re Jessup), 2010 WL 2926050, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. July 22, 2010) (MERS had authority to execute an assignment as nominee of lender because “the language in the Lender’s own instrument is sufficient to identify MERS as such.”); GMAC Mortg., LLC v. Reynolds, 2010 WL 7746836, at *2 (Mass. Land Ct. Nov. 30, 2010) (“MERS, as mortgagee of record, has the authority to assign the mortgage.”); In re Relka, 2009 WL 5149262, at *4-5 (Bankr. D. Wyo. Dec. 22, 2009) (The Deed of Trust granted MERS “the right to assign the mortgage.”); Taylor v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 44 So. 3d 618, 623 (Fla. 5th DCCA 2010) (The mortgage granted MERS the “explicit and agreed upon authority to make . . . an assignment.”).

64. See, e.g., Williams v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2011 WL 2293260 at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 9, 2011) (“To the extent Plaintiffs challenge any assignment from MERS to U.S. Bank, Plaintiffs lack standing to do so because they were not a party to those assignments.”); Bridge v. Aames Capital Corp., 2010 WL 3834059, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2010) (“Courts have routinely found that a debtor may not challenge an assignment between an assignor and assignee”); Livonia Prop. Holdings, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 724, 735 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (“Borrower disputes the validity of the assignment [of mortgage] documents. But, as a non-party to those documents, it lacks standing to attack them.”).

65. Jones, supra note 3, at 36.

66. Jones, supra note 3, at 36, 38.

67. Id.

68. See Amoskeag Bank v. Chagnon, 572 A2d 1153, 1155 (N.H. 1990) (“The purpose then of the recording statutes…is to provide notice to the public of a conveyance of or encumbrance on real estate.”); Corpus v. Arriaga, 294 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. App. 2009) (“The purpose of recording statutes in Texas is to give notice to persons of the existence of the instrument.”); Burnett v. County of Bergen, 968 A.2d 1151 (N.J. 2009) (“The very purpose of recording and filing [assignments of mortgages, deeds, discharges of mortgages, and other public records] is to place the world on notice of their contents.”).

69. See Fuller v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., (U.S. Dist. Ct., Middle District of Fla.,Jacksonville Div.) (Case No. 3:11–CV–1153–J–20MCR) (June 27, 2012) at p. 3, fn. 1.

70. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc. Rules of Membership, Rule 2 – Registration on the MERS System, Section 5(a).

71. See Fuller, supra note 69, at pp. 18-19.

72. Joe Murin, MERS: Myths, Misconceptions and Realities, July 22, 2010 (available at http://mortgagenewsdaily.com/channels/voiceofhousing/164078.aspx); see also Fuller, supra note 69 and accompanying text.

73. Peterson, Foreclosures and MERS, supra note 9 at 1365-66.

74. Plymouth County, supra note 23 at p. 17.

75. Remarks of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner Introducing the Financial Stability Plan, February 10, 2009 (available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg18.aspx).

76. See Christopher L. Peterson articles, supra note 9.

77. MERS’ principal owners are the Mortgage Bankers Association, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase Bank, HSBC, CitiMortgage, GMAC, American Land Title Association and Wells Fargo Bank.

78.See, http://www.aei.org/article/economics/financial-services/housing-finance/housing-affordability-us-is-the-envy-of-the-developed-world; see also http://absalonproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Harvard-Lea-110v5.pdf.

79. Jones, supra note 3, at 40.

80. For an excellent discussion of the background, issues and certain case law developments regarding the MERS® System, see Beau Phillips, MERS: The Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 63 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 262 (Fall Winter 2009).

81. Murin, supra note 72.

82. Id.

83. Over 600 government institutions (cities, municipalities and states) utilize the MERS System free of charge to locate property preservation contacts for loans registered on the MERS System.

Share this:

  • Twitter
  • Facebook

Like this:

Like Loading...

Using Securitization Audits As An Effective Tool For Foreclosure Defense

30 Sunday Jun 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Litigation Strategies, MERS, Non-Judicial States, Securitization

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Business, Creditor, Foreclosure, MERS, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Mortgage loan, Real estate, Securitization

By now, most homeowners in foreclosure proceedings were suddenly realizing that most loans originated in between 2000 and 2010 were securitized without the borrower’s knowledge. This means the lenders pooled the mortgage with thousands of others and sold these pooled loans to investors immediately or very shortly after loan origination. They were paid in full but retained loan “servicing”, the day to day loan administration operations, for which they now received between $25 and $45 per year for each $1,000 of loan value. This may have been on top of a profit in the sale. On a $400,000 loan the servicer’s financial interest is now only $10,000, not the $400,000 they are trying to foreclose on.

What’s more, in the process of investors purchasing the loan, the originating lender had to guarantee that all transfers were as laid out in pooling and servicing agreements which are on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Any violation and the now “master servicing lender” is under obligation to buy back the loan at full price, a guaranteed loss on a now non-performing loan facing foreclosure.

Based on default servicing agreements the servicing lender can use creative loan accounting to essentially position a defaulted loan to where the servicer receives most of all of the property in a foreclosure and the investor owner gets little or nothing, but the loans were insured and T.A.R.P. monies make the investor whole so they don’t miss the property. The servicer sold the loan for payment in full and now gets the property free and clear because the mortgage was not to them, it was to the investor. Is this fair? No, but it is happening every 15 to 20 seconds in the USA.

So how does an attorney you stop this? They use the evidence process in court to introduce findings of a highly qualified expert that is willing to stand behind the issuance and be an expert witness. To keep those costs down in foreclosure and bankruptcy most judges all expert witnesses to appear in a virtual manner, by phone conference or video conference and in so doing enable this type of support in a case at nominal prices.

The evidential findings are based in undisputed facts that are not objectionable because they address genuine material facts pertinent to the case. These facts include showing many defects that prevent foreclosure and bring to light issues the lender foreclosing wants to hide and has misrepresented. Ownership, improper endorsements, subsequent sales, now bankrupt parties, not including real owners as parties in interest, fraudulent use of MERS, fraudulent and collusion on affidavits, robo-signed documents, illegal deed and trustee assignments underlying improper deed enforcement and much more. Basically anything by which the lender can foreclose because that is the only way to sever the risk of lawsuit by the investors. That is why the investors are not being included in the lawsuit. Should they become aware, there could be a class action and because they bought hundreds of thousands of similar problematic loans, the servicer can inherit tremendous risk and potential losses.

The evidence usually turns up facts that conclude the first party ownership is just not there according to law, at least not a secured mortgage anyway. Unsecured the mortgage debt can be crammed down by a bankruptcy Judge or completely discharged after some years in a quiet title action. Those are the legal aspects left up to lawyers and courts.

Faced with losing in court, lenders typically settle and move on. The number of cases winning in this way is a relatively small number. Settlements include loan modifications of terms, acceptance of short sales, waivers of deficiency judgments and having the case dismissed entirely or crammed down by a bankruptcy judge.

The solution? Simple, affordable and fast. – To find out how you can effectively challenge and win your foreclosure defense using Securitization Audit visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

Share this:

  • Twitter
  • Facebook

Like this:

Like Loading...

The Effects of “US Bank v. Ibanez” in Mortgage Securitization Cases

24 Monday Jun 2013

Posted by BNG in Appeal, Case Laws, Case Study, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Notary, Note - Deed of Trust - Mortgage, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, Securitization, Trial Strategies

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Bank of America, Foreclosure, Ibanez, Massachusetts, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, U.S. Bancorp, US Bank, Wells Fargo

THIS DECISION WAS A GREAT WIN TO HOMEOWNERS!

Background

For those new to the case, the problem the Court dealt with in this case is the validity of foreclosures when the mortgages are part of securitized mortgage lending pools. When mortgages were bundled and packaged to Wall Street investors, the ownership of mortgage loans were divided and freely transferred numerous times on the lenders’ books. But the mortgage loan documentation actually on file at the Registry of Deeds often lagged far behind.

In the Ibanez case, the mortgage assignment, which was executed in blank, was not recorded until over a year after the foreclosure process had started. This was a fairly common practice in Massachusetts, and I suspect across the U.S. Mr. Ibanez, the distressed homeowner, challenged the validity of the foreclosure, arguing that U.S. Bank had no standing to foreclose because it lacked any evidence of ownership of the mortgage and the loan at the time it started the foreclosure.

Mr. Ibanez won his case in the lower court in 2009, and due to the importance of the issue, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court took the case on direct appeal.

The SJC Ruling: Lenders Must Prove Ownership When They Foreclose

The SJC’s ruling can be summed up by Justice Cordy’s concurring opinion:

“The type of sophisticated transactions leading up to the accumulation of the notes and mortgages in question in these cases and their securitization, and, ultimately the sale of mortgaged-backed securities, are not barred nor even burdened by the requirements of Massachusetts law. The plaintiff banks, who brought these cases to clear the titles that they acquired at their own foreclosure sales, have simply failed to prove that the underlying assignments of the mortgages that they allege (and would have) entitled them to foreclose ever existed in any legally cognizable form before they exercised the power of sale that accompanies those assignments. The court’s opinion clearly states that such assignments do not need to be in recordable form or recorded before the foreclosure, but they do have to have been effectuated.”

The Court’s ruling appears rather elementary: you need to own the mortgage before you can foreclose. But it’s become much more complicated with the proliferation of mortgage backed securities (MBS’s) –which constitute 60% or more of the entire U.S. mortgage market. The Court has held unequivocally that the common industry practice of assigning a mortgage “in blank” — meaning without specifying to whom the mortgage would be assigned until after the fact — does not constitute a proper assignment, at least in Massachusetts.

The Case in Review:

On Jan. 7, 2011, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
ruled against U.S. Bancorp and Wells Fargo & Co. in their appeal of a Massachusetts Land Court decision in March 2009 invalidating their foreclosure sales because both banks had failed to make the requisite showing that they were the mortgage holders at the time of the foreclosures. The case made headlines across the country, but turned on the prosaic notion that only the mortgage holder can foreclose on a mortgage.

Documentation provided by the banks in their efforts to prove that they were the present assignees of the mortgages at the time of the notice of foreclosure and subsequent foreclosure sale failed to convince the court that the proper party had initiated the foreclosure.

Because Massachusetts does not require a mortgage holder to obtain judicial authorization to foreclose on Massachusetts property, the decision in U.S. Bank National Association v. Ibanez serves as a forewarning to banks that foreclosures will only be upheld as valid by a showing of strict compliance with the statutory power of sale requirements, that is, that they were the mortgage holder at the time of notice of foreclosure and execution of the foreclosure sale.

Copycat litigation has followed in Massachusetts and elsewhere, but the ramifications of Ibanez could be broader than just an increase in courtroom activity. Legislatures will wrestle with the possibility of increased regulations, and prosecutors will likely scour the files for possible illegal activity concerning the dates of mortgage transfers.

Case Background
In July 2007, U.S. Bank NA and Wells Fargo Bank NA, as trustees of two securitization trusts, foreclosed on the mortgages of the respective properties and purchased the properties at the foreclosure sale. In September and October 2008, U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo brought actions separately in the Massachusetts Land Court seeking among other things, a declaration that title to the two properties was vested in them.

The Land Court heard the two actions together and ruled that the foreclosure sales were invalid because the banks acquired the mortgages by assignment only after the foreclosure sales and therefore had no interest in the mortgages being foreclosed at the time of the publication of the notices of sale or the foreclosure sales.

At issue was whether the banks had shown sufficient documentation that they were in fact the mortgage holders at the time of the sales pursuant to a valid chain of assignments. In U.S. Bank’s case, the original lender was Rose Mortgage Inc., which assigned the mortgage in blank. At some point the blank space was stamped with Option One Mortgage Corp. as assignee, and was recorded on June 7, 2006.

On Jan. 23, 2006, before recording, Option One executed an assignment in blank. U.S. Bank claimed that Option One assigned the mortgage to Lehman Brothers Bank FSB, which assigned it to Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., which assigned it to the Structured Asset Securities Corp., which then assigned the mortgage, pooled with over 1,000 other loans, to U.S. Bank, as trustee, on or around Dec. 1, 2006.

U.S. Bank filed for foreclosure on April 17, 2007, and purchased the property at the foreclosure sale on July 5, 2007. On Sept. 2, 2008, American Home Mortgage Servicing Inc., as successor in interest to Option One, the record holder of the mortgage, executed a written assignment of the mortgage to U.S.Bank, as trustee, which was then recorded on Sept. 11, 2008.

In the Land Court proceeding, however, U.S. Bank failed to put in the record the trust agreement, which it claimed constituted the assignment of the mortgage. U.S. Bank did offer the private placement memorandum, an unsigned offer of mortgage-backed securities to potential investors, which included the representation that mortgages “will be” assigned to the trust. The memorandum also stated that each mortgage would be identified in a schedule attached to the trust agreement. U.S. Bank also did not provide any such schedule identifying the particular loan as among the mortgages assigned to the trust.

In Wells Fargo’s case, the original lender was Option One, which executed an assignment of the mortgage in blank on May 25, 2005. Option One later assigned the mortgage to Bank of America Corp. in a flow sale and servicing agreement, which then assigned it to Asset Backed Funding Corp., which assigned it, pooled with others, to Wells Fargo, as trustee, pursuant to a pooling and servicing agreement.

On July 5, 2007, the day Wells Fargo purchased the property, Option One, the record mortgage holder, executed an assignment of the mortgage to Wells Fargo as trustee, which was recorded on May 12, 2008, but had an effective date of April 18, 2007.

In the Land Court proceeding, Wells Fargo did not provide the flow sale and servicing agreement reflecting the assignment by Option One to Bank of America. Wells Fargo did produce an unexecuted copy of the mortgage loan purchase agreement, which made reference to a schedule listing the assigned mortgages, but failed to provide a schedule showing that the mortgage was among those assigned to Asset Backed Funding Corporation.

Wells Fargo also provided a copy of the pooling and servicing agreement, but this copy was only downloaded from the U.S.Securities and Exchange Commission website, was unsigned and did not contain the loan schedules referenced in the agreement. Wells Fargo produced a schedule that it represented identified the mortgage by the property’s ZIP code and city because the payment history and loan amount matched the loan at issue.

SJC Decision
In Massachusetts, a mortgagee must strictly comply with the statutory power of sale by proving its authority to foreclose and complying with the notice requirement. Only a present holder of the mortgage is authorized to foreclose on the mortgaged property. As highlighted by the SJC in this case, the statutory power is also limited to those who are holders of mortgages pursuant to valid, verifiable assignments at the time of the notice of sale and the subsequent foreclosure sale. U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo failed to prove that they were.

The court rendered U.S. Bank’s foreclosure invalid for several reasons: 1) It failed to produce the document,the trust agreement, which it claimed assigned the mortgage to it; 2) the private placement memorandum described the trust agreement as having only an intent to assign mortgages to U.S. Bank in the future, not as an actual assignment; 3) U.S. Bank did not produce the schedule of loans mortgages that was supposedly attached to the agreement, so it failed to show that the mortgage at issue was among those assigned by that agreement; and 4) U.S. Bank failed to produce any evidence that the assigning party, Structured Asset Securities Corp., ever held the mortgage to be assigned. The court determined that Option One, not U.S. Bank, was the mortgage holder at the time of the foreclosure.

Similarly, the court rendered Wells Fargo’s foreclosure invalid because: 1) While the pooling and servicing agreement reflected a present assignment, the mortgage loan schedule provided by Wells Fargo failed to identify with specificity the mortgage at issue as one of the mortgages assigned; and 2) Wells Fargo did not provide any documentation showing that Asset Backed Funding Corporation held the mortgage that it was purportedly assigning under the pooling and servicing agreement. Because Wells Fargo failed to submit anything demonstrating that the mortgage was ever assigned by Option One to another entity before the notice and sale, the court found that Option One was the mortgage holder.

Ibanez in Practice
The SJC provided insight into the documentation it believes is required to support a valid foreclosure in the case of assignments and securitization trusts. Whether pending and future legislation or regulations change how the court views these matters remains to be seen.

* An assignment does not have to be in recordable form at the time of the notice of sale or the foreclosure sale, though it may be the better practice. An executed agreement that assigns a pool of mortgages along with the schedule that “clearly and specifically” identifies the mortgage at issue may suffice to establish the trustee as mortgage holder.
* A bank must provide proof that the assignment was made by a party that validly held the mortgage. This can be accomplished by providing a chain of assignment linking the bank to the record holder or a single assignment from the record holder of the mortgage.
* An assignment in blank does not constitute a lawful assignment of a mortgage.

* An assignment of a note without an assignment of the underlying mortgage does carry with it an assignment of the mortgage, and therefore does not give the holder of the note sufficient financial interest in the mortgage to permit it to foreclose.
* A mortgage holder may not be permitted to rely on Title Standard No. 58 issued by the Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts for the proposition that an entity that does not hold a mortgage may foreclose on a property and later cure the cloud on title by a later assignment of a mortgage. However, an assignment that is confirmatory of an earlier, valid assignment made prior to publication of notice and execution of sale may be executed and recorded after the foreclosure without defecting title. A confirmatory assignment cannot confirm an assignment that was not validly made earlier, or backdate an assignment being made for the first time.
* A post foreclosure assignment may not be treated as a pre-foreclosure assignment by declaring an “effective date” that precedes the notice of sale and foreclosure.

Retroactive Implications of Ibanez
Because the court found that it was not creating new law, but rather applying tried and true standards, it made its decision retroactive. In his decision, Judge Gants stated, “The legal principles and requirements we set forth are well established in our case law and our statutes. All that has changed is the plaintiffs’ apparent failure to abide by those principles and requirements in the rush to sell mortgage-backed securities.” Thus it is likely that homeowners will seek recovery for homes that were wrongfully foreclosed upon.

But beyond that, questions arise. For example, Massachusetts is not a state that requires judicial approval of foreclosures, whereas about 23 states already require some sort of judicial authorization or judicial intervention in the foreclosure process. Would the facts in Ibanez have allowed a foreclosure to progress as far as it did in a state that required judicial foreclosure? Should there be more regulations around the foreclosure process? The Ibanez court didn’t seem to think so, as it found the existing rules to be relatively straightforward and capable of controlling the situation.

Even so, lawmakers in Massachusetts wasted little time in introducing legislation that appeared to be reactionary to the Ibanez decision. Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley drafted legislation that would reportedly establish standards to ensure that creditors undertake “commercially reasonable efforts to avoid unnecessary foreclosures” and would also codify Ibanez by requiring a creditor to show it is the current mortgage holder before foreclosing and require creditors to record their assignments before commencing foreclosure proceedings.

A violation of this legislation as introduced would constitute a violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act as well. There have been at least 10 other bills introduced in the Massachusetts House and Senate that address various aspects of the foreclosure process, including legislation that would require foreclosure mediations and judicial review of foreclosures.

The great danger may be for an overeager bank official who realizes that the bank’s paperwork suffers from the defects outlined in Ibanez. The temptation to back-date documents and to “fill in the blanks” may be too great for some to resist. Prosecutors and regulators will likely be looking for just such situations as they attempt to make cases.

What the court in Ibanez really ruled is that the banks need to strictly comply with the laws already on the books in proceeding with foreclosures, and in light of the court’s candid opinion, and harsh concurrence by Justice Robert J. Cordy, banks would do well to ensure that they have their ducks in line. Banks would also be wise to educate their staff on Ibanez and how not to react to it.

But when all is said and done, however, what Ibanez may ultimately have done is provided the impetus for legislators, regulators, and prosecutors to change the way foreclosures proceed in Massachusetts, and possibly all over the country, in creating new requirements for banks, and courts, far beyond those at play in Ibanez.

My Analysis of the Case

  • Winners: Distressed homeowners facing foreclosure
  • Losers: Foreclosing lenders, people who purchased foreclosed homes with this type of title defect, foreclosure attorneys, and title insurance companies.
  • Despite pleas from innocent buyers of foreclosed properties and my own predictions, the decision was applied retroactively, so this will hurt Massachusetts homeowners who bought defective foreclosure properties.
  • If you own a foreclosed home with an “Ibanez” title issue, I’m afraid to say that you do not own your home anymore. The previous owner who was foreclosed upon owns it again. This is a mess.
  • The opinion is a scathing indictment of the securitized mortgage lending system and its non-compliance with Massachusetts foreclosure law. Justice Cordy, a former big firm corporate lawyer, chastised lenders and their Wall Street lawyers for “the utter carelessness with which the plaintiff banks documented the titles to their assets.”
  • If you purchased a foreclosure property with an “Ibanez” title defect, and you do not have title insurance, you are in trouble. You may not be able to sell or refinance your home for quite a long time, if ever. Recourse would be against the foreclosing banks, the foreclosing attorneys. Or you could attempt to get a deed from the previous owner. Re-doing the original foreclosure is also an option but with complications.
  • If you purchased a foreclosure property and you have an owner’s title insurance policy, contact the title company right away.
  • The decision carved out some room so that mortgages with compliant securitization documents may be able to survive the ruling. This will shake out in the months to come. A major problem with this case was that the lenders weren’t able to produce the schedules of the securitization documents showing that the two mortgages in question were part of the securitization pool. Why, I have no idea.
  • The decision opens the door for foreclosing lenders to prove ownership with proper securitized documents. There will be further litigation on this. Furthermore, since the Land Court’s decision in 2009, many lenders have already re-done foreclosures and title insurance companies have taken other steps to cure the title defects.
  • We don’t know how other state court’s will react to this ruling. The SJC is one of the most well respected state supreme courts in the country. This decision was well-reasoned and I believe correct given that the lenders couldn’t even produce any admissible evidence they held the mortgages. The ruling will certainly be followed in states (such as California) operating under a non-judicial foreclosure system such as Massachusetts.
  • Watch for class actions against foreclosing lenders, the attorneys who drafted the securitization loan documents and foreclosing attorneys. Investors of mortgage backed securities (MBS) will also be exploring their legal options against the trusts and servicers of the mortgage pools.
  • The banking sector has already dropped some 5% today (1.7.11), showing that this ruling has sufficiently spooked investors.

For more info on how you can use the Valid imperfected Securitization arguements such as the ones used in this case to effectively and successfully challenge and win your Foreclosure Defense, please visit http://www.fightforeclosure.net

Share this:

  • Twitter
  • Facebook

Like this:

Like Loading...

The Nuts and Bolts of Mortgage Securitization Process

22 Saturday Jun 2013

Posted by BNG in Foreclosure Defense, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, Securitization

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, MERS, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Mortgage note, Mortgage-backed security, Promissory note, Uniform Commercial Code

The beginnings of the now multi-trillion dollar secondary market for residential mortgage loans date back to the federal government’s creation of Fannie Mae in 1938. Since then, the complexity of the secondary mortgage market has increased, especially as a result of the rapid growth and market acceptance of mortgage backed securities (“MBS”) that began in the 1980s. In contrast, the legal principles and processes by which mortgage-related promissory notes and security instruments (mortgages and deeds of trust) are assigned and transferred have centuries-old origins. Now, in the midst of the worst economic and housing crisis since the 1930s, some are questioning whether the traditional state law principles and processes of assignment and transfer can be fully reconciled with today’s complex holding, assignment and transfer systems for mortgage related promissory notes and security instruments, and what methods are legally effective for participants in the secondary mortgage market to establish, maintain and transfer mortgage notes and security instruments.

This post provides an overview of the legal principles and processes by which promissory notes and related mortgage security instruments are typically held, assigned, transferred and enforced in the secondary mortgage market in connection with loan securitizations and the creation of MBS.

1. Basic Principles
The two core legal documents in most residential mortgage loan transactions are the promissory note and the mortgage or deed of trust that secures the borrower’s payment of the promissory note. The promissory note contains a promise by the borrower to pay the lender a stated amount of money at a specified interest rate (which can be fixed or variable) by a certain date. The typical mortgage or deed of trust contains a grant of a mortgage lien or other security interest in the borrower’s real property to the lender or, in a deed of trust, to a trustee for the benefit of the lender, to secure the borrower’s obligations under the promissory note.
In a typical “private-label” mortgage loan securitization, each mortgage loan, which is evidenced by a mortgage note and secured by a mortgage, is sold, assigned and transferred to a trust through a series of steps:

• The loan originator or a subsequent purchaser sells, assigns and transfers the mortgage loans to a “sponsor,” which is typically a financial services company or a mortgage loan conduit or aggregator.

• The sponsor sells, assigns and transfers the mortgage loans to a “depositor,” which in turn sells, assigns and transfers the mortgage loans to the trustee, which will hold the mortgage loans in trust for the benefit of the certificate holders.

• The trustee issues the MBS pursuant to a pooling and servicing agreement or trust agreement entered into by the depositor, the trustee and a master servicer or servicers.

• The trustee administers the pool assets, typically relying on the loan servicer to perform most of the administrative functions regarding the pool of mortgage loans. In addition, a document custodian is often designated to conduct a review of the mortgage loan documents pursuant to the requirements of the pooling and servicing agreement and to hold
the mortgage loan documents for the loans included in the trust pool.

• In general, the loan documents are assigned and transferred from the depositor to the trustee through the indorsement of the mortgage note and the transfer of possession of the mortgage note to the trustee or a custodian on behalf of the trustee. An assignment of the related mortgage is also typically delivered to the transferee or its custodian, except
in cases where the related mortgage identifies Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”) as the mortgagee. Such assignments generally are in recordable form, but unrecorded, and are executed by the transferor without identifying a specific transferee – a so called assignment in blank.

• In some mortgage loan transactions, MERS becomes the mortgagee of record as the nominee of the loan originator and its assignee in the local land records where the mortgage is recorded, either when the mortgage is first recorded or as a result of the recording of an assignment of mortgage to MERS. This means that MERS is listed as the record title holder of the mortgage. MERS’ name does not appear on the mortgage note, and the beneficial interest in the mortgage remains with the loan originator or its assignee. The documents pursuant to which MERS acts as nominee make clear that MERS is acting in such capacity for the benefit of the loan originator or its assignee. When a mortgage loan is originated with MERS as the nominal mortgagee (or is assigned to MERS post-origination), MERS
tracks all future mortgage loan and loan servicing transfers and other assignments of the mortgage loan unless and until ownership or servicing is transferred (or the loan is otherwise assigned) to an entity that is not a MERS member. In this way, MERS serves as a central system to track changes in ownership and servicing of the loan. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae, among other governmental entities, permit loans that they
purchase or securitize to be registered with MERS.

As part of the loan securitization process detailed above, a mortgage note and a mortgage may be sold, assigned and transferred several times from one entity to another. The legal principles that govern the assignment and transfer of mortgage notes and mortgages are generally determined by state law. See, e.g., In re Cook, 457 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 2006) (state law governed whether transferee had superior interest in promissory note secured by mortgage). As such, these principles can vary depending upon the state in which the assignor of the mortgage notes, the underlying property, or the relevant mortgage-related documents are located. The assignment and transfer of a mortgage note, on the one hand, and of a mortgage, on the other hand, are addressed separately below.

2. Transfer of Promissory Notes Secured by Mortgages
The residential mortgage notes in common use in the secondary mortgage market typically are negotiable instruments. The law of negotiable instruments developed over the centuries as a way to encourage commerce and lending by making such instruments, including negotiable mortgage notes, as liquid and transferable as possible. See, e.g., Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346, 347 (1846) (“[A] negotiable bill or note is a courier without luggage”); 2 Frederick M. Hart & William F. Willier, Negotiable Instruments Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 1.01 (“Negotiable instruments play such an important role in the modern commercial world that it is difficult to realize that the struggle for their existence could be as long and complex as it has been, yet the evolution of the concept took centuries.”). Similarly, the standardization of the forms of mortgage notes and mortgages over the past thirty years or more has contributed to the liquidity and transferability of mortgage notes and the underlying mortgages. See Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 765, 799-800 (2004-2005) (“standardization of mortgage documents created marketable commodities. Once mechanisms were in place for the secondary market to operate, events rapidly moved toward the ultimate goal: the creation of a security which has as its base land [and] yet which will be as freely transferable as stocks and bonds” (internal quotation omitted)).

The Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), which, with state-specific variations, has been adopted as law by all 50 states and the District of Columbia, governs, in significant part, the transfer of mortgage notes.  Article 3 applies to the negotiation and transfer of a mortgage note that is a “negotiable instrument,” as that term is defined in Article 3. See UCC §§ 3-102, 3-201, 3-203 and 3-204; see, e.g., Swindler v. Swindler, 355 S.C. 245, 250 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) (Article 3 governs negotiable mortgage note). In addition, Article 9 applies to the sale of “promissory notes,” a term that generally includes all mortgage notes (both negotiable and nonnegotiable). See UCC §§ 1-201(b)(35) and 9-109(a)(3)

The residential mortgage notes in common use today are typically negotiable instruments for UCC purposes. In addition, as a general matter, the securitization of a loan under a typical pooling and servicing agreement provides both for the negotiation of negotiable mortgage notes (by indorsement and transfer of possession to the securitization trustee or the custodian for the trustee) and for an outright sale and assignment of all of the mortgage notes and related mortgages. Thus, whether the mortgage notes in a given securitization pool are deemed “negotiable” (as we believe most typically are) or “non-negotiable” will have little or no
substantive effect under the UCC on the validity of the transfer of the mortgage notes. The typical securitization process effects valid transfers of the mortgage notes and related mortgages in accordance with the provisions of Articles 3 and 9 of the UCC.

What Constitutes a “Negotiable Instrument?
A “negotiable instrument” is defined as:
an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it:
(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder;

(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and

(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money, but the promise or order may contain (i) an undertaking or power to give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment, (ii) an authorization or power to the holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral, or (iii) a waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection of an obligor.
UCC § 3-104(a).

Reference in a mortgage note to a mortgage does not affect the mortgage note’s status as a negotiable instrument. See UCC § 3-106(b) (“A promise or order is not made conditional [] by a reference to another writing for a statement of rights with respect to collateral, prepayment, or acceleration….”); see also Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Matthews, 321 S.E.2d 545, 547 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (“referring to a mortgage or other collateral [in a mortgage note] does not impair negotiability” of the note); In re AppOnline.com, 285 B.R. 805, 815-16 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002) (reference in mortgage notes to underlying mortgages does not affect the negotiability of the notes).

The fact that a mortgage note contains a variable or adjustable interest rate also does not affect the mortgage note’s status as a negotiable instrument. That is because UCC § 3-112(b) provides that “[i]nterest may be stated in an instrument[7] as a fixed or variable amount of money or it may be expressed as a fixed or variable rate or rates. The amount or rate of interest may be stated or described in the instrument in any manner and may require reference to information not contained in the instrument.” UCC § 3-112(b).

How is a Negotiable Mortgage Note Transferred?
A negotiable mortgage note is transferred when it is “delivered” by a person other than the mortgagor for the purpose of giving the transferee the right to enforce the note. See UCC § 3-203(a). “Delivery” of a mortgage note occurs when there has been a voluntary transfer of possession of the mortgage note. See UCC § 1-201(b)(15). As a general matter, the “[t]ransfer of an instrument, whether or not the transfer is a negotiation, vests in the transferee any right of the transferor to enforce the instrument . . . .” UCC § 3-203(b). Accordingly, a person in possession of the note becomes a “person entitled to enforce” if it can prove that it is the transferee. See UCC § 3-301.

The easiest and most common way to transfer a negotiable mortgage note is through “negotiation.” Article 3 defines “negotiation” as “a transfer of possession, whether voluntary or involuntary, of an instrument by a person other than the issuer to a person who thereby becomes its holder.” UCC § 3-201(a). The “negotiation” of a negotiable mortgage note that is payable to an identified person or entity (such as the entity that originated a mortgage loan and whose name appears as the payee in the mortgage note) – “requires transfer of possession of the instrument and its indorsement by the holder.” UCC § 3-201(b) (emphasis added). As explained below, “indorsement” and “holder” are both defined terms in the UCC.

The “holder” of a negotiable mortgage note is “the person in possession of [the mortgage note] that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession.” UCC § 1-201(b)(21)(A). In other words, upon the closing of a mortgage loan, the “holder” of the mortgage note is the entity that is the payee on the mortgage note and that possesses the note (either actually or constructively). After a negotiable mortgage note has been negotiated, such as in connection with a loan securitization, the “holder” of the mortgage note is the entity that possesses the mortgage note if the mortgage note was indorsed to that entity or if the mortgage note was indorsed in blank or to bearer.

The term “indorsement” is defined to include “a signature . . . that alone or accompanied by other words is made on an instrument [in our case, a negotiable mortgage note] for the purpose of . . . negotiating the instrument.” UCC § 3-204(a). Such an indorsement may be either a “special indorsement” or a “blank indorsement.” See UCC § 3-205. A “special indorsement” is a written indorsement that specifically “identifies a person to whom it makes the instrument payable.” UCC § 3-205(a). A “blank indorsement” is an indorsement that does not identify a person to whom the instrument is payable. See UCC § 3-205(b). Mortgage notes that are transferred in connection with loan securitizations are typically indorsed in blank with language such as “Pay to the order of _____________,” where no name is filled in the blank. The effect of an indorsement in blank is significant: “When indorsed in blank, an instrument becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone until specially indorsed.” UCC § 3-205(b) (emphasis added).10 See also UCC § 3-201(b) (The negotiation of a negotiable mortgage note that is payable to bearer (such as a negotiable mortgage note that has been indorsed in blank) is effected by “transfer of possession alone.”).
The term “possession” is not defined in the UCC. Thus, courts rely on common law definitions of possession to interpret that concept in the context of the negotiation of an instrument such as a mortgage note. See, e.g., In re Kelton Motors, Inc., 97 F.3d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1996) (because Article 3 does not define “possession,” a court must look to the general law of the jurisdiction in determining whether a party is in possession of a negotiable instrument).
Possession can be, and very often is, effected by an agent, nominee or designee, such as the designated custodian for the securitization trust. See, e.g., Midfirst Bank, SB v. C.W. Haynes and Co., Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1304, 1314-15 (D.S.C. 1994) (constructive possession exists when an authorized agent of the owner holds the note on behalf of the owner); Jenkins v. Evans, 31 A.D.2d 597, 598 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept. 1968) (agent had authority to possess instruments for principal). In such cases, while the designated custodian has “physical” possession of the mortgage note, the trustee for which the custodian holds the mortgage note has “constructive” or “legal” possession. See Midfirst Bank, 893 F.Supp. at 1314-15; see also UCC § 9-313 cmt.  (“if the collateral is in [the] possession of an agent of the secured party for the purposes of possessing on behalf of the secured party, and if the agent is not also an agent of the debtor, the secured party has taken actual possession” (emphasis added)).

Who May Enforce A Negotiable Mortgage Note?
The maker of a mortgage note is obligated to pay the note to the “person entitled to enforce the instrument.” UCC § 3-412. The “person entitled to enforce” a negotiable mortgage note includes “(i) the holder of the instrument, [and] (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder.” UCC § 3-301. Accordingly, to enforce a mortgage note against the borrower, a person must generally prove either that it is a “holder” or that it is a transferee with the rights of a holder. See UCC § 3-301. The first category of persons that may enforce a mortgage note is a “holder.” A “holder” of a negotiable mortgage note is “the person in possession of [the mortgage note] that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession.” UCC § 1-201(b)(21)(A). The manner in which one becomes a “holder” is described in the section above.

The second category contemplated by UCC § 3-301– a “nonholder in possession who has the rights of a holder” – is more difficult to define. Under this clause, a person would qualify as a “nonholder in possession” if possession of the mortgage note was transferred to him from the transferor, but the transferor did not indorse the mortgage note. See UCC § 3-203 cmt. In this circumstance, the transferee is entitled to enforce the instrument, but to do so, the transferee must first prove both possession of the unindorsed mortgage note and prove the transfer of the mortgage note by the holder to the transferee. See id. Under both clauses, the person seeking to enforce the mortgage note must have possession of the note.

UCC § 3-301 also permits a person without possession to enforce a mortgage note where the mortgage note has been lost, stolen, or destroyed within the meaning of UCC § 3-309. See UCC § 3-301.12 Courts have consistently affirmed the use of UCC § 3-309 to enforce lost, stolen or destroyed negotiable mortgage notes that a party, such as a securitization trustee, seeks to enforce when the party has proven the terms of the mortgage notes and its right to enforce the mortgage notes (i.e., it has proven the transfer of the mortgage note from the transferee). See, e.g., In re Montagne, 421 B.R. 65, 79 (D. Vt. 2009) (finding that plaintiff who satisfied requirements of UCC § 3-309 could enforce lost mortgage note); Waggoner v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 2003-CA-002666-MR, 2005 WL 2175439, at *1 n.1 (Ky. App. Ct. Sept. 9, 2005) (“The promissory note was proven … by an affidavit concerning a lost or destroyed promissory note.”).

What Rights Against Borrower Defenses are Available to the Holder of a Negotiable Mortgage Note?
A key concept relating to the negotiation of negotiable mortgage notes is the “holder in due course” doctrine. That is because where the “holder” of a negotiable mortgage note is deemed a “holder in due course,” the holder takes the mortgage note subject only to specific limited defenses of the borrower. The following is a brief summary of an expansive area of law. Under UCC § 3-302(a):
[A] “holder in due course” means the holder of an instrument if:
(1) the instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder does not bear such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration or is not otherwise so irregular or incomplete as to call into question its authenticity; and

(2) the holder took the instrument (i) for value, (ii) in good faith, (iii) without notice that the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored or that there is an uncured default with respect to payment of another instrument issued as part of the same series, (iv) without notice that the instrument contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered, (v) without notice of any claim to the instrument described in Section 3-306 [regarding claims of a property or possessory right in the instrument or its proceeds, including a claim to rescind a negotiation and to recover the instrument or its proceeds], and (vi) without notice that any party has a defense or claim in recoupment described in Section 3-305(a).

UCC § 3-302(a).

Under Article 3, a holder in due course of a negotiable mortgage note takes the mortgage note free of (a) all prior claims to or regarding the mortgage note by any person and (b) most defenses to enforceability of the mortgage note that may be raised by parties with whom the holder in due course has not dealt. See UCC §§ 3-305 and 3-306; see also Provident Bank v. Community Home Mortgage Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 558, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). The defenses to which a holder in due course may be subject are found in UCC § 3-305, and
include:

a defense of the obligor based on (i) infancy of the obligor to the extent it is a defense to a simple contract, (ii) duress, lack of legal capacity, or illegality of the transaction which, under other law, nullifies the obligation of the obligor, (iii) fraud that induced the obligor to sign the instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to learn of its character or its essential terms, or (iv) discharge of the obligor in insolvency proceedings.

UCC § 3-305(a)(1).

How Is a Mortgage Note Transferred Under Article 9 of the UCC?
The sale of mortgage notes is also governed, in significant part, by Article 9. Article 9 establishes
(1) whether the interests of a transferee of a mortgage note have both “attached” and become “perfected” so that those interests will prevail over conflicting claims of third parties and (2) the rights of the transferee in and to the underlying mortgage that secures the mortgage note.

Article 9 addresses the sale of mortgage notes, regardless of whether they are negotiable or nonnegotiable. More specifically, Article 9 applies to “a sale of . . . promissory notes.” UCC § 9-109(a)(3). A “promissory note” is defined as “an instrument that evidences a promise to pay a monetary obligation, does not evidence an order to pay, and does not contain an acknowledgment by a bank that the bank has received for deposit a sum of money or funds.” UCC § 9-102(a)(65). Given this broad definition, residential mortgage notes in common use today are typically “promissory notes” for purposes of Article 9.

Under Article 9, the sale of a mortgage note (whether or not the mortgage note is negotiable) is deemed a secured transaction and the transferee’s “security interest” is automatically perfected when it attaches (more on “attachment” and “perfection” below). See UCC § 9-309(4). While security interests are most commonly thought of as the liens obtained by lenders, the UCC defines the term “security interest” to also include “any interest of a . . . buyer of . . . a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to Article 9.” UCC § 1-201(b)(35) (emphasis added). In addition, the definition of “secured party” includes “a person to which . . . promissory notes have been sold.” UCC § 9-102(a)(72)(D).

Before a buyer’s “security interest” in a mortgage note can be perfected under Article 9, the security interest must “attach.” A security interest attaches when (1) value has been given for the sale, (2) the seller has rights in the mortgage note or the power to transfer rights in the mortgage note to the buyer and (3) either (a) the mortgage note is in the possession of the buyer pursuant to a security agreement of the seller or (b) the seller has signed a written or electronic security agreement that describes the mortgage note. See UCC § 9-203(b). Article 9 defines “security agreement” as “an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest,” UCC § 9-102(a)(73), which, in the context of a mortgage loan securitization, would include an agreement pursuant to which mortgages and mortgage notes are sold and transferred from one entity to another. Such an agreement, normally a pooling and servicing agreement or trust agreement, typically will provide that the transfer of the mortgage note pursuant thereto effects a sale of the mortgage note, which would thus, under Article 9, constitute a “security agreement.”

Significantly, the attachment of a security interest in a mortgage note that is itself “secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property is also attachment of a security interest in the security interest, mortgage or other lien.” UCC § 9-203(g) (emphasis added). Similarly, under UCC § 9-308(e), perfection of a security interest in a promissory note “also perfects a security interest in a security interest, mortgage, or other lien on personal or real property securing the right.” UCC § 9-308(e) (emphasis added). In other words, perfection of a security interest (which includes a sale to a buyer) in a mortgage note pursuant to Article 9 also perfects a security interest in the mortgage that secures the note.

Perfection of the interest in the mortgage note is important because it provides the transferee of the mortgage note with a right in the mortgage note and mortgage superior to that of a subsequent lien creditor of the seller. And, perfection provides the transferee of the mortgage note with a right in the mortgage superior to that of a subsequent lien creditor of the mortgagee, which includes a bankruptcy trustee (see UCC § 9-102(a)(52)). See UCC § 9-308 cmt.

Transfer of Mortgage Notes: Conclusion
In summary, under the UCC, the transfer of a mortgage note that is a negotiable instrument is most commonly effected by indorsing the note, which may be a blank or special indorsement, and delivering the mortgage note to the transferee (or the agent acting on behalf of the transferee). As the residential mortgage notes in common usage typically are “negotiable instruments,” this is the most common method of transfer.

In addition, even without indorsement, the assignment can be effected by transferring possession under UCC § 3-203(a). Moreover, the sale of any mortgage note also effects the assignment and transfer of the mortgage under Article 9. The attachment and perfection of the buyer’s interest in the mortgage note attaches and perfects the buyer’s interest in the underlying mortgage that secures the mortgage note. Securitization agreements often
provide both for (a) the indorsement and transfer of possession to the trustee or the custodian for the trustee, which would constitute a negotiation of the mortgage note under Article 3 of the UCC and (b) an outright sale and assignment of the mortgage note. Thus, regardless of whether the mortgage notes in a securitization trust are deemed “negotiable” or “non-negotiable,” the securitization process generally includes a valid transfer of the mortgage notes to the trustee in accordance with the explicit requirements of the UCC.

3. Assignment and Transfer of Ownership of Mortgages
As described above, when a mortgage loan is assigned and transferred as part of the securitization of the loan in the secondary market, both the mortgage note and the mortgage itself are typically sold, assigned, and physically transferred to the trustee that is acting on behalf of the MBS investors or to a trustee-designated document custodian pursuant to a custody agreement. The assignment and transfer are usually documented and performed in accordance with a pooling and servicing agreement.

What is the Relationship Between the Transfer of a Mortgage Note and the Transfer of Ownership of the Mortgage?
When a mortgage note is transferred in accordance with common mortgage loan securitization processes, the mortgage is also automatically transferred to the mortgage note transferee under the UCC and the general common law rule that “the mortgage follows the note.” See, e.g., Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 275 (1873) (“The transfer of the note carries with it the security, without any formal assignment or delivery, or even mention of the latter.”); Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Coakley, 41 A.D.3d 674, 674 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 2007) (“the mortgage . . . passed as an incident to the promissory note”); Restatement (Third) of Property, Mortgages § 5.4(a) (1997) (“A transfer of an obligation secured by a mortgage also transfers the mortgage . . . . ”).

The rule that “the mortgage follows the note” has been codified in the UCC, but the rule’s common law origins date back hundreds of years, long before the creation of the UCC. As stated in the official comments to UCC § 9-203(g), that section “codifies the common-law rule that a transfer of an obligation secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property also transfers the security interest or lien.” UCC §9-203 cmt.

All states follow this rule.16 In addition to the codification of the rule under UCC § 9-203(g), reported court cases in nearly every state and non-UCC statutory provisions in some states make clear that “the mortgage follows the note”:

Alabama: Armour Fertilizer Works v. Zills, 177 So. 136, 138 (Ala. 1937) (“when the note is secured by a mortgage, such mortgage follows the note”).
Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat § 33-817 (“The transfer of any contract or contracts secured by a trust deed shall operate as a transfer of the security for such contract or contracts.”).
Arkansas: Leach v. First Cmty. Bank, No. CA 07-05, 2007 WL 2852599, at *1 (Ark. App. Ct. Oct. 3, 2007) (“Arkansas has long followed the rule that, in the absence of an agreement or a plain manifestation of a contrary intention, the security of the original mortgage follows the note or renewal thereof.”).

California: Cal. Civ. Code § 2936 (“The assignment of a debt secured by mortgage carries with it the security”); In re Staff Mortgage & Invest. Corp., 625 F.2d 281, 284 (9th Cir. 1980) (in California, “[A] deed of trust is a mere incident of the debt it secures and . . . an assignment of the debt ‘carries with it the security.” (internal quotation omitted)).

Colorado: Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 275 (1873) (in an appeal from the Supreme Court of Colorado Territory, the United States Supreme Court stated: “The transfer of the note carries with it the security, without any formal assignment or delivery, or even mention of the latter.”).

Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 49-17 (“When any mortgage is foreclosed by the person entitled to receive the money secured thereby but to whom the legal title to the mortgaged premises has never been conveyed, the title to such premises shall, upon the expiration of the time limited for redemption and on failure of redemption, vest in him in the same manner and to the same extent as such title would have vested in the mortgagee if he had foreclosed, provided the person so foreclosing shall forthwith cause the decree of foreclosure to be recorded in the land records in the town in which the land lies.”); In re AMSCO, Inc., 26 B.R. 358, 361 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982) (“An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it . . . .”).

District of Columbia: Hill v. Hawes, 144 F.2d 511, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (after mortgage note has been cancelled, cancellation of “any mortgage follows as a matter of course and does not require a separate action”).

Florida: Capital Investors Co. v. Ex’rs of Estate of Morrison, 484 F.2d 1157, 1163 n.12 (4th Cir. 1973) (“That the mortgage follows the note it secures and derives negotiability, if any, from the note is the rule in Florida where the land under mortgage in this case was located.” (citing Daniels v. Katz, 237 So.2d 58, 60 (Fla. App. 1970); Meyerson v. Boyce, 97 So.2d 488, 489 (Fla. App. 1957))); Margiewicz v. Terco Properties, 441 So.2d 1124, 1125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (when a note secured by a mortgage is assigned, the mortgage follows the note into the hands of the mortgagee).

Illinois: Federal Nat’l Mort. Ass’n v. Kuipers, 314 Ill. App.3d 631, 635, 732 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000) (“The assignment of a mortgage note carries with it an equitable assignment of the mortgage by which it was secured. The assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor-mortgagee with regard to the rights and interests under the note and mortgage. . . . [I]n Illinois, the assignment of the mortgage note is sufficient to transfer the underlying mortgage.”) (citations omitted).

Indiana: Lagow v. Badollet, 1 Blackf. 416, 1826 WL 1087, at *3 (Ind. 1826) (“a mortgage . . . follows the debt into whose hands soever it may pass”).

Iowa: Bremer County Bank v. Eastman, 34 Iowa 392, 1872 WL 254, at *1 (Iowa 1872) (“The transfer of the note, secured by the mortgage, carried the mortgage with it as an incident to the debt, and the indorsee of the note could maintain an action in his own name, to foreclose the mortgage without any assignment thereon whatever.”).

Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann § 58-2323 (“The assignment of any mortgage as herein provided shall carry with it the debt thereby secured.”); Bank Western v. Henderson, 255 Kan. 343, 354, 874 P.2d 632, 640 (1994) (“[T]he mortgage follows the note. A perfected claim to the note is equally perfected as to the mortgage.”).

Maryland: In re Bird, No. 03-52010-JS, 2007 WL 2684265, at *2-4 (Bankr. D.Md. Sept. 7, 2007) (“The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it . . . .”).

Massachusetts: The transfer of a mortgage note, without the express transfer of the mortgage, vests in the note holder an equitable interest in the mortgage (an interest that can be enforced by the note holder) and the mortgage holder is deemed to hold the mortgage in constructive trust for the benefit of the note holder. See Weinberg v. Brother, 263 Mass. 61, 62 (1928); Barnes v. Boardman, 149 Mass. 106, 114 (1889); Morris v. Bacon, 123 Mass. 58, 59 (1877); First Nat’l Bank of Cape Cod v. North Adams Hoosac Savs. Bank, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 790, 796 (1979); see also In re Ivy Properties, Inc., 109 B.R. 10, 14 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (“[U]nder Massachusetts common law the assignment of a debt carries with it the underlying mortgage, without necessity for the granting or recording of a separate mortgage assignment.”).

Despite the above cited authorities, the Massachusetts Land Court in a recent opinion cast doubt on the “mortgage follows the note” rule:

[E]ven a valid transfer of the note does not automatically transfer the mortgage. . . . The holder of the note may have an equitable right to obtain an assignment of the mortgage by filing an action in equity, but that is all it has. . . . The mortgage itself remains with the mortgagee (or, if properly assigned, its assignee) who is deemed to hold the legal title in trust for
the purchaser of the debt until the formal assignment of the mortgage to the note holder or, absent such assignment, by order of the court in an action for conveyance of the mortgage.
. . . But . . . the right to get something and actually having it are two different things.

U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, Nos. 08 MISC 384283 (KCL), 08 MISC 386755 (KCL), 2009 WL 3297551, at *11 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 14, 2009) (citations omitted).

The Ibanez case appears to stand in stark contrast to the principles embodied in the UCC.
The Ibanez case was affirmed and Judges concurred on appeal before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, that state’s highest court.

Michigan: Prime Fin. Serv. v. Vinton, 279 Mich. App. 245, 257, 761 N.W.2d 694, 704 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (“the transfer of a note necessarily includes a transfer of the mortgage with it”) (citing Ginsberg v. Capitol City Wrecking Co., 300 Mich. 712, 717, 2 N.W.2d 892 (1942)); Jones v. Titus, 208 Mich. 392, 397, 175 N.W. 257, 259 (Mich. 1919) (when a note given with a mortgage was indorsed over to a third party it carried with it the equitable title to the mortgage).

Minnesota: Jackson v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 497 (Minn. 2009) (“Absent an agreement to the contrary, an assignment of the promissory note operates as an equitable assignment of the underlying security interest.”) (emphasis in original).

Mississippi: Holmes v. McGinty, 44 Miss. 94, 1870 WL 4406, at *4 (“[T]he mortgage . . . follows the debt as an incident, and is a security for whomsoever may be the beneficial owner of it.”).

Missouri: George v. Surkamp, 76 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Mo. 1934) (when the holder of the promissory note assigns or transfers the note, the deed of trust is also transferred).

Montana: First Nat’l Bank v. Vagg, 65 Mont. 34, 212 P. 509, 511 (Mont. 1922) (“The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while the assignment of the latter alone is a nullity. The mortgage can have no separate existence.”) (citations omitted).

Nebraska: In re Union Packing Co., 62 B.R. 96, 100 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986) (with or without the
assignment of the mortgage, the assignee of the promissory note has the right to enforce the mortgage securing the note).

New Hampshire: Southerin v. Mendum, 5 N.H. 420, 1831 WL 1104, at *7 (N.H. 1831) (“When a
mortgagee transfers to another person , the debt which is secured by the mortgage, he ceases to have any control over the mortgage. . . . And we are of the opinion, that the interest of the mortgagee passes in all cases with the debt, and that it is not within the statute of frauds, because it is a mere incident to the debt, has no value independent of the debt, and cannot be separated from the debt.”).

New Jersey: In re Kennedy Mort. Co., 17 B.R. 957, 966 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1982) (“Anyone interested in acquiring an interest in the mortgage would be obliged to obtain an interest in the debt.”).

New York: Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Coakley, 41 A.D.3d 674, 838 N.Y.S.2d 622 (App. Div. 2007) (“at the time of the commencement of this action, MERS was the lawful holder of the promissory note (see UCC 3-204[1]; Franzese v. Fidelity N.Y. FSB, 214 A.D.2d 646, 625 N.Y.S.2d 275), and of the mortgage, which passed as an incident to the promissory note (see Payne v. Wilson, 74 N.Y. 348, 354-355; see also Weaver Hardware Co. v. Solomovitz, 235 N.Y. 321, 139 N.E. 353; Matter of Falls, 31 Misc. 658, 660, 66 N.Y.S. 47, aff’d. 66 A. D. 616, 73 N.Y.S. 1134”) (emphasis added); Provident Bank v. Community Home Mortgage Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 558, 564-65 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (applying principle that the mortgage follows the note).

North Carolina: Dixie Grocery Co. v. Hoyle, 204 N.C. 109, 167 S.E. 469 (1933) (“The mortgage follows the debt.”).

Ohio: U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n v. Marcino, 181 Ohio App.3d 328, 337 (2009) (“[T]he negotiation of a note operates as an equitable assignment of the mortgage, even when the mortgage is not assigned or delivered. Kuck v. Sommers (1950), 100 N.E.2d 68, 75, 59 Ohio Abs. 400. Various sections of the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted in Ohio, support the conclusion that the owner of a promissory note should be recognized as the owner of the related mortgage. . . . Thus, although the recorded assignment is not before us, there is sufficient evidence on the record to establish that appellee is the current owner of the note and mortgage at issue in this case, and, therefore, the real party in interest.”) (citations to Ohio’s versions of UCC §§ 9-109(a)(3), 9-102(a)(72)(D) and 9-203(g) omitted).

Oklahoma: Zorn v. Van Buskirk, 111 Okla. 211, 239 P. 151 (1925) (“the mortgage follows the note”).

Pennsylvania: In re Miller, No. 99-25616JAD, 2007 WL 81052, at *6 & n.7 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Jan.
9, 2007) (citing and quoting with approval Gray, Mortgages in Pennsylvania at § 1-3 (1985) (“the
mortgage follows the note”)).

South Carolina: MidFirst Bank, SSB v. C.W. Haynes & Co., Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1304, 1318 (D. S.C. 1994) (“South Carolina recognizes the ‘familiar and uncontroverted proposition’ that ‘the assignment of a note secured by a mortgage carries with it an assignment of the mortgage.’ Hahn v. Smith, 157 S.C. 157, 154 S.E. 112 (1930); Ballou v. Young, 42 S.C. 170, 20 S.E. 84 (1894).”).

Texas: Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Williams, 230 F.2d 330, 333 (5th Cir. 1956) (applying Texas law) (“The rule is fully recognized . . . that a mortgage to secure a negotiable promissory note is merely an incident to the debt, and passes by assignment or transfer of the note.”).

Utah: Smith v. Jarman, 211 P. 962, 966 (Utah 1922) (“The modern doctrine that the mortgage follows the note as an incident was thus long ago recognized by this court . . . .”).

Virginia: Yerby v. Lynch, 3 Gratt. 460, 1847 WL 2384, at *8-10 (Va. 1847) (“the mortgage follows the debt”).

Virgin Islands: UMLI C VP LLC v. Matthias, 234 F. Supp. 2d 520, 523 (D. V.I. 2002) (citing and quoting with approval the “RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PR OPER TY, MORTGAGES § 5.4(a) (1997). The comment to this section further explains that ‘[t]he principle of this subsection, that the mortgage follows the note, … applies even if the transferee does not know that the obligation is secured by a mortgage…. Recordation of a mortgage assignment is not necessary to the effective transfer of the obligation or the mortgage securing it.’ Id. § 5.4 cmt. b (1997). Accordingly, in the Virgin Islands, no separate document specifically assigning and transferring the mortgage which secures a note is required to accompany the assignment of the obligation, because the mortgage automatically follows the note.”).

Washington: Nance v. Woods, 79 Wash. 188, 189, 140 P. 323, 323 (Wash. 1914) (“the mortgage follows the note”).

As mentioned above, the general common law rule that “the mortgage follows the note” is codified in Article 9 of the UCC. Section 9-203(g) of the UCC states: “The attachment of a security interest in a right to payment or performance secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property is also attachment of a security interest in the security interest, mortgage, or other lien.”17 UCC § 9-203(g) (emphasis added). The phrase “security interest” in this provision includes a buyer’s ownership interest because UCC § 1-201(b)(35) defines “security interest” to include “any interest of a . . . buyer of . . . a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to Article 9.” Thus, under Article 9, a sale of a mortgage note means that the buyer’s rights attach not only to the mortgage note itself but also to the mortgage that secures the mortgage note. Moreover, under UCC § 9-308(e), those rights are perfected and can be enforced against third parties. Regarding the impact of these UCC provisions, one treatise states: “Article 9 makes it as plain as possible that the secured party need not record an assignment of mortgage, or anything else, in the real property records in order to perfect its rights in the mortgage.” J. McDonnell and J. Smith, Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code, § 16.09[3][b].

Courts in several states have affirmed and applied the “mortgage follows the note” rule in cases where the mortgage assignment was not recorded by the transferee.19 See, e.g., Nat’l Livestock Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 203 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1906) (citing with approval a decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas for the proposition that “where a mortgage upon real estate is given to secure payment of a negotiable note, and before its maturity the note and mortgage are transferred by indorsement of the note to a bona fide holder, the assignment, if there be a written one, need not be recorded”); Jackson v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 497-98, 500 (Minn. 2009) (applying the “mortgage follows the note” rule where there was no assignment of the mortgage); UMLI C VP LLC v. Matthias, 234 F. Supp. 2d 520, 523 (D. V.I. 2002) (“Recordation of a mortgage assignment is not necessary to the effective transfer of the obligation or the mortgage securing it.”); Federal Nat’l Mort. Ass’n v. Kuipers, 314 Ill. App. 3d 631, 635, 732 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000) (“Because the assignment of the debt, with nothing more, is sufficient to preserve the mortgage lien, it cannot follow that the lien is somehow extinguished for the failure to record the assignment. Therefore, we are persuaded that the mortgage lien and priority position inure to the benefit of the assignee and that recording the assignment is unnecessary to preserve the security for the debt.”); In re Kennedy Mortgage Co., 17 B.R. 957, 964 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982) (“The fact that assignments of mortgages may be recorded does not affect the validity of an assignment of a mortgage which has not been recorded.”).

Courts have also affirmed and applied the “mortgage follows the note” rule even when there was no actual separate written assignment of the mortgage. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 275 (1873) (“The transfer of the note carries with it the security, without any formal assignment or delivery, or even mention of the latter.”); Chase Home Fin., LLC v. Fequiere, 119 Conn. App. 570, 989 A.2d 606, 610-11 (Conn. Ct. App. 2010) (“General Statutes § 49-17 [which codifies the “mortgage follows the note” rule] permits the holder of a negotiable instrument that is secured by a mortgage to foreclose on the mortgage even when the mortgage has not yet been assigned to him.” (emphasis added)); U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n v. Marcino, 181 Ohio App.3d 328, 337 (2009) (holding that bank was the “current owner” of a mortgage note and the related mortgage despite the fact that “there is no evidence on the record that appellee is the current assignee of the note and mortgage,” and finding that “the negotiation of a note operates as an equitable assignment of the mortgage, even when the mortgage is not assigned or delivered” (citing Kuck v. Sommers, 100 N.E.2d 68, 75, 59 Ohio Abs. 400 (1950)); UMLI C VP LLC v. Matthias, 234 F. Supp. 2d 520, 523 (D. V.I. 2002) (the principle “that the mortgage follows the note, . . . applies even if the transferee does not know that the obligation is secured by a mortgage”); In re Union Packing Co., 62 B.R. 96, 100 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986) (with or without the assignment of the mortgage, the assignee of the promissory note has the right to enforce the mortgage securing the note); Morris v. Bacon, 123 Mass. 58, 59 (1877) (note holder that endorsed and delivered mortgage note to bank as security for a loan, but without an assignment of the mortgage, was required by the court to transfer the mortgage to the bank); Bremer County Bank v. Eastman, 34 Iowa 392, 1872 WL 254, at *1 (Iowa 1872) (“The transfer of the note, secured by the mortgage, carried the mortgage with it as an incident to the debt, and the indorsee of the note could maintain an action in his own name, to foreclose the mortgage without any assignment thereon whatever.”); Southerin v. Mendum, 5 N.H. 420, 1831 WL 1104, at *8 (N.H. 1831) (“the right of the mortgagee before foreclosure is . . . assignable by a mere assignment of the debt, without deed or writing”).

Common MBS practices, as described above, are consistent with the general rule that “the mortgage follows the note”: pursuant to the pooling and servicing agreement that governs a mortgage-loan securitization, and the language of assignment typically contained in such an agreement, the mortgage note and the mortgage itself are sold, assigned, transferred and delivered to the trustee, and the transferor also typically delivers a written assignment of the mortgage that is in blank in recordable form. Courts have held that the language of assignment contained in a pooling and servicing agreement, along with the corresponding transfer, sale and delivery of the mortgage note and mortgage, are sufficient to transfer the mortgage to the transferee/trustee or its designee or nominee. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Konover, No. 3:05 CV 1924 (CFD), 2009 WL 2710229, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug. 21, 2009) (MBS pooling agreement vested authority in pool trustee to bring legal action in the event of default); U.S. Bank N.A. v. Cook, No. 07 C 1544, 2009 WL 35286, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2009) (MBS pooling trust agreement effected an assignment of the mortgage at issue to the pool trustee); In re Samuels, 415 B.R. 8, 18 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) (“The [Pooling and Servicing Agreement] itself [by which the MBS loan trust was created], in conjunction with the schedule of mortgages deposited through it into the pool trust, served as a written assignment of the designated mortgage loans, including the mortgages themselves.”); EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Chaudhri FSB, 400 N.J. Super. 126, 141, 946 A.2d 578, 588 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2008) (“any [mortgage] assignment shall pass and convey the estate of the assignor in the mortgaged premises, and the assignee may sue thereon in his own name.’” (citing New Jersey Stat. Ann. § 46:9-9 and Byram Holding Co. v. Bogren, 2 N.J. Super. 331, 336, 63 A.2d 822 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1949)); LaSalle Bank N.A. v. Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 2d 618, 632-33 (D. Md. 2002) (MBS pooling agreement granted trustee authority to bring suit on behalf of trust); LaSalle Bank N.A. v. Nomura Asset Capital Corp., 180 F. Supp. 2d 465, 470-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (language in the pooling and servicing agreement for MBS trust effectually assigned mortgage to the pool trustee).

What is the Relationship Between the UCC and State Real Property Laws?
Article 9 does not apply to “the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real property, . . . except to the extent that provision is made for . . . liens on real property in Sections 9-203 and 9-308.” UCC §9-109(d)(11) (emphasis added). As discussed above, UCC § 9-203(g) provides that, when a security interest in a mortgage note attaches, a security interest in the underlying mortgage also attaches, and UCC § 9-308(e) provides the same regarding the perfection of the security interest. See UCC § 9-203 cmt. 9 (the “mortgage follows the note” rule codified into UCC §§ 9-203(g) and 9-308(e)). In addition, UCC § 9-109(b) makes clear that Article 9 does apply to mortgage notes even though Article 9 does not govern the creation of the mortgage itself:

The application of this article [9] to a security interest [remember that this term is defined to include any interest of a buyer of a promissory note in a transaction subject to Article 9] in a secured obligation [e.g., mortgage note] is not affected by the fact that the obligation [e.g., mortgage note] is itself secured by a transaction or interest [e.g., creation of the
mortgage or deed of trust itself] to which this article does not apply.

UCC § 9-109(b)

The creation of an interest in or lien on real property, including a mortgage, is governed by the non-UCC law of the state in which the property is located. See, e.g., Oregon v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378-79 (1977). Likewise, the enforceability of mortgages (including the right and method to foreclose) is subject to all of the conditions precedent and requirements that are set forth in the particular mortgage itself and in all applicable state and local laws. Those conditions precedent and procedural requirements vary from mortgage to mortgage and from state to state. Thus, ownership of a mortgage (i.e., without notice to the mortgagor or the public, without judicial proceedings (where required), without satisfaction of other conditions precedent or procedural requirements in the mortgage itself or in applicable state law), does not always give the holder of the mortgage the legal ability to foreclose on the mortgage. Though a discussion of the other necessary prerequisites to foreclosure is beyond the scope of this paper, the fact that other steps may need to be taken by the owner of a mortgage note, or the owner of a mortgage, is neither unique nor surprising in our legal and regulatory system and does not diminish an otherwise legally effective transfer of the mortgage note and mortgage.

How Does the Use of MERS Affect These Issues?
The use of MERS as the nominee for the benefit of the trustee and other transferees in the mortgage loan securitization process has been a subject of litigation in recent years. See, e.g., Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 619, 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). Some cases address the authority or ability of MERS or transferees of MERS to foreclose on a mortgage for which MERS is or was the mortgagee of record. See, e.g., Saxon Mort. Serv., Inc. v. Hillery, No. C-08-4357 EMC, 2008 WL 5170180, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2008). As a general matter, the assignment and transfer of a mortgage to MERS as nominee of and for the benefit of the beneficial owner of the mortgage does not adversely impact the right to foreclose on the mortgage.

Decisions in many jurisdictions support this conclusion. See, e.g., In re Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc. (MERS) Litig., No. 2:09-md-2119, 2010 WL 4038788, at *8 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2010) (“Plaintiffs have not cited any legal authority where the naming of MERS . . . was cause to enjoin a non-judicial foreclosure as wrongful.”); Commonwealth Property Advocates, LLC v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 2:10-CV-340 TS, 2010 WL 3743643, at *3 (D. Utah Sept. 20, 2010) (MERS as nominee has authority to foreclose); Taylor v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. 5D09-4035, 2010 WL 3056612, at *3 (Fla. App. Aug. 6, 2010) (“[T]he written assignment of the note and mortgage from MERS to Deutsche Bank properly transferred the note and mortgage. . . . The transfer, moreover, was not defective by reason of the fact that MERS lacked a beneficial ownership interest in the note at the time of the assignment, because MERS was lawfully acting in the place of the holder and was given explicit and agreed upon authority to make just such an assignment.”); Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Bellistri, No. 4:09-CV-731 CAS, 2010 WL 2720802, at *15 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2010) (“[a]s the nominee of the original lender … or the lender’s assigns, MERS has bare legal title to the note and deed of trust securing it, and this is sufficient to create standing” to initiate foreclosure proceedings); Silvas v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, No. CV-09-265-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 4573234, at *8 (D. Ariz. Jan. 5, 2010) (MERS empowered to foreclose where MERS is designated on deed of trust as beneficiary); Diessner v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1187-91 (D. Ariz. 2009) (MERS and trustee under deed of trust are authorized to institute non-judicial foreclosure proceeding); Jackson v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 501 (Minn. 2009) (rejecting argument that transfer of mortgage note to MERS is a transfer that must be recorded before foreclosure); Reynoso v. Paul Financial, LLC, No. 09-3225 SC, 2009 WL 3833298, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2009) (naming of MERS as initial beneficiary under deed of trust, as nominee for the lender, and the subsequent transfer of the deed of trust from MERS to a transferee was effective and did not hinder transferee’s right to foreclose); Blau v. America’s Servicing Co., No. CV-08-773, 2009 WL 3174823, at *8 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2009) (MERS authorized under deed of trust to act on behalf of lender and transfer its interests); Farahani v. Cal-Western Recon. Corp., No. 09-194, 2009 WL 1309732, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2009) (MERS authorized to pursue non-judicial foreclosure action); Vazquez v. Aurora Loan Servs., No 2:08-cv-01800-RCJRJJ, 2009 WL 1076807, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 20, 2009) (loan documents sufficiently demonstrate MERS’ standing “with respect to the loan and the foreclosure”); Pfannenstiel v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., No. CIV S-08-2609, 2009 WL 347716, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2009) (dismissing plaintiff ’s claim that MERS lacked authority to foreclose); Trent v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., 288 Fed. App’x 571, 572 (11th Cir. 2008) (MERS “has the legal right to foreclose on the debtors’ property” and “is the mortgagee”); Peyton v. Recontrust Co., No. TC021868, Notice of Ruling, at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. County of Los Angeles S. Cent. Dist. Oct. 15, 2008) (MERS may foreclose under California law); Johnson v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., 252 Fed. App’x 293, 294 (11th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment for MERS on its action for foreclosure of plaintiff ’s property); In re Smith, 366 B.R. 149, 151 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007) (MERS has standing to conduct foreclosure on behalf of the beneficiary); Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Revoredo, 955 So.2d 33, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“Because, however, it is apparent – and we so hold – that no substantive rights, obligations or defenses are affected by use of the MERS device, there is no reason why mere form should overcome the salutary substance of permitting the use of this commercially effective means of business.”); Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Ventura, CV054003168S, 2006 WL 1230265, at *1 (Conn. Super. Apr. 20, 2006) (MERS is proper party in foreclosure).

There are several minority decisions that, in some form, have taken issue with MERS. But none of these decisions, to our knowledge, has invalidated a mortgage for which MERS is the nominee, and none of these decisions has challenged MERS’ ability to act as a central system to track changes in the ownership and servicing of loans:22 See Rinegard-Guirma v. Bank of Am., Nat’l Ass’n, No. 10-1065-PK , 2010 WL 3945476, at *4 (D. Or. Oct. 6, 2010) (suggesting that MERS may not qualify as a legitimate beneficiary of a deed of trust under Oregon law, and preliminarily enjoining foreclosure action by MERS); In re Allman, No. 08-31282-elp7, 2010 WL 3366405, at *10 (Bankr. D. Or. Aug. 24, 2010) (same); Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289, 297 (Me. 2010); In re Box, No. 10-20086, 2010 WL 2228289, at *5 (Bankr W.D. Mo. June 3, 2010) (finding that MERS, as beneficiary and nominee under the deed of trust lacked authority to assign the mortgage note because it never “held” the note itself);23 In re Hawkins, No. BK -s-07-13593-LBR , 2009 WL901766, at *3 (Bankr. D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2009) (finding that MERS was not a true “beneficiary” under a deed of trust, that, under the UCC, MERS was not entitled to enforce the note, and that “[i]n order to foreclose, MERS must establish there has been a sufficient transfer of both the note and deed of trust, or that it has authority under state law to act for the note’s holder”).

Finally, it is important to recognize that the UCC does not displace traditional rules of agency law.
See UCC § 1-103(b) (“Unless displaced by the particular provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code], the principles of law and equity, including the law [of] . . . principal and agent . . . supplement its provisions.”); see
also UCC § 9-313 cmt. 3 (principles of agency apply for purposes of determining “possession” under Article 9).
Under general agency law, an agent has authority to act on behalf of its principal where the principal “manifests assent” to the agent “that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.” Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006).

Accordingly, the UCC does not prevent MERS or others, including loan servicers, from acting as the agent for the note holder in connection with transfers of ownership in mortgage notes and mortgages. See, e.g., In re Tucker, No. 10-61004, 2010 WL 3733916, at *6 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Sept. 20, 2010) (finding MERS was the “agent for [the lender] under the Deed of Trust from the inception, and MERS became the agent for each subsequent note-holder under the Deed of Trust when each such note holder negotiated the Note to its successor and assign”); King v. Am. Mortgage Network, Inc., No. 1:09CV162 DAK, 2010 WL 3516475, at *3 (D. Utah Sept. 2, 2010) (rejecting argument that note and deed of trust were split because Fannie Mae held the note and MERS was listed as the nominal beneficiary under the deed of trust and finding that both MERS and the authorized loan servicer had authority as agents of the note holder to act on behalf of the note holder, including the initiation of foreclosure proceedings on the underlying property); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204(1)(d) (“The party foreclosing the mortgage is either the owner of the indebtedness or of an interest in the indebtedness secured by the mortgage or the servicing agent of the mortgage.”); Hilmon v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 06-13055, 2007 WL 1218718, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 2007); Caravantes v. California Reconveyance Co., No. 10-cv-1407-IEG (AJB), 2010 WL 4055560, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2010) (“as servicer of the subject loan in this case, JP Morgan had the authority to record the Notice of Default and to enforce the power of sale under the Deed of Trust”); Birkland v. Silver State Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 2:10-CV-00035-KJD-LRL, 2010 WL3419372, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 25, 2010) (“MERS, as nominee on a deed of trust, is granted authority as an agent on behalf of the nominator (holder of the promissory note) as to the administration of the deed of trust, which would include substitution of trustees”). In short, principles of agency law provide MERS and loan servicers another legal basis for their respective roles in the transfer of mortgage notes and mortgages.

4. Conclusion

In summary, the longstanding and consistently applied rule in the United States is that, when a mortgage note is transferred, “the mortgage follows the note.” When a mortgage note is transferred and delivered to a transferee in connection with the securitization of the mortgage loan pursuant to an MBS pooling and servicing agreement or similar agreement, the mortgage automatically follows and is transferred to the mortgage note transferee, notwithstanding that a third party, including an agent/nominee entity such as MERS, may remain as the mortgagee of record. Both common law and the UCC confirm and apply this rule, including in the context of mortgage loan securitizations. The legal principles and processes discussed above provide for – and, if followed, result in – a valid and enforceable transfer of mortgage notes and the underlying mortgages. The transfer and legal effectiveness of mortgage notes and mortgages are not diminished by the fact that the enforceability of mortgages, including the right to foreclose, is subject to the conditions precedent and requirements that are set forth in the particular mortgage itself and in the laws of the state in which the mortgaged property is located.

Footnotes:

1. References to the UCC are to the Official Text of the Model UCC, as revised, issued by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
2. Note that the UCC replaces the more common U.S. spelling of “endorsement” for the less common “indorsement.” The UCC spelling is used throughout this Executive Summary.3. However, in some states, such as Massachusetts and Minnesota, courts have held that the transfer of a mortgage note without an
express transfer of the mortgage vests in the note holder only an equitable interest in the mortgage. This arrangement has been
described as follows: the holder of the mortgage holds the legal title to the mortgage in constructive trust for the benefit of the
mortgage note holder. In both states, however, case law suggests that foreclosure proceedings must be initiated by, or at least in the
name of, the holder of the legal title in the mortgage.
4. In most states, recording of an assignment of mortgage is generally not required to ensure the enforceability of the assignment of mortgage as between the assignor and assignee, and anyone with knowledge thereof. It is beyond the scope of this post to discuss in detail the potential risks to the mortgage transferee of not recording a mortgage assignment.
Those risks might include, among others, delaying the transferee’s ability to foreclose on the mortgage, failing to receive notices that may go to the mortgagee of record, and otherwise leaving the assignee open to negligent or fraudulent actions or inactions by the mortgagee of record that could bind the mortgage transferee and impair the value or enforceability of the mortgage. Similarly, when an assignment of mortgage is not recorded, the assignor may be liable for certain obligations imposed upon a mortgagee of record, such as the obligation to provide a pay-off statement or mortgage release within a designated time period.

5. Issues related to a party’s right to foreclose or to engage in foreclosure-related activities are generally outside the scope of this paper.
6. For ease of reference, “mortgage” will be used throughout much of this post to refer to both mortgages and deeds of trust, and “mortgage note” will be used to refer to a promissory note that is secured by a mortgage.

7. References to the UCC are to the Official Text of the Model UCC, as revised, issued by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws.
8. While Article 9 does not directly govern a mortgage on real property, the fact that a mortgage note is itself secured by a mortgage on real property does not render Article 9 inapplicable to transfers of the mortgage note. See UCC § 9-109(b) (“The application of this article [9] to a security interest in a secured obligation is not affected by the fact that the obligation is itself secured by a transaction or interest to which this article does not apply.”).
9. Note that the UCC eschews the more common U.S. spelling of “endorsement” for the less common “indorsement.” The UCC spelling is used throughout this paper.

10. Article 3 and Article 9 are not mutually exclusive. Article 9 applies to the transfer of all “promissory notes,” which includes negotiable
and non-negotiable instruments. Both Article 3 and Article 9 apply to “negotiable instruments.” With respect to non-negotiable instruments, only Article 9 applies to the transfer.
11. UCC § 3-104(b) defines “instrument” simply as a “negotiable instrument” for purposes of Article 3. As discussed in more detail below, the definition of “instrument” in Article 9 (governing secured transactions) is somewhat more expansive.

12. It is important to note that Article 3 does not concern “ownership” of a mortgage note, but instead provides for the transfer of a mortgage note and the right to enforce such notes. See UCC § 3-301; UCC § 3-203 cmt. 1. A party need not be the “owner” of the mortgage note to enforce it. See UCC § 3-301 (“A person may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument.”). Thus, a party may have the right to enforce the instrument, but not have “ownership” of that instrument. UCC § 3-203 cmt 1. For an example of situations where a party with the right to enforce an instrument is not also the “owner” of the instrument, see UCC 3-203 cmt. 1 and Note 16 infra.
13. Note also that UCC § 3-203(c) provides for the scenario in which an instrument is transferred for value without the indorsement that, as described in the text below, would be needed for the mortgage note to have been “negotiated.” Under that section, if a negotiable mortgage note is transferred for value as part of a loan securitization, but the transferor fails to indorse the note, the transferee of the note has the “specifically enforceable right to the unqualified indorsement of the transferor.” UCC § 3-203(c); see Note 16, infra (discussing distinction between the right to enforce a mortgage note and ownership of the mortgage note).

14. An indorsement is considered to be made “on an instrument” for purposes of negotiation when it is made either on the mortgage note itself or on a separate paper, often referred to as an “allonge,” that is affixed to the note. See UCC § 3-204(a). Once affixed, the allonge becomes “part of the instrument.” Id.
15. As noted above, the right to enforce an instrument and the ownership of that instrument are not necessarily the same. See UCC §3-203 cmt. 1. Thus, a party may have the right to enforce the instrument, but not have “ownership” of that instrument. Id. A party need not be the “owner” of the note to enforce it. See UCC § 3-301 (“A person may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument.”). For example, if X (holder of an instrument payable to X) sells the instrument to Y pursuant to a document conveying all of X’s right, title and interest
in the instrument to Y, but does not deliver immediate possession to Y, Y would have ownership of the instrument under the agreement, but Y generally would not be entitled to enforce the instrument until it obtained possession of the instrument. Id.
16. UCC § 3-301 also permits a person without possession to enforce a mortgage note where, in certain circumstances, there has been mistaken payment as defined in UCC § 3-418(d).

17. Article 9 also applies to the creation of a lien on, or a “less-than-ownership security interest” in, a mortgage note. Because most assignments and transfers of mortgage notes in loan securitizations are of the ownership of the mortgage notes, not a mere lien on or security interest in the notes, this paper addresses only outright sales of mortgage notes under Article 9. The principles discussed below regarding attachment of a buyer’s interest in a sale of mortgage notes are identical to those that apply in the context of the creation of a lien on mortgage notes, and the principles regarding perfection of the interest in the mortgage notes are likewise very similar. “Although . . . Article [9] occasionally distinguishes between outright sales of receivables and sales that secure an obligation, neither . . . Article [9] nor the definition of “security interest” (Section 1-201(37)) delineates how a particular transaction is to be classified. That issue is left to the courts.” UCC § 9-109 cmt 4.
18. Under Article 9, the term “instrument” is defined broadly as “a negotiable instrument or any other writing that evidences a right to the payment of a monetary obligation, is not itself a security agreement or lease, and is of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment.” UCC § 9-102(a)(47).

19. The comments to UCC § 9-203 expressly provide that “Subsection (g) codifies the common-law rule that a transfer of an obligation secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property also transfers the security interest or lien.” UCC § 9-203 cmt. 9; see also Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) § 5.4(a) (1997). The same holds true for UCC § 9-308(e), under which perfection of a security interest in a mortgage note also accomplishes perfection of a security interest in the mortgage. See UCC §9-308 cmt. 6.

20. However, in some states, such as Massachusetts and Minnesota, courts have held that the transfer of a mortgage note without an express transfer of the mortgage vests in the note holder only an equitable interest in the mortgage. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Cape Cod v. North Adams Hoosac Savs. Bank, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 790, 796 (1979); Jackson v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 497, 500-01 (Minn. 2009). This arrangement has been described as follows: the holder of the mortgage holds the legal title to the mortgage in constructive trust for the benefit of the mortgage note holder. See First Nat’l Bank of Cape Cod, 7 Mass. App. Ct. at 796. In both states, however, case law suggests that foreclosure proceedings must be initiated by, or at least in the name of, the holder of the legal title in the mortgage. See Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 500; U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, Nos. 08 MISC 384283 (KCL), 08 MISC 386755 (KCL), 2009 WL 3297551, at *11 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 14, 2009) (rejecting argument that note holders had authority to foreclose on mortgages for which their status as full mortgagees was in dispute) (currently on appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court).

21. Courts have observed that UCC § 9-203(g) codifies the “mortgage follows the note” rule. See, e.g., U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n v. Marcino, 181 Ohio App.3d 328, 337 (2009) (quoting with approval Official Comment 9 to UCC § 9-203: “subsection (g) [of UCC § 9-203] codifies the common-law rule that a transfer of an obligation secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property also transfers the security interest or lien”).
22. As discussed above, UCC § 9-308(e) provides that “perfection of a security interest in a right to payment or performance also perfects a security interest in a security interest, mortgage, or other lien on personal or real property securing the right.” UCC §9-308(e) (emphasis added).
23. In most states, recording of an assignment of mortgage is generally not required to ensure the enforceability of the assignment of mortgage as between the assignor and assignee, and anyone with knowledge thereof. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail the potential risks to the mortgage transferee of not recording a mortgage assignment. Those risks might include, among others, delaying the transferee’s ability to foreclose on the mortgage, failing to receive notices that may go to the mortgagee of record, and otherwise leaving the assignee open to negligent or fraudulent actions or inactions by the mortgagee of record that could bind the mortgage transferee and impair the value or enforceability of the mortgage. Similarly, when an assignment of mortgage is not recorded, the assignor may be liable for certain obligations imposed upon a mortgagee of record, such as the obligation to provide a pay-off statement or mortgage release within a designated time period.

24. Although the rule is “the mortgage follows the note” when a mortgage note is assigned, some case law indicates that the converse is not true and that the mortgage note does not necessarily follow the mortgage if there is an attempted assignment of the mortgage alone or separate from the mortgage note. See, e.g., Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 619, 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (“An assignment of the deed of trust separate from the note has no ‘force.’”); Saxon Mort. Serv., Inc. v. Hillery, No. C-08-4357 EMC, 2008 WL 5170180, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2008) (“For there to be a valid assignment, there must be more than just assignment of the deed [of trust] alone; the note must also be assigned.”); In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 400-05 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009); Kelley v. Upshaw, 39 Cal.2d 179, 192 (1952) (“In any event, Kelley’s purported assignment of the mortgage without an assignment of the debt which is secured was a legal nullity.”). This is consistent with the longstanding aspect of the “mortgage follows the note” rule that “the note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident.” In re Bird, No. 03-52010-JS, 2007 WL 2684265, at *2-4 (Bankr. D.Md. Sept. 7, 2007).
25. UCC Article 3, which applies to negotiable mortgage notes, does not apply to mortgages themselves because mortgages do not fit the definition of “negotiable instrument” in UCC § 3-104(a).

26. Some investors and loan servicers have sought to lessen the risk of challenges to foreclosure pertaining to MERS by assigning loans out of MERS and to the note holder prior to the initiation of foreclosure.
27. The Court in In re Box expressly noted, but did not decide, the question of whether MERS had authority to assign the note as an agent of the lender or even as “a nominee beneficiary.” In re Box, 2010 WL 2228289 at *4. The same court, in a later case, answered the question directly and found that MERS, as the designated “nominee for the lender and its assigns,” “was the agent for [the lender] under the Deed of Trust from the inception, and MERS became agent for each subsequent note-holder under the Deed of Trust when each such note holder negotiated the Note to its successors and assigns.” In re Tucker, No. 10-61004, 2010 WL 3733916, at *6 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Sept. 20, 2010) (“[w]hen [note-holder] acquired the right to enforce the Note as the note-holder, MERS held the beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust on behalf of [note-holder] and [note-holder] had the right to enforce all the rights granted to [the original lender] and its successors and assigns in the Deed of Trust”). Thus, the Court found that the Note and the Deed of Trust were not split because of MERS’ status as agent for the note holders. Id.

28. Some parties to litigation, and commentators, have relied upon the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 2009), to support the proposition that the identification of MERS as a nominee on a mortgage is improper. However, reliance on the decision in Kesler for that proposition is misplaced and stretches the decision well-beyond its actual holding. In Kesler, the Court merely held that MERS, in its capacity as the nominee for the lender under a second-position mortgage, was not entitled to notice of a foreclosure sale by the holder of the senior mortgage. See id. at 169-70. As the Kansas Appeals Court that considered the case noted, “[w]hether MERS may act as a nominee for the lender, either to bring a foreclosure suit or for some other purpose, is not at issue….” Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 192 P.3d 177, 180 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).

For More Info on How To Effectively Challenge Your Wrongful Foreclosure Using Valid Mortgage Securitization Arguments, UCC and Relevant Case Laws: Visit http://www.fightforeclosure.net

Share this:

  • Twitter
  • Facebook

Like this:

Like Loading...
← Older posts

Enter your email address to follow this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Recent Posts

  • San Fernando Valley Con Man Pleads Guilty in Multi-Million Dollar Real Estate Fraud Scheme that Targeted Vulnerable Homeowners
  • Mortgage Application Fraud!
  • What Homeowners Must Know About Mortgage Forbearance
  • Cosigning A Mortgage Loan: What Both Parties Need To Know
  • What Homeowners Must Know About Filing Bankruptcy Without a Lawyer: Chapter 13 Issues

Categories

  • Affirmative Defenses
  • Appeal
  • Bankruptcy
  • Banks and Lenders
  • Borrower
  • Case Laws
  • Case Study
  • Credit
  • Discovery Strategies
  • Fed
  • Federal Court
  • Foreclosure
  • Foreclosure Crisis
  • Foreclosure Defense
  • Fraud
  • Judgment
  • Judicial States
  • Landlord and Tenant
  • Legal Research
  • Litigation Strategies
  • Loan Modification
  • MERS
  • Mortgage fraud
  • Mortgage Laws
  • Mortgage loan
  • Mortgage mediation
  • Mortgage Servicing
  • Non-Judicial States
  • Notary
  • Note – Deed of Trust – Mortgage
  • Pleadings
  • Pro Se Litigation
  • Real Estate Liens
  • RESPA
  • Restitution
  • Scam Artists
  • Securitization
  • State Court
  • Title Companies
  • Trial Strategies
  • Your Legal Rights

Archives

  • February 2022
  • March 2021
  • February 2021
  • September 2020
  • October 2019
  • July 2019
  • May 2019
  • April 2019
  • March 2019
  • January 2019
  • September 2018
  • July 2018
  • June 2018
  • May 2018
  • April 2018
  • March 2018
  • February 2018
  • January 2018
  • December 2017
  • November 2016
  • April 2016
  • March 2016
  • January 2016
  • December 2015
  • September 2015
  • October 2014
  • August 2014
  • July 2014
  • June 2014
  • May 2014
  • April 2014
  • January 2014
  • December 2013
  • November 2013
  • October 2013
  • September 2013
  • August 2013
  • July 2013
  • June 2013
  • May 2013

Recent Posts

  • San Fernando Valley Con Man Pleads Guilty in Multi-Million Dollar Real Estate Fraud Scheme that Targeted Vulnerable Homeowners
  • Mortgage Application Fraud!
  • What Homeowners Must Know About Mortgage Forbearance
  • Cosigning A Mortgage Loan: What Both Parties Need To Know
  • What Homeowners Must Know About Filing Bankruptcy Without a Lawyer: Chapter 13 Issues
Follow FightForeclosure.net on WordPress.com

RSS

  • RSS - Posts
  • RSS - Comments

Tags

5th circuit court 9th circuit 9th circuit court 10 years Adam Levitin adding co-borrower Adjustable-rate mortgage adjustable rate mortgage loan administrative office of the courts adversary proceeding affidavits Affirmative defense after foreclosure Alabama Annual percentage rate Appeal Appeal-able Orders Appealable appealable orders Appealing Adverse Decisions Appellate court Appellate Issues appellate proceeding appellate record applying for a mortgage Appraiser Areas of Liability arguments for appeal Arizona Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution Asset Asset Rental Assignment (law) Attorney Fees Attorney general August Aurora Loan Services of Nebraska automatic stay avoid foreclosure Avoid Mistakes During Bankruptcy Avoid Mistakes in Bankruptcy bad credit score bank bank forecloses Bank of America Bank of New York Bankrupcty Bankruptcy bankruptcy adversary proceeding bankruptcy appeal Bankruptcy Appeals Bankruptcy Attorney bankruptcy code bankruptcy court Bankruptcy Filing Fees bankruptcy mistakes bankruptcy on credit report bankruptcy process Bankruptcy Trustee Banks Banks and Lenders Bank statement Barack Obama Berkshire Hathaway Bill Blank endorsement Borrower borrower loan borrowers Borrowers in Bankruptcy Boston Broward County Broward County Florida Builder Bailout Business Buy and Bail Buyer Buyers buying a house buying foreclosed homes California California Court of Appeal California foreclosure California Residents Case in Review Case Trustees Center for Housing Policy CFPB’s Response chapter 7 chapter 7 bankruptcy chapter 11 chapter 11 bankruptcy Chapter 11 Plans chapter 13 chapter 13 bankruptcy Chinese style name Chunking circuit court Citi civil judgments Civil procedure Clerk (municipal official) Closed End Credit Closing/Settlement Agent closing argument collateral order doctrine collection Collier County Florida Colorado Complaint Computer program Consent decrees Consequences of a Foreclosure Consumer Actions Consumer Credit Protection Act Content Contractual Liability Conway Cosigning A Mortgage Loan Counsels Court Court clerk courts Courts of Nevada Courts of New York Credit credit bureaus Credit Counseling and Financial Management Courses credit dispute letter credit disputes Credit history Creditor credit repair credit repair company credit report credit reports Credit Score current balance Debt Debt-to-income ratio debtor Deed in lieu of foreclosure Deed of Trust Deeds of Trust defaulting on a mortgage Default judgment Defendant Deficiency judgment deficiency judgments delinquency delinquency reports Deposition (law) Detroit Free Press Deutsche Bank Dingwall Directed Verdict Discovery dispute letter District Court district court judges dormant judgment Double Selling Due process Encumbered enforceability of judgment lien enforceability of judgments entry of judgment Equifax Equity Skimming Eric Schneiderman Escrow Evans Eviction execution method execution on a judgment Experian Expert witness extinguishment Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) Fake Down Payment False notary signatures Fannie Mae Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac federal bankruptcy laws Federal Bureau of Investigation Federal Court federal courts Federal government of the United States Federal Home Loan Bank Board Federal Housing Administration Federal Judgments Federal Rules of Civil Procedure federal statute Federal tax FHA FICO Fictitious Loan Filing (legal) filing for bankruptcy Finance Finance charge Financial institution Financial reports Financial Services Financial statement Florida Florida Homeowners Florida Supreme Court Fonts Forbearance foreclose foreclosed homes foreclosing on home Foreclosure foreclosure auction Foreclosure Crisis foreclosure defense foreclosure defense strategy Foreclosure in California foreclosure in Florida Foreclosure laws in California Foreclosure Pending Appeal foreclosure process Foreclosure Rescue Fraud foreclosures foreclosure suit Forms Fraud fraud prevention Fraudulent Appraisal Fraudulent Documentation Fraudulent Use of Shell Company Freddie Mac fresh financial start Glaski good credit good credit score Good faith estimate Governmental Liability HAMP HAP hardship home Home Affordable Modification Program home buyer Home insurance homeowner homeowners home ownership Homes Horace housing counselor How Many Bankruptcies Can a Homeowner File How Much Debt Do I Need To File Bankruptcy HSBC Bank USA Ibanez Ibanez Case Identify Theft injunction injunctive injunctive relief installment judgments Internal Revenue Service Interrogatories Investing involuntary liens IOU issuance of the remittitur items on credit report J.P. Morgan Chase Jack Conway Jack McConnell joint borrowers JPMorgan Chase JPMorgan Chase Bank Juarez Judgment judgment creditors judgment expired Judgments after Foreclosure Judicial judicial foreclosures Judicial States July Jury instructions Justice Department Kentucky Kristina Pickering Landlord Language Las Vegas late payment Late Payments Law Lawsuit lawsuits Lawyer Lawyers and Law Firms Lease Leasehold estate Legal Aid Legal Aid by State Legal Assistance Legal burden of proof Legal case Legal Help Legal Information lender lenders Lenders and Vendors lending and servicing liability Lien liens lien stripping lien voidance lifting automatic stay Linguistics Lis pendens List of Latin phrases litigator load modification Loan Loan Modification Loan Modification and Refinance Fraud loan modification specialists Loan origination loans Loan Servicer Loan servicing Los Angeles loses Making Home Affordable Massachusetts Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Mastropaolo MBA Letter MBIA McConnell Means Test Forms Mediation mediation program Medical malpractice MER MERS Michigan Monetary Awards Monetary Restitution money Montana mortgage Mortgage-backed security Mortgage Application Fraud Mortgage broker mortgage company Mortgage Coupon Mortgage Electronic Registration System Mortgage fraud Mortgage law mortgage lender Mortgage loan mortgage loan modification mortgage loan modifications mortgage loans Mortgage mediation Mortgage modification Mortgage note mortgages Mortgage servicer Mortgage Servicing Fraud motion Motion (legal) Motion in Limine Motions National Center for State Courts National City Bank National Mortgage Settlement Natural Negotiable instrument Nelva Gonzales Ramos Nevada Nevada Bell Nevada Foreclosure Nevada mortgage loans Nevada Supreme Court New Jersey New Mexico New York New York Stock Exchange New York Times Ninth Circuit non-appealable non-appealable order Non-judicial non-judicial foreclosure non-judicial foreclosures Non-judicial Foreclosure States Non-Judicial States non-recourse nonjudicial foreclosures North Carolina note Notice Notice of default notice of entry of judgment Nueces County Nueces County Texas Objections Official B122C-2 Official Form B122C-1 Ohio Options Oral argument in the United States Orders Originator overture a foreclosure sale Owner-occupier Payment Percentage Perfected periodic payments personal loans Phantom Sale Plaintiff Plan for Bankruptcy Pleading post-judgment pre-trial Pro Bono Process for a Foreclosure Processor Process Service Produce the Note Promissory note pro per Property Property Flip Fraud Property Lien Disputes property liens pro se Pro se legal representation in the United States Pro Se Litigating Pro Se litigator Pro Se trial litigators Protecting Tenant at Foreclosure Act Protecting Tenants PSA PTFA public records purchase a new home Quiet title Real estate Real Estate Agent Real Estate Liens Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Real property RealtyTrac Record on Appeal refinance a loan Refinance Fraud Refinancing registered judgment Regulatory (CFPB) relief remittance reports remove bankruptcy remove bankruptcy on credit report Remove Late Payments Removing Liens renewal of judgment renewing a judgment Reno Reno Air Request for admissions Rescission Residential mortgage-backed security Residential Mortgage Lending Market RESPA Restitution Reverse Mortgage Fraud Rhode Island robert estes Robert Gaston Robo-signing Sacramento Scam Artists Scope Secondary Mortgage Market Securitization securitized Security interest Se Legal Representation Self-Help Seller servicer servicer reports Services servicing audit setting aside foreclosure sale Settlement (litigation) short sale Short Sale Fraud Social Sciences Social Security South Dakota Special agent standing state State Court State Courts state law Statute of Limitations statute of limitations for judgment renewals statute of repose stay Stay of Proceedings stay pending appeal Straw/Nominee Borrower Subpoena Duces Tecum Summary judgment Supreme Court of United States Tax lien tenant in common Tenants After Foreclosure Tenants Without a Lease Tennessee Texas The Dodd Frank Act and CFPB The TRID Rule Thomas Glaski TILA time-barred judgment Times New Roman Times Roman Timing Title 12 of the United States Code Title Agent Tolerance and Redisclosure Transferring Property TransUnion trial Trial court TRO true owners of the note Trust deed (real estate) Trustee Truth in Lending Act Tuesday Typeface Types of Real Estate Liens U.S. Bancorp U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission UCC Underwriter Uniform Commercial Code United States United States Attorney United States Code United States Congress United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit United States Department of Housing and Urban Development United States Department of Justice United States district court United States District Court for the Eastern District of California United States federal courts United States federal judge Unperfected Liens US Bank US Securities and Exchange Commission valuation voluntary liens Wall Street Warehouse Lender Warehouseman Washington Washington Mutual Wells Fargo Wells Fargo Bank withdrawal of reference write of execution wrongful foreclosure wrongful foreclosure appeal Wrongful Mortgage Foreclosure Yield spread premium

Fight-Foreclosure.com

Fight-Foreclosure.com

Pages

  • About
  • Buy Bankruptcy Adversary Package
  • Buy Foreclosure Defense Package
  • Contact Us
  • Donation
  • FAQ
  • Services

Archives

  • February 2022
  • March 2021
  • February 2021
  • September 2020
  • October 2019
  • July 2019
  • May 2019
  • April 2019
  • March 2019
  • January 2019
  • September 2018
  • July 2018
  • June 2018
  • May 2018
  • April 2018
  • March 2018
  • February 2018
  • January 2018
  • December 2017
  • November 2016
  • April 2016
  • March 2016
  • January 2016
  • December 2015
  • September 2015
  • October 2014
  • August 2014
  • July 2014
  • June 2014
  • May 2014
  • April 2014
  • January 2014
  • December 2013
  • November 2013
  • October 2013
  • September 2013
  • August 2013
  • July 2013
  • June 2013
  • May 2013

Website Powered by WordPress.com.

Privacy & Cookies: This site uses cookies. By continuing to use this website, you agree to their use.
To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: Cookie Policy
  • Follow Following
    • FightForeclosure.net
    • Join 338 other followers
    • Already have a WordPress.com account? Log in now.
    • FightForeclosure.net
    • Customize
    • Follow Following
    • Sign up
    • Log in
    • Report this content
    • View site in Reader
    • Manage subscriptions
    • Collapse this bar
 

Loading Comments...
 

    %d bloggers like this: