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Tag Archives: Florida

What Florida Homeowners Should Expect in “Pro Se” Foreclosure Defense Litigation

12 Thursday Jun 2014

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Banks and Lenders, Case Laws, Case Study, Discovery Strategies, Federal Court, Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, Loan Modification, Mortgage Laws, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, RESPA, State Court, Title Companies, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Florida

When a Homeowner is approaching foreclosure on his/her property, there are numerous things the homeowner should bear in mind.

(This is Not Intended to be a Legal Advice and Nothing on this Post is to be Construed a Legal Advice).

I. HOMEOWNERS EXPECTATIONS

A. Realistic Expectations – Homeowners Should Expect to See ALL Original Mortgage Closing Documents.

1. Keep the Home – at some point lender will in all probability be entitled to foreclose either for the full amount due, small reduction or large reduction
2. Short Sale – No Buyers/No Money
3. Modify Mortgage – No Mandatory Programs:

Right now there is no program available that will compel a lender to renegotiate a loan, and you cannot force a cram down in bankruptcy. The program Congress passed in July effective Oct. 1, 2008 is a voluntary lender program. In order to be eligible, one must live in the home and have a loan that was issued between January 2005 and
June 2007. The provisions was later amended during the meltdown to include struggling homeowners in past few years. Additionally, the homeowner must be spending at least 31% of his gross monthly income on mortgage debt. The homeowner can be current with the existing mortgage or in default, but either way the homeowner must prove that he/she will not be able to keep paying their existing mortgage and attest that it is not a deliberate default just to obtain lower payments.

All second liens must be retired or paid such as a home equity loan or line of credit, or Condo or Home Owner Ass’n lien. So if the homeowner has a 2nd mortgage, he is not eligible for the program until that debt is paid. And, the homeowner cannot take out another home equity loan for at least five years, unless to pay for necessary upkeep on the home. The homeowner will need approval from the FHA to get the new home equity loan, and total debt cannot exceed 95% of the home’s appraised
value at the time. This means that the homeowner’s present lender must agree to reduce his payoff so that the new loan is not greater than 95% of appraised value. For example, if the present loan in default is $200,000.00 but the home appraises for $150,000.00 the new loan cannot exceed a little over $142,000.00, and the present lender has to agree to reduce the mortgage debt to that amount. You can contact your
current mortgage servicer or go directly to an FHA-approved lender for help. These lenders can be found on the Web site of the Department of Housing and Urban Development: http://www.hud.gov/ As I pointed out above, this is a voluntary program, so the present lender must agree to rework this loan before things can get started.

Also, homeowners should contact the city in which they reside or county to see if they have a homeowner’s assistance program. West Palm Beach will give up to $10,000 to keep its residents from going into default.

Over the years, we have seen FANNIE MAE and FREDDIE MAC announced that they will set aside millions to rewrite mortgage terms so its homeowner can remain in their home. Given the outcome of numerous modification attempts and denials of loan modifications, I do not know whether the terms or conditions for the modification was for the benefit of the lender or the borrower, though any prudent person will conclude it is for the former.

Bank of America, which includes Countrywide, and JP Morgan Chase also announced earlier, that they will set aside millions to rewrite mortgage terms so its home mortgagors can remain in their homes.

4. Stay in the home and try to defeat the foreclosure under TILA RESPA and Lost Note, etc.

II. DEFENDING A MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE

A. Homeowners Should Prepare Themselves for Litigation. (Using Foreclosure Defense Package found at http://fightforeclosure.net

1. Homeowners needed for 4 Events
a. Answer Interrogatories, Request to Produce
b. Homeowner’s Deposition
c. Mediation – Homeowners should understand that mortgage cases like most cases have a high percentage of settling.
d. Trial

2. Cases move slowly even more now because of the volume of foreclosures and the reduction of court budgets.

3. Cases move on a 30/60/90 day tickler system – one side does something the other side gets to respond or sets a hearing.

4. If the Homeowner fails to do any of the above timely or fails to appear for any of the events, he/she may lose his case automatically.

5. Because of the way the system works the Homeowner may not hear from the court for several weeks or months – that does not mean that the court is ignoring the case – that is just how the system works but feel free to call or write and ask questions.

6. If you have a lawyers, keep in contact with the lawyer and advise of changes in circumstances/goals and contact info. If you are representing yourself keep in contact with the court clerk and docket sheet.

7. Home in places like Florida as well as other States should understand that a Foreclosure is – The legal mechanism by which the mortgage lender ends the “equity of redemption” by having a judge determine the amount of debt and a specific date, usually in 30 or 60 days to pay the money, and if not paid by that date, the judge allows the clerk to auction the property. Fla. Stat. §697.02, which changed the old English common law notion that the mortgage gave the lender an interest in the borrower’s land, makes the mortgage a lien against title. Fla. Stat. §45.0315 tells the mortgage lender that the borrower has the right to redeem the property after final judgement of foreclosure, until shortly after the clerk conducts the auction, when the clerk issues the certificate of sale. The client still has legal, recorded title to the property throughout the foreclosure process until the clerk issues the certificate of sale (ends redemption) then the certificate of title (transfers title) 10 days after the clerk’s sale if no objection to sale filed.

8. Deficiency – The judgement will determine the amount of the debt. A deficiency is the difference between the debt owed and the fair market value of the home at the date of the clerk’s sale.

9. Homeowners without Attorneys should knows that the complaint must be answered in 20 days or he/she could automatically lose, unless he/she either files a motion to dismiss with the court or files a motion for leave to extend time to answer “showing good cause” why the answer was not given when due. In either event, the motion needs to be filed before the due date.

B. Read the Summons Complaint, the Mortgage, Note and the Assignments.

1. Check the Summons for proper service and if not prepare a motion to quash.

2. The vast majority of foreclosure complaints are filed by foreclosure factories and will generally have 2 counts – reestablish a lost mortgage and note and foreclose. Fertile area for a motion to dismiss (see the sample motions to dismiss in the package at http://fightforeclosure.net)

3. Homeowners with the foreclosure defense package at http://fightforeclosure.net can be assured that he/she will find a basis to make a good faith motion to dismiss most of the form mortgage foreclosure complaints.

4. Homeowners should endeavor to set the motion to dismiss for hearing 30 days out or so. Otherwise, let the opposing counsel’s office set the hearing.

5. Cannot reestablish a negotiable instrument under Fla. Stat. §71.011 must be Fla. Stat. §673.3091 and person suing to foreclose must have the right to foreclose and reestablish when he files the lawsuit – post lawsuit assignments establish the lender did not own at time of suit unless pre-suit equitable assignment. See: Mason v. Rubin, 727 So.2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); National Loan Invest. v. Joymar Ass.,
767 So.2d 549 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2000); State Street Bank v. Lord, 851 So.2d 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). For an example of how far courts will go to find mortgages enforceable see: State Street Bank v. Badra, 765 So.2d 251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), Mtg. Elec. Regis. Sys. v. Badra, 4D07-4605 (Fla. 4th DCA 10-15-2008).

C. Answer Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim

1. A general denial of allegations regarding the lost note is not enough. The foreclosure mill must specifically deny lost note allegations (see forms in the package at http://fightforeclosure.net).

2. Generally speaking Homeowners should be prepared to file a counterclaim with the affirmative defenses because the lender then cannot take a voluntary dismissal without court order and the
SOL (Statutes of Limitation) may expire for the TILA claims. You have more control over the suit, but now you must pay a filing fee for the counterclaim.

3. If Homeowners are not familiar with specific RESPA Yield Spread defense, they can review some of the articles in this blog because in 1995 or so FRB changed the regulations so that made the payment is not automatically a kickback for the referral of business (In my opinion this was the beginning of the mortgage mess we have now). Homeowners using Foreclosure Defense package found at http://fightforeclosure.net will find samples of well structured RESPA Yield Spread premium (YSP) defense within the package.

D. Discovery 

1. In order to take more control over the case and shake up things from the beginning, homeowners using the Foreclosure Defense package at http://fightforeclosure.net should send out well constructed foreclosure Interrogatories and Request to Produce with the Answer. Homeowners in certain cases may also serve Notice of Taking P’s Deposition DT. See package for samples and for the wording. That will give Homeowners more control over the case, putting the Foreclosure Mill on its toes from the word go.

2. Usually the lenders firm will call and ask 3 things 1) “What do you really want – an extended sale date?” 2) “Can I have more time to answer discovery?” 3) “Can I have more time to find you a witness?” Answer to 1) “I really want to rescind the purported loan – do you want to agree to a rescission?” 2 & 3) “No problem as long as you
agree not to set any dispositive motion for hearing until a reasonable time after I get the discovery or take the deposition so that I can prepare and I do not incur an expedited deposition fee.”

3. Lender Depositions: There is rarely a need to actually depose the lender because their testimony rarely varies , and it can work to your disadvantage because if you actually take the pre-trial deposition for the lender or his servicing agent, you will have preserved the lender’s testimony for trial. If for some reason the lender cannot appear on the scheduled trial date, he will either take a voluntary dismissal or settle
the case. It is easier for Homeowners to win their cases or forced favorable settlements when the lender’s representative could not appear at the trial or meet up with the court deadlines.

4. Closing Agents depositions: Again, There is rarely a need to actually depose the closing because the testimony rarely varies and you will have preserved the testimony for trial. They either say: 1) “I do not remember the closing because I do hundreds and this was years ago, but it is my regular business practice to do A B and C and I followed my regular practice for this loan.” – the most credible and the usual
testimony; 2) 1) “I remember this closing and I gave all the required disclosures to the consumer and explained all the documents.” Not credible unless they tie the closing to an exceptional memorable event because the closing generally took place years and hundreds of closings earlier and you can usually catch them on cross “So name the next loan you closed and describe that closing” 3) 1) “I remember this closing and I gave the consumer nothing and explained nothing. Rare – though this has happened at one time. You do need the closing file so you can do a notice of production to non-party.

5. Mortgage Broker depositions: Again, there is rarely a need to actually depose the broker because the testimony rarely varies and you will have preserved the testimony for trial. They either say: 1) “I do not remember this borrower because I do hundreds and this was years ago, but it is my regular business practice to do A B and C and I followed my regular practice for this loan.” – the most credible and the usual
testimony; 2) 1) “I remember this borrower and I gave all the required disclosures to the consumer and explained all the documents.” Not credible unless they tie the borrower to an exceptional memorable event. 3) 1) “I remember this closing and I broke the mortgage brokerage laws and violated TILA. Rare – this has never
happened. You do need their application package so do a notice of production to nonparty.

6. Compare the documents in all of the closing packages: Lender’s underwriting, closing agent and mortgage broker. I have seen 3 different sets of documents. One in each package. The key is what was given to the Homeowner at the closing.

 7. Homeowner’s deposition – very important if the case turns on a factual issue of what happened at the closing. Homeowner needs to be very precise and sure as to what occurred at the closing.

E. Motions to Strike

1. Lender’s counsel frequently moved to strike the defenses. These motions are generally not well taken, and simply prolong the case. See Response to Motion to Strike.

2. There are two rules for striking a party’s pleadings; one arises under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(f), and the other arises under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.150.

3. Under Rule 1.140(f): “A party may move to strike . . . redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter from any pleading at any time.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(f).

4. Under Rule 1.150, a party can move to strike a “sham pleading” at any time before trial. This rule requires the Court to hear the motion, take evidence of the respective parties, and if the motion is sustained, allows the Court to strike the pleading to which the motion is directed. The Rule 1.150(b) Motion to Strike as a sham must be verified and must set forth fully the facts on which the movant relies and may be supported by affidavit.

F. Lender’s Motions for Summary Judgment

1. The lender will no doubt file a motion for summary judgment, usually including the affidavit of a servicing agent who has reviewed the file, many times not attaching the documents that he is attesting are true and accurate. The court should rule that the affidavits are hearsay and lack a foundation or predicate because the affiant is summarizing the legal import of documents usually trust agreements and servicing agreements, without attaching copies. See another post in this Blog that deals with the Summary Judgment memorandum for the legal basis to object to the lender’s summary judgment.

III. TRUTH IN LENDING

A. Overview

1. Congress passed TIL to remedy fraudulent practices in the disclosure of the cost of consumer credit, assure meaningful disclosure of credit terms, ease credit shopping, and balance the lending scales weighted in favor of lenders. Beach v. Ocwen, 118 S.Ct.1408 (1998), aff’g Beach v. Great Western Bank, 692 So.2d 146,148-149 (Fla.1997), aff’g Beach v. Great Western, 670 So.2d 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), Dove v. McCormick, 698 So.2d 585, 586 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), Pignato v. Great Western Bank, 664 So.2d 1011, 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), Rodash v. AIB Mortgage, 16 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir.1994). {1}

2. TIL creates several substantive consumer rights. §1640(a)(1) gives consumers actual damages for TIL errors in connection with disclosure of any information. §1640(a)(2)(A)(iii) gives consumers statutory damages of twice the amount of any finance charge, up to $2,000.00 for errors in connection with violations of §1635 or §1638(a)(2) through (6), or (9), and the numerical disclosures, outside of the $100.00 error tolerance. See Beach, 692 So.2d p.148-149, Kasket v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
695 So.2d 431,434 (Fla.4 DCA 1997) [Kasket I,] Dove, p.586-587, Pignato, p.1013, Rodash, p.1144. {2} See also §1605(f)(1)(A). {3}

3. §1635(a) allows a consumer to rescind home secured non-purchase credit for any reason within 3 business days from consummation. If a creditor gives inaccurate required information, TIL extends the rescission right for 3 days from the date the creditor delivers the accurate material TIL disclosures and an accurate rescission notice, for up to three years from closing. Pignato, p.1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (“TILA permits the borrower to rescind a loan transaction until midnight of the third business day following delivery of all of the disclosure materials or the completion
of the transaction, whichever occurs last.”]. See also: Beach, cases, supra, Rodash, Steele v Ford Motor Credit, 783 F.2d 1016,1017 (11th Cir.1986), Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. S&L, 791 F.2d 699, 701-702 (9th Cir. 1986).

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{1} All 11th Circuit TIL decisions and pre- 11th Circuit 5th Circuit cases are binding in Florida. Kasket v. Chase Manhattan Mtge. Corp., 759 So.2d 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (Kasket, II) [11th Circuit TIL decisions binding in Florida]

{2} §1640’s last paragraph has the §1640(a)(2) damage limit: “In connection with the disclosures referred to in section 1638 of this title, a creditor shall have a liability determined under paragraph (2) only for failing to comply with the requirements of section 1635 of this title or of paragraph (2) (insofar as it requires a disclosure of the “amount financed”), (3), (4), (5), (6), or (9) of section of this title…”

{3} This subsection provides that numerical disclosures in connection with home secured loans shall be treated as being accurate if the amount disclosed as the finance charge does not vary from the actual finance charge by more than $100, or is greater than the amount required to be disclosed. See also Williams v. Chartwell Financial Services, Ltd., 204 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2000). (Over-disclosure can also be a violation under certain circumstances.)

———————————————-

4. HOEPA loans (Also called a §1639 or Section 32 loan.) TIL requires additional disclosures and imposes more controls on loans that meet either the “T-Bill Trigger” or “Points and Fees Trigger” set forth at §1602(aa). §1639, Reg Z 226.31 & Reg Z 226.32, require the creditor for a §1602(aa) loan to give additional early [3 days before consummation] disclosures to the consumer and prohibits loans from containing certain terms [i.e. a prohibition on certain balloon payments]. It also has
a special actual damage provision at §1640(a)(4). (HOEPA can make a lender a TIL creditor for the first HOEPA loan). (The trigger for Florida’s Fair Lending Act is based on the HOEPA triggers. This may affect a larger number of loans and may provided post 3 year rescission. See Fla. Stat. §494.00792(d)).

5. Zamarippa v. Cy’s Car Sales, 674 F.2d 877, 879 (11th Cir. 1982), binding in Florida under, Kasket II, hods: “An objective standard is used to determine violations of the TILA, based on the representations contained in the relevant disclosure, documents; it is unnecessary to inquire as to the subjective deception or misunderstanding of particular consumers.”

6. In 1995, Congress created a defensive right to rescind when a lender sues a consumer to foreclose the mortgage. See §1635(a) & (i)[1995], Reg. Z 226.23(a)(3) & (h) [1996]. The §1635(i) amendment triggers the consumer’s defensive right to rescind when the creditor overstates the amount financed by more than $35.00, or errs in the Notice of Right to Cancel form, and the claim is raised to defend a foreclosure. See also Reg Z 226.23(h).

7. Florida defers to the FRB’s interpretation of TIL and its own regulations. Beach, 692 So.2d p.149, Pignato, p.1013, Kasket, I p.434. The U.S. Supreme Court requires deference to the FRB’s interpretations of the Statute and its own regulations. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 560, 565-570 (1980). TIL is remedial, so courts expansively and broadly apply and interpret TIL in favor of the consumer.
Rodash, p. 1144; Schroder v. Suburban Coastal Corp., 729 F.2d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir. 1984); Kasket II, W.S. Badcock Corp. v. Myers 696 So.2d 776, p. 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) adopting Rodash, p.1144: “TIL is remedial legislation. As such, its language must be liberally construed in favor of the consumer.”

8. Pignato, p. 1013 also holds: “Creditors must strictly comply with TILA. Rodash, 16 F.3d at1144; In re Porter, 961 F.2d 1066, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). A single violation of TILA gives rise to full liability for statutory damages, which include actual damages incurred by the debtor plus a civil penalty. 15 U.S.C.A. §§1640(a)(1)(2)(A)(i). Moreover, a violation may permit a borrower to rescind a loan transaction, including a rescission of the security interest the creditor has in the borrower’s principal dwelling. 15 U.S.C.A. §§1635(a).” See also the Beach cases.
This is in harmony with W.S. Badcock, p. 779, which holds: “Violations of the TILA are determined on an objective standard, based on the representations in the relevant disclosure documents, with no necessity to establish the subjective misunderstanding or reliance of particular customers.”

B. Assignee Liability

1. §1641(a)(1) and §1641(e)(1)-(2) provides that assignees are liable for §1640(a) damages if the disclosure errors are apparent on the face of the disclosure statement and other documents assigned. Congress statutorily designated the TIL disclosure statement, the TIL notice of right to cancel, and any summary of the closing costs as documents assigned. See §1641(e)(2).

2. §1641(c) provides that assignees are liable for §1635 rescission regardless of the apparent on the face of the “documents assigned” standard for damages claims. Belini v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, 412 F.3d 17, p. 28 (1st Cir. 2005).

3. You must make sure that you rescind as to the correct “creditor.” See: Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2002).

C. Right to Rescind

1. Each consumer with the right to rescind must receive one [1] copy of the correct TIL Disclosure Statement and two [2] copies of a correct Notice of Right to Cancel form. If not, the consumer can rescind for up to 3 years after closing. See: Reg Z 226.23(a)(3), fn 48; Beach v. Ocwen, 118 S.Ct.1408 (1998), aff’g Beach v. Great Western Bank, 692 So.2d 146,148-149 (Fla.1997), aff’g Beach v. Great Western Bank, 670 So.2d 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Rodash v. AIB Mortgage, 16 F.3d 1142
(11th Cr.1994); Steele v Ford Motor Credit, 783 F.2d 1016 (11th Cir.1986), all binding here under Kasket v. Chase Manhattan Mtge. Corp., 759 So.2d 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (11th Circuit cases on federal TIL issues are binding on Florida courts).

2. The error must be a “material error” which is defined at Reg Z 226.23 fn 48: “The term “material disclosures” means the required disclosures of the annual percentage rate, the finance charge, the amount financed, the total payments, the payment schedule, and the disclosures and limitations referred to in sections 226.32(c) and (d).”

3. A HOEPA loan requires additional disclosures 3 days before consummation. See: Reg Z 226.31(c)(1) (“The creditor shall furnish the disclosures required by section 226.32 at least three business days prior to consummation of a mortgage transaction covered by section 226.32.”). The failure to deliver the HOEPA forms is an additional TIL material disclosure which extends the right to rescind for violations. See: Reg Z 226.23(a)(3): “The consumer may exercise the right to rescind until midnight of the third business day following consummation, delivery of the notice required by paragraph (b) of this section, or delivery of all material disclosures, [fn]48 whichever occurs last. If the required notice or material disclosures are not delivered, the right to rescind shall expire 3 years after consummation….” See also fn 48 above.

4. Florida’s Fair Lending Act is based on the HOEPA triggers and appears to adopt TIL right to rescind without the 3 year limit. See: Fla. Stat. §494.00792(d). This theory has not been tested in any appellate court.

5. Most creditor’s closing/underwriting files will have a signed acknowledgment that the consumer received 2 copies of the TIL notice of right to cancel. Under TIL 15 U.S.C. 1635(c) this creates a rebuttable presumption of receipt: “Notwithstanding any rule of evidence, written acknowledgment of receipt of any disclosures required under this subchapter by a person to whom information, forms, and a statement is
required to be given pursuant to this section does no more than create a rebuttable presumption of delivery thereof.” Once the consumer’s affidavit or interrogatory answer or deposition stares that the consumer did not receive the 2 notices, this rebuts the presumption of receipt in the acknowledgment and presents a question of fact for trial. See: Cintron v. Bankers Trust Company, 682 So.2d 616 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1996).

6. The critical issue is what did each consumer receive not what is in the creditor’s underwriting or closing file. Make sure that the TIL Right to Rescind form is correctly filled out and the loan closed on the date it purports to have closed. If the lender directs the consumer to deliver the notice of right to cancel form to a post office box, this should extend the right to rescind.

D. Material Errors

1. The TIL Disclosure Statement “Federal Box” will contain the following “material information”. These numbers are taken from the Norwest v. Queen Martin trial memorandum: {4}

Annual Percentage Rate       Finance Charge               Amount Financed
11.227%                                 $176,073.12                     $70,708.16

Total of Payments
$246,781.28

PAYMENTS: Your payment schedule will be:
Number of Payments       Amount of Payments     When Payments Are Due

Monthly beginning
359                                        685.52                            10/01/99

1                                         679.60                             09/01/29

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{4} The disclosures are interrelated. If one multiplies the monthly payment amounts by the number of payments, and adds the sums, this equals the total of payments. Adding the finance charge to the amount financed equals the total of payments. The annual percentage rate is the percent of these figures, based on 360 monthly payments, using either the American or actuarial method.

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2. At the bottom of the TIL Disclosure Statement, usually just inside the bottom part of the federal box, you will see a place for the creditor to place an “X” next to: “‘e’ means an estimate;” and a second box to place an “X” next to: “all dates and numerical disclosures except the late payment disclosures are estimates.” Estimated disclosures violate TIL.

3. If no Reg Z 226.18(c) required Itemization of Amount Financed (not a material disclosure error) one “work backwards” to determine how the creditor arrived at the TIL disclosures. First, one must deduct the $70,708.16 “amount financed” from the face amount of the note. Lets assume this note was for a $76,500.00 loan. Therefore the creditor had to use $5,791.84 as the total of “prepaid finance charges.” In order
to arrive at the disclosed $70,708.16 “amount financed.” Then one must examine the HUD-1 charges to find the charges that equal the $5,791.84 “prepaid finance charges” to determine the items from the HUD-1 that the creditor included in the $5,791.84 prepaid finance charges to determine if $5,791.84 correct reflects all the prepaid finance charges. See: §1638(a)(2)(A); Reg Z 226.18(b): “The amount financed is calculated by: (1) Determining the principal loan amount or the cash price
(subtracting any downpayment); (2) Adding any other amounts that are financed by the creditor and are not part of the finance charge (usually not applicable); and, (3) Subtracting any prepaid finance charge.”

4. The Norwest/Martin Trial memo has a great deal of detail with respect to the specific charges and violations.

F. Truth in Lending Remedies

1. §1635(b) and Reg Z 226.23(d)(1-4) rescission; and, 2) §1640 damages.

2. Semar v. Platte Valley Federal S & L Ass’n, 791 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1986) is the leading case used by virtually all courts to impose TIL’s §1635(b) and Reg Z 226.23(d)(1-4) rescission remedy in a non-§1639, non-vesting case.

3. Semar, interpreted Reg Z 226.23(d)(1) “Effects of rescission: When a consumer rescinds a transaction, the security interest giving rise to the right of rescission becomes void and the consumer shall not be liable for any amount, including any finance charge.” The Semar, Court accepted the consumer’s rescission formula under Reg Z 226.23(d)(1), added all the “finance charges” listed on the HUD-1, plus the 2 $1,000.00 maximum statutory damage awards ($1,000.00 for the initial error and $1,000.00 for the improper response to rescission, increased to $2,000.00 in 1995),
plus all the mortgage payments made, then deducted this sum from the face amount of the Semar, note to arrive at the net debt owed the creditor.

4. §1640(a)(2)(A)(iii) Statutory Damages $2,000.00 for initial errors and $2,000.00 for the improper response to rescission. See: 15 U.S.C. §1635(g); 15 U.S.C. §1640 (a)15 U.S.C. §1640(g); Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat. Bank, 575 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1978), binding in the 11th Circuit under Bonner. (TIL statutory damages available for initial TIL error and improper response to demand to rescind).

5. §1640(a)(1) Actual Damages for any errors: Hard to prove need to establish “detrimental reliance” on an erroneous disclosure.

6. §1640(a)(4) Enhanced HOEPA Damages: §1640(a)(4) enhances the damages: “in the case of a failure to comply with any requirement under section 1639 of this title, an amount equal to the sum of all finance charges and fees paid by the consumer, unless the creditor demonstrates that the failure to comply is not material.”

5. Equitable Modification under §1635(b) and Reg Z 226.23(d)(4). Williams v. Homestake Mortg. Co., 968 F.2d 1137 (11th Cir. 1992) allows for equitable modification of TIL, Burden on lender to prove facts that justify the equitable modification. If not, Florida courts must follow Yslas v. D.K Guenther Builders, Inc., 342 So.2d 859, fn 2 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1977), which holds:

“The statutory scheme to effect restoration to the status quo provides that within ten days of receipt of the notice of rescission the creditor return any property of the debtor and void the security interest in the debtor’s property. The debtor is not obligated to tender any property of the creditor in the debtor’s possession until the creditor has performed his obligations. If the creditor does not perform within ten days of the notice or does not take possession of his property within ten days of the
tender, ownership of the creditor’s property vests in the debtor without further obligation.” [emphasis added].

The 2nd District recently reaffirmed Yslas in Associates First Capital v. Booze, 912 So.2d 696 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2005). Associates, involved a partial §1635(b) and Reg Z 226.23(d)(1-4) rescission because the consumer refinanced with the same creditor, and the refinance included an additional advance of credit. In the Associates, the consumer can rescind only the additional advance. Important here, the Associates,
consumer argued, and the Court agreed that the lender failed to perform a condition precedent to equitably modify TIL by failing to respond to his rescission notice within 20 days, as required by §1635(b) and Reg Z 226.23(d)(2):

“If a lender fails to respond within twenty days to the notice of rescission, the ownership of the property vests in the borrowers and they are no longer required to pay the loan. See § 1635(b); Staley v. Americorp Credit Corp., 164 F. Supp. 2d 578, 584 (D. Md. 2001); Gill v. Mid-Penn Consumer Disc. Co., 671 F.Supp. 1021 (E.D.Pa. 1987). However, because 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(f)(2) provides only a partial right of rescission where there is a refinancing, when the Lender failed to respond to
the notice of rescission within twenty days, ownership of only the property subject to the right of rescission — the $994.01 loaned for property taxes — vested in the Borrowers without further obligation.” Associates, p. 698.

G. Truth in Lending Supplements State Remedies & Both Apply

1. Williams v. Public Finance Corp., 598 F.2d 349, rehearing denied with opinion at 609 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1980), binding here under Bonner, holds that a consumer can get both TIL damages and usury damages because state usury laws and the Federal Truth in Lending Act provide separate remedies to rectify separate wrongs based on separate unrelated statutory violations. The 5th Circuit rejected the creditor’s “double penalty” argument by holding that if it accepted the argument, it would give special lenient treatment to the creditor when his loan violates 2 separate statutes, one state and one federal, designed to remedy 2 separate wrongs:

“Moreover, we eschew an analysis of these statutory cases limited by the
common law doctrines of compensation for breach of contract. These cases involve penal statutes, and we are compelled to enforce their clear and direct commands whether or not they seem to be overcompensating in a contract or tort analysis. There is nothing inherently wrong, excessive, or immoral in a borrower receiving two bounties for catching a lending beast who has wronged him twice — first, by sneaking up on him from behind, and then by biting him too hard. The private attorney general who exposes and opposes these credit wolves is not deemed unduly enriched when his valor is richly rewarded and his vendor harshly rebuked. Nor does the state’s punishment for the usurious bite interfere with Congress’s punishment for the wearing of sheep’s clothing.”

“We have come, or gone, a long way from Shakespeare’s ancient caution, “Neither a borrower, nor a lender be.” In today’s world borrowing and lending are daily facts of life. But that a fact becomes diurnal does not mean it has been cleansed of its dire potential. We still heed the Bard’s advice, but in our own modern way — by strict regulation of the strong and careful protection of the weak and unwary. While the well-intended efforts of our many sovereigns may at times sound more like discordant and competing solos than mellifluous duets, we, as judges, must restrain
our impulse to stray from the score.” Williams, 609 F.2d pg. 359-360.

In case the first opinion was unclear on this point, the Williams, rehearing opinion repeated and reaffirmed its “lending wolf” analysis:

“Noting that the effect of appellants’ argument was to ask for “special lenient treatment to lenders who violate two laws instead of just one,” we rejected the approach to the question proposed by the appellants and defined our inquiry in the following terms:

[W]e think the real question in this case is a relatively standard one of statutory interpretation. More specifically, we think the question is whether Congress intended that the TIL Act would apply to loans which violated state usury laws punishable by forfeiture. At the outset we note that no exception for such loans is made explicitly in the TIL Act. Moreover, since the Act is to be construed liberally to effect its remedial purposes, Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture Co., 479 F.2d 740, 748 (5th
Cir. 1973), we are generally disinclined to read into the Act an implicit exception which benefits lenders at the expense of borrowers. However, the real test of whether this exception was intended or not must start with the question of whether it serves or disserves the purposes of the Act. In this analysis resides the real focus of our decision. The ILA and TIL Act provide separate remedies to rectify separate wrongs.
The ILA limits what a lender subject to its provisions can charge for the use of its money; the TIL Act provisions involved here are designed to penalize and deter an independent wrong arising from nondisclosure. [fn5] We did not believe, and do not believe, that it subserves the purposes of the TIL Act to read into it an implied exception for loans which violate unrelated state usury laws. As we have already said, we do not think it especially unfair or unjust to order two punishments for a
lender who violates two laws. And more to the point, we think it would be directly contrary to the purposes and policies of the TIL Act to excuse a violator from federal penalty simply because he is also liable for a state penalty, especially where that state penalty may often be less harsh than the federal penalty…….”

“…… Appellants petition for rehearing have taken offense at our characterization of lenders who violate the ILA as “credit wolves” and as wearers of “sheep’s clothing” when they also violate the disclosure provisions of the TIL Act. They suggest that such labels have obscured our analysis of the legal issues here. Such most certainly is not the case. Our analysis was and is based on our perception of the proper
construction of the federal and state policies, even though their meshing is not nearly as perfect as we and appellants could wish. Nonetheless, as we read the ILA and the TIL Act, appellants have violated both and are subject to the penalties of both. Although appellants’ predations may be technical and they may feel we have cried “wolf” too readily, the fact remains that as we read the statutes appellants are guilty of the violations charged.” Williams, 598 F.2d pg. 1181-1184.

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at http://www.fightforeclosure.net “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will show you step-by-step litigation solutions helping you challenge these fraudsters and ultimately saving your home from foreclosure either through loan modification or “Pro Se” litigation visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

 

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How Florida Homeowners Can Quiet Title to their Properties

20 Friday Dec 2013

Posted by BNG in Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Your Legal Rights

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Court clerk, Default judgment, Filing (legal), Florida, Lis pendens, Motions, Process Service, Quiet title

The information provided below is for a quiet title action in Florida. Your state may use different procedures.

In order to file a quiet title action, you will need the following documents:
1)   Civil Cover sheet
2)   Summons
3)   Lis Pendens
4)   Complaint
5)   Exhibit-A: Copy of the Warranty Deed
6)   Exhibit-B: Rescission letter or court order if applicable

Cover Sheet
The Civil Cover Sheet form is filed by the plaintiff or petitioner for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of reporting judicial workload data pursuant to Florida Statute section 25.075.

Summons
This document is given to the sheriff or process server to be served on the defendant. If there is more than one defendant, additional copies will be needed.

Lis Pendens
The lis pendens serves to put the public on notice that a case is pending concerning a specific property.

Complaint
The complaint should have a style case and signature block in compliance with Florida filing guidelines.  The sample complaint complies with the guideline.

Once the package of documents is ready, take them to the filing office at the county Court that has jurisdiction over your property. The filing fee may be a shock based on the value of the property. In 2009, Florida legislator passed new law dramatically increasing filing fee for foreclosure and quiet title actions. It may cost you a few hundred if not thousands of dollar. I don’t think you should be discouraged by that. If you don’t have the money, you can file for indigent status by filing the proper form. Your county clerk can give you the form.

Once your case has been filed, the clerk will assign a case number and return to you copies of the summons, lis pendens and the complaint.
You need to take them to the sheriff office for process service or choose a private  process server company. It is possible that the summon cannot be served because the company is out of the business. If that’s the case, notice should be published in the local law journal. Check with the clerk for a list of acceptable publication.

The sheriff will charge about $40. Once the summons is served:
–   The plaintiff has 20 days to answer your complaint.
–    If the plaintiff does not answer within that time frame, file a Motion for Default.
–    When a default is entered, file a Motion for Default Judgment.
–   File an affidavit in support of Motion for Default Judgment.
–    Schedule a hearing with the judicial assistance after 20 days to have your motion for default judgment heard. Remember to bring a court reporter along.
–    Prepare and bring with you a proposed order for Final Default Judgment Quieting Title.
–    If your motion is granted, hand over the proposed order to the judge to sign.
–    Once the judge signed the order, you will receive a copy by mail.
–    The clerk will be ordered to record the judgment in the public record.
You’re done! You have quieted your title. Enjoy your property free and clear. No more refi PLEASE.

For additional protection you may want to put the title under a living trust out of your name or record a new mortgage.

Quiet title is not a silver bullet; it is just another tool to protect your property. Any party can come later and try to vacate your quiet title judgment. For that reason, you need to make sure that you do it right.

If a party who is entitled to service of process is not served, the judgment will most likely be vacated. Proper service of process is extremely important. Do not take it lightly.

With the passing of time, the quiet title judgment becomes stronger.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package  that will help you challenge these fraudsters and save your home from foreclosure visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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How Homeowners Can Spot Fraudulent Mortgage Documents

02 Monday Dec 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Fraud, Judicial States, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Florida, MERS, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, National City Bank, Texas, Trust deed (real estate), United States, Wall Street

This post is designed to assist struggling homeowners who find themselves in an unfortunate situation of wrongful foreclosure by illegal entities who are foreclosing without legitimate documents. Most securitized loans are being wrongfully foreclosed by entities who does not have any interest in the properties they are foreclosing.

If MERS is listed on your Deed of Trust there’s a better chance than not that there is fraud involved in your mortgage documents. MERS was used by the Wall Street Banks to avoid paying county recorder fees and real estate transfer tax fees.   You will need to visit your County Recorder’s office to obtain copies of all of your real property records from the first filing on your current loan up to today.

1.     The Mortgage or Deed of Trust is assigned from the Originator directly to the Trustee for the Securitized Trust.

2.     The Mortgage or Deed of Trust is assigned months and sometimes years after the date of the origination of the underlying mortgage note.

3.     The Mortgage or Deed of Trust is assigned from the initial aggregator directly to the Securitized Trust with no assignments to the Depositor or the Sponsor for the Trust.

4.     The Mortgage or Deed of Trust is executed, dated or assigned in a manner inconsistent with the mandatory governing rules of Section 2.01 of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.

5.     The assignment of the Mortgage or Deed of Trust is executed by a legal entity that was no longer in existence on the date the document was executed.

6.     The assignment of the mortgage or Deed of Trust is executed by an entity whose name is different than the entity named in the original document (i.e., National City Bank Corporation in lieu of ABC Corporation as a division of National City Bank).

7.     The assignment was executed by a party pursuant to a Power of Attorney but no Power of Attorney is attached to the instrument or filed with the instrument or otherwise recorded with local land registry.

8.     The mortgage note is allegedly transferred in a single document along with the Mortgage or Deed of Trust (i.e., “Assignment of the Note and Mortgage”).  You cannot “assign” a mortgage note.  You can only “negotiate” a mortgage note under Article 3 of the UCC.

9.     The assignment is executed by a party who claims to be an “attorney in fact” for the assignor.

10.    The assignment is notarized by a notary in Dakota County, Minnesota.

11.    The assignment is notarized by a notary in Hennepin County, Minnesota.

12.    The assignment is notarized by a notary in Duval County, Florida.

13.    The assignment is executed by an officer or secretary of MERS.

14.    The assignment is notarized by a secretary or paralegal employed by the attorney for the mortgage servicer.

15.    The assignment is executed or notarized by an employee of MR Default Services, Promiss Solutions LLC, National Default Exchange, LP, LOGS Financial Services, or some similar third-party.

16.    The endorsement on the note is actually on an allonge affixed to the note.  In most states, an allonge cannot be used if there is a sufficient amount of room at the “foot” or the “bottom” of the original note for the endorsement.

17.    The allonge is not “permanently” affixed to the original note. The term permanent excludes the use of staples and tape and as a result you must use a sold fastener such as glue.  Allonges are commonly referred to “in the business” as “tear-off fraud papers.”

18.    The note proffered in evidence is not the original but a copy of the “certified copy” provided to the debtors at the closing.

19.    The note is endorsed in blank with no transfer and delivery receipts.  It is fine to endorse a note in blank, in which case it becomes “bearer” paper under the UCC.  However, in order to prove a true sale from the Sponsor to the Depositor you must have written delivery and transfer receipts and proof of pay outs and pay in transactions.

20.    The note proffered in evidence is not endorsed at the foot of the note or on an affixed allonge.

21.    The assignment of the mortgage or deed of trust post-dates the filing of the court pleading.

22.    The assignment of the mortgage or deed of trust is executed after the filing of the court pleadings but claims to be “legally effective” before the filing.  For example, the deed of trust is assigned on June 1, 2009, with an effective date of May 1, 2007.

23.    The parties who executed the assignment and who notarized the signature are in fact the same parties.

24.    The signor states that he or she is an “agent” for the executing entity.

25.    The signor states that he or she is an “attorney in fact” for the executing entity.

26.    The signor states that he or she is an employee of the executing entity but claims to have custody and control of the records of the entity.

27.    The signor of the document makes statements about the status of the mortgage debt based on his or her review of the “records of the plaintiff” or the “records of the moving party.”

28.    The proponent of the original note files an Affidavit of Lost Note.

29.    The signor claims that the allegations in the court pleading are correct but the assignment of the mortgage and/or delivery and transfer of the note occurs after the law suit or the motion for relief from stay was filed.

30.    One or more of the operative documents in the case is signed by one of the attorneys for the mortgage servicer.

31.    The default payment history filed in the case is prepared by the attorney for the mortgage servicer or a member of his or her staff.

32.    The affidavit filed in support of legal fees is not signed by an attorney with the firm involved in the case.

33.    The name of one or more of the signors is stamped on the document.

34.    The document is a form with standard “fill-in-the-blanks” for names and amounts.

35.    The signature of one or more parties on the document is not legible and looks like something a three year old might have done.

36.    The document is dated and signed years before the document is actually filed with the register of real estate documents or deeds or mortgages.

37.    The proffered document has the word C O P Y stamped on or embedded in the document.

38.    The document is executed by a notary in Denton County, Texas.

39.    The document is executed by a notary in Collin County, Texas.

40.    The document includes a legend “Hold for” a named law firm after recording.

41.    The document was drafted by a law firm representing the mortgage servicer in the pending case.

42.    The document includes any type of bar code that was not added by the local register or filing clerk for such instruments.

43.    The document includes a reference to an “instrument number.”

44.    The document includes a reference to a “form number.”

45.    The document does not include any reference to a Master Document Custodian.

46.    The document is not authenticated by any officer or authorized agent of a Master Document Custodian.

47.    The paragraph numbers on the document are not consistent (the last paragraph on page one is 7 and the first paragraph on page two starts with number 9).

48.    The endorsement of the note is not at the “foot” or “bottom” of the last page of the note.  For example, a few states allow an endorsement on the back of the last page of the note but the majority requires it at the foot of the note.

49.    The document purports to assign the mortgage or the deed of trust to the Trustee for the Securitized Trust before the Trust was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.  This type of registration is normally referred to as a “shelf registration.”

50.    The document purports to transfer the note to the Trustee for the Securitized Trust before the date the Trust provides for the origination date of instruments in the Trust.  The Prospectus, the Prospectus Supplement and the Pooling and Servicing Agreement will clearly state that the pool of notes includes those originated between date X and date Y.

51.    The document purports to transfer the note to the Trustee for the Securitized Trust after the cut-off date for the creating of such instruments for the Trust.

52.    The origination date on the mortgage note is not within the origination and cut-off dates provided for the by terms of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.

53.    The “Affidavit of a Lost Note” is not filed by the Master Document Custodian for the Trust but by the Servicer or some other third-party.

54.    The document is signed by a “bank officer” without any designation of the office held by the said officer.

55.    The affidavit includes the following language on the bottom of each page:  ”This is an attempt to collect a debt.  Any information obtained will be used for that purpose.”

56.    The document is signed by a person who identifies himself or herself as a “media supervisor” for the proponent.

57.    The document is signed by a person who identifies himself or herself as a “media coordinator” for the proponent.

58.    The document is signed by a person who identifies himself or herself as a “legal coordinator” for the movant.

59.    The date of the signature on the document and the date the signature was notarized are not the same.

60.    The parties who signed the assignment and who notarized the signature are located in different states or counties.

61.    The transferor and the transferee have the same physical address including the same street and post office box numbers.

62.    The assignor and the assignee have the same physical address including the same street and post office box numbers.

63.    The signor of the document states that he or she is acting “solely as nominee” for some other party.

64.    The document refers to a power of attorney but no power of attorney is attached.

65.    The document bears the following legend:  ”This is not a certified copy.”

66.    The document is signed by:  (these are just a few names, do site search from more robo-signers)

Jose Aguilar

Joseph Alvarado

Felix Amenumey

Natalie Anderson

Pam Anderson

Scott Anderson or by Scott W. Anderson

Pamela Ariano

Leticia Arias

Chris Arndt

Aimee Austin

Gina  Avila

Katrina Bailey

Fern Baker

Janice M. Baker

Lorraine Balara

Steve Ballman

Steve Bashmakov

Michael Bender

Jamie Bilot

Marnessa Birckett

Sarah Block

Janette Boatman

Michele Boiko

Sheri Bongaarts

Beth Borse

Christie Bouchard

Diane Bowser

Christopher Bray

Tammy Brooks-Saleh or Tammy Saleh

Sandy Broughton

Jenny Brouwer

Jacqueline Brown

Paul Bruha

Lins Bryce

Rita Bucolo

Judy Buseman

Butler & Hosch, P.A.

Becky Byrne

Rodney Cadwell

Robin Callahan

Carolyn Cari

Jeffrey P. Carlson

Nancy L. Carlson

Richard J. Carlson

Robin Carmody

Marvell Carmouche

Amy Jo Cauthern-Munoz

Kristi M. Caya

Kim Chambers

Carol Chapman

Keith Chapman

Hari Charagundla

Debra Chieffe

Christina Ching

Dave Chiodo

Jim Clark

Tara Clayton

John Cody

Robyn Colburn

Rebecca Colgan

Karen Cook

Frank Coon

Julie Coon

Julie Cordova

Jeremy Cox

Cathy Crawford

Kevin Crecco

Dave Cunningham

Michael Curry

Nanci Danekar

Amie Davis

Vickie Day

Yvette Day

Teresa DeBaker

Jody Delfs

Richard Delgado

Mike Dian

Dulce Diaz

Larry Dingmann

Kathleen Doherty

Jason Dreher

Jennifer Duncan

Kimbretta Duncan

Ronald Durant

Neil E. Dyson

Shirley Eads

Salena Edwards

Judy Faber

Sue Filiczkowski

Donna Fitton

Sean Flanagan

Angela L. Freckman

Verdine A. Freeman

Eric Friedman

Fedelis Fondungallah

Barb Frost

LeAllen Frost

Fanessa Fuller

Laura Furrick

Sarah Gacek

Judi Gambrel

Elizabeth Geretschlaeger

Peggy Glass

Dory or Dorey Goebel

Alma Gonzales

Eileen J. Gonzales

Kathleen Gowan

Kelly Graham

Steven Y. Green

Steven Grout

Cathy Hagstrom

Michelle Halyard

Craig Hanlon

Michael Hanna

Donna Harkness

Michael Hebling

Renee L. Hensley

May Her

Jim Herman

Laura Hescott

Dave Hillen

Joseph P. Hillery

Craig Hinson

Bob Hora

Teddi Horan

Robert L. Horn

Chrys Houston

JK Huey

Paul Hunt

Vickie Ingamells

Cassandra Inouye

Andrea Jenkins

Ashley Johnson

Mary B. Johnson

Janet Jones

Tina Jones

Peggy Jordon

Etsuko Kabeya

Jamil Kahin

Robert E. Kaltenbach

Pam Kammerer

Gloria Karau

Vishal Karingada

Rhonda Kastli

Andrew Keardy

Patricia Kelleher

Scott Keller

Bryan Kerr

John Kerr

Kim Kinney

Sandy Kinnunen

LeeAnne Kramer

Mutru Kumar

Martha Kunkle

Margie Kwaitanowski

Vicki Kyle

Sukhada Lad

Brian J. LaForest

Diane LaFrance

Patricia Lambengco

Kyurstina Lawton

Toccoa Lenair

Bharati Lengade

Lindsey Lesch

Whitney Lewis

Marie Lockwood

Stephanie Lowe

Todd Luckey

Michele Luszcz

Joseph Lutz

Hang Luu

Frank Madden

Lisa Magnuson

William Maguire

Michael G. Mand

Silvia Marchan

Charmaine Marchesi

Brock Martin

Joel Martinson

Denise A. Marvel

Mary Maxwell

Christopher Mayall

Patrick McClain

Mary McGrath

Hattie McLaughlin

Noel McNally

Donna McNaught

Michael Mead

Marcia Medley

Susan Meier

Marisa Menza

Pamela Michael

Linda Miller

Steve Moe

Nancy Mooney

Joanne Moore

Melody Moore

Taylor Moore

Ruth Morgan

Michael H. Moreland

Treva Moreland

Annmarie Morrison

Melissa Mosloski

Kim Mullins

Patricia Murray

Ginny Neidert

Steve A. Nielsen

Susan Nightingale

Colleen O’Donnell

Richard Olasande

Mitchell Oringer

Clothilde Ortega

Amy Payment

Dawn Peck

Bonnie Pelletier

Patte Peloquin

Joseph Pensabene

Kenneth R. Perkins

Jennifer Peters

Charity Peterson

Joyce Petty

Ann Pinto

Ingrid Pittman

Bernadette Polux

Tamara Price

Erika Puentes

Beverly Quaresima

Shivani L. Ram

Antonia Ramirez

Rona Ramos

Myron Ravelo

Peter Read

Keith S. Reno

Anthony N. Renzi

Dawn L. Reynolds

Jeff Rivas

Jose Rivera

Bill Rizzo

Paula Rosato

Margery A. Rotundo

Sarah Rubin or Sara Rubin

Paige Sahr

Tammy Saleh

Kendall Sanders

Cindy Sandoval

Dianna Sandoval

Kimberly Sanford

Josephine Sciarrino

Stephanie Scott

Jenee Simon

Laura Siess

Gregory Smallwood

Rosalie Solano

Erika Spencer

Joseph Spicer

Renae Stanton

Jeffrey Stephan

Maya Stevenson

Richard Stires

Judith Stone

September Stoudemire

Roy Stringfellow

Anne Sutcliffe

Rachel Switzer

Emmanuel Tabot

Mary Taylor

Varsha Thakkar

Bernice Thell

Keith Torok

Deb Twining

Kenneth Ugwuadu

R.P. Umali

Keo Maney Kue Vang

Jason Vecchio

Rebecca Verdeja

Vinod Vishwakarma

Fifi Volgarakis

Janet Vollmer

Kim Waldroff

Linda Walton

Lisa Watson

John Wesley

Katrina Whitfield-Bailey or by Katrina Whitfield or by Katrina Bailey

Joanne Wight

Cathy Williams

Paul Williams

Kristine Wilson

Mary Winbauer

Rebecca Wirtz

Danielle Woods

Janine Yamoah

Jerry Yang

Elizabeth Yeranosian

Mellisa Ziertman

Jan Zimmerman

Stephen Zindler

Katie Zrust

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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Why Homeowners Lose on Appeal – A Review of Wrongful Foreclosure Appeal Case

02 Monday Dec 2013

Posted by BNG in Appeal, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, MERS, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation

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Tags

Arizona, Bank of America, Florida, MERS, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, New York, Washington, Wells Fargo

A CASE IN REVIEW (1)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-17364    D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00517-JAT

OLGA CERVANTES, an unmarried
woman; CARLOS ALMENDAREZ, a
married man; ARTURO MAXIMO, a
married man, individually and on
behalf of a class of similarly
situated individuals,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

OPINION
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., a
New York corporation; MORTGAGE
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS,
INC., a subsidiary of MERSCORP,
INC., a Delaware corporation; ý MERSCORP, INC.; FEDERAL HOME
LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION, a
foreign corporation, AKA Freddie
Mac; FEDERAL NATIONAL
MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, a foreign
corporation; GMAC MORTGAGE,
LLC, a Delaware corporation;
NATIONAL CITY MORTGAGE, a
foreign company and a division of
National City Bank, a foreign
company; J.P. MORGAN CHASE
BANK, N.A., a New York
corporation; CITIMORTGAGE, INC., a
New York corporation;

HSBC MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
U.S.A., a Delaware corporation;
AIG UNITED GUARANTY
CORPORATION, a foreign
corporation; WELLS FARGO BANK,
N.A., a California corporation,
DBA Wells Fargo Home Equity;
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., a foreign
corporation; GE MONEY BANK, a
foreign company; PNC FINANCIAL
SERVICES GROUP, INC., a
Pennsylvania corporation; No. 09-17364
NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION, a D.C. No. subsidiary of PNC Financial  Services Group; N 2:09-cv-00517-JAT ATIONAL CITY
BANK, a subsidiary of National OPINION
City Corporation; MERRILL LYNCH
& COMPANY, INC., a subsidiary of
Bank of America Corporation;
FIRST FRANKLIN FINANCIAL
CORPORATION, a subsidiary of
Merrill Lynch & Company, Inc.;
LASALLE BANK, N.A., a subsidiary
of Bank of America; TIFFANY &
BOSCO P.A., an Arizona
professional association,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
February 16, 2011—San Francisco, California
Filed September 7, 2011

Before: Richard C. Tallman, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,* and
Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Callahan

*Due to the death of the Honorable David R. Thompson, the Honorable
Johnnie B. Rawlinson, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit,
has been drawn to replace him on this panel. Judge Rawlinson has read
the briefs, reviewed the record, and listened to the audio recording of oral
argument held on February 16, 2011.

COUNSEL
William A. Nebeker and Valerie R. Edwards, Koeller
Nebeker Carlson & Haluck, LLP, Phoenix, Arizona, and Robert
Hager and Treva Hearne, Hager & Hearne, Reno, Nevada,
for the appellants.
Timothy J. Thomason, Mariscal Weeks McIntyre & Friedlander,
P.A., Phoenix, Arizona, Thomas M. Hefferon, Goodwin
Procter, LLP, Washington, DC, Howard N. Cayne,
Arnold & Porter, LLP, Washington, DC, Stephen E. Hart,
Federal Housing Finance Agency, Washington, DC, Mark S.
Landman, Landman Corsini Ballaine & Ford P.C., New York,
New York, and Robert M. Brochin, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius,
LLP, Miami, Florida, for the appellees.

OPINION

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:
This is a putative class action challenging origination and
foreclosure procedures for home loans maintained within the
Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS). The plaintiffs
appeal from the dismissal of their First Amended Complaint
for failure to state a claim. In their complaint, the
plaintiffs allege conspiracies by their lenders and others to use
MERS to commit fraud. They also allege that their lenders
violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601
et seq., and the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§ 44-1522, and committed the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress by targeting the plaintiffs for loans they
could not repay. The plaintiffs were denied leave to file their
proposed Second Amended Complaint, and to add a new
claim for wrongful foreclosure based upon the operation of
the MERS system.

On appeal, the plaintiffs stand by the sufficiency of some
of their claims, but primarily contend that they could cure any
pleading deficiencies with a newly amended complaint, which
would include a claim for wrongful foreclosure. We are
unpersuaded that the plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to
support their claims. Although the plaintiffs allege that
aspects of the MERS system are fraudulent, they cannot
establish that they were misinformed about the MERS system,
relied on any misinformation in entering into their home
loans, or were injured as a result of the misinformation. If
anything, the allegations suggest that the plaintiffs were
informed of the exact aspects of the MERS system that they
now complain about when they agreed to enter into their
home loans. Further, although the plaintiffs contend that they
can state a claim for wrongful foreclosure, Arizona state law
does not currently recognize this cause of action, and their
claim is, in any case, without a basis. The plaintiffs’ claim
depends upon the conclusion that any home loan within the MERS system is unenforceable through a foreclosure sale, but
that conclusion is unsupported by the facts and law on which
they rely. Because the plaintiffs fail to establish a plausible
basis for relief on these and their other claims raised on
appeal, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the complaint
without leave to amend.

     I.
The focus of this lawsuit—and many others around the
country—is the MERS system.

1. How MERS works
MERS is a private electronic database, operated by MERSCORP,
Inc., that tracks the transfer of the “beneficial interest”
in home loans, as well as any changes in loan servicers. After
a borrower takes out a home loan, the original lender may sell
all or a portion of its beneficial interest in the loan and change
loan servicers. The owner of the beneficial interest is entitled
to repayment of the loan. For simplicity, we will refer to the
owner of the beneficial interest as the “lender.” The servicer
of the loan collects payments from the borrower, sends payments
to the lender, and handles administrative aspects of the
loan. Many of the companies that participate in the mortgage
industry—by originating loans, buying or investing in the
beneficial interest in loans, or servicing loans—are members
of MERS and pay a fee to use the tracking system. See Jackson
v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487,
490 (Minn. 2009).

When a borrower takes out a home loan, the borrower executes
two documents in favor of the lender: (1) a promissory
note to repay the loan, and (2) a deed of trust, or mortgage,
that transfers legal title in the property as collateral to secure
the loan in the event of default. State laws require the lender
to record the deed in the county in which the property is located. Any subsequent sale or assignment of the deed must
be recorded in the county records, as well.

This recording process became cumbersome to the mortgage
industry, particularly as the trading of loans increased.
See Robert E. Dordan, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems
(MERS), Its Recent Legal Battles, and the Chance for a
Peaceful Existence, 12 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 177, 178 (2010).
It has become common for original lenders to bundle the beneficial
interest in individual loans and sell them to investors
as mortgage-backed securities, which may themselves be
traded. See id. at 180; Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490. MERS
was designed to avoid the need to record multiple transfers of
the deed by serving as the nominal record holder of the deed
on behalf of the original lender and any subsequent lender.
Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490.

At the origination of the loan, MERS is designated in the
deed of trust as a nominee for the lender and the lender’s
“successors and assigns,” and as the deed’s “beneficiary”
which holds legal title to the security interest conveyed. If the
lender sells or assigns the beneficial interest in the loan to
another MERS member, the change is recorded only in the
MERS database, not in county records, because MERS continues
to hold the deed on the new lender’s behalf. If the beneficial
interest in the loan is sold to a non-MERS member, the
transfer of the deed from MERS to the new lender is recorded
in county records and the loan is no longer tracked in the
MERS system.
In the event of a default on the loan, the lender may initiate
foreclosure in its own name, or may appoint a trustee to initiate
foreclosure on the lender’s behalf. However, to have the
legal power to foreclose, the trustee must have authority to act
as the holder, or agent of the holder, of both the deed and the
note together. See Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d
158, 167 (Kan. 2009). The deed and note must be held
together because the holder of the note is only entitled to repayment, and does not have the right under the deed to use
the property as a means of satisfying repayment. Id. Conversely,
the holder of the deed alone does not have a right to
repayment and, thus, does not have an interest in foreclosing
on the property to satisfy repayment. Id. One of the main
premises of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit here is that the MERS system
impermissibly “splits” the note and deed by facilitating
the transfer of the beneficial interest in the loan among lenders
while maintaining MERS as the nominal holder of the
deed.
The plaintiffs’ lawsuit is also premised on the fact that
MERS does not have a financial interest in the loans, which,
according to the plaintiffs, renders MERS’s status as a beneficiary
a sham. MERS is not involved in originating the loan,
does not have any right to payments on the loan, and does not
service the loan. MERS relies on its members to have someone
on their own staff become a MERS officer with the
authority to sign documents on behalf of MERS. See Dordan,
12 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. at 182; Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 491.
As a result, most of the actions taken in MERS’s own name
are carried out by staff at the companies that sell and buy the
beneficial interest in the loans. Id.

2. The named plaintiffs
The three named plaintiffs in this case, Olga Cervantes,
Carlos Almendarez, and Arturo Maximo, obtained home
loans or refinanced existing loans in 2006. All three signed
promissory notes with their lenders—Cervantes with Countrywide
Home Loans, and Almendarez and Maximo with First
Franklin. Each executed a deed of trust in favor of his or her
lender, naming MERS as the “beneficiary” and as the “nominee”
for the lender and lender’s “successors and assigns.”
All three plaintiffs are Hispanic, and Almendarez and Maximo
do not speak or read English. Almendarez and Maximo
negotiated the mortgage loans with their lenders in Spanish, but were provided with, and signed, copies of their loan documents
written in English.
The plaintiffs subsequently defaulted on their loans. Following
Cervantes’s default, trustee Recontrust Company initiated
non-judicial foreclosure proceedings by recording a
notice of a trustee’s sale in the county records. The parties
have not addressed the status of the noticed sale. Following
defaults by Almendarez and Maximo, their lender, First
Franklin, appointed LaSalle Bank as its trustee to initiate nonjudicial
foreclosure proceedings. MERS recorded documents
with the county assigning its beneficial interest in the deeds
of trust to La Salle Bank. Later, Michael Bosco of Tiffany &
Bosco was substituted in as First Franklin’s trustee. Michael
Bosco sold Almendarez’s house at public auction in February
2009. The sale of Maximo’s property was cancelled in April
2009.

3. Procedural history
Cervantes filed suit in March 2009. Almendarez and Maximo
joined the lawsuit, and the plaintiffs filed their First
Amended Complaint a few days later. The First Amended
Complaint names several defendants, including the plaintiffs’
lenders, the trustees for the lenders, MERS, and MERS members
who are named only as co-conspirators based on their
role in using the MERS system. The defendants filed several
motions to dismiss, prompting the plaintiffs to file a motion
for leave to amend, along with a proposed Second Amended
Complaint. The district court held a hearing on the various
motions, at which the plaintiffs orally proposed to amend their
complaint with a wrongful foreclosure claim. The district
court granted the motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint,
and denied the motion for leave to amend on the
ground that amendment would be futile. The plaintiffs appeal.

    II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097,
1102 (9th Cir. 2008). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Dismissal is proper when the complaint does
not make out a cognizable legal theory or does not allege sufficient
facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Mendiondo,
521 F.3d at 1104. A complaint that alleges only “labels and
conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of the
cause of action” will not survive dismissal. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

The district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Gompper v. VISX, Inc.,
298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002). Although leave to amend
should be given freely, a district court may dismiss without
leave where a plaintiff ’s proposed amendments would fail to
cure the pleading deficiencies and amendment would be
futile. See Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection
Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).1

1The plaintiffs have requested that we take judicial notice of orders of
the United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissing
complaints without prejudice in pending multidistrict litigation concerning
MERS. The plaintiffs imply that it was inconsistent for the same district
court to deny leave to amend here. We deny the requests because the
orders are not relevant.

                               III.
The plaintiffs challenge the dismissal of their complaint
without leave to amend but, on appeal, only address the district
court’s: (1) dismissal of their claim for conspiracy to
commit fraud through the MERS system; (2) failure to
address their oral request for leave to add a wrongful foreclosure
claim; (3) dismissal of trustee Tiffany & Bosco from the suit; (4) denial of leave to amend their pleadings regarding equitable tolling of their TILA and Arizona Consumer Fraud Act claims; and (5) dismissal of their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We address these claims in
turn, and do not consider the dismissed claims that are not
raised on appeal. Entm’t Research Group v. Genesis Creative
Group, 122 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We will not
consider any claims that were not actually argued in [appellant’s]
opening brief.”).

1. Conspiracy to commit fraud through the MERS
system
On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that they sufficiently
alleged a conspiracy among MERS members to commit fraud.
In count seven of the First Amended Complaint, they allege
that MERS members conspired to commit fraud by using
MERS as a sham beneficiary, promoting and facilitating predatory
lending practices through the use of MERS, and making
it impossible for borrowers or regulators to track the changes
in lenders.

[1] Under Arizona law, a claim of civil conspiracy must be
based on an underlying tort, such as fraud in this instance.
Baker ex rel. Hall Brake Supply, Inc. v. Stewart Title & Trust
of Phoenix, Inc., 5 P.3d 249, 256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). To
show fraud, a plaintiff must identify “(1) a representation; (2)
its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker’s knowledge of
its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) the speaker’s intent that
it be acted upon by the recipient in the manner reasonably
contemplated; (6) the hearer’s ignorance of its falsity; (7) the
hearer’s reliance on its truth; (8) the right to rely on it; [and]
(9) his consequent and proximate injury.” Echols v. Beauty
Built Homes, Inc., 647 P.2d 629, 631 (Ariz. 1982).

[2] The plaintiffs’ allegations fail to address several of
these necessary elements for a fraud claim. The plaintiffs have
not identified any representations made to them about the MERS system and its role in their home loans that were false
and material. None of their allegations indicate that the plaintiffs
were misinformed about MERS’s role as a beneficiary,
or the possibility that their loans would be resold and tracked
through the MERS system. Similarly, the plaintiffs have not
alleged that they relied on any misrepresentations about
MERS in deciding to enter into their home loans, or that they
would not have entered into the loans if they had more information
about how MERS worked. Finally, the plaintiffs have
failed to show that the designation of MERS as a beneficiary
caused them any injury by, for example, affecting the terms
of their loans, their ability to repay the loans, or their obligations
as borrowers. Although the plaintiffs allege that they
were “deprived of the right to attempt to modify their toxic
loans, as the true identity of the actual beneficial owner was
intentionally hidden” from them, they do not support this bare
assertion with any explanation as to how the operation of the
MERS system actually stymied their efforts to identify and
contact the relevant party to modify their loans. Thus, the
plaintiffs fail to state a claim for conspiracy to commit fraud
through the MERS system, and dismissal of the claim was
proper.

[3] While the plaintiffs’ allegations alone fail to raise a
plausible fraud claim, we also note that their claim is undercut
by the terms in Cervantes’s standard deed of trust, which
describe MERS’s role in the home loan.2 For example, the
plaintiffs allege they were defrauded because MERS is a
“sham” beneficiary without a financial interest in the loan, yet
the disclosures in the deed indicate that MERS is acting
“solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and
assigns” and holds “only legal title to the interest granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument.” Further, while the
plaintiffs indicate that MERS was used to hide who owned the
loan, the deed states that the loan or a partial interest in it “can
be sold one or more times without prior notice to Borrower,”
but that “[i]f there is a change in Loan Servicer, Borrower will
be given written notice of the change” as required by consumer
protection laws. Finally, the deed indicates that MERS
has “the right to foreclose and sell the property.” By signing
the deeds of trust, the plaintiffs agreed to the terms and were
on notice of the contents. See Kenly v. Miracle Props., 412 F.
Supp. 1072, 1075 (D. Ariz. 1976) (explaining that a deed of
trust is “an essentially private contractual arrangement”). In
light of the explicit terms of the standard deed signed by Cervantes,
it does not appear that the plaintiffs were misinformed
about MERS’s role in their home loans.

2Cervantes’s deed of trust, attached to MERSCORP’s reply in support
of its motion to dismiss, may be considered at the pleadings stage because the complaint references and relies on the deed, and its authenticity is unquestioned. See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

[4] Moreover, amendment would be futile. In their proposed
Second Amended Complaint, the plaintiffs seek to add
further detail concerning how MERS works in general and
how it has facilitated the trade in mortgage-backed securities.
But none of the new allegations cure the First Amended Complaint’s
deficiencies: the plaintiffs have not shown that they
received material misrepresentations about MERS that they
detrimentally relied upon. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s dismissal, without leave to amend, of the claim for
conspiracy to commit fraud through the MERS system.

2. Wrongful foreclosure
The plaintiffs contend that the district court abused its discretion
by dismissing their complaint without leave to add a
wrongful foreclosure claim. The only mention of a wrongful
foreclosure claim was during the hearing on the plaintiffs’
motion for leave to amend and the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
Although the plaintiffs expressed their intention to add
a wrongful foreclosure claim, they failed to include it in their
proposed Second Amended Complaint. Moreover, during the
hearing, the plaintiffs stated only a general theory of the claim: they posited that any foreclosure on a home loan tracked in the MERS system is “wrongful” because MERS is not a true beneficiary. As the plaintiffs describe it on appeal, their claim is that “the MERS system was used to facilitate wrongful foreclosure based on the naming of MERS as the
beneficiary on the deed of trust, which results in the note and
deed of trust being split and unenforceable.”

[5] The plaintiffs’ oral request to add a wrongful foreclosure
claim was procedurally improper and substantively
unsupported. The district court’s local rules require the plaintiffs
to submit a copy of the proposed amended pleadings
along with a motion for leave to amend. See D. Ariz. Civ. L.
R. 15.1. The plaintiffs failed to do so. Further, they failed to
provide the district court with an explanation of the legal and
factual grounds for adding the claim. It is particularly notable
here that Arizona state courts have not yet recognized a
wrongful foreclosure cause of action. Although a federal court
exercising diversity jurisdiction is “at liberty to predict the
future course of [a state’s] law,” plaintiffs choosing “the federal
forum . . . [are] not entitled to trailblazing initiatives
under [state law].” Ed Peters Jewelry Co. v. C & J Jewelry
Co., Inc., 124 F.3d 252, 262- 63 (1st Cir. 1997) (affirming
dismissal of a wrongful foreclosure claim when no such
action existed under state law). Under the circumstances, we
conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district
court to deny leave to amend without addressing the plaintiffs’
proposed claim for wrongful foreclosure. See Gardner
v. Martino (In re Gardner), 563 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2009)
(concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by denying leave to amend where the party seeking leave
failed to attach a proposed amended complaint in violation of
local rules and failed to articulate a factual and legal basis for
amendment).

[6] In any event, leave to amend would be futile because
the plaintiffs cannot state a plausible basis for relief. Looking
to states that have recognized substantive wrongful foreclosure claims, we note that such claims typically are available
after foreclosure and are premised on allegations that the borrower
was not in default, or on procedural issues that resulted
in damages to the borrower. See, e.g., Ed Peters Jewelry Co.,
124 F.3d at 263 n.8 (noting that the Massachusetts Supreme
Court recognized a claim for wrongful foreclosure where no
default had occurred in Mechanics Nat’l Bank of Worcester v.
Killeen, 384 N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (Mass. 1979)); Fields v. Millsap
& Singer, P.C., 295 S.W.3d 567, 571 (Mo. Ct. App.
2009) (stating that “a plaintiff seeking damages in a wrongful
foreclosure action must plead and prove that when the foreclosure
proceeding was begun, there was no default on its part
that would give rise to a right to foreclose” (internal alteration
and citation omitted)); Gregorakos v. Wells Fargo Nat’l
Ass’n, 647 S.E.2d 289, 292 (Ga. App. 2007) (“In Georgia, a
plaintiff asserting a claim of wrongful foreclosure must establish
a legal duty owed to it by the foreclosing party, a breach
of that duty, a causal connection between the breach of that
duty and the injury it sustained, and damages.” (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted)); Collins v. Union Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 662 P.2d 610, 623 (Nev. 1983) (“[T]he
material issue of fact in a wrongful foreclosure claim is
whether the trustor was in default when the power of sale was
exercised.”). Similarly, the case that the plaintiffs cite for the
availability of a wrongful foreclosure claim under Arizona
law, Herring v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 06-2622,
2007 WL 2051394, at *6 (D. Ariz. July 13, 2007), recognized
such a claim where the borrower was not in default at the time
of foreclosure. The plaintiffs have not alleged that Cervantes’s
or Maximo’s homes were sold and, in any event, all are
in default and have not identified damages. Thus, under the
established theories of wrongful foreclosure, the plaintiffs
have failed to state a claim.

Instead, the plaintiffs advance a novel theory of wrongful
foreclosure. They contend that all transfers of the interests in
the home loans within the MERS system are invalid because
the designation of MERS as a beneficiary is a sham and the system splits the deed from the note, and, thus, no party is in
a position to foreclose.

[7] Even if we were to accept the plaintiffs’ premises that
MERS is a sham beneficiary and the note is split from the
deed, we would reject the plaintiffs’ conclusion that, as a necessary
consequence, no party has the power to foreclose. The
legality of MERS’s role as a beneficiary may be at issue
where MERS initiates foreclosure in its own name, or where
the plaintiffs allege a violation of state recording and foreclosure
statutes based on the designation. See, e.g., Mortgage
Elec. Registration Sys. v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289, 294-97 (Me.
2010) (concluding that MERS cannot foreclose because it
does not have an independent interest in the loan because it
functions solely as a nominee); Landmark Nat’l Bank, 216
P.3d at 165-69 (same); Hooker v. Northwest Tr. Servs., No.
10-3111, 2011 WL 2119103, at *4 (D. Or. May 25, 2011)
(concluding that the defendants’ failure to register all assignments
of the deed of trust violated the Oregon recording laws
so as to prevent non-judicial foreclosure). But see Jackson,
770 N.W.2d at 501 (concluding that defendants’ failure to
register assignments of the beneficial interest in the mortgage
loan did not violate Minnesota recording laws so as to prevent
non-judicial foreclosure). This case does not present either of
these circumstances and, thus, we do not consider them.

[8] Here, MERS did not initiate foreclosure: the trustees
initiated foreclosure in the name of the lenders. Even if
MERS were a sham beneficiary, the lenders would still be
entitled to repayment of the loans and would be the proper
parties to initiate foreclosure after the plaintiffs defaulted on
their loans. The plaintiffs’ allegations do not call into question
whether the trustees were agents of the lenders. Rather, the
foreclosures against Almendarez and Maximo were initiated
by the trustee Tiffany & Bosco on behalf of First Franklin,
who is the original lender and holder of Almendarez’s and
Maximo’s promissory notes. Although it is unclear from the
pleadings who the current lender is on plaintiff Cervantes’s loan, the allegations do not raise any inference that the trustee
Recontrust Company lacks the authority to act on behalf of
the lender.

Further, the notes and deeds are not irreparably split: the
split only renders the mortgage unenforceable if MERS or the
trustee, as nominal holders of the deeds, are not agents of the
lenders. See Landmark Nat’l Bank, 216 P.3d at 167. Moreover,
the plaintiffs have not alleged violations of Arizona
recording and foreclosure statutes related to the purported
splitting of the notes and deeds.

[9] Accordingly, the plaintiffs have not raised a plausible
claim for wrongful foreclosure, and we conclude that dismissal
of the complaint without leave to add such a claim was
not an abuse of discretion.

3. Injunctive relief against Tiffany & Bosco
[10] The plaintiffs contend that the district court improperly
dismissed the trustee Tiffany & Bosco from this suit
under Arizona Revised Statute 33-807(E). Section 33-807(E)
provides that a “trustee is entitled to be immediately dismissed”
from any action other than one “pertaining to a
breach of the trustee’s obligations,” because the trustee is otherwise
bound by an order entered against a beneficiary for
actions that the trustee took on its behalf. The only breach that
the plaintiffs allege against Tiffany & Bosco is that it failed
to recognize that its appointment was invalid. According to
the plaintiffs, the appointment was invalid because MERS is
a sham beneficiary and lacks power to “appoint” a trustee.
However, a trustee such as Tiffany & Bosco has the “absolute
right” under Arizona law “to rely upon any written direction
or information furnished to him by the beneficiary.” Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 33-820(A). Thus, Tiffany & Bosco did not have
an obligation to consider whether its presumptively legal
appointment as trustee, which was recorded in the county
records, was invalid based on the original designation of MERS as a beneficiary. Accordingly, Tiffany & Bosco was
properly dismissed.

4. Equitable Tolling and Estoppel
The plaintiffs contend that the district court failed to
address the equitable tolling of their claims under TILA and
the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act and, in any event, abused its
discretion by denying the plaintiffs leave to amend their allegations
in support of equitable tolling and estoppel. A district
court may dismiss a claim “[i]f the running of the statute is
apparent on the face of the complaint.” Jablon v. Dean Witter
& Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). However, a district
court may do so “only if the assertions of the complaint, read
with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to
prove that the statute was tolled.” Id.

[11] The plaintiffs’ claims under TILA and the Arizona
Consumer Fraud Act are subject to one-year statutes of limitations.
15 U.S.C. § 1640(e); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-541(5). Both
limitations periods began to run when the plaintiffs executed
their loan documents, because they could have discovered the
alleged disclosure violations and discrepancies at that time.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (the one-year limitations period for
a TILA claim begins when the violation occurred); Alaface v.
Nat’l Inv. Co., 892 P.2d 1375, 1379 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (a
cause of action for consumer fraud under Arizona law accrues
“ ‘when the defrauded party discovers or with reasonable diligence
could have discovered the fraud’ ”). The running of the
limitations periods on both claims is apparent on the face of
the complaint because the plaintiffs obtained their loans in
2006, but commenced their action in 2009.

[12] The plaintiffs have not demonstrated a basis for equitable
tolling of their claims. “We will apply equitable tolling
in situations where, despite all due diligence, the party invoking
equitable tolling is unable to obtain vital information bearing
on the existence of the claim.” Socop-Gonzalez v. I.N.S., 272 F.3d 1176, 1193 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted). The plaintiffs suggest that their
TILA claim should have been tolled because Almendarez and
Maximo speak only Spanish, but received loan documents
written in English. However, the plaintiffs have not alleged
circumstances beyond their control that prevented them from
seeking a translation of the loan documents that they signed
and received. Thus, the plaintiffs have not stated a basis for
equitable tolling. See Hubbard v. Fidelity Fed. Bank, 91 F.3d
75, 79 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (declining to toll TILA’s
statute of limitations when “nothing prevented [the mortgagor]
from comparing the loan contract, [the lender’s] initial
disclosures, and TILA’s statutory and regulatory requirements”).

[13] In addition, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated a
basis for equitable estoppel. Equitable estoppel “halts the statute
of limitations when there is active conduct by a defendant,
above and beyond the wrongdoing upon which the plaintiff ’s
claim is filed, to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time.” See
Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The First Amended Complaint
alleges only that the defendants “fraudulently misrepresented
and concealed the true facts related to the items subject to disclosure.”
The plaintiffs, however, have failed to specify what
true facts are at issue, or to establish that the alleged misrepresentation
and concealment of facts is “above and beyond the
wrongdoing” that forms the basis for their TILA and Arizona
Consumer Fraud Act claims. Guerrero, 442 F.3d at 706.

[14] The district court therefore properly dismissed the
plaintiffs’ claims under both TILA and the Arizona Consumer
Fraud Act as barred by a one-year statute of limitations. The
plaintiffs did not add any new facts to the proposed Second
Amended Complaint, and do not suggest any on appeal, that
would support applying either equitable tolling or equitable
estoppel to their claims. Thus, the district court also did not
abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend.

5. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The plaintiffs contend that they sufficiently stated a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. When ruling on
a motion to dismiss such a claim under Arizona law, a district
court may determine whether the alleged conduct rises to the
level of “extreme and outrageous.” See Cluff v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 460 P.2d 666, 668 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969), overruled on
other grounds by Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.,
783 P.2d 781 (Ariz. 1989).

[15] Here, the plaintiffs fail to meet that threshold. They
allege that the lenders’ “actions in targeting Plaintiffs for a
loan, misrepresenting the terms and conditions of the loan,
negotiating the loan, and closing the loan” were “extreme and
outrageous because of the Plaintiffs’ vulnerability” and “because
the subject of the loan was each Plaintiff ’s primary residence.”
This conduct, though arguably offensive if true, is
not so outrageous as to go “beyond all possible bounds of
decency.” Lucchesi v. Frederic N. Stimmell, M.D., Ltd., 716
P.2d 1013, 1015 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc). The plaintiffs essentially
allege that the lenders offered them loans that the lenders
knew they could not repay; this is not inherently “extreme
and outrageous.” Moreover, the plaintiffs do not allege any
additional support for their claim in their proposed Second
Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the district court properly
dismissed, without leave to amend, the plaintiffs’ claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.

IV.
The district court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint without leave to amend. The plaintiffs’
claims that focus on the operation of the MERS system ultimately
fail because the plaintiffs have not shown that the
alleged illegalities associated with the MERS system injured
them or violated state law. As part of their fraud claim, the
plaintiffs have not shown that they detrimentally relied upon any misrepresentations about MERS’s role in their loans. Further,
even if we were to accept the plaintiffs’ contention that
MERS is a sham beneficiary and the note is split from the
deed in the MERS system, it does not follow that any attempt
to foreclose after the plaintiffs defaulted on their loans is necessarily
“wrongful.” The plaintiffs’ claims against their original
lenders fail because they have not stated a basis for
equitable tolling or estoppel of the statutes of limitations on
their TILA and Arizona Consumer Fraud Act claims, and
have not identified extreme and outrageous conduct in support
of their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Thus, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.

If you have been a victim of wrongful foreclosure and need help in saving your home from fraudulent foreclosure, you need to know the Foreclosure Fundamentals that will ensure that you stick it to these illegal entities rather than having your case thrown out by the courts that favors the deep pockets. To get the real arsenals that will blow the lids off of these crime pots – visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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Florida Homeowner’s Guide to a Civil Lawsuit

02 Saturday Nov 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Discovery Strategies, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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This post is intended to offer a general introduction to, and overview of, the course of a “typical” civil lawsuit for homeowners wishing to fight their foreclosure in other to save their homes. Because of the vast array of actions that may be pursued in Florida courts, an exhaustive discussion of the rights, remedies, and procedures available is beyond the scope of this post.

Moreover, this post will focus mainly on the pretrial proceedings, which tend to be more “mysterious” and less publicized than the actual trial. Indeed, pretrial proceedings can be a valuable way of savings your home as many banks and lenders who were in the business of illegal wrongful foreclosure with fraudulently manufactured sets of mortgage documents never take homeowners serious until it gets to that stage. The reason why they take a homeowner serious from that point on is that Banks and lenders will then start making major expenses on legal fees to attorneys retained to respond to the wrongful foreclosure complaints filed by homeowners. With an average wrongful foreclosure litigation lasting between 2 to 5 years, and many homeowners living in their homes mortgage free throughout the litigation period without making a dime in mortgage payments, most smart Lenders and Banks try to cut their loses by quickly modifying mortgage loans with terms most favorable to homeowners in order for homeowners to remain in their rightfully owned dream homes. This fit would not have been accomplished by simply asking the banks to modify a mortgage loan as most loans have been securitized to investors. Lenders and banks from that point on serves only as “servicers” (Not Owners) to the securitized investment trusts From that point after the securitization, they are no longer owners of the mortgage loans, but simply servicers of the trust, unless they later repurchase it after default. They may try to trick homeowners into thinking that they still own their mortgage loans, absolutely not! That’s why they are giving homeowners run around in order to foreclose and steal the home right behind your nose. Folks! they can’t modify mortgage loans for the simple fact that “they cannot modify what they don’t own” period! There are thousands of investors that own the mortgage pools.  Mortgage pools are controlled by PSA (Pooling and Servicing Agreement) and they must obtain consent authorizations from all investors (Real Owners), in order to modify any loans in the securitized pools that is why it is nearly impossible to modify most loans unless you take them to Court to prove their ownership, which they cannot do. Then and only then will the Lenders and Banks get those consent from investors as investors do not want to lose assets and in most times the loans will simply be repurchased from the trust by your lender after default before modification. Once repurchased, your loan is ‘get this’, “no longer a secured debt” but an unsecured debt and your “home” is no longer used as a collateral to your mortgage loan debt. Your mortgage loan may also have been paid off by forced place insurance your lender placed on your loan when you took out your loan, as that is taken out to cover their loses in the event of your default on the mortgage loan. That this why they are charging you the forced placed insurance premium when you took out your mortgage loan, in order to collect large sums of money that reduces your mortgage debt and in most cases, “pays off your entire mortgage loan” when you default. But they will still try to foreclose on you as if your loan is still a secured debt which it is not. They perpetrate those fraud due to your ignorance. That’s of course if you keep quite and let them steal your home right under your nose.

While many homeowners are familiar with the general procedures applicable in criminal cases, they may be less familiar with civil proceedings. For example, unlike criminal defendants, civil litigants enjoy no constitutional speedy trial rights. As a result, civil proceedings may seem unduly lengthy, particularly in counties where the court dockets are especially congested. Courts try to speed up the process and encourage extra-judicial resolution of disputed claims, for example, through court-annexed mediation or arbitration.

I. The Pleadings

A. The Complaint
B. Answer
C. Responsive Motions
D. Counterclaims
E. Crossclaims and Third-Party Claims
F. Amendment

II. Pretrial Procedure

A. Discovery
B. Discovery Methods
C. Protective Orders
D. Sanctions

III. Dismissal

A. Voluntary Dismissal
B. Involuntary Dismissal
C. Summary Judgment

IV. Non-Judicial Methods of Resolution

A. Mediation
B. Arbitration
C. Offers of Judgment

V. Trial

A. Demand for Jury
B. Jury Selection
C. Opening Statements
D. Motion for Directed Verdict
E. Closing Argument
F. Jury Instructions
G. Verdict

VI. Conclusion
————————–

I. The Pleadings.

The term “pleadings” often is used synonymously (and incorrectly) to refer to any documents filed with the court. However, this term has a more limited and technical meaning. The “pleadings” in a lawsuit are simply those filings that set forth either (a) the complaining party’s allegations and causes of action; or (b) the defending party’s responses to those allegations along with any defenses or causes of action the defending party may assert. This becomes significant only when the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure distinguish between “pleadings” and other documents. For example, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is directed solely to the “pleadings” and the court may not consider any other filings, such as exhibits, deposition testimony, interrogatory answers, etc.

A. The Complaint.

A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint or petition. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.050. This initial pleading filed by the complaining party generally consists of factual allegations, a description of the legal claims based on those allegations, and a request for relief. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b). Some pleadings are subject to special rules. For example, in actions alleging injury or death arising out of medical malpractice, the pleadings are required to include a certificate that counsel has conducted “a reasonable investigation as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant.” Fla. Stat. Sec. 766.104(1) (2003). “Good faith” may be demonstrated by a written expert opinion that there is evidence of medical negligence. Id. Failure to comply with this section may subject the party to an award of fees and costs. Id. These special pleading rules are in addition to the pre-suit notice requirements applicable to medical malpractice claims. See Fla. Stat. Sec. 766.106 (2003). A lawsuit may involve one defendant, multiple defendants, or even a class of defendants. The procedures and requirements for certifying a class of plaintiffs or defendants are found in Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220. Similarly, the lawsuit may involve multiple plaintiffs or a class of plaintiffs.

A complaint may assert more than one count. It may state different causes of action, even if they are inconsistent. This common practice is called pleading “in the alternative.” Sometimes the conduct complained about may support more than one cause of action, depending on what discovery reveals. For example, Adam contracts to sell a piece of commercial real estate to Bob. Adam decides to accept a better offer from Charles. Bob brings a lawsuit against Adam after Adam reneges on their agreement. Bob may seek monetary damages because he will have to incur additional expenses in finding another suitable property. However, Bob also may sue in the alternative, for “specific performance,” which simply means that the original contract between Bob and Adam would be enforced and Adam would be required to sell the property to Bob, instead of paying Bob money damages.

Therefore, a party often does not have to choose initially which theory it will proceed on; however, the party ultimately can recover only once. Therefore, Bob cannot have both remedies and will have to choose which one he wants.

A party also may plead claims that are inconsistent with each other. As one court has noted, this is because “the pleadings in a cause are merely a tentative outline of the position which the pleader takes before the case is fully developed on the facts.” Hines v. Trager Constr. Co., 188 So. 2d 826, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 194 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1966). This rule applies equally to defendants. Therefore, a defendant may raise defenses that are inconsistent with each other.

The relief most commonly sought is money damages. Compensatory damages are intended to compensate the injured party for its loss. Punitive or exemplary damages are awarded beyond the actual loss and are intended to punish the wrongdoer and to deter similar conduct by others. The availability of punitive damages is limited by statute and court rule. See Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.72 (2003). This statute prevents a party from even including a claim for punitive damages in the complaint until that party has presented record evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict for punitive damages. This is important because the party seeking punitive damage is not entitled to the discovery of information concerning the other party’s financial net worth until the court is satisfied that a triable claim for punitive damages has been established. Id. In 2003, these requirements were incorporated into Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(f).

A party also may seek injunctive relief, i.e., an order by the court directing a party to do some act (positive) or to refrain from doing some act (negative). Once such an order is entered by a court, noncompliance with that order may be punishable as contempt of court.

One form of injunctive relief frequently requested is “specific performance,” which is essentially a direction to a party to perform its contract. Specific performance may be requested in land sales contracts and non-compete agreements. However, this remedy is not available to enforce certain types of contracts, such as personal service contracts.

A party also may seek declaratory relief. The trial courts have jurisdiction “to declare rights, status, and other equitable or legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” Fla. Stat. Sec. 86.011 (2003). This may include the interpretation and declaration of rights under “a statute, regulation, municipal ordinance, contract, deed, will, franchise, or other article, memorandum, or instrument in writing.” Fla. Stat. Sec. 86.021 (2003). The declaration may be affirmative or negative and “has the force and effect of a final judgment.” Fla. Stat. Sec. 86.011 (2003). For example, declaratory judgment proceedings frequently are initiated by insurance companies seeking a determination of their obligation to defend against another action.

B. Answer.

After being served with the initial pleading, the defendant (or respondent) must respond to it. A defendant has a couple of options at this stage.

Typically the defendant files an answer, which responds to each allegation of the complaint and which may set forth one or more defenses. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(c). Under the rules of civil procedure, “affirmative defenses” must be asserted in a responsive pleading or motion to dismiss or they will be waived. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d). Affirmative defenses are those defenses that “avoid” rather than deny. For example, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. By raising this defense, the defendant asserts that even if the defendant committed all of the horrible acts alleged by the plaintiff, the plaintiff has no cause of action because the action was not filed in a timely fashion. In that respect the claim is “avoided,” rather than denied.

C. Responsive Motions.

In lieu of, or in addition to, filing an answer, the defendant may move to challenge the legal sufficiency of the claims raised by the plaintiff. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140. These rules apply equally to counterclaims, crossclaims, and third-party claims. This motion is not a “pleading.” The defendant may argue that the complaint “fails to state a claim,” that is, even assuming that the facts alleged in the complaint are true, the law does not recognize a cause of action. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(6). For example, a store patron sues the grocery store for damages after he is assaulted by a third person in the vacant lot next door. The grocery store will move to dismiss, claiming that the store patron has failed to state a cause of action because it has no duty to protect customers off the premises. An out-of-state defendant might argue that the court lacks “personal jurisdiction” over him or her Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(2). because he or she lacks sufficient “contacts” with the state, such as an office or business transactions in the state. This is based on the federal due process clause. Before a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, that defendant must possess “certain minimum contacts with the state” so that “maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’.” Walt Disney Co. v. Nelson, 677 So. 2d 400, 402 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

Other defenses that might be raised at this stage include failure to join an indispensable party, Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(7). lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(1). Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the court’s authority or competence to preside over certain matters. For example, by statute, circuit courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear matters involving amounts less than $15,000.00. The subject matter for such actions is vested in the county courts. See Fla. Stat. Sec. 34.01(1)(c) (2003). improper venue, Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(3). Venue is governed by Fla. Stat. Ch. 47 (2003), except where the Legislature has provided for special venue rules. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Sec. 770.05 (2003) (limiting choice of venue in actions involving “libel or slander, invasion of privacy, or any other tort founded upon any single publication, exhibition, or utterance”). and insufficiency of process Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(4). “Insufficiency of process” refers to the actual document which is served. To determine if the process is adequate, one should examine it to determine that it is signed by a clerk of court or the clerk’s deputy, it bears the clerk’s seal, a correct caption, the defendant’s correct name, the name of the appropriate state, the return date, the name and address of the party or lawyer causing process to be issued, and the name of any defendant organization. If it is not a summons, it should comply with the statute or rule that authorizes its issuance. See H.

Trawick, Florida Practice & Procedure Sec. 8-22, at 170-72 (1999). or service of process. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(5). A defect in the “service of process” claims that the defendant was not served appropriately: for example, he or she was not served personally, when required. Service of process is governed by Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.070 and by Fla. Stat. Chs. 48, 49 (2003). Certain defenses are waived if not raised either by an answer (or other responsive pleading) or by motion to dismiss, such as personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficiency of process or service of process. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(h)(1).

A defendant also may move for “a more definite statement” if the pleading is so vague or ambiguous that the defendant cannot frame a sufficient response to it Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(e). or it may move to “strike” portions as “redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(f).

D. Counterclaims.

In addition to its responsive pleading, a defendant may file a counterclaim, which operates like a complaint, except that the defendant is now the counterclaim plaintiff. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170. Thus, a counterclaim sets out factual allegations, legal claims, and a request for relief, just like a complaint. Id. A counterclaim requires a response by the “counterclaim defendant,” who was the plaintiff in the initial complaint. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.100(a) and 1.110(c).

Counterclaims may be “permissive” or “compulsory.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a), (b). A counterclaim is “compulsory” and, therefore, must be raised in he current action if it “arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a). On the other hand, a counterclaim is “permissive” if it does not arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(b). This designation determines whether the counterclaim must be raised at this time or whether the defendant/counterclaim plaintiff can bring a separate action on the counterclaim. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a), (b).

E. Crossclaims and Third-Party Claims.

A defendant may file a crossclaim against another defendant Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(g). or may file a third-party complaint against a nonparty. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(h). Crossclaims and third-party claims include factual allegations, legal claims, and requests for relief. They also require a response by the crossclaim or third-party defendants. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.100(a). In practice, the pleadings can become quite complicated because of the number of possible claims which may be asserted. For example, a crossclaim defendant can assert a counterclaim against the crossclaim plaintiff and can assert a third-party claim against other nonparties. Multiple plaintiffs who are subject to a counterclaim can assert cross-claims against each other or third-party claims against other nonparties. There may be fourth party complaints. Understanding the availability of crossclaims, counterclaims and third-party claims by various parties aids in comprehension when one is faced with a lengthy caption identifying one party as a defendant, a counterclaim plaintiff, a crossclaim defendant, and a third-party plaintiff, all at the same time.

F. Amendment.

A party may amend the pleading once as a matter of right if there has been no responsive pleading. Otherwise, leave of court or written consent of the other side is required. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a). Leave of court is “given freely when justice so requires.” Id. Frequently a party will amend the pleading to cure any deficiencies addressed by a motion to dismiss. Amendments may be allowed even after trial under certain circumstances. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(b).

II. Pretrial Procedure.

After responsive pleadings or motions are due, the court may schedule a case management conference to try to expedite and streamline litigation, for example, by scheduling service of papers, coordinating complex litigation, addressing discovery issues, pretrial motions and settlement issues, requiring the parties to file stipulations, etc. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.200(a).
Later, the court may schedule a pretrial conference to address simplification of issues, amendments, admissions by one party, experts, etc. The failure of a party or its attorney to cooperate in these conferences may result in sanctions. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.200(b), (c); Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.75(1) (2003).

A. Discovery.

Discovery occupies a large part of most civil lawsuits because Florida courts do not favor trial “by ambush.” Therefore, the rules of civil procedure encourage, indeed mandate, complete discovery. In practice, however, discovery disputes occupy a large amount of attorney and judge time.

Generally, discovery is allowed of “any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1). In this context, “relevance” has a very broad meaning. Information is discoverable if it “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id.

The goals of discovery are several. Each party desires to know what the other party intends to present at trial so as to avoid any nasty surprises. Each party also seeks to obtain evidence either to support its claims and/or defenses or rebut the opposing party’s claims and/or defenses, whether directly or through impeachment. Discovery permits a party to obtain information concerning what documents the other side intends to introduce, what that party’s experts and other witnesses will say and how that party intends to prove its claims and/or defenses. In cases in which punitive damages legitimately have been sought, the plaintiff may obtain financial worth information from the alleged wrongdoer. However, keep in mind that punitive damages only may be requested with prior permission of the court. See Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.72 (2003).

While discovery is very broad, it is not without limitation. For example, the other side generally cannot discover privileged information. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1). Examples of evidentiary privileges recognized by statute are: journalist’s privilege, Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.5015 (2003); attorney-client communications, Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.502 (2003); psychotherapist-patient communications, Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.503 (2003); sexual assault counselor-victim communications, Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.5035 (2003); domestic violence advocate-victim communications, Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.5036 (2003); husband-wife communications, Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.504 (2003); communications to clergy, Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.505 (2003); accountant-client communications, Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.5055 (2003); and trade secrets, Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.506 (2003). The rules also restrict a party’s ability to obtain documents and tangible things prepared “in anticipation of litigation” by the other side. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(3). This is also known as the “work-product” privilege. The rules severely limit a party’s ability to discover information concerning experts who have been retained by the other side in anticipation of litigation but who are not expected to testify at trial. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(4)(B).

B. Discovery Methods.

There are several mechanisms for obtaining discovery. To a large extent, the type of discovery method employed and its timing depend on the information desired and the particular style of the legal practitioner.

1. Depositions.

A “deposition” is an oral examination of a person under oath that is recorded by a stenographer and may be videotaped or audiotaped. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.310. A party deponent may be required to produce documents during the examination. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(5). Depositions of parties may be used by the other side for any purpose. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.330(a)(2). Depositions may be taken by telephone. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(7). Depositions frequently are used to impeach subsequent testimony. Sometimes, depositions may be taken prior to the filing of a civil action or during appeal to preserve testimony. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.290. Depositions may or may not be transcribed, depending upon the wishes of the parties. Depositions also may be conducted on written questions. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.320. This method is not used frequently.

2. Interrogatories.

“Interrogatories,” another common discovery method, are written questions that are served on a party Although the rules allow for any person to be deposed, interrogatories and requests for admission may be directed only to parties. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.340(a) (“a party may serve upon any other party written interrogatories”) and 1.370(a) (“[A] party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission of the truth of any matters within the scope of rule 1.280(b)”). and that require written responses within thirty (30) days. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.340(a). The rules limit the number of questions to thirty (30) without court approval. Id. Form interrogatories pre-approved by the Florida Supreme Court must be used if applicable. Id. Interrogatories must be answered separately, fully, in writing, and under oath unless objections are made. Id. Like deposition testimony, interrogatory answers frequently are used to impeach subsequent testimony.

A party may produce records in lieu of answering an interrogatory if the answer may be derived from those records and if it is equally burdensome for the party to determine the answer as it is for the party seeking the information. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.340(c).

3. Production of Documents and Things by Parties.

A party may be required to produce documents or other tangible things for inspection and/or copying by the other side. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.350(a). “Documents” are defined broadly to include writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, phono-records and other “data compilations” from which information may be obtained or translated. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.350. The party seeking the information may test and sample the tangible items. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.350(a)(2). A party may request to enter upon designated land or property to inspect some object or operation. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.350(a)(3).

4. Production of Documents and Things by Nonparties.

A party also may obtain documents from nonparties by issuing a subpoena directing production of documents or things without deposition. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.351(a). Other parties must be notified at least ten (10) days before the subpoena issues so that they may object. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.351(b). If another party objects, this method of nonparty discovery becomes unavailable. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.351(c). If there is no objection, the nonparty may comply with the subpoena by providing copies of the documents or things sought. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.351(e).

5. Mental and Physical Examinations.

In certain circumstances, a party may request that a qualified expert conduct a physical or mental examination of a party, or a person in that party’s control or custody. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.360(a). This discovery method is utilized most often in personal injury cases and otherwise when a person’s physical or mental condition is in controversy. The party requesting the examination must demonstrate good cause. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.360(a)(2).

6. Request for Admissions.

An important, but often under-utilized, form of discovery is the “request for admissions.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370. One party serves upon another party a written request that the party admit to the truth of certain matters, including statements or opinions of fact or the application of law to fact, or the genuineness of documents. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370(a). If the other side fails to respond or object within thirty (30) days, the facts are considered admitted, which means that they are conclusively established. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370(b). The requesting party also may move to determine the sufficiency of the responses. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370(a). If the court decides that a response does not comply with the rule, the matter may be deemed admitted or an amended answer required. Id. If a party fails to admit a matter and the other side later proves that matter, the party may have to pay the costs incurred by the other side in making that proof. Id. Recently, the Florida Supreme Court revised the rules of civil procedure to limit the number of requests for admissions to thirty (30).Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370(a).

C. Protective Orders.

At any time, a party or nonparty from whom discovery is sought may ask the court to enter a protective order to protect that person from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c). Such a protective order may prohibit discovery, limit its scope, or effectuate other protective measures. Id.

D. Sanctions.

A party who is dissatisfied with the other side’s cooperation in discovery may seek an order compelling discovery. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.380(a). If a motion to compel is granted, the opposing party shall pay the moving party’s expenses incurred in obtaining the order, which may include attorney’s fees, unless the opposition to the motion was justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.380(a)(4). Similarly, if the motion is denied, the moving party shall pay the nonmoving party’s expenses unless the motion was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Id.

If the court orders discovery, failure to obey that order may be punishable as contempt. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b). The court has many available sanctions for discovery violations, particularly when the recalcitrant person is a party. Certain matters may be deemed established or a party may be prevented from opposing or supporting claims or defenses or from introducing evidence. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b)(2). The court may strike pleadings, dismiss the action, or enter a default judgment. Id. However, the failure to submit to a physical or mental examination is not punishable by contempt. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b)(2)(E).

III. Dismissal.

Frequently, civil actions are dismissed before a trial on the merits of the underlying claims. In addition to settlement, dismissal of a civil action may come about under a number of circumstances.

A. Voluntary Dismissal.

A party’s ability to dismiss its own action is limited by the rules of civil procedure. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420. The dismissal rules also apply to counterclaims, crossclaims, and third-party claims. A party may dismiss its lawsuit voluntarily without a court order prior to trial, as long as no motion for summary judgment has been heard or one has been denied and the case has not been submitted to the fact-finder. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(1)(A). An action may be dismissed by stipulation of the parties. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(1)(B). If the plaintiff previously has dismissed a similar case, this second dismissal will operate as an adjudication on the merits and the plaintiff will not be permitted to refile the action. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(1). Otherwise, the plaintiff may be able to refile the action. However, the plaintiff may be required to pay costs before bringing a similar action against the same party. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(d).

B. Involuntary Dismissal.

The court may enter an order of dismissal as a sanction for failure to comply with court rules or orders. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b). In evaluating whether the compliance merits this drastic sanction, the court considers the intent of the noncompliant party, the existence of previous sanctions, the involvement of the client, the degree of prejudice to the other side, and any justification for noncompliance. See H. Trawick, Florida Practice & Procedure Sec. 21-5, at 335-37 (1999).

If a case is tried to the court (i.e., without a jury), a party may seek involuntary dismissal if the other side, after completing its presentation of evidence, has failed to show a right to relief. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b).
Unless the order states that the dismissal is without prejudice, an involuntary dismissal under this rule is an adjudication on the merits and precludes the plaintiff from refiling the action. See, e.g., Drady v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 193 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967), cert. denied, 210 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1968).

An action shall be dismissed by the court for failure to prosecute if there has been no record activity for one year unless the court has stayed the action or a party shows good cause prior to the hearing. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e). In practice, this rule is strictly enforced.

C. Summary Judgment.

After the lawsuit has been filed, either party may move for summary judgment, subject to certain time restrictions. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510. Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment does more than challenge the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Of course, a summary judgment motion may be directed to a counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim in the same manner. In moving for a summary judgment, one argues that the opposing party cannot present evidence that would be sufficient to demonstrate a “genuine issue as to any material fact” and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c). Orders granting summary judgment are scrutinized closely on appeal.

The motion for summary judgment may be supported or opposed by competent affidavits made on personal knowledge that set forth admissible facts. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a), (b), (e). The parties also may rely upon depositions and answers to interrogatories. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e). However, in evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a trial judge may not weigh evidence or assess credibility. If the material facts are in dispute, summary judgment may not be entered and the litigation continues.

IV. Non-Judicial Methods of Resolution.

There are several ways in which a case may be resolved by the parties before trial, with the assistance of “alternative dispute resolution” techniques.

A. Mediation.

Mediation is “a process whereby a neutral third person called a mediator acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of a dispute between two or more parties. It is an informal and nonadversarial process with the objective of helping the disputing parties reach a mutually acceptable and voluntary agreement.” Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.1011(2) (2003). The parties also may stipulate to mediation. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.710(b). Mediation does not suspend the discovery process. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.710(c).

Some civil actions are never ordered to mediation, including bond estreatures, habeas corpus and extraordinary writs, bond validations, criminal or civil contempt proceedings, or any other matters specified by the chief judge of that court. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.710(b).

The mediator may be chosen by the parties or may be appointed by the court. The chief judge maintains a list of mediators who have been certified by the Florida Supreme Court. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.102(5) (2003). When possible, qualified individuals who have volunteered their time to serve as mediators shall be appointed. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.102(5)(a) (2003). Often parties agree on a particular mediator in order to select someone with specialized knowledge or expertise in the area under consideration.

Parties who fail to appear at mediation without good cause are subject to sanctions. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b). The mediator controls the mediation process. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.720(d). Counsel are permitted to communicate privately with their clients. Id. If the parties and mediator agree, mediation can proceed without counsel. Id. The mediator can meet privately with the parties or their counsel. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.720(e).

If the mediation results in no agreement, the mediator reports this to the court without comment or recommendation. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.730(a). The mediator also may identify pending motions or outstanding legal issues, discovery process or other actions whose resolution could facilitate the possibility of a settlement. Id. If an agreement is reached, it is reduced to writing and signed by the parties and their counsel. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.730(b). Mediation proceedings are privileged, subject to limited exceptions. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.102(3) (2003). Written communications in mediation are also exempt from Florida’s Public Records Act.Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.102(3) (2003).

B. Arbitration.

There are generally two types of court-ordered arbitration: mandatory non-binding arbitration and voluntary binding arbitration. In addition, arbitration often is ordered when the parties previously have agreed contractually to submit their claims to arbitration. See Fla. Stat. Sec. 682.02 (2003).

1. Mandatory (Non-Binding) Arbitration.

The court may direct the parties to participate in mandatory, non-binding arbitration. See Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.103(2) (2003). Unlike mediation, which is relatively informal, arbitration is similar to a mini-trial because arbitrators may administer oaths, take testimony, issue subpoenas and apply to the court for orders compelling attendance and production. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.103(4) (2003). The arbitrator (or arbitration panel) renders a written decision that will become final if the parties do not submit a timely request for a trial de novo. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.103(5) (2003). If a party requests a trial de novo and does not achieve a result that is more favorable than the arbitration award, that party may be assessed costs, including fees. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.103(6) (2003).

2. Voluntary (Binding) Arbitration.

The parties also may agree in writing to submit their action to binding arbitration, except when constitutional issues are involved. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.104(1) (2003). The parties may agree on the selection of one or more arbitrators; otherwise, they will be appointed by the court. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.104(2) (2003). As in mandatory non-binding arbitration, the arbitrator has the power to administer oaths, issue subpoenas, etc. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.104(7) (2003). A majority of the arbitrators may render a decision. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.104(8) (2003). The Florida Rules of Evidence apply to voluntary binding arbitration proceedings. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.104(9) (2003). Appeals to the circuit court are limited to statutorily defined issues, such as failure of the arbitrators to comply with procedural or evidentiary rules, misconduct, etc. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.104(10) (2003). Disputes involving child custody, visitation, or child support, or the rights of a nonparty to the arbitration are non-arbitrable. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.104(14) (2003). In addition, the court may require the parties in a medical malpractice action to submit to non-binding arbitration before a panel of arbitrators consisting of a plaintiff’s attorney, a health care practitioner or defense attorney, and a trial attorney. See Fla. Stat. Sec. 766.107(1) (2003). The panel considers the evidence and decides the issues of liability, amount of damages, and apportionment of responsibility among the parties, but may not award punitive damages. Fla. Stat. Sec. 766.107(3)(b) (2003). Voluntary binding arbitration is also available in medical malpractice actions. See Fla Stat. Sec. 766.207 (2003).

C. Offers of Judgment.

Before trial, a party may submit a written “offer of judgment” that offers to settle a claim on specified terms, e.g., for a specified amount, etc. Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.79(1) (2003). The other side has thirty (30) days to accept the offer in writing. If the plaintiff rejects an offer by a defendant under this section and ultimately obtains a judgment of no liability or at least twenty-five percent (25%) less than the offer, the plaintiff will be responsible for costs and fees from the date of the filing of the offer. Id. Likewise, if the defendant rejects a demand for judgment by the plaintiff under this section, and the plaintiff subsequently obtains a judgment that is at least twenty-five percent (25%) greater than the offer, the defendant will be responsible for plaintiff’s fees and costs incurred after the date of the filing of the demand. Id. An offer or demand may be withdrawn in writing at any time prior to its acceptance. Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.79(5) (2003). Another statute provides for the assessment of costs and fees against a party whose rejection of an offer of settlement subsequently is determined by the court to have been “unreasonable.” Unlike Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.79 an award of fees and costs under this section is not mandatory. However, this section does not apply to causes of action which accrue after October 1, 1990 and, therefore, the statute is all but obsolete. See Fla. Stat. Sec. 45.061 (2003). Given the availability of fees and costs under this section, it is a powerful mechanism for encouraging parties to consider settlement offers seriously.

V. Trial.

Although the majority of civil cases are resolved without a trial, many still proceed to trial. Once all motions directed to the last “pleading” Recall that “pleading” has a specialized meaning and refers to complaint and answer, counterclaim and response to counterclaim, crossclaim and response to crossclaim, etc.have been resolved of or, if no such motions were served, within twenty (20) days of the service of the last pleading, an action is “at issue,” and a party may notify the court that it is ready to be set for trial. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.440(b). Typically, the court directs the parties to mediation if mediation already has not occurred. Otherwise, a trial date may be scheduled.

A. Demand for Jury.

The right to a jury trial in a civil case is not absolute and, in fact, may be waived if it is not demanded in a timely fashion. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.430(d).

Typically, the demand for a jury trial is appended to the plaintiff’s complaint. A plaintiff may choose, however, for strategic purposes or otherwise, not to assert its jury trial right. However, both parties enjoy the right to a jury trial Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.430(a); Art. I, Sec. 22, Fla. Const. and a defendant who desires a jury trial typically will demand one in its answer or other responsive pleading. If a jury trial is not demanded within the time limits imposed by the rules of civil procedure, it is deemed waived. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.430(d). If a jury trial is demanded, the demand thereafter may not be withdrawn without consent of the parties. Id.

A matter may be tried completely or partially to a jury. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.430(c). However, parties are not entitled automatically to a jury trial in all cases because some matters, such as injunction proceedings, are not triable to a jury.

B. Jury Selection.

Assuming that a jury trial has been demanded, the first step in the trial process is jury selection. Prospective jurors may be provided with a questionnaire to determine any legal disqualifications (e.g., felony conviction). Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(a)(1). Fla. Stat. Sec. 40.013 (2003), disqualifies from jury service (1) those individuals who have been convicted of a felony and (2) the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Cabinet officers, clerk of court, and judges. Fla. Stat. Sec. 40.013(1), (2)(a) (2003). This chapter also permits other individuals to be excused upon request, including law enforcement officers and their investigative personnel, expectant mothers and non-full-time employed single parents of children under six years old, practicing attorneys and physicians, the physically infirm, individuals over seventy (70) years old, individuals who demonstrate hardship, extreme inconvenience, or public necessity, and persons who care for certain incapacitated individuals. Id. Jurors also may be provided with questionnaires to assist in voir dire, or the oral examination of prospective jurors. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(a)(2). The parties have the right to examine jurors orally on voir dire. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(b). The court also may question prospective jurors. Id.

The parties may challenge any prospective juror “for cause,” i.e., if the juror is biased, incompetent, or related to a party or attorney for a party or has some interest in the action. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(c)(1). There is no limit to the number of “for cause” challenges that may be raised. On the other hand, a party generally is limited to three (3) “peremptory” challenges, which do not require that the party establish cause, or any other reason for that matter. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(d). However, there are constitutional limitations on peremptory challenges. For example, a party may not utilize its peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors in a racially discriminatory manner. See, e.g., State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Laidler v. State, 627 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).

After the trial jury is selected, the court may provide for the selection of alternate jurors, and the parties generally are allowed one peremptory challenge for this process. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(g). Alternate jurors are selected in the same manner as trial jurors, and are in all respects identical except that they are discharged if they are not needed when the jury retires to deliberate. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(g)(1).

C. Opening Statements.

After a jury is selected, the parties present opening statements. Opening statements are not supposed to be arguments; rather, the parties should advise the jury of what the evidence will prove. After opening statements, the parties or the court may “invoke the rule,” which simply means that nonparty witnesses are excluded from the courtroom while others are testifying. Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.616 (2003). In addition, the witnesses are directed not to discuss the case with anyone other than the attorneys. H. Trawick, Florida Practice & Procedure Sec. 22-7, at 356 (1999).

D. Motion for Directed Verdict.

After the plaintiff presents its case-in-chief, the defendant may move for a directed verdict on the grounds that the plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to justify submission of the case to the jury. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.480(a). If the action is being tried to the court without a jury, the proper motion is a motion for involuntary dismissal under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b), as discussed earlier. If the motion is denied or reserved, the case proceeds, subject to the defendant’s ability to renew the motion at the close of the evidence. However, in a nonjury trial, renewal of the motion for involuntary dismissal at the close of the evidence is not authorized.

Orders granting directed verdict are unusual and scrutinized closely on appeal. Courts commonly “reserve ruling” on a motion for directed verdict and allow the case to proceed to the jury. This is a preferred approach because if the trial court grants a directed verdict and does not submit the case to the jury, and the directed verdict is overturned on appeal, the entire case must be retried. On the other hand, if the judge reserves ruling on the motion for directed verdict, the judge may override a subsequent plaintiff’s verdict and if that decision is overturned on appeal, the verdict may simply be reinstated without the necessity of a new trial.

After the plaintiff presents its case and any motions for directed verdict by either side are addressed, the defendant presents its case-in-chief. At the close of the defendant’s case, either party may move for a directed verdict. The plaintiff may present rebuttal evidence.

E. Closing Argument.

After the close of all the evidence, each side has an opportunity to present closing arguments. Because the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, the plaintiff is permitted to argue first and last (i.e., in rebuttal to defendant’s argument). The attorneys are required to confine their closing arguments to the evidence presented, along with its reasonable inferences. Alford v. Barnett Nat’l Bank, 137 Fla. 564, 188 So. 322 (1939). Case law restricts the types of arguments that may be presented in closing argument. For example, an attorney may not express a personal belief in his client or his client’s case. Miami Coin-O-Wash, Inc. v. McGough, 195 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). He may not request that the jury place itself in his client’s shoes, i.e., the so-called “Golden Rule” argument. Bullock v. Branch, 130 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961).

F. Jury Instructions.

If the judge does not direct a verdict following the parties’ respective presentations, the case is submitted to a jury. Prior to the close of evidence, the parties must submit requested jury instructions. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.470(b). These may include numerous form instructions pre-approved by the Florida Supreme Court. Additional instructions may need to be drafted and often there will be great debate between the parties on their wording.

The judge instructs the jurors on the manner in which they are expected to deliberate and the law that they must follow. Finally, the jurors retire to deliberate. Id. Frequently, the jury has questions during the deliberation process. The parties and their attorneys are notified of such questions. There may be some discussion or debate on how such questions are to be answered and the attorneys may object on the record to the answers ultimately provided to the jury.

G. Verdict.

Once the jury’s deliberations are complete, the verdict is announced in open court. A verdict may be either a “general” verdict or a “special” verdict. A general verdict “finds for a party in general terms on all issues within the province of the jury to determine.” H. Trawick, Florida Practice & Procedure Sec. 24-2, at 399 (1999). On the other hand, the court might employ a “special verdict,” which asks the jury to answer specific questions that determine the disputed facts. H. Trawick, Florida Practice & Procedure Sec. 24-3, at 400 (1999). For example, a special verdict form in a negligence action might require the jury to determine whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff. If the answer to this question were negative, the court would enter judgment for the defendant because duty is an essential element of a negligence claim. A general verdict, on the other hand, might simply ask whether the jury’s verdict was for the plaintiff and, if so, for how much. Regardless of the form of verdict that is used, a separate verdict on each count must be required if requested by either party. H. Trawick, Florida Practice & Procedure Sec. 24-2, at 399 (1999). The verdict form is written and signed by the foreperson.

In negligence actions, the verdict is required to be itemized according to economic loss, noneconomic loss, and punitive damages (if awarded). Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.77(1) (2003). “Economic damages” refers to “past lost income and future lost income reduced to present value; medical and funeral expenses; lost support and services; replacement value of lost personal property; loss of appraised fair market value of real property; costs of construction repairs, including labor, overhead, and profit; and any other economic loss which would not have occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of action.” Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.81(1) (2003). In addition, damages must be itemized further into past and future damages. Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.77(2) (2003). Economic damages are computed before and after reduction to present value, but no other damages are reduced to present value. Id. After the verdict is read, either party may request that the individual jurors be polled. Each juror is asked then to confirm that the verdict read is his or her verdict. Once the requested polling is complete, the jury is discharged.

VI. Conclusion.

This post provides a general overview of the route of a civil lawsuit. Every lawsuit is different and the steps often vary dramatically. Pretrial proceedings frequently are overlooked as a valuable source of information. Although access to various components of the pretrial process is beyond the scope of this post, homeowners should view this post as a guide for successful wrongful foreclosure defense. Hopefully, this post will serve to “demystify” the pretrial process and assist homeowners gearing up to fight the wrongful foreclosure shops that are illegally snatching away their dream homes.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and needed solutions to defend or reclaim your home please visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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Judicial Versus Non-Judicial Foreclosure

31 Thursday Oct 2013

Posted by BNG in Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Non-Judicial States, Note - Deed of Trust - Mortgage, Pro Se Litigation, Your Legal Rights

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Florida, Foreclosure, New Jersey, New Mexico, Notice of default, Real estate, South Dakota, United States

Foreclosure-Process2-1024x791

In many discussions about mortgage foreclosures the terms
judicial and non-judicial foreclosure are used. They involve very different processes. These terms refer to how individual states handle real estate foreclosure. Under both systems, time frames and terms vary widely from state to state. The following is a brief, general description of both
processes. The accompanying chart (see last page) depicts the varying time frames involved in the judicial foreclosure process.

foreclosure-stockdenslowfigure-1image-6922538539_image-69225_38539
Judicial Foreclosures

A judicial foreclosure is a court proceeding that begins when the lender files a complaint and records a notice in the public land records announcing a claim on the property to potential buyers, creditors and other interested parties. The complaint describes the debt, the borrower’s default and the amount owed. The complaint asks the court to allow the lender to foreclose its lien and take possession of the property as a remedy for non-payment.

foreclosureexplained

The homeowner is served notice of the complaint, either by mail, direct service or publication of the notice. The defendant (borrower) is permitted to dispute the facts (such as show that payments were made), offer defenses or present counterclaims by answering the complaint, filing a separate suit, and/or by attending a hearing arranged by the court. If the defendant shows there are differences of material facts, a trial will be held by the court to determine if foreclosure should occur. In the vast
majority of cases, however, the foreclosure action is undisputed because the borrower is in default and cannot offer facts to the contrary. If the court determines the homeowner did default and that the debt is valid, it will issue a judgment in favor of the servicer for the total amount owed, including costs for the foreclosure process. In order for the judge to determine the amount of the judgment, the servicer submits paperwork through an affidavit that itemizes the amounts due.

Twenty two states use judicial procedures as the primary way to foreclose.
These include: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont and Wisconsin.

In all other states, foreclosure is usually handled by attorneys who follow a state-provided process. In the mortgage documents, borrowers give lenders the “power of sale” outside of judicial process in the event of an uncured default. Documentation or affidavit issues are not common in these states because of the non-judicial nature of the process.

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Next, the court will authorize a sheriff’s sale. The sale is an auction of the property open to anyone, and must be held in a public place. Procedures for a sheriff’s sale in each locality differ, but the individual with the highest bid is granted the property. After the sale is confirmed by the court, the deed, which transfers ownership, is prepared, recorded and the highest bidder becomes the owner of the property.

In most cases, the highest bidder is the servicer, who takes title of the property. The servicer then can sell the property. At this point, it is called
real estate owned (REO).

Visio-foreclosure timeline.vsd
Non-Judicial Foreclosures

The requirements for non-judicial foreclosure are established by state statute; there is no court intervention. When the default occurs, the homeowner is mailed a default letter and in many states a
Notice of Default is recorded, at or about the same time. The homeowner may cure the debt during a prescribed period; if not, a Notice of Sale is mailed to the homeowner, posted in public places, recorded
at the county’s recorder’s office, and published in area newspapers
/legal publications. When the legally required notice period (determined by each state) has expired, a public auction is held and the highest
bidder becomes the owner of the property, subject to recordation of the deed. Prior to the sale, if the borrower disagrees with the facts of the case, he or she can try to file a lawsuit to enjoin the trustee’s sale.

short_sale_table_2

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and needed solutions to defend or reclaim your home please visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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Constitutional Rights of Florida Citizens Violated By Florida House Bill 87

28 Saturday Sep 2013

Posted by BNG in Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, Your Legal Rights

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Bill, Broward County, Broward County Florida, Collier County Florida, Due process, Florida, Foreclosure, Law

Representatives Kathleen Passidomo (District 106, Collier County) and George Moraitis, Jr. (District 93, Broward County) have supported the passing of House Bill 87, which denies residents the right to take their homes back after a wrongful foreclose.

According to House Bill 87, if a bank forecloses on a property, and if it is later discovered that the bank did not have standing to foreclose or that it was the incorrect bank with no beneficial interest in the loan, then the only available option to the homeowner is to sue for damages. The homeowner will no longer be afforded the opportunity to get his or her home back from the bank once the foreclosure has been finalized.

The people of Florida are demanding that proposed House Bill 87 not be allowed to pass into law in any form. The Bill is deemed unconstitutional because it violates Article 1, Sections 9 and 10 of Florida’s Constitution, which states that it is unlawful to pass any law or any Judicial and/or Executive Branch process which deprives any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, and it prohibits the passing of any law that impairs the obligations of contracts.

If House Bill 87 is not killed, constituents and citizens of Florida, and any Florida property owner, will lose their individual property and due process rights. The “Kill House Bill 87” petition states:

“The people demand that House Bill 87 be voted down and not passed into law, as the proposed Bill is no more than another brazen attempt to further deprive U.S. citizens of their constitutional rights to due process of law in Florida’s courts, and will be used as a stepping stone to change the State of Florida into a non-judicial foreclosure state.”

The petition’s current goal is to gather 2,000 signatures. If you would like to support the voting down of the unconstitutional House Bill 87, then please sign the petition below.

To sign the petition please click here: http://petitions.moveon.org/sign/kill-house-bill-87?source=s.icn.em.mt&r_by=7041070

Fightforeclosure.net supports the people’s petition to eradicate House Bill 87. If you have been a victim of wrongful foreclosure and need help in saving your home from fraudulent foreclosure visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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Nevada Foreclosure Rate Tops U.S. Again

25 Wednesday Sep 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Foreclosure Crisis, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, Your Legal Rights

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August, Florida, Foreclosure, Las Vegas, Nevada, Percentage, Real estate, RealtyTrac, Reno

Last month Nevada once again secured the top spot as the state with the nation’s highest foreclosure rate due to spikes in default notices and scheduled foreclosure auctions.

According to a report by the Irvine-based real estate analytics company, RealtyTrac, in August one out of every 359 Nevada housing units was the subject of a new foreclosure filing.  This number reflects more than two-and-a-half times the national average.

RealtyTrac defines foreclosure filings as:

“Including notices of default, notices of pending trustee sales and repossessions by banks.”

Additionally, RealityTrac stated that last month with one filing for every 323 housing units, Las Vegas was ranked third for the nation’s highest foreclosure rate among large metropolitan areas. Nevada’s foreclosure filings have increased over 100 percent compared to the previous month and nearly 11 percent percent over August 2012, due to the 226 percent increase in default notices and a 96 percent jump in scheduled foreclosure auctions compared with July.

RealtyTrac Vice President Daren Blomquist attempts to explain the recent jump in Nevada foreclosures saying:

“The foreclosure floodwaters have receded in most parts of the country, but lenders and communities continue to clean up the damage left behind, which means the recent uptick in bank repossessions is a trend that will likely continue into next year,” he said. “Meanwhile foreclosure flash floods will continue to hit some markets over the next few months as delayed foreclosure starts are quickly pushed into the pipeline.

Another explanation for Nevada’s increase in foreclosures is due to the possibility that bankers have identified how to operate under the new Assembly Bill 300 law that is supposed to make it easier for banks to seize homes from delinquent borrowers.

Under AB300, a bank’s affidavit no longer has to be based on personal knowledge of a home’s mortgage-document history before they foreclose. Instead, the bank’s affidavit can be founded on an assessment of internal lending records and either title paperwork or filings with the local county recorder.

For More Information on How To Effectively Challenge Your Lender/Bank In Order to Save Your Home Even If Foreclosure has taken place, Visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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Quiet Title Action ~ What Florida Home Owners Need to Know

14 Wednesday Aug 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Banks and Lenders, Federal Court, Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Loan Modification, MERS, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Center for Housing Policy, Florida, Foreclosure, MER, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, RealtyTrac, Securitization, United States

Quiet Title Actions: How to Force the Banks To Prove Up

The Foreclosure Crisis

I. THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS

• ISSUE ONE: Who Owns Your Note?

1. The Securitization Process:
– A. Originator Sells To Nominee (First Sale)
– B. The Nominee Sells To Depositor (Second Sale)
– C. The Depositor Sells to the REMIC Trust
• The REMIC Trust created to hold “pool” of mortgages and sell “shares” in
the REMIC Trust to investors.
• A Trustee is designated to operate the trust (typically a bank).
• The REMIC Trust operates through “Bylaws” and “Pooling and Servicing
Agreements”.
• The Pooling and Servicing Agreement outlines how the income from the
mortgages will be managed and the Servicing Agent who will collect income
and foreclose in the event of default.

The Foreclosure Crisis

• One in every 365 housing units in the United States was branded with a foreclosure notice recorded in December 2011, according to RealtyTrac.com. That means 850,000 Americans got a big lump of coal in their stocking from Uncle Scrooge.
• Over 2,076,764 American homes are now in foreclosure.
• One in every 165 housing units in California (more that twice the national average) received a foreclosure notice in December, for a total of 80,488 properties. In Nevada, the figure was one in every 93 houses.
• USA Today reports that almost 1 in 5 children in Nevada lived or live in owneroccupied homes that were lost to foreclosure or are at risk of being lost. The percentages are 15% in Florida, 14% for Arizona, and 12% for California. That’s about one in eight children in California. Five years into the foreclosure crisis, an estimated 2.3 million children have lived in homes lost to foreclosure.
• RealtyTrac reports that foreclosure and REO (real estate-owned) homes accounted for 24 percent of all residential sales during the fourth quarter of 2011.
• Here in relatively affluent Palm Beach County, homeowners are No. 1 in the state for the average number of loans in foreclosure that are delinquent. It has the fourth highest number of foreclosures, 45,829 with an average delinquency of 623 days.

Florida’s Foreclosure Statistics

• Florida is leading the country in foreclosure rates.
• Florida metro areas dominate the top 25 list for cities with the worst foreclosure rates — including the eight highest in the nation, according to a report released Tuesday.#
• In all, 17 of the top 25 cities with the highest foreclosure rates as of March are Florida cities, according to the Center for Housing Policy, the research arm of the Washington, D.C.-based National Housing Conference. #
• With a 10.9 percent foreclosure rate, Jacksonville is ranked 18th overall, but 14 other Florida cities had higher rates. Miami topped the list with the nation’s highest rate of 18.2 percent. #
• Miami’s conventional mortgage foreclosure rate in March was 14.2 percent, while its subprime rate was 39.1 percent. Jacksonville’s conventional foreclosure rate was 7.8 percent while its subprime rate was 29 percent.
• But given the fact that Florida cities made up 15 of the 25 cities with the highest “serious” mortgage delinquency rates — either behind by 90 days behind or more or now in foreclosure, there could be more foreclosures in the state’s future. And just like on the foreclosure list, Miami was also first, with a delinquency rate of 23.6 percent; and Jacksonville was 18th, with a rate of 15.6 percent.

Who Owns Your House?

• ISSUE ONE: WHO OWNS YOUR HOUSE?
– Promissory Note (the “Note”): Loan Agreement
– Mortgage/Deed of Trust: Power of Sale Document
– Grant Deed: You own until you breach the Promissory Note and
your Lender (or Others) use the Power of Sale Document to
Foreclose
– Before Securitization: Your Lender held your Note was always
the Foreclosing Entity.
– After Securitization: No One Knows Who Owns Your Note

Who Owns Your Note?

ISSUE TWO: Who Owns Your Note?
1. The Securitization Process:
– A. Originator Sells To Nominee (First Sale)
– B. The Nominee Sells To Depositor (Second Sale)
– C. The Depositor Sells to the REMIC Trust
• The REMIC Trust created to hold “pool” of mortgages and sell “shares” in
the REMIC Trust to investors.
• A Trustee is designated to operate the trust (typically a bank).
• The REMIC Trust operates through “Bylaws” and “Pooling and Servicing
Agreements”.
• The Pooling and Servicing Agreement outlines how the income from the
mortgages will be managed and the Servicing Agent who will collect income
and foreclose in the event of default.

• Why Is There a Question?
1. The Securitization Process: No One Knows Who Owns Your
Note
– The Original Lenders Failed to Properly Assign Your Note to
Subsequent Purchasers
– Incompetent Personnel
– No Training: No One Trained to Sell Notes Properly
– Never Occurred Before: Prior to Securitization Didn’t
Transfer or Sell Notes
– Thousands of Assignments Left Blank
– Remic Trusts Never Receive Assignments or Possession of
Notes: Current litigation

2. Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc
1. Created by over 44 Financial Institutions in 1998 to Avoid the
Registration of Securitized Mortgages : Saves Millions of
Dollars in Recordation fees;
2. Presently Being Sued in (5) States for Unlawfully failing to pay
Recording Fees on Securitized Mortgage Transactions
• WHAT IS MERS FUNCTION?
– TO CAMOUFLAGE THE SALE OF YOUR LOAN TO MULTIPLE
ENTITIES IN THE SECURITIZATION PROCESS;
– AVOID RECORDING FEES ON EVERY SALE OF YOUR LOAN
TO SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS.
– ACT AS “BENEFICIARY” OF YOUR DEED OF TRUST OR
“NOMINEE” OF YOUR MORTGAGE

What is MERS?

• “MERS is a mortgage banking ‘utility’ that registers
mortgage loans in a book entry system so that … real
estate loans can be bought, sold and securitized (Similar
to Wall Street’s book entry utility for stocks and bonds is
the Depository Trust and Clearinghouse.”
• MERS is enormous. It originates thousands of loans
daily and is the mortgagee of record for at least 40
million mortgages and other security documents.
• MERS acts as agent for the owner of the note. Its
authority to act should be shown by an agency
agreement. Of course, if the owner is unknown, MERS
cannot show that it is an authorized agent of the owner.

Result: BANKS CAN’T PROVE THEY OWN YOUR LOAN

• The Wall Street Journal Picks Up the Scent
• An article by Nick Timiraos appeared in The Wall Street Journal on June 1, 2011 – “Banks Hit Hurdle to Foreclosures.”
• “Banks trying to foreclose on homeowners are hitting another roadblock,” Timiraos writes, “as some delinquent borrowers are successfully arguing that their mortgage companies can’t prove they own the loans and therefore don’t have the right to foreclose.”
• If you (or I) try to boot a homeowner into the street without any proof that we’re entitled to the property, the cops will lock us up. Stealing is stealing, whether it is somebody’s wallet or their 3-bedroom 2-bath in the suburbs with two dogs and a kid. When a bank tries to steal the bungalow without proof that they have a right to foreclose, it’s a “hurdle” or “another roadblock.”
• Semantics aside, this is good news for all people holding grant deeds. This year, the Journal reports, cases in California, North Carolina, Alabama, Florida, Maine, New York, New Jersey, Texas, Massachusetts and other states have raised questions about whether banks properly demonstrated ownership.
• In some cases, borrowers are showing courts that banks failed to properly assign ownership of mortgages after they were pooled into mortgage-backed securities. In other cases, borrowers say that lenders backdated or fabricated documents to fix those errors.
• “Flawed mortgage-banking processes have potentially infected millions of foreclosures, and the damages against these operations could be significant and take years to materialize,” said Sheila Bair, chairman of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., in testimony to a Senate committee last month.
• In March, an Alabama court said J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. couldn’t foreclose on Phyllis Horace, a delinquent homeowner in Phenix City, Ala., because her loan hadn’t been properly assigned to its owners
– a trust that represents investors – when it was securitized by Bear Stearns Cos. The mortgage assignment showed that the loan hadn’t been transferred to the trust from the subprime lender that originated it.

The Problem With MERS

• Federal bankruptcy courts and state courts have found that MERS and its member banks often confused and misrepresented who owned mortgage notes. In thousands of cases, they apparently lost or mistakenly destroyed loan documents.
• The problems, at MERS and elsewhere, became so severe last fall that many banks temporarily suspended foreclosures.
• Not even the mortgage giant Fannie Mae, an investor in MERS, depends on it these days.
• “We would never rely on it to find ownership,” says Janis Smith, a Fannie Mae spokeswoman, noting it has its own records.
• Apparently with good reason. Alan M. White, a law professor at the Valparaiso University School of Law in Indiana, last year matched MERS’s ownership records against those in the public domain.
• The results were not encouraging. “Fewer than 30 percent of the mortgages had an accurate record in
MERS,” Mr. White says. “I kind of assumed that MERS at least kept an accurate list of current ownership.
They don’t. MERS is going to make solving the foreclosure problem vastly more expensive.”
• The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled last year that MERS could no longer file foreclosure proceedings there, because it does not actually make or service any loans. Last month in Utah, a local judge made the no-lessstriking decision to let a homeowner rip up his mortgage and walk away debt-free. MERS had claimed ownership of the mortgage, but the judge did not recognize its legal standing.
• And, on Long Island, a federal bankruptcy judge ruled in February that MERS could no longer act as an “agent” for the owners of mortgage notes. He acknowledged that his decision could erode the foundation of the mortgage business.
• But this, Judge Robert E Grossman said, was not his fault.
• “This court does not accept the argument that because MERS may be involved with 50 percent of all residential mortgages in the country,” he wrote, “that is reason enough for this court to turn a blind eye to
the fact that this process does not comply with the law.”

Legal Issues

1. SEPARATION OF THE NOTE AND THE DEED
• In the case of MERS, the Note and the Deed of Trust are held by separate entities. This can pose a unique problem dependent upon the court. The prevailing case law illustrates the issue:
• “The Deed of Trust is a mere incident of the debt it secures and an assignment of the debt carries with it the security instrument. Therefore, a Deed Of Trust is inseparable from the debt and always abides with the debt. It has no market or ascertainable value apart from the obligation it secures.
• A Deed of Trust has no assignable quality independent of the debt, it may not be assigned or transferred apart from the debt, and an attempt to assign the Deed Of Trust without a transfer of the debt is without effect. “
• This very “simple” statement poses major issues. To easily understand, if the Deed of Trust and the Note are not together with the same entity, then there can be no enforcement of the Note. The Deed of Trust enforces the Note. It provides the capability for the lender to foreclose on a property. If the Deed is separate from the Note, then enforcement, i.e. foreclosure cannot occur.
The following ruling summarizes this nicely.
• In Saxon vs Hillery, CA, Dec 2008, Contra Costa County Superior Court, an action by Saxon to foreclose on a property by lawsuit was dismissed due to lack of legal standing. This was because the Note and the Deed of Trust were “owned” by separate entities. The Court ruled that when the Note and Deed of Trust were separated, the enforceability of the Note was negated until rejoined.

2. MERS IS A NOMINEE AND NOT THE HOLDER OF THE NOTE
• The question now becomes as to whether a Note Endorsed in Blank and transferred to different entities does allow for foreclosure. If MERS is the foreclosing authority but has no entitlement to payment of the money, how could they foreclose? This is especially true if the true beneficiary
is not known. Why do I raise the question of who the true beneficiary is?
• THE MERS WEBSITE STATES…..
• “On MERS loans, MERS will show as the beneficiary of record. Foreclosures should be commenced in the name of MERS. To effectuate this process, MERS has allowed each servicer to choose a select number of its own employees to act as officers for MERS.
Through this process, appropriate documents may be executed at the servicer’s site on behalf of MERS by the same servicing employee that signs foreclosure documents for non-MERS loans. Until the time of sale, the foreclosure is handled in same manner as non-MERS foreclosures. At the time of sale, if the property reverts, the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale will follow
a different procedure. Since MERS acts as nominee for the true beneficiary, it is important that the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale be made in the name of the true beneficiary and not MERS. Your title company or MERS officer can easily determine the true beneficiary. Title companies have indicated that they will insure subsequent title when these procedures are followed.”

3. MERS IS THE NOMINEE AND NOT THE BENEFICIARY
• To further reinforce that MERS is not the true beneficiary of the loan, one need only look at the following Nevada Bankruptcy case, Hawkins, Case No. BK-S-07-13593-LBR (Bankr.Nev. 3/31/2009) (Bankr.Nev., 2009) – “A “beneficiary” is defined as “one designated to benefit from an appointment, disposition, or assignment . . . or to receive something as a result of
a legal arrangement or instrument.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 165 (8th ed. 2004). But it is obvious from the MERS’ “Terms and Conditions” that MERS is not a beneficiary as it has no rights whatsoever to any payments, to any servicing rights, or to any of the properties secured by the loans. To reverse an old adage, if it doesn’t walk like a duck, talk like a duck, and quack like a duck, then it’s not a duck.”
• When the initial Deed of Trust is made out in the name of MERS as Nominee for the Beneficiary and the Note is made to AB Lender, there should be no issues with MERS acting as an Agent for AB Lender. Hawkins even recognizes this as fact.
• The issue does arise when the Note transfers possession. Though the Deed of Trust states “beneficiary and/or successors”, the question can arise as to who the successor is, and whether Agency is any longer in effect. MERS makes the argument that the successor Trustee is a MERS
member and therefore Agency is still effective, and there does appear to be merit to the argument on the face of it.The original Note Holder, AB Lender, no longer holds the note, nor is entitled to payment. Therefore, that Agency relationship is terminated. However, the Note is endorsed in blank, and no Assignment has been made to any other entity, so who is the true
beneficiary? And without the Assignment of the Note, is the Agency relationship intact?

4. MERS FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES
• There, you have it. Direct from the MERS website. They admit that they
name people to sign documents in the name of MERS. Often, these are
Title Company employees or others that have no knowledge of the actual
loan and whether it is in default or not.
• Even worse, MERS admits that they are not the true beneficiary of the loan.
In fact, it is likely that MERS has no knowledge of the true beneficiary of the
loan for whom they are representing in an “Agency” relationship. They
admit to this when they say “Your title company or MERS officer can
easily determine the true beneficiary.
• Why are the Courts Accepting MERS as a Nominee or Agent of the
“Lenders”? The “beneficiary” term is erroneous. Even MERS states it
is not a “beneficiary”.
• If so, MERS cannot assign deeds of trust or mortgages to third parties
legally.

• ISSUE THREE: Does MERS have the Right to Participate in Your
Foreclosure?
– NO. According to the Majority of Federal Court Opinions and Every State Supreme Court decision which has addressed this Issue: Oregon and Washington Supreme Ct Decisions Pending
– Every Attorney General who has examined the legality of MERS has determined it is illegal business enterprise: New York; Delaware; Oregon, Washington, Idaho; with more to come.
_ Declared Unlawful Business Organization : ( In re: Agard, No. 10-77338, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 488, at 58-59 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb 10, 2011)
_ In California, the federal court determined that MERS has to have a written contract with the new noteholder in order to have the authority to appoint or assign the beneficial interest in the note sufficient to foreclose (In re: Vargas: US Dist Ct, Central Dist of Calif; Case No LA 08-107036-SB).
– Judge Michael Simon of the Oregon Federal Court has found that MERS cannot assign its beneficiary status in a deed of trust to a third party for foreclosure purposes due to the fact that MERS does not under Oregon law have the legal authority to do so (James, et al v Reconstruct Trust, et al: US Dist Ct. Case No: 3:11-cv-00324-ST).

         Solutions

QUIET TITLE ACTIONS: Definition
• quiet title action n. a lawsuit to establish a party’s title to real property
against anyone and everyone, and thus “quiet” any challenges or claims to
the title. Such a suit usually arises when there is some question about clear
title, there exists some recorded problem (such as an old lease or failure to
clear title after payment of a mortgage), an error in description which casts
doubt on the amount of property owned, or an easement used for years
without a recorded description. An action for quiet title requires description
of the property to be “quieted,” naming as defendants anyone who might
have an interest (including descendants—known or unknown—of prior
owners), and the factual and legal basis for the claim of title. Notice
must be given to all potentially interested parties, including known and
unknown, by publication. If the court is convinced title is in the plaintiff (the
plaintiff owns the title), a quiet title judgment will be granted which can be
recorded and thus provide legal “good title.“

• QUIET TITLE ACTIONS:
– Purpose: Require All Adverse Claims to Title to Prove to the Court the
Worthiness of Their Claim:
– Mortgages/Deeds Of Trust:
• Who is the Owner of Your Note? Prove It
• Who is the Beneficiary of Your Deed of Trust/Mortgage? The Owner of the
Note
• Who has the Legal Right to Foreclose?
– ONLY THE OWNER OF THE NOTE IS A TRUE BENEFICIARY
– ONLY THE BENEFICIARY OF THE MORTGAGE OR DEED OF
TRUST OR ITS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE CAN FORECLOSE
– MERS IS NOT A BENEFICIARY-According to its own Website
– MERS IS NOT A LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF ANY REMIC TRUST
» No Contract
» At Best MERS has a Contractual Relationship with Original Lender

• FLORIDA QUIET TITLE STATUTES-Civil Practice and Procedure
• 65.061 Quieting title; additional remedy.—
• (1) JURISDICTION.–Chancery courts have jurisdiction of actions by any person or corporation claiming legal or equitable title to any land…. and shall determine the title of plaintiff and may enter judgment quieting the title and awarding possession to the party entitled thereto….
• (2) GROUNDS.–When a person or corporation not the rightful owner of land has any conveyance or other evidence of title thereto, or asserts any claim, or pretends to have any right or title thereto, any person or corporation is the true and equitable owner of land the record title to which is not in the person or corporation because of the defective execution of any deed or mortgage because of the omission of a seal thereon, the lack of witnesses, or any defect or omission in the wording of the acknowledgment of a party or parties thereto, when the person or corporation claims title thereto by the defective instrument and the defective instrument was apparently made and delivered by the grantor to convey or mortgage the real estate and was recorded in the county where the land lies which may cast a cloud on the title of the real owner….
• (4) JUDGMENT.–If it appears that plaintiff has legal title to the land or is the equitable owner thereof based on one or more of the grounds mentioned in subsection (2), or if a default is entered against defendant (in which case no evidence need be taken), the court shall enter judgment removing the alleged cloud from the title to the land and forever quieting the title in plaintiff and those claiming under him or her since the commencement of the action and adjudging plaintiff to have a good fee simple title to said land or the interest thereby cleared of cloud.

DECLARATORY RELIEF
• WHO OWNS THE NOTE? WHO IS ENTITLED TO FORECLOSE?
• FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: RULE 57. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
• 28 U.S.C. §2201. Rules 38 and 39 govern a demand for a jury trial. The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a declaratory judgment that is otherwise appropriate. The court may order a speedy hearing of a declaratory-judgment action.
• The fact that a declaratory judgment may be granted “whether or not further relief is or could be prayed” indicates that declaratory relief is alternative or cumulative and not exclusive or extraordinary. A declaratory judgment is appropriate when it will “terminate the controversy” giving rise to the proceeding. Inasmuch as it often involves only an issue of law
on undisputed or relatively undisputed facts, it operates frequently as a summary proceeding, justifying docketing the case for early hearing as on a motion, as provided for in California (Code Civ.Proc. (Deering, 1937) §1062a), Michigan (3 Comp.Laws (1929) §13904), and Kentucky
(Codes (Carroll, 1932) Civ.Pract. §639a–3).
• The “controversy” must necessarily be “of a justiciable nature, thus excluding an advisory decree upon a hypothetical state of facts.” Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 325, 56 S.Ct. 466, 473, 80 L.Ed. 688, 699 (1936). The existence or nonexistence of any right, duty, power, liability, privilege, disability, or immunity or of any fact upon which such legal relations depend, or of a status, may be declared.

• WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE:
• What is a Wrongful Foreclosure Action?
• A wrongful foreclosure action typically occurs when the lender starts a
judicial foreclosure action when it simply has no legal cause. Wrongful
foreclosure actions are also brought when the service providers accept
partial payments after initiation of the wrongful foreclosure process, and
then continue on w i t h the f o r e c l o s u r e process. These
predatory lending strategies, as well as other forms of misleading
homeowners, are illegal.
• The borrower is the one that files a wrongful disclosure action with the court against the service provider, the holder of the note and if it is a non-judicial foreclosure, against the trustee complaining that there was an illegal, fraudulent or willfully oppressive sale of property under a power of sale contained in a mortgage or deed or court judicial proceeding. The borrower can also allege emotional distress and ask for punitive damages in a wrongful foreclosure action.

• FRAUD CLAIMS
• Mortgage Payments: Have you been paying mortgage payments to the
wrong financial institution?
• JP Morgan Chase: Bought “Assets” of WAMU from FDIC in 2008
– All Mortgage Loans from 2003-2008 were already sold to REMIC Trusts
– What Did Chase Bank Buy? Servicing Contracts?
– Can Chase Bank Foreclose on Notes It Does Not Own?
• One West Bank: Bought “Assets” of IndyMac from FDIC in 2008
– All Mortgage Loans from 2003-2008 were already sold to REMIC Trusts
– What did One West Bank Buy? Servicing Contracts?
– Can One West Foreclose on Notes It Does Not Own?
• Bank of America: Bought “Servicing Contracts” from Countrywide in 2008
– All Mortgage Loans from 2003-2008 were already sold to REMIC Trusts
– What Did Bank of America Buy? Servicing Contracts
– Can Bank of America Foreclose on Notes It Does Not Own?

• QUIET TITLE LITIGATION:
– Potential Outcomes:
• Actual Quiet Title: Removal of All Liens, Encumbrances,
Mortgages:
• Principal Reduction: Mediation or Arbitration Resulting in
Substantial Reduction in Your Mortgage Balance
• Damage Claims against Financial Institutions: Punitive Damages?
• TROS and Injunctions: Stopping the Foreclosure Process
• Did Default Insurance Pay Off My Mortgage
• Declaratory Relief:
– Who Do I Pay My Mortgage To?
– Who Can Foreclose on My House?

Credit Rehabilitation
• Credit Rehabilitation
• The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) gives you the right to contact credit bureaus directly and dispute items on your credit reports. You can dispute any and all items that are inaccurate, untimely, misleading, biased, incomplete or unverifiable (questionable items). If the bureaus cannot verify that the information on their reports is indeed correct, then those items must be deleted.
• PeabodyLaw has created the “Mortgage Audit Plan”:
– Obtain a Securitization Audit from Audit Pros, Inc.
– Peabody Law will utilize the results of your Securitization Audit to file a
court action seeking a court order removing all negative credit reporting
items from your credit history based upon the findings of the audit.
– Upon receipt of Court Judgment rendering the nullification of unlawful
and erroneous credit references, Peabody Law will send a Demand
Letter with the Judgment attachment to each Credit Reporting Agency
demanding retraction and removal of all negative credit references
relating to mortgage payments, foreclosures, short sales, etc.

For a Complete Pro Se “Do It Yourself” Foreclosure Defense Kit With Well Drafted Pleadings and Step By Step Guide For Saving Your Home Visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

25.788969 -80.226439

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Foreclosure Deficiency Judgment Nevada Mortgage Laws

17 Friday May 2013

Posted by BNG in Non-Judicial States

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Business, Debt, Deficiency judgment, Florida, Foreclosure, Nevada, Uniform Commercial Code, United States

NEVADA MORTGAGE LAWS:
In this session, we are going to discuss in somewhat greater details the Nevada Mortgage Laws and how to handle the looming foreclosure crisis which has made state of Nevada in the highest ranks in USA. Once we are educated in these laws, our next step should be how to fight and fight back vehemently because banks are not changing their ways and tactics. An educated borrower is the best defense against foreclosure and its aftermath.

NRS 40.430 Action for recovery of debt secured by mortgage or other lien; “action” defined.
Nevada has only One Action Law for the recovery of any debt, or for the enforcement of any right secured by a mortgage or other lien upon real estate. That action must be in accordance with the provisions of NRS 40.430 to 40.459, inclusive. In that action, the judgment must be rendered for the amount found due the plaintiff, and the court, by its decree or judgment, may direct a sale of the encumbered property, or such part thereof as is necessary, and apply the proceeds of the sale as provided in NRS 40.462.

What is One Action Rule of Nevada?
This section must be construed to permit a secured creditor to realize upon the collateral for a debt or other obligation agreed upon by the debtor and creditor when the debt or other obligation was incurred. A sale directed by the court pursuant to subsection 1 must be conducted in the same manner as the sale of real property upon execution, by the sheriff of the county in which the encumbered land is situated, and if the encumbered land is situated in two or more counties, the court shall direct the sheriff of one of the counties to conduct the sale with like proceedings and effect as if the whole of the encumbered land were situated in that county.

What this One Action Rule Does Not Include?
(a) To appoint a receiver for, or obtain possession of, any real or personal collateral for the debt or as provided in NRS 32.015.(b) To enforce a security interest in, or the assignment of, any rents, issues, profits or other income of any real or personal property.
(c) To enforce a mortgage or other lien upon any real or personal collateral located outside of the State which does not, except as required under the laws of that jurisdiction, result in a personal judgment against the debtor.
(d) For the recovery of damages arising from the commission of a tort, including a recovery under NRS 40.750, or the recovery of any declaratory or equitable relief.
(e) For the exercise of a power of sale pursuant to NRS 107.080.
(f) For the exercise of any right or remedy authorized by chapter 104 of NRS or by the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in any other state.
(g) For the exercise of any right to set off, or to enforce a pledge in, a deposit account pursuant to a written agreement or pledge.
(h) To draw under a letter of credit.
(i) To enforce an agreement with a surety or guarantor if enforcement of the mortgage or other lien has been automatically stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 or pursuant to an order of a federal bankruptcy court under any other provision of the United States Bankruptcy Code for not less than 120 days following the mailing of notice to the surety or guarantor pursuant to subsection 1 of NRS 107.095.
(j) To collect any debt, or enforce any right, secured by a mortgage or other lien on real property if the property has been sold to a person other than the creditor to satisfy, in whole or in part, a debt or other right secured by a senior mortgage or other senior lien on the property.
(k) Relating to any proceeding in bankruptcy, including the filing of a proof of claim, seeking relief from an automatic stay and any other action to determine the amount or validity of a debt.
(l) For filing a claim pursuant to chapter 147 of NRS or to enforce such a claim which has been disallowed.
(m) Which does not include the collection of the debt or realization of the collateral securing the debt.
(n) Pursuant to NRS 40.507 or 40.508.
(o) Which is exempted from the provisions of this section by specific statute.
(p) To recover costs of suit, costs and expenses of sale, attorneys’ fees and other incidental relief in connection with any action authorized by this subsection.

How Mortgage is Defined Under Nevada Laws?
NRS 40.433 “Mortgage or other lien” defined. A “mortgage or other lien” includes a deed of trust, but does not include a lien which arises pursuant to chapter 108 of NRS, pursuant to an assessment under chapter 116, 117, 119A or 278A of NRS or pursuant to a judgment or decree of any court of competent jurisdiction.

The Judicial Proceedings Are An Affirmative Defense
1. The commencement of or participation in a judicial proceeding in violation of NRS 40.430 does not forfeit any of the rights of a secured creditor in any real or personal collateral, or impair the ability of the creditor to realize upon any real or personal collateral, if the judicial proceeding is:
(a) Stayed or dismissed before entry of a final judgment; or
(b) Converted into an action which does not violate NRS 40.430.
2. If the provisions of NRS 40.430 are timely interposed as an affirmative defense in such a judicial proceeding, upon the motion of any party to the proceeding the court shall:
(a) Dismiss the proceeding without prejudice; or
(b) Grant a continuance and order the amendment of the pleadings to convert the proceeding into an action which does not violate NRS 40.430.
3. The failure to interpose, before the entry of a final judgment, the provisions of NRS 40.430 as an affirmative defense in such a proceeding waives the defense in that proceeding. Such a failure does not affect the validity of the final judgment, but entry of the final judgment releases and discharges the mortgage or other lien.
4. As used in this section, “final judgment” means a judgment which imposes personal liability on the debtor for the payment of money and which may be appealed under the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.

How Surplus Money is Distributed?
NRS 40.440 Disposition of surplus money. If there is surplus money remaining after payment of the amount due on the mortgage or other lien, with costs, the court may cause the same to be paid to the person entitled to it pursuant to NRS 40.462, and in the meantime may direct it to be deposited in court.

FORECLOSURE SALES AND DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS
I have been asked about deficiency judgment many times. In Nevada, the time period for filing a deficiency judgment by your lender is only 6 months. Recently the Nevada legislature also reduced the time period to six months of any HELOC or second trust deed. Now, these folks cannot file any deficiency judgment if the right has been accrued more than six months. Also, if a collection agency buys any of these loans, they cannot collect more than what they paid for.However, they can file this deficiency judgment and can enforce it later against you. This is a concise summary of all of the laws of deficiency judgment. Please read carefully and seek the help of a licensed attorney before doing anything or filing any action.

What is an Indebtedness?
NRS 40.451 “Indebtedness” defined. “indebtedness” means the principal balance of the obligation secured by a mortgage or other lien on real property, together with all interest accrued and unpaid prior to the time of foreclosure sale, all costs and fees of such a sale, all advances made with respect to the property by the beneficiary, and all other amounts secured by the mortgage or other lien on the real property in favor of the person seeking the deficiency judgment. Such amount constituting a lien is limited to the amount of the consideration paid by the lienholder.

NRS 40.453 Waiver of rights in documents relating to sale of real property against public policy and unenforceable; exception. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.495:
1. It is hereby declared by the Legislature to be against public policy for any document relating to the sale of real property to contain any provision whereby a mortgagor or the grantor of a deed of trust or a guarantor or surety of the indebtedness secured thereby, waives any right secured to him by the laws of this state.
2. A court shall not enforce any such provision.

How Deficiency Judgment is Awarded?
NRS 40.455 Deficiency judgment: Award to judgment creditor or beneficiary of deed of trust.
1. Upon application of the judgment creditor or the beneficiary of the deed of trust within 6 months after the date of the foreclosure sale or the trustee’s sale held pursuant to NRS 107.080, respectively, and after the required hearing, the court shall award a deficiency judgment to the judgment creditor or the beneficiary of the deed of trust if it appears from the sheriff’s return or the recital of consideration in the trustee’s deed that there is a deficiency of the proceeds of the sale and a balance remaining due to the judgment creditor or the beneficiary of the deed of trust, respectively.
2. If the indebtedness is secured by more than one parcel of real property, more than one interest in the real property or more than one mortgage or deed of trust, the 6-month period begins to run after the date of the foreclosure sale or trustee’s sale of the last parcel or other interest in the real property securing the indebtedness, but in no event may the application be filed more than 2 years after the initial foreclosure sale or trustee’s sale.

What is the Procedure for a Hearing of a Deficiency Judgment in Nevada? NRS 40.457 1.

Before awarding a deficiency judgment under NRS 40.455, the court shall hold a hearing and shall take evidence presented by either party concerning the fair market value of the property sold as of the date of foreclosure sale or trustee’s sale. Notice of such hearing shall be served upon all defendants who have appeared in the action and against whom a deficiency judgment is sought, or upon their attorneys of record, at least 15 days before the date set for hearing.

2. Upon application of any party made at least 10 days before the date set for the hearing the court shall, or upon its own motion the court may, appoint an appraiser to appraise the property sold as of the date of foreclosure sale or trustee’s sale. Such appraiser shall file with the clerk his appraisal, which is admissible in evidence. The appraiser shall take an oath that he has truly, honestly and impartially appraised the property to the best of his knowledge and ability. Any appraiser so appointed may be called and examined as a witness by any party or by the court. The court shall fix a reasonable compensation for the appraiser, but his fee shall not exceed similar fees for similar services in the county where the encumbered land is situated.
NRS 40.459 Limitations on amount of money judgment. After the hearing, the court shall award a money judgment against the debtor, guarantor or surety who is personally liable for the debt. The court shall not render judgment for more than:

1. The amount by which the amount of the indebtedness which was secured exceeds the fair market value of the property sold at the time of the sale, with interest from the date of the sale; or
2. The amount which is the difference between the amount for which the property was actually sold and the amount of the indebtedness which was secured, with interest from the date of sale, whichever is the lesser amount.

NRS 40.462 Distribution of proceeds of foreclosure sale.
1. Except as otherwise provided by specific statute, this section governs the distribution of the proceeds of a foreclosure sale. The provisions of NRS 40.455, 40.457 and 40.459 do not affect the right to receive those proceeds, which vests at the time of the foreclosure sale. The purchase of any interest in the property at the foreclosure sale, and the subsequent disposition of the property, does not affect the right of the purchaser to the distribution of proceeds pursuant to paragraph (c) of subsection 2 of this section, or to obtain a deficiency judgment pursuant to NRS 40.455, 40.457 and 40.459.
2. The proceeds of a foreclosure sale must be distributed in the following order of priority:
(a) Payment of the reasonable expenses of taking possession, maintaining, protecting and leasing the property, the costs and fees of the foreclosure sale, including reasonable trustee’s fees, applicable taxes and the cost of title insurance and, to the extent provided in the legally enforceable terms of the mortgage or lien, any advances, reasonable attorney’s fees and other legal expenses incurred by the foreclosing creditor and the person conducting the foreclosure sale.
(b) Satisfaction of the obligation being enforced by the foreclosure sale.
(c) Satisfaction of obligations secured by any junior mortgages or liens on the property, in their order of priority.
(d) Payment of the balance of the proceeds, if any, to the debtor or his successor in interest.
If there are conflicting claims to any portion of the proceeds, the person conducting the foreclosure sale is not required to distribute that portion of the proceeds until the validity of the conflicting claims is determined through inter-pleader or otherwise to his satisfaction.
3. A person who claims a right to receive the proceeds of a foreclosure sale pursuant to paragraph (c) of subsection 2 must, upon the written demand of the person conducting the foreclosure sale, provide:
(a) Proof of the obligation upon which he claims his right to the proceeds; and
(b) Proof of his interest in the mortgage or lien, unless that proof appears in the official records of a county in which the property is located.
Such a demand is effective upon personal delivery or upon mailing by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the last known address of the claimant. Failure of a claimant to provide the required proof within 15 days after the effective date of the demand waives his right to receive those proceeds.
4. As used in this section, “foreclosure sale” means the sale of real property to enforce an obligation secured by a mortgage or lien on the property, including the exercise of a trustee’s power of sale pursuant to NRS 107.080.
NRS 40.463 Agreement for assistance in recovering proceeds of foreclosure sale due to debtor or successor in interest; requirements for enforceable agreement; fee must be reasonable.
1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a debtor or his successor in interest may enter into an agreement with a third party that provides for the third party to assist in the recovery of any balance of the proceeds of a foreclosure sale due to the debtor or his successor in interest pursuant to paragraph (d) of subsection 2 of NRS 40.462.
2. An agreement pursuant to subsection 1:
(a) Must:
(1) Be in writing;
(2) Be signed by the debtor or his successor in interest; and
(3) Contain an acknowledgment of the signature of the debtor or his successor in interest by a notary public; and
(b) May not be entered into less than 30 days after the date on which the foreclosure sale was conducted.
3. Any agreement entered into pursuant to this section that does not comply with subsection 2 is void and unenforceable.
4. Any fee charged by a third party for services provided pursuant to an agreement entered into pursuant to this section must be reasonable. A fee that exceeds $2,500, excluding attorney’s fees and costs, is presumed to be unreasonable. A court shall not enforce an obligation to pay any unreasonable fee, but may require a debtor to pay a reasonable fee that is less than the amount set forth in the agreement.
5. A third party may apply to the court for permission to charge a fee that exceeds $2,500. Any third party applying to the court pursuant to this subsection has the burden of establishing to the court that the fee is reasonable.
6. This section does not preclude a debtor or his successor in interest from contesting the reasonableness of any fee set forth in an agreement entered into pursuant to this section.
7. As used in this section:
(a) “Creditor” means a person due an obligation being enforced by a foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to NRS 40.451 to 40.463, inclusive.
(b) “Debtor” means a person, or the successor in interest of a person, who owes an obligation being enforced by a foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to NRS 40.451 to 40.463, inclusive.
(c) “Third party” means a person who is neither the debtor nor the creditor of a particular obligation being enforced by a foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to NRS 40.451 to 40.463, inclusive.

RIGHTS OF GUARANTOR, SURETY OR OBLIGOR IN REAL PROPERTY

NRS 40.465 “Indebtedness” defined. As used in NRS 40.475, 40.485 and 40.495, “indebtedness” means the principal balance of the obligation, together with all accrued and unpaid interest, and those costs, fees, advances and other amounts secured by the mortgage or lien upon real property.
NRS 40.475 Remedy against mortgagor or grantor; assignment of creditor’s rights to guarantor, surety or obligor. Upon full satisfaction by a guarantor, surety or other obligor, other than the mortgagor or grantor of a deed of trust, of the indebtedness secured by a mortgage or lien upon real property, the paying guarantor, surety or other obligor is entitled to enforce every remedy which the creditor then has against the mortgagor or grantor of the mortgage or lien upon real property, and is entitled to an assignment from the creditor of all of the rights which the creditor then has by way of security for the performance of the indebtedness.
NRS 40.485 Interest in proceeds of secured indebtedness upon partial satisfaction of indebtedness. Immediately upon partial satisfaction by a guarantor, surety or other obligor, other than the mortgagor or grantor of a deed of trust, of the indebtedness secured by a mortgage or lien upon real property, the paying guarantor, surety or other obligor automatically, by operation of law and without further action, receives an interest in the proceeds of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage or lien to the extent of the partial satisfaction, subject only to the creditor’s prior right to recover the balance of the indebtedness owed by the mortgagor or grantor.

NRS 40.495 Waiver of rights; separate action to enforce obligation; available defenses.
1. The provisions of NRS 40.475 and 40.485 may be waived by the guarantor, surety or other obligor only after default.
2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 4, a guarantor, surety or other obligor, other than the mortgagor or grantor of a deed of trust, may waive the provisions of NRS 40.430. If a guarantor, surety or other obligor waives the provisions of NRS 40.430, an action for the enforcement of that person’s obligation to pay, satisfy or purchase all or part of an indebtedness or obligation secured by a mortgage or lien upon real property may be maintained separately and independently from:
(a) An action on the debt;
(b) The exercise of any power of sale;
(c) Any action to foreclose or otherwise enforce a mortgage or lien and the indebtedness or obligations secured thereby; and
(d) Any other proceeding against a mortgagor or grantor of a deed of trust.
3. If the obligee maintains an action to foreclose or otherwise enforce a mortgage or lien and the indebtedness or obligations secured thereby, the guarantor, surety or other obligor may assert any legal or equitable defenses provided pursuant to the provisions of NRS 40.451 to 40.463, inclusive.
4. The provisions of NRS 40.430 may not be waived by a guarantor, surety or other obligor if the mortgage or lien:
(a) Secures an indebtedness for which the principal balance of the obligation was never greater than $500,000;
(b) Secures an indebtedness to a seller of real property for which the obligation was originally extended to the seller for any portion of the purchase price;
(c) Is secured by real property which is used primarily for the production of farm products as of the date the mortgage or lien upon the real property is created; or
(d) Is secured by real property upon which:
(1) The owner maintains his principal residence;
(2) There is not more than one residential structure; and
(3) Not more than four families reside.

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