What Homeowners Must Know About Mortgage Fraud & Restitution

10 Tuesday Apr 2018

Posted by BNG in Banks and Lenders, Case Laws, Case Study, Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, Mortgage fraud, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, Restitution, State Court, Your Legal Rights

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Foreclosure, homeowners, Law, Lawsuit, Loan, Monetary Restitution, Mortgage fraud, Nevada, Ninth Circuit, Pro se legal representation in the United States, Restitution

During the peak of the housing boom in Las Vegas, Russell, a mortgage loan processor for a large bank, reviewed a mortgage application. Everything appeared to be in order: this particular type of mortgage loan required no income verification because the buyer had excellent credit and the home would be an owner-occupied property. Russell approved the loan for the bank.

Unbeknownst to Russell and the bank, the applicant was actually a “straw buyer,” using his name and credit to buy the house at the insistence of his business partner, but not actually intending to live in the house. All the applicant had to do was sign a few documents and both the applicant and his business partner would profit from exploding housing prices. The applicant’s credit would allow the pair to purchase a single-family residence for $295,000, and then, before the first mortgage payment came due, they would flip the property, that is, immediately sell the home, and profit from the home’s extraordinary short-term appreciation. The applicant never planned on living in the house nor making any mortgage payments, despite his execution of loan documents to the contrary.

Unfortunately, housing prices did not continue their fantastic escalation and the pair were unable to sell the home. Not surprisingly, neither the applicant nor his business partner made any mortgage payments and the home went into foreclosure. At the time of the home’s foreclosure, the house had a fair market value of $265,000. However, the bank that relied on the applicant’s information had too many similarly situated properties at the time of the foreclosure and decided to keep the home in inventory until it could sell the home at a later date.

Meanwhile, the financial institution became suspicious of the applicant and realized he never even moved into the house, despite claiming on his Uniform Residential Loan Application that this would be an “owner-occupied” property.

Concerned with an increase in mortgage fraud, the lender tipped off authorities, who subsequently investigated and arrested the straw buyer and his business partner. Almost a year later, the partners pled guilty and were sentenced, inter alia, to pay restitution to the financial institution. At the time of sentencing, the home had a fair market value of $145,000.

The court ordered restitution based on the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) concerning fraud and property. The victim, in this case the bank, argued its amount of loss equaled $295,000 (the amount originally borrowed) less the current fair market value of the property returned, $145,000; thus, the court should order the defendants to pay restitution of $150,000. On the other hand, the defendants argued that at the time the property was returned to the financial institution, the value of the home was $265,000. And because the bank had control over the property since that point in time, and had the ability to sell it any time, the defendants should not be liable for the further declining
market conditions. Thus, the defendants argued they only owed restitution of $30,000. Alternatively, the judge could consider a third possibility: recent recommendations from US Sentencing Guidelines. Under these new guidelines,
the court determines the fair market value of the home on the defendants’ sentencing
date.

But, if the bank had not sold the home by that date, that fair market value would be based on the county’s assessed value of the property. In Clark County, where Las Vegas is situated, the Assessor’s Office updates property values annually and, depending on the specific time frame in this hypothetical, the assessment value can range from a lagging property assessment valuing the home at $280,000 to a more current assessment valuing the home at $125,000.

Which measure of restitution and subsequent calculation is best? That is, which value most adequately compensates the injured victim without unfairly burdening the defendants? The Ninth Circuit would side with the defendants in this case, having previously held that the value of the home on the date the bank gains control is the proper measure of restitution. Accordingly, the defendants in this case would be ordered to pay only $30,000 in restitution. On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit would hold that the “property” stolen was the money used to finance the home purchase, and not the actual home.

Subsequently, the “property” is not returned to the victim until the bank sells the
house and gets the entire amount it loaned to the defendants back. For that reason, if the bank sold the home by the sentencing date for $145,000, the defendants would be ordered to pay $150,000 in restitution. And if a judge considered the US Sentencing Guidelines, she would look to the local assessor’s office to determine the correct value. Thus, the amount of restitution a defendant pays depends on where the mortgage fraud takes place and whether the presiding judge considers the US Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly, mortgage fraud restitution is not uniform throughout the United States.

This note discusses the circuit split in applying the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 to mortgage fraud crimes—specifically, the difference in the mortgage fraud restitution formula. In Part I, I provide an introduction to mortgage fraud. In Part II, I provide background on the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, which established a directive to courts to order restitution to identifiable victims. Further, the Act indicated, albeit imprecisely, that the restitution amount is based on the property’s value on the sentencing date, less the property’s “value” on the date the property is returned. Regrettably, the Act does not provide a definition of the word property,” which has resulted in a circuit split. Three circuit courts calculate the mandatory restitution as the property’s “value” based on the date the property is returned—that is, the property’s fair market value on that date. On the other hand, four circuits insist that the “value” of the property can only be determined when the bank actually sells that property. In Part III, I will discuss the circuit split where courts disagree on the “appropriate” restitution calculation.

In an effort to provide a uniform calculation, last year the US Sentencing Commission proposed changes to the US Sentencing Guidelines. While the Guidelines are only advisory and not mandatory, these recent amendments result in a third possible calculation that I discuss in Part IV.

Finally, in Part V, I critique each of the three imperfect approaches. In addition, I provide comparisons to various state foreclosure deficiency statutes as an illustration of alternative calculations. I conclude by proposing an amendment to the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act that, in the cases of collateralized loans obtained by fraud, defines “property” as the actual property fraudulently obtained: cash. In addition, I propose an additional “good faith” clause to the amendment to prevent banks from holding onto a foreclosed property longer than necessary. The sooner a property is sold, the sooner the bank recuperates some of its lost funds and the sooner a defendant knows the restitution
amount he must pay.

A. What is Mortgage Fraud?

In the hypothetical above, the partners executed mortgage fraud by using the applicant’s name and credit as a “straw buyer.” That is, a person who allows his name to be used in the loan process but has no intention of actually making any mortgage loan payments. Mortgage fraud comes in a variety of forms. For example, a person commits loan origination fraud when he misrepresents or omits information on a loan application upon which an underwriter ultimately relies to write a loan. Mortgage fraud can also occur with illicit programs aimed at current homeowners who are having trouble with their payments. Lately, this type of foreclosure rescue fraud is increasing. These types of scams focus on homeowners on the verge of foreclosure. Criminals promise to “stop or delay the foreclosure process,” and, in return, homeowners sign over their property to the criminals.

Mortgage fraud can also include “flopping.” Flopping occurs when a bank agrees to a short sale with the homeowner who then attempts to get the lowest price possible by purposefully damaging the soon-to-be-sold house. The house is then bought by an accomplice, cleaned up, and immediately flipped for a profit of upwards of 30 percent. In 2011, Nevada ranked second to Florida in the Mortgage Fraud Index (MFI), a ranking of states based on reported fraud and misrepresentation investigations. The FBI investigates mortgage fraud through Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) filed by financial institutions.

The number of mortgage fraud SARs filed in 2011 was 93,508. To put this in perspective, in 2003 the number of reports filed was less than 7,000. However, mortgage fraud may be decreasing: 2012 SARs are down 25 percent compared to the previous year.

B. Why Does Mortgage Fraud Matter?

Mortgage fraud is a “significant contributor” to our economic crisis. Mortgage fraud has contributed to an increasing number of home foreclosures, decreasing home prices, and tightening of credit because of investor losses attributable to mortgage-backed securities. Further, “[t]he discovery of mortgage fraud via the mortgage industry loan review processes, quality control measures, regulatory and industry referrals, and consumer complaints lags behind economic indicators—often up to two years or more, with the impacts [of the fraud] felt far beyond these years.” Undeniably, reports of mortgage fraud persist and are continually emphasized in the news.

Lenient underwriting standards and a booming housing market have shaped a perfect backdrop for fraud to thrive. However, “[b]y 2007, real estate values began to fall and mortgage lenders began experiencing large losses due to fraud, reducing their ability to fund new mortgage loans.” The economic implications of mortgage fraud are staggering. The actual dollar amount attributed to mortgage fraud is unknown, however in 2010 alone “more than $10 billion in loans originated with fraudulent application data.”

Moreover, in fiscal year 2012, 70,291 SARs were filed with losses of $2.69 billion. And while the number of mortgage fraud instances has decreased, the dollar amounts involved in instances of fraud has increased.

C. Why Restitution?

Until the early 1980s, courts did not habitually consider restitution as part of sentencing guidelines. In fact, if a court ordered restitution, it was usually based on the defendant’s ability to pay. The passage of the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA) in 1982, its subsequent revision in 1986, and later the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) in 1996 empowered federal judges to order restitution to victims of certain crimes without consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay. Unfortunately, victims receive only a fraction of the costs from crimes through restitution, as not all defendants have the resources to pay the restitution and their income potential diminishes significantly once they are in jail. However, as courts consider both the MVRA and the frequently cited public policy argument for restitution (making the victim whole), courts consequently order restitution awards to mortgage fraud victims. Indeed, “[v]ictims in mortgage fraud cases are statutorily entitled to restitution.

D. The Split

When a court convicts a defendant of mortgage fraud, and the defendant’s return of the property alone is not enough to fully restore the identified victim, the court will try to offset this deficiency in one of two ways. The Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits determine restitution based on the property’s fair market value the day the victim receives title to the property. The Third, Eighth, Tenth, and, most recently, Seventh Circuits hold the shortage is calculated based on the actual sale of the collateral real estate. Thus, the value of the property is unknown until the property has been sold and the lender receives the net proceeds. Consequently, this split “sets up a potential case for the U.S.
Supreme Court to decide whether the MVRA requires a court to determine restitution based on the fair market value of collateral real estate on the date it is returned to a victim . . . or the cash value upon foreclosure sale.”

II. THE MANDATORY VICTIMS RESTITUTION ACT OF 1996

Congress first enacted legislation in support of victims’ rights with the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA). The act included a broad provision for victim restitution. In considering the bill, the Committee on the Judiciary indicated that [t]he principle of restitution is an integral part of virtually every formal system of criminal justice, of every culture and every time. It holds that, whatever else the sanctioning power of society does to punish its wrongdoers, it should also insure that the wrongdoer is required to the degree possible to restore the victim to his or her prior state of well-being.

However, while this report indicated the importance of requiring restitution,
the Act only provided that a Court may order the defendant to pay restitution. Congress expanded and amended legislation for victims in future legislation, most notably in the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996. Congress identified one of the primary purposes of the Act as “requiring Federal criminal defendants to pay full restitution to the identifiable victims of their crimes.” In addition, Congress specifically made mandatory restitution applicable to fraudulent crimes against property. Moreover, Congress explicitly identified the legislation’s purpose:

This legislation is needed to ensure that the loss to crime victims is recognized, and
that they receive the restitution that they are due. It is also necessary to ensure that
the offender realizes the damage caused by the offense and pays the debt owed to the
victim as well as to society. Finally, this legislation is needed to replace an existing
patchwork of different rules governing orders of restitution under various Federal
criminal statutes with one consistent procedure.

If restitution is appropriate, a court may only award it to identifiable victims. A
federal crime victim is defined as “a person directly and proximately harmed as
a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of Columbia.” Further, restitution is only applicable to crime victims when the
defendant is actually convicted. In addition, “[a] ‘victim’s’ participation in a
fraudulent mortgage scheme . . . will generally exclude the victim from
restitution.”

It should also be remembered that restitution, “like all criminal sanctions . . . is a sanction of limited application.” Restitution is only complete, then, when payment of the obligation is complete. In jurisdictions that allow “extended or nominal payment mechanisms,” which can prolong the repayment, the variable time value of money may cause any restitution to be technically incomplete, even once the balance is repaid in full. Unfortunately, only 17.4 percent of measured property offenses resulted in criminal charges. Where convictions of mortgage fraud do result, however, courts consider the language of the MVRA in awarding restitution:

The court may also order restitution . . . . The order may require that such defendant
. . . return the property to the owner of the property . . . or . . . if return of the property . . . is impossible, impractical, or inadequate, pay an amount equal to the greater of . . . the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss, or destruction, or . . . the value of the property on the date of sentencing, less the value (as of the date the property is returned) of any part of the property that is returned . . . .

Accordingly, when the return of the property is inadequate restitution, the MVRA states that the offset value must be determined as of the date the property is returned. However, the statute is silent as exactly how to measure the value of the property on that date. Consequently, in the absence of clear guidelines, three possible formulas have arisen.

III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

With a lack of clarity in defining “property” in the MVRA, the circuit courts have split in their interpretations of restitution. Two circuits have followed the Ninth Circuit in determining that the value of the property is the fair market value on the date of the property’s return, arguing that once the property is returned to the victim, the victim has control over the property and may dispose of the property whenever it chooses. Accordingly, these courts calculate the fair market value of the property based on the date the property is returned rather than waiting for a later sale. Conversely, four circuits hold that the “property” can only be valued when the house is eventually sold and the proceeds are provided to the victim because cash, not real estate, was the actual
property the defendants took from the victim.

A. The Ninth Circuit Method

A bank would say a restitution calculation can only be determined when the property is sold, but a defendant would argue that if a bank holds on to the property in a declining market, it is unfair for the defendant to pay more in restitution than what the property was worth when the victim regained control of it. The Ninth Circuit method considers the fairness of a bank refraining from selling a property immediately, and ultimately agrees with the defendant’s argument.

After the passage of the Victim and Witness Protection Act in 1982, the Ninth Circuit became the first circuit court to consider mortgage fraud restitution. The court turned to an earlier decision in a timber theft case for property valuation guidance. In United States v. Tyler, the defendant was ordered to pay restitution for his theft of timber from a national forest. However, the victim, the federal government, did not sell the timber upon its seizure and in fact purposefully held onto the timber, claiming it needed the timber for evidentiary purposes in its case against Tyler. During the period between the
arrest and sentencing, timber prices declined. The district court found that the
amount of restitution equaled the difference of the timber’s value from sentencing
date and the higher value when defendant actually stole the timber. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the District Court and held that the defendant should not have an increased restitution when the victim decides to retain the property. The court reasoned that the defendant’s conduct did not cause the subsequent loss the government experienced and therefore restitution was properly calculated as the property’s value on the date the victim regained control of the timber.

The Ninth Circuit subsequently applied this logic to a mortgage fraud context in United States v. Smith, where the defendant obtained loans secured by speculative real estate. The court determined that the credit against restitution should be based on the value of the property on the date title is transferred to the victim. The court noted, “[a]s of that date, the new owner had the power to dispose of the property and receive compensation.” Because the victim has control over the property’s sale once the property is returned, “[v]alue should therefore be measured by what the financial institution would have received in a sale as of that date.”

The Smith decision served as the “keystone for all of the subsequent decisions.”
The Ninth Circuit reinforced this valuation method in later cases. Further, in United States v. Gossi, the court elaborated on its prior decisions that value should be based on the date the victim has control over the property. Specifically, the court noted that what comes with control of the property is the power to dispose, which allows the victim to sell the property anytime and provides no immediate calculation of restitution. Subsequently, the court cited Smith, stating the “[v]alue should therefore be measured by what the financial institution would have received in a sale as of that date.” Finally, this past year, the Ninth Circuit upheld its mortgage fraud restitution calculation in United States v. Yeung. In Yeung, the defendant enlisted five people in a scheme involving false information on straw buyers’ loan applications in order to purchase and refinance homes in Northern California during the booming housing market. The district court considered a sentencing memo indicating that Yeung should pay restitution in the amount of the “outstanding principal balance on the defaulted loans less any money recovered from a sale of the properties used as collateral for the loans.”

Applying the US Sentencing Guidelines, rather than the MVRA, the district court ordered a restitution award in excess of $1.3 million. The Court of Appeals, however,
indicated that a financial institution has control of the property either when the
property is sold or when, citing Smith, the lender “had the power to dispose of
the property and receive compensation,” and therefore restitution should be
based on the fair market value on the date the property is returned. One distinction in Yeung, however, involved a loan purchased on the secondary market. One of the loans had been sold from the originating lender to a loan purchaser at a discount. The court indicated that the “property” in such circumstances is the actual loan, and not the original real property. The court determined that the restitution calculation in this type of circumstance must consider how much the loan purchaser paid for the loan, “less the value of the real property collateral as of the date the victim took control of the collateral property.”

Further, the court disagreed with the district court’s calculation of one property’s value. The district court determined the value of one of the properties as $363,863—the amount the victim received from the property’s sale. However, this sale did not occur until sixteen months after the victim took control of the property. Accordingly, the court found the actual value should be determined from the date the victim took control of the property. Two circuits follow the Ninth Circuit’s restitution calculation. In both United States v. Reese and United States v. Holley, the Fifth Circuit maintained that a property’s value is determined based on the date the collateral property is returned to the lender. Further, in Holley, the Fifth Circuit specifically analogized the facts of Holley to the Smith case in subscribing to the Ninth Circuit calculation

Relatedly, in United States v. Boccagna, the Second Circuit performed an extensive analysis of how property value should be measured, ultimately agreeing with the Ninth and Fifth Circuits. The Boccagna court noted that the MVRA does not define how to determine the value of property. Instead, the court stated, the “law appears to contemplate the exercise of discretion by sentencing courts in determining the measure of value appropriate to restitution calculation in a given case.” The court found the property’s sale price was lower than the fair market value and remanded the case to determine this value as part of the restitution calculation.

B. The Seventh Circuit Method

In contrast, four circuit courts presume the fair market value is determined only by the actual sale of the property. I have referred to this calculation as the Seventh Circuit method because of that court’s recent decision in which it analyzed all circuit holdings to date. However, these decisions begin outside of that circuit. The Third Circuit, in United States v. Himler, observed that the return of the property would be inadequate to compensate the victim, and explicitly disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s view that value of the property is “as of the date the victim took control of [it].” The court noted instead that real estate is an illiquid asset, and “is only worth what you can get for it.” Thus, the court held that restitution would equal the original loan amount, less the eventual amount recovered from a sale. Surprisingly in this case, waiting until the sale actually
occurred resulted in the defendant paying less restitution than he would have if the fair market value had been used. The condominium in Himler sold for significantly more than its presumed value when title was transferred, due to favorable market conditions.

The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. James, also concluded that value is based on the actual foreclosure sales price and not an appraised value when the property is returned to the mortgage holder. The court noted that the MVRA “generally uses the term ‘value,’ and does not limit calculation of ‘value’ only to the use of the ‘fair market value’ of the property at issue.” Further, because the statute does not specifically mention value as being fair market value, there are other examples of value that may be appropriate, such as foreclosure sales price and replacement price. The court subsequently noted that
value can be a flexible concept, and a court with discretionary powers should keep in mind the purpose of restitution—to make the victim whole. The court concluded, therefore, that the foreclosure sale price in that case reflected a more accurate measure of the victim’s loss. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Statman, used the foreclosure sale price of a fraudulently purchased bakery business in calculating the restitution award to a state’s small business-funding agency. While the defendant wanted the court to consider the appraised value of the bakery, the court cited James and determined that a foreclosure sale price was a permissible calculation method. The court also agreed with the Tenth Circuit; its decision aligns with the public policy concerns, which justify the existence of restitution in the first place—the need to make victims whole for the actual loss. While this case involved financial fraud, and not mortgage fraud per se, the chosen calculation method aligns this circuit with the sale-price camp.

Most recently, in United States v. Robers, the Seventh Circuit joined the Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits concluding “it is proper to determine the offset value [of property that is returned] based on the eventual amount recouped by the victim following sale of the collateral real estate.” The court observed that because the victim loaned cash to the defendants to purchase the property, the cash was therefore the “property” taken, not a home. Basing its opinion on the plain language of the MVRA, the Seventh Circuit decided that “ ‘property’ must mean the property originally taken from the victim,” the value can only be determined by the amount of cash returned to the victim from a sale.

IV. YET ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE—US SENTENCING GUIDELINES

The US Sentencing Guidelines are advisory rules that set out uniform sentencing guidelines for various offenses. The Guidelines are not mandatory,
and while judges have discretion in sentencing, courts must consider the Guidelines
in determining a defendant’s sentence. Moreover, a court of appeals reviewing a sentence that follows the Guidelines will consider the sentencing reasonable per se. Under these Guidelines, the factors considered when imposing a sentence include restitution to the victim. Further, the Guidelines state that, “[i]n the case of an identifiable victim, the court shall . . . enter a restitution order for the full amount of the victim’s loss, if such order is authorized under 18 U.S.C. . . . § 3663.”

The US Sentencing Commission annually reviews the current Guidelines and proposes amendments to reflect inadequacies in recent sentences. Recent revisions to the Guidelines, however, are not consistent with the latest Seventh Circuit decision in Robers. In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress issued a directive to the US Sentencing Guideline Commission to review and amend federal sentencing guidelines related to “persons convicted of fraud offenses relating to financial institutions or federally related mortgage loans and any other similar provisions of law.” The amendment subsequently attempts to address the inconsistencies with Application Note 3(E) and “credits against loss rule,” which offsets a victim’s
loss by any credit the victim has already received. In general, the rule deducts the fair market value of the property returned to the victim from the amount of restitution the defendant is required to pay. In other words, the restitution is offset by the collateral’s fair market value. The Commission specifically addressed the situation that the circuit courts have wrestled with—when the victim gets the collateral back but has not disposed of the property, resulting in a problematic value calculation. The Commission noted this and, in an attempt to provide uniform guidelines, it proposed two changes. The first change established a specific date of the fair. market value determination: “the date on which the guilt of the defendant has been established.” The second change “establishes a rebuttable presumption that the most recent tax assessment value of the collateral is a reasonable estimate of the fair market value.” The Commission suggests that a court may consider the accuracy of this measure by examining factors such as how current the assessment is and the jurisdiction’s calculation process. In sum, a court ordering restitution following these Guidelines would establish the value of the property based on the official date of the defendant’s guilt. In addition, if the property has been returned to the victim but remains unsold, a court will use the local tax assessor’s value of the property to determine the property’s value.

V. CRITIQUE OF THE THREE CALCULATIONS

The absence of a definition for the term “property” in the MVRA is the root of the different applications of the statute throughout the country. “When the court defines ‘property,’ the question is whether the statute refers to the property stolen or the property returned. They are not necessarily equivalent, particularly in the context of complex financial instruments . . . .” However, as stated previously, the Act’s purpose is to make the victim whole, and no matter which formula is used, each calculation has the potential to not achieve this goal.

A. The Ninth Circuit Method: Control as the Impetus

There are several advantages to the Ninth Circuit mortgage fraud restitution calculation method, which holds that the fair market value should be calculated based on the date the property is returned to the financial institution victim. First, the date reflects the date that control over the property has been returned to the victims. Accordingly, the bank then has the power to dispose of the property at its discretion without additionally penalizing the defendant if the victim refrains from selling the property on that date. For example, a victim may decide to hold on to the property, as in United States v. Tyler or United States v. Smith, coincidental with a declining market. A victim may have too
many properties in inventory to immediately put a particular property up for sale. Or a victim may be making a calculated business decision to retain the property for a certain period of time for accounting purposes. No matter the purpose behind the retention, it is unfair to place the additional penalty that coincides with declining real estate prices on the defendant who had no control or even influence over the property’s sale.

Second, this specific date requires no guesswork when attempting to calculate the amount of restitution, which results in better efficiency. On the date the bank gets the property back, an appraisal can determine the property’s fair market value. The court can immediately calculate the restitution amount with this figure. Waiting until the property actually sells could result in a delay of months or years to determine how much the actual proceeds from the sale are. As a result, the court has an almost immediate figure to apply to the calculation and can order the restitution award right away. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit calculation method has some considerable weaknesses. First, real estate is an illiquid asset, and determining fair market value of an illiquid asset is difficult. An appraisal only suggests what the house could sell for, not what the house actually will sell for. In addition, appraisals are based on historical data of home sales, and during sharp market increases or decreases an appraisal will not reflect the most up-to-date real estate prices.

Second, the recent housing bubble created an economic environment where home prices decreased at a radical rate. Traditionally, such sharp declines are not a concern with real estate over the long run because, while real estate prices fluctuate, they eventually trend upward. However, in situations like the recent drops in home values, the victim-lender can be punished for the market decline, despite the fact the victim was actively trying to sell the property. In addition, amidst tightening credit conditions, fewer buyers may qualify to purchase a home. This results in too much supply, not enough demand, and
consequently puts further downward pressure on home prices. The victimlender
is therefore penalized for market conditions beyond its control and consequently
does not receive complete restitution. Further, a victim financial institution is not in the business of selling homes; it is in the business of making collateralized mortgage loans for qualified buyers. Not only will the lender have costs associated with selling the
home (for example, carrying costs or realtor commissions), the lender cannot make a sale magically happen, especially if the home is situated in a market flooded with other foreclosure sales. Thus, when the lender eventually sells the home, it can potentially face a greater loss, an inequity beyond its control.

B. The Seventh Circuit Method: Cash Proceeds are the “Property”

As discussed in Part II, the Seventh Circuit, along with three other circuits, requires a sale of the property in order to establish the net proceeds offsetting a restitution award. These circuits distinguish that the property fraudulently obtained was the cash proceeds to finance a real estate purchase, not the actual home. Thus, this method recognizes the illiquidity of real estate and instead requires cash proceeds from a property’s sale; therefore, no return of the property for restitution purposes occurs with just the transfer of title or “control” over the property.

In addition, this method provides a more exact amount to the restitution calculation. With an appraisal, a court only has an approximation of what the house is worth. With an actual sale, the court knows specifically what the home sold for, and also has information on the true net proceeds to the lender.

Finally, this method also provides a buffer of protection for a victim trying to sell a property in a declining housing market. If the victim is unable to sell the property immediately, and home prices continue to plummet, the victim will not be financially punished by an ensuing lower sales price of the property. Thus, by treating the property as cash proceeds and not calculating the restitution award until there is a sale of the property, this allows the victim to come closer to achieving full restitution because the funds returned are the original amount that was taken.

This calculation method, however, has some distinct disadvantages. First, calculating the amount of time a home will be on the market is a challenge. For example, in a downturn economy, is it appropriate for the defendants to wait for the home to sell for months or years? At what point should the restitution award sentence be official? Without an established time period for a requisite sale, there will be a decrease of both efficiency and certainty as the defendant will have to wait longer to find out what the value of the property is and therefore how much restitution is necessary. In addition, what if the lender purposely holds on to the property longer than necessary? Indeed, victim banks could make a “business decision” to hold onto a property for years before attempting to sell. This type of allowance does not encourage an efficient method of asset redistribution, which can delay economic recovery in a down economy. Further, what if the victim holds an improper foreclosure auction—for example, by failing to advertise the foreclosure sale—and subsequently purchases the home itself for an amount far lower than fair market value because of a (not surprising) lack of buyers? Should the
lender be rewarded for its misbehavior? On the other hand, some would argue
that between the two parties—a convicted criminal who attempted to defraud a
financial institution and a more innocent lender who trusted the criminal borrower—
the defendant should absorb the risk.

Further, it is possible in a booming housing market that a defendant will owe no restitution. For example, if the defendant fraudulently obtained a home loan for $200,000 and the victim lender subsequently sold the property for $205,000, the defendant will be absolved from restitution. However, if part of the goal of restitution is to make the victim whole, the victim is more than compensated in a booming housing market.

Moreover, this type of calculation can have an adverse effect on other types of property. Knowing that the value of the property is not calculated until the item is actually sold, a criminal has little incentive to actually return the property. This would not be a concern for real property, but the same legal framework could be applied to other forms of collateral that can be moved and hidden, like cars. Thus, a thief can choose to hold on to the property or never return the property because of a lack of incentive to return it immediately. Accordingly, “[t]he decision is focused on the statute’s goal of making victims whole but potentially interferes with the statute’s goal of returning property to
victims.” Consequently, “[i]f a defendant is going to be on the hook for the offset amount regardless of when the property is sold, then why return the property? Also, the decision may have the unintended consequence of interfering with the marketplace . . . .”

Finally, the loan in question in these circumstances is for a collateralized asset. The actual home provided security to the lender. As such, the lender bore the risk when it made the loan; however, the lender also understood it could foreclose on the home in case of default. Thus, this cost of doing business is already accounted for and a victim lender understands this type of risk when providing mortgage loans.

C. US Sentencing Guidelines: Local Property Assessment is the Real
“Value”

As discussed in Part IV, the US Sentencing Guidelines establish the date of valuation as the conviction date of the defendant. In addition, if the property has not sold by that date, the local property tax assessor’s value of the home is the value of the property for restitution calculation purposes. There are several advantages to this approach. First, if every circuit applied this approach, these guidelines would result in a uniform application throughout the country and would eliminate the conflicting restitution awards. In addition, this approach sets a number that can be calculated and independently verified. An individual could easily confirm the tax assessor’s value of the property and calculate the restitution.

Moreover, the Guidelines allow flexibility. For example, if a court determines that an assessed value is too divergent from a property’s fair market value, the court has discretion to address these differences and assign a fair market value.

The Guideline method, however, has potential disadvantages. First, as previously
noted, the assessed value may not be near the fair market value of the property, and a battle of experts may ensue as both the defendant and the victim claim otherwise. In addition, this discrepancy may afford too much discretion to judges when the goal of the Guidelines is to set a uniform policy.

In addition, this approach disregards the Seventh Circuit method recognizing that the property taken was the actual cash for the home loan. Instead, by relying on a tax assessor’s value if the home remains unsold, the Commission determined that the “property” is the tangible real estate, and not the cash that was lent. Again, if the victim were unable to sell the home in a declining housing market, the restitution award would fail to compensate the victim for its true loss.

D. Alternative Methods of Calculation – State Deficiency Statutes

The problematic issue of fair market assessment is not unique to restitution.
Every state and the District of Columbia have a deficiency statute, whereby a lender can obtain a deficiency judgment to recover the difference between a foreclosure sale price and the current outstanding balance owed on the mortgage loan. Not every jurisdiction, however, calculates this deficiency in the same way. For example, Nevada calculates the home value based on the actual sale price, not the fair market value when the property is returned to the lender. However, the court may also consider the home’s appraised
value in its determination.

Some states maintain that a foreclosure sale price determines the value of the home when calculating a deficiency judgment. In other words, these states determine that a property’s value is only determined at the time of the property’s sale. Therefore, this calculation is similar to the Seventh Circuit method whereby a property’s value can only be determined following a sale of the real estate.

Other states consider the fair market value of the property when considering a deficiency judgment. States that consider the fair market value at the time the property is returned coincide with the Ninth Circuit calculation method. Notably, some of these states are states that have had a high number of foreclosures and are within the Ninth Circuit: for example, Arizona and California. Other states provide that the courts have discretion to determine the appropriate value of the property. This discretion is analogous to the alternative offered by US Sentencing Guidelines. This alternative is available when a court deems the property’s assessed value is inappropriate and provides that a court has authority to consider other evidence in its determination of a property’s value.

Thus, just as there is a lack of uniformity in the restitution calculation depending on which state you live in, there is a corresponding lack of uniformity regarding deficiency judgments. While most states follow the foreclosure sale approach recognizing the property’s value can only be determined with an actual sale, this approach does not account for the amount of time a financial institution can choose to hold onto the property. It further fails to account for the lack of control a mortgagor has over the sale process. On the other hand, while the fair market approach recognizes the importance of the control aspect, this approach does not consider a mortgagee’s potential inability to sell in a down economy.

E. Analysis

Restitution is founded primarily on the idea that the victim should be made whole for his property loss. The actual property that was defrauded from a victim in mortgage fraud is the money lent as part of the real estate transaction.
Therefore, until the actual money is returned, equity has not been restored to the victim. However, equity also demands that a victim not take advantage of the criminal defendant and hold on to the returned real estate property longer than necessary to sell the real estate property. Therefore, there should be a limitation to ensure a victim does not unreasonably allow the property to languish. Accordingly, a “good faith” requirement should be included in any amendment to the MVRA, requiring a victim to sell the property to recoup funds with good faith. Thus, a defendant who believes a victim unfairly held onto a property for too long may petition the court to reduce the amount of restitution owed if the victim did not commence the sales process with good
faith.

If Congress were to amend MVRA, it should provide a definition of the term “property” to help distinguish between properties at the different phases of a financial transaction. Because of the diverse types of financial fraud—e.g. mortgage fraud compared with securities fraud—the term “property” may have more than one meaning within these contexts, and may also change throughout the transaction. For instance, consider a scheming debtor who fraudulently obtained a margin loan to purchase both mortgage backed securities and corporate bonds. The property “stolen” initially in this case is the fraudulently obtained cash used to purchase the assets. However, after the margin loan is received, the property now consists of two types of financial instruments within
the debtor’s portfolio. Indeed, the property in its current form (financial assets)
can be converted back to the form of the original property (cash). However, with the current definition of property, it is unclear if that conversion is even required.

The definition of property should state that “property” is defined as the specific or particular type of asset (such as cash) that the defendant secured from the victim. This way, the “property” returned to the victim (money) will be the same type of property stolen (money used to purchase the home). In addition, similar to many state statutes prohibiting insurance companies from operating in bad faith, the Act should prohibit victim-lenders from operating in bad faith.

VI. CONCLUSION

Defendants, like the partners in the fictional story in the introduction, could face varied restitution awards depending on which state they commit the mortgage fraud in. This lack of a uniform approach results in inadequate restitution to victims. If the goal of the MVRA is to make victims whole, a more standardized and consistent calculation of restitution is required. Providing a definition of property in the MVRA would provide this uniformity. Further, requiring victims to act in good faith as they attempt to convert property back to the type of asset they were deprived of will help ensure defendants aren’t unfairly punished.

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/ “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will show you step-by-step litigation solutions helping you challenge these fraudsters and ultimately saving your home from foreclosure either through loan modification or “Pro Se” litigation visit: https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/

California Broker Receives 10-Year Prison Sentence for Mortgage Fraud

18 Sunday Aug 2013

Posted by BNG in Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, Your Legal Rights

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California, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Foreclosure, Justice Department, Mortgage fraud, Real estate, Special agent, United States Department of Justice

In California, a real estate broker out of Elk Grove was sentenced to 10 years in prison for her role in a mortgage fraud scheme that led to more than $5.5 million in losses, the Justice Department announced in a statement.

Hoda Samuel, 62, owned and operated Liberty Real Estate & Investment Company and Liberty Mortgage Company.

Out of 30 fraudulent sales transactions that occurred between April 2006 and February 2007, Samuel serve as the real estate agent for the buyer in 29 of the home sales, according to the statement. All the properties involved in the transactions went into foreclosure.

The transactions included false statements pertaining to income, employment, and rental history. To back the fabricated information, false documents were created and presented to lenders, and people were paid to answer calls from lenders and affirm the false statements.

Samuel also exaggerated the value of the collateral securing the loans, often exceeding the actual asking prices by $15,000 to $40,000. Repairs and costs for disability access modifications were also included in the prices, but were rarely done. According to the statement, at times, children of buyers were named as building contractors so money could go to the buyers.

“Greed-based crimes such as these can undermine the stability of our financial institutions and the economy, resulting in devastating consequences for homeowners, businesses and the communities in which the properties are located,” said special agent in charge Monica M. Miller of the Sacramento division of the FBI.

For More Information How to Save Your Home From Foreclosure as a Result of Mortgage Fraud Like this Visit http://www.fightforeclosure.net

How Homeoweners Can Use Various Forms of Mortgage Fraud Schemes For Wrongful Foreclosure Defense

12 Monday Aug 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Banks and Lenders, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Loan Modification, Non-Judicial States, Notary, Note - Deed of Trust - Mortgage, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, Scam Artists, Title Companies, Your Legal Rights

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Business, Finance, Financial Services, Loan origination, mortgage, Mortgage fraud, Mortgage loan, United States

Over the past few years, mortgage fraud continues to result in significant losses for both financial institutions and homeowners.

Mortgage fraud has continued to increase over the past few years. Declining economic conditions, liberal underwriting standards, and declining housing values contributed to the increased level of fraud. Market participants are perpetrating mortgage fraud by modifying old schemes, such as property flip, builder-bailout, and short sale fraud, as well as employing newer schemes, such as buy and bail, reverse mortgage fraud, loan modification and refinance fraud, and mortgage servicing fraud.

It is imperative that homeowners understand the nature of the various schemes involving mortgage frauds as this will help you to build rock solid defense when fighting your wrongful foreclosure to save your home.

Various individuals participate in mortgage fraud schemes. The following list consists of common participants in such schemes.

Appraiser                                Processor
Borrower                              Real Estate Agent
Buyer                                       Seller
Closing/Settlement Agent    Title Agent
Loan Servicer Underwriter
Originator    Warehouse Lender

BASIC MORTGAGE TRANSACTIONS

Basic mortgage transactions are generally the same whether the purpose of the loan is to purchase a property, refinance an existing loan, or obtain a loan against a property that is unencumbered and may be offered through one of the channels described below:

Retail

In retail transactions, the borrower makes an application directly with a financial institution loan officer. These mortgage transactions are the most basic and involve the fewest number of third parties, which may include appraisers and closing agents. Usually, the application package consisting of financial information, credit report, a collateral valuation report such as an appraisal or evaluation, title information, and various other credit-related documents, is compiled and forwarded to an underwriter for a credit decision. Upon approval, the financial institution then releases funds to a closing agent, who disburses funds to the various parties. The loan package is returned to the financial institution and reviewed for quality and accuracy. The loan is either held on the financial institution’s books or sold into the secondary market. Retail originations only include loans closed in the financial institution’s name.

Broker Origination

A broker-originated loan is similar to the retail transaction, except that the borrower makes an application with a mortgage broker. A broker is a firm or individual, acting on behalf of either the financial institution or the borrower, who matches a borrower’s financing needs with an institution’s mortgage origination programs. Brokers are compensated by receiving a commission expressed as a percentage of the total loan amount (e.g., 1 percent origination fee) from the borrower or through a yield-spread premium from the lender when the loan closes.

Brokers have played a critical role in the wholesale loan origination process and have significant influence on the total loan transaction. Brokers have served as the point of contact for the borrower and the lender, and coordinated the involvement of other parties to complete the transaction. A broker can perform some or most of the loan processing functions including, but not limited to, taking loan applications; ordering credit and title reports; verifying a borrower’s income and employment; etc.

Once the broker has gathered the necessary information, the application is submitted along with supporting documentation to one or more financial institutions for underwriting. The financial institution’s underwriter reviews the information and makes a credit decision. The financial institution also may perform pre-funding quality assurance activities, such as re-verification of income and employment.

A copy of the loan approval package, with documents prepared in the name of the financial institution, is then returned to the broker. Once the loan has closed, the completed package should be returned directly to the financial institution. Again, the financial institution may review the loan for quality and either retain the loan in its own portfolio or sell it.

Mortgage Loan Purchased from a Correspondent

In this transaction, the borrower applies for and closes a loan with a correspondent of the financial institution, which can be a mortgage company, another depository institution, finance company, or credit union service organization. The correspondent can close the loan with internally-generated funds in its own name or with funds borrowed from a warehouse lender. Without the capacity or desire to hold the loan in its own portfolio, the correspondent sells the loan to a financial institution. The purchasing financial institution is frequently not involved in the origination aspects of the transaction, and relies upon the correspondent to comply with the financial institution’s approved underwriting, documentation, and loan delivery standards. The purchasing financial institution may perform a quality control review prior to purchase. Also, the purchasing financial institution must review the appraisal or evaluation report and determine conformity with the Agencies’ appraisal standards, regulations, and supervisory guidance, as well as the financial institution’s requirements.

The loan can be booked in the financial institution’s own portfolio or sold.

In “delegated underwriting” relationships, the financial institution grants approval to the correspondent to process, underwrite, and close loans according to the financial institution’s processing and underwriting requirements. Proper due diligence, internal controls, approvals, quality control audits, and ongoing monitoring are warranted for these higher-risk relationships.

Each of the Agencies has issued detailed guidance on a financial institution’s management of its arrangements with third parties, including brokers, and associated risk. Examiners are encouraged to review and consider the guidance issued by their Agency in evaluating broker arrangements. Additionally, the Secure and Fair Enforcement Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008 (S.A.F.E. Act) requires licensing and/or registration for all residential mortgage loan originators. The system is also used for state-licensed mortgage companies. More information is available at the website at http://www.stateregulatoryregistry.org and contains comprehensive licensing, registration, enforcement action that is expected to be made available to the public through the website in the near future.

COMMON MORTGAGE FRAUD SCHEMES

This post defines schemes as the big picture or secret plan of action used to perpetrate a fraud. There are a variety of “schemes” by which mortgage fraud can take place. These schemes can involve individuals inside the financial institution or third parties. Various combinations of these schemes may be implemented in a single fraud. The descriptions provided below are examples of traditional and emerging schemes that are used to facilitate mortgage fraud. Click on the link for each fraud scheme to learn more about that particular scheme.

Builder Bailout

This scheme is used when a builder, who has unsold units in a tract, subdivision, or condominium complex, employs various fraudulent schemes to sell the remaining properties.

Buy and Bail

Chunking

Chunking occurs when a third party convinces an uninformed borrower to invest in a property (or properties), with no money down and with the third party acting as the borrower’s agent. The third party is also typically the owner of the property or part of a larger group organizing the scheme. Without the borrower’s knowledge, the third party submits loan applications to multiple financial institutions for various properties. The third party retains the loan proceeds, leaving the borrower with multiple loans that cannot be repaid. The financial institutions are forced to foreclose on the properties.

Double Selling

Double selling occurs when a mortgage loan originator accepts a legitimate application and documentation from a buyer, reproduces or copies the loan file, and sends the loan package to separate warehouse lenders to each fund the loan.

Equity Skimming

Equity skimming is the use of a fraudulent appraisal that over-values a property, creating phantom equity, which is subsequently stripped out through various schemes.

Fictitious Loan

A fictitious loan is the fabrication of loan documents or use of a real person’s information to apply for a loan which the applicant typically has no intention of paying. A fictitious loan can be perpetrated by an insider of the financial institution or by external parties such as loan originators, real estate agents, title companies, and/or appraisers.

Loan Modification and Refinance Fraud

This scheme occurs when a borrower submits false income information and/or false credit reports to persuade the financial institution to modify or refinance the loan on more favorable terms.

Mortgage Servicing Fraud

This fraud is perpetrated by the loan servicer and generally involves the diversion or misuse of loan payments, proceeds from loan prepayments, and/or escrow funds for the benefit of the service provider.

Phantom Sale

This scheme generally involves an individual or individuals who falsely transfer title to a property or properties and fraudulently obtain funds via mortgage loans or sales to third parties.

Property Flip Fraud

A fraudulent property flip is a scheme in which individuals, businesses, and/or straw borrowers, buy and sell properties among themselves to artificially inflate the value of the property.

Reverse Mortgage Fraud

Reverse Mortgage Fraud involves a scheme using a reverse mortgage loan to defraud a financial institution by stripping legitimate or fictitious equity from the collateral property.

Short Sale Fraud

Fraud occurs in a short sale when a borrower purposely withholds mortgage payments, forcing the loan into default, so that an accomplice can submit a “straw” short-sale offer at a purchase price less than the borrower’s loan balance. Sometimes the borrower is truly having financial difficulty and is approached by a fraudster to commit the scheme. In all cases, a fraud is committed if the financial institution is misled into approving the short-sale offer, when the price is not reasonable and/or when conflicts of interest are not properly disclosed.

Two additional fraud schemes, which are briefly addressed below, are debt elimination and foreclosure rescue schemes. While these schemes are typically not perpetrated directly on financial institutions, and therefore not expanded upon to the same degree as the above-mentioned schemes, the end result of the scheme can have a negative impact on the financial institution.

DEBT ELIMINATION SCHEME

Debt elimination schemes are illegal schemes that offer to eliminate a borrower’s debt for an up-front fee. The organizers of these schemes create phony legal documents based on the borrower’s loan(s) for presentment to the borrower’s financial institution or other lending institution in an attempt to falsely satisfy the loans.

The threat this fraud scheme presents to a financial institution is the borrower’s cessation of loan payments. Financial institutions may find that the use of the false documents complicates the collection process and may temporarily prevent any final action against the borrower.

FORECLOSURE RESCUE SCHEME

Foreclosure rescue schemes prey upon homeowners in financial distress or facing foreclosure, with the promise to help save their home. There are multiple variations of this scheme, often charging up-front fees and/or convincing the homeowner to deed the property to the fraudster, with the premise that the homeowner can rent or buy the property back once the individual’s credit has improved. The goal of the fraudster is to collect fees or mortgage payments that are intended for the lender, but are not delivered, usually resulting in the loan going into default and ultimately foreclosure, causing loss to the financial institution.

COMMON MECHANISMS OF MORTGAGE FRAUD SCHEMES

This post defines mechanism as the process by which fraud is perpetrated. A single mortgage fraud scheme can often include one or more mechanisms and may involve collusion between two or more individuals working in unison to implement a fraud. Click on the links to learn more about that particular mechanism. The following is a list of common mechanisms used to perpetrate mortgage fraud schemes:

Asset Rental: Cash or other assets are temporarily placed in the borrower’s account/possession in order to qualify for a mortgage loan. The borrower usually pays a “rental” fee for the temporary “use” of the assets.

Fake Down Payment: In order to meet loan-to-value requirements, a fake down payment through fictitious, forged, falsified, or altered documents is used to mislead the lender.

Fraudulent Appraisal: Appraisal fraud can occur when an appraiser, for various reasons, falsifies information on an appraisal or falsely provides an inaccurate valuation on the appraisal with the intent to mislead a third party.

Fraudulent Documentation: Fraudulent documentation consists of any forged, falsified, incomplete, or altered document that the financial institution relied upon in making a credit decision.

Fraudulent Use of Shell Company: A business entity that typically has no physical presence, has nominal assets, and generates little or no income is a shell company. Shell companies in themselves are not illegal and may be formed by individuals or business for legitimate purposes. However, due to lack of transparency regarding beneficial ownership, ease of formation, and inconsistent reporting requirements from state to state, shell companies have become a preferred vehicle for financial fraud schemes.

Identify Theft: Identity theft can be defined as assuming the use of another person’s personal information (e.g., name, SSN, credit card number, etc.) without the person’s knowledge and the fraudulent use of such knowledge to obtain credit.

Straw/Nominee Borrower: An individual used to serve as a cover for a questionable loan transaction.

EXAMPLES OF MORTGAGE FRAUD SCHEMES

– – – – Builder Bailout – – – –

A builder bailout occurs when a builder, who has unsold units in a tract, subdivision, or condominium complex, employs various fraudulent schemes to sell the remaining properties. In stressed economic or financial conditions, a builder may be pressured to liquidate remaining inventory to cover financial obligations. To sell the remaining properties, the builder may use a variety of tools including, but not limited to, hidden down payment assistance or excessive seller concessions to elevate the sales price. As a result of the scheme, the unsuspecting financial institution is often left with a loan secured by inflated collateral value and the “real” loan-to-value is greater than 100 percent.

Examples:

– A builder convinces buyers to purchase property by offering to pay excessive incentives that are undisclosed to the lender, including down payments, “no money down promotions”, and/or closing cost assistance.

– In an effort to attract participants, a builder promises to manage properties as rentals and absorb any negative cash flow for the first 12 to 18 months.

– A builder forms one or more companies to purchase the builder’s inventory at inflated market values. The affiliated company finances 100 percent of the purchase amount and funnels the excess cash back to the builder. This scheme falsely inflates the property value, clouds the builder’s true ability to move the inventory, and disguises the fact that the builder is ultimately responsible for repayment of the loan.

– A builder forms a mortgage origination affiliate to originate fraudulent loans. The loan files contain credit discrepancies, fraudulent appraisals, and/or erroneous certificates of occupancy and completion.

– When the builder can no longer lure investors/speculators, the builder may employ straw buyers to purchase the properties.

Red Flags

A red flag is an indicator that calls for further scrutiny. One red flag by itself may not be significant; however, multiple red flags may indicate an operating environment that is conducive to fraud.
• Excessive or unsubstantiated down payment.
• Unexplained large or multiple deposits reflected on deposit account statements.
• Borrower states that the property will be owner-occupied, but the property is located in a market dominated by investment properties or second homes (beach properties, duplexes, apartment buildings).
• Use of gift funds or grant funds.
• The HUD-1 shows disbursements from the builder’s (as seller) funds to persons or entities not reflected as lien-holders or vendors on the title commitment.
• Robust condominium sales in a slow market.
• All comparable properties are from the same project.
• Many loans to one applicant (credit report).
• No-money-down sales pitch (noted in marketing brochures or website).
• Reference to secondary financing on purchase contract, but not on the loan application.

• Parties to the transaction appear affiliated based on file documentation (personally/professionally).
• Incentives that include pre-paid condominium fees, principal and interest payments for a year, buy-down, free furniture, automobiles, parking spaces, boat slips, etc.

Companion Frauds

• Straw/Nominee Borrower

• Documentation Fraud (associated with income and assets)

• Fraudulent Appraisal

– – – – Buy and Bail – – – –

This scheme typically involves a borrower who is current on a mortgage loan, but the value of the house has fallen below the amount owed. The borrower continues to make loan payments, while applying for a purchase money mortgage loan on a similar but less expensive house because its value has declined. Alternatively, the borrower currently has good credit, but pending events are such that the borrower will soon be unable to afford monthly payments on the existing loan (e.g. loan term adjustments, job loss, debt accumulation, etc.) or qualify for a new loan. In either case, after the new property has been obtained, the borrower “walks” or “bails” on the first loan.

Examples:

A self-employed child-care service provider is living in a house purchased for $500,000 two years ago that is now worth approximately $350,000. Monthly payments on the adjustable rate mortgage loan are $3,000. In a few months the payments will adjust upward, as a result of the rate change, to $3,700, an amount the homeowner cannot afford. The homeowner finds a home selling for $200,000 and obtains a loan on that property by falsely claiming to rent the existing property. After moving into the second house, the borrower defaults on the initial mortgage loan.

Red Flags

A red flag is an indicator that calls for further scrutiny. One red flag by itself may not be significant; however, multiple red flags may indicate an operating environment that is conducive to fraud.
• Second home is substantially less in value and/or loan amount than the existing home.
• Borrower has minimal or no equity.
• Borrower is a first-time landlord (renting out the original property).
• Limited documentation is available to validate lease terms with the purported tenant.
• Purported tenant has a pre-existing relationship with the homeowner.

• Rental agreement appears suspect or projected rental cash flows appear unreasonable.
• Borrower defaults on the original mortgage loan shortly after purchasing a second property (only likely to be detected if the same lender holds both mortgages and loans).

Companion Fraud

• Fraudulent Documentation

– – – – Chunking – – – –

A third party convinces an uninformed borrower to invest in a property (or properties), with no money down, with the third party acting as the borrower’s agent. The third party is also typically the owner of the property, or is part of a larger group organizing the scheme. Without the borrower’s knowledge, the third party submits loan applications on the borrower’s behalf to multiple financial institutions for various properties. These applications are submitted as owner-occupied or as an investment property with a falsified lease. The scheme usually requires the assistance of an appraiser, broker, and/or title company representative to ensure that the third party, as agent for the borrower, does not have to bring any money to the multiple closings. The third party retains the loan proceeds, leaving the borrower with multiple loans that cannot be repaid. The financial institutions are forced to foreclose on the properties and suffer sizable losses.

Examples:

A borrower attended a seminar that outlined how to get rich by investing in real estate with no money down. A third party, a presenter at the seminar, encouraged the borrower to invest in three real estate properties. Under the third party’s guidance, the borrower completed the required application and provided documentation for the loans. The borrower was unaware that the third party owned numerous properties in the name of a Limited Liability Company and submitted applications on not just the three properties known to the borrower, but on a total of 15 different properties. Each application was sent to a different lender, and all were scheduled to close within a one-week timeframe. The borrower attended three of the closings with a different representative of the LLC as the seller. The third party then acted as an agent for the borrower, with power of attorney, at the other 12 closings. The borrower ended up with 15 mortgage loans instead of the three for which he had knowledge, and the lenders were stuck with loans to a borrower without the ability to repay the debts and were forced to foreclose on the properties.

Fraudsters approached nominees (straw borrowers) and enticed the nominees into allowing the fraudsters to apply for mortgage loans in the nominees’ names in order to buy houses. The fraudsters paid the nominees a small amount for allowing the fraudsters to use the nominees’ names to apply for the mortgage loans. The fraudsters completed the loan application paperwork with falsified information in order for the nominees to qualify for the loans. The fraudsters then received inflated property appraisals and obtained two mortgages on each home, one for the purchase price and another for the balance of the appraisal value.

According to the fraudster, the nominee will have no involvement beyond the mortgage application and the fraudster will manage the properties, find tenants, collect monthly payments, and pay the mortgage loans. The tenants, with insufficient credit, are placed in the homes under proposed lease/option-to-buy contracts. The fraudster fails to make a majority of the nominee’s mortgage loan payments, causing many of the mortgage loans to go into default. In some instances, the fraudster steals the tenants’ deposit money. Ultimately, lenders foreclose on the properties.

Red Flags

A red flag is an indicator that calls for further scrutiny. One red flag by itself may not be significant; however, multiple red flags may indicate an operating environment that is conducive to fraud.
• Multiple mortgage applications by one borrower.
• Credit report that reflects numerous mortgage inquiries.
• Out-of-state borrower.
• Seller that is a corporation or LLC.
• Seller that owns property for a short period of time.
• Previous transfer price that is much lower than current contract price.
• Incomplete lease agreements.
• Payoffs from seller’s funds to non-lien holders and vendors on the title commitment.

Companion Frauds

• Fraudulent Documentation

• Fraudulent Appraisal
• Identity Theft
• Property Flip Fraud
• Double Selling

– – – – Double Selling – – – –

A mortgage loan originator accepts a legitimate application and related documentation from a borrower, reproduces or copies the loan file, and sends the loan package to separate warehouse lenders to each fund the same loan. In some instances, double selling is self-perpetuating because, to keep the scheme going, different loans must be substituted for the ones on which documents cannot be provided. Under this scheme, the broker has to make payments to the investor who received the copied documents or first payment default occurs.

Examples:

– A borrower colluded with a mortgage broker to use the borrower’s property as collateral for numerous home equity lines of credit (HELOCs) at different financial institutions. The scheme was executed by closing on multiple HELOCs in a short period of time to take advantage of the delay in recording the mortgages. In addition, the mortgage broker misrepresented the borrower’s financial information in order to increase the borrower’s debt capacity. The property with less than $125,000 in equity was used to obtain over $1 million in credit from several financial institutions.

– A mortgage company used a group of financial institutions (referred to as warehouse lenders) to temporarily fund mortgage loans, which were then sold to another group of financial institutions as long-term investments. The scheme was accomplished by reselling the same loans to multiple investors. Accumulated losses associated with this scheme were in the millions of dollars.

Red Flags

• Discrepancies between underwriting and closing instructions.
• Outstanding trailing documents (e.g., executed note, deed, truth-in-lending, settlement statement, etc.)
• Missing or illegible insured closing letter in the name of the originator from the title company.
• Recent and numerous changes in the wiring instructions.
• Incorrectly named insured and loss payee on the hazard insurance policy.
• Missing mortgage insurance or guaranty, certificate of eligibility.
• Missing purchase commitment from investor – investor lock.

Companion Frauds

• Fraudulent Documentation
• Identity Theft

– – – – Equity Skimming – – – –

The use of a fraudulent appraisal, unrecorded liens or other means to create phantom equity, which is subsequently stripped out through either of the following methods:

Purchase Money Transaction

An inflated appraisal and sales contract allows the purchaser to obtain property with little or no down payment. The parties agree to raise the selling price to cover the buyer’s closing costs and/or down payment, or to obtain cash back at closing. As a result, the loan amount is higher than what the house is worth, effectively skimming all of the phantom equity out of the property.

Cash-Out Refinance Transaction

In the case of a refinance, the inflated appraisal or lack of recordation allows the borrower to extract cash in an amount greater than the actual value of the property.

Examples:

– A good example of an equity skimming scheme required a two-step process. In the first step, a loan officer and real estate agent colluded to purchase houses using false information on applications to qualify for loans. The second stage required the collusion of an appraiser to overstate the value allowing equity to be skimmed through the cash-out refinance process. Once no more equity could be extracted, the houses were allowed to go into foreclosure.

– A skimmer/purchaser convinces a property seller to provide a second mortgage loan with payments to begin later, perhaps in 6-12 months. During this period, the skimmer makes no payments on either the first or the second mortgage loan. In situations where the second mortgage is unrecorded, the skimmer will obtain a home equity or closed-end second mortgage, causing a loss to the issuing financial institution. By the time the seller realizes that they will not receive payments, the first mortgagee has begun foreclosure proceedings.

Red Flags

A red flag is an indicator that calls for further scrutiny. One red flag by itself may not be significant; however, multiple red flags may indicate an operating environment that is conducive to fraud.
• Borrower receiving cash back at closing in a purchase transaction.
• Title to property recently transferred.
• Cash-out refinance shortly after the property has been purchased (reference application, appraisal, and title commitment).
• Purpose for cash-out is not well documented.

Companion Frauds

• Fraudulent Appraisal
• Fraudulent Documentation (employment and income)

– – – – Fictitious Loan – – – –

Examples:

A mortgage broker created loan applications by using names, addresses, and phone numbers out of the telephone book. These loans were subsequently funded by various financial institutions. As the loans were fabricated and no properties existed, the loans went into default and were charged off.

Red Flags

A red flag is an indicator that calls for further scrutiny. One red flag by itself may not be significant; however, multiple red flags may indicate an operating environment that is conducive to fraud.
• Signatures are not consistent throughout the file.
• No real estate agent is employed.
• SSN was recently issued, or there is a death claim filed under SSN.
• Format of the passport number is not consistent with country of issuance.
• Employment and/or address on credit report do not match borrower’s application or there is an absence of credit history.
• Credit history is inconsistent with the borrower’s age.
• Returned mortgage loan payment coupons and/or monthly statements.
• Early payment default.

Companion Frauds
• Straw/Nominee Borrower
• Fraudulent Documentation
• Fraudulent Appraisal

– – – – Loan Modification and Refinance Fraud – – – –

Borrower submits false income information and/or false credit reports to persuade a financial institution to modify or refinance a loan on more favorable terms.

With respect to any mortgage loan, a loan modification is a revision to the contractual payment terms of the related of the related mortgage note, agreed to by the servicer and borrower, including, without limitation, the following:

1. Capitalization of any amounts owed by adding such amount to the outstanding principal balance.
2. Extension of the maturity.
3. Change in amortization schedule.
4. Reduction or other revision to the mortgage note interest rate.
5. Extension of the fixed-rate payment period of any adjustable rate mortgage loan.
6. Reduction or other revision to the note interest rate index, gross margin, initial or periodic interest rate cap, or maximum or minimum rate of any adjustable rate mortgage loan.
7. Forgiveness of any amount of interest and/or principal owed by the related borrower.
8. Forgiveness of any principal and/or interest advances that are reimbursed to the servicer from the securitization trust.

9. Forgiveness of any escrow advances of taxes and insurance and/or any other servicing advances that are reimbursed to the servicer from the securitization trust.
10. Forbearance of principal whereby the servicer “moves” a certain interest free portion of the principal to the “back-end” of the loan, lowering the amortizing balance and the monthly payment.

Refinancing is the process of paying off an existing loan by taking a new loan and using the same property as security. A homeowner may refinance for the following legitimate reasons:
• In a declining interest rate environment a refinance generally will lower monthly payments.
• In a rising interest rate environment a refinance to a fixed rate loan from an adjustable rate loan will generally allow the borrower to lock in the lower rate for the life of the loan.
• In a period of rising home prices the refinance allows the borrower to withdraw equity.

Examples:

– Two years after the origination of a mortgage loan, a borrower contacted the lender, claiming a need to modify the loan. In an attempt to deceive the lender into modifying the loan, the borrower stopped making loan payments. The borrower’s original loan application indicated that the borrower earned $7,500 per month; however, the borrower subsequently claimed income of only $1,200 per month. While evaluating the need for the modification, the bank reviewed the borrower’s credit report and determined that the customer’s supposed annual income of $14,400, was insufficient in comparison to the reported $40,000 per year servicing other debt, which was current. The bank stopped the modification process, as the borrower had intentionally understated income in an attempt to defraud the financial institution.

– A borrower contacted the lender claiming a reduction in income and trouble with making loan payments. The borrower provided the lender with a copy of his most recent tax return, which showed an adjusted gross income (AGI) of $45,000, down from the previous year’s $96,897. The borrower signed Form 4506-T, authorizing the lender to access tax returns filed with the IRS. In reviewing the tax information obtained from the IRS, the lender found that the borrower had recently amended the most recent return, lowering the AGI from $105,670 to $45,000. In this scenario, the borrower had purposely amended the return to reflect a lower AGI, possibly with the intent of amending it a second time to reflect the true amount of income.

– A borrower requests a loan modification for a property that he claims to occupy. Based on the various facts provided to the lender, it appears that the borrower is eligible for a modification. When underwriting the modification, the lender verifies the borrower’s income with the IRS. During the verification process, the lender recognizes two potential problems with the information provided. The address on the tax return is different than the address of the house collateralizing the loan, and the return reflects rental income from real property. After additional investigation, the lender concludes that the customer was trying to modify the loan on rental property and not on the primary residence.

Red Flags

A red flag is an indicator that calls for further scrutiny. One red flag by itself may not be significant; however, multiple red flags may indicate an operating environment that is conducive to fraud.
• Borrower states that the property is his primary residence and is therefore owner-occupied but the mailing address and telephone number are not for the subject property (e.g., property is located in North Carolina; mailing address and telephone number are in New York).
• Vague and/or unrealistic hardship (“the national economy”).
• No documented resolution of hardship.
• No or limited financial analysis in file.
• No employment/income verification.
• Credit Report inconsistent with borrower’s stated hardship.

• Financial reports that reflect low delinquencies that are inconsistent with local economic conditions or the bank’s loan portfolio composition.

Companion Frauds

• Fraudulent Documentation
• Fraudulent Appraisal (refinance)

– – – – Mortgage Servicing Fraud – – – –

Mortgage servicing typically includes, but is not limited to, billing the borrower; collecting principal, interest, and escrow payments; management of escrow accounts; disbursing funds from the escrow account to pay taxes and insurance premiums; and forwarding funds to an owner or investor (if the loan has been sold in the secondary market). A mortgage service provider is typically paid on a fee basis. Mortgage servicing can be performed by a financial institution or outsourced to a third party servicer or sub-servicer.

Mortgage servicing fraud generally involves the diversion or misuse of principal and interest payments, loan prepayments, and/or escrow funds for the benefit of the service provider. Mortgage servicing fraud can take many forms, including the following:

• A mortgage servicer sells a loan it services, but fails to forward funds to the owner of the loan following the sale. The servicer continues to make principal and interest payments on the loan so the owner is not aware that the loan had been sold.

• A mortgage servicer diverts escrow payments for taxes and insurance for its own use. This action would jeopardize a financial institution’s collateral protection.

• A mortgage servicer that fails to forward principal and interest payments to an institution that holds the note and mortgage, could report that loan as past due for a short period of time, and then use proceeds from other loans to bring that loan current. This would be similar to a lapping scheme involving accounts receivable. Deliberately failing to post payments in a timely manner causes late fees to increase which directly elevates the servicers’ income.

• A mortgage servicer makes payments on loans originated for or on behalf of a financial institution as a means to avoid repurchase pursuant to first payment default provisions.

Examples:

– Several insiders of a mortgage company fraudulently sold serviced loans belonging to other financial institutions and kept the proceeds. An insider modified data in the servicing system to make it appear the loans were still being serviced and were current.

– Two executive officers of a mortgage company took out personal mortgage loans in their names which were subsequently sold to an investor, with servicing retained by the mortgage company. The executives did not make any payments on their loans and suppressed delinquency reporting to the investor, allowing them to “live free” for a period of time until the investor performed a servicing audit and discovered the fraud.

Red Flags

• Failure of the financial institution to perform an on-site review of the servicer (loan documents, servicing records, etc.)
• A review of remittance reports provided to the financial institution by servicer finds a:
o Lack of detail within the remittance reports (principal reduction, interest paid, late fees charged and paid).
o Remittance reports that fail to reconcile with bank records.
• A review of delinquency reports provided to the financial institution by the servicer finds a:
o Lack of detail within delinquency reports.
o High volume of delinquent loans.
• A review of portfolio reports provided to the financial institution by the servicer finds a:
o Lack of detail within portfolio reports (listing of loans owned by the financial institution being serviced by the servicer including current balance).
o Portfolio reports that fail to reconcile with bank records.
• Annual review reveals detrimental information or deteriorating financial condition of the servicer.
• County records indicating lien holders are unknown to the financial institution.
• Excessive delay in a servicer’s remittance of principal and interest payments, escrow payments, or prepayments.
• Cancellation or reductions in coverage on servicer’s insurance policies, including errors and omissions policies.
• Failure of the servicer to maintain copies of original payment documents (e.g., loan payment checks) verifying borrower as the source of payments.
• Excessive errors related to payment calculations on adjustable rate loans or escrow calculations.

Companion Fraud
• Fraudulent Documentation

– – – – Phantom Sale – – – –

Phantom sales typically involve an individual or individuals who falsely transfer title to a property or properties and fraudulently obtain funds via mortgage loans or sales to third parties.

Examples:

– The perpetrator identifies an apparently abandoned or vacant property and records a fictitious quit claim deed to transfer the property into the perpetrator’s name. Once the perpetrator has recorded the necessary document, he has several options:

• Apply for and execute a loan secured by the property. He pockets the loan proceeds and disappears.
• Transfer the property to a co-conspirator. The new owner applies for a loan, splits the proceeds with the original perpetrator, and both disappear with the money.
• Transfer the property to a false name, apply for a loan in the false name, pocket the proceeds and disappear.
• Sell the property to an uninvolved third party, pocket the proceeds, and disappear.

In the first three scenarios the financial institution is left with a mortgage loan that has no payment source and is collateralized by fraudulently obtained property. This results in a 100 percent loss to the financial institution once the fraud is exposed. In the last example, both the purchaser and financial institution are defrauded.

Red Flags

• Title search reveals a recent ownership transfer via quit claim deed.
• Ownership transfers via quit claim deeds in an area where such is not normal.
• Quit claim deed owner is not from subject area.
• Quit claim deed owner is unrelated to former owner.

• Quick sale to third party after quit claim deed owner acquires property.

Companion Frauds

• Fraudulent Appraisal
• Identity Theft
• Straw/Nominee Borrower

– – – – Property Flip Fraud – – – –

A fraudulent property flip is a scheme in which individuals, businesses, and/or straw borrowers buy and sell properties amongst themselves, normally within a short time frame, to artificially inflate the value of the properties. This scheme is designed to extract as much cash as possible from the property, and the loan proceeds are often used for purposes not stated on the application.

There are a number of variations of the fraudulent property flip, some of which are more prevalent than others depending on the current economic conditions. Some schemes occur in geographic areas experiencing significant property value appreciation or in stagnant markets, where properties have been on the market for extended periods of time. An essential party in this scheme is a complicit appraiser, who fraudulently provides an inflated opinion of the property’s market value. The following are two variations of fraudulent property flips:

• A buyer purchases a property at market value and on the same day sells the property, at an inflated price in excess of the true market value to a straw buyer who has been paid to act as a buyer. The financial institution lending to the straw buyer typically is unaware of the prior purchase by the fraudster earlier that same day.

• A seller, whose property has been on the market for an extended period of time, is approached by a buyer/borrower who makes an offer on the property that is substantially higher than the market value. A financial institution funds the loan based on a fraudulent appraisal that inflates the value of the property. In some cases, the inflated value is supported by non-existent home improvements that were to be made. For example, a seller lists a property for $250,000 and a buyer/borrower offers $299,000. At closing, the seller receives the net proceeds of $250,000 on the original asking price of the home and the surplus of $49,000 is disbursed to the fraudsters through a payoff from the seller’s funds on the HUD-1 Settlement Statement at closing.

Examples:

– A group of individuals was organized by a real estate agent to flip properties. Each participant acquired a property with 100 percent financing, prior to the real estate market peak. The properties were then sold repeatedly amongst the individuals and /or their spouses to increase the market value. Title to some of the properties is held in trusts, obscuring ownership.

However, once the group obtained the requisite amount of cash, the loans were allowed to go into default. The participants split the loan proceeds in excess of the true market value for perpetrating the scheme.

Red Flags

• Property listed for extended period of time and sells for higher than list price.

• Property has been transferred or sold within the last six months.
• The property is advertised as “For Sale by Owner”.
• Value of the property has notably increased with no improvements or improvements are insufficient to justify the increase.
• Borrower has limited capacity to repay (e.g., high debt-to-income ratio)
• The property seller is not the owner of record.
• Purchase is disguised as refinances to circumvent down payment.
• Seller is an entity/corporation.
• Power of attorney used without explanation.
• Borrower owns excessive amount of real estate.
• Similarities on multiple applications received from a specific seller or broker.
• Notes in loan file suggest borrower pushed for a quick closing.
• Appraiser is not on list of approved appraisers.
• Appraisal was ordered by a party to the transaction or before the sales contract, or appraisal is a fax.
• Borrower named on the appraisal is different from applicant.
• Appreciation is noted in an area with stable or declining real estate prices.

• Comparables on the appraisal are unusual.
• Inconsistencies in VOE or VOD.
• Violation of the lender’s closing instructions.
• Same individuals involved as buyers and/or sellers in multiple transactions, which may be noted on the deed, title abstract, or other real estate documents found in file.
• Unusual credits or disbursements on settlement statements or discrepancies between the HUD-1 and escrow instructions.
• First payment default on loan.

Companion Frauds
• Fraudulent Appraisal
• Fraudulent Documentation
• Identity Theft
• Straw/Nominee Borrower

– – – – Reverse Mortgage Fraud – – – –

The rapid growth in and changes to the reverse mortgage market have created a lucrative environment for fraudulent activities. The vast majority of reverse mortgage loans are offered through HUD and are FHA-insured; the products are commonly referred to as Home Equity Conversion Mortgages (HECMs). According to data maintained by HUD and other sources, the reverse mortgage loan market increased over the last 5 years from approximately “$5.4 billion a year to more than $17.3 billion in 2008.”4
In addition, recent legislation increased the dollar amount of HECMs to $625,000, and purchase money transactions became effective in 2009. The primary requirements imposed by HUD are that the borrower has attained age 62 and that the collateral value supports the loan amount. There is no requirement to have owned the property for any minimum amount of time, and the loans do not require monthly repayment. Therefore, the loans are primarily underwritten based on the age of the youngest borrower and value of the home being used as collateral.

Reverse mortgage fraud is a scheme where legitimate or fictitious equity is stripped from the collateral. The lump-sum cash-out option will yield the greatest amount of loan proceeds, and likely will be where most fraud occurs. However, fraud may occur in other reverse mortgage loan products. For example, under the term program, where a borrower receives equal monthly payments for a fixed period of time, older borrowers will receive higher payments due to a shorter payment stream, creating a direct incentive to falsify age. Due to the structure of the HECMs, there are no warnings, such as past-due status or default, to raise suspicions, and possibly limit losses, as repayment is only required upon the borrower moving out of the property; upon death; default of property taxes or hazard insurance; or the property is in unreasonable disrepair.

Examples:

Property title is transferred into the perpetrator’s name and quickly re-titled into a straw buyer’s name. A lump-sum cash-out reverse mortgage loan is obtained and is premised on collusion of an appraiser who provides an “as if” renovated appraised value to fraudulently increase the market value. The perpetrator also places fictitious liens on the property to divert loan proceeds to himself.

Red Flags
A red flag is an indicator that calls for further scrutiny. One red flag by itself may not be significant; however, multiple red flags may indicate an operating environment that is conducive to fraud.

• No notes in loan file pertaining to how the proceeds will be used, or notes indicate that proceeds will be used for unspecified monthly living expenses, but the loan is a lump-sum cash-out option.
• File notes indicate that the borrower does not exhibit any knowledge of the property, such as location, number of rooms, etc.
• The property title may have been “abandoned” by the local government and then transferred into the perpetrator’s name. The property may then be re-titled into the borrower’s name via either a warranty deed or a quit claim deed.
• Files contain notices that property taxes are delinquent, indicating default under the terms.
• Files contain notices that property insurance has lapsed, indicating default under the terms.
• Loan file information shows mail as returned to sender, possibly indicating the “owner” is no longer occupying the property and did not provide a forwarding address. An event of default occurs, when the owner no longer lives in the property.
• The title search (if performed) showed that the property title recently transferred to the borrower’s name, following a very short ownership by the seller, indicating the possibility of a flip transaction.
• Lender search of public records for either assessed value or sales prices show that the neighborhood is valued at substantially less than the subject property.
• Problems with the appraisal report may include:

– The report was prepared for a third party and not ordered by the financial institution.

– Comparable properties are not in the same neighborhood.

– Prior sales history is inconsistent with title search results.

• Refer to Fraudulent Appraisal for further details on potential appraisal fraud red flags.

Companion Frauds

• Fraudulent Appraisal
• Fraudulent Documentation
• Property Flip Fraud

– – – – Short Sale Fraud – – – –

A short sale is a sale of real estate in which the proceeds from the sale are less than the balance owed on the loan. The borrower may claim to have financial hardship and offers to sell the property so the financial institution will not have to foreclose. The financial institution and all interested parties, including other lien holders and any mortgage insurer, must approve the transaction. Some institutions may be motivated to approve a short sale because it is faster, results in a smaller loss than the prospect of a foreclosure, and does not increase the level of Other Real Estate Owned. Depending on the settlement and the state where the property is located, the deficiency balance may be forgiven by the financial institution.

Not all short sales are fraudulent. However, fraud occurs when a borrower withholds mortgage loan payments, forcing the loan into default so that an accomplice can submit a “straw” short-sale offer at a purchase price less than the borrower’s loan balance. Sometimes the borrower is truly having financial difficulty and is approached by a fraudster to commit the scheme. In all cases, a fraud is committed if the financial institution is misled into approving the short-sale offer when the price is not reasonable and/or when conflicts of interest are not properly disclosed.

Examples:

– A fraudster uses a straw buyer to purchase a home for the purpose of defaulting on the mortgage loan. The straw buyer makes no payments on the loan and the property goes into default. Prior to foreclosure the fraudster makes an offer to purchase the property from the lender in a short sale agreement below market value. The lender agrees without knowing that the short sale was premeditated.

Red Flags

• Sudden default with no workout discussions and immediate request for short sale.
• Loan file documentation suggests ambiguous or conflicting reasons for default.
• Mortgage loan delinquency is inconsistent with the borrower’s spending, savings, and other credit patterns as indicated in the credit report.
• Short-sale offer is from a related party, which is sometimes not disclosed, or straw buyer.
• Short-sale offering price is less than current market value.
• HUD-1 Settlement statement shows cash-back at closing to the delinquent borrower, or other disbursements that have not been expressly approved by the servicer (sometimes disguised as “repairs” or other payouts).
• Fraudulent appraisal to support below market price.
• Seller intentionally lowers value of property by causing excessive, but cosmetic, damage or hiding dead animals to produce offensive odors. Adjustment to value is exaggerated downward even though costs for rehabilitation are low.
• Seller feigns financial hardship and hides assets – large volume of assets on original loan application have dissipated without explanation.
• County records show that the property was flipped soon after short sale with a higher price.
• County records show ownership is transferred back to the seller after short sale.
• Site visit or registered mail is not returned indicates seller continues to reside in the property.
• Real estate agent is in collusion with seller and withholds competitive/higher offers.
• Unusually high commission is paid to real estate agent.

Companion Fraud
• Fraudulent Documentation

*********** Fraud Mechanisms **********

Asset Rental

Asset rental is the rental of bank deposits or other assets, which are temporarily placed in a borrower’s account, in order for a borrower to qualify for a loan. The borrower usually pays some fee, such as a rental fee, for the temporary “use” of the asset. Asset rental programs have been generally described as tools to help borrowers whose financial condition poses a roadblock to being approved for a loan. Most often, the rental involves deposits or credit histories. Asset rental is a tool that can be used to commit mortgage fraud.

Deposit rental is a means to inflate an individual’s assets. An individual typically pays an origination fee of 5 percent of the amount of the deposit to be rented and a monthly fee of 1 percent to 1¾ percent of the deposit amount. The rented deposit can be owned by a third party that purports to be a financial institution or adds the borrower’s name to a real deposit account without granting access. The third party agrees to verify the deposit to any party authorized by the borrower. Written statements and verifications of deposit are available for an extra fee.

Credit histories are rented in an effort to raise an individual’s credit score. An individual typically pays a fee and is added to another individual’s credit card account as a non-user. The borrower has no access to or use of the credit card but benefits from the actual credit card holder’s timely payments.

In addition to asset rental, some companies also have advertised verification of employment and income services. Individuals fill out a form listing annual and monthly income and sources. Upon receipt of fees, the company verifies income and employment to lenders or others as authorized by the borrower.

Examples:

– A borrower would like to purchase a $450,000 house. Unfortunately, his $71,000 bookkeeper salary and $13,000 in a savings account do not meet the underwriting standards for the amount of the loan. The borrower, however, is certain that his salary will continue to increase at a minimum of 10 percent per year.

The borrower rented a $40,000 deposit account, for a fee of $2,000; the loan application reflected the $40,000 account as an asset. In addition, the borrower expected a raise the following year to $78,000, and enlisted an entity to verify that salary amount. The $78,000 was shown on the loan application as his current income. The loan file contained a verification of deposit for the $40,000 account, a verification of employment form verifying his job as an accountant, and a verification of income form for his $78,000 salary.

Red Flags

• Verification of Deposit (VOD), Verification of Employment (VOE) and Verification of Income (VOI) from a common source that is not the employer or the financial institution where the deposit is held.

• Information on credit report that is not consistent with information on VODs, VOEs and VOIs.
• Even numbers only appearing on the VODs and VOIs. Discrepancies between the deposit account establishment date and the date the borrower says it was established in the loan application process.

Fake Down Payment

In order to meet loan-to-value requirements, a fake down payment through fictitious, forged, falsified, or altered documents is used to mislead the lender. Collusion with a third party, such as a broker, closing agent, appraiser, etc. often exists to raise the purchase price and make it appear that the buyer is making a down payment to cover the difference between the purchase price and proposed loan. A fake down payment reduces the financial institution’s collateral position and in some cases, a financial institution may be financing over 100 percent of the purchase. Without the fake down payment, the financial institution would not have otherwise made the loan.

Examples:

A borrower wants to purchase property but does not have the money for a down payment. He offers the seller more than the asking price to give the appearance that the buyer is putting money down in order to get the loan. The seller agrees to amend the contract to reflect the increased price. The increase in sales price is not disbursed to the seller. Instead, a false payoff from the seller’s funds is reflected on the HUD-1 Settlement Statement when in reality, the seller provides the funds to the borrower for the down payment.

– A third party broker has a borrower interested in a loan to finance the purchase of a home. The borrower does not have sufficient funds available to meet the lender’s LTV requirements. Therefore, the broker loans the borrower $10,000 to use as a down payment, and the funds are represented to be a gift from family. The borrower and broker then enter into a loan agreement. The loan is to be secured by a lien against the house. Approximately ten days after closing of the purchase transaction, the broker records the second lien against the house to secure the down payment loan.

Red Flags

• Source of funds for down payment cannot be verified.
• Down payment appears to be accumulated suddenly instead of over time.
• Deposit is a rented account (refer to asset rental) or has a round dollar balance.
• Down payment source is held in a non-financial institution such as an escrow trust account, title company, etc.
• Market value of property is inflated.
• Property sells above asking price even though on the market for an extended period of time.

Fraudulent Appraisal

Appraisal fraud can occur when an appraiser for various reasons falsifies information on an appraisal or falsely provides an inaccurate valuation on the appraisal with the intent to mislead a third party. In addition, appraisal fraud occurs when a person falsely represents himself as a State-licensed or State-certified appraiser or uses the identity of an appraiser as his own.

One common form of appraisal fraud relies on overvalued or undervalued property values, also known as artificial inflation/deflation using one or more valuation approaches. A buyer and a real estate professional will use a willing appraiser to artificially modify the value of a property. The property’s false inflated value can be used to secure a second mortgage, place the property on the market at a greatly inflated price, or secure an initial mortgage loan that will be defaulted upon at a later time. An undervalued appraisal can be used to assist in a short sale or loan modification fraud scheme.

Examples:

– A couple obtains financing for the purchase of their first house, contingent upon the house value. The couple plan to use the $8,000 tax credit for the down payment and closing costs and only have nominal cash available, so there is no possibility that the couple could cover the difference if the house doesn’t appraise. The couple’s loan officer arranges for an appraisal of the property, but sends the appraiser the standardized form with the final market value section completed. The appraiser wants to continue his relationship with the mortgage broker, so he agrees to develop an appraisal report to support the value provided. The property is compared to properties outside of the general area where the subject house is located. Without knowledge of that area, it appears, to anyone reviewing the appraisal report, that the comparable properties provide support for the value. However, no adjustments have been made for the facts that the comparable properties are newer, larger, in better condition, and in a better location than the subject property.

– A house being appraised has materially less square footage than the comparable properties. To boost the square footage of the subject property, the appraiser doubles the square footage of the unheated out-building, that is used for lawn equipment, and adds that square footage to the square footage of the house. No adjustments are made to the comparable properties, since now the subject and comparable properties have similar square footage. A review of the square footage of the house and out-building clearly shows that the appraiser intentionally misrepresented the property value.

Red Flags

There are various red flag indicators that can be used to identify the possibility of appraisal fraud. The identification of red flags could suggest individual fraud activities or more complex fraud schemes. Such red flag indicators for appraisal fraud are subdivided into categories below:

Appraisal Engagement Letter/Appraisal Ordering

• There is no appraisal engagement letter in file or the appraisal does not correspond to the engagement letter.
• The appraisal was ordered or provided by the buyer, seller, or an unidentified third party to the transaction rather than the financial institution or its agent.
• The appraisal was order by the financial institution loan production staff rather than from an independent office within the institution.

The Appraiser/Appraiser Compensation

• Appraiser was not located in reasonable proximity of the subject property and it is unclear that the appraiser has appropriate knowledge of the local market.
• Appraiser licensing/certification information is missing or appraiser information is clouded in some way.
• Appraisal fee is based on market value of subject property.
• Appraiser has had enforcement action taken against him or is not otherwise eligible to perform appraisals for federally related transactions (www.ASC.gov).

Property Comparables

• Comparable properties are materially different from subject property.
• Comparable properties are outside a reasonable radius of the subject property (except for rural properties).
• Comparable property sales are stale without an explanation.
• Appraiser makes large value adjustments to comparable properties without adequate explanation.
• Recent and multiple sales for subject and/or comparables are shown in the appraisal without adequate explanation as to the circumstances.

Appraisal Information and Narrative

• The market value in the appraisal report is lower than purchase price.
• Listing rather than sales information was used to determine value.
• Evidence of appraisal tampering (e.g., different font style, handwritten changes).
• Refinance transaction shows property recently listed “for sale”.
• Market rent is significantly less than rent amounts indicated on lease agreement.
• Income approach is not used on a tenant-occupied, or rented single-family dwelling.
• Significant appreciation or devaluation in short period of time.
• Appraisal indicates transaction is a refinance when it is a purchase.
• Appraised value is contingent upon property improvements or curing of property defects.
• Abnormal capitalization or discount rates without explanation.
• Appraisal dated before loan application date.
• Significant variances in property value among the Cost, Income, and Sales approach.
• Appraisal excludes one or more valuation approaches when such an approach is pivotal to the loan underwriting decision.
• Owner is someone other than seller shown on sales contract.
• Unusual or frequent prior sales are listed for subject and/or comparables without adequate explanation.
• Occupant noted as “tenant” or “unknown” for owner-occupied refinances.

Appraisal Photographs and Mapping (Comparable and Subject)

• Photos missing, non-viewable, or blurry.

• A “For Rent” or “For Sale” sign shows in the photos of the subject property for an owner-occupied refinance.
• Photos do not match property description.
• Photo background image is inconsistent with the date or season of the appraisal.
• Photos of subject property taken from odd angles to mask unfavorable conditions.
• Negative valuation factors are not disclosed in appraisal (e.g., commercial property next door, railroad tracks, or another structure on premises).
• Photos for the subject property and comparables appear to be from different photo source (e.g., internet photos).
• Appraisal maps showing location of subject and comparables is either absent or shows wide geographical separation from subject property.

Other Appraisal Information

• Documentation in loan file suggests a re-appraisal due to appraisal results or the stated value of subject property without an explanation.
• Loan file contains more than one recent appraisal with significant variance in value without an explanation.
• House number of property in photo does not match the subject property address.
• A fax or an electronic version of the appraisal is used in lieu of the original containing signature and certification of appraiser.
• The appraisal was not reviewed prior to loan funding or appraisal was reviewed by loan production rather than an independent office within the institution.

Fraudulent Documentation

Documentation fraud occurs when any document relied upon by the financial institution to make a credit decision, is forged, falsified, or altered. Fraud can also occur if proper due diligence and verification practices are not consistently applied. Similarly, obtaining documents to satisfy a checklist is not the same as having verified the authenticity of the document.

Documentation Types

1. Sales Contract

Sales contracts may be falsified to reflect higher sales prices. These higher sales prices are intended to produce higher comparables for appraisal purposes and result in artificially inflated values. The inflated values result in a higher loan amount than would otherwise be justified. Additionally, falsified seller identity may be used to perpetrate frauds, such as transferring property via falsified deeds or listing property for sale that the seller does not legally own. The identity of the buyer and/or seller may also be falsified in order to disguise a flip transaction or the use of a straw borrower.

Red Flags

• Borrower is not listed as purchaser on the sales contract.
• Seller listed on contract is not the owner listed on title or appraisal.
• All parties did not sign the sales contract and/or addendum.
• Sales contract is not dated or dated after other file documents (unless it is a pre-qualification.)
• Sales contract is received at the last minute or has been changed from the previously submitted contract.

2. Loan Application

Parts of or the entire application may be falsified.

Red Flags

• Application states purpose is for refinance, but the credit report and/or tax records do not indicate the borrower owns the property.
• Purchase amount of the property differs from the sales contract.
• Borrower claims the property will be owner-occupied, when the intent is for investment/rental purposes.
• Application shows all assets, but liabilities are inconsistent with those reported on the credit report.
• Assets are inconsistent with job position and income.
• Omission of some or all properties owned by the borrower in the real estate section of the application.
• Borrower declarations are inconsistent with credit report.
• Debt-to-Income ratios are exactly at maximum approval limits
• Misrepresentation of employment and income.

3. Credit Report

The credit report contains significant information reflective of the borrower’s ability and desire to repay debt obligations. Credit reports are sometimes altered so that a borrower can meet specific loan requirements. For example, credit scores can be changed (increased) through scanning and alteration of information.

Red Flags

• The absence of credit history indicating the possible use of an alias and/or multiple social security numbers.
• Borrower recently pays many or all accounts in full, possibly indicating an undisclosed debt consolidation loan.
• Indebtedness disclosed on the application differs from the credit report.
• The length of time trade lines were opened is inconsistent with the buyer’s age.
• The borrower claims substantial income but only has credit experience with finance companies.
• All trade lines opened at the same time with no explanation.
• Recent inquiries from other mortgage lenders are noted.
• AKA (also known as) or DBA (doing business as) are indicated.

4. Driver’s License

Government issued driver’s licenses can be partially verified through entities that can identify whether the licensing number sequence complies with the state’s system. However, state issued identification cards do not always have the same quality.

Red Flags

• No hologram.
• No photograph.
• Name, address, physical characteristics do not match.
• Expired driver’s license.
• Illegible driver’s license.

5. Social Security Number

The first five digits of a Social Security Number (SSN) signify the state and the date range in which it was issued. SSNs should be compared to numbers associated with deceased taxpayers. Identity alerts are also a useful tool if accessed via the credit reporting system.

Red Flags

• Credit report alert states that SSN has not been issued.
• Credit report alert states that SSN is on the master death index.
• Format and digits are not correct.
• Improper color and weight of the social security card.
• Highly unlikely series of digits (999-99-9999 or 123-45-6789).

• Ink smudges, poorly aligned, and odd fonts.

6. Bank Statement

Deposit account statements may include legitimate financial institution names and addresses, but can be fraudulently modified to include falsified telephone numbers that are answered by a party to the scheme.

Red Flags

• Altered copies.
• Missing pages.
• Application information (name and address) does not match the account holders.
• Inconsistency in the color of original bank statements.

7. Deposit Verification (VOD)

A party to the scheme may verify deposits held at a depository institution, even though no such financial institution, account, or deposits in that name exist.

Red Flags

• The VOD is completed on the same day it is ordered.
• Deletions or cross outs exist on the VOD.
• No date stamp receipt affixed to the VOD by the depository to indicate the date of receipt.
• The buyer has no deposit accounts, but a VOD is in the file.
• The deposit account is not in the borrower’s name or is a joint account with a third party.
• The borrower’s account balance at the financial institution is insufficient to close the transaction.
• The deposit account is new or has a round dollar balance.
• The closing check is drawn on a different financial institution.
• An illegible signature exists with no further identification provided.
• Significant balance changes are noted in depository accounts during the two months prior to the date of verification.
• The checking account’s average two-month balance exactly equals the present balance.
• Funds for the down payment are only on deposit for a short period.
• An IRA is shown as a source of down payment funds.
• Account balances are inconsistent with application information.
• The down payment source is held in a non-depository “depository,” such as an escrow trust account, title company, etc.
• An escrow receipt is used as verification which may have been from a personal check not yet cleared or a check returned due to insufficient funds.
• The VOD is not folded indicating it may have been hand carried.
• The VOD is not on original financial institution letterhead or a recognized form.

8. Employment Verification (VOE)

Fake employment verification can be used by those who collude in mortgage fraud. This is usually associated with an organized scheme.

Red Flags

• The seller and applicant have similar names.
• Borrower’s employer does not know borrower or borrower was terminated from employment prior to the closing date.
• The VOE is not on original letterhead or a standard Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA)/Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) form.
• The VOE is completed the same day it is ordered, indicating it may have been hand-carried or completed before the initial application date.
• An illegible signature exists with no further identification provided.
• The employer uses only a mail drop or post office box address.
• The business entity is not in good standing with the State or registered with applicable regulatory agencies.
• An overlap exists with current and prior employment.
• Excessive praise is noted in the remarks section of response.
• Round dollar amounts are used in year-to-date or past earnings.
• Income is not commensurate with stated employment, years of experience, or type of employment.
• Income is primarily commission based, although borrower claims he is a salaried employee.
• The borrower’s interest in the property is not reasonable given its distance from the place of employment.
• The borrower has a recent large increase in income or started a new job.
• Faxes are used in lieu of originals documents.
• CPA letter is used to validate employment.
• Leases are used to evidence additional income.

9. W-2 Statement or Paystub

Off-the-shelf software and internet sites make the creation of fake W-2 statements and paystubs relatively easy.

Red Flags

• Borrower income is inconsistent with type of employment.
• Social security number on W2 or paystub is invalid, differs from loan application, or has been recently issued.
• Name misspelled.
• Variances in employment data with other file documentation.
• Commission-type position with “base” salary only (and vice versa).
• Round dollar amounts for year-to-date or prior year’s earnings.
• Numbers that appear to be “squeezed in”.
• Document alterations, such as white-outs or cross-outs or inconsistent fonts.
• Not computer-generated, especially from large employer.
• W-2 is typed, but paystubs are computer-generated.
• Check numbers do not increase chronologically.
• Amounts withheld for Social Security, Medicare and other government programs are inconsistent with the level required.
• Debts reflected as deduction from pay (credit union loans, etc.) not disclosed on application.
• Year-to-date totals do not total accurately from paycheck to paycheck.
• An employer identification number that is not in the XX-XXXXXXX (two digits, hyphen, seven digits) format, or is not all numeric.
• Employer and employee names or addresses are inaccurate.

• Income reflected on W-2 statements is different than income reported on mortgage loan application, VOE, and tax returns.
• Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) and Medicare wages/taxes and local taxes, where applicable, exceed ceilings/set percentages.
• Copy submitted is not “Employee’s Copy” (Copy C).

10. Tax Return/Amended Tax Return

Fake tax returns may be provided to the underwriter as the borrower believes that no verification will occur. In other instances, amendments to tax returns may be made to further the scheme, regardless of whether the income amount increases or decreases.

Red Flags

• Address and/or profession do not agree with other information submitted on the mortgage loan application.
• Type of handwriting varies within return.
• Evidence of “white-out” or other alterations.
• Unemployment compensation reported, but no gap in employment is disclosed.
• Estimated tax payments by self-employed borrower (Schedule SE required); or self-employment tax claimed, but self-employment not disclosed.
• Tax returns are not signed/dated by borrower.
• IRS Form 1040 – Schedule A:

– Real estate taxes and/or mortgage loan interest is paid but no property is owned, or vice versa.

– Tax preparation fee is deducted, yet prior year’s return is prepared by borrower.

– Minimal or no deductions for a high-income borrower.

• IRS Form 1040 – Schedule B:

– Borrower with substantial cash in the bank shows little or no related interest income.

– No dividends are earned on stocks owned.

– Amount or source of income does not agree with the information submitted on the mortgage loan application.

• IRS Form 1040 – Schedule C:

– Business code is inconsistent with type of business.

– Gross income does not agree with total income on Form 1099s.

– No “cost of goods sold” on retail or similar type of business.

– Borrower takes a depreciation deduction for investment real estate not disclosed, or vice versa.

– Borrower shows interest expense but no related loan, such as a business loan with personal liability.

– No deductions for taxes and licenses.

– Wages are paid, but no tax expense is claimed.

– Wages are paid, but there is no employer identification number.

– Salaries paid are inconsistent with the type of business.

– Business expenses are inconsistent with type of business (e.g., truck driver with no vehicle expense).

– Income significantly higher than previous years.

• IRS Form 1040 – Schedule E:

– Additional properties are listed, but not shown on the mortgage loan application.

– Mortgage loan interest is deducted but no mortgage is disclosed.

– Borrower shows partnership income (may be liable as a general partner for partnership’s debts).

11. Deed

Quit Claim and Warranty Deeds may be used by someone who is transferring the property’s title, but is not the owner or the owners’ representative. The purpose of such transactions is to sell the property outright or to refinance the debt in a cash-out transaction to collect loan proceeds. A fake Power of Attorney may be used as authorizing the deed transfer.

Red Flags

• Recent ownership transfer or multiple transfers in a short period of time via quit claim or warranty deed.
• Representative not local or from out of state.
• Deeds involving individuals not party to the transactions.
• Deeds where parties share common names/hyphenated names, suggesting family relationships.
• Obvious errors, such as misspelled names, or other items.

12. Title or Escrow Company/Title Commitment

Fraudulent loan schemes may involve the use of a fake title company or may involve an employee of the title company. The company appears to provide legitimate documentation, which was possibly stolen from a legitimate title company (such as a falsified closing protection letter). Employees of legitimate title companies may be part of a scheme, where they either fabricate title commitments or delete information that would help identify fraudulent activity, such as flipping.

Red Flags

• The seller either is not on the title or is not the same as shown on the appraisal or sales contract.
• The seller owned the property for a short time with cash out on sale.

• The buyer had a pre-existing financial interest in the property.
• The chain of title includes the buyer, real estate agent, or broker.
• The title insurance or opinion was prepared for and/or mailed to a party other than the lender.
• Income tax or similar liens are noted against the borrower on refinances.
• Non-lien holders are shown on HUD-l.
• The title policy is not issued on the property with the lien or on the whole property.
• Faxed documents are used rather than originals or certified copies.
• Title commitment and final title policy reflect two different title insurers.
• Closing instructions are not followed.
• Delinquent property tax exists and does not appear on the title commitment.
• A notice of default is recorded and does not appear on the title commitment.

13. Business License

Business licenses may be fabricated to show that a supposed self-employed borrower owns a business. In this instance, the borrower owns no such business. Others may actually formally incorporate with the state office to conceal the fact that no such business operates.

Red Flags

• No physical address (P.O. Box only) or physical address belongs to mail box rental company. Various search engines can help determine if disclosed physical address belongs to mail box rental.
• No telephone number or email address.
• No state franchise or other required annual filings.

14. Notary stamps

Notary stamps may be stolen and used in fraudulent transactions. In addition, notaries may be participants in furthering a scheme and receive funds for their participation. While e-notary will prevent stealing of physical stamps, it will not necessarily eliminate the coercion of notaries. Also, the fact that e-notary does not require the log to be downloaded daily to an impartial party that maintains a database of transactions, can allow for information to be changed after-the-fact. This would be the equivalent of changing the hand-written log.

Red Flags

• Seal is not embossed.
• Seal appears to be photocopied, rather than original.
• Notary is either related to or has a business relationship with a party to the transaction.

15. Power of Attorney

Powers of Attorney (POA) are legal documents authorizing another party to act on the first party’s behalf. POAs can be Limited, General, or Durable. Durable POAs have the longest duration, as they cease upon the death of the authorizing person, whereas General POAs cease upon a pre-established date, competency, or incapacitation. Limited POAs are identified with a specific timeframe or certain acts. Documents can be easily fabricated to show that one party has a legal right to enter into financial transactions on behalf of another. POAs may or may not be filed with the appropriate governmental office.

Red Flags

• A General or Durable POA is dated at approximately the same date as the transaction.
• Person, who supposedly authorized the Limited or General POA, is unaware of the document.
• In those areas where all POAs are recorded documents, the document is not recorded.
• The POA is not prepared by an attorney, but by using off-the-shelf software.
• POA is used in cash-out refinances or reverse mortgage loans.

16. HUD-1 Settlement Statement

The HUD-1 settlement statement is an accounting of the transaction from both the borrower’s and seller’s standpoint. This form is often falsified to withhold information from the lender, or there are often two distinctly different HUD-1 forms in fraudulent transactions.

Red Flags

• Borrower receives cash-back at closing.
• Payoff of non-lien holders typically reflected as marketing fees, payment for repairs, or renovations.
• Existence of multiple, different HUD-1’s.
• Items paid outside of closing (outside of normal appraisal and credit report fees).
• Overpayment of fees and commissions to realtor, broker, etc.
• Signatures on the HUD-1 do not match other signatures throughout the file.

Fraudulent Use of a Shell Company

A shell company is a business entity that typically has no physical presence, has nominal assets, and generates little or no income. Shell companies in themselves are not illegal and may be formed by individuals or businesses for legitimate purposes. However, due to lack of transparency regarding beneficial ownership, ease of formation, and inconsistent reporting requirements from state to state, shell companies have become a preferred vehicle for financial fraud schemes.

Both the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and FinCEN have reported on shell companies and their role in facilitating criminal activity. These reports have focused on limited liability corporations (LLCs) due to their dominance and growth in popularity. However, any type of business entity can be a shell company. To further obscure ownership and activity, there are numerous businesses that can provide a shell company with a registered agent and mail forwarding service, or offer nominee services, such as nominee officers, directors, shareholders, or nominee bank signatory. Other businesses sell established shell companies for the purpose of giving the appearance of longevity of a business, and a history of creditworthiness which may be required when obtaining leases, credit, or bank loans.

Examples:

– Several individuals with the intent of committing fraud formed a shell company as a way of disguising their identities. The individuals purchased properties in the name of the shell company and at the same time recruited straw borrowers to purchase the properties from the shell company at inflated prices. Owners of the shell company provided the straw borrowers with fake documents in order to qualify for the loans. The shell company owners profited from the difference between the original purchase price and the mortgage loan proceeds, less the fee paid to the straw borrower. The straw borrower defaulted on the loan, forcing the financial institutions to foreclose on the houses.

Red Flags

• Entity has no telephone number or email address.
• No physical address (P.O. Box only) or physical address belongs to mail box rental company.
• No company logo.
• No website, if one would be expected.
• No domestic address/contact if a foreign company.
• Newly-formed entity.
• Registered agent recently changed.
• Transacting businesses share the same address; provide only a registered agent’s address; or other address inconsistencies.
• Unusual cash withdrawals from business accounts.

Identity Theft

Identity theft can be defined as assuming the use of another person’s personal information (e.g., name, SSN, credit card number, etc.) without the person’s knowledge and the fraudulent use of such knowledge to obtain credit. Perpetrators commit identity theft to execute schemes using fake documents and false information to obtain mortgage loans. These individuals obtain someone’s legitimate personal information through various means, (e.g., obituaries, mail theft, pretext calling, employment or credit applications, computer hacking, trash retrieval, etc.) With this information, they are able to impersonate homebuyers and sellers using actual, verifiable identities that give the mortgage transactions the appearance of legitimacy.

Examples:

– A university student database, which included social security numbers and other personal identifying information, is compromised by a computer hacker. The investigation revealed that the hacker subsequently sold the personal identification information to a third party, who then proceeds to submit falsified mortgage loan applications to numerous financial institutions which resulted in approximately $5 million in losses to the financial institutions. Law enforcement stated that the third party, in collusion with a notary, appraiser, and other industry insiders, used the student information to purchase homes owned by the third party and other collaborators at highly inflated prices. In addition to identity theft, the loan files also included misrepresentations of employment, falsified down payments, and inflated appraisals.

Red Flags

A red flag is an indicator that calls for further scrutiny. One red flag by itself may not be significant; however, multiple red flags may indicate an operating environment that is conducive to fraud.
• Credit report contains a fraud alert or consumer-driven freeze on their credit report, which means no credit reports can be pulled until the consumer lifts the freeze.
• Credit report indicates that the social security number was not yet issued.
• Recently-opened accounts.
• Employment and residence history on the credit report and application do not match.
• Copy of driver’s license does not match profile on the application.
• Recently issued SSN.
• Current address on the application does not match other documents in the file (e.g., bank statements, W-2’s, utility bills, etc.)
• Additional red flags may be found in the FCRA under Appendix J of 12 CFR 41 (Subpart J – Identity Red Flags)

Straw Borrower / Nominee Borrower

A straw (nominee) borrower is an individual used to intentionally disguise the true beneficiary of the loan proceeds. Straws can be willing participants in the transaction or victims whose identity is being used without their knowledge. Often a willing straw borrower does not think the transaction is dishonest because they believe the recipient of the loan proceeds will make the payments. Reasons why a beneficiary of the loan proceeds may use a straw borrower are because the beneficiary:

• Does not qualify for the mortgage loan,
• Has no intent to occupy the property as a primary residence, or
• Is not eligible for a particular loan program.

Also straw borrower activities are commonly used with family members who step in for the purchase or refinance when the true home owner (family member) does not qualify for a loan.

Examples:

– A couple wanted to buy a home but did not qualify because their debt ratio was much too high. They also had very little cash to use as a down payment. To “help” them, one of their parents applied for the loan and was approved for a 97 percent LTV product. The couple moved into the house, and could not make the monthly payments. The servicer called the straw borrower, who informed the servicer that he did not live in the home and that his daughter and son-in-law were supposed to be making the payments. Despite, being contractually obligated, the straw borrower parent refused to bring the loan current. The lender was forced to foreclose and took a loss on the sale of the REO.

– A fraud ring acquired 25 properties, all of which were in various stages of disrepair. Some were even uninhabitable and slated for condemnation by the city. The ring then recruited individuals through their church, clubs, and other associations to each buy a property sight unseen. Each borrower was told they would not need to live in the property, and each borrower was also promised payment of $7500. The fraud ring arranged for inflated appraisals to be performed by promising the appraiser the job of appraising all 25 properties. The applications were submitted to several different lenders with numerous misrepresentations surrounding not only the true property values, but occupancy intent, borrower employment, income, and assets as well. The loans closed and resulted in first payment defaults, as the straw borrowers were told that their properties were passive investments that would not require any monthly payments due to tenants already being in the properties. A handful of the straw borrowers did receive their $7500 as promised, but most did not. Upon receiving collection calls, the straw borrowers determined they had been misled. The lenders ultimately foreclosed on the properties, discovered the true condition of the properties, and suffered losses upon the sale of the REO.

Red Flags

• The application is unsigned or undated.
• Borrower’s income is inconsistent with job or position.
• A quit claim deed was used either right before or soon after the loan was closed.
• Investment property is represented as owner-occupied on loan application.
• Loan documents show someone signed on the borrower’s behalf.
• Names were added to the purchase contract.
• Sale involves a relative or related party.
• No sales agent or realtor was involved.
• The name and address of borrower on credit report does not correspond with information on the loan application.
• Appraisal irregularities exist regarding property valuation and documentation. (See Fraudulent Appraisal.)
• Power of attorney was used in place of borrower.
• Good assets, but “gifting” was used as all or part of down payment.
• Repository alerts on credit report.

Glossary:

Appraisal Management Company (AMC): A business entity that administers a network of certified and licensed appraisers to fulfill real estate appraisal assignments on behalf of mortgage lending institutions and other entities. The company recruits, qualifies, verifies licensing, and negotiates fees and service-level expectations with a network of third-party appraisers. It also provides administrative duties like order entry and assignment, tracking and status updates, pre-delivery quality control, and preliminary and hard copy report delivery. Furthermore, the AMC oversees ongoing quality control, accounts payable and receivable, market value dispute resolution, warranty administration, and record retention.

Appraiser: One who is expected to perform valuation services competently and in a manner that is independent, impartial, and objective.

Borrower: One who receives funds in the form of a loan with the obligation of repaying the loan in full with interest. The borrower may be purchasing property, refinancing an existing mortgage loan, or borrowing against the equity of the property for other purposes.

Buyer: A buyer is a person who is acquiring property.

Closing: The culmination of any RE transaction in which the interested parties or their representatives meet to execute documents, exchange funds, and transfer title to a property.

Closing Costs: Moneys expended by a party in completing a RE transaction, over and above the purchase price, including: legal fees, taxes, origination fees, discount points, mortgage insurance premium, interest adjustments, registration fees, appraisal fees, title insurance premium, etc.

Closing/Settlement/Escrow Agent: An individual or company that oversees the consummation of a mortgage transaction at which the note and other legal documents are signed and the loan proceeds are disbursed. Title companies, attorneys, settlement agents, and escrow agents can perform this service. Local RE law may dictate the party conducting the closing.

Concessions: Benefits or discounts given by the seller or landlord of a property to help close a sale or lease. Common concessions include absorption of moving expenses, space remodeling, upgrades (also called “build-outs”), and reduced rent for the initial term of the lease.

Collusion: An agreement, usually secretive, which occurs between two or more persons to deceive, mislead, or defraud others of their legal rights, or to obtain an objective forbidden by law, typically involving fraud or gaining an unfair advantage.

Correspondent: A mortgage originator who underwrites and/or sells mortgage loans to other mortgage bankers or financial institutions.

Credit Report Fraud Alert: A notation at the bottom of a credit report indicating that some items of identification, i.e., Social Security number, address, etc., are associated with past fraudulent activities. For example, an address may be flagged because the previous occupant allegedly used the property for financial misbehavior. Each credit reporting agency has different names for these alerts: TransUnion – HAWK Alerts, Experian – Fraud Shield, and Equifax – Safescan.
Deed: The document by which title to real property is transferred or conveyed from one party to another. (See Quitclaim Deed and Warranty Deed.)

Deed of Trust: A type of security instrument in which the borrower conveys title to real property to a third party (trustee) to be held in trust as security for the lender, with the provision that the trustee shall re convey the title upon the payment of the debt. Conversely, the third party will sell the land and pay the debt in the event of default by the borrower. (See Mortgage.)

Developer: A person or entity, who prepares raw land for building sites, constructs buildings, creates residential subdivisions or commercial centers, rehabilitates existing buildings, or performs similar activities.

eNotary: An electronic notary that may include the use of a digital seal to notarize digital documents. (See also Notary.)

Escrow Instructions: Instructions prepared by a lender and/or underwriter to direct the progression of a mortgage closing transaction from start to finish.

Evaluation: A valuation required by the Agencies’ appraisal regulations for certain transactions that are exempt from the regulations.

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac): Commonly used name for the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), a government sponsored entity that provides a secondary market for conforming conventional residential mortgage loans by purchasing them from primary lenders.

Federal Housing Administration (FHA): A federal agency established to advance homeownership opportunities. The FHA provides mortgage insurance to approved lending institutions.

Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae): A government sponsored entity that, as a secondary mortgage loan institution, is the largest single holder of residential mortgage loans in the United States. Fannie Mae primarily buys conforming conventional residential loans from primary lenders.

Federally related transaction: Means any real estate-related financial transactions entered into after the effective date hereof that:
(1) The FDIC or any regulated institution engages in or contracts for; and
(2) Requires the services of an appraiser.

Foreclosure: A legal proceeding following a default by a borrower in which real estate secured by a mortgage or deed of trust is sold to satisfy the underlying debt. Foreclosure statutes are enacted by state government.

Form 1003: The standardized loan application form used in residential mortgage loan transactions.

Form 4506T: An IRS form that taxpayers execute to authorize the IRS to release past tax returns to a third party. Many lenders require mortgage loan applicants to execute this form in order to verify income.

Fraud: A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to their detriment.

Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae): A government-owned corporation that provides sources of funds for residential mortgage loans, insured or guaranteed by the FHA or VA.

HUD-l Form: A standardized form prescribed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development that provides an itemization listing of funds paid at closing. Items that appear on the statement include RE commissions, loan fees, points, taxes, initial escrow amounts, and other parties receiving distributions. The HUD-l statement is also known as the “closing statement” or “settlement sheet.”

Lapping: A fraud that involves stealing one customer’s payment and then crediting that customer’s account with a subsequent customer’s payment.

Loan Servicer: A loan servicer is a public or private entity or individual engaged to collect and process payments on mortgage loans.

Loan-to-Value Ratio (LTV): Relationship of loan amount to collateral value, expressed as a percentage.

Market Value: The most probable price which a property should bring in a competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller each acting prudently and knowledgeably, and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus. Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specified date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

(1) Buyer and seller are typically motivated;
(2) Both parties are well informed or well advised, and acting in what they consider their own best interests;
(3) A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market;
(4) Payment is made in terms of cash in U.S. dollars or in terms of financial arrangements comparable thereto; and
(5) The price represents the normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special or creative financing or sales concessions granted by anyone associated with the sale.

Modification Agreement: A document that evidences a change in the terms of a mortgage loan, without refinancing the loan. Commonly, changes are made to the interest rate, repayment terms, guarantors, or property securing the loan.

Mortgage: A lien on the property that secures a loan. The borrower is the mortgagor; the lender is the mortgagee.

Mortgage Banker: An individual or firm that originates, purchases, sells, and/or services loans secured by mortgages on real property.

Mortgage Broker: An individual or firm that receives a commission for matching borrowers with lenders. Mortgage brokers typically do not fund the loans they help originate.

Mortgage Fraud: A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact in a mortgage loan application to induce another to approve the granting of a mortgage loan. For the purpose of this paper, mortgage fraud refers solely to fraudulent schemes pertaining to residential mortgage loans.

Nominee Loan: A loan made to one individual in which the proceeds of the loan benefit another individual without the knowledge of the lender.

Notary: A person who certifies the authenticity of required signatures on a document, by signing and stamping the document. (See also eNotary.)

Originator: The individual or entity that gathers application data from the borrower. Alternatively, a person or entity, such as a loan officer, broker, or correspondent, who assists a borrower with the loan application.

Power-of-Attorney: A legal document that authorizes a person to act on another’s behalf. A power-of-attorney can grant complete authority or can be limited to certain acts (closing on a property) or timeframes (from date granted until a termination date). A durable power-of-attorney continues until the grantor’s death.

Pretext Calling: A scheme associated with identity theft in which a fraudster, pretending to represent a legitimate entity, calls an unsuspecting party seeking personal identification data, such as social security numbers, passwords, or other forms of account information. The fraudster then uses this information to assume the identity of the unsuspecting victim. Among other things, the fraudster can obtain a mortgage loan in the name of the unsuspecting victim.

Processor: The processor is an individual who assembles all the necessary documents to be included in the loan package.

Quitclaim Deed: A deed that transfers without warranty whatever interest or title, if any, a grantor may have at the time the conveyance is made. A grantor need not have an interest in the property to execute a quitclaim deed.

Real Estate Agent: An individual or firm that receives a commission for representing the buyer or seller, in a RE purchase transaction.

Reverse Mortgage: A reverse mortgage loan converts the equity in the home into cash. Unlike a traditional loan, no repayment is required until the borrower no longer uses the house as a principal residence. To be eligible under FHA’s program, Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM), the homeowner must be at least 62 years old, and live in the house. The program was expanded in 2009 so that HECMs can be used to purchase a primary residence.

Secure and Fair Enforcement Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008 (S.A.F.E. Act): Legislation designed to enhance consumer protection and reduce fraud by encouraging states to establish minimum standards for the licensing and registration of state-licensed mortgage loan originators and for the Conference of State Bank Supervisors and the American Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators to establish and maintain a nationwide mortgage licensing system and registry for the residential mortgage industry. The S.A.F.E. Act further requires the federal agencies to establish similar requirements for the registration of depository institution loan originators.

Secondary Market: The buying and selling of existing mortgage loans, usually as part of a “pool” of loans.

Seller: Person offering to sell a piece of real estate.

Short Sale: Sale of the mortgaged property at a price that nets less than the total amount due on the mortgage loan. Servicers and borrowers negotiate repayment programs, forbearance, and/or forgiveness for any remaining deficiency on the debt to lessen the adverse impact on borrowers’ credit records.

Straw Buyer/Borrower: A person used to buy property or borrow against property in order to conceal the actual owner. The straw buyer does not intend to occupy the property or make payments and often deeds the property to the other individual immediately after closing. The straw buyer is usually compensated for use of his identity.

Third Party: The parties necessary to execute a residential mortgage transaction other than a financial institution and a legitimate borrower. Third parties include, but are not limited to, mortgage brokers, correspondents, RE appraisers, and settlement agents.

Title Agent: The title agent is a person or firm that is authorized on behalf of a title insurer to conduct a title search and issue a title insurance report or title insurance policy.

Title Company/Abstract Company: Entity that researches recorded ownership of and liens filed against real property and then issues a title insurance policy guaranteeing the lien position of the lender or provides a title opinion. Some states also require an attorney opinion supported by an abstract.

Title Insurance: An insurance policy that indemnifies the lien position of a lender against losses associated with property interests not disclosed in the title opinion. The borrower can also obtain this coverage by purchasing a separate policy.

Title Opinion/Commitment/Binder: An examination of public records, laws, and court decisions to ensure that no one except the seller has a valid claim to the property, and to disclose past and current facts regarding ownership of the subject property.

Underwriting: The credit decision-making process which can be automated, manual or a combination of both. In an automated process, application information is entered into a decision-making model that makes a credit determination based on pre-determined criteria. In a manual process an individual underwriter, usually an employee of the financial institution, makes the credit decision after evaluating all of the information in the loan package, including the credit report, appraisal, and verifications of deposit, income, and employment. Financial institutions often use a combination of both, with the automated decision representing one element of the overall credit decision. In each case, the decision may include stipulations or conditions that must be met before the loan can close.

Verification of Deposit (VOD): Written document sent to the borrower’s depository institution to confirm the existence of a down payment or cash reserves.

Verification of Employment (VOE): Written document sent to the borrower’s employer to confirm employment/income. Employment is often reconfirmed by calling the employer prior to funding.

Verification of Income (VOI): Written documentation supporting the borrower’s income level and income stream.

Warehouse Lender: A short-term lender for mortgage bankers. Using mortgage loans as collateral, the warehouse lender provides interim financing until the loans are sold to a permanent investor.

Warehouse (Loan): In mortgage lending, warehouse loans are loans that are funded and awaiting sale or delivery to an investor.

Warehouse Financing: Short-term borrowing of funds by a mortgage banker based on the collateral of warehoused loans. This form of interim financing is used until the warehoused loans are sold to a permanent investor.

Warranty Deed: A deed warranting that the grantor has a title free and clear of all encumbrances and will defend the grantee against all claims against the property.

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