How Homeowners Can Find Who Owns Their Mortgage Loans

17 Tuesday Jul 2018

Posted by BNG in Banks and Lenders, Judicial States, Loan Modification, MERS, Mortgage Laws, Mortgage Servicing, Non-Judicial States, RESPA, Securitization, Your Legal Rights

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Fannie Mae, Finance, Freddie Mac, HAMP, homeowners, Loan servicing, MERS, mortgage, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Mortgage loan, Mortgage modification, Mortgage servicer, Promissory note, Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, RESPA, Securitization

A mortgage loan is typically assigned several times during its term, and may be held by one entity but serviced by another. Different disclosure requirements apply depending upon whether information is sought about the ownership of the mortgage loan or its servicing. Knowing exactly who owns and services the mortgage is a critical first step to negotiating a binding workout or loan modification. The information is needed to send a notice of rescission under the Truth in Lending Act, to identify the proper party to name and serve in a lien avoidance proceeding, and to identify other potential parties in litigation. This information may also provide a defense to foreclosure or stay relief in bankruptcy if these proceedings are not initiated by a proper party.

1. Send a TILA § 1641(f)(2) Request to the Servicer

The Truth in Lending Act requires the loan servicer to tell the borrower who the actual holder of the mortgage really is.3 Upon written request from the borrower, the servicer must state the name, address, and telephone number of the owner of the obligation or the master servicer of the obligation.

One problem with this provision’s enforcement had been the lack of a clear remedy for the servicer’s non-compliance. However, the Helping Families Save Their HomesAct of 20095 amends TILA to explicitly provide that violations may be remedied byTILA’s private right of action found in § 1640(a), which includes recovery of actualdamages, statutory damages, costs and attorney fees.6 The amendment adds the ownerdisclosure provision found in § 1641(f)(2) to the list of TILA requirements that give rise to a cause of action against the creditor if there is a failure to comply.

See NCLC Foreclosures (2d ed. 2007 and Supp.), § 4.3.4.

15 U.S.C. § 1641(f)(2). The provision should require disclosure to the borrower’s advocate with a properly signed release form. See NCLC Foreclosures, Appx. A, Form 3, infra.

If the servicer provides information about the master servicer, a follow-up requestshould be made to the master servicer to provide the name, address, and telephone number of the owner of the obligation. Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 404 (May 20, 2009). See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a).

1640(a) refers to “any creditor who fails to comply,” by specifically adding as an actionable requirement a disclosure provision which Congress knew is directed toservicers and therefore involves compliance by creditors through their servicers,

Congress chose to make creditors liable to borrowers for noncompliance by servicers.The TILA provision does not specify how long the servicer has to respond to the request. Perhaps because no parties were directly liable under § 1640(a) for violations of the disclosure requirement before the 2009 amendment, no case law had developed on what is a reasonable response time. In the future, courts may be guided by recent regulations issued by the Federal Reserve Board requiring servicers to provide payoff statements within a reasonable time after request by the borrower. In most circumstances, a reasonable response time is within five business days of receipt.

Applying this benchmark to § 1641(f)(2) requests would seem appropriate since surely no more time is involved in responding to a request for ownership information than preparing a payoff statement. Alternatively, a 30-day response period should be the outer limit for timeliness since that is the time period Congress used in § 1641(g).

2. Review Transfer of Ownership Notices

The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 also added a new provision in TILA which requires that whenever ownership of a mortgage loan securing a consumer’s principal dwelling is transferred, the creditor that is the new owner or assignee must notify the borrower in writing, within 30 days after the loan is sold or assigned, of the following information:

• the new creditor’s identity, address, and telephone number;

• the date of transfer;

• location where the transfer is recorded;

• how the borrower may reach an agent or party with authority to act on

behalf of the new creditor; and

• any other relevant information regarding the new owner.9

The new law applies to any transfers made after the Act’s effective date, which was

May 20, 2009. The Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) recently

announced a program to implement the new law.

Reg Z § 226.36(c)(1(iii); NCLC Truth in Lending, § 9.9.3 (6th ed. 2007 and

2008 Supp.).

Official Staff Commentary § 226.36(c)(1)(iii)-1.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g)(1)(A)–(E).

Under “MERS InvestorID,” notices will be automatically generated whenever a“Transfer of Beneficial Rights” occurs on the MERS system. A sample Transfer Noticeand “Training Bulletin” are available for download at http://www.mersinc.org/news. MERS is taking the position, based on the wording of the statute (which refers to “place where ownership of the debt is recorded”), that it can comply by disclosing only the location where the original security instrument is recorded because the note is not a “recordable Attorneys should request that clients provide copies of any ownership notices they have received based on this new law. Assuming that there has been compliance with the statute, the attorney may be able to piece together a chain of title as to ownership of the mortgage loan (for transfers after May 20, 2009) and verify whether any representations made in court pleadings or foreclosure documents are accurate. Failure to comply with the disclosure requirement gives rise to a private right of action against the creditor/new owner that failed to notify the borrower.

3. Send a “Qualified Written Request” under RESPA

Any written request for identification of the mortgage owner sent to the servicer will not only trigger rights under 15 U.S.C. § 1641(f) discussed earlier, but will also be a “qualified written request” under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. Under RESPA, a borrower may submit a “qualified written request” to request information concerning the servicing of the loan or to dispute account errors. Because the servicer acts as an agent for the mortgage owner in its relationship with the borrower, a request for information about the owner should satisfy the requirement that the request be related to loan servicing. The request may be sent by the borrower’s agent, and this has been construed to include a trustee in a bankruptcy case filed by the borrower. Details about how to send the request are covered in § 8.2.2 of NCLC Foreclosures. The servicer has 20 business days after receipt to acknowledge the request, and must comply within 60 business days of receipt. Damages, costs and attorneys fees are available for violations, as well as statutory damages up to $1,000 in the case of a pattern and practice of noncompliance.

4. Review the RESPA Transfer of Servicing Notices

Finding the loan servicer is generally easier because the borrower is likely getting regular correspondence from that entity. Still, the law requires that formal servicing transfer notices are to be provided to borrowers, and reviewing these can provide helpful information. RESPA provides that the originating lender must disclose at the time of loan application whether servicing of the loan may be assigned during the term of the mortgage. In addition, the borrower must be notified when loan servicing is transferred document.” If MERS members do not agree with this interpretation, they can opt out of MERS InvestorID and presumably send their own notice.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a).

12 U.S.C. § 2605(e). See also NCLC Foreclosures, § 8.2.2.

12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A); In re Laskowski, 384 B.R. 518 (Bankr.N.D.Ind. 2008

(chapter 13 trustee, as agent of consumer debtor, and the debtor each have standing to send a qualified written request).

12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2).

12 U.S.C. § 2605(f).

12 U.S.C. § 2650(a). See NCLC Foreclosures, § 8.2.3.

after the loan is made. Failure of the servicer to comply with the servicing transfer requirements subjects the servicer to liability for actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorney fees.18 Unlike the TILA requirement discussed earlier, RESPA is limited to the transfer of servicing; it does not require notice of any transfers of ownership of the note and mortgage.

5. Go to Fannie and Freddie’s Web Portals

To facilitate several voluntary loan modification programs implemented by the U.S.Treasury, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac allow borrowers to contact them to determine if they own a loan. Borrowers and advocates can either call a toll-free number or enter the property’s street address, unit, city, state, and ZIP code on a website. The website information, however, sometimes refers to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac as “owners” when in fact their participation may have been as the party that had initially purchased the loans on the secondary market and later arranged for their securitization and transfer to a trust entity which ultimately holds the loan.

6. Check the Local Registry of Deeds

Checking the local registry where deeds and assignments are recorded is another way to identify the actual owner. But do not rely solely on the registry of deeds to identify the obligation’s current holder of the obligation, as many assignments are not recorded. In fact, if MERS is named as the mortgagee, typically as “nominee” for the lender and its assigns, then mortgage assignments will not be recorded in the registry of deeds. A call to MERS is not helpful as MERS currently will only disclose the name of the servicer and not the owner. In addition, some assignments may be solely for the administrative convenience of the servicer, in which case the servicer may appear as the owner of the mortgage loan.

12 U.S.C. § 2650(b). See NCLC Foreclosures, § 8.2.3.

12 U.S.C. § 2650(f). See NCLC Foreclosures, § 8.2.6.

See, e.g., Daw v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 5 Fed.Appx. 504 (7th Cir. 2001).

See 27 NCLC REPORTS, Bankruptcy and Foreclosures Ed., Mar/Apr 2009.

For Fannie Mae call 1-800-7FANNIE (8 a.m. to 8 p.m. EST); Freddie Mac call 1-800-

FREDDIE (8 a.m. to 8 p.m. EST).

Fannie Mae Loan Lookup, at http://www.fanniemae.com/homeaffordable; Freddie Mac Self-

Service Lookup, at http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate.

See NCLC Foreclosures, § 4.3.4A.

The telephone number for the automated system is 888-679-6377. When calling MERS to obtain information on a loan, you must supply MERS with the MIN number or a Social Security number. The MIN number should appear on the face of the mortgage.

You may also search by property address or by other mortgage identification numbers by using MERS’s online search tool at http://www.mers-servicerid.org. 68700-001

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/ “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will show you step-by-step litigation solutions helping you challenge these fraudsters and ultimately saving your home from foreclosure either through loan modification or “Pro Se” litigation visit: https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/

What Homeowners Must Know About the Residential Mortgage Lending Market

11 Wednesday Apr 2018

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Banks and Lenders, Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Mortgage fraud, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, RESPA, State Court, Your Legal Rights

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Areas of Liability, CFPB’s Response, Consumer Actions, Content, Contractual Liability, Forms, Governmental Liability, Lenders and Vendors, MBA Letter, Regulatory (CFPB), Residential Mortgage Lending Market, RESPA, Scope, Secondary Mortgage Market, The Dodd Frank Act and CFPB, The TRID Rule, Timing, Tolerance and Redisclosure

Introduction and Background

Residential mortgage lenders have long been required to disclose to their borrowers (i) the cost of credit to the consumer and (ii) the cost to the consumer of closing the loan transaction. These regulatory disclosure requirements arise from two statutes – the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA) and the Truth In Lending Act (TILA). The regulations were designed to protect consumers by disclosing to them the costs of a mortgage loan (TILA) and the cost of closing a loan transaction (RESPA). These disclosures have in the past been enforced by multiple federal agencies (the Federal Reserve Board, Housing and Urban Development, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the National Credit Union Administration) and provided to consumers on multiple forms with sometimes overlapping information (the Truth in Lending disclosures, the Good Faith Estimate, and the HUD-1 Settlement Statement).

The Dodd Frank Act and CFPB

In 2010, the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd Frank Act) created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), consolidated the consumer protection functions of the above-federal agencies in the CFPB, transferred rulemaking authority under the statutes to the CFPB, and amended section 4(a) of RESPA and section 105(b) of TILA requiring CFPB to issue an integrated disclosure rule, including the disclosure requirements under TILA and sections 4 and 5 of RESPA. The purpose of the integration was to streamline the process and ensure that the disclosures are easy to read and comprehend so that consumers can “understand the costs, benefits, and risks” associated with mortgage loan transactions, in light of the “facts and circumstances.” 12 U.S.C. 5532(a).

The TRID Rule

The CFPB issued a propose rule in July, 2012. The final TILA-RESPA integrated disclosure (TRID) rule was published in late 2013, amended in February, 2015, and went into effect on October 3, 2015. More than simply streamlining the existing process, the TRID rule replaced the entire disclosure structure, changing the form, timing, and content of the disclosures.

Scope – The TRID rule applies to most closed-end consumer mortgages, but not to home equity loans, reverse mortgages, or mortgages secured by anything other than real property (dwellings, mobile homes, etc). It does not apply to lenders who make five or less mortgage loans a year. It does, however, apply to most construction loans that are closed-end consumer credit transactions secured by real property, but not to those that are open-end or commercial loans.

Forms – The TRID rule replaced the forms that had been used for closing mortgage loans with two new, mandatory forms. The Loan Estimate or H-24 form (attached as Exhibit 1) replaces the former Good Faith Estimate and the early TILA disclosure form. The Closing Disclosure or H-25 form (attached as Exhibit 2) replaces the HUD-1 Settlement Statement and the final TILA disclosure form.

Content – Among other information, the three page Loan Estimate must contain (i) the loan terms, (ii) the projected payments, (iii) the itemized loan costs, (iv) any adjustable payments or interest rates, (v) the closing costs, and (vi) the amount of cash to close. If actual amounts are not available, lenders must estimate. Among other information, the Closing Disclosure must contain (i) loan terms, (ii) projected payments, (iii) loan costs, (iv) closing costs, (v) cash to close, and (vi) adjustable payments and adjustable rates as applicable. The required forms are rigid and require the disclosure of this information in a detailed and precise format.

Timing – The TRID rule requires a creditor (or mortgage broker) to deliver (in person, mail or email) a Loan Estimate (together with a copy of the CFPB’s Home Loan Toolkit booklet) within three business days of receipt of a consumer’s loan application and no later than seven business days before consummation of the transaction. A loan application consists of six pieces of information from the consumer: (i) name, (ii) income, (iii) social security number, (iv) property address, (v) estimated value of property, and (vi) amount of mortgage loan sought. 12 C.F.R. §1026.2 (a) (3)(ii). After receiving an application, a creditor may not ask for any additional information or impose any fees (other than a reasonable fee needed to obtain the consumer’s credit score) until it has delivered the Loan Estimate.

The TRID rule also requires a creditor (or settlement agent) to deliver (in person, mail or email) a Closing Disclosure to the consumer no later than three business days before the consummation of the loan transaction. The Closing Disclosure must contain the actual terms of the loan and actual cost of the transaction. Creditors are required to act in good faith and use due diligence in obtaining this information. Although creditors may rely on third-parties such as settlement agents for the information disclosed on the Loan Estimate and Closing Disclosure, the TRID rule makes creditors ultimately responsible for the accuracy of that information.

Tolerance and Redisclosure – If a charge ultimately imposed on the consumer is equal to or less than the amount disclosed on the Loan Estimate, it is generally deemed to be in good faith. If a charge ultimately imposed on the consumer is greater than the amount disclosed on the Loan Estimate, the disclosure is generally deemed not in good faith, subject to certain tolerance limitations. For example, there is zero tolerance for (i) any fee paid to the creditor, broker, or affiliate, and (ii) any fee paid to a third-party if the creditor did not allow the consumer to shop for the service. Creditors may charge more than the amount disclosed on the Loan Estimate for third-party service fees as long as the charge is not paid to an affiliate of the creditor, the consumer had is permitted to shop for the service, and the increase does not exceed 10 percent of the sum of all such third-party fees. Finally, creditors may charge an amount in excess of the amount disclosed on the Loan Estimate, without any limitation, for amounts relating to (i) prepaid interest, (ii) property insurance premiums, (iii) escrow amounts, (iv) third-party service providers selected by the consumer and not on the creditor’s list of providers or services not required by the creditor, (iv) and transfer taxes.¹ If the fees and charges imposed on the consumer at closing exceed the fees and charges disclosed on the Loan Estimate, subject to the tolerance levels, the creditor is required to refund the consumer within 60 days of consummation of the loan.

If the information disclosed on the Closing Disclosure changes prior to closing, the creditor is required to provide a corrected Closing Disclosure. An additional three-day waiting period is required with a corrected Closing Disclosure if there is an increase in the interest rate of more than 1/8 of a percent for fixed rate loans or 1/4 of a percent for adjustable rate loans, a change in loan product, or a prepayment penalty is added to the loan. For all other changes, the corrected Closing Disclosure must be provided prior to consummation. If a change to a fee occurs after consummation, then a corrected Closing Disclosure must be delivered to the consumer within 30 calendar days of receiving information of the change. If a clerical error is identified, then a corrected Closing Disclosure must be delivered to the consumer within 60 calendar days of consummation.

Impact on Relationships Between Lenders and Vendors

The TRID rule is detailed and highly technical and the CFPB has published very little official guidance as to the interpretation of the rule. As a result, the various members of the industry are interpreting the rule widely differently and applying it with the according lack of uniformity. An example of the kinds of disagreement arising is the issue of whether the final numbers can be massaged in order to avoid re-disclosure and delivery of a new Closing Disclosure at closing or after. This has led to significant conflicts between creditors and settlement agents as to what the TRID rule requires. Some have described it as a “battle field” with settlement agent’s following creditor’s varying instructions but documenting “everything.”

Impact on Secondary Mortgage Market

The implementation of the TRID rule has also apparently begun to cause delays in closing consumer mortgage loan transactions, with closing times up month over month and year over year since October. Loan originators are also reporting decreases in earnings and attributing some of that decrease to implementation of the TRID rule. Moreover, Moody’s has reported that, because some third-party due diligence companies have been strictly applying their own interpretations of the TRID rule in reviewing loan transactions for “technical” violations (i.e., inconsistent spelling conventions and failure to include a hyphen), these firms have found that up to 90% of reviewed loan transactions did not fully comply with the TRID rule requirements. The fact that most of these compliance issues appear to be technical and non- material has not dampened concerns.

MBA Letter

Indeed, these concerns were set forth by President and CEO of the Mortgage Bankers Association David Stevens in a letter to CFPB Director Richard Codray on December 21, 2015 (letter attached as Exhibit 3). In the letter, Stevens identified the problem, proposed a possible interim solution, and asked for ongoing guidance. The problem, according to Stevens, is that certain due diligence companies have adopted an “extremely conservative interpretation” of the TRID rule, resulting in up to a 90% non-compliance rate. This could put loan originators in the position of being unable to move loans to the secondary market or having to sell them at substantial discounts, and could ultimately lead to significant liquidity problems. It is also unknown how the government sponsored entities (GSEs) will interpret the TRID rule, and whether they too will adopt such conservative interpretations and ultimately demand loans be repurchased and seek indemnification for the lack of technical compliance. Stevens proposed written clarification on a lender’s ability to correct a variety of these technical errors, but also noted a significant need for ongoing guidance and additional written clarifications.

CFPB’s Response

On December 29, 2015, Director Cordray responded to Stevens’s letter, reassuring him that the “first few months” of examinations would be corrective, not punitive, and focused on whether creditors have made “good faith efforts to come into compliance with the rule.” Cordray also noted the GSEs have indicated that they do not intend to exercise repurchase or indemnification remedies where good faith efforts to comply are present.²Cordray also addressed the ability to issue a corrected closing disclosure in order to correct “certain non- numerical clerical errors” or “as a component of curing any violations of the monetary tolerance limits, if they exist.” Interestingly, in this context Cordray raised the issue of liability for statutory and class action damages, noting that “consistent with existing . . . TILA principles, liability for statutory and class action damages would be assessed with reference to the final closing disclosure issued, not to the loan estimate, meaning that a corrected closing disclosure could, in many cases, forestall any such private liability.”

Cordray went on to say that, despite the fact that TRID integrates the disclosures in TILA and RESPA, it did not change the “prior, fundamental principles of liability” under either statute and as a result that:

(i) there is no general assignee liability unless the violation is apparent on the face of the disclosure documents and the assignment is voluntary. 15 U.S.C. §1641(e).

(ii) By statute, TILA limits statutory damages for mortgage disclosures, in both individual and class actions to failure to provide a closed-set of disclosures. 15 U.S.C. §1640(a).

(iii) Formatting errors and the like are unlikely to give rise to private liability unless the formatting interferes with the clear and conspicuous disclosure of one of the TILA disclosures listed as giving rise to statutory and class action damages in 15 U.S.C. §1640(a).

(iv) The listed disclosures in 15 U.S.C. §1640(a) that give rise to statutory and class action damages do not include either the RESPA disclosures or the new Dodd-Frank Act disclosures, including the Total Cash to Close and Total Interest Percentage.

Cordray concluded his letter by noting that “the risk of private liability to investors is negligible for good-faith formatting errors and the like” and that “if investors were to reject loans on the basis of formatting and other minor errors . . . they would be rejecting loans for reasons unrelated to potential liability” associated with the disclosures required by the TRID rule.

While the promise of a good faith implementation period and the assurance that TRID does not expand TILA liability to RESPA disclosures offers some comfort to creditors, Cordray’s letter is not a compliance bulletin or supervisory memo, was not published in the Federal Register, and does not appear to be an official interpretation of the TRID rule that would bind the CFPB or any court. Moreover, his comments focus primarily on statutory damages and do not take into consideration potential liability for actual damages and, importantly, attorney’s fees.

Potential Areas of Liability

Despite these assurances, creditors still must concern themselves with potential liability for TRID violations. The following is list of the main sources of potential liability for TRID violations.

Regulatory (CFPB) – The CFPB has the ability investigate potential violations via its authority to issue civil investigative demands, a form of administrative subpoena. 12 U.C.C. §5562(c). Upon a determination of a violation, the CFPB can issues cease-and-desist orders, require creditors to adopt compliance and governance procedures, and order restitution and civil penalty damages. CFPB may impose penalties ranging from $5,000 per day to $1 million per day for knowing
violations.

(A) First tier – For any violation of a law, rule, or final order or condition imposed in writing by the Bureau, a civil penalty may not exceed $5,000 for each day during which such violation or failure to pay continues.

(B) Second tier – Notwithstanding paragraph (A), for any person that recklessly engages in a violation of a Federal consumer financial law, a civil penalty may not exceed $25,000 for each day during which such violation continues.

(C) Third tier – Notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) and (B), for any person that knowingly violates a Federal consumer financial law, a civil penalty may not exceed $1,000,000 for each day during which such violation continues.

12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(2).

Other Governmental Liability – Creditors could also face potential additional claims pursuant to the False Claims Act and the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA).

Consumer Actions – While statutory damages may be limited under TILA to $4,000 in individual suits and the lesser of 1% of company value or $1 million in class actions, that does not account for potential liability for actual damages and attorney’s fees.

Contractual Liability – Absent a specific contractual carve out for technical violations of TRID, originating lenders and creditors may also face potential liability for violation of contractual representations that the loans they are selling were originated “in compliance with law.”

Conclusion

The problem with the TRID rule is that, like the legendary metal bed of the Attic bandit Procrustes, it is a one size fits all regulation and industry participants are going to get stretched or lopped in the process of attempting to fit every transaction into the regulation’s apparently inflexible requirements. Time may well bring additional CFPB guidance, either in the form of the CFPB’s formal, binding interpretations of the rule or in the form of regulatory decisions. Such guidance may then give industry participants a better understanding of how to make and close mortgage loans and avoid liability in process. In the meantime, we can expect further delays, disagreements, and, ultimately, enforcement and litigation.

¹ There had been disagreement on whether transfer taxes (property taxes, HOA dues, condominium or cooperative fees) were subject to tolerances or not. On February 10, 2016, in a rare instance, the CFPB issued an amendment to the supplementary information to the TRID rule to correct a “typographical error” and clarify this issue, amending a sentence that had read that these charges “are subject to tolerances” to read that such charges “are not subject to tolerances” (emphasis added).

² In fact, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac both issued similar letters on October 6, 2015 advising that “until further notice” they would “not conduct routine post-purchase loan file reviews for technical compliance with TRID,” as long as creditors are using the correct forms and exercising good faith efforts to comply with the rule. In these letters, the GSEs further agreed not to “exercise contractual remedies, including repurchase” for non-compliance except where the required form is not used or if a practice impairs enforcement of the loan or creates assignee liability and a court, regulator, or other body determines that the practice violates TRID. Similarly, the Federal Housing Administration issued a letter that “expires” April 16, 2016, agreeing “not to include technical TRID compliance as an element of its routine quality control reviews,” but noting that it does expect creditors to use the required forms and use good faith efforts to comply with TRID.

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

What Florida Homeowners Should Expect in “Pro Se” Foreclosure Defense Litigation

12 Thursday Jun 2014

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Banks and Lenders, Case Laws, Case Study, Discovery Strategies, Federal Court, Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, Loan Modification, Mortgage Laws, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, RESPA, State Court, Title Companies, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Florida

When a Homeowner is approaching foreclosure on his/her property, there are numerous things the homeowner should bear in mind.

(This is Not Intended to be a Legal Advice and Nothing on this Post is to be Construed a Legal Advice).

I. HOMEOWNERS EXPECTATIONS

A. Realistic Expectations – Homeowners Should Expect to See ALL Original Mortgage Closing Documents.

1. Keep the Home – at some point lender will in all probability be entitled to foreclose either for the full amount due, small reduction or large reduction
2. Short Sale – No Buyers/No Money
3. Modify Mortgage – No Mandatory Programs:

Right now there is no program available that will compel a lender to renegotiate a loan, and you cannot force a cram down in bankruptcy. The program Congress passed in July effective Oct. 1, 2008 is a voluntary lender program. In order to be eligible, one must live in the home and have a loan that was issued between January 2005 and
June 2007. The provisions was later amended during the meltdown to include struggling homeowners in past few years. Additionally, the homeowner must be spending at least 31% of his gross monthly income on mortgage debt. The homeowner can be current with the existing mortgage or in default, but either way the homeowner must prove that he/she will not be able to keep paying their existing mortgage and attest that it is not a deliberate default just to obtain lower payments.

All second liens must be retired or paid such as a home equity loan or line of credit, or Condo or Home Owner Ass’n lien. So if the homeowner has a 2nd mortgage, he is not eligible for the program until that debt is paid. And, the homeowner cannot take out another home equity loan for at least five years, unless to pay for necessary upkeep on the home. The homeowner will need approval from the FHA to get the new home equity loan, and total debt cannot exceed 95% of the home’s appraised
value at the time. This means that the homeowner’s present lender must agree to reduce his payoff so that the new loan is not greater than 95% of appraised value. For example, if the present loan in default is $200,000.00 but the home appraises for $150,000.00 the new loan cannot exceed a little over $142,000.00, and the present lender has to agree to reduce the mortgage debt to that amount. You can contact your
current mortgage servicer or go directly to an FHA-approved lender for help. These lenders can be found on the Web site of the Department of Housing and Urban Development: http://www.hud.gov/ As I pointed out above, this is a voluntary program, so the present lender must agree to rework this loan before things can get started.

Also, homeowners should contact the city in which they reside or county to see if they have a homeowner’s assistance program. West Palm Beach will give up to $10,000 to keep its residents from going into default.

Over the years, we have seen FANNIE MAE and FREDDIE MAC announced that they will set aside millions to rewrite mortgage terms so its homeowner can remain in their home. Given the outcome of numerous modification attempts and denials of loan modifications, I do not know whether the terms or conditions for the modification was for the benefit of the lender or the borrower, though any prudent person will conclude it is for the former.

Bank of America, which includes Countrywide, and JP Morgan Chase also announced earlier, that they will set aside millions to rewrite mortgage terms so its home mortgagors can remain in their homes.

4. Stay in the home and try to defeat the foreclosure under TILA RESPA and Lost Note, etc.

II. DEFENDING A MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE

A. Homeowners Should Prepare Themselves for Litigation. (Using Foreclosure Defense Package found at http://fightforeclosure.net

1. Homeowners needed for 4 Events
a. Answer Interrogatories, Request to Produce
b. Homeowner’s Deposition
c. Mediation – Homeowners should understand that mortgage cases like most cases have a high percentage of settling.
d. Trial

2. Cases move slowly even more now because of the volume of foreclosures and the reduction of court budgets.

3. Cases move on a 30/60/90 day tickler system – one side does something the other side gets to respond or sets a hearing.

4. If the Homeowner fails to do any of the above timely or fails to appear for any of the events, he/she may lose his case automatically.

5. Because of the way the system works the Homeowner may not hear from the court for several weeks or months – that does not mean that the court is ignoring the case – that is just how the system works but feel free to call or write and ask questions.

6. If you have a lawyers, keep in contact with the lawyer and advise of changes in circumstances/goals and contact info. If you are representing yourself keep in contact with the court clerk and docket sheet.

7. Home in places like Florida as well as other States should understand that a Foreclosure is – The legal mechanism by which the mortgage lender ends the “equity of redemption” by having a judge determine the amount of debt and a specific date, usually in 30 or 60 days to pay the money, and if not paid by that date, the judge allows the clerk to auction the property. Fla. Stat. §697.02, which changed the old English common law notion that the mortgage gave the lender an interest in the borrower’s land, makes the mortgage a lien against title. Fla. Stat. §45.0315 tells the mortgage lender that the borrower has the right to redeem the property after final judgement of foreclosure, until shortly after the clerk conducts the auction, when the clerk issues the certificate of sale. The client still has legal, recorded title to the property throughout the foreclosure process until the clerk issues the certificate of sale (ends redemption) then the certificate of title (transfers title) 10 days after the clerk’s sale if no objection to sale filed.

8. Deficiency – The judgement will determine the amount of the debt. A deficiency is the difference between the debt owed and the fair market value of the home at the date of the clerk’s sale.

9. Homeowners without Attorneys should knows that the complaint must be answered in 20 days or he/she could automatically lose, unless he/she either files a motion to dismiss with the court or files a motion for leave to extend time to answer “showing good cause” why the answer was not given when due. In either event, the motion needs to be filed before the due date.

B. Read the Summons Complaint, the Mortgage, Note and the Assignments.

1. Check the Summons for proper service and if not prepare a motion to quash.

2. The vast majority of foreclosure complaints are filed by foreclosure factories and will generally have 2 counts – reestablish a lost mortgage and note and foreclose. Fertile area for a motion to dismiss (see the sample motions to dismiss in the package at http://fightforeclosure.net)

3. Homeowners with the foreclosure defense package at http://fightforeclosure.net can be assured that he/she will find a basis to make a good faith motion to dismiss most of the form mortgage foreclosure complaints.

4. Homeowners should endeavor to set the motion to dismiss for hearing 30 days out or so. Otherwise, let the opposing counsel’s office set the hearing.

5. Cannot reestablish a negotiable instrument under Fla. Stat. §71.011 must be Fla. Stat. §673.3091 and person suing to foreclose must have the right to foreclose and reestablish when he files the lawsuit – post lawsuit assignments establish the lender did not own at time of suit unless pre-suit equitable assignment. See: Mason v. Rubin, 727 So.2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); National Loan Invest. v. Joymar Ass.,
767 So.2d 549 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2000); State Street Bank v. Lord, 851 So.2d 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). For an example of how far courts will go to find mortgages enforceable see: State Street Bank v. Badra, 765 So.2d 251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), Mtg. Elec. Regis. Sys. v. Badra, 4D07-4605 (Fla. 4th DCA 10-15-2008).

C. Answer Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim

1. A general denial of allegations regarding the lost note is not enough. The foreclosure mill must specifically deny lost note allegations (see forms in the package at http://fightforeclosure.net).

2. Generally speaking Homeowners should be prepared to file a counterclaim with the affirmative defenses because the lender then cannot take a voluntary dismissal without court order and the
SOL (Statutes of Limitation) may expire for the TILA claims. You have more control over the suit, but now you must pay a filing fee for the counterclaim.

3. If Homeowners are not familiar with specific RESPA Yield Spread defense, they can review some of the articles in this blog because in 1995 or so FRB changed the regulations so that made the payment is not automatically a kickback for the referral of business (In my opinion this was the beginning of the mortgage mess we have now). Homeowners using Foreclosure Defense package found at http://fightforeclosure.net will find samples of well structured RESPA Yield Spread premium (YSP) defense within the package.

D. Discovery

1. In order to take more control over the case and shake up things from the beginning, homeowners using the Foreclosure Defense package at http://fightforeclosure.net should send out well constructed foreclosure Interrogatories and Request to Produce with the Answer. Homeowners in certain cases may also serve Notice of Taking P’s Deposition DT. See package for samples and for the wording. That will give Homeowners more control over the case, putting the Foreclosure Mill on its toes from the word go.

2. Usually the lenders firm will call and ask 3 things 1) “What do you really want – an extended sale date?” 2) “Can I have more time to answer discovery?” 3) “Can I have more time to find you a witness?” Answer to 1) “I really want to rescind the purported loan – do you want to agree to a rescission?” 2 & 3) “No problem as long as you
agree not to set any dispositive motion for hearing until a reasonable time after I get the discovery or take the deposition so that I can prepare and I do not incur an expedited deposition fee.”

3. Lender Depositions: There is rarely a need to actually depose the lender because their testimony rarely varies , and it can work to your disadvantage because if you actually take the pre-trial deposition for the lender or his servicing agent, you will have preserved the lender’s testimony for trial. If for some reason the lender cannot appear on the scheduled trial date, he will either take a voluntary dismissal or settle
the case. It is easier for Homeowners to win their cases or forced favorable settlements when the lender’s representative could not appear at the trial or meet up with the court deadlines.

4. Closing Agents depositions: Again, There is rarely a need to actually depose the closing because the testimony rarely varies and you will have preserved the testimony for trial. They either say: 1) “I do not remember the closing because I do hundreds and this was years ago, but it is my regular business practice to do A B and C and I followed my regular practice for this loan.” – the most credible and the usual
testimony; 2) 1) “I remember this closing and I gave all the required disclosures to the consumer and explained all the documents.” Not credible unless they tie the closing to an exceptional memorable event because the closing generally took place years and hundreds of closings earlier and you can usually catch them on cross “So name the next loan you closed and describe that closing” 3) 1) “I remember this closing and I gave the consumer nothing and explained nothing. Rare – though this has happened at one time. You do need the closing file so you can do a notice of production to non-party.

5. Mortgage Broker depositions: Again, there is rarely a need to actually depose the broker because the testimony rarely varies and you will have preserved the testimony for trial. They either say: 1) “I do not remember this borrower because I do hundreds and this was years ago, but it is my regular business practice to do A B and C and I followed my regular practice for this loan.” – the most credible and the usual
testimony; 2) 1) “I remember this borrower and I gave all the required disclosures to the consumer and explained all the documents.” Not credible unless they tie the borrower to an exceptional memorable event. 3) 1) “I remember this closing and I broke the mortgage brokerage laws and violated TILA. Rare – this has never
happened. You do need their application package so do a notice of production to nonparty.

6. Compare the documents in all of the closing packages: Lender’s underwriting, closing agent and mortgage broker. I have seen 3 different sets of documents. One in each package. The key is what was given to the Homeowner at the closing.

7. Homeowner’s deposition – very important if the case turns on a factual issue of what happened at the closing. Homeowner needs to be very precise and sure as to what occurred at the closing.

E. Motions to Strike

1. Lender’s counsel frequently moved to strike the defenses. These motions are generally not well taken, and simply prolong the case. See Response to Motion to Strike.

2. There are two rules for striking a party’s pleadings; one arises under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(f), and the other arises under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.150.

3. Under Rule 1.140(f): “A party may move to strike . . . redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter from any pleading at any time.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(f).

4. Under Rule 1.150, a party can move to strike a “sham pleading” at any time before trial. This rule requires the Court to hear the motion, take evidence of the respective parties, and if the motion is sustained, allows the Court to strike the pleading to which the motion is directed. The Rule 1.150(b) Motion to Strike as a sham must be verified and must set forth fully the facts on which the movant relies and may be supported by affidavit.

F. Lender’s Motions for Summary Judgment

1. The lender will no doubt file a motion for summary judgment, usually including the affidavit of a servicing agent who has reviewed the file, many times not attaching the documents that he is attesting are true and accurate. The court should rule that the affidavits are hearsay and lack a foundation or predicate because the affiant is summarizing the legal import of documents usually trust agreements and servicing agreements, without attaching copies. See another post in this Blog that deals with the Summary Judgment memorandum for the legal basis to object to the lender’s summary judgment.

III. TRUTH IN LENDING

A. Overview

1. Congress passed TIL to remedy fraudulent practices in the disclosure of the cost of consumer credit, assure meaningful disclosure of credit terms, ease credit shopping, and balance the lending scales weighted in favor of lenders. Beach v. Ocwen, 118 S.Ct.1408 (1998), aff’g Beach v. Great Western Bank, 692 So.2d 146,148-149 (Fla.1997), aff’g Beach v. Great Western, 670 So.2d 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), Dove v. McCormick, 698 So.2d 585, 586 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), Pignato v. Great Western Bank, 664 So.2d 1011, 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), Rodash v. AIB Mortgage, 16 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir.1994). {1}

2. TIL creates several substantive consumer rights. §1640(a)(1) gives consumers actual damages for TIL errors in connection with disclosure of any information. §1640(a)(2)(A)(iii) gives consumers statutory damages of twice the amount of any finance charge, up to $2,000.00 for errors in connection with violations of §1635 or §1638(a)(2) through (6), or (9), and the numerical disclosures, outside of the $100.00 error tolerance. See Beach, 692 So.2d p.148-149, Kasket v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
695 So.2d 431,434 (Fla.4 DCA 1997) [Kasket I,] Dove, p.586-587, Pignato, p.1013, Rodash, p.1144. {2} See also §1605(f)(1)(A). {3}

3. §1635(a) allows a consumer to rescind home secured non-purchase credit for any reason within 3 business days from consummation. If a creditor gives inaccurate required information, TIL extends the rescission right for 3 days from the date the creditor delivers the accurate material TIL disclosures and an accurate rescission notice, for up to three years from closing. Pignato, p.1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (“TILA permits the borrower to rescind a loan transaction until midnight of the third business day following delivery of all of the disclosure materials or the completion
of the transaction, whichever occurs last.”]. See also: Beach, cases, supra, Rodash, Steele v Ford Motor Credit, 783 F.2d 1016,1017 (11th Cir.1986), Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. S&L, 791 F.2d 699, 701-702 (9th Cir. 1986).

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{1} All 11th Circuit TIL decisions and pre- 11th Circuit 5th Circuit cases are binding in Florida. Kasket v. Chase Manhattan Mtge. Corp., 759 So.2d 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (Kasket, II) [11th Circuit TIL decisions binding in Florida]

{2} §1640’s last paragraph has the §1640(a)(2) damage limit: “In connection with the disclosures referred to in section 1638 of this title, a creditor shall have a liability determined under paragraph (2) only for failing to comply with the requirements of section 1635 of this title or of paragraph (2) (insofar as it requires a disclosure of the “amount financed”), (3), (4), (5), (6), or (9) of section of this title…”

{3} This subsection provides that numerical disclosures in connection with home secured loans shall be treated as being accurate if the amount disclosed as the finance charge does not vary from the actual finance charge by more than $100, or is greater than the amount required to be disclosed. See also Williams v. Chartwell Financial Services, Ltd., 204 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2000). (Over-disclosure can also be a violation under certain circumstances.)

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4. HOEPA loans (Also called a §1639 or Section 32 loan.) TIL requires additional disclosures and imposes more controls on loans that meet either the “T-Bill Trigger” or “Points and Fees Trigger” set forth at §1602(aa). §1639, Reg Z 226.31 & Reg Z 226.32, require the creditor for a §1602(aa) loan to give additional early [3 days before consummation] disclosures to the consumer and prohibits loans from containing certain terms [i.e. a prohibition on certain balloon payments]. It also has
a special actual damage provision at §1640(a)(4). (HOEPA can make a lender a TIL creditor for the first HOEPA loan). (The trigger for Florida’s Fair Lending Act is based on the HOEPA triggers. This may affect a larger number of loans and may provided post 3 year rescission. See Fla. Stat. §494.00792(d)).

5. Zamarippa v. Cy’s Car Sales, 674 F.2d 877, 879 (11th Cir. 1982), binding in Florida under, Kasket II, hods: “An objective standard is used to determine violations of the TILA, based on the representations contained in the relevant disclosure, documents; it is unnecessary to inquire as to the subjective deception or misunderstanding of particular consumers.”

6. In 1995, Congress created a defensive right to rescind when a lender sues a consumer to foreclose the mortgage. See §1635(a) & (i)[1995], Reg. Z 226.23(a)(3) & (h) [1996]. The §1635(i) amendment triggers the consumer’s defensive right to rescind when the creditor overstates the amount financed by more than $35.00, or errs in the Notice of Right to Cancel form, and the claim is raised to defend a foreclosure. See also Reg Z 226.23(h).

7. Florida defers to the FRB’s interpretation of TIL and its own regulations. Beach, 692 So.2d p.149, Pignato, p.1013, Kasket, I p.434. The U.S. Supreme Court requires deference to the FRB’s interpretations of the Statute and its own regulations. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 560, 565-570 (1980). TIL is remedial, so courts expansively and broadly apply and interpret TIL in favor of the consumer.
Rodash, p. 1144; Schroder v. Suburban Coastal Corp., 729 F.2d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir. 1984); Kasket II, W.S. Badcock Corp. v. Myers 696 So.2d 776, p. 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) adopting Rodash, p.1144: “TIL is remedial legislation. As such, its language must be liberally construed in favor of the consumer.”

8. Pignato, p. 1013 also holds: “Creditors must strictly comply with TILA. Rodash, 16 F.3d at1144; In re Porter, 961 F.2d 1066, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). A single violation of TILA gives rise to full liability for statutory damages, which include actual damages incurred by the debtor plus a civil penalty. 15 U.S.C.A. §§1640(a)(1)(2)(A)(i). Moreover, a violation may permit a borrower to rescind a loan transaction, including a rescission of the security interest the creditor has in the borrower’s principal dwelling. 15 U.S.C.A. §§1635(a).” See also the Beach cases.
This is in harmony with W.S. Badcock, p. 779, which holds: “Violations of the TILA are determined on an objective standard, based on the representations in the relevant disclosure documents, with no necessity to establish the subjective misunderstanding or reliance of particular customers.”

B. Assignee Liability

1. §1641(a)(1) and §1641(e)(1)-(2) provides that assignees are liable for §1640(a) damages if the disclosure errors are apparent on the face of the disclosure statement and other documents assigned. Congress statutorily designated the TIL disclosure statement, the TIL notice of right to cancel, and any summary of the closing costs as documents assigned. See §1641(e)(2).

2. §1641(c) provides that assignees are liable for §1635 rescission regardless of the apparent on the face of the “documents assigned” standard for damages claims. Belini v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, 412 F.3d 17, p. 28 (1st Cir. 2005).

3. You must make sure that you rescind as to the correct “creditor.” See: Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2002).

C. Right to Rescind

1. Each consumer with the right to rescind must receive one [1] copy of the correct TIL Disclosure Statement and two [2] copies of a correct Notice of Right to Cancel form. If not, the consumer can rescind for up to 3 years after closing. See: Reg Z 226.23(a)(3), fn 48; Beach v. Ocwen, 118 S.Ct.1408 (1998), aff’g Beach v. Great Western Bank, 692 So.2d 146,148-149 (Fla.1997), aff’g Beach v. Great Western Bank, 670 So.2d 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Rodash v. AIB Mortgage, 16 F.3d 1142
(11th Cr.1994); Steele v Ford Motor Credit, 783 F.2d 1016 (11th Cir.1986), all binding here under Kasket v. Chase Manhattan Mtge. Corp., 759 So.2d 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (11th Circuit cases on federal TIL issues are binding on Florida courts).

2. The error must be a “material error” which is defined at Reg Z 226.23 fn 48: “The term “material disclosures” means the required disclosures of the annual percentage rate, the finance charge, the amount financed, the total payments, the payment schedule, and the disclosures and limitations referred to in sections 226.32(c) and (d).”

3. A HOEPA loan requires additional disclosures 3 days before consummation. See: Reg Z 226.31(c)(1) (“The creditor shall furnish the disclosures required by section 226.32 at least three business days prior to consummation of a mortgage transaction covered by section 226.32.”). The failure to deliver the HOEPA forms is an additional TIL material disclosure which extends the right to rescind for violations. See: Reg Z 226.23(a)(3): “The consumer may exercise the right to rescind until midnight of the third business day following consummation, delivery of the notice required by paragraph (b) of this section, or delivery of all material disclosures, [fn]48 whichever occurs last. If the required notice or material disclosures are not delivered, the right to rescind shall expire 3 years after consummation….” See also fn 48 above.

4. Florida’s Fair Lending Act is based on the HOEPA triggers and appears to adopt TIL right to rescind without the 3 year limit. See: Fla. Stat. §494.00792(d). This theory has not been tested in any appellate court.

5. Most creditor’s closing/underwriting files will have a signed acknowledgment that the consumer received 2 copies of the TIL notice of right to cancel. Under TIL 15 U.S.C. 1635(c) this creates a rebuttable presumption of receipt: “Notwithstanding any rule of evidence, written acknowledgment of receipt of any disclosures required under this subchapter by a person to whom information, forms, and a statement is
required to be given pursuant to this section does no more than create a rebuttable presumption of delivery thereof.” Once the consumer’s affidavit or interrogatory answer or deposition stares that the consumer did not receive the 2 notices, this rebuts the presumption of receipt in the acknowledgment and presents a question of fact for trial. See: Cintron v. Bankers Trust Company, 682 So.2d 616 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1996).

6. The critical issue is what did each consumer receive not what is in the creditor’s underwriting or closing file. Make sure that the TIL Right to Rescind form is correctly filled out and the loan closed on the date it purports to have closed. If the lender directs the consumer to deliver the notice of right to cancel form to a post office box, this should extend the right to rescind.

D. Material Errors

1. The TIL Disclosure Statement “Federal Box” will contain the following “material information”. These numbers are taken from the Norwest v. Queen Martin trial memorandum: {4}

Annual Percentage Rate Finance Charge Amount Financed
11.227% $176,073.12 $70,708.16

Total of Payments
$246,781.28

PAYMENTS: Your payment schedule will be:
Number of Payments Amount of Payments When Payments Are Due

Monthly beginning
359 685.52 10/01/99

1 679.60 09/01/29

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{4} The disclosures are interrelated. If one multiplies the monthly payment amounts by the number of payments, and adds the sums, this equals the total of payments. Adding the finance charge to the amount financed equals the total of payments. The annual percentage rate is the percent of these figures, based on 360 monthly payments, using either the American or actuarial method.

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2. At the bottom of the TIL Disclosure Statement, usually just inside the bottom part of the federal box, you will see a place for the creditor to place an “X” next to: “‘e’ means an estimate;” and a second box to place an “X” next to: “all dates and numerical disclosures except the late payment disclosures are estimates.” Estimated disclosures violate TIL.

3. If no Reg Z 226.18(c) required Itemization of Amount Financed (not a material disclosure error) one “work backwards” to determine how the creditor arrived at the TIL disclosures. First, one must deduct the $70,708.16 “amount financed” from the face amount of the note. Lets assume this note was for a $76,500.00 loan. Therefore the creditor had to use $5,791.84 as the total of “prepaid finance charges.” In order
to arrive at the disclosed $70,708.16 “amount financed.” Then one must examine the HUD-1 charges to find the charges that equal the $5,791.84 “prepaid finance charges” to determine the items from the HUD-1 that the creditor included in the $5,791.84 prepaid finance charges to determine if $5,791.84 correct reflects all the prepaid finance charges. See: §1638(a)(2)(A); Reg Z 226.18(b): “The amount financed is calculated by: (1) Determining the principal loan amount or the cash price
(subtracting any downpayment); (2) Adding any other amounts that are financed by the creditor and are not part of the finance charge (usually not applicable); and, (3) Subtracting any prepaid finance charge.”

4. The Norwest/Martin Trial memo has a great deal of detail with respect to the specific charges and violations.

F. Truth in Lending Remedies

1. §1635(b) and Reg Z 226.23(d)(1-4) rescission; and, 2) §1640 damages.

2. Semar v. Platte Valley Federal S & L Ass’n, 791 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1986) is the leading case used by virtually all courts to impose TIL’s §1635(b) and Reg Z 226.23(d)(1-4) rescission remedy in a non-§1639, non-vesting case.

3. Semar, interpreted Reg Z 226.23(d)(1) “Effects of rescission: When a consumer rescinds a transaction, the security interest giving rise to the right of rescission becomes void and the consumer shall not be liable for any amount, including any finance charge.” The Semar, Court accepted the consumer’s rescission formula under Reg Z 226.23(d)(1), added all the “finance charges” listed on the HUD-1, plus the 2 $1,000.00 maximum statutory damage awards ($1,000.00 for the initial error and $1,000.00 for the improper response to rescission, increased to $2,000.00 in 1995),
plus all the mortgage payments made, then deducted this sum from the face amount of the Semar, note to arrive at the net debt owed the creditor.

4. §1640(a)(2)(A)(iii) Statutory Damages $2,000.00 for initial errors and $2,000.00 for the improper response to rescission. See: 15 U.S.C. §1635(g); 15 U.S.C. §1640 (a)15 U.S.C. §1640(g); Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat. Bank, 575 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1978), binding in the 11th Circuit under Bonner. (TIL statutory damages available for initial TIL error and improper response to demand to rescind).

5. §1640(a)(1) Actual Damages for any errors: Hard to prove need to establish “detrimental reliance” on an erroneous disclosure.

6. §1640(a)(4) Enhanced HOEPA Damages: §1640(a)(4) enhances the damages: “in the case of a failure to comply with any requirement under section 1639 of this title, an amount equal to the sum of all finance charges and fees paid by the consumer, unless the creditor demonstrates that the failure to comply is not material.”

5. Equitable Modification under §1635(b) and Reg Z 226.23(d)(4). Williams v. Homestake Mortg. Co., 968 F.2d 1137 (11th Cir. 1992) allows for equitable modification of TIL, Burden on lender to prove facts that justify the equitable modification. If not, Florida courts must follow Yslas v. D.K Guenther Builders, Inc., 342 So.2d 859, fn 2 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1977), which holds:

“The statutory scheme to effect restoration to the status quo provides that within ten days of receipt of the notice of rescission the creditor return any property of the debtor and void the security interest in the debtor’s property. The debtor is not obligated to tender any property of the creditor in the debtor’s possession until the creditor has performed his obligations. If the creditor does not perform within ten days of the notice or does not take possession of his property within ten days of the
tender, ownership of the creditor’s property vests in the debtor without further obligation.” [emphasis added].

The 2nd District recently reaffirmed Yslas in Associates First Capital v. Booze, 912 So.2d 696 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2005). Associates, involved a partial §1635(b) and Reg Z 226.23(d)(1-4) rescission because the consumer refinanced with the same creditor, and the refinance included an additional advance of credit. In the Associates, the consumer can rescind only the additional advance. Important here, the Associates,
consumer argued, and the Court agreed that the lender failed to perform a condition precedent to equitably modify TIL by failing to respond to his rescission notice within 20 days, as required by §1635(b) and Reg Z 226.23(d)(2):

“If a lender fails to respond within twenty days to the notice of rescission, the ownership of the property vests in the borrowers and they are no longer required to pay the loan. See § 1635(b); Staley v. Americorp Credit Corp., 164 F. Supp. 2d 578, 584 (D. Md. 2001); Gill v. Mid-Penn Consumer Disc. Co., 671 F.Supp. 1021 (E.D.Pa. 1987). However, because 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(f)(2) provides only a partial right of rescission where there is a refinancing, when the Lender failed to respond to
the notice of rescission within twenty days, ownership of only the property subject to the right of rescission — the $994.01 loaned for property taxes — vested in the Borrowers without further obligation.” Associates, p. 698.

G. Truth in Lending Supplements State Remedies & Both Apply

1. Williams v. Public Finance Corp., 598 F.2d 349, rehearing denied with opinion at 609 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1980), binding here under Bonner, holds that a consumer can get both TIL damages and usury damages because state usury laws and the Federal Truth in Lending Act provide separate remedies to rectify separate wrongs based on separate unrelated statutory violations. The 5th Circuit rejected the creditor’s “double penalty” argument by holding that if it accepted the argument, it would give special lenient treatment to the creditor when his loan violates 2 separate statutes, one state and one federal, designed to remedy 2 separate wrongs:

“Moreover, we eschew an analysis of these statutory cases limited by the
common law doctrines of compensation for breach of contract. These cases involve penal statutes, and we are compelled to enforce their clear and direct commands whether or not they seem to be overcompensating in a contract or tort analysis. There is nothing inherently wrong, excessive, or immoral in a borrower receiving two bounties for catching a lending beast who has wronged him twice — first, by sneaking up on him from behind, and then by biting him too hard. The private attorney general who exposes and opposes these credit wolves is not deemed unduly enriched when his valor is richly rewarded and his vendor harshly rebuked. Nor does the state’s punishment for the usurious bite interfere with Congress’s punishment for the wearing of sheep’s clothing.”

“We have come, or gone, a long way from Shakespeare’s ancient caution, “Neither a borrower, nor a lender be.” In today’s world borrowing and lending are daily facts of life. But that a fact becomes diurnal does not mean it has been cleansed of its dire potential. We still heed the Bard’s advice, but in our own modern way — by strict regulation of the strong and careful protection of the weak and unwary. While the well-intended efforts of our many sovereigns may at times sound more like discordant and competing solos than mellifluous duets, we, as judges, must restrain
our impulse to stray from the score.” Williams, 609 F.2d pg. 359-360.

In case the first opinion was unclear on this point, the Williams, rehearing opinion repeated and reaffirmed its “lending wolf” analysis:

“Noting that the effect of appellants’ argument was to ask for “special lenient treatment to lenders who violate two laws instead of just one,” we rejected the approach to the question proposed by the appellants and defined our inquiry in the following terms:

[W]e think the real question in this case is a relatively standard one of statutory interpretation. More specifically, we think the question is whether Congress intended that the TIL Act would apply to loans which violated state usury laws punishable by forfeiture. At the outset we note that no exception for such loans is made explicitly in the TIL Act. Moreover, since the Act is to be construed liberally to effect its remedial purposes, Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture Co., 479 F.2d 740, 748 (5th
Cir. 1973), we are generally disinclined to read into the Act an implicit exception which benefits lenders at the expense of borrowers. However, the real test of whether this exception was intended or not must start with the question of whether it serves or disserves the purposes of the Act. In this analysis resides the real focus of our decision. The ILA and TIL Act provide separate remedies to rectify separate wrongs.
The ILA limits what a lender subject to its provisions can charge for the use of its money; the TIL Act provisions involved here are designed to penalize and deter an independent wrong arising from nondisclosure. [fn5] We did not believe, and do not believe, that it subserves the purposes of the TIL Act to read into it an implied exception for loans which violate unrelated state usury laws. As we have already said, we do not think it especially unfair or unjust to order two punishments for a
lender who violates two laws. And more to the point, we think it would be directly contrary to the purposes and policies of the TIL Act to excuse a violator from federal penalty simply because he is also liable for a state penalty, especially where that state penalty may often be less harsh than the federal penalty…….”

“…… Appellants petition for rehearing have taken offense at our characterization of lenders who violate the ILA as “credit wolves” and as wearers of “sheep’s clothing” when they also violate the disclosure provisions of the TIL Act. They suggest that such labels have obscured our analysis of the legal issues here. Such most certainly is not the case. Our analysis was and is based on our perception of the proper
construction of the federal and state policies, even though their meshing is not nearly as perfect as we and appellants could wish. Nonetheless, as we read the ILA and the TIL Act, appellants have violated both and are subject to the penalties of both. Although appellants’ predations may be technical and they may feel we have cried “wolf” too readily, the fact remains that as we read the statutes appellants are guilty of the violations charged.” Williams, 598 F.2d pg. 1181-1184.

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at http://www.fightforeclosure.net “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

How Homeowners Can Effectively Use RESPA in their Foreclosure Defense

11 Wednesday Jun 2014

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Banks and Lenders, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Non-Judicial States, RESPA, Your Legal Rights

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It is important for every homeowner to use the RESPA provisions in their foreclosure defense.

Most Homeowners often wonder what is RESPA. This post is designed to enlighten homeowners as to what RESPA is and how the provisions of RESPA can help them in the foreclosure fight.

So What is RESPA!

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)

1. RESPA initially applied to loans subject to a first lien on residential property of one to four units. In 1992, it was amended to apply to subordinate loans on such property as well. The implementing regulations are contained in Regulation X, 24 C.F.R. § 3500, as well as in Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.19.

2. RESPA requires good faith estimates of Truth In Lending Act disclosures before consummation or within three business days after the creditor receives the consumer’s written application, whichever occurs earlier. Re-disclosure is required no later than consummation or settlement. According to § 226.19(b), when dealing with variable-rate loans a booklet on adjustable rate mortgages must be provided along with other detailed disclosures specified in the regulations.

3. RESPA prohibits mortgage transaction servicers from giving and creditors from accepting “any portion, split or percentage” of any charge made or received for settlement services “other than for services actually performed. 12 U.S.C. § 2607(b). High and unearned fees that are not actionable under RESPA, are still subject to challenge as unconscionable and that it is an unfair and deceptive practice to represent a charge as for a specific purpose, when the actual cost of that item is much less.

4. RESPA also requires servicers of covered mortgages to respond to written requests from the borrower or the borrower’s agent for information or disputes concerning the servicing of the loan, and to either make appropriate corrections or, after investigation, explain why the account is correct. Failure to comply with the response requirements gives rise to liability for actual damages, statutory damages up to $1000 in case of a pattern or practice of noncompliance and attorneys’ fees and costs, with special class action provisions.

5. The provisions of RESPA which deal with mortgage servicing are generally found in either 12 U.S.C. § 2605 or § 2609. Section 2605, known as the “Servicer Act,” requires servicers to respond to borrower requests for information and to correct account errors (referred to as “qualified written requests”), § 2605(e); disclose information relating to the transfer of servicing operations, §§ 2605(a) and (b); and make timely payments out of escrow accounts. § 2605(g); Section 2609 deals
exclusively with escrow accounts and limits the amount servicers can demand to be deposited in an escrow account and requires an escrow analysis be conducted to determine the proper escrow payment. § 2609(a); It also requires servicers to provide an annual escrow statement § 2609(c) and a notice of escrow shortages or deficiencies.
§ 2609(b)

6. There is one requirement imposed by § 2605 that does not apply if the borrower is behind on payments. Section 2505(g) requires a servicer to make payments from an escrow account for taxes, insurance and other charges “in a timely manner as such payments become due.” As long as the borrower’s mortgage payment is not more than thirty days late, the servicer must pay escrow items such as taxes and insurance in a timely manner even if there are not sufficient funds in the escrow account to cover the items. Reg. X, 24 C.F.R. § 3500.17(k)(2). RESPA creates an express right of action for a servicer’s failure to make payments from an escrow account for taxes, insurance and other charges “in a timely manner as such payments become due.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(g). Regulation X provides that this obligation to make timely disbursements out of escrow does not apply when the “borrower’s payment is more than 30 days overdue.” Reg. X, 24 C.F.R. § 3500.17(k)(1), (2) The regulation has no explanation of this limitation. It could be interpreted to mean that a servicer has no obligation to timely disburse payments for taxes and insurance or other charges whenever the home owner’s mortgage payment is more than thirty days late at the time the disbursement becomes due, even if there are sufficient funds in the escrow account to cover the disbursement.

7. The regulation should not give an exemption to a servicer who wrongly claimed that the borrower was late with payments at the time the disbursement was required, or if timely payments are being made under a forbearance or repayment agreement. If the exemption does not apply, the servicer must pay escrow items such as taxes and insurance timely even if there are not sufficient funds in the escrow account to cover the
items.[ Reg. X, 24 C.F.R. § 3500.17(k)(2) The application of the regulation denies a servicer an opportunity to force-placed insurance from another carrier in this situation. The servicer is required to pay the insurance premium on the borrower’s policy when due by advancing funds. Any escrow deficiency resulting from the advance is paid by the borrower through an adjustment to future escrow payments following an escrow
account analysis.

It is important for homeowners to know that;

RESPA – provides a private cause of action for violation of its prohibitions against misuse of escrowed funds, kickbacks from companies providing settlement services, and steering borrowers to title insurance companies. Either treble or statutory damages plus attorney’s fees are available for violations. RESPA also requires advance disclosures (Good Faith Estimate), and disclosure at settlement of settlement costs in real estate transactions. While the statute does not create a private cause of
action for disclosure violations, analyzing the disclosures often reveals Truth in Lending and HOEPA violations.

The bankruptcy mentors say that to avoid the Reg X 30-day default exception, an argument can be made that the exception does not apply after confirmation of the plan. The reason is that the confirmation designates the account as reinstated. In re Jones, 2007 WL 1112047 (Bankr.E.D.La. Apr 13, 2007)(plan confirmation “recalibrates” the
amounts due as of the petition date); In re Wines, 239 B.R. 703 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1999) (post-petition mortgage debt treated like a current mortgage and consists of those payments which come due after the bankruptcy petition is filed. Ongoing postpetition payments, including escrow amounts and timely disbursements, should be treated under the terms of the note and mortgage as if no default exist. The Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Single-Family Uniform Instrument for a mortgage or deed of trust
(Section 3, entitled “Funds for Escrow Items”), requires the servicer to maintain the escrow account in compliance with RESPA. A provision in the plan can require the servicer to comply with the RESPA escrow account requirements during the administration of the plan.

The general RESPA preemption provision provides that state laws are
preempted only to the extent of their inconsistency with RESPA. 12 U.S.C. § 2616. State laws providing greater protections to borrowers than RESPA that are not inconsistent with RESPA are not preempted.

– Citation: 12 U.S.C. §2601, et seq. 24 C.F.R. Part 3500 (Regulation X) 64 Fed. Reg. 10079 (HUD Policy Statement on lender paid broker fees)

– Liable Parties: Lender Broker, if not exclusive agent or lender,
Servicer, Title Company

– Actionable Wrongs: Failure to give Good Faith Estimate; disclose other credit-related information and give HUD-1 Settlement Statement and servicing statements; Payment or acceptance of kickbacks or referral
fees; Making charges for which no identifiable services are provided; Improper servicing of loan.

– Remedies: Three times amount of illegal charges Attorney fees

– Limitations: 1 year to bring an affirmative claim No limit if raised by way of recoupment

Hirsch v. Bank of America, 328 F. 3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2003). (provides a two-part test in analyzing RESPA kickback violations involving a mortgage broker. First, the court must “determine whether the broker has provided goods or services of the kind typically associated with a mortgage transaction.” Then, the court must “determine whether the total compensation paid to the broker is reasonably related to the total value of the goods or services actually provided.”

Recently followed by: Culpepper v. Irwin Mortg. Corp., 20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 824 (11th Cir. Ala. July 2, 2007) (applying two part test)

§ 203.508 Providing information.

(a) Mortgagees shall provide loan information to mortgagors and arrange for individual loan consultation on request. The mortgagee must establish written procedures and controls to assure prompt responses to inquiries.

(c) Within thirty days after the end of each calendar year, the mortgagee shall furnish to the mortgagor a statement of the interest paid, and of the taxes disbursed from the escrow account during the preceding year. At the mortgagor’s request, the mortgagee shall furnish a statement of the escrow account sufficient to enable the mortgagor to reconcile the account.

(d) Mortgagees must respond to HUD requests for information concerning individual accounts.

(e) Each servicer of a mortgage shall deliver to the mortgagor a written notice of any assignment, sale, or transfer of the servicing of the mortgage. The notice must be sent in accordance with the provisions of § 3500.21(e)(1) of this title and shall contain the information required by § 3500.21(e)(2) of this title. Servicers must respond to mortgagor inquiries pertaining to the transfer of servicing in accordance with §3500.21(f) of this title.

§ 203.550 Escrow accounts.
It is the mortgagee’s responsibility to make escrow disbursements before bills become delinquent. Mortgagees must establish controls to insure that bills payable from the escrow fund or the information needed to pay such bills is obtained on a timely basis. Penalties for late payments for items payable from the escrow account must not be charged to the mortgagor unless it can be shown that the penalty was the direct
result of the mortgagor’s error or omission. The mortgagee shall use the procedures set forth in § 3500.17 of this title, implementing Section 10 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (12 U.S.C. 2609), to compute the amount of the escrow, the methods of collection and accounting, and the payment of the bills for which the money has been escrowed.

In the case of escrow accounts created for purposes of § 203.52 or § 234.64 of this chapter, mortgagees may estimate escrow requirements based on the best information available as to probable payments that will be required to be made from the account on a periodic basis throughout the period during which the account is maintained.

The mortgagee shall not institute foreclosure when the only default of the mortgagor occupant is a present inability to pay a substantial escrow shortage, resulting from an adjustment pursuant to this section, in a lump sum.

When the contract of mortgage insurance is terminated voluntarily or because of prepayment in full, sums in the escrow account to pay the mortgage insurance premiums shall be remitted to HUD with a form approved by the Secretary for reporting the voluntary termination of prepayment. Upon prepayment in full sums held in escrow for taxes and hazard insurance shall be released to the mortgagor promptly.

When Homeowners good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

What Homeowners in Washington Needs to Know About Saving Their Homes

10 Saturday May 2014

Posted by BNG in Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Landlord and Tenant, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Note - Deed of Trust - Mortgage, Pro Se Litigation, RESPA, State Court, Your Legal Rights

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This outline covers mainly Washington law, but an effort has been made to include information that will be useful in most foreclosure contexts. Bankruptcy and tax issues pervade foreclosures, but are beyond the scope of this article. The focus is upon residential foreclosures as opposed to commercial foreclosures although there is substantial overlap.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. WHETHER TO REINSTATE, DEFEND OR GIVE-UP
B. OFFENSIVE STRATEGY

II. DEFENDING NONJUDICIAL DEED OF TRUST FORECLOSURES
A. INTRODUCTION
B. PROCEDURE FOR RESTRAINING TRUSTEE’S SALES
C. DEFENSES BASED ON TRUSTEE MISCONDUCT
D. POST-SALE REMEDIES
E. SETTING ASIDE THE TRUSTEE’S SALE
F. ADDITIONAL STATUTORY REMEDIES
G. RAISING DEFENSES IN THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER
(EVICTION) ACTION
H. DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE

III. DEFENDING JUDICIAL FORECLOSURES
A. INTRODUCTION
B. HOMESTEAD RIGHTS
C. UPSET PRICE
D. DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS
E. REDEMPTION RIGHTS
F. POSSESSION AFTER SALE
G. POST FORECLOSURE RELIEF

IV. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
A. BANKRUPTCY
B. WORKOUTS (DEED IN LIEU)
C. LENDER LIABILITY
D. MOBILE HOME FORECLOSURES
E. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF FORECLOSURE

V. THE GOVERNMENT AS INSURER, GUARANTOR OR LENDER
A. INTRODUCTION
B. HUD WORKOUT OPTIONS
C. THE VA HOME LOAN PROGRAM
D. RURAL HOUSING LOANS

VI. RESOURCES

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. WHETHER TO REINSTATE, DEFEND OR GIVE-UP

By far the most important decision that must be initially made is whether the property is worth saving. This is often ignored and wasted effort is expended when there is no “equity” (realistic fair market value minus all debt, liens, property taxes, anticipated foreclosure costs, late fees, and selling costs) in the property.
The options are as follows:
1. Reinstatement. Pay the costs and late charges and stop the process. In most non-judicial foreclosures this is permitted up until the date of sale. In Washington the lender must allow reinstatement 10 days prior to the sale date. See RCW 61.24. Often a lender or relative will loan necessary funds and take a subordinate lien on the property to do so. The makes sense only if the new payments are within the means of the debtor.
2. Sell the Property. If there is equity, but no ability to reinstate, then immediately list and sell the property to recoup equity.
3. Obtain Foreclosure Relief. Most government insured loans (if, VA, FHA) have programs allowing (or requiring) lenders to assist defaulting borrowers. See discussion under §V infra. Check into these options immediately.
4. Give Up. This is actually an option as most state laws permit the debtor to remain in possession during the foreclosure process and redemption period rent-free. Most laws, especially in non-judicial foreclosure states – do not allow (or at least limit) deficiencies. Debtors contemplating bankruptcy should take advantage of homestead rights and redemption rights. If there is no equity or negative equity and no ability to make payments, there is no economic reason to try to avoid foreclosure.
5. Defend the Foreclosure. After all of the above have been considered, defense of the foreclosure may be warranted. This outline discusses some defenses that may result in re-instatement of the mortgage or recovery of equity.
B. OFFENSIVE STRATEGY
In addition to defenses that may be raised, there may be affirmative claims that can be brought against the lender which should be immediately determined and raised in a counterclaim or set-off or, in the case of non-judicial foreclosure, brought by separate suit and coupled with an injunction against continuing the non-judicial foreclosure. These claims can also be brought in bankruptcy. See, e.g. In re Perkins, 106 BR 863 (1989).
A few examples of affirmative claims:
1. Truth-in-Lending Act Violations. Often lenders will hand the debtor a claim, which can turn a debt into an asset. If the Truth-in-Lending disclosure statement is less than one year old, there may be damage claims for improper disclosure. See, 15 U.S.C. 1635. More importantly, there may be a right of rescission, which can be exercised up to three years after the closing resulting in a tremendous advantage to the borrower. See, e.g., Beach v. Ocwen Fed Bank, 118 S. Ct. 1408 (1998).
2. Usury. If a state usury law applies (usually on seller financed real estate), this can parlay a debt into an asset. Federal pre-emption generally prevents this, but there are exceptions. See, RCW 19.52.
3. Mortgage Broker Liability, Lender Liability, Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices. Numerous claims that arise in the mortgage financing context give rise to set-offs that can allow negotiation out of the foreclosure. See e.g. Mason v. Mortgage America, 114 Wn. 2d 842 (1990). Intentional breach of contract gives rise to emotional stress damages. See, Cooperstein v. Van Natter, 26 Wn. App. 91 (1980); Theis v. Federal Finance Co., 4 Wn. App. 146 (1971).
Under a new federal statute to regulate high interest, predatory loans, Congress enacted in 1994 the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (effective on loans after October 1, 1995). This amendment to the Truth-In-Lending Act requires greater disclosures in loans where a number of factors exist such as, points exceeding 8% and other excessive costs. Penalties include enhanced damages and rescission. See 15 U.S.C. 1602(u) and 15 U.S.C. 1640(a).
The Mortgage Broker Practices Act, RCW 31.04 and the Consumer Protection Act also have enhanced damages and attorney fees.

II. DEFENDING NONJUDICIAL DEED OF TRUST FORECLOSURES

A. INTRODUCTION

The deed of trust is currently one of the most common devices for securing conventional and government insured or guaranteed real estate loans. The deed of trust may be typically foreclosed either judicially as a mortgage or non-judicially. Set forth below are the jurisdictional variations in security agreements and the most common foreclosure procedures#.

Nonjudicial

# 1

Jurisdiction
Customary Security Agreement
Customary Foreclosure Procedure

Alabama
Mortgage
Nonjudicial

Alaska
Deed of Trust
Nonjudicial

Arizona
Deed of Trust
Nonjudicial

Arkansas
Mortgage
Judicial

California
Deed of Trust
Nonjudicial

Colorado
Deed of Trust (Semi-judicial)
Public Trustee’s Sale

Connecticut
Mortgage

Judicial-Strict Foreclosure

Delaware
Mortgage
Judicial

Dis. of Col.
Deed of Trust
Nonjudicial

Florida
Mortgage
Judicial

Georgia
Security Deed
Nonjudicial

Hawaii
Mortgage
Judicial

Idaho
Mortgage
Judicial & Nonjudicial

Illinois
Mtg. & D.T.
Judicial

Indiana
Mortgage
Judicial

Iowa
Mortgage
Judicial

Kansas
Mortgage
Judicial

Kentucky
Mortgage
Judicial

Louisiana
Mortgage
Judicial

Maine
Mortgage
Judicial (Nonjudicial for Corporate Borrower)

Maryland
Deed of Trust
Nonjudicial

Massachusetts
Mortgage
Nonjudicial

Michigan
Mortgage
Nonjudicial

Minnesota
Mortgage
Nonjudicial

Mississippi
Deed of Trust
Nonjudicial

Missouri
Deed of Trust
Nonjudicial

Montana
Instlmnt. Contract
Nonjudicial

Nebraska
Deed of Trust Mortgage
Judicial & Nonjudicial

Nevada
Deed of Trust
Nonjudicial

New Hampshire
Mortgage
Nonjudicial

New Jersey
Mortgage
Judicial

New Mexico
Mortgage
Judicial

New York
Mortgage
Judicial

North Carolina
Deed of Trust
Judicial

North Dakota
Mortgage
Judicial

Ohio
Mortgage
Judicial

Oklahoma
Mortgage
Judicial

Oregon
Deed of Trust
Nonjudicial

Pennsylvania
Mortgage
Judicial

Puerto Rico
Mortgage
Judicial

Rhode Island
Mortgage
Nonjudicial

South Carolina
Mortgage
Judicial

South Dakota
Mortgage
Judicial & Nonjudicial

Tennessee
Deed of Trust
Nonjudicial

Texas
Deed of Trust
Nonjudicial

Utah
Deed of Trust
Nonjudicial

Vermont
Mortgage
Strict Foreclosure

Virgin Islands
Mortgage
Judicial

Virginia
Deed of Trust
Nonjudicial

Washington
Deed of Trust
Nonjudicial

West Virginia
Deed of Trust
Nonjudicial

Wisconsin
Mortgage
Judicial

Wyoming
Mtg. & Installment Contracts

foreclosure is allowed in approximately one-half of the states. Also listed are the states that permit nonjudicial foreclosure and their relevant statutes#. With nonjudicial foreclosure, it is not necessary to utilize the court for the foreclosure sale unless a deficiency judgment is sought. Nonjudicial foreclosure is often the preferred method of foreclosure because it is more efficient than judicial foreclosure and quicker. The nonjudicial foreclosure procedure has been found constitutional between private parties on the basis that there is no state action#, but there is a serious question as to whether the government can direct a lender to use a nonjudicial procedure#.

______________________________________________________________________________________

Judicial
# ALABAMA: ALA. CODE §§35-10-1 TO 35-10-10; [FORECLOSURE AFTER 12/1988 §§35-10-11 TO 35-10-16]
(1991).
Alaska: Alaska Stat. §§34.20.090 to 34.20.100 (1991).
Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§33-807 to 33-814 (West 1991).
Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. §§18-50-108; 18-50-116 (1987).
California: Cal. Civ. Code §§2924 to 2924(h) West 1992).
D.C.: D.C. Code Ann. §§45-715 to 45-718 (1991).
Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. §§9-13-141; 44-14-162.4; 44-14-48; 44-14-180 to 187 (Harrison 1991).
Idaho: Idaho Code §§6-101; 104; 45-1502 to 45-1506 (1991).
Iowa: Iowa Code Ann. §654.18 (West 1992).
Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, §§7-105; 7-202 (1988).
Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 183, §§19, 21; ch. 244, §§11-15 (West 1992).
Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§451-401 et seq.; 600.2431; 600.3201 et seq.; 600.3170 (West 1992).
Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Ann. §§580.01 to 580.30; 582.01 et seq. (West 1992).
Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. §§11-5-111; 15-1-23; 89-1-55 (1972).
Missouri: Mo. Ann. Stat. §§442.290to 443.325 (Vernon 1992).
Montana: Mont. Code Ann. §§25-13-802; 71-1-111; 71-1-223 to 232, 71-1-311 to 317 (1991).
Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. §§76-1001 to 1018 (1981).
Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. §§107.020; 107.025; 107.080 to 107.100; 40.050; 40.453 (Michie 1991).
New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§479:22 to 479:27 (1991).
New York: N.Y. Real Prop. Acts §§1401 to 1461 (McKinney 1992).
North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code §35-22-01 (1992).
Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 46, §§40 to 49 (West 1992).
Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. §§86.705 to 86.795 (1989).
Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws §§34-11-22; 34-20-4; 34-23-3; 34-27-1 (1984).
South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§21-48-1 to 21-48-26; 21-48A-1 to 21-48A-5 (1992).
Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. §§35-5-101 to 35-5-112 (1991). See, Note, Power of Sale Foreclosures in
Tennessee, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 871 (1978).
Texas: Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§51-002; 51.003; 51.005 (West 1992).
Utah: Utah Code Ann. §§57-1-23 to 57-1-34 (1986).
Vermont: Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§4531a to 4533 (1991).
Virginia: Va. Code Ann. §§55-59.1 to 55-59.4; 55-61 to 55-66.7 (Michie 1991).
Washington: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§61.24.010 to 61.24.130 (West 1992).

_______________________________________________________________________________________

West Virginia: W. Va. Code §§38-1-3 to 38-1-12 (1991).
Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. §§34-4-101 to 34-4-113 (1991).

# See Charmicor, Inc. v. Deaner, 572 F.2d 694 (9th Cir.1978); Northrip v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir.1975); Barrera v. Security Building & Investment Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975); Bryant v. Jefferson Federal Savings & Loan Association, 509 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir.1974); Lawson v. Smith, 402 F.Supp. 851 (N.D.Cal.1975); Global Industries, Inc. v. Harris, 376 F.Supp. 1379 (N.D.Ga.1974); Homestead Savings v. Darmiento, 230 Cal.App.3d 424, 281 Cal.Rptr. 367 (1991); Leininger v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, macon, 481 So.2d 1086 (Miss.1986); Wright v. Associates Financial Services Co. of Oregon, Inc., 59 Or.App.688, 651 P.2d 945 (1983), certiorari denied 464 U.S. 834, 104 S.Ct. 117, 78 L.Ed.2d 116 (1983); Kennebec Inc. v. Bank of the West, 88 Wash.2d 718, 565 P.2d 812 (1977); Dennison v. Jack, 172 W.Va. 147, 304 S.E.2d 300 (1983).
# Island Financial, Inc. v. Ballman, 92 Md.App. 125, 607 A.2d 76 (1992); Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F.Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C.1975); Vail v. Derwinski, 946 F.2d 589 (8th Cir.1991), amended by 956 F.2d 812 (8th Cir.1992) and Boley v. Brown, 10 F.3d 218 (4th Cir.1993) which held that the VA’s control over the foreclosure process in VA guaranteed loan foreclosures constitutes sufficient governmental action to trigger due process protections. Accord, U.S. v. Whitney, 602 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. N.Y. 1985); U.S. v. Murdoch, 627 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. Ind. 1986). See Also Leen, Galbraith & Gant, Due Process and Deeds of Trust – Strange Bedfellows, 48 Wash.L.Rev. 763 (1973).

B. PROCEDURE FOR RESTRAINING TRUSTEE’S SALE

Anyone having an interest in the real property security, including the borrower, may restrain the non-judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust on any proper ground#. Proper grounds for enjoining a trustee’s sale include: (1) there is no default on the obligation, Salot v. Wershow, 157 CA.2d 352, 320 P.2d 926 (1958), (2) the deed of trust has been reinstated, (3) the notice of default, notice of sale, or proposed conduct of the sale is defective, Crummer v. Whitehead, 230 CA.2d 264, 40 CR 826 (1964), (4) the lender has waived the right to foreclose, (5) a workout/settlement has been agreed to, (6) equitable reasons that would entitle a debtor to close a sale of the property or complete a refinance, (7) to enforce government relief programs, and trustee misconduct. Finally, there may be defenses to the debt (i.e. usury, truth in lending violations, misrepresentation of the seller, breach of warranty by the seller, etc.) or set-offs, which substantially reduce the debt.

1. Time for Filing Action
The action can presumably be filed any time before the scheduled trustee’s sale, but the sooner the better. Under Washington law, if one seeks to restrain the sale, five days notice must be given to the trustee and the beneficiary. See the Revised Code of Washington (hereinafter “RCW”) 61.24.130(2); Note, supra, footnote 4. A trustor in California has at least one hundred and ten days (after the recording of the notice of default) to seek to enjoin the sale. In California, fifteen days are required for noticing a motion for a preliminary injunction. See CCP section 1005.

______________________________

# See, e.g., Reiserer v. Foothill Thrift and Loan, 208 Cal.App.3d 1082, 256 Cal.Rptr. 508 (1989) (unpublished opinion); Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. La Mansion Hotels & Resorts, Ltd., 762 S.W.2d 646 (Tex.App.1988); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983); National Life Insurance Co. v. Cady, 227 Ga. 475, 181 S.E.2d 382 (1971); Peoples National Bank v. Ostrander, 6 Wn.App. 28, 491 P.2d 1058 (1971). See, generally, note, Court Actions Contesting The Nonjudicial Foreclosure of Deeds of Trust in Washington, 59 Wash.L.Rev. 323 (1984); Restraining Orders in Non-Judicial Deed of Trust Foreclosures, Property Law Reporter, June 1987 (Vol. 3 Nos. 4 & 5).

2. Effect of Lis Pendens
Filing a lis pendens at the time the lawsuit is commenced constitutes constructive notice to purchasers and others dealing with the property of the claims and defenses asserted by the plaintiff#. Even if the plaintiff does not seek an order restraining the trustee’s sale or a restraining order is denied, purchasers at the sale acquire the property subject to the pending litigation#.

3. Notice of Application for Restraining Order
In Washington, a person seeking to restrain a trustee’s sale must give five days notice to the trustee setting forth when, where and before whom the application for the restraining order or injunction will be made. See RCW 61.24.130(2). See also Civil Rules 6 and 81 of the Civil Rules for Superior Court regarding computation of time.

________________________________

# Putnam Sand & Gravel Co. v. Albers, 14 CA3d 722, 92 CR 636 (1971).

# Avco Financial Services Loan, Inc. v. Hale, 36 Ohio App.3d 65, 520 N.E.2d 1378 (1987); Land Associates, Inc. v. Becker, 294 Or. 308, 656 P.2d 927 (1982), appeal after remand 74 Or.App. 444, 703 P.2d 1004 (1985).

4. Payment Obligation
When a preliminary injunction is sought, many states require the petitioner to post an injunction bond to protect the lender from injury because of the injunction#. Some courts require the party seeking the injunctive relief to pay to the court the amount due on the obligation#. If the amount due on the obligation is in dispute, most courts will require the borrower to tender at least what he/she acknowledges is due#.
Under Washington law, if the default is in making the monthly payment of principal, interest and reserves, the court requires such sum to be paid into the court every thirty days. See RCW 61.24.130(1)(a). A practice tip: even if local law does not require this, it would advantageous to offer to make ongoing payments. Then the creditor loses nothing during the pendency of the suit. In the case of default on a balloon payment, the statute requires that payment of the amount of the monthly interest at the new default rate shall be made to the court

clerk every thirty days. See RCW 61.24.130 (1)(b). If the property secured by the deed of trust is an owner occupied single family dwelling, then the court must require the party seeking to restrain the trustee’s sale to make the monthly payment of principal interest and reserves to the clerk of the court every 30 days. See RCW 61.24.130(1).
Although the amount that the party seeking to restrain the trustee’s sale must pay as a condition of continuing the restraining order would ordinarily be the regular monthly payment on the obligation, RCW 61.24.130(1)(a), when there is a balloon payment past due, RCW 61.24.130(1)(b) provides:

In the case of default in making payments of an obligation then fully payment by its terms, such sum shall be the amount of interest accruing monthly on said obligation at the non-default rate, paid to the clerk of the court every thirty days.

__________________________

# See Hummell v. Republic Federal Savings & Loan, 133 Cal.App.3d 49, 183 Cal.Rptr. 708 (4th Dist.1982); Broad & Locust Associates v. Locust-Broad Realty Co., 318 Pa.Super. 38, 464 A.2d 506 (1983); Strangis v. Metropolitan Bank, 385 N.W.2d 47 (Minn.App.1986); Franklin Savings Association v. Reese, 756 S.W.2d 14 (Tex.App.1988); Koegal v. Prudential Mutual Savings, Inc., 51 Wn.App. 108 (1988).

# See Ginther-Davis Center, Limited v. Houston National Bank, 600 S.W.2d 856 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980), error refused n.r.e.; see also Tiffany, Real Property, § 1549 (3d Ed. 1939) for a list of cases; Thompson, Real Property § 5179 (1957). Cf. Grella v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d 15 (Tex.App.1982).
# See Glines v. Theo R. Appel Realty Co., 201 Mo.App.596, 213 S.W. 498 (1919).

This is consistent with the intent to preserve the status quo while the lawsuit is pending and provide security only for prospective harm.

Failure to seek a restraint may constitute a waiver of all rights to challenge a sale for defects whenever the party who received notice of the right to enjoin the trustees sale, had actual or constructive knowledge of a defense to foreclosure prior to the sale, and failed to bring an action to enjoin the sale. The doctrine of waiver would thus preclude an action by a party to set aside a completed trustee’s sale#. Finally, RCW 61.24.130 allows the court to consider the grantor’s equity in determining the amount of security. This would significantly help a borrower avoid a costly bond. An appraisal showing equity should persuade a court that the lender is protected while the underlying dispute is resolved in court.

When a party knew or should have known that they might have a cause of action to set aside the sale but unreasonably delayed commencing the action, causing damage to the defendant, the doctrine of laches may bar the action#.

_________________________________

# Koegel v. Prudential Mutual Savings, Inc., 51 Wn. App. 108, 114 (1988); Steward v. Good, 51 Wn. App. 509, 515 (1988).

C. DEFENSES BASED ON TRUSTEE MISCONDUCT

Most defenses that are available in judicial foreclosures are also available in nonjudicial foreclosures of deeds of trust. Defenses may include violation of Truth-in-Lending, usury statutes, other consumer protection legislation, or special requirements when the government is the lender, insurer, or guarantor, infra. Other defenses are unique to nonjudicial foreclosure of deeds of trust because they relate to the particular obligations imposed upon trustees who conduct the sale of the real property.

1. Breach of Fiduciary Duties
A trustee selling property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale has strict obligations imposed by law. In most states, “a trustee is treated as a fiduciary for both the borrower and the lender.”#

________________________________________________________________________________________

# Carlson v. Gibraltar Savings, 50 Wn. App. 424, 429 (1988).
# Baxter & Dunaway, The Law of Distressed Real Estate (Clark Boardman Company, Ltd., November 1990). See Spires v. Edgar, 513 S.W.2d 372 (Mo.1974).

In McPherson v. Purdue, 21 Wn. App. 450, 452-3, 585 P.2d 830 (1978), the court approved the following statement describing the duties of a trustee from California law:
Among those duties is that of bringing “the property to the hammer under every possible advantage to his cestui que trusts,” using all reasonable diligence to obtain the best price.

In Cox v. Helenius, 103 Wn.2d 383, 388, 693 P.2d 683 (1985), the Washington Supreme Court adopted the following view:
Because the deed of trust foreclosure process is conducted without review or confrontation by a court, the fiduciary duty imposed upon the trustee is “exceedingly high”.

The court went on to illuminate four duties of the trustee:

(1) The trustee is bound by his office to use diligence in presenting the sale under every possible advantage to the debtor as well as the creditor;

(2) The trustee must take reasonable and appropriate steps to avoid sacrifice of the debtor’s property and his interest;

(3) Once a course of conduct is undertaken that is reasonably calculated to instill a sense of reliance thereon by the grantor, that course of conduct can not be abandoned without notice to the grantor; and

(4) When an actual conflict of interest arises between the roles of attorney for the beneficiary and trustee, the attorney should withdraw from one position, thus preventing a breach of fiduciary duty.

In Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (UT 1978), it was stated that “the duty of the trustee under a trust deed is greater than the mere obligation to sell the pledged property, . . . it is a duty to treat the trustor fairly and in accordance with a high punctilio of honor.” The Supreme Court in Blodgett went even further and found that the breach of this confidential duty may be regarded as constructive fraud#.

The general rule is summarized in Nelson & Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law, (West Publishing Co., 3d Ed. 1994), §7.21:
. . . a trustee in a deed of trust is a fiduciary for both the mortgagor and mortgagee and must act impartially between them. As one leading decision has stated, “the trustee for sale is bound by his office to bring the estate to a sale under every possible advantage to the debtor as well as to the creditor, and he is bound to use not only good faith but also every requisite degree of diligence in conducting the sale and to attend equally to the interest of debtor and creditor alike, apprising both of the intention of selling, that each may take the means to procure an advantageous sale.”

Mills v. Mutual Building & Loan Association, 216 N.C. 664, 669, 6 S.E.2d 549, 554 (1940).
The fiduciary duty of a trustee to obtain the best possible price for trust property that it sells has been discussed in nonjudicial and other contexts#.

_______________________________________________________________________________________

# See also McHugh v. Church, 583 P.2d 210, 214 (Alaska 1978).

However, this “fiduciary” characterization of a trustee is not accepted in all jurisdictions. The California Supreme Court has stated,
“The similarities between a trustee of an express trust and a trustee under a deed of trust end with the name. ‘Just as a panda is not a true bear, a trustee of a deed of trust is not a true trustee.’ *** [T]he trustee under a deed of trust does not have a true trustee’s interest in, and control over, the trust property. Nor is it bound by the fiduciary duties that characterize a true trustee.”

Monterey S.P. Partnership v. W.L. Bangham, Inc. 49 Cal.3d 454, 462, 261 Cal.Rptr. 587,592 (1989).

In most jurisdictions, a trustee cannot, without the express consent of the trustor, purchase at the sale that he conducts#. A court may impose additional affirmative duties (beyond the statutory requirements) upon the trustee in certain circumstances.

This could include a requirement that a trustee’s sale be continued, if necessary, to prevent a total loss of the debtor’s equity. West v. Axtell, 322 Mo. 401, 17 S.W.2d 328 (1929). RCW 61.24.040(6) authorizes a trustee to continue a trustee’s sale for a period or periods totaling 120 days for “any cause he deems advantageous.”

___________________________

# See Cox v. Helenius, supra, at p. 389; Allard v. Pacific National Bank, 99 Wn. 2d 394, 405, 663 P.2d 104 (1983), modified by 99 Wn.2d 394, 773 P.2d 145 (1989). superseded by RCW 11.100.140 as stated in Conran v. Seafirst Bank, 1998 Wn.App. Lexis 156.. See also National Life Insurance Company v. Silverman, 454 F.2d 899, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1971), in which the court stated that the same good faith is required of trustees under a deed of trust of real estate as is required of other fiduciaries.

# See Smith v. Credico Industrial Loan Company, 234 Va. 514, 362 S.E.2d 735 (1987); Whitlow v. Mountain Trust Bank, 215 Va. 149, 207 S.E.2d 837 (1974).

However, the Washington Court of Appeals has ruled that the trustee need not exercise “due diligence” in notifying interested parties of an impending sale. Morrell v. Arctic Trading Co., 21 Wn. App. 302, 584 P.2d 983 (1978). Further, the general rule is that a trustee is not obligated to disclose liens or other interests which the purchaser could or should have discovered through his or her own investigation. Ivrey v. Karr, 182 Md. 463, 34 A.2d 847, 852 (1943). The Washington courts have held that even when a trustee is aware of defects in title, the trustee only undertakes an affirmative duty of full and accurate disclosure if s/he has made any representations or answered any questions concerning the title. McPherson v. Purdue, 21 Wn. App. 450, 453, 585 P.2d 830 (1978). However, despite this general rule, there is authority behind the proposition that a trustee has a fiduciary duty to restrain the sale due to defects known to the trustee. In Cox v. Helenius, 103 Wn.2d 383,*,693 P.2d 683 (1985), in which the trustee knew that the right to foreclose was disputed and that the attorney for the trustor had failed to restrain the sale, the court held that the trustee should have either informed the attorney for the trustor that she had failed to properly restrain the sale or delayed foreclosure. As a result of the trustee’s failure to do so, the sale was held void.

Trustees are not permitted to “chill the bidding” by making statements which would discourage bidding, for example, a statement that it is unlikely that the sale will be held because the debtor intends to reinstate#. If a trustee does engage in “chilled bidding”, the sale is subject to being set aside#.

____________________________________________________________________________________

# See, Nelson & Whitman, supra, Section 7.21; Dingus, Mortgages-Redemption After Foreclosure Sale in

Missouri, 25 Mo.L.REV. 261, 284 (1960).

# Biddle v. National Old Line Ins. Co., 513 S.W.2d 135 (Tex.Civ.App.1974), error refused n.r.e.; Sullivan v. Federal Farm Mortgage Corp., 62 Ga.App.402, 8 S.E.2d 126 (1940).

# Queen City Savings v. Manhalt, 111 Wn.2d 503 (1988).

2. Strict Construction of the Deed of Trust Statute
The nonjudicial foreclosure process is intended to be inexpensive and efficient while providing an adequate opportunity for preventing wrongful foreclosures and promoting the stability of land titles#. However, statutes allowing foreclosure under a power of sale contained within the trust deed or mortgage are usually strictly construed. Id. at 509.
Recent decisions have moved away from the strict construction ruling, holding that some technical violations of statutes governing nonjudicial foreclosures will not serve as grounds for setting aside sale when the error was non-prejudicial and correctable. See Koegal, supra at 113. An example of a non-prejudicial and correctable error is noncompliance with the requirement that the trustee record the notice of sale 90-days prior to the actual sale when actual notice of the sale was given to the debtors 90-days prior to the sale and the lack of recording caused no harm. Steward, supra at 515. Further, inconsequential defects often involve minor discrepancies regarding the notice of sale. In Bailey v. Pioneer Federal Savings and Loan Association, 210 Va. 558, 172 S.E.2d 730 (1970), where the first of four published notices omitted the place of the sale, the court held that since there was “substantial compliance” with the requirements specified by the deed of trust and since the parties were not affected in a “material way,” the sale was valid#. In another case, where the notice of sale was sent by regular rather than by statutorily required certified or registered mail and the mortgagor had actual notice of the sale for more than the statutory period prior to the sale, the sale was deemed valid#. Clearly a grantor must show some prejudice.

D. POST-SALE REMEDIES

1. Statutory Presumptions
The Washington Deed of Trust Act contains statutory presumptions in connection with a trustee’s sale that are similar to those found in most other states. # RCW 61.24.040(7) provides, in part:

. . . the [trustee’s] deed shall recite the facts showing that the sale was conducted in compliance with all of the requirements of this chapter and of the deed of trust, which recital shall be prima facie evidence of such compliance and conclusive evidence thereof in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

# See also Tarleton v. Griffin Federal Savings Bank, 202 Ga.App. 454, 415 S.E.2d 4 (1992); Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Services, Inc., 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987).

# Macon-Atlanta State Bank v. Gall, 666 S.W.2d 934 (Mo.App.1984). For a complete list of defects considered “insubstantial”, see Graham v. Oliver, 659 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Mo.App.1983).
# See also Cal. Civ. Code § 2924 (West 1981); Utah Code Ann.1953, 57-1-28; West’s Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. §38-39-115; Or.Rev.Stat. 86.780; So.Dak.Compiled Laws 21-48-23.

Such provisions are designed to protect bona fide purchasers and to assure that the title passed through a trustee’s sale will be readily insurable. However, although the required recitals are described as “conclusive” in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value, there is extensive case law setting forth the basis for rebutting these presumptions. They also don’t apply to a dispute between the grantor and grantee. See, generally, Nelson & Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law, (2d ed. 1985) § 7.21 ff. Some states employ other means of stabilizing titles, such as title insurance. Yet another means of stabilizing titles is to include a provision in the deed of trust that in the event of a trustee’s sale, the recital will be conclusive proof of the facts. See, Johnson v. Johnson, 25 Wn. 2d 797 (1946); Glidden v. Municipal Authority, 111 Wn. 2d 341 (1988), modified By Glidden v. Municipal Authority, 764 P.2d 647 (1988).

2. The Bona Fide Purchaser
The law is well settled that a bona fide purchaser, in order to achieve that status, must have purchased the property “for value.” See RCW 61.24.040(7).

The general rule is set forth in Phillips v. Latham, 523 S.W.2d 19, 24 (Tex. 1975):

[The purchaser] cannot claim to be a good-faith purchaser for value because the jury found . . . that the sale price of $691.43 was grossly inadequate. These findings are not attacked for lack of evidence. Although good faith does not necessarily require payment of the full value of the property, a purchaser who pays a grossly inadequate price cannot be considered a good-faith purchaser for value.

Further, if a lis pendens has been recorded, it “will cause the purchaser to take subject to the plaintiff’s claims.” Bernhardt, California Mortgage & Deed of Trust Practice (2d Edition 1990).

A purchaser will not then constitute a bona fide purchaser able to utilize the presumptions of regularity in recitals of the trustee’s deed. See CC § 2924. The beneficiary of a deed of trust is not a bona fide purchaser. See Johnson, supra.

E. SETTING ASIDE THE TRUSTEE’S SALE

Setting aside a trustee’s sale is largely a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Crummer v. Whitehead, 230 Cal. App. 2d 264, 40 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1964); Brown v. Busch, 152 Ca. App. 2d 200, 313 P.2d 19 (1957). After a trustee’s sale has taken place, a trustor or junior lienor may bring an action in equity to set aside the sale. See Crummer v. Whitehead, 230 Cal. App. 2d 264, 40 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1964); see also Note, “Court Actions Contesting The Nonjudicial Foreclosure of Deeds of Trust In Washington,” 59 Wash.L.Rev. 323 (1984)#.

An action may be brought to set aside a trustee’s sale under circumstances where the trustee’s sale is void. Cox v. Helenius, 103 Wn.2d 383, 693 P.2d 683 (1985). In those circumstances where the defect in the trustee’s sale procedure does not render the trustee’s sale void, the court will probably apply equitable principles in deciding what relief, if any, is available to the parties. A general discussion of equitable principles in contexts other than trustee’s sale can be found in Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoake Associates, 82 Wn.2d 475, 513 P.2d 36 (1973) and Arnold v. Melani, 75 Wn.2d 143, 437 P.2d 908 (1968). Although it is preferable to raise any defenses to the obligations secured by the deed of trust or other defects in the nonjudicial foreclosure process prior to the trustee’s sale, a trustee’s sale can presumably be set aside if there was a good reason for not restraining it. Possible reasons could include those described below.

__________________________________________________________________________________

# Attempting to Set Aside Deed of Trust Foreclosure Because of Trustee’s Fiduciary Breach, 53 Missouri L. Rev. 151 (1988).

1. Breach of the Trustee’s Duty

a. Inadequate Sale Price

The general rule on using inadequate sale price to set aside a deed of trust sale is stated in Nelson & Whitman, supra, § 7.21:

All jurisdictions adhere to the recognized rule that mere inadequacy of the foreclosure sale price will not invalidate a sale, absent fraud, unfairness, or other irregularity. Stating the rule in a slightly different manner, courts sometimes say that inadequacy of the sale price is an insufficient ground unless it is so gross as to shock the conscience of the court, warranting an inference of fraud or imposition#.

In Cox v. Helenius, supra, at p. 388, the court indicated that the inadequate sale price coupled with the trustee’s actions, would have resulted in a void sale, even if not restrained.

Generally, unless the sale price is grossly inadequate, other irregularities or unfairness must exist. However, considerable authority exists to support setting aside a sale when, coupled with an inadequate sale price, there is any other reason warranting equitable relief. Nelson & Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law, supra.

b. Hostility or Indifference to Rights of Debtor.

In Dingus, supra, at 289, it is stated:

In an action to set aside a foreclosure sale under a deed of trust, evidence showing that the trustee was hostile and wholly indifferent to any right of the mortgagor warrants setting aside the sale. Lunsford v. Davis, 254 S.W. 878 (Mo. 1923).

CF. Cox v. Helenius, supra.

c. Other Trustee Misconduct

Other trustee misconduct that would give rise to grounds for setting aside a trustees sale could include “chilled bidding” where the trustee acts in a manner that discourages other parties from bidding on the property#. Actions by the trustee which lull the debtor into inaction may also give rise to grounds for avoiding the sale#. Particular note should also be made of the discussion in Cox v. Helenius, supra, at p.390 in which trustees who serve a dual role as trustee and attorney for the beneficiary are directed to transfer one role to another person where an actual conflict of interest arises.

2. Absence of Other Foreclosure Requisites

RCW 61.24.030 sets forth the requisites to non-judicial foreclosure. Failure to meet these requisites may render the trustee’s sale void. In Cox v. Helenius, 103 Wn.2d 383, 693 P.2d 683 (1985), the court concluded that a trustee’s sale was void under circumstances where the borrower had filed an action contesting the obligation and that action was pending at the time of the trustee’s sale. The action was filed after service of the notice of default but before service of the notice of foreclosure and trustee’s sale.

___________________________________________________________________________________

# Nelson & Whitman, supra, Section 7.21. Dingus, supra, at p. 274; see also Biddle v. National Old Line Insurance Co., 513 S.W.2d 135 (Tex.Civ.App. 1974).

# Dingus, supra, at pp. 272-73; Cox v. Helenius, supra, at p. 389.

The decision in Cox was based on language in the Deed of Trust Act that made it a requisite to foreclosure that “no action is pending on an obligation secured by the deed of trust.” That part of the Cox decision was legislative overruled by Chapter 193, Law of 1985, Reg. Sess., which amended RCW 61.24.030(4) to read as follows:

That no action commenced by the beneficiary of the deed of trust is now pending to seek satisfaction of an obligation secured by the deed of trust in any court by reason of the grantor’s default on the obligation secured;

As a result of the amendment, pendency of an action on the obligation brought by the grantor does not render a subsequent trustee’s sale void. Only pending actions commenced by the beneficiary to seek satisfaction of the obligation secured by the deed of trust operate as a bar to nonjudicial foreclosure. The trustee must be properly appointed and be appointed before the trustee has authority to act. When an eager trustee “jumps the gun” the actions are equally void.

F. ADDITIONAL STATUTORY REMEDIES

1. Confirmation of Sale Price.

Many states (but not Washington) require confirmation that the nonjudicial sale resulted in a fair value to the debtor. Below is listed the states that have adopted fair market value statutes#. Fair market value statutes are usually used to limit deficiency judgments to the difference between the fair market value and the debt. Failure to confirm the sale within the statutory period is usually a bar to a deficiency. For example, in Georgia the court must be petitioned for a confirmation of the sale if a deficiency judgment is sought.

2. Redemption in Nonjudicial Foreclosures.

Approximately one-half of the states allow for redemption after foreclosure, although not Washington. Some states allow redemption after a nonjudicial sale. See Minnesota Statutes Annotated § 580 et seq. Generally, the grantor can remain in possession during the redemption period, rent the property (retaining the rents) and/or sell the property (or sell the redemption rights).

G. RAISING DEFENSES IN THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER (EVICTION) ACTION

________________________________

# Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §33-814(A) (1989).
California: Cal. Civ. Code §580a (1989); Id. §726 (1989); Kirkpatrick v. Stelling, 36 Cal. App.2d 658, 98
P.2d 566, appeal dismissed, 311 U.S. 607 (1940); Risenfeld, California Legislation Curbing Deficiency
Judgments, 48 Calif. L. rev. 705 (1960). See infra, California jurisdictional summary in Part 1.
Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. §§44-14-161, -162 (1989).
Idaho: Idaho Code §§6-108, 45-1512 (1988).
Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§600.3170, .3280 (1989).
Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. §76-1013 (1989).
Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. §40.457 (1988).
New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A:50-3 (1989).
New York: N.Y. Real Prop. Acts Law §1371 (McKinney 1979 and Supp. 1990).
North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. §45-21.36 (1988).
North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code §32-19-06 (Supp. 1989).
Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. tit. 12, §686 (1990).
Pennsylvania: Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 §§2621.1, .6 (Purdon 1967).
South Dakota: S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §§21-47-16, -48-14 (1989).
Utah: Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32 (1989).
Washington: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §61.12.060 (1989).
Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. §846.165 (1988).

In Washington, RCW 61.24.060 specifies that the purchaser at a trustee’s sale is entitled to possession of the property on the 20th day following the sale. If the grantor or person claiming through the grantor refuses to vacate the property, the purchaser is entitled to bring an action to recover possession of the property pursuant to the unlawful detainer statute, RCW 59.12. Ordinarily, parties in possession will not be allowed to raise some defenses in the unlawful detainer action that could have been raised prior to the trustee’s sale#. In most states defenses in an eviction action are severely limited. Despite these early cases restricting defenses in unlawful detainer, e.g. Peoples National Bank v. Ostander, 6 Wn. App. 28 (1971), a more recent case, Cox v. Helenius, 103 Wash. 2d 208 (1985), allowed defenses to be raised that the sale was void because of defects in the foreclosure process itself. In fact, Cox v. Helenius was initially a unlawful detainer action in the King County Superior Court. In Savings Bank of Puget Sound v. Mink, 49 Wn. App. 204 (1987), Division One of the Court of Appeals, held that a number of defenses raised by the appellant (Truth-in-Lending violations, infliction of emotional distress, defamation, slander, etc.) were not properly assertable in an unlawful detainer action but ruled that:

However, in Cox v. Helenius, supra, the Supreme Court recognized that there may be circumstances surrounding the foreclosure process that will void the sale and thus destroy any right to possession in the purchaser at the sale. In Cox, the Court recognized two bases for post sale relief: defects in the foreclosure process itself, i.e., failure to observe the statutory prescriptions and the existence of an actual conflict of interest on the part of the trustee…

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# People’s National Bank v. Ostrander, 6 Wn. App. 28, 491 P.2d 1058 (1970). See, however, Crummer v. Whitehead, 230 Cal. App. 2d 264 (1964) contra declined to follow by Eardley v. Greenberg, 160 Az.518, 774 P.2d 822 (Az.App. Div. 1 1989); MCA, Inc., v. Universal Diversified Enterprises Corp., 27 Cal. App. 3d 170 (1972). contra declined to follow by Eardley v. Greenberg, 160 Az.518, 774 P.2d 822 (Az.App. Div. 1 1989) But in a bankruptcy proceeding, defenses may be raised after the sale if the debtor is in possession.

B. The Deed of Trust Act must be construed strictly against lenders and in favor of borrowers.

Washington law is similarly clear that the Deed of Trust Act, being non-judicial in nature and without the scrutiny by courts until the unlawful detainer stage, is strictly construed against lenders and in favor of borrowers. Queen City Savings and Loan v. Mannhalt, 111

In order to avoid the jurisdictional and other problems that arise when trying to litigate claims in the unlawful detainer action, it is recommended that a separate action be filed to set aside the trustee’s sale and that the two actions be consolidated.

H. DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE

There is a damage claim for the tort of wrongful foreclosure. The claim may also exist as a breach of contract claim. See, Theis v. Federal Finance Co., 4 Wn. App. 146 (1971); Cox v. Helenius, supra.

III. DEFENDING JUDICIAL FORECLOSURES

A. INTRODUCTION

The same range of defenses is generally available to the borrower in both nonjudicial and judicial foreclosures. Defenses may include fraud or misrepresentation, violations of Truth-in-Lending, violations of usury statutes, violations of other consumer protection acts, or failure to comply with applicable regulations when the government is the lender, insurer, or guarantor. Other defenses, however, are unique to judicial foreclosures and must be raised affirmatively. Most rights are set forth in statutes and they must be asserted in compliance with the particular requirements of the law. The judicial foreclosure statutes are set forth below#.

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# Alabama: Ala. Code §§6-9-140 to 150; 164; 35-10-2 to 35-10-12; (1977).
Alaska: Alaska Stat. §§90.45.170 to .220 (1991).
Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§33-721 to 33-728 (1991).
Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. §§18-49-103 to 106 (1987).
California: Cal. Civ. proc. §§725a to 730.5 (West 1991).
Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§38-38-101 to 38-38-111 (West 1991).
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§49-24 to 49-31 (West 1991).
Delaware: Del. Code Ann. tit. 10 §§5061 to 5067 (1991).
D.C.: D.C. Code Ann. §45-716 (1981).
Florida: Fla. Stat. Ann. §702.01 (West 1992).
Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. §§9-13-140; 44-14-48 to 44-14-49; 44-14-184; 187; 189 (1991).
Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. §§667-1 to 667-7 (1991)
Idaho: Idaho Code §§6-101 to 6-103; 45-1502 to 45-1503 (1991).
Illinois: Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 10, para. 15-1404; 15-1501 to 15-1512 (Smith-Hurd 1987).
Indiana: Ind. Code Ann. §32-8-11-3 (Burns 1980)
Iowa: Iowa Code Ann. §654.18 (West 1992).
Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. §60-2410 (1990).
Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§381.190; 426.525 (Michie 1991).
Louisiana: La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 2631 (West 1992).
Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, §§6321 to 6325 (West 1991).
Maryland: Md. Real Prop. Code Ann. §7-202 (1988).
Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 244, §1 (West 1992).
Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§600.3101 to 600.3130 (West 1992).
Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Ann. §§581.01 to 581.12 (1992).
Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. §§89-1-53; 89-1-55 (1972).
Missouri: Mo. Ann. Stat. §§443.190 (Vernon 1992).
Montana: Mont. Code Ann. §§71-1-222; 232; 311; 25-13-802 (1991).
Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. §§25-2137 to 25-2147 (1991).
Nevada: Nev. Rev. Ann. Stat. §§40.430; 40.435 (Michie 1991).
New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§479:19 to 479:27 (1991).
New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A:50-2 (West 1991).
New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. §§39-5-1 to 39-5-23; 48-7-7 (1991).

New York: N.Y. Real Prop. Acts Law §§1321; 1325 to 1355 (McKinney 1992).
North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. §§45-21.16; 45-21.17; 45-38 (1991).
North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code §32-19-01 to 32-19-40 (1992).
Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2323.07 (Anderson 1984).
Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §686 (West 1992).
Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. §§88.010 et seq. (1989).
Pennsylvania: Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §§274; 715; Pa. Rules Civ. Proc. Rules 1141 to 1150; 3180 to 3183;
3232; 3244; 3256; 3257.
Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws §34-27-1 (1984).
South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. §§15-7-10; 29-3-650 (Law Co-op 1990).
South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§21-47-1 to 25; 21-48A-4 (1991).
Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. §21-1-803 (1991).
Texas: Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§51-002; 51.004; 51.005 (West 1992).
Utah: Utah Code Ann. §§78-37-1 to 78-37-9 (1986).
Vermont: Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §4528 (1991).
Virgin Islands: V.I. Code Ann. tit. 28, §531 to 535 (1991).
Virginia: Va. Code Ann. §§55-59.4; 55-61 (Michie 1981).
Washington: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§61.12.040; 61.12.060 (West 1992).
West Virginia: W. Va. Code §§55-12-1 to 55-12-8 (1991).
Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. Ann. §§846.01 to 846.25 (West 1991 (Repealed).
Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. §§1-18-101 to 1-18-112 (199).

B. HOMESTEAD RIGHTS

If the plaintiff’s complaint seeks possession of the property at the sheriff’s sale and the homeowner wishes to remain on the premises during the redemption period, then the homeowner should plead the existence of homestead rights in the answer so as not to waive them. State, ex rel., O’Brien v. Superior Court, 173 Wash. 679, 24 P.2d 117 (1933); State, ex rel., White v. Douglas, 6 Wn.2d 356, 107 P.2d 593 (1940).

C. UPSET PRICE

Some states authorize the court to establish an upset price (or minimum bid amount) in a foreclosure sale. In Washington, RCW 61.12.060 authorizes the court where a deficiency is sought, in ordering a sheriff’s sale, to take judicial notice of economic conditions and, after a proper hearing, fix a minimum or upset price for which the mortgaged premises must be sold before the sale will be confirmed. If a depressed real estate market justifies seeking an upset price, then the mortgagor should request in the answer that one be set. See, McClure v. Delguzzi, 53 Wn. App. 404 (1989). Some states give this power to the courts with any sale without reference to any other valuation method. See e.g. Kan. Stat. §60-2415(b) (1988); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §600.3155 (1919). The court has great discretion in arriving at and setting an upset price if the statute fails to specify the method to be used in calculating the price. There is always the danger that in the absence of statutory standards, the power to set the upset price will be abused#.

D. DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS

A deficiency judgment results when the amount for which the property is sold at the sheriff’s sale is less than the amount of the judgment entered in the foreclosure action. A deficiency judgment in connection with a foreclosure is enforceable like any other money judgment. If the mortgage or other instrument contains an express agreement for the payment of money, then the lender may seek a deficiency judgment. See RCW 61.12.070. In Thompson v. Smith, 58 Wn. App. 361 (1990), Division I, held the acceptance of a deed in lieu of foreclosure triggers the anti-deficiency provisions of the Deed of Trust Act, 61.24.100. The procedural requirements for obtaining a deficiency judgment vary, but must be strictly adhered to or the right will be lost. In general, an action must be brought within a statutorily set amount of time following the foreclosure sale. For example, California Civ. Proc. Code § 726 (Supp. 1984) (three months); N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1371 (2) (McKinney 1979) (ninety days); and Pennsylvania Stat. Ann. tit. 12, section 2621.7 (1967) (six months). Many states also have time limits for the completion of the execution of a deficiency. Maryland Rules, Rule W75 (b)(3) (1984) (three years); and Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2329.08 (Anderson 1981) (two years on land with dwelling for two families or less or used as a farm dwelling). Some states have longer redemption periods when a deficiency is sought. e.g. Wisconsin (6-12 months); Washington (8-12 months).

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# See Michigan Trust Co. v. Dutmers, 265 Mich. 651, 252 N.W. 478 (1933).

E. REDEMPTION RIGHTS

Approximately one-half of the states have statutes that give a borrower the right to redeem the property after the foreclosure sale. This right has specific statutory time limits. The time period for redemption varies from thirty days to three years after the foreclosure sale. Strict compliance with the statutory requirements is mandatory.

Under Washington law, if the lender seeks a deficiency judgment or if the mortgage does not contain a clause that the property is not for agricultural purposes, then the redemption period is one year from the date of the sheriff’s sale. See RCW 6.23.020.

If the lender does not seek a deficiency judgment and the mortgage contains a clause that the property is not being used for agricultural purposes, than the redemption period is eight months. Id.

There is no statutory redemption period if there is a structure on the land and the court finds that the property has been abandoned for six months prior to the decree of foreclosure. See RCW 61.12.093. This section is not applicable to property that is used primarily for agricultural purposes. RCW 61.12.095.

The purchaser at the sheriff’s sale, or the purchaser’s assignee, must send notice to the judgment debtor every two months that the redemption period is expiring. Failure to give any of the notices in the manner and containing the information required by statute will operate to extend the redemption period. RCW 6.23.080.

Any party seeking to redeem must give the sheriff at least five days written notice of the intention to apply to the sheriff for that purpose. RCW 6.23.080(1). The amount necessary to redeem is the amount of the bid at the sheriff’s sale, interest thereon at the rate provided in the judgment to the time of redemption, any assessment or taxes which the purchaser has paid after circumstances, other sums that were paid on prior liens or obligations. RCW 6.23.020.

Redemption rights are freely alienable and a property owner can sell the homestead during the redemption period free of judgment liens. Great Northwest Federal Savings and Loan Association v. T.B. and R.F. Jones, Inc., 23 Wn. App. 55, 596 P.2d 1059 (1979). This is an important right and is often overlooked. For example, in VA loans the sale price is very low because the VA deducts its anticipated costs of holding and resale. Therefore, the property can be redeemed for that amount. There, lenders routinely advise debtors to move out at the beginning of the period, which they do not legally have to do.

The debtor can sometimes rent the property and the rents retained during the redemption period.

F. POSSESSION AFTER SALE

If the homeowner exercises his redemption rights and there is a purchaser in possession, then the homeowner can apply for a writ of assistance to secure possession of the property anytime before the expiration of the redemption period. If the homeowner has no right to claim a homestead or is not occupying the property as a homestead during redemption period, then the lender can apply for a writ of assistance at the time of the foreclosure decree to obtain possession of the property. A writ of assistance is similar to a writ of restitution and is executed by the sheriff. The purchaser at the sheriff’s sale normally has no right to possession until after receipt of a sheriff’s deed#.

G. POST FORECLOSURE RELIEF

A foreclosure can be vacated under rules allowing vacating judgments, e.g. F.R.Civ.P 60(b); See also Godsden & Farba, Under What Circumstances Can a Foreclosure Sale be Set Aside Under New York Law, New York State Bar Journal (May 1993).

IV. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES

A. BANKRUPTCY

Bankruptcy has a significant impact on real estate foreclosures and is beyond the scope of this outline. Under section 362 (a) of the Bankruptcy Code, filing any of the three types of bankruptcy stays all foreclosure proceedings. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (a)(4); Murphy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 34 Clev.St.L.Rev. 597 (1986). A stay has been held to apply to a possessory interest after foreclosure to allow a challenge to the validity of the foreclosure in an adversary action in bankruptcy court. In re Campos, No. 93-04719 (W.D. WN-B.Ct, Order of July 9, 1993). The stay applies to both judicial and nonjudicial foreclosures and it also applies whether or not the foreclosure was begun before the bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (a). The only notable exception to the automatic stay is for foreclosures brought by the Secretary of HUD on federally insured mortgages for real estate involving five or more units. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (b)(8).

A trustee in a bankruptcy may also undo a foreclosure as a fraudulent transfer if a creditor gets a windfall. See II U.S.C. §547 and §548, within 90 days or within one year if an “insider” forecloses#.

A portion of the equity under state or federal law may be protected from creditors, although not from secured creditors.

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# Norlin v. Montgomery, 59 Wn.2d 268, 357 P.2d 621 (1961). The mortgagee’s right to possession of the property is not lost through default or abandonment. overruled on other grounds. Howard v. Edgren, 62 Wn.2d 884, 385 P.2d 41 (1963).

B. WORKOUTS (DEED IN LIEU)

A deed is sometimes given by a mortgagor in lieu of foreclosure and in satisfaction of a mortgage debt. Such a workout “is subject to close scrutiny in an effort to determine whether it was voluntarily entered into on the part of the mortgagor under conditions free of undue influence, oppression, unfairness or unconscientious advantage. Further the burden of proving the fairness rests with the mortgagee.” Robar v. Ellingson, 301 N.W.2d 653, 657-658 (N.D.1981) (insufficient threshold evidence of oppression or unfairness to trigger mortgagee’s burden of proof). Courts also tend to find the deed in lieu of foreclosure to be another mortgage transaction in the form of an absolute deed. Peugh v. Davis, 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 332, 24 L.Ed. 775 (1877). See also, Noelker v. Wehmeyer, 392 S.W.2d 409 (Mo.App.1965). When a mortgagee takes a deed in lieu there is the possibility that the conveyance will be avoided under bankruptcy laws. It should be noted that if other liens have been created against a property after the time of the original mortgage, the deed in lieu will not cut off those liens. See Note, 31 Mo.L.Rev. 312, 314 (1966). A deed in lieu should contain a comprehensive agreement regarding any deficiency claims, etc.

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# See Durrett v. Washington National Ins., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980); cf. In re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984). Compare state fraudulent conveyances statutes, e.g, RCW 19.40.031.

C. LENDER LIABILITY

It is possible to use theories of lender liability to assist in successfully negotiating a workout, or an avoidance of foreclosure. This principally occurs in commercial foreclosures but there are some strategies that apply to the residential setting. This may involve persuading the lender that failing to reach a workout agreement may result in a claim against the lender, absolving the borrower from liability on the loan and/or granting an affirmative judgment against the lender. Some of the useful theories of lender liability are breach of agreement to lend, breach of loan agreement, failure to renew term note/wrongful termination, promissory estoppel, lender interference, and negligent loan management. Some of the common law defenses for a borrower are fraud, duress, usury and negligence. Further, because banks are so closely regulated, a borrower should also explore statutory violations. For a detailed treatment of workouts, see Dunaway, supra, (Vol. 1, Chapter 4B)#.

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# See also, Penthouse International v. Dominion Fed. S&L, 665 F. Supp. 301 (S.D. N.Y. 1987, rev. 855 F.2d 963 (2nd Cir. 1988); Joques v. First National, 515 A.2d 756 (Md. 1976); KMC v. Irving Trust, 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Libilities Resulting From Improper Interference with Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. Law J. 343 (1975).

D. MOBILE HOME FORECLOSURES

Generally, mobile homes are repossessed under Article 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and are beyond the scope of this outline. Many states limit deficiencies in purchase money security agreements and/or allow reinstatement. There are many abuses in the sales of mobile homes and the various consumer protection laws (and usury laws) provide a fertile source of potential defenses. See generally, Unfair and Deceptive Practices, National Consumer Law Center (2nd ed.), paragraph 5.4.8.

E. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF FORECLOSURE

Although beyond the scope of this outline, there are tax consequences when property is foreclosed, particularly in commercial transactions.

First, a foreclosure or deed in lieu of foreclosure is treated as a sale or exchange. Treas. Rep. 1-001-2; Rev. Ruling 73-36, 1973-1 CB 372. The amount realized (gained) is the greater of the sales proceeds or the debt satisfied. Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950). When debt is cancelled (such as by an anti-deficiency statute), a gain may be generated. IRS Code §61(a).

Second, when home equity debt plus purchase debts exceeds the value of the property, a taxable gain can be generated. Finally, if the debtor is “insolvent” when the foreclosure occurs, §108(a)(1)(A) of the IRS Code excludes income (gain) to the extent the debtor is insolvent. This is complicated and a tax expert should be consulted to analyze any potential tax bite upon foreclosure. See generally, Dunaway, supra, for a detailed analysis of the tax consequences of foreclosure.

V. THE GOVERNMENT AS INSURER, GUARANTOR OR LENDER

A. INTRODUCTION

There are a variety of federal home ownership programs that may provide special protections for homeowners who are faced with the prospect of foreclosure. These protections generally apply regardless of whether the security divide used is a mortgage or deed of trust. The programs range from home loans insured by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) or guaranteed by the Veteran’s Administration (VA) to programs such as the Farmer’s Home Administration (FmHA) home ownership program where the government acts as a direct lender. The procedures which must be followed by loan servicers and applicable governmental agencies are described below. Also, Fannie Mae published in 1997 a Foreclosure Manual for loan services, which outlines various workouts and other loss mitigation procedures.

When the government controls the loan (or the lender) its actions are subject to the protection of the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution#. This calls into question the use of nonjudicial foreclosure as there is no opportunity to be heard and notice is usually deficient or, at best, minimal.

B. HUD WORKOUT OPTIONS

1. Applicability

Homeowners who have a HUD insured mortgage or deed of trust may be eligible for relief through the HUD foreclosure prevention program. HUD regulations also require that lenders meet certain servicing responsibilities before proceeding with foreclosure. Regulations for loss mitigation are found at 24 C.F.R. Sec. 203.605.

2. Procedure when the Homeowner is in Default

a. Delinquency Required for Foreclosure.

The servicer shall not turn the action over for foreclosure until at least three full monthly payments are unpaid after application of any partial payments. 24 C.F.R. Sec. 203. The servicer is required to send a HUD brochure on avoiding foreclosure to the borrower informing them of their right to seek various alternatives to foreclosure.

The servicer must allow reinstatement even after foreclosure has been started if the homeowner tenders all amounts to bring the account current, including costs and attorney fees. 24 C.F.R. Sec. 203.

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# See Vail v. Brown, 946 F.2d 589 (8th Cir. 1991); Johnson v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 734 F.2d 774 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Murdoch, 627 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Boley v. Brown, 10 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 1993).

b. Forbearance Relief.

The homeowner may be eligible for special forbearance relief if it is found that the default was due to circumstances beyond the homeowners’ control. 24 C.F.R. Sec. 203. The homeowner and the lender are authorized to enter into a forbearance agreement providing for:
i. Increase, reduction, or suspension of regular payments for a specified period;

ii. Resumption of regular payments after expiration of the forbearance period;

iii. Arrangements for payment of the delinquent amount before the maturity date of the mortgage or at a subsequent date.

Suspension or reduction or payments shall not exceed 18 months under these special forbearance relief provisions.

c. Recasting of Mortgage.

HUD has the authority to approve a recasting agreement to extend the term of the mortgage and reduce the monthly payments. 24 C.F.R. Sec. 203.

HUD’s actions may be declared unlawful and set aside if the court finds it to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. See Federal National Mortgage Association v. Rathgens, 595 F. Supp. 552 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Butler v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 595 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1984). See, generally, Ferrell v. Pierce, 560 F. Supp. 1344 (N.D. Ill. 1983).

In Brown v. Kemp, 714 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Wash. 1989) the court found HUD’s decision for an assignment program application to be informal agency action and thus reviewable under the “arbitrary” and “capricious” standard.
Failure to follow servicing requirements or comply with the HUD assignment regulations or handbook provisions may also constitute an equitable defense to foreclosure#.

C. THE VA HOME LOAN PROGRAM

1. Applicability

Homeowners who have a VA guaranteed mortgage or deed of trust may be eligible for relief through a VA recommended forbearance program or “refunding” of the loan. Regulations promulgated at 38 C.F.R. Sec. 36.4300, et seq., and VA servicing handbooks establish a policy of forbearance when a loan is in default. The VA is reluctant to enforce these regulations against lenders.

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# See, Bankers Life Company v. Denton, 120 Ill. App. 3d 676, 458 N.E.2d 203 (1983); Brown v. Lynn, 385 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Ill. 1974); GNMA v. Screen, 379 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1976); Cross v. FNMA, 359 So.2d 464 (1978); FNMA v. Ricks, 372 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1975); contra, Robert v. Cameron Brown Co., 556 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1977); Hernandez v. Prudential Mortgage Corporation, 553 F.2d 241 (1st Cir. 1977).

2. Forbearance Relief

Lenders are officially encouraged to grant forbearance relief for mortgagors who default on their loans due to circumstances beyond their control. Lender’s Handbook, VA Pamphlet No. 26-7 (Revised) and VA Manual 26-3. These rights should be pursued with the lender immediately.

3. Refunding Loans

The Veteran’s Administration is authorized to “refund” loans when borrowers meet certain criteria. Refunding the loan is when the VA pays the lender in full and takes an assignment of the loan and security in cases where the loan is in default. The VA then owns the loan and the veteran makes payments to the VA directly. Although 38 C.F.R. Sec. 36.4318 authorize refunding, the regulations are much more vague than those promulgated in connection with the HUD assignment program.

4. Judicial Review

The VA decision to deny assignment of a VA loan is committed to agency discretion within the meaning of the federal Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 701(a)(2), and is not reviewable. Rank v. Nimmo, 677 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1982).

The courts have ruled that a borrower has no express or implied right of action in federal court to enforce duties, which VA or lenders might have under VA publications with respect to forbearance assistance. See, Rank v. Nimmo, supra; Gatter v. Nimmo, 672 P.2d 343 (3rd Cir. 1982); Simpson v. Clelend, 640 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1981). But, see, Union National Bank v. Cobbs, 567 A.2d 719 (1989) (failure to follow VA Handbook an equitable defense).

Failure to follow VA publications, however, may be an equitable defense to foreclosure under state law. See, Simpson v. Cleland, supra.

5. Waiver of Debt/Release of Liability

Federal statutes, VA regulations and guidelines require the VA to waive a deficiency (or indemnity) debt, after a foreclosure, when equity and good conscience require it. 38 C.F.R. §1.965(a)(3). The VA is reluctant to follow its own regulations and must be pressed. The Court of Veterans Appeals (CVA) reverses over 50% of denial of waivers – an astonishing measure of the VA’s failure to follow clear federal law! See The Veterans Advocate, Vol. 5, No. 10, P. 93 (June 1994). The VA urged its regional offices to avoid CVA rulings until forced to retract this directive. See The Veterans Advocate, supra. The VA also ignores the six-year statute of limitations when demanding payment. 28 U.S.C. 2415.

Secondly, the VA can determine that the claimed debt is invalid, such as when the veteran is eligible for a retroactive release of liability. This occurs when the VA would have released the veterans when the property was sold to a qualifying purchaser who assumes the debt. 38 U.S.C. 3713(b); Travelstead v. Derwinski, 978 F.2d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

The VA has the burden to determine whether the veteran should be released.

6. Deficiency Judgments and VA Loans

It is the policy of VA to order an appraisal prior to a judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure sale and to instruct the lender to bid the amount of the appraisal at the sale. This “appraisal” is always below fair market value and includes the VA’s anticipated costs of holding and liquidating the property. 38 U.S.C. 3732(c); 38 C.F.R. §36.4320. Ordinarily, on pre-1989 laws, VA will not waive its right to seek a deficiency judgment in a judicial foreclosure and will reserve its right to seek a deficiency against a borrower, even in the case of a nonjudicial foreclosure of a deed of trust, notwithstanding the anti-deficiency language of RCW 61.24.100. On loans made after 1989 changes in the VA program, deficiencies are not sought.

Although, United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1960) appears to authorize this VA deficiency policy, the Washington non-judicial deed of trust foreclosure procedure which retains judicial foreclosure and preservation of the right to seek a deficiency judgment as an option, seems to make United States v. Shimer, distinguishable.

In United States v. Vallejo, 660 F. Supp. 535 (1987), the court held that the VA must follow Washington foreclosure law, including the anti-deficiency provisions of the Deed of Trust Act as the “federal common law”. This ruling was subsequently followed in a class action, Whitehead v. Derwinski, 904 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1990), wherein the VA has been permanently enjoined from collecting $63 million in claims and ordered to repay millions in illegally collected deficiencies. This issue of the application of various state laws as to federally insured loans is not clear, as the Ninth Circuit overruled Whitehead in Carter v. Derwinski, 987 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. – en banc – 1993). Subsequent decisions still create doubt as to whether United States v. Shimer, supra, is still good law#.

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# See, United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); United States v. Ellis. 714 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Haddon Haciendas Co., 541 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1976).

At the very least, if the lender is instructed by the VA to preserve the right to seek a deficiency against the borrower, then the lender should be required to foreclose the deed of trust judicially as a mortgage.

D. RURAL HOUSING SECTION 502 LOANS

1. Applicability

The Rural Housing Service (RHS) formerly, the Farmer’s Home Administration, is authorized to grant interest credit and provide moratorium relief for homeowners who fall behind on their loan payments due to circumstances beyond their control. Regulations for moratorium relief and interest credit are found at 7 C.F.R. Sec. 3550 et seq and must be complied with prior to foreclosure. United States v. Rodriguez, 453 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Wn. 1978). See, 42 U.S.C. §1472. All servicing of RHS loans is handled at the Centralized Servicing Center in St. Louis, MO (phone: 1-800-793-8861).

2. Interest Credit

If a homeowner falls behind on his RHS loan because of circumstances beyond his or her control, then RHS has the authority to accept principal only and waive the interest payments. Although RHS is supposed to use this remedy before considering moratorium relief, it rarely does.

3. Moratorium Relief

If a homeowner falls behind in loan payments because of circumstances beyond his or her control, RHS may suspend payments or reduce payments for six months. Moratorium relief may be extended for additional six-month segments up to a total of three years#.

Once a homeowner has been granted moratorium relief, RHS cannot grant it again for five years. If a homeowner cannot resume payments in three years from when moratorium relief began, then it will begin foreclosure proceedings.

After moratorium relief has been extended, the homeowner can make additional partial payments to catch up the delinquent amount or, the loan can be reamortized. RHS will restructure the loan, 7 U.S.C. 2001.

4. Waiver of Redemption and Homestead Rights

Form mortgages used by RHS purported to waive the homeowner’s redemption rights and homestead rights in the event of foreclosure. It is questionable whether such a waiver is enforceable#.

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# See generally, Note, Agricultural Law: FmHA Farm Foreclosures, An Analysis of Deferral Relief, 23 Washburn L.J. 287 (Winter 1984); Newborne, Defenses to a FmHA Foreclosure, 15 NYU Review of Law and Social Change, 313 (1987).

5. Homestead Protection
See, 7 U.S.C. 2000.
6. Lease/Buy-Back
See, 7 U.S.C. 1985 (e).

VI. RESOURCES

The following treatises are excellent sources of basic information about all aspects of the foreclosure process. Dunaway, The Law of Distressed Property (4 volumes – Clark Boardman Co. 1994 and suppls.; Nelson & Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law (West 3rd Ed. 1994); Bernhardt, California Mortgages and Deed of Trust Practice, (3rd ed. 2000 University of Calif.), Repossessions and Foreclosures (4th ed. 2000) National Consumer Law Center. See also, Fuchs, Defending Non-Judicial Residential Foreclosures, Texas Bar J (November 1984).

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# See, United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); United States v. Haddon Haciendas, 541 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Stadium Apts., Inc., 425 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.), (1970), cert. den. 400 U.S. 926, 91 S. Ct. 187 (1970); Phillips v. Blaser, 13 Wn.2d 439, 125 P.2d 291 (1942).

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will help you challenge these fraudsters and save your home from foreclosure visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

How Homeowners Can Identify the Right Parties to Their Mortgage

30 Wednesday Apr 2014

Posted by BNG in Banks and Lenders, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Loan Modification, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, RESPA, Your Legal Rights

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I. Finding the Right Party

A. Send a “Request for Information” under RESPA

The party most often known to your client is the servicer of the mortgage. This is the party that deals most regularly with the client, by requesting and accepting payments and providing mortgage and escrow statements. As agent for the mortgage owner, the servicer is also the party that should have accurate information about the entity that owns and holds the mortgage. Several federal statutes require the servicer to identify the mortgage owner if a proper request is made.

Sending a “qualified written request” under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) has been one method used to compel disclosure of this information from a servicer. The problem with this approach, however, has been that RESPA gave servicers almost three months to comply — the servicer had 20 business days to acknowledge receipt of the request, and 60 business days to provide the information. RESPA regulations that go into effect on January 10, 2014, create a new procedure for information requests and significantly reduce the response period to 10 business days for a request for the mortgage owner.

A written inquiry that seeks information with respect to the borrower’s mortgage loan will now be referred to as “request for information,” rather than a qualified written request. For most requests for information that do not seek information about the mortgage owner, a servicer will need to acknowledge the request within 5 business days of receipt, and respond within 30 business days of receipt. If the borrower or borrower’s agent sends a written request seeking the identity, address or other relevant contact information for the owner or assignee of a mortgage loan, the servicer must respond within 10 business days. Moreover, a servicer is not permitted to extend the time period for responding to such a request by an additional 15 days, as can be done for other requests for information.

The Commentary to Regulation X instructs that a servicer complies with a request for the owner or assignee of a mortgage loan by identifying the person on whose behalf the servicer receives payments from the borrower. To assist in compliance, the CFPB Commentary provides the following examples:

1) A servicer services a mortgage loan that is owned by the servicer or its affiliate in portfolio. The servicer therefore receives the borrower’s payments on behalf of itself or its affiliate. A servicer complies by responding to a borrower’s request with the name, address, and appropriate contact information for the servicer or the affiliate, as applicable;

2) A servicer services a mortgage loan that has been securitized. In general, a special purpose vehicle such as a trust is the owner or assignee of a mortgage loan in a securitization transaction, and the servicer receives the borrower’s payments on behalf of the trust. If a securitization transaction is structured such that a trust is the owner or assignee of a mortgage loan and the trust is administered by an appointed trustee, a servicer complies with a borrower’s request by providing the name of the trust and the name, address, and appropriate contact information for the trustee. If a mortgage loan is owned by “Mortgage Loan Trust, Series ABC-1,” for which “XYZ Trust Company” is the trustee, the servicer should respond by identifying the owner as “Mortgage Loan Trust, Series ABC-1,” and providing the name, address, and appropriate contact information for “XYZ Trust Company” as the trustee.

With respect to investors or guarantors, such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae, the Commentary further notes that although these entities might be exposed to some risk related to mortgage loans held in a trust, either in connection with their role as an investor in securities issued by the trust or as guarantor to the trust, they are not the owners or assignees of the mortgage loans solely as a result of their roles as investors or guarantors. Rather than name Fannie Mae as the owner or assignee of a mortgage held in a securitized trust in which Fannie Mae is a guarantor but does not serve as the trustee for the trust, the Commentary would therefore suggest that the servicer should identify the trustee of the trust as the owner or assignee of the mortgage.

However, the Commentary also recognizes that a party such as a guarantor may in certain circumstances assume multiple roles for a securitization transaction. For example, a mortgage loan subject to a request may be held in a trust as part of a securitization transaction in which Fannie Mae serves as trustee, master servicer, and guarantor. Because Fannie Mae is the trustee of the trust that owns the mortgage loan, a servicer complies with the regulation in responding to a borrower’s request by providing the name of the trust, and the name, address, and appropriate contact information for Fannie Mae as the trustee.

A servicer that fails to comply with a request for information is subject to a cause of action for recovery of the borrower’s actual damages, costs and attorney’s fees, as well as statutory damages up to $2,000 in the case of a pattern and practice of noncompliance.

B. Send a TILA § 1641(f)(2) Request to the Servicer

Similar to RESPA, the Truth in Lending Act contains a provision that requires the loan servicer to tell the borrower who is the actual holder of the mortgage. Upon written request from the borrower, the servicer must state the name, address, and telephone number of the owner of the obligation or the master servicer of the obligation.

One problem with enforcement of this provision had been the lack of a clear remedy. However, a 2009 amendment to TILA explicitly provides that violations of this disclosure requirement may be remedied by TILA’s private right of action found in section 1640(a), which includes recovery of actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorney fees. Still, because section 1640(a) refers to “any creditor who fails to comply,” some courts have held that there is no remedy against a servicer who fails to comply if the servicer is neither the original creditor nor an assignee. Arguments supporting the view that servicers are liable in this situation are set out in § 11.6.9.4 of NCLC’s Truth in Lending (8th ed. and Supp.).

Another problem with the TILA provision is that it does not specify how long the servicer has to respond to the request. To be consistent with the virtually identical requirement under RESPA, courts may conclude that a reasonable response time should not exceed 10 business days after receipt.

C. Review Transfer of Ownership Notices

TILA also requires that whenever ownership of a mortgage loan securing a consumer’s principal dwelling is transferred, the creditor that is the new owner or assignee must notify the borrower in writing, within 30 days after the loan is sold or assigned, of the following information:

the new creditor’s name, address, and telephone number;
the date of transfer;
location where the transfer of ownership is recorded;
the name, address, and telephone number for the agent or other party having authority to receive a rescission notice and resolve issues concerning loan payments; and
any other relevant information regarding the new owner.

This law applies to any transfers made after May 20, 2009. Attorneys should ask their clients for copies of any transfer ownership notices they have received under this law. Assuming that there has been compliance with the statute and the client has kept the notices, the attorney may be able to piece together a chain of title as to ownership of the mortgage loan (for transfers after May 20, 2009) and determine the current owner of the mortgage. Failure to comply with the disclosure requirement gives rise to a private right of action against the creditor/new owner that failed to notify the borrower.

D. Check Fannie & Freddie’s Web Portals

Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have implemented procedures to help borrowers to determine if Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac owns their loan. Borrowers and advocates can either call a toll-free number or enter a street address, unit, city, state, and ZIP code for the property location on a website set up to provide the ownership information. The website information, however, may in some cases refer to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac as “owners” when in fact their participation may have been as the party that had initially purchased the loans on the secondary market and later arranged for their securitization and transfer to a trust entity which ultimately holds the loan.

E. Check the Local Registry of Deeds

Checking the local registry where deeds and assignments are recorded is another way to identify the actual owner. However, attorneys should not rely solely on the registry of deeds to identify the current holder of the obligation, as many assignments are not recorded. In fact, if the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) is named as the mortgagee, typically as “nominee” for the lender and its assigns, then assignments of the mortgage will not be recorded in the local registry of deeds. A call to MERS will not be helpful as MERS will only disclose the name of the servicer and not the owner. In addition, some assignments may be solely for the administrative convenience of the servicer, in which case the servicer is the owner of the mortgage loan.

II. Sample Request for Identity of Mortgage Owner under RESPA

[attorney letterhead]

[date]

[name of servicer]

[address]

Attn: Borrower Inquiry Department

Re: [name of debtors, address, account number]

Dear Sir or Madam:

Please be advised that I represent [debtors] with respect to the mortgage loan you are servicing on the property located at [address]. My clients have authorized me to send this request on their behalf (see Authorization below). As servicer of my client’s mortgage loan, please treat this as a “request for information” pursuant to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, subject to the response period set out in Regulation X, 12 C.F.R.§ 1024.36(d)(2)((i)(A).

Please provide the following information:

The name of the owner or assignee of my clients’ mortgage loan;

The address and telephone number for the owner or assignee of my clients’ mortgage loan;

The name, position and address of an officer of the entity that is the owner or assignee of my clients’ mortgage loan; and

Any other relevant contact information for the owner or assignee of my clients’ mortgage loan.

Thank you for taking the time to respond to this request.

Very truly yours,

_____________________

[attorney]

III. Authorization of Release Information

To: [servicer]

Re: Borrowers: [name of debtors]

Account No: [account no.]

Property Address: [address]

We are represented by the law office of [name of firm] and attorney [name of attorney] concerning the mortgage on our home located at [address]. We hereby authorize you to release any and all information concerning our mortgage loan account to the law office of [name of firm] and attorney [name of attorney] at their request. We also authorize you to discuss our case with the law office of [name of firm] and attorney [name of attorney].

Thank you for your cooperation.

Very truly yours,

_____________________

[debtor 1]

_______________________

[debtor 2]

Summaries of Recent Cases

Published State Cases

Servicer Estopped from Asserting the Statute of Frauds as a Defense to Contract Claim Based on Permanent Mod; Wrongful Foreclosure & Tender

Chavez v. Indymac Mortg. Servs., __ Cal. App. 4th __, 2013 WL 5273741 (Sept. 19, 2013): This case involves the relationship between two principles, the statute of frauds and the doctrine of estoppel. The statute of frauds requires certain types of contracts (and agreements modifying existing contracts) to be memorialized in writing, and invalidates contracts not meeting this standard. Agreements pertaining to the sale of real property are covered by the statute of frauds. A statute of frauds defense, however, is not allowed to fraudulently void a contract. In those cases, “[the doctrine of] equitable estoppel may preclude the use of a statute of frauds defense.” To estop a statute of frauds defense, a plaintiff must show, in part, that the defendant intended (or led the plaintiff to believe they intended) the plaintiff to act upon defendant’s conduct, and that plaintiff did so, to their detriment. Here, the trial court sustained servicer’s demurrer because borrower had not specifically “plead around the statute of frauds” in her complaint. The Court of Appeal disagreed. Both the language of the TPP and the Modification Agreement, combined with the facts alleged in the complaint, preclude a statute of frauds defense. The modification agreement’s language, which was “ambiguous at best and illusory at worse,” promised to “automatically” modify borrower’s loan if she agreed to its terms, fully performed under the TPP, and if her representations continued to be true, but at the same time predicated contract formation on servicer’s execution and return of the Modification Agreement to the borrower. “Under [servicer’s] proposed reading of the Modification Agreement, [borrower] could do everything required of her to be entitled to a permanent modification, but [servicer] could avoid the contact by refusing to send [her] a signed copy of the Modification Agreement for any reason whatsoever.” Despite this language, servicer “objectively intended” to modify borrower’s loan: not only did servicer respond to borrower’s successful TPP completion by sending her the Modification Agreement, but it then accepted borrower’s continued payments. This conduct and the conflicting contractual language in the TPP and Modification Agreement show servicer’s “intent” that borrower act upon this conduct. Borrower detrimentally relied on servicer’s conduct by signing the Modification Agreement, which obligated her to pay additional fees and costs she would otherwise not have paid. Servicer’s statute of frauds defense failed and the demurrer to her breach of contract claim was overturned.

After finding the Modification Agreement enforceable, the court also overturned the demurrer of borrower’s wrongful foreclosure claim, based on a breach of the Modification Agreement. The court did not require tender here, where the servicer “lacked a contractual basis to exercise the power of sale,” which would void the foreclosure. Borrower’s additional claims, that servicer did not provide proper pre-foreclosure notice, would make the foreclosure sale voidable, not void. Under this notice claim alone, borrower would have to tender the amount due, but because her case is partly based on her breach of contract claim, tender is not required.

CC § 2923.5 Pleading Specificity; Damage Causation for Promissory Fraud Claim; Statute of Frauds Applies to Modifications

Rossberg v. Bank of Am., N.A., __ Cal. App. 4th __, 2013 WL 5366377 (Aug. 27, 2013): CC § 2923.5 prevents servicers from filing a notice of default until 30 days after contacting (or diligently attempting to contact) a borrower to discuss foreclosure alternatives. In other words, the servicer must make contact more than 30 days before initiating a foreclosure. Failing to contact or attempting to contact the borrower within the 30 days immediately preceding an NOD does not violate the statute. Here, borrowers alleged their servicer failed to personally meet with them or call them to discuss foreclosure alternatives “in the 30-days leading up to [the NOD].” This insufficient pleading, coupled with the multiple servicer-borrower contacts made before the 30-day window, led the court to affirm the demurrer to borrower’s § 2923.5 claim.

Promissory fraud includes the elements of fraud, but couches them within a promissory estoppel-like structure: 1) a promise made; 2) the intent not to perform at the time of the promise; 3) intent to deceive; 4) reasonable reliance; 5) nonperformance; and 6) damages caused by the reliance and nonperformance. Importantly, a borrower must demonstrate “how the actions he or she took in reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations caused the alleged damages.” If the borrower would have been harmed even without the promise, reliance, and nonperformance, “causation cannot be alleged and a fraud cause of action cannot be sustained.” Here, borrowers alleged reliance on Bank of America’s promises to modify their loan by providing financial documents, disclosing confidential information, and by continuing to make loan payments. These actions, borrowers alleged, led to their inability to obtain a “replacement loan.” First, borrowers make no causal connection between providing personal information and harm. Second, continuing to make loan payments on a debt owed allowed borrowers to remain in their home and is not causally linked to any damages. Borrowers also fail to show sufficient equity to obtain a replacement loan. Finally, borrowers did not allege that their detrimental reliance led to their default, the real harm. The court affirmed the demurrer to the fraud claim.

The statute of frauds requires certain types of contracts to be memorialized in writing, including contracts involving real property. Additionally, a contract to modify a contract subject to the statute of frauds is also within the statute of frauds. Here, borrowers alleged BoA orally promised to modify their promissory note and deed of trust— contracts that fall within the statute of frauds. Following, any modification to those instruments also falls within the statute of frauds and had to be written to be enforceable. Even though BoA’s communications were about modifying borrower’s loan, and not purchasing real property, it still fell within the statute of frauds because it would modify the contract that did convey real property. Since all BoA’s representations were oral, there was no enforceable contract and no viable contract claims

“Dual Tracking” as Basis for an “Unfair” UCL Claim; Duty of Care

Aspiras v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., __ Cal. App. 4th __, 2013 WL 5229769 (Aug. 21, 2013): To bring a UCL claim under the “unfair” prong, borrowers may identify a practice that violates legislatively stated public policy, even if that activity is not technically prohibited by statute. Here, borrowers based their UCL claim on the “unfair” practice of dual tracking, relying on Jolley v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 213 Cal. App. 4th 872 (2013) (“[W]hile dual tracking may not have been forbidden by statute at the time, the new legislation and its legislative history may still contribute to its being considered ‘unfair’ for purposes of the UCL.”). This court of appeal both distinguished Jolley and declined to follow its “dicta.”

First, the court did not find dual tracking in this case. Before the foreclosure sale, Wells Fargo denied borrowers’ modification application. In a subsequent communication, borrowers were told their modification was still “under review” (though borrowers inadequately pled the specifics of this communication). Here, the court zeroed in on a footnote from Jolley quoting from the California Senate floor analysis of AB 278, which ultimately prohibited dual tracking: “‘[B]orrowers can find their loss-mitigation options curtailed because of dual-track processes that result in foreclosures even when a borrower has been approved for a loan modification.’” (emphasis original to Aspiras). Dual tracking is commonly known as the practice of negotiating a loan modification while simultaneously foreclosing, and the Jolley court used this general conception of dual tracking to find a duty of care. See Jolley, 213 Cal. App. 4th at 905-06. This court seems to regard an approved modification, as opposed to a modification “under review,” as the sole basis for a UCL dual tracking based claim. Since borrowers were never approved for a loan modification in this case, the court reasoned that dual tracking never took place.

The court also disagrees with the Jolley court’s interpretation of “unfair” prong of the UCL. “[I]t is not sufficient to merely allege the [unfair] act violates public policy or is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous. . . . [T]o establish a practices is ‘unfair,’ a plaintiff must prove the defendant’s ‘conduct is tethered to an [ ] underlying constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision.’” This court found, unlike Jolley, that dual tracking occurring before HBOR became effective (2013) did not offend any public policy underlying a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision.

Finally, this court declined to follow Jolley dicta finding a duty of care arising from modification negotiations. This court followed several federal district courts finding that “‘offering loan modifications is sufficiently entwined with money lending so as to be considered within the scope of typical money lending activities.’” This court opined that finding a duty of care arising from modifications would disincentivize servicers from modifying loans because they could be held liable afterwards. The court attributed much of its disagreement with Jolley to the construction loan at the center of that case. With construction loans, “the relationship between the lender and the borrower . . . is ‘ongoing’ with contractual disbursements made throughout the construction period.” The Jolley court found a duty of care arising from this situation, and then “expanded its analysis beyond lenders involved in construction loans” to more conventional lender-borrower relationships. This court declined to follow that interpretation.

Disputing Title in an Unlawful Detainer: Consolidation

Martin-Bragg v. Moore, 219 Cal. App. 4th 367 (2013): “Routine” unlawful detainers are summary proceedings, meant to resolve quickly and determine possession only. Title, however, can complicate a UD and render it irresolvable as a summary proceeding. Outside of the landlord-tenant context, UD defendants can make title an issue by asserting rightful title as an affirmative defense. In that case, “the trial court has the power to consolidate [the UD] proceeding with a simultaneously pending action in which title to the property is in issue.” Alternatively, the UD court may stay the UD until the other action resolves title. The court may not, however, decide title as part of the UD by affording it full adversarial treatment, as this would impermissibly turn a summary proceeding into a complex trial. Similarly, a court cannot resolve title as part of a UD summary proceeding, as it did here. This unfairly infringes on a defendant’s due process and right to a full, adversarial trial on the title issue (which can include discovery). Once title is put at issue, a defendant’s due process rights are given priority over a plaintiff’s right to a summary proceeding to decide possession. Not only did this court improperly attempt a summary resolution to the title issue as part of the UD case, but it did so in full recognition of the extremely complex nature of this particular title claim and in the face of defendant’s repeated requests for consolidation. This was an abuse of discretion that prejudiced defendant’s case and the court of appeal accordingly reversed.

Unpublished & Trial Court Decisions

CC § 1367.4(b): HOA Must Accept Partial Payments on Delinquent Assessments

Huntington Cont’l Town House Ass’n, Inc. v. Miner, No. 2013-00623099 (Cal. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 26, 2013): The Davis-Sterling Act governs HOA-initiated judicial foreclosures on assessment liens. Specifically, CC § 1367.4 regulates how HOAs may collect delinquent assessment fees less than $1,800 (any legal manner apart from foreclosure) and more than $1,800 (foreclosure, subject to conditions). Here, the homeowners attempted to pay $3,500 to the HOA during foreclosure litigation. This payment more than covered homeowner’s delinquent assessment, but was below the “total” amount owed, which included the assessment, late fees, interest, and attorney’s fees. The HOA refused to accept this “partial payment” and the trial court allowed foreclosure. The appellate division reversed because the plain language of § 1367.4(b) “allows for partial payments and delineates to what debts, and in which order, payments are to be applied.” The HOA should have accepted the payment, which would have brought homeowners current and tolled the 12-month clock that allows HOAs to proceed with foreclosures under § 1367.4.

Dual Tracking Preliminary Injunction: “Pending” vs. “Under Review”

Pearson v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. C-13-01822 (Cal. Super. Ct. Contra Costa Co. Sept. 13, 2013): CC § 2923.6 prevents servicers from foreclosing while a first lien loan modification is “pending.” Here, borrowers submitted their application in January, a servicer representative confirmed it was the correct type of application to qualify borrowers for a modification, and without making a decision, servicer recorded the NOD in May. Whether or not the application was literally “under review” by the servicer when they recorded the NOD does not affect whether they violated § 2923.6. To resolve a “pending” application under the statute, a servicer must give a written determination to the borrower. Only then can they move forward with foreclosure. Servicer also argued that borrower had not demonstrated a “material change in financial circumstances” that would qualify her for a modification review. CC § 2923.6(g) only requires borrowers submitting a second (or subsequent) modification application to demonstrate a change in finances. Here, borrower’s application was her first attempt to modify her loan. An earlier telephone call with a servicer representative does not constitute a “submission” of an application, as servicer argued. Because borrower has shown she is likely to prevail on the merits of her dual tracking claim, the court granted the preliminary injunction, declining tender and setting a one-time bond of $1,000, plus borrower’s original monthly loan payments.

Motion to Compel Discovery in Wrongful Foreclosure Fraud Claim

Pooni v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., No. 34-2010-00087434-CU-OR-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct. Sacramento Co. Sept. 12, 2013): Discovery requests must be “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Here, borrowers sent Wells Fargo interrogatories asking: 1) “DESCRIBE all policies, which YOUR underwriter uses in modifying a loan;” and 2) “DESCRIBE all criterion YOU use to determine if YOU are going to modify a loan.” (emphasis original). Wells Fargo objected to these questions because they sought “confidential information, trade secrets and proprietary business information” and because Wells Fargo’s internal decision making was irrelevant. The only issue being litigated, Wells claimed, was what Wells communicated to the borrowers regarding their modification. The court disagreed, ordering Wells Fargo to answer the interrogatories. To prevail on their fraud claim, borrowers must show that Wells orally represented that they would qualify for a modification, and that 1) Wells mishandled their application, or 2) they did not qualify under Wells’ policies. Under either scenario, Wells Fargo’s internal modification policies are relevant to borrower’s fraud claim and the interrogatories are therefore reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence bearing directly on that claim. Further, Wells Fargo provided no evidence that the information sought was a trade secret, and borrowers have agreed to a protective order.

Subsequent Servicer-Lender’s Assumed Liability for Original Lender’s Loan Origination Activities

Sundquist v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 WL 4773000 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2013): “[T]ort liability of one corporation can be ‘assumed voluntarily by the contract’ by another corporation.” Here, borrowers seek to hold BoA liable for the actions of Mission Hills, borrowers’ original lender. BoA purchased the loan from Mission Hills sometime after loan origination and borrowers assert that through this purchase agreement, BoA assumed all of Mission Hills’ tort liabilities. The trial court disagreed, finding no factual or legal basis for assumed liability. The court of appeal reversed, liberally construing the complaint to adequately allege BoA’s assumption of liability by its purchase of the subject loan from Mission Hills. BoA argued that the assignment from MERS to BAC Home Loans contains no language that would give rise to assumed liability. This agreement, however, may have nothing to do with an agreement assigning the loan itself from Mission Hills to BoA. “[I]t is entirely possible that Mission Hills sold the loan to Bank of America by means of some other agreement, and even after that transfer MERS continued to act as ‘nominee’ –now on behalf of Bank of America instead of Mission Hills—until . . . MERS assigned its interest in the deed of trust the note to BAC.” The court instructed the trial court to vacate its order and to overrule the demurrer with respect to the deceit, breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty causes of action, all of which were pled against BoA, as well as Mission Hills. The court affirmed the sustaining of the demurrers on borrowers’ other causes of action (promissory estoppel, civil conspiracy, negligence, and wrongful foreclosure).

Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production & Interrogatories; Sanctions

Becker v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 56-2012-00422894-CU-BT-VTA (Cal. Super Ct. Aug. 23, 2013): The court agreed with borrower that Wells Fargo must provide responses to the following requests for production of all documents regarding: 1) all communications with borrowers; 2) the servicing of the loan; 3) credit applied against the balance due on the loan; 4) the disposition of payments made in connection with the loan; and 5) regarding the treatment of taxes applied to the loan. Additionally, the court compelled Wells Fargo to answer interrogatories involving the documents reviewed, employees who worked on the loan, the specific documents requested and submitted for a loan modification, the exact amount owed by borrowers, and an itemized statement for every charge during the life of the loan. The court described Wells Fargo as “a sophisticated company, [capable of] tracking . . . who contacts the borrowers,” and noted that borrower’s request to know all parties who received fees or proceeds from the loan was reasonably related to produce evidence of who had a stake in the loan’s modification. The court sanctioned Wells Fargo $1,500 for its failure to answer borrower’s discovery requests.

Fraud and UCL Claims Based on Dual Tracking: Bank’s Failed Motion for Summary Judgment and Settlement

Rigali v. OneWest Bank, No. CV10-0083 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Luis Obispo Co. Feb. 14, 2013):[20] For a fraud claim to reach a jury, a borrower must show “the existence of some evidence” of: 1) false representation; 2) defendant’s knowledge of falsity; 3) defendant’s intention to deceive borrowers; 4) borrower’s justifiable reliance on the representation; 5) causal damages. Here, borrowers could not produce a “smoking gun” – an exact moment where OneWest misrepresented facts with a clear fraudulent intent—but taken as a whole, borrowers’ facts are enough to let a jury decide if OneWest’s string of (mis)communications with borrowers constituted fraud. Borrowers have produced some evidence that OneWest never intended to modify their loan: OneWest assigned of the DOT to U.S. Bank while they were sending borrowers multiple loan modification proposals; OneWest accepted borrower’s modification payment, and then assigned the loan to U.S. Bank; OneWest waited to refund the modification payment until after U.S. Bank completed the foreclosure sale. While this action stems from events occurring before dual tracking was prohibited by statute, “[d]istilled to its very essence, Plaintiffs are claiming that they were ‘given the runaround’ and then ‘double-crossed’ by OneWest” in a manner identical to dual tracking. Relying on West and Jolley, this court determined that summary judgment was inappropriate.

As to damages, the court pointed to borrowers’ assertions that OneWest convinced them their modification would be approved, delaying borrowers’ decision to hire an attorney and to sue to prevent the foreclosure. Also, had borrowers known the sale was proceeding (defective notice is part of their fraud claim), they allege they would have accessed various family funds to save their home. These damages constitute a viable fraud claim that survives summary judgment.

Tender is not required to state a claim for wrongful foreclosure if doing so would be inequitable. In their tender analysis, this court assumed that borrowers would eventually prevail on the fraud claim, and found it would then be “inequitable to require tender of the full amount due under the note.”

Federal Cases

Servicer’s Failure to Endorse Insurance Carrier’s Reimbursement Check May Constitute Breach of Contract

Gardocki v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., __ F. App’x __, 2013 WL 4029214 (5th Cir. Aug. 8, 2013): In this action to nullify a completed foreclosure sale, the servicer and holder of the loan, JP Morgan, failed to endorse an insurance reimbursement check for storm damage repairs, as required by borrower’s insurance carrier. Under the terms of the mortgage agreement, JP was entitled to inspect the repairs before endorsing a reimbursement check. Borrower claims JP Morgan neither inspected the home nor endorsed the check, as requested. Borrower had made repairs with his own funds, so JP Morgan’s refusal to sign-off on the reimbursement left borrower with insufficient funds to pay his mortgage. After borrower’s default, JP Morgan foreclosed and sold the home. The district court dismissed all of borrower’s claims without explanation. The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed and remanded the case, finding borrower’s arguments to be questions of fact. If the facts in the complaint are true, JP Morgan breached the mortgage agreement for failing to endorse the insurance check, and that the breach could have caused the default, resulting in a wrongful foreclosure.

Discovery Dispute: Bank’s Motion to Strike Expert Disclosure of Handwriting Witness, Borrower’s Motion to Compel Interrogatory Responses

Becker v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Inc., 2013 WL 5406894 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2013): Borrower seeks to introduce testimony of an expert witness to determine whether borrowers’ loan documents were “robo-signed.” Defendant objected because borrower’s robo-signing related claims involving forged documents were dismissed. Borrower claimed robo-signing was still pertinent to his negligence, emotional distress and UCL claims. The court denied defendant’s motion to strike the disclosure of the witness: defendant had neither alleged a “live” discovery issue, nor had it determined the expert would absolutely not provide relevant testimony.

Borrower brought a motion to compel responses to many interrogatory requests. Most notable was his request that Wells Fargo and Wachovia explain how they became the owners/holders of the borrower’s loan. The court declined to compel a response because defendant’s explanation of corporate succession was sufficient. Borrower also asked defendants to identify how many of their trial modifications eventually became permanent. The court agreed with borrower that “the number of times defendant has permitted a trial modification to transform into a permanent modification has at least some degree of relevance to the fraud and unfair business practices claims.” Parties were ordered to meet and confer to determine that the borrower only wants the number of permanent modifications offered, not details about individual cases.

Loan Owner in Bankruptcy May Sell Loan “In the Ordinary Course of Business” without Bankruptcy Court Approval

Miller v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., 2013 WL 5291939 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2013): Bankruptcy trustees “may enter into transactions, including the sale or lease of property . . . in the ordinary course of business, without a hearing.” Previously, this court granted a very limited summary judgment motion in favor of borrower, determining “that there is no genuine dispute that the loan at issue was transferred by [loan holder] while it was in bankruptcy (as [borrower] contends) and not before (as Defendants contend).” Now, the court addresses whether the loan holder – while in bankruptcy – could have sold borrower’s loan to a second entity without the bankruptcy court’s explicit approval. In selling either borrower’s loan by itself, or as part of a securitization with other loans, the owner of the loan did not violate bankruptcy law because the sale was in its “ordinary course of business.” The assignment of the loan from the original lender (in bankruptcy) to Wells Fargo was valid, and the eventual foreclosure proper. All borrower’s claims were dismissed.

Glaski-type Claim Fails Because Borrower Could Not Show Defect in Foreclosure Process was Prejudicial

Dick v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 2013 WL 5299180 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2013): To state a valid wrongful foreclosure claim, a borrower must show that the problems in the foreclosure process that made it “wrongful” prejudiced borrower in some way, specifically, in their ability to pay their mortgage. Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 198 Cal. App. 4th 256, 272 (2011). California courts have failed to find prejudice if a defaulting borrower cannot show that the improper foreclosure procedure (like an invalid assignment) “interfered with the borrower’s ability to pay or that the original lender would not have foreclosed under the circumstances.” If the proper party could have foreclosed, in other words, the borrower cannot sue the improper party who actually foreclosed. This court acknowledged borrower’s possible standing under Glaski v. Bank of America, 218 Cal. App. 4th 1079 (2013) to bring a wrongful foreclosure claim based on an improper assignment of a loan to a trust after the trusts’ closing date, but declines to determine that question because the wrongful foreclosure claim was dismissed on Fontenot grounds.

HOLA Applies to a National Bank, Preempts HBOR

Marquez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 WL 5141689 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2013): California federal district courts have adopted several different analyses to determine whether national banks, like Wells Fargo, can invoke HOLA preemption despite HOLA’s application to federal savings associations (FSA). The court acknowledged this split in authority: a majority of courts have applied HOLA preemption to national banks if the loan originated with a federal savings association, while a minority have analyzed what conduct is being litigated—if committed by the FSA, then HOLA is applicable, but if committed by a national bank, HOLA is inapplicable. This court sided with the majority, reasoning that borrowers originally contracted with an FSA and agreed to be bound by the terms of the DOT, which include regulation by HOLA and the OTS.

After establishing HOLA as the appropriate preemption analysis, the court determined that each of borrower’s claims, including four HBOR claims, are preempted by HOLA. State laws regulating or affecting the “processing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of . . . mortgages” are expressly preempted by HOLA. CC § 2923.55, which prevents servicers from taking foreclosure actions until contacting, or attempting to contact, a borrower to discuss foreclosure alternatives, “fall squarely” within HOLA express preemption. Dual tracking, prohibited by CC § 2923.6, also falls under “processing” mortgages, as does the requirement that servicers provide a single point of contact to borrowers seeking loan modifications (CC § 2923.7). Finally, requiring servicers to verify foreclosure documents before recording them is also preempted, as it also relates to “processing” and “servicing” of a loan. The court dismissed all of borrower’s claims.

Dual Tracking: “Complete” Application & A Private Right of Action under CC § 2924.12

Massett v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 WL 4833471 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2013): To receive a TRO based on a dual tracking claim, a borrower must demonstrate: 1) they submitted a “complete” application and 2) the application is still pending, but the servicer has initiated or continued foreclosure proceedings. Here, to prove they were likely to succeed on the merits on both the “complete” and pending elements, borrowers submitted two emails from a servicer representative, the first acknowledging receipt of their application and noting, “[w]e do not need any further documentation at this point in time.” The second, dated just 13 days before the TRO hearing and 15 before the scheduled sale stated: “The account is currently still in review.” These emails provided sufficient evidence that borrower’s application was complete, still pending, and that they were likely to prevail on a CC § 2923.6 claim. The court found a possible foreclosure sale to constitute “irreparable harm,” not based on the usual loss-of-home argument, but based on HBOR’s statutory scheme. CC § 2924.12 “only authorizes relief ‘[i]f a trustee’s deed upon sale has not been recorded.’ If the scheduled sale goes forward, then, plaintiffs will have no means of contesting Nationstar’s alleged dual-tracking.” Compared to the type of harm likely to be experienced by the borrowers, the TRO will only delay Nationstar’s ability to foreclose, should they deny borrower’s modification application. The balance then, tips in borrowers’ favor. Lastly, the court cited Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 213 Cal. App. 4th 872, 904 (2013) in finding a public interest in prohibiting dual tracking. The court granted borrowers a TRO to postpone the foreclosure sale.

Borrower’s “Counter Offer” to a Loan Modification Can Extinguish a Dual Tracking Claim

Young v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 2013 WL 4853701 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2013): HBOR prevents servicers from foreclosing while a first lien loan modification is pending. If a servicer offers a loan modification, a borrower has 14 days in which to accept. If they do not, the servicer can proceed with the foreclosure. CC § 2923.6(c)(2). Here, borrower responded to a loan modification offer, within 14 days, but did so with a “counter offer,” not an acceptance. Servicer did not respond to the counter offer and proceeded with the foreclosure after several months. The court found no dual tracking since borrowers failed to comply with the statute. Borrowers argued their counter offer responded to what they believed to be a modification offered related to the present litigation and settlement communications. Since settlement negotiations cannot be admitted as evidence, borrowers argued, their counter offer should not be considered by the court. Nothing, however, was offered in exchange for accepting the modification (like dismissing the action, for example), so the court did not find this argument persuasive. Additionally, borrowers’ claim that the modification offer was unreasonable and/or not in good faith also failed. Nothing in HBOR requires servicers to provide modifications, or instructs them on the quality of those modifications. The court denied the TRO.

Borrower’s Motion to Strike Bank’s Affirmative Defenses

Burton v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 2013 WL 4736838 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2013): Defendants must “affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense[s]” when responding to a complaint. Fed.R. Civ. Proc. 8(c)(1). Affirmative defenses will be stricken, though, if legally or factually deficient. A legally insufficient affirmative defense will fail under any set of facts stated by defendant. A factually insufficient affirmative defense fails to give the plaintiff fair notice, i.e., state the “nature and grounds” for the defense. If the defense simply states a legal conclusion, without linking it to the facts of the case, it does not provide fair notice. Under each rubric, defendants bear the burden of proof. Here, borrower moved to strike all 20 of Nationstar’s affirmative defenses to his breach of contract and fraud claims as both legally and factually insufficient. The court agreed that 13 affirmative defenses were “bare bones” conclusions of law, devoid of facts, and ordered them stricken with leave to amend. Borrowers’ legally insufficient challenge to Nationstar’s statute of limitations and lack-of-tender defenses failed. Moving to strike a SOL defense “seeks resolution of legal and factual issues not available at this pleading stage.” If Nationstar amends their SOL defense to overcome its factual insufficiencies, it will remain as both legally and factually well-pled. Nationstar’s defense related to tender also remains, as borrower’s use of a tender exception (that the sale would be void, not merely voidable), is premature at this stage.

Rescinded NOD Moots CC §§ 2923.5 & 2924 Claims; Fraud-Based Detrimental Reliance & Damages

Tamburri v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 2013 WL 4528447 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2013): Before recording an NOD, servicers must contact, or attempt to contact, borrowers to discuss foreclosure alternatives. CC § 2923.5. Under the previous version of this statute, and the operative one in this case, the sole remedy was postponing the sale. There was no remedy after a sale occurred. (Under HBOR, economic damages are available under CC § 2924.12 & 2924.19.) In this case, defendants rescinded the NOD and there is no pending foreclosure sale. The court granted summary judgment to defendants because borrower’s § 2923.5 claim was mooted by the NOD rescission.

Wrongful foreclosure claims are based on: 1) an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive foreclosure; 2) prejudicing the borrower; 3) who tendered the amount due under the loan. Here, the court granted summary judgment to defendants because the rescinded NOD negated the first two elements. Additionally, California courts have found no “preemptive right of action to determine standing to foreclose.”

To allege fraud, a borrower must establish (along with servicer’s fraudulent conduct) detrimental reliance and damages. Here, borrower alleged she “would have behaved differently,” had her servicer not “misrepresented the identity of the owner of [the] loan,” allowing it to profit from a foreclosure, rather than modify the loan. “[B]ehaving differently, by itself, does not establish a claim for fraud. Plaintiff must have relied to her detriment in order to state a claim for fraud.” (emphasis original). Borrower could not demonstrate damages either; she was in default, knew her servicer, attempted to work with them to modify her loan, and was unsuccessful. Knowing who owned the loan would not have changed borrower’s situation. The court accordingly granted summary judgment to defendants on borrower’s fraud claim.

Servicer Wrongfully Foreclosed After Borrower Tendered the Amount Due on the NOD; Damages Assessed According to Loss of Home Equity

In re Takowsky, 2013 WL 5183867 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2013); 2013 WL 5229748 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. July 22, 2013): Notices of default must specify the “nature of each breach actually known to the [loan] beneficiary,” including a statement of how much the borrower is in default. Whatever the actual default amount, the amount listed on the NOD controls. Here, the NOD stated that borrower had breached the second deed of trust, and listed amounts due accordingly. It made no mention of senior liens. Borrower paid her servicer the amount due on the NOD. “In doing so, Plaintiff cured the only default explicitly listed in the NOD,” and by accepting that payment, servicer was prevented from foreclosing. Borrower’s actual default on the senior lien is not relevant because that default was not listed on the NOD. Servicer’s subsequent foreclosure was wrongful because servicer had no power of sale under the NOD. Further, borrower made servicer aware of its confusing misstatements regarding the amount required to prevent foreclosure, so servicer either knew, or should have known, that borrower believed she only had to cure the default on the second lien to prevent foreclosure.

To determine damages, the bankruptcy court assessed borrower’s loss of home equity resulting from the wrongful foreclosure. Equity was calculated by taking the total value of the home and subtracting what borrower owed. The parties contested the property valuation, but the court accepted borrower’s estimation, based on expert testimony and appraisal. Borrower had significant home equity pre-foreclosure, so her damages were substantial (over $450,000). The court denied borrower’s request for damages to compensate her for moving and storage costs. She would have had to sell her home, or lost it to foreclosure eventually, the court reasoned, incurring those costs in due course. The court also denied damages related to emotional distress, pointing again to her likely property loss even without this foreclosure, her pre-existing bankruptcy proceedings, and her choice to remain in the home until the sheriff came to evict her, rather than leaving voluntarily before that stage.

Out of State Cases

HAMP Guidelines Provide Benchmark for “Good Faith” Standards in Foreclosure Settlement Conferences

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Rodriguez, __ N.Y.S.2d __, 2013 WL 4779543 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 5, 2013): Parties involved in residential foreclosures in New York state must undergo settlement conferences where both servicer and borrower must “negotiate in good faith” to reach a resolution, which includes a loan modification if possible. If the servicer evaluates borrower for a HAMP modification, the un-modified monthly payment must be greater than 31% of the borrower’s monthly gross income for the borrower to qualify. Here, servicer denied borrower a HAMP modification on two grounds. First, borrower’s mortgage payments fell below 31% of their gross monthly income. Borrowers pointed out (on multiple occasions) servicer’s incorrect principal and interest figures which set the mortgage payment too low. Second, the principal and interest could not be reduced by 10% or more, as required in a HAMP Tier 2 analysis. Borrowers objected to the use of a Tier 2 standard when they should have first been evaluated under Tier 1, according to HAMP guidelines. Servicer refused to comply with either request—for using the correct inputs or for evaluating under Tier 1 before Tier 2. The court found this conduct violated the duty to negotiate in good faith under New York law governing foreclosure settlement conferences. As a gauge for evaluating “good faith” conduct, the court used the HAMP guidelines themselves as “an appropriate benchmark [that] would enable the bank to abide by both state and federal regulations.” Since this servicer chose not to abide by the guidelines in evaluating borrower’s financial information, they did not make a “good faith” effort to negotiate. The court made clear that making a good faith effort will not, necessarily, result in a loan modification. The court ordered servicer to give borrower a “final detailed determination on his loan modification application, after review of all possible HAMP options,” and stopped interest accrual on borrower’s loan from the date servicer formally denied a modification.

Servicers Cannot Use “Investor Restrictions” as Excuse Not to Negotiate Settlement Conferences in Good Faith

Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Izraelov, 2013 WL 4799151 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 10, 2013): Parties involved in residential foreclosures in New York state must undergo settlement conferences where both servicer and borrower must “negotiate in good faith” to reach a resolution, which includes a loan modification if possible. Servicers who refuse to modify a loan because of an investor restriction “must provide the court or referee with suitable documentary evidence of the obstacle, and the court or referee may appropriately direct its production.” Further, if an investor restriction does exist, the servicer must make a good faith effort to convince the investor to waive the restriction for the borrowers in question, and to produce documentary evidence of this effort.

Here, after servicer (HSBC) refused to consider borrowers for a HAMP modification, the referee required documentation of an investor restriction. HSBC produced a one-page document, an agreement between them and another HSBC entity, stating that they are not allowed to participate in HAMP modifications without “express permission.” Deutsche Bank was not mentioned. The referee also required evidence of HSBC’s good faith effort to obtain an investor waiver. Specifically, she required the documentation outlined by HAMP’s guidance on “good faith” efforts (See HAMP, “Q2301.”). The reviewing court agreed this was a reasonable request and that HAMP “good faith” standards are an acceptable gauge to judge a servicer’s conduct, “whether or not the loan qualifies for HAMP.” In this case, the court assumed HSBC made a good faith effort to obtain a waiver. But, after it received a waiver, it refused to consider borrower for a modification. This violated the “good faith” requirement for mandated settlement conferences under New York law. The court ordered the servicer(s) to request documentation from borrowers and to consider them, at least, for a HAMP modification. It also ordered that borrowers are not responsible for interest on their loan accruing from the date HSBC announced it could not offer any modification to borrowers (totaling over three years’ worth of interest).

Recent Regulatory Updates

FHA Mortgagee Letter 2013-32 (Sept. 20, 2013, must be adopted by Dec. 1, 2013)

Active Bankruptcies & Bankruptcy Discharge

Borrowers in active chapter 7 and 13 bankruptcies are FHA Loss Mitigation Option eligible, if otherwise compliant with bankruptcy law and orders from their particular bankruptcy court.

Borrowers who received chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge but did not reaffirm the FHA-insured mortgage debt are still eligible for Loss Mitigation Options.

Treatment of “Continuous” and “Unearned” Income

“Continuous income” includes income received by the borrower, “that is reasonably likely to continue” from the date of modification evaluation through the next year. To determine continuous income, servicers must evaluate the borrower’s sources of net and gross income and expenses, and input those numbers to determine if borrower has the income necessary to qualify for a loss mitigation program. Continuous income may include employment income, but it also can encompass “unearned income,” like social security, VA benefits, child support, survivor benefits, and pensions.

Capitalization & Arrears

Loan Modifications and FHA-HAMP Partial Claims can include arrearages of unpaid interest, escrow fees, and foreclosure attorney fees. “Outstanding arrearages capitalized into modifications are not subject to the statutory limit [30% of the unpaid principle balance at default] on Partial Claims. However, arrearages and related foreclosure costs included in Partial Claims are subject to statutory limit . . . .”

Fannie Mae Announcements SVC-2013-18 & SVC-2013-19 (Sept. 18, 2013)

Announcement SVC-2013-18: Extension of Programs & New NPV Test

Fannie Mae’s HAMP and Second-Lien Modification Programs have been extended. All HAMP-eligible borrowers must be in a Trial Period Plan by March 1, 2016. All HAMP or Second-Lien Modification Program participants must have permanent modifications by September 1, 2016.

Beginning January 1, 2014, loans evaluated for Fannie Mae HAMP will only be eligible “if the value of the ‘modification’ scenario equals or exceeds the value of the ‘no-modification’ scenario.” A negative NPV result can no longer qualify a loan for HAMP “if the value of the ‘modification scenario is below the value of the ‘no-modification’ scenario.” Even if this is the case, though, the servicer must then evaluate the borrower for other foreclosure alternatives within the Fannie Mae guidelines, before foreclosing.

Announcement SVC-2013-19

Establishes processes servicers must follow in eliminating and rescinding foreclosure sales.

Freddie Mac Single-Family Seller/Servicer Guide Bulletin 2013-17 (Sept. 16. 2013)

Streamlined Modification program is extended to include all loans entering into a Streamlined Modification TPP by December 1, 2015. Freddie Mac HAMP program is extended to include all borrowers entering into a TPP by March 1, 2016 and a permanent modification by September 1, 2016.

All loans evaluated for HAMP on or after January 1, 2014, will only be eligible if they have a positive NPV result (an NPV of $0 or greater). Servicers must consider borrowers with a negative NPV result for other foreclosure alternatives.

MHA Update, Supplemental Directive 13-07: HAMP Handbook Version 4.3 (Sept. 16, 2013)

The new HAMP Handbook includes and supersedes Supplemental Directives 13-01 through 13-06, and includes revisions to v.4.2.

How Homeowners Can Effectively Defend Their Foreclosure

07 Tuesday Jan 2014

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, MERS, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, RESPA, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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If you have found yourself in an unfortunate situation of having to challenge a foreclosure lawsuit. Before you file your answer, I recommend that you have the Plaintiff’s attorney verify your debt. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, or FDCPA for short, states that any borrower undergoing a foreclosure proceeding against them has the opportunity to question the amounts owed, as long as the request for verification is made within thirty days of the Complaint being filed. It is very important to act quickly. The FDCPA verification letter does more than just verify the amount of money you owe; it also acts like a pause button to the foreclosure action.

The Plaintiff’s attorney may not proceed with the foreclosure until they verify your debt by sending the FDCPA debt verification letter to the same address where you were originally served, or to a different address that you specify. The production and mailing of this letter usually takes about a month, so you just bought yourself thirty days just by mailing a letter to the Plaintiff’s attorney. In this game, time is more valuable than money. Any stall tactics we can successfully implement are priceless.

If you’ve been served with a foreclosure lawsuit or expect one in the near future, it’s essential to know what foreclosure defenses may be available to help you dismiss, delay or win your case.

Because foreclosure laws differ from state to state and sometimes county to county within each state, we strongly urge you to hire a lawyer in your area to handle the case if at all possible. Whether you hire an attorney or defend your own foreclosure lawsuit, the more you know the more likely you’ll succeed so learn all you can about the foreclosure phases in your state as well as possible foreclosure defenses applicable to your situation.

Types of Foreclosure Defenses

There are six general categories of foreclosure defenses, also known as “affirmative defenses” in Florida and other states – defective service of the lawsuit documents, loan closing related defenses, breach of contract, standing/chain of title issues, fraud and misrepresentation and “catch all” defenses that may protect your rights if other defenses fail.

Once you identify your foreclosure defenses, you’ll either list them in the Answer to Your Foreclosure Lawsuit, as part of a Motion to Dismiss before filing your answer or as grounds for a counterclaim against the bank. Depending on the foreclosure defense involved, you may be able to use a combination of two and even all three of these options.

1. Defective Service of Process

In Judicial Foreclosure states which require the use of the court system to process foreclosures, the lawsuit itself and a summons must be personally delivered to you by a licensed process server. Referred to as “service of process”, there will be at least two documents involved consisting of the actual lawsuit and a summons for each defendant with instructions when and where to respond.

If the process server makes several legitimate but unsuccessful attempts to serve you, they’ll simply serve you by publishing notice of the lawsuit in the local newspaper so its generally better to accept the papers than hiding and hoping it goes away. The process server only gets paid if you get served so don’t expect them to give up and it’s safer to know what’s going on than missing important court deadlines because you never saw the legal notice in your newspaper.

Although it sounds pretty basic, sloppy paperwork and fraudulent practices have once again conspired to make this an important foreclosure defense for homeowners who were never served or served improperly. Defective service of process obviously includes instances when you were never served despite living in the property, but can also be when the process server didn’t take all the state required steps to find you, served a minor or the house next door, files false affidavits in court about who they served and when, forged signatures or backdated documents and a host of similar intentional and unintentional actions that may justify dismissing the lawsuit.

If this defense applies to you, it may be grounds for a motion to dismiss the foreclosure lawsuit and/or part of your answer to the lawsuit as an affirmative defense. Consult with an attorney in your area familiar with the local requirements for process servers if possible and include the defense as part of your lawsuit answer by stating something similar to “As a first affirmative defense, the service of process was defective.” This is just an example that should be modified in accordance with the local pleading rules for each county and state to make sure you meet the local requirements.

2. Loan Closing Related Defenses

There are several related foreclosure defenses we’ve grouped under this category that arise from federal disclosure requirements under the Truth in Lending Act(“TILA”)and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act(“RESPA”).

Each of these federal laws were created to help consumers by forcing lenders to disclose the material terms of your loan including the actual dollar amount of all finance charges over the life of your loan, a good faith estimate of potential closing costs provided to you prior to closing, an explanation of your three day right to cancel the entire loan transaction and other essential disclosure requirements that may result in the actual rescission of your loan documents under certain circumstances.

Because this is a very technical area requiring expertise in evaluating your HUD-1 closing statement and related documents that is beyond the scope of this discussion, we strongly suggest that you retain an attorney or experienced realtor to help you analyze your loan documents and determine if violations exist. If you suspect that there are deficiencies, there are several critical steps that must be taken to protect your rights including sending a “Notice of Rescission” to your lender before the lender corrects the defects.

3. Breach of Contract

Breach of Contract is one of the strongest foreclosure defenses available to homeowners and investors and may also be grounds for a motion to dismiss or counterclaim against the bank. Although the specific allegations can be similar to those made in other foreclosure defenses, breach of contract claims should almost always be used as a stand alone defense if sufficient facts exist.

Without providing a seminar on contract law, there are three basic elements to every breach of contract claim-a valid contract, breach of some obligation imposed by that contract, and damages specifically resulting from the breach itself. For example,your obligation as borrower under the contract (the loan documents) is to make timely payments of the amount you’ve agreed to pay, while the bank must also comply with its contractual requirements.

One of the most frequent breaches by the bank is purchasing “forced placed” insurance that is either unnecessary, overly expensive or both. The damage from the breach is your inability to make monthly payments because of the higher insurance costs and as a result, you would not have breached your obligation to make monthly payments if the bank hadn’t first breached its obligations by forcing you to pay more than your contract requires.

Other possible breaches by the bank include failing to comply with its own underwriting requirements in giving you loan terms that were unfair or not supported by your income. By offering no interest or adjustable rate loans that later skyrocketed upwards, balloon payments due in the midst of an economic crisis or even providing too much money for a loan they knew you couldn’t afford, the bank breached its contractual obligations in many respects.

Finally, additional examples include breach of the disclosure requirements in RESPA or TILA discussed above or failing to provide adequate notice of default and its intent to accelerate the payment requirements as specified in paragraph 22 or 23 of most mortgages.

No matter where you allege the breach of contract – in a motion to dismiss, answer or counterclaim – you need to be very specific about the facts. Thus, breach of contract as a defense in your answer should read something like “As a third affirmative defense, the bank breached the contract by purchasing forced place insurance that was either unnecessary or too expensive” or ” by failing to provide proper notice of its intent to accelerate the loan as required by paragraph 22/23 of my mortgage.”

Of course modify these examples to reflect your specific circumstances and to comply with local court rules and procedure. Even if you decide not to hire an attorney to defend your case, you can always hire a lawyer for an hour or two to help you meet local requirements.

4. Lack of Standing/Defective Chain of Title

Ask homeowners who owns their mortgage and most will confidently tell you its the company they pay each month. However, the answer is much more complicated as the original loan was almost certainly transferred several times since closing and at best you’re likely paying the loan servicing company not the original owner.

The importance of this defense – called “lack of standing” or “defective chain of title” – can’t be overstated as several courts have found fraudulent, backdated and inadequate loan documents in many cases and have actually dismissed foreclosure lawsuits with prejudice as a result. Lack of standing to sue and/or not owning the loan documents can be the grounds for a motion to dismiss, an affirmative defense in your answer or the basis for a counterclaim against the bank.

There are at least three important documents to review before deciding if this defense can help you – the mortgage or deed of trust, the promissory note and any assignments involved in transferring the loan from one bank to another. The current owner of your loan must have physical possession of each of these original “wet ink” documents and every transfer must be properly endorsed on the documents and recorded in the county where the property is located together with payment of recording and doc stamp fees. Finally, make sure the current assignment was dated prior to the the date the foreclosure lawsuit is filed with the court.

With the huge number of mortgages transactions, many banks have no idea where the original documents are, most failed to properly record each transfer or assignment and in too many situations actually forged or backdated documents in an effort to meet legal requirements. In fact a recent Reuters investigation involved a random review of foreclosure files from five different states and found more than 1000 questionable mortgage assignments, promissory notes with missing or faulty endorsements and foreclosure lawsuits containing multiple inaccurate facts.

During the early stages of the foreclosure crisis, the bank’s strategy of filing lawsuits without proper documentation worked well and many people unnecessarily lost their homes as a result. However, recent court decisions have refused to endorse these illegal bank schemes and have required compliance with basic evidence standards instead. To proceed with foreclosure lawsuits, most courts now require proof that the banks have physical possession of the original documents and further require evidence to show how they got the documents and that the chain of title is not defective.

A couple of additional issues to watch out for are any cases involving “MERS” as the plaintiff in your foreclosure lawsuit and whether or not a loan servicing company has authority from the mortgage owner to file suit and confirming that the owner even has authority to do so. MERS stands for the “Mortgage Electronic Registration System” banks created in an attempt to hide mortgage transactions from public scrutiny and avoid paying recording fees for each transfer. Most courts have finally decided that MERS has no standing to sue homeowners so be sure to raise any and all defenses related to this issue.

For more information on MERS and the illegal and fraudulent actions of banks and lenders involved in the foreclosure fiasco, we strongly recommend an excellent site by Greg Hunter called USA Watchdog.com which contains numerous interesting and well researched articles on the subject overall.

As you can see from this very brief discussion, lack of standing and figuring out who owns your mortgage is both an important defense and complicated subject. As a result, we strongly urge you to retain an attorney to handle your case if these issues arise or at minimum consult with a lawyer for a couple of hours to help you focus on the right issues and discuss strategies to get documents the banks refuse to provide.

When raising this issue as an affirmative defense in your answer, it should read something like “As a fourth affirmative defense, the plaintiff lacks standing to sue as a result of a defective chain of title and related issues.” As always, modify this example to reflect your specific circumstances and to comply with local court rules.

5. “Catch All” Foreclosure Defenses

“Catch All” foreclosure defenses refer to procedural devices and general defenses to make sure you raise all possible issues that may help you and/or to supplement other applicable defenses that are missing one or more of their required elements.

The first defense in this category is called “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” and the second is “the failure to comply with conditions precedent.”

The failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is similar in concept to the breach of contract and lack of standing defenses raised above and generally addresses deficiencies in the required documentation and whether or not the plaintiff is the actual owner of your loan and has the right to sue you. The defense can be used as grounds for a motion to dismiss or as an affirmative defense in your answer, but is rarely used to support a counterclaim against the bank. Even though the defense may overlap with other applicable defenses, it’s almost always worthwhile to list as an additional affirmative defense.

The second “catch all” defense is the failure to comply with conditions precedent and covers issues ranging from the failure to provide proper and timely notice of default and the bank’s intention to accelerate your loan payments and/or failing to properly attach the required documents to the foreclosure lawsuit. Again, it’s almost always worthwhile to list this as an additional affirmative defense to cover areas you may have missed.

6. Fraud and Misrepresentation Foreclosure Defenses

The final category of defenses addressed in this article are fraud and misrepresentation by the bank, the loan servicing company or the mortgage broker on behalf of the bank. Although this defense may be right on point for many of the improper actions by the bank, the pleading requirements are much more difficult for anything related to fraud and thus require far more detail than the defenses raised above.

This doesn’t mean you shouldn’t use this defense if sufficient grounds exist, but be prepared to state the exact nature of the fraud or misrepresentation, when it occurred and in what context as well as any additional information you may have. Because many of these issues require discovery and review of bank documents you may not have at the time you respond to the foreclosure lawsuit, courts may dismiss your defense until you have more information. Remember you can always amend your answer at a later date once you have the necessary information, so make sure you have enough evidence initially before deciding to include this as a defense. The idea is not to throw everything in and hope something works as the bank and courts will see through this strategy and minimize your credibility even though legitimate defenses exist.

Your affirmative defense should read something like “As a sixth affirmative defense, the bank is guilty of fraud and misrepresentation in the following manner” and then include the facts necessary to support your allegations. If possible, meet with an attorney to help you identify any potential fraud and help comply with local court pleading requirements.

What Homeowners Need to Know About Federal Laws that Govern Mortgage Origination and Servicing

10 Saturday Aug 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Banks and Lenders, Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, RESPA, Your Legal Rights

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Adjustable-rate mortgage, Closed End Credit, Finance, Finance charge, Loan, Security interest, Statute of Limitations, Truth in Lending Act

There are eight (8) major federal laws pertinent to mortgage origination and servicing.

Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA); 15 U.S.C. § 1638.

Purpose. TILA is largely a disclosure statute that requires that lenders make certain disclosures to borrowers and potential borrowers. The Act is meant to insure that borrowers are informed of all of the terms of the loan before they take out the loan and can make an informed decision.

Scope. TILA applies to consumer credit – both closed end credit (like mortgages) and open ended credit (like credit cards) – extended by a creditor.

To constitute as “consumer credit” under the statute:
• The consumer must be a natural person.

• Credit is the right to defer payment of debt or to
incur debt and defer payment.

• The credit must be payable, by written agreement, by more than four
installments or subject to finance charges.

Under TILA, a “creditor” is:

• An entity that regularly extends consumer credit. Regularly means six or
more real estate secured loans, two or more high cost loans (or one or
more if made through a broker), or 26 or more in other cases per year.

• The creditor is the entity to which the obligation is payable to on its face.
Arrangers, like brokers, are not covered by TILA.

Exceptions.

• Business, agricultural, organizational and commercial credit.
• Credit over $25,000 unless secured by real estate or a dwelling.
• Public utility credit in some instances.
• Securities or commodities accounts.
• Certain student loans.
• Home fuel budget plans if no finance charge is imposed.

Protections.

Fundamentals. Lenders must disclose the following terms and conditions:

1. Amount Financed The amount financed is the amount of money that the borrower receives for his own benefit. Generally, this would include the proceeds of the loan, the purchase price of the goods/services being purchased, and the amount of pre-existing debts being paid off by consolidation or refinancing. Amount financed is roughly the same as the concept of “principle” but it is distinct from how principle is construed under state usury laws.

2. Finance Charge. Any charge that a consumer pays, directly or indirectly,
that is charged by the creditor, directly or indirectly, as incident to or a condition of the extension of credit. Examples include interest, service charges, points, origination fees, and many other costs associated with credit.

3. Annual Percentage Rate (APR). The cost of credit as a yearly rate.

Required Disclosures for Closed End Credit – Failure to disclose the following terms and conditions gives rise to Statutory Claims.

1. Total Finance Charge. Consists of all finance charges as defined above.

Exceptions
a. Under certain conditions, charges by third parties, closing agent fees,
debt cancellation coverage, and overdraft fees.
b.Application fees so long as they are charged to all applicants, whether or
not credit is extended.
c. Late fees.
d.Certain closing costs, so long as they are bona fide and reasonable.
e. Voluntary credit life, health, accident and loss of income insurance so
long as the voluntary nature, cost and term are disclosed and the consumer
separately agrees to the insurance in writing.
f. Credit property insurance premiums so long as the consumer is aware
that he can purchase insurance elsewhere.
g. Certain security interest related charges.
h.Annual fees or fees periodically charged as a condition to credit.
i. Seller’s points.
j. Interest reductions in time deposits.

2. Amount Financed. The principle part of the loan minus all charges
deemed to be finance charges.

3. Annual Percentage Rate.
4. Payment Schedule.
5. Total Number of Payments.
6. Security Interests.
7. Special Formatting Rules.

The disclosures must be clear, obvious, separate from other information and in a form that the borrower can keep. Disclosures must be provided in a timely manner, in a way that the borrower can keep before the consummation of the loan.

Lenders must also give the borrower a Notice of Right to Cancel, which informs the borrower of his right to rescind and contains the forms that the borrower needs to exercise that right.

Relief and Statute of Limitations. Under TILA, the borrower has an absolute right to rescind for three business days after the consummationof the loan. After three business days, a borrower may have the right to rescind up to three years if the disclosures were not made to the client. Damages and attorney’s fees are recoverable under the statute.

Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA); 15 U.S.C. § 1639

Purpose. HOEPA is designed to protect all borrowers, but especially
borrowers that apply for and take out high cost loans. HOPEA is
associated with TILA and is often considered a part of TILA.

Scope. Same as TILA.

Protections. Special Disclosures for Variable Rate Closed End Loans (like
ARMS)

1. The lender must disclose the maximum interest rate that could be charged over the life of the loan in the loan note.

2. The lender must give the borrower a copy of the ARM brochure that contains generic information about ARMs as well as more specific explanations of the aspects of each variable rate plan that the borrower is considering.

3. These disclosures must be given when the application is furnished
or before the payment of a nonrefundable fee, which ever is first.

4. During the life of the loan, the lender must send rate adjustment
or change notices before the loan rate will change.

HOEPA prohibits prepayment charges and balloon payments in a limited amount of cases, higher interest rates after default, negative amortization, more than two payments being made from the loan proceeds, pattern/practice of extending credit without taking into consideration the borrower’s ability to pay, and payments directly to home improvement contractors.

Relief and Statute of Limitations. A party can recover damages and rescind under HOEPA. Attorney’s fees and costs are also available. The Statutes of limitations for affirmative actions is one year. For rescission, the statutes of limitation is three years.

Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA); 15 U.S.C. § 1691

Purpose. The purpose of the ECOA is to stop discrimination in the lending industry.

Protections. ECOA has three important aspects:

1. First, it prohibits discrimination in any aspect of credit based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, assistance income.

2. Second, the ECOA requires creditors to take specific actions when approving or denying credit, prevents certain factors from being used to determine creditworthiness, mandates when an existing account may be closed, and restricts the ways that information is reported to credit reporting agencies concerning spouses.

3. Third, the Act imposes certain notice requirements on the credit issuer
when a loan application is approved or denied. If the creditor makes a counter offer (for more or less credit), then it must notify the borrower in writing of the new terms.

How ECOA Protection Can Be Applied to Foreclosure Fraud

Bait and switch tactics may give rise to a claim under the ECOA. If a creditor gives credit in a much larger amount than the borrower requested and never gives the borrower an opportunity to deny the additional amount, then the creditor violated the procedural terms of the ECOA by failing to provide the borrower with written notice of all action taken on the original loan application. This tactic is often used in predatory lending. A creditor will give more credit to pay borrower’s debts that the borrower expressed no interest in paying. The new amount is often disclosed too late in the process for the borrower to feel as if he can object.

Relief and Statute of Limitations. The ECOA allows home owners to pursue relief higher on the food chain than the original lender, and provides for actual and punitive damages (up to $10,000 in an individual action), equitable relief and attorney’s fees. The statute of limitations is one year.

Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (RESPA); 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.

Purpose. The purpose of RESPA is to protect home buyers from
abusive practices in the residential real estate industry. The Act controls
the manner in which settlement services for a residential real estate loan are provided and compensated.

Scope. RESPA applies to federally related mortgages, meaning those made by federally-insured depository lenders, HUD-related loans, loans intendedto be sold on the secondary market to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac or to creditors who make or invest more than a million dollars per year in residentially secured loans. Most home equity loans (as well as refinancings), mobile home purchase loans and construction loans are covered by RESPA. A loan for vacant land is excluded unless a structure will be constructed or a manufactured home will be placed on the property within two years of settlement of the loan. There are some exceptions to RESPA. If a lender makes a loan from its own funds, holds the loan for varying periods of time and then sells the loan on the open market, it is not covered. Also, certain lenders that originate loans through a computer system are generally exempt from RESPA’s requirements.

Protections. RESPA requires that no later than three business days after the application, the consumer must receive a “good faith estimate” of settlement costs (usually via the HUD-1 settlement statement) along with a booklet explaining the costs. At closing, all settlement agents must use the HUD-1 settlement kickbacks and unearned fees. No person shall give or accept any fee, kickback or gift for a referral of a settlement service. Additionally, RESPA requires servicers to notify consumers about the possibility that their mortgages may be transferred and when one is imminent, and to have a mechanism that allows borrowers to make inquiries about their account to a servicer and to have corrections made to
their accounts, if necessary. Servicers have a substantive duty to pay the property taxes, homeowner’s insurance and other escrowed monies to the appropriate recipients as long as the borrower is current. Further, RESPA limits the amount that a lender can require that a borrower place in escrow, and prohibits a lender or servicer from charging the borrower for the preparation of statements required by TILA, the HUD-1 settlement statement, or escrow account statement.

Statute of Limitations. The statute of limitations is one year except for servicer violations which has a 3 year limitation.

Fair Housing Act (FHA); 42 U.S.C. § 3605

Purpose. The FHA prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin in the making of
or purchasing of residential real estate loans and any other related financial assistance.

Scope. The FHA applies to loan brokers, financing consultants and anyone else providing financial assistance related to the making of the loan as well as the secondary market in the purchasing of loans, debts or securities, thepooling or packaging of these instruments, and the marketing or the sale of securities issued on the basis of loans or debts.

Protection. To prove discrimination, the consumer must show that the defendants intentionally targeted on the basis of a protected class when trying to obtain credit or that there was a credit-grant policy that had a disparate impact on that basis.

Relief and Statute of Limitations. Under the FHA, the court can award actual and punitive damages, attorney’s fees and costs. The statute of limitations is two years from the occurrence or from the termination of the discriminatory practice for affirmative claims.

Federal Trade Commission “Holder” Rule

The FTC’s “Holder” rule, or the FTC Rule on Preservation of Consumers’ Claims and Defenses, allows a consumer to make a claim against a subsequent holder of a loan for the acts of the original lender. The original lender may be judgment proof, and it is unlikely that a consumer would effectively be able to defend against a collection action and bring an affirmative suit against the original lender. The rule creates an incentive for the lending industry to police itself and subsequent holders of a debt are in a better position to sue the original lender than the borrower.

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA); 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.

Purpose. FDCPA restricts debt collector’s efforts to obtain payment and
to choose venue. The Act protects debtors from abusive or harassing
debt collection practices.

Scope. The Act is generally used in the non-mortgage context because mortgage servicers are exempt because they usually acquire servicing rights before the mortgage goes into default. A debt collector generally includes collection agencies, creditors using false names or collecting for other creditors, collection attorneys, purchasers of delinquent debts, repossession companies, and suppliers or designers of deceptive forms, but generally excludes companies collecting their own debts.

Protections. The Act protects the consumer from an invasion of privacy, harassment, abuse, false or deceptive representations, and unfair or unconscionable collection methods. Specific acts that are prohibited include late night or repetitive phone calls, false threats of legal action or criminal prosecution and communications with most third parties regarding the debt.

FDCPA provides the consumer the ability to stop all debt collection action with a letter, makes the collector deal with the consumer’s attorney if the consumer has one, and gives the consumer the right to dispute the existence, legality or amount of the disputed debt.

Relief and Statute of Limitations. The plaintiff can recover actual damages, statutory damages (up to $1000), attorney’s fees and costs and perhaps punitive damages and injunctive relief. Class actions are also authorized and the statute of limitations for all actions is one year for affirmative claims.

Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968

Purpose. RICO can be used to provide a civil remedy to abusive
consumer credit practices.

Scope. Any cause of action under RICO must have the following elements: the existence of an enterprise, the enterprise is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, the defendant has engaged in one or more of four prohibited activities in section 1962, and the prohibited conduct cased injury to the plaintiff’s business or property.

Protections. Every RICO violation involves a collection of an unlawful debt (gambling debts or usury under state or federal law, at a rate at least twice the enforceable usury rate) or a pattern of racketeering activity. RICO can provide a remedy when a lender misrepresents that its rates are better than other lenders’ rates or that its loan will pay off other debts when it will
not. A well-plead allegation may state a claim for mail fraud in a loan flipping case under RICO. A borrower may also successfully plead a claim under RICO when there is a spread premium case where the payment of the premium is not revealed and the cost of the premium is passed onto the borrower in the form of a higher interest rate and where the broker represented that it would provide the lowest available rate, money was exchanged between the broker, the assignee, the funding lender and the title company and mail was used in furtherance of the scheme.

Remedy and Statute of Limitations. A person injured in his business or property can sue for treble damages but no physical or emotional damage claim can be made. The statute of limitations is four years in affirmative cases.

For More Information on How You Can Effectively Use Solid Arguments that are Structured on Your Lender’s Violations of Federal Laws, Which to Your Advantage, Will Subsequently Reduce Your Mortgage Payments and Save Your Home from Foreclosure Visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

FightForeclosure.net

~ Your "Pro Se" Foreclosure Fight Solution!

Category Archives: RESPA

How Homeowners Can Find Who Owns Their Mortgage Loans

What Homeowners Must Know About the Residential Mortgage Lending Market

What Florida Homeowners Should Expect in “Pro Se” Foreclosure Defense Litigation

How Homeowners Can Effectively Use RESPA in their Foreclosure Defense

What Homeowners in Washington Needs to Know About Saving Their Homes

How Homeowners Can Identify the Right Parties to Their Mortgage

How Homeowners Can Effectively Defend Their Foreclosure

What Homeowners Need to Know About Federal Laws that Govern Mortgage Origination and Servicing

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