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Category Archives: Appeal

What Borrowers Must Know About Voiding Liens in a Mortgage

06 Sunday Oct 2019

Posted by BNG in Appeal, Bankruptcy, Banks and Lenders, Borrower, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure, Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, Loan Modification, Mortgage fraud, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Note - Deed of Trust - Mortgage, Pro Se Litigation, Real Estate Liens, State Court, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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enforceability of judgment lien, Foreclosure, foreclosure defense, homeowners, involuntary liens, Lien, lien stripping, lien voidance, liens, Loan, Loan servicing, Mortgage loan, Mortgage modification, Mortgage servicer, Pro se legal representation in the United States, Property Lien Disputes, property liens, Real Estate Liens, Removing Liens, Types of Real Estate Liens, Unperfected Liens, voluntary liens

There are numerous methods for voiding questionable liens in any given mortgage. In this post, we’ll discuss an interesting decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Bankruptcy Adversary Proceeding.

This decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit poses a serious threat to mortgage companies that service mortgages of chapter 13 debtors. Mortgage servicers should be aware of the case’s implications and adjust their internal case monitoring procedures as necessary.

Consider a common situation. A borrower files a chapter 13 bankruptcy case, and her mortgage servicer files a proof of claim for the mortgage balance. The borrower then objects to the proof of claim based on some purported technicality: the signature was forged, the endorsement was improper, the servicer lacks standing to enforce the note, etc. For whatever reason, the mortgage servicer does not respond to this objection, and the claim is disallowed by default.

When this happens, the borrower will often attempt to leverage a favorable settlement, like a mortgage modification, by filing a lawsuit to void the mortgage under 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). This provision allows a bankruptcy court to void a lien if the lien secures a claim that is not “allowed.” Because the mortgage was “disallowed” by default due to the mortgage servicer’s failure to respond, this statute theoretically allows the court to void the mortgage altogether.

Courts generally do not void mortgages that are substantively valid but were disallowed because of a default. The most common solution in these situations is a settlement and a motion to reconsider the disallowance under 11 U.S.C. § 502(j). Bankruptcy courts may grant these motions for “cause” at their discretion, which is typically satisfied if the mortgage servicer can prove the substantive validity of the mortgage. See generally In re Oudomsouk, 483 B.R. 502, 513-14 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2012). This works to everyone’s advantage: the mortgage servicer gets paid through the bankruptcy, and the debtor avoids the risk of post-bankruptcy foreclosure if the lien’s validity is ultimately upheld after the case concludes.

The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in In re Blendheim may change this result. 2015 WL 5730015 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2015). In Blendheim, the debtors owned a condominium with two mortgages. After filing chapter 7 and obtaining a discharge of their unsecured debts, the debtors immediately filed a chapter 13 case to restructure their mortgages on the condominium (this process is known as a “chapter 20”). HSBC, the senior servicer, filed a proof of claim for the senior mortgage, but the debtors objected because (a) HSBC attached only the deed of trust, and not the promissory note, to the proof of claim, and (b) one of the signatures on the note was purportedly forged.

For reasons unknown, HSBC did not respond to the objection, and the bankruptcy court entered an order disallowing HSBC’s claim by default. Five months later, the debtors brought an adversary proceeding to void the mortgage under 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). Almost eighteen months after the bankruptcy court disallowed HSBC’s claim, HSBC filed a motion to reconsider the disallowance. HSBC also challenged the debtors’ attempt to void the mortgage because the disallowance was not actually litigated; it was the result of a default. The bankruptcy court disagreed, finding that (a) HSBC had no good reason for failing to respond to the claim objection, and (b) the statute plainly permitted lien avoidance in these circumstances. After the bankruptcy court confirmed the debtors’ plan, which provided for payment of only the junior mortgage, HSBC appealed.

On appeal, HSBC raised three primary issues. First, it argued that Section 506(d) should not operate to void its mortgage, notwithstanding the plain language of the statute, when the order disallowing the claim was not actually litigated but was based on a default. Second, it argued that even if the lien were properly voided under Section 506(d), the result could not be permanent because the debtors, having recently received a discharge in their chapter 7 case, were not eligible for a discharge in their chapter 13 case. Third, it argued that by losing its lien because of a default order in the bankruptcy case, as opposed to a formal lawsuit, it was denied due process.

The court disagreed with HSBC on each issue. First, it held that lien avoidance was appropriate. HSBC cited cases where courts refused to void a mortgage when a claim was disallowed for being filed late. The court distinguished these cases, holding that a creditor who files a late proof of claim is not “actively participating in the case” and therefore cannot have its state law lien rights impacted. See generally Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 418-19. But when a creditor timely files a proof of claim then willfully fails to respond to the debtors’ objection to the claim, the situation is fundamentally different. According to the court, the Bankruptcy Code plainly allows permanent lien avoidance when a creditor, like HSBC, “just sle[eps] on its rights and refuse[s] to defend its claim.” Blendheim, 2015 WL 5730015, at *11.

Next, the court addressed HSBC’s second argument and held that lien avoidance was appropriate even though the debtors were not eligible for a discharge. Acknowledging a split of authority, the court clarified that discharge affects only personal liability, not the in rem rights of creditors, so the cases on which HSBC relied were distinguishable. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code prohibits lien avoidance just because a borrower has no right to a discharge.

Finally, the court held that HSBC’s due process was not offended. HSBC received notice of the claim objection and had ample time to respond.  Its failure to do so, while fatal to its lien, did not violate its due process rights.

What This Means for Mortgage Creditors

The Blendheim case may have serious implications for mortgage creditors. This situation is not an outlier: mortgage servicers commonly fail to respond to claim objections. his may be because of the quick deadline to respond to these objections or the use of separate legal counsel for handling administrative functions in bankruptcy versus defending adversary proceedings. Historically, when a claim is disallowed based on a creditor’s failure to respond to a claim objection, bankruptcy courts will grant a reconsideration motion under Section 502(j) if the creditor can prove the substantive validity of the mortgage.

After Blendheim, the result may be different. The Blendheim court, after all, did not seem to care about the underlying validity of HSBC’s claim. Instead, it focused on HSBC’s failure to respond without a good reason.

How does this Affect Mortgage Creditors

Mortgage servicers should be aware of this decision and should make sure that they are closely following the dockets of cases involving their borrowers in bankruptcy. If they don’t, they risk losing their mortgage lien, if any, altogether.

CASE STUDY:  HSBC v. BLENDHEIM

[The views expressed in this document are solely the views of the Author. This document is intended for informational purposes only and is not legal advice or a substitute for consultation with a licensed legal professional in a particular case or circumstance]

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

If you are a homeowner already in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy with questionable liens on your property, you needs to proceed with Adversary Proceeding to challenge the validity of Security Interest or Lien on your home, Our Adversary Proceeding package may be just what you need.

Homeowners who are not yet in Bankruptcy should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/ “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will show you step-by-step litigation solutions helping you challenge these fraudsters and ultimately saving your home from foreclosure either through loan modification or “Pro Se” litigation visit: https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/

If you have received a Notice of Default “NOD”, take a deep breath, as this the time to start the FIGHT! and Protect your EQUITY!

If you do Nothing, you will see the WRONG parties WITHOUT standing STEAL your home right under your nose, and by the time you realize it, it might be too late! If your property has been foreclosed, use the available options on our package to reverse already foreclosed home and reclaim your most prized possession! You can do it by yourself! START Today — STOP Foreclosure Tomorrow!

 

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What Pro Se Homeowners Must Know About Appellate Issues and Record on Appeal

28 Saturday Apr 2018

Posted by BNG in Appeal, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Appeal, Appellate court, Appellate Issues, appellate proceeding, appellate record, arguments for appeal, closing argument, Jury instructions, litigator, Motion in Limine, Objections, post-judgment, pre-trial, Pro Se Litigating, Pro Se litigator, Pro Se trial litigators, Record on Appeal, trial, Trial court

Trying cases is one of the most exciting things a litigator does during his or her career but it is also certainly one of the most stressful.

While over 90% of the cases never make it to trial before settlement, if your case is one of the 10% or less that made it to trial, as a Pro Se litigator, there are few things to bear in mind.

A study conducted few years back shows that About 97 percent of civil cases are settled or dismissed without a trial. The number tried in court fell from 22,451 in 1992 to 11,908 in 2001, according to the study. Plaintiffs won 55 percent of the cases and received $4.4 billion in damages.

Homeowners litigating their wrongful foreclosure cases Pro Se are not Attorneys by profession, however, this post is designed to help Homeowners perfect and win their wrongful foreclosure Appeals.

Your case on appeal can be greatly improved by focusing on potential appellate issues and the record on appeal from the start of a case until the finish.

While in the trenches during trial, many litigators understandably focus all of their energies on winning the case at hand. But a good litigator knows that trial is often not the last say in the outcome of a case. The final outcome often rests at the appellate level, where a successful trial outcome can be affirmed, reversed, or something in between. The likelihood of success many times hinges on the substance of the record on appeal. The below discusses a variety of issues that Pro Se trial litigators should keep in mind as they prepare and present their case so they position themselves in the best possible way for any appeals that follow.

Prepare Your Appellate Record From The Moment Your Case Begins

Perhaps one of the biggest misconceptions regarding preserving an adequate record on appeal is when a Pro Se litigant should start considering what should be in the record. In short, the answer is from the moment the complaint is filed. At that time, Pro Se Litigants should begin to think carefully about the elements of each asserted cause of action, potential defenses and their required elements, and the burden of proof for each. Every pleading should be drafted carefully to ensure that no arguments are waived in the event they are needed for an appeal. For instance, a complaint should allege with specificity all the factual and legal elements necessary to sustain a claim, while an answer should include any and all applicable affirmative defenses to avoid waiver. See, e.g., Travellers Int’l, A.G. v. Trans World Airlines, 41 F.3d 1570, 1580 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The general rule in federal courts is that a failure to plead an affirmative defense results in a waiver.”).

Likewise, if you file a motion to dismiss, ensure that the motion contains all the
necessary evidence that both a trial court and appellate court would need to find in your favor.

Of particular importance in federal court practice is the pre-trial order. Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 16, the pre-trial order establishes the boundaries of trial. See Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 206 (5th Cir.1998) (“It is a well-settled rule that a joint pre-trial order signed by both parties supersedes all pleadings and governs the issues and evidence to be presented at trial.”). If the pre-trial order does not contain the pertinent claims, defenses or arguments that you wish to present at trial, you are likely also going to be out of luck on appeal.

Later on in the case, as the factual record becomes more fully developed, consider
whether amending or supplementing the pleadings or other court submissions are necessary to make the record as accurate as possible. Most states follow the federal practice of allowing liberal amendments. However, these can be contested, particularly late in the process, closer to trial. While appellate review is often for abuse of discretion, formulating a strong motion in favor of or in opposition to an amendment can preserve the issue.

What to Keep in Mind as Your Case Proceeds

As the case develops, consider whether the elements you need to prove your case are
sufficiently reflected in the information you obtain during discovery. If not, determine whether there are ways to obtain the information you need well before trial starts. By the time trial arrives, it may be too late to supplement the record to get before the trial judge and the appellate court what you need to win your case. In that regard, anything you have in writing that gets submitted to the court may very well end up being part of the record on review, so make sure it is accurate and understandable. Incomprehensible or incomplete submissions can muddy your appellate record and damage a successful appellate proceeding. In the same vein, make sure
anything presented to the court prior to trial that you want to be part of the record is transcribed.

Otherwise, there will be an insufficient record on appeal. This is particularly so when it comes to discovery disputes. Although they are common in present day litigation, judges hate discovery disputes. To preserve discovery issues for appeal, be sure to get a ruling, and make sure it is reflected in writing. Moreover, carefully review every pre-trial court order or other judicial communication, including court minutes, to ensure accuracy. Attempting to make corrections during the appellate process may not be possible.

Another significant area for appellate issues is the failure to timely identify experts. This is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, so it is important that one builds a record on the issue, particularly regarding any prejudice suffered by the untimely disclosure.

After Discovery Closes – The Motion in Limine

Once discovery has closed, consider carefully any motions in limine you may want to
make. Although motions in limine are not strictly necessary, they are helpful in identifying evidentiary issues for the judge and litigant and increase the chances of a substantive objection, sidebar, and ruling when the issue arises at trial. One potential pitfall – some jurisdictions require a party to renew an objection at trial after a motion in limine has been denied, so make sure to do so if necessary. See, e.g., State ex. Rel Missouri Highway and Transp. Com’n v. Vitt, 785 S.W.2d 708, 711 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1990) (“A motion in limine preserves nothing for review. Following denial of a motion in limine, a party must object at trial to preserve for appellate review the point at issue.”) (internal citation omitted). Also, if the Court delivers its ruling on a motion in limine orally, make sure it is transcribed properly by the court reporter.
Leave no doubt that you have raised (and obtained a ruling on) an issue.

Now the Trial – What to Keep in Mind

Above all else, when in doubt, object. Objections should be immediate and specifically describe the basis for the objection so the record is clear. Make the argument to win –
every objection should be more than just reciting labels, and should provide sufficient information for the trial judge to decide the issue. The goal is not to be coy with the trial judge and hope for a lucky break, but to be prepared to make an argument to win the issue at trial or, alternatively, on appeal. In addition, if you are the party proffering the evidence, make sure the proffer is on the record and that you expressly state why the evidence is being offered. This may require pressing on the judge to get the full objection on the record. If you fail to do so, you risk the appellate court not reviewing the claim on appeal. See, e.g., National Bank of Andover v. Kansas Bankers Sur. Co., 290 Kan. 247, 274-75 (2010) (observing “purpose of a proffer is to make an adequate record of the evidence to be introduced … [and] preserves the issue for appeal and provides the appellate court an adequate record to review when determining whether the trial court erred in excluding the evidence.”). Also, always be careful of waiving any issues for appeal by agreeing to a judge’s proposed compromise on evidentiary issues.

An important but often overlooked consideration is the courtroom layout and dynamics. Well-thought and timely objections will be for naught if they are not transcribed. Sometimes the courtroom layout can make record preservation difficult. For example, if objections are made at sidebar conferences where the court reporter is not present, those objections may not make their way into the appellate record or be dependent on the after the fact recollections of others. See, e.g., Ohio App. R. 9(c) (describing procedures for preparing statement of evidence where transcript of proceedings is unavailable and providing trial court with final authority for settlement and approval). This should be avoided whenever possible.

Beyond objections, make sure all the evidence you need for your appeal is properly admitted by the trial court before the close of your case. All exhibits that were used at trial should be formally moved into evidence if there is any doubt as to whether they will be needed on appeal. If you had previously moved for summary judgment and lost, make sure you take the necessary steps at trial to preserve those summary judgment issues, especially in jurisdictions that do not allow interlocutory appeals.

Another important aspect of the trial is the jury instructions. Jury instructions should always be complete. Remember that the instructions you propose can be denied without error if any aspect of them is not accurate, so break them into small bites so that the judge can at least accept some parts. Specifically object to any jury instructions as necessary before the jury begins its deliberations. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c). Failure to do so will waive the right to have the instruction considered on appeal. See, e.g., ChooseCo, LLC v. Lean Forward Media, LLC, 364 Fed. Appx. 670, 672 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that defendant’s objection to jury instructions and verdict form during jury deliberations did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c) and noting that the “[f]ailure to object to a jury instruction or the form of an interrogatory prior to the jury retiring results in a waiver of that objection.”).

Additionally, when you lodge your objections, make sure you explain why the jury charge is in error since general objections are insufficient. See, e.g., Victory Outreach Center v. Meslo, 281 Fed. Appx. 136, 139 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that general objection to the court’s jury instructions and proposed alternative instructions, “were insufficient to preserve on appeal all potential challenges to the instructions” and were not in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)(1)). If possible, have a set of written objections to the other side’s jury charges, and get the judge to rule on that, since judges like to hold such conferences off the record.

Also, do not overlook the verdict form. Know that when you agree to a particular form (general or special), that will mean that you are probably taking certain risks and waiving certain arguments one way or the other. Give this thought, and make sure that you know the rules of your jurisdiction on verdict forms so you can object if necessary. See, e.g., Palm Bay Intern., Inc. v. Marchesi Di Barolo S.P.A., 796 F.Supp. 2d 396, 409 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (objection to verdict sheet should be made before jury retires); Saridakis v. South Broward Hosp. Dist., 2010 WL 2274955, at *8 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (noting that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(c)(2)(B) states that an objection is timely if “a party objects promptly after learning that the instruction or request will be … given or refused” and that the Eleventh Circuit “require[s] a party to object to a … jury verdict form prior to jury deliberations” or the party “waives its right to raise the issue on appeal.”). (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Finally, pay careful attention to the closing argument. This can be an area where winning at trial by convincing a jury may be at odds with preserving the issue on appeal. On the flip side, many litigators are loath to interrupt a closing argument to object. If you need to object to preserve an issue, do so.

Post-Judgment – Final Things to Consider

First, determine whether certain arguments must be made post-judgment to preserve those arguments for appeal. Some arguments (such as those attacking the sufficiency of the evidence) must be made at that time or they are waived. See, e.g., Webster v. Bass Enterprises Production Co., 114 Fed.Appx. 604, 605 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that failure to challenge back pay award in post-judgment motion waived the issue on appeal absent exceptional circumstances that did not exist). Written motions post-judgment should include all relevant references to trial transcripts and evidence to make as complete and clean a factual record as possible.

Second, when the appellate record is being compiled, carefully double check the record to ensure its accuracy. Many times the trial court clerk or court reporter accidentally omits portions of the record. If this is not caught and corrected in a timely manner, you may be stuck with a bad record. Most jurisdictions have procedures in place for supplementing and correcting the record but understand them well in advance so there is adequate time to address any discrepancies before the appellate briefing is due.

Conclusion

Too often even seasoned trial lawyers get tripped up on appeal by not having an orderly and complete record. As a Pro Se litigator, you must never lose sight of the factual and legal issues in a case and what an appellate court will need to consider in making the desired determinations. As demonstrated above, a winning record requires thought at all stages of the litigation, not just when the notice of appeal is filed. With proper preparation, attention to detail, and forethought, one can ensure that the proper record on appeal is never in doubt.

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/ “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will show you step-by-step litigation solutions helping you challenge these fraudsters and ultimately saving your home from foreclosure either through loan modification or “Pro Se” litigation visit: https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/

 

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What Homeowners Must Know About Appeal-able Orders and Judgment from the Federal Courts

01 Thursday Mar 2018

Posted by BNG in Appeal, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, Your Legal Rights

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Appeal-able Orders, Foreclosure, foreclosure defense, homeowners, Judgment, Orders, Plaintiff, United States

In order to effectively perfect your Appeal case as a Pro Se Litigator, homeowners must familiarize themselves about Appealing unfavorable decisions.

1. Appeal-able Orders: Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:

(a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Final orders and
judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C. § 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945)).

A magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Perez-Priego v. Alachua County Clerk of Court, 148 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 1998). However, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3), the Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction over an appeal from a final judgment entered by a magistrate judge, but only if the parties consented to the magistrate’s jurisdiction. McNab v. J & J Marine, Inc., 240 F.3d 1326, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2001).

(b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).
Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885-86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judgment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys’ fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998).

(c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Under this section, appeals are permitted from the following types of orders:

i. Orders granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions; However, interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted. McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1472-73 (11th Cir. 1986);

ii. Orders appointing receivers or refusing to wind up receiverships; and

iii. Orders determining the rights and liabilities of parties in admiralty cases.

(d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court’s denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable.

(e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited
exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93
L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Blythe Eastman Paine
Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964).

2. Time for Filing: The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional.
Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:

(a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the order or judgment appealed from is entered. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD – no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below.

(b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): “If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later.”

(c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion.

(d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend or reopen the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time to file an appeal may be reopened if the district court finds, upon motion, that the following conditions are satisfied: the moving party did not receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order within 21 days after entry; the motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered or within 14 days after the moving party receives notice, whichever is earlier; and no party would be prejudiced by the reopening.

(e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution’s internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.

3. Format of the notice of appeal: Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro Se notice of
appeal must be signed by the appellant.

4. Effect of a notice of appeal: A district court lacks jurisdiction, i.e., authority, to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/ “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will show you step-by-step litigation solutions helping you challenge these fraudsters and ultimately saving your home from foreclosure either through loan modification or “Pro Se” litigation visit: https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/

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How Homeowners Can Greatly Improve their Chances of Winning on Appeal

24 Wednesday Jan 2018

Posted by BNG in Appeal, Case Laws, Case Study, Discovery Strategies, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Note - Deed of Trust - Mortgage, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, Scam Artists, Title Companies, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Appeal, Court, District Court, Foreclosure, foreclosure defense, homeowners, Plaintiff, pro se, Pro se legal representation in the United States, State Court, United States district court

A seasoned Attorney will tell you that trying cases is one of the most exciting things a litigator does during his or her career but it is also certainly one of the most stressful. While in the trenches during trial, many litigators understandably focus all of their energies on winning the case at hand. But a good litigator knows that trial is often not the last say in the outcome of a case. The final outcome often rests at the appellate level, where a successful trial outcome can be affirmed, reversed, or something in between. The likelihood of success many times hinges on the substance of the record on appeal. The below discusses a variety of issues that trial litigators should keep in mind as they prepare and present their case so they position themselves in the best possible way for any appeals that follow.

Prepare Your Appellate Record From The Moment Your Case Begins

Perhaps one of the biggest misconceptions regarding preserving an adequate record on appeal is when a lawyer should start considering what should be in the record. In short, the answer is from the moment the complaint is filed. At that time, counsel should begin to think carefully about the elements of each asserted cause of action, potential defenses and their required elements, and the burden of proof for each. Every pleading should be drafted carefully to ensure that no arguments are waived in the event they are needed for an appeal. For instance, a complaint should allege with specificity all the factual and legal elements necessary to sustain a claim, while an answer should include any and all applicable affirmative defenses to avoid waiver. See, e.g., Travellers Int’l, A.G. v. Trans World Airlines, 41 F.3d 1570, 1580 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The general rule in federal courts is that a failure to plead an affirmative defense results in a waiver.”). Likewise, if you file a motion to dismiss, ensure that the motion contains all the necessary evidence that both a trial court and appellate court would need to find in your favor. Of particular importance in federal court practice is the pre-trial order. Under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 16, the pre-trial order establishes the boundaries of trial. See Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 206 (5th Cir.1998) (“It is a well-settled rule that a joint pre-trial order signed by both parties supersedes all pleadings and governs the issues and evidence to be presented at trial.”). If the pre-trial order does not contain the pertinent claims, defenses or arguments that you wish to present at trial, you are likely also going to be out of luck on appeal.

Later on in the case, as the factual record becomes more fully developed, consider whether amending or supplementing the pleadings or other court submissions are necessary to make the record as accurate as possible. Most states follow the federal practice of allowing liberal amendments. However, these can be contested, particularly late in the process, closer to trial. While appellate review is often for abuse of discretion, formulating a strong motion in favor of or in opposition to an amendment can preserve the issue.

What to Keep in Mind as Your Case Proceeds

As the case develops, consider whether the elements you need to prove your case are sufficiently reflected in the information you obtain during discovery. If not, determine whether there are ways to obtain the information you need well before trial starts. By the time trial arrives, it may be too late to supplement the record to get before the trial judge and the appellate court what you need to win your case. In that regard, anything you have in writing that gets submitted to the court may very well end up being part of the record on review, so make sure it is accurate and understandable. Incomprehensible or incomplete submissions can muddy your appellate record and damage a successful appellate proceeding. In the same vein, make sure anything presented to the court prior to trial that you want to be part of the record is transcribed. Otherwise, there will be an insufficient record on appeal. This is particularly so when it comes to discovery disputes. Although they are common in present day litigation, judges hate discovery disputes. To preserve discovery issues for appeal, be sure to get a ruling, and make sure it is reflected in writing. Moreover, carefully review every pre-trial court order or other judicial communication, including court minutes, to ensure accuracy. Attempting to make corrections during the appellate process may not be possible.

Another significant area for appellate issues is the failure to timely identify experts. This is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, so it is important that one builds a record on the issue, particularly regarding any prejudice suffered by the untimely disclosure.

After Discovery Closes – The Motion in Limine

Once discovery has closed, consider carefully any motions in limine you may want to make. Although motions in limine are not strictly necessary, they are helpful in identifying evidentiary issues for the judge and counsel and increase the chances of a substantive objection, sidebar, and ruling when the issue arises at trial. One potential pitfall – some jurisdictions require a party to renew an objection at trial after a motion in limine has been denied, so make sure to do so if necessary. See, e.g., State ex. Rel Missouri Highway and Transp. Com’n v. Vitt, 785 S.W.2d 708, 711 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1990) (“A motion in limine preserves nothing for review. Following denial of a motion in limine, a party must object at trial to preserve for appellate review the point at issue.”) (internal citation omitted). Also, if the Court delivers its ruling on a motion in limine orally, make sure it is transcribed properly by the court reporter.

Now the Trial – What to Keep in Mind

Above all else, when in doubt, object. Objections should be immediate and specifically describe the basis for the objection so the record is clear. Make the argument to win – every objection should be more than just reciting labels, and should provide sufficient information for the trial judge to decide the issue. The goal is not to be coy with the trial judge and hope for a lucky break, but to be prepared to make an argument to win the issue at trial or, alternatively, on appeal. In addition, if you are the party proffering the evidence, make sure the proffer is on the record and that you expressly state why the evidence is being offered. This may require pressing on the judge to get the full objection on the record. If you fail to do so, you risk the appellate court not reviewing the claim on appeal. See, e.g., National Bank of Andover v. Kansas Bankers Sur. Co., 290 Kan. 247, 274-75 (2010) (observing “purpose of a proffer is to make an adequate record of the evidence to be introduced … [and] preserves the issue for appeal and provides the appellate court an adequate record to review when determining whether the trial court erred in excluding the evidence.”). Also, always be careful of waiving any issues for appeal by agreeing to a judge’s proposed compromise on evidentiary issues.

An important but often overlooked consideration is the courtroom layout and dynamics. Well-thought and timely objections will be for naught if they are not transcribed. Sometimes the courtroom layout can make record preservation difficult. For example, if objections are made at sidebar conferences where the court reporter is not present, those objections may not make their way into the appellate record or be dependent on the after the fact recollections of others. See, e.g., Ohio App. R. 9(c) (describing procedures for preparing statement of evidence where transcript of proceedings is unavailable and providing trial court with final authority for settlement and approval). This should be avoided whenever possible.

Beyond objections, make sure all the evidence you need for your appeal is properly admitted by the trial court before the close of your case. All exhibits that were used at trial should be formally moved into evidence if there is any doubt as to whether they will be needed on appeal. If you had previously moved for summary judgment and lost, make sure you take the necessary steps at trial to preserve those summary judgment issues, especially in jurisdictions that do not allow interlocutory appeals.

Another important aspect of the trial is the jury instructions. Jury instructions should always be complete. Remember that the instructions you propose can be denied without error if any aspect of them is not accurate, so break them into small bites so that the judge can at least accept some parts. Specifically object to any jury instructions as necessary before the jury begins its deliberations. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c). Failure to do so will waive the right to have the instruction considered on appeal. See, e.g., ChooseCo, LLC v. Lean Forward Media, LLC, 364 Fed. Appx. 670, 672 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that defendant’s objection to jury instructions and verdict form during jury deliberations did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c) and noting that the “[f]ailure to object to a jury instruction or the form of an interrogatory prior to the jury retiring results in a waiver of that objection.”).

Additionally, when you lodge your objections, make sure you explain why the jury charge is in error since general objections are insufficient. See, e.g., Victory Outreach Center v. Meslo, 281 Fed. Appx. 136, 139 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that general objection to the court’s jury instructions and proposed alternative instructions, “were insufficient to preserve on appeal all potential challenges to the instructions” and were not in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)(1)). If possible, have a set of written objections to the other side’s jury charges, and get the judge to rule on that, since judges like to hold such conferences off the record. Also, do not overlook the verdict form. Know that when you agree to a particular form (general or special), that will mean that you are probably taking certain risks and waiving certain arguments one way or the other. Give this thought, and make sure that you know the rules of your jurisdiction on verdict forms so you can object if necessary. See, e.g., Palm Bay Intern., Inc. v. Marchesi Di Barolo S.P.A., 796 F.Supp. 2d 396, 409 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (objection to verdict sheet should be made before jury retires); Saridakis v. South Broward Hosp. Dist., 2010 WL 2274955, at *8 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (noting that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(c)(2)(B) states that an objection is timely if “a party objects promptly after learning that the instruction or request will be … given or refused” and that the Eleventh Circuit “require[s] a party to object to a … jury verdict form prior to jury deliberations” or the party “waives its right to raise the issue on appeal.”). (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Finally, pay careful attention to the closing argument. This can be an area where winning at trial by convincing a jury may be at odds with preserving the issue on appeal. On the flip side, many litigators are loath to interrupt a closing argument to object. If you need to object to preserve an issue, do so.

Post-Judgment – Final Things to Consider

First, determine whether certain arguments must be made post-judgment to preserve those arguments for appeal. Some arguments (such as those attacking the sufficiency of the evidence) must be made at that time or they are waived. See, e.g., Webster v. Bass Enterprises Production Co., 114 Fed.Appx. 604, 605 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that failure to challenge back pay award in post-judgment motion waived the issue on appeal absent exceptional circumstances that did not exist). Written motions post-judgment should include all relevant references to trial transcripts and evidence to make as complete and clean a factual record as possible

Second, when the appellate record is being compiled, carefully double check the record to ensure its accuracy. Many times the trial court clerk or court reporter accidentally omits portions of the record. If this is not caught and corrected in a timely manner, you may be stuck with a bad record. Most jurisdictions have procedures in place for supplementing and correcting the record but understand them well in advance so there is adequate time to address any discrepancies before the appellate briefing is due.

Conclusion

Too often even seasoned trial lawyers get tripped up on appeal by not having an orderly and complete record. A litigator must never lose sight of the factual and legal issues in a case and what an appellate court will need to consider in making the desired determinations. As demonstrated above, a winning record requires thought at all stages of the litigation, not just when the notice of appeal is filed. With proper preparation, attention to detail, and forethought, one can ensure that the proper record on appeal is never in doubt.

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/ “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will show you step-by-step litigation solutions helping you challenge these fraudsters and ultimately saving your home from foreclosure either through loan modification or “Pro Se” litigation visit: https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/

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What Homeowners Should Know About Appeals at the 9th Circuit

28 Monday Nov 2016

Posted by BNG in Appeal, Bankruptcy, Fed, Federal Court, Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Landlord and Tenant, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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9th circuit, 9th circuit court, Appeal, Law, Lawsuit, Pro se legal representation in the United States, wrongful foreclosure appeal

The Ninth Circuit uses a limited en banc system for en banc matters because of its size, with 11 judges comprising an en banc panel;

The Chief Judge is always one of the 11 en banc judges;

The Ninth Circuit currently has 29 active judges and 15 judges on senior status;

Active judges are expected to hear 32 days of oral arguments per year;

Judges are assigned to hear cases by rotation, and no preference is given for judges from those jurisdictions;

Oral argument are scheduled on certain dates;

Filings for are currently down 3% compared to last year;

Pro Se filings account for 51% of the documents filed with the court;

The largest category of pro se litigants are prisoners;

48% of all immigration appeals in the US are filed in the Ninth Circuit;

From the entry of the final order of the lower court or agency to final Ninth Circuit disposition: 32.6 months
From the filing of the law brief to oral argument or submission on briefs: 8.7 months in the Ninth Circuit (4.1 months nationally);

The court is permitted to move cases up in priority;

Priority is set by a staff attorney who assigns a number to each case based on a point system: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, and 24. Cases assigned 1 or 2 go to the screening panel for disposition. Cases assigned 24 always get oral argument, and involve matters like the death penalty. Cases assigned 3, 5, 7, or 10, will depend on the number of parties, the types of issues, etc. These cases may get oral argument, or be submitted on briefs;

The assignment of the panel of judges is separate from assignment of cases;

Panels are set 1 year in advance;

The clerk’s office assigns cases based on a formula that includes priority 99% of petitions for rehearing en banc are rejected – a judge on the court must initiate the process for en banc rehearing, and a judge may do so even if there is no petition for rehearing en banc filed;

If there is a second appeal to the court in the same case, the case is first presented to the original panel to see if they want to decide the second appeal – usually the panel will take back the case in approximately 1/4 to 1/3 of cases – if you want the same panel, file a motion to ask to have the case assigned to the same panel, but give good reasons why;

Generally, most general civil appeals where the parties are represented by attorneys will get set for oral argument – but about 20-25% that are assigned to oral argument will ultimately be submitted on briefs instead.

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at http://www.fightforeclosure.net “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will show you step-by-step litigation solutions helping you challenge these fraudsters and ultimately saving your home from foreclosure either through loan modification or “Pro Se” litigation visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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How Can Nevada Homeowners Effectively Handle Foreclosure Matters

08 Friday Apr 2016

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Pro Se Litigation

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Foreclosure, foreclosure defense, Mortgage loan, Nevada, Nevada Foreclosure, Nevada mortgage loans, Pro se legal representation in the United States

Why Is It Impportant For Nevada Homeowners to Protect their Homes?

In Nevada, homeowners must be aware of mortgage loans and foreclosure laws inorder to be few steps aheads of unscrupulous elements that would do whatever it takes to snatch away your home right under your nose.

Why You Need to Know About Nevada Mortgage Loans

When you take out a loan to purchase residential property in Nevada, you typically sign a promissory note and a deed of trust. A promissory note is basically an IOU that contains the promise to repay the loan, as well as the terms for repayment. The deed of trust provides security for the loan that is evidenced by a promissory note.

How Can you Handle the Issues of Missed Payments

If you miss a payment, most loans include a grace period of ten or fifteen days after which time the loan servicer will assess a late fee. (Loan servicers collect and process payments from homeowners, as well as handle loss mitigation applications and foreclosures for defaulted loans.)

The late fee is generally 5% of the overdue payment of principal and interest based on the terms of the note. To find out the late charge amount and grace period for your loan, look at the promissory note that you signed. This information can also be found on your monthly mortgage statement.

What Are Your Option About Missing Quite a Few Payments

If you miss a few mortgage payments, your mortgage servicer will probably send a letter or two reminding you to get caught up, as well as call you to try to collect the payments. Don’t ignore the phone calls and letters. This is a good opportunity to discuss loss mitigation options and attempt to work out an agreement (such as a loan modification, forbearance, or payment plan) so you can avoid foreclosure.

How Can You Handle Pre-Foreclosure Loss Mitigation Review Period

Under the federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau servicing rules that went into effect January 10, 2014, the mortgage servicer must wait until you are 120 days delinquent on payments before making the first official notice or filing for any nonjudicial or judicial foreclosure. This is to give you sufficient time to explore loss mitigation opportunities. (If a servicer’s sole purpose of providing a notice is to inform you that you are late on your payments and/or explain what your loss mitigation options are, the servicer can deliver the notice within this pre-foreclosure period.)

What About Deed of Trust, What You Need to Know

Nevada deeds of trust often contain a clause that requires the lender to send a notice, commonly called a breach letter or demand letter, informing you that your loan is in default before it can accelerate the loan and proceed with foreclosure. (The acceleration clause in the mortgage permits the lender to demand that the entire balance of the loan be repaid if the borrower defaults on the loan.)

The letter must specify:

  • the default
  • the action required to cure the default
  • a date (usually not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given to the borrower) by which the default must be cured, and
  • that failure to cure the default on or before the date specified in the notice may result in acceleration of the debt and sale of the property.

What Types of Foreclosure Procedures Is there In Nevada

In Nevada, most residential foreclosures are nonjudicial. This means the lender can foreclose without going to court as long as the deed of trust contains a power of sale clause.

What is Notice of Default and Election to Sell

In Nevada, Non-judicial proceedings is used to foreclose most home. The Nevada nonjudicial foreclosure process formally begins when the trustee, a third-party, records a Notice of Default and Election to Sell (NOD) in the office of the recorder in the county where the property is located, providing three months to cure the default.

A copy of the NOD must be sent to each person who has a recorded request for a copy and each person with an interest or claimed interest in the property by registered or certified mail within ten days after the NOD is recorded recordation.

What Are the Requirements for Posting NOD?

If a residential foreclosure, a copy of the NOD must be posted in a conspicuous place on the property 100 days before the date of sale.

Are there Any Affidavit Required

The trustee or beneficiary (lender) must record a notarized affidavit along with the NOD that states, based on a review of business records, including all of the following information.

  • The full name and business address of the current trustee or the current trustee’s personal representative or assignee, the current holder of the note secured by the deed of trust, the current beneficiary of record and the current servicer of the obligation or debt secured by the deed of trust.
  • That the beneficiary under the deed of trust, the successor in interest of the beneficiary or the trustee is in actual or constructive possession of the note secured by the deed of trust; or that the beneficiary or its successor in interest or the trustee is entitled to enforce the obligation or debt secured by the deed of trust.
  • That the beneficiary or its successor in interest, the servicer of the obligation or debt secured by the deed of trust or the trustee, or an attorney representing any of those persons, has sent to the borrower a written statement including the amount needed to cure the default, the principal amount of the debt, the accrued interest and late charges, a good faith estimate of all fees, contact information for obtaining the most current amounts due, and each assignee of the deed of trust.

What Other Alternatives Do I Have to Stop the Foreclosure?

You have 3 alternatives, sometimes 4.

Your alternatives are:

1). Try to call your alleged lender to see if you can get a reasonable person on the phone. Don’t panic, just be prepared as over 90% of the people you speak to on the phone are programmed to act certain way.i.e, if you are lucky as 99.9% you’ll get a recording and will have to leave a message, unfortunately, you have less that 20% of getting a call back response. You’ll know very early that the alleged lender, definitely not with your best interest at heart.

2). Nevada law requires that borrowers who are in foreclosure be given the option to participate in mediation if the property is owner-occupied.

The trustee must mail to the borrower (by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested) an Election to Mediate Form no later than ten days after recording the NOD. If the borrower wants to elect mediation, the form must be completed and returned within 30 days.

3). You can commence litigation to immediately stop the foreclosure, but you have to be prepared to whether the stop as you’ll experience various emotions during the litigation proceedings, but with time, you’ll get used to it.

3) Bamkruptcy is another method to stop foreclosure, but it will not be in your best interest if you just found yourself in foreclosure situation. We recommend Bankruptcy as the last resort and this is why?

If you are a homeowner with a mortgage payment, say like $1000/mth. If you have missed payment that is 1 year or more. Your Chapter 13 bankrupcty payments will be difficult for you to make once in bankrupcty because you will still make the Normal monthly payment and then some portion of the missed payments, which is sometimes, nealy half of the monthly payment. So if you make a payment of $1000 before the foreclosure began, you’ll now have to make ($1500 (Regular + Potion Payments) to catch up. So you ask yourself, if you can’t afford the original payment of $1000, before you went into foreclosure, how can you afford the higher payments.

In Nevada, You Have What is called Danger Notice

At least 60 days prior to the date of the sale, the trustee must provide the borrower(s) with a separate “Danger Notice” stating that they are in danger of losing their home to foreclosure, along with a copy of the original promissory note.

The notice must be:

  • personally served to the borrower
  • left with a person of suitable age and discretion (if the borrower is not available) and a copy mailed, or
  • if a person of suitable age and discretion is not available, then the notice may be posted in a conspicuous place on the property, left with a person residing in the property, and then mailed to the borrower.

What do you need to know about Notice of Sale

After expiration of the three-month period following the recording of the NOD, the trustee must give notice of the time and place of the sale by recording the notice of sale and by:

  • Providing the notice of sale to each required party by personal service or by mailing the notice by registered or certified mail to the last known address 20 days before sale.
  • Posting the notice of sale on the property 15 days before the sale.
  • Posting the notice of sale for 20 days successively in a public place in the county where the property is situated and on the property 15 days before sale.
  • Publishing a copy of the notice of sale three times, once each week for three consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the property is situated.

Notice to Tenants

If the property is tenant occupied, a separate notice must be posted in a conspicuous place on the property and mailed to the tenant no later than three business days after the notice of sale is given.

Reinstatement Before Sale

In the case of owner-occupied housing, the borrower gets a right to reinstate by paying the arrearage, costs, and fees. This right expires 5 days prior to the date of the foreclosure sale.

The Foreclosure Sale

The foreclosure sale must be between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. All sales of real property must be made:

  • at the courthouse in the county in which the property or some part thereof is situated (in counties with a population of less than 100,000), or
  • at the public location in the county designated by the governing body of the county for that purpose (in counties with a population of 100,000 or more).

The property will be:

  • sold to the highest third-party bidder or
  • revert to the foreclosing lender and become REO

Deficiency Judgment Following Sale

When a lender forecloses on a mortgage, the total debt owed by the borrower to the lender frequently exceeds the foreclosure sale price. The difference between the sale price and the total debt is called a “deficiency.” In some states, the lender can seek a personal judgment against the debtor to recover the deficiency. Generally, once the lender gets a deficiency judgment, the lender may collect this amount from the borrower.

In Nevada, a lender may obtain a deficiency judgment following foreclosure, but the amount of the judgment is limited to the lesser of:

  • the difference between the total debt and fair market value of the home, or
  • the difference between the total debt and foreclosure sale price.

For loans taken out after October 1, 2009, deficiencies are prohibited for purchase money loans (that have not been refinanced) held by a bank or other financial institution for single-family residences occupied continuously by the borrowers.

Redemption Period

A redemption period is the legal right of any mortgage borrower in foreclosure to pay off the total debt, including the principal balance, plus certain additional costs and interest, in order to reclaim the property. In Nevada, there is no redemption period following a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.

Eviction Following Foreclosure

If you don’t vacate the property following the foreclosure sale, the new owner will likely:

  • offer you a cash-for-keys deal (where the new owner offers you money in exchange for you agreeing to move out), or
  • give you a three-day notice to quit (leave) before filing an eviction lawsuit.

To learn more about foreclosure in general, ways to defend against foreclosure, and programs to help struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at http://www.fightforeclosure.net “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will show you step-by-step litigation solutions helping you challenge these fraudsters and ultimately saving your home from foreclosure either through loan modification or “Pro Se” litigation visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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Why Homeowners Must Time Correctly Before Appealing Adverse Decisions

03 Sunday Apr 2016

Posted by BNG in Appeal, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Your Legal Rights

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Appeal, Appealable, appealable orders, Appealing Adverse Decisions, Law, Lawsuit, Pro se legal representation in the United States

CASE STUDY: 989 F.2d 1074

Effective Foreclosure Defense requires timing. If you time correctly, you can save your home. Homeowners presently in litigation must time correctly when appealling adverse ruling to avoid conflict of Jurisdiction. This case shows how wrong timing before filing a Notice of Appeal resulted to Dismissal of Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction.

989 F.2d 1074

25 Fed.R.Serv.3d 62

Don Byron REILLY; Mary Lou Reilly, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Bruce HUSSEY, Attorney; Robert J. Phillips, Attorney;
Federal Land Bank of Spokane, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 91-35903.

United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Nov. 2, 1992.
Decided March 23, 1993.

Don Byron Reilly and Mary Lou Reilly, pro se.

W. Arthur Graham, Cent. Coast Farm Credit, Arroyo Grande, CA, for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana.

Before: WRIGHT, HUG, and POOLE, Circuit Judges.

EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:

The Reillys appeal pro se the district court’s order dismissing their adversary complaint. Because their notice of appeal was filed while a motion for rehearing was pending in the district court, we lack jurisdiction to hear their appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

2 In February 1977, the Reillys negotiated a loan from the Federal Land Bank of Spokane and gave as security a deed of trust to a ten-acre tract of land in Ravalli County, Montana. By February 1986, the Reillys were in default on the loan, having missed two annual payments, and had failed to pay real property taxes. The Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings.
3 The Reillys first attempted to avoid foreclosure by filing a Chapter 11 petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Montana, in January 1986. The court lifted the automatic stay so that the Bank could continue with pending foreclosure proceedings in Montana state court. The property was sold at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale in March 1987. The Reillys’ appeal to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit was dismissed as moot.
4 In February 1987, while that appeal was pending, the Reillys sought to prevent foreclosure by filing an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court. They sought to void the deed of trust on the ground that the legal description was erroneous. The court dismissed their complaint, finding the deed valid under Montana law and not voidable under the Bankruptcy Code. The Reillys appealed to the U.S. District Court, District of Montana, which dismissed the appeal with prejudice.
5 In June 1988, on a creditor’s motion, the bankruptcy court converted the Reillys’ bankruptcy to a Chapter 7 proceeding. The Reillys appealed. Following the conversion, the bankruptcy court modified its order lifting the automatic stay to allow the Bank to continue an unlawful detainer action in state court. That court found the Reillys guilty of unlawful detainer and issued an order of ejectment. In October 1989, the BAP affirmed the conversion. Five weeks later, the Montana Supreme Court dismissed the Reillys’ appeal of their ejectment, finding that the issues raised were based solely on federal bankruptcy law and had already been decided in the federal proceedings.
6 In May 1989, the Reillys filed a second adversary complaint in the bankruptcy court, which is the basis of this appeal. The Reillys again complained, among other things, that the original order lifting the stay was improper. The bankruptcy court granted the Bank’s motion to dismiss the complaint.
7 The Reillys appealed. In March 1991, they filed an amended brief in which they argued, apparently for the first time, that because Judge Peterson failed to disqualify himself at the outset, all decisions of the bankruptcy court should be set aside.1 On June 4, 1991, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court on all issues. First, the court held that the Reillys were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel from challenging the order lifting the stay. Second, they failed to state a claim for relief under the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 because the Act confers no private right of action. Third, res judicata barred their challenge to the validity of the deed of trust. The district court did not rule on whether Judge Peterson should have been disqualified.
8 Having suffered yet another adverse decision, the Reillys sought a hearing before us. The fate of their appeal is determined by the timing of their filings following the district court order. On June 14, 1991, they filed in the district court a motion to reconsider. On July 3, 1991, while their motion to reconsider was pending, they filed a notice of appeal. On July 29, 1991, the district court entered an order denying the motion to reconsider.
 JURISDICTION
9 We have jurisdiction to hear appeals from bankruptcy proceedings in which the district court or bankruptcy panel exercises appellate jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). Such appeals are governed by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, as amended in 1989. Fed.R.App.P. 6.
10 Rule 4(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a notice of appeal filed before the disposition of a post-trial motion “shall have no effect.” However, Rule 4(a)(4) does not apply in bankruptcy proceedings in which the district court or bankruptcy panel exercises appellate jurisdiction. Fed.R.App.P. 6(b)(1)(i). In contrast, Bankruptcy Rule 8015, which governs motions for rehearing2 by the district court or the bankruptcy appellate panel, is silent on the effect of appeals filed before a motion for rehearing is decided. See Bankr.Rule 8015, 11 U.S.C.A. (West Supp.1992). Rule 6(b)(2)(i) provides that, if a timely motion for rehearing is filed under Rule 8015, the time for appeal to the court of appeals runs from the entry of the order denying the rehearing.

11 The Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules deliberately omitted any provision regarding the effect of an appeal filed before the entry of an order denying a rehearing because it wished to “leave undisturbed the current state of law in that area.” Fed.R.App.P. 6, Advisory Committee Notes, 1989 Amendment, subdivision (b)(2). At the time of the amendment, this circuit had held that a notice of appeal in a bankruptcy case is null if it was filed while a motion for rehearing was pending in the district court. In re Stringer, 847 F.2d 549, 550 (9th Cir.1988). That holding is left undisturbed by the 1989 amendment of Fed.R.App.R. 6, and we reaffirm Stringer in this context.

12 In their zeal to pursue all possible avenues of review, the Reillys filed a notice of appeal while their motion for reconsideration was pending before the district court. Their notice of appeal was premature and a nullity: “[I]t is as if no notice of appeal were filed at all. And if no notice of appeal is filed at all, the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to act.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61, 103 S.Ct. 400, 403, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982) (per curiam). Because the Reillys failed to file a notice of appeal after the district court denied their motion for reconsideration, we are without jurisdiction to hear their appeal.
13 Our holding does not deprive the Reillys of an opportunity to be heard. They have had their day in court; indeed they have had their days in many different courts. Clearly, they continue to feel aggrieved; but just as clearly, an unfavorable decision does not necessarily mean that a court has failed to fairly consider their arguments.
14 This appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
15 DISMISSED.
1Bankruptcy Judge John L. Peterson presided over the chapter 11 proceedings and both adversary proceedings in the bankruptcy court. In June 1986, in the original bankruptcy hearing, Judge Peterson advised the parties of his wife’s minority stock interest in a creditor of the bankruptcy estate. He gave the parties the option of signing a remittal of disqualification or waiting for another bankruptcy judge. Both parties voluntarily signed the remittal

Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(e), a judge is not allowed to “accept from the parties to a proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification” based on the financial interest of the judge’s spouse. The Reillys did not seek review of the disqualification issue, however, until some five years and numerous proceedings later. While § 455 contains no explicit timeliness requirement, we have required that a motion to disqualify or recuse a judge under this section must be made in a timely fashion. Molina v. Rison, 886 F.2d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir.1989).

Moreover, in August 1990, while the present action was pending in district court, the Reillys filed a complaint with the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit alleging misconduct by Judge Peterson. We issued an order concluding that “[i]f the judge’s failure to recuse himself, despite the parties’ remittal, was conduct prejudicial to the effective and efficient administration of the business of the courts, appropriate and corrective action has been taken and this complaint therefore should be closed.” In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, No. 90-80054, at 4 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 1991).

2The Reillys filed a motion for “reconsideration.” The terms “rehearing” and “reconsideration” are used interchangeably. See In re Shah, 859 F.2d 1463, 1464 (10th Cir.1988); In the Matter of X-Cel, Inc., 823 F.2d 192, 194 (7th Cir.1987)

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What Homeowners Must Know About Jurisprudential Exceptions to the Final Judgment

02 Saturday Apr 2016

Posted by BNG in Appeal, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Appeal, Appealable, appealable orders, collateral order doctrine, non-appealable, non-appealable order, Orders

Manu Homeowners in foreclosure litigations are confused as to what Court Orders should or should not be appealled. This post is designed to help clear those confusions as to what is appealable.

The primary gatekeeper at the door to the federal courts of appeals is the rule that only final judgments are appealable. The final judgment rule has performed this role well, for the most part. In certain cases, however, a trial court’s error on an interlocutory issue is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. To deal with this type of injustice, the courts and Congress have created a patchwork of exceptions to the final judgment rule.

A. Collateral Order Doctrine:

The collateral order doctrine is sometimes called the Cohen collateral order doctrine, named for the landmark United States Supreme Court decision, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). When we talk about an order being final and appealable under the collateral order doctrine, we are still talking about an order that is appealable under section 1291.
The general rule is that “a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered, in which claims of district court error at any stage of the litigation can be ventilated.” Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994). Accordingly, as noted in the preceding section, a decision is ordinarily considered final and appealable under section 1291 only if it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); see Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 863 (quoting Catlin). The Supreme Court has recognized, however, “a narrow class of collateral orders which do not meet this definition of finality, but which are nevertheless immediately appealable under § 1291.” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996). “Since Cohen, [the Supreme Court has] had many opportunities to revisit and refine the collateral-order exception to the final-judgment rule.” Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 276 (1988).

1. Three-prong test for the collateral order doctrine.

The Supreme Court has articulated a threeprong test to determine whether an order that does not finally resolve litigation is nonetheless appealable under section 1291. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
First, the order must “conclusively determine the disputed question.” Id. Second, the order must “resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action.” Id. Third and finally, the order must be “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 431 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468); accord Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 202 (1999) (“[C]ertain orders may be appealed, notwithstanding the absence of final judgment, but only when they ‘are conclusive, . . . resolve important questions separate from the merits, and . . . are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.’” (quoting Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995))); see also Doleac ex rel. Doleac v. Michalson, 264 F.3d 470, 490-91 (5th Cir. 2001) (restating the Cohen test as a four-step analysis: the decision (1) cannot be tentative, informal, or incomplete; (2) must deal with claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action; (3) must be effectively unreviewable on the appeal from final judgment; and (4) must involve an issue too important to be denied review).

Under the first prong—that the order conclusively determine the disputed question—the Supreme Court has observed that there are two kinds of nonfinal orders: those that are “inherently tentative,” and those that, although technically amendable, are “made with the expectation that they will be the final word on the subject addressed.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 n.14 (1983). The latter category of orders meets the first prong of the collateral order doctrine.
Under the second prong—that the issue be separate from the merits—the Court has described it as a “distillation of the principle that there should not be piecemeal review of ‘steps towards final judgment in which they will merge.’” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 12 n.13 (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546). A classic case meeting the third p r o n g of the c o l l a t e r a l o r d e r doctrine—unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment—are denials of immunity from suit. As the Fifth Circuit explained in a recent case involving an appeal from a district court order denying a sheriff’s motion for summary judgment in an “official capacity” suit,

Official-capacity suits, in contrast [to
personal-capacity suits], ‘generally
represent only another way of pleading
an action against an entity of which an
officer is an agent.’” . . . [T]he plea
[here] ranks as a ‘mere defense to
liability’” [rather than immunity from
suit]. Because an erroneous ruling on
liability may be reviewed effectively on
appeal from final judgment, the order
denying the Sheriff’s summary
judgment motion in this “official
capacity” suit was not an appealable
collateral order.

Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 476-77 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); see Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 202. As its stringent requirements indicate, the collateral order doctrine is not to be applied liberally. “Rather, the doctrine “is ‘extraordinarily limited’ in its application.” Pan E. Exploration Co. v. Hufo Oils, 798 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1986). Moreover, appealability under the collateral order doctrine must be determined “without regard to the chance that the litigation might be speeded, or a ‘particular injustice’ averted by a prompt appellate court decision.” Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 868.

2. Examples of orders appealable under the collateral order doctrine.

A. Orders denying claims of immunity from suit asserted in a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment when the order is based on a conclusion of law:

  • Qualified immunity. Swint, 514 U.S. at 42 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)); Gentry v. Lowndes County, 337 F.3d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 2003); Martinez v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 300 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2002).
  • Immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 1999); Stena Rederi A.B. v. Comision de Contratos, 923 F.2d 380, 385-86 (5th Cir. 1991).
  • Absolute immunity. Swint, 514 U.S. at 42 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, and Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982)).
  • Eleventh Amendment immunity. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993); Martinez v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 300 F.3d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 2002); Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 F.3d 974, 976 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Sherwinski v. Peterson, 98 F.3d 849, 851 (5th Cir. 1996) (denial of state’s motion to dismiss is appealable even if the district court’s order is not based on an express finding of no immunity if the end result is the same).
  • Refusal to rule on a claim of immunity from suit. Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1986).
  • Successive appeal of denial of qualified immunity defense. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996) (holding that there can be two interlocutory appeals under the collateral order doctrine of denials of qualified immunity defenses in the same case: one appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss, and a second appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment).
  •  B. Abstention-based stay, dismissal, and remand orders:
  • Under Colorado River abstention. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 9 (abstention-based stay order).
  • Under Burford abstention. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996) (abstention-based remand order).
  • Under Pullman abstention. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 9 & n.8 (citing Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 (1962)).

A district court order abstaining may take the form of an abstention-based stay order or an abstentionbased remand order. The Supreme Court addressed the appealability of abstention-based remand orders in Quackenbush. Most “remand” orders—those remanding removed cases back to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction—are not reviewable by appeal or otherwise because of the bar to appellate review embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 714. If, on the other hand, a district court remands a case to state court for a reason other than lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, for example, in the interest of docket congestion, the bar to review in section 1447(d) does not apply, and the decision is reviewable. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 352-53 (1976).

C. Pre-remand decisions made by a district court if that decision is “separable” from the remand order and independently reviewable through a mechanism such as the collateral order doctrine.

  • Dahiya v. Talmidge Int’l, Ltd., No. 02-31068, 2004 WL 1098838 (5th Cir. May 18, 2004) (citing City of Waco v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 293 U.S. 140 (1934); Heaton v. Monogram Credit Card Bank, 297 F.3d 416, 421 (5th Cir. 2002); Doleac ex rel. Doleac v. Michalson, 264 F.3d 470, 486 (5th Cir. 2001); Arnold v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 277 F.3d 772, 776 (5th Cir. 2001); Linton v. Airbus Industrie, 30 F.3d 592, 597 (5th Cir. 1994); Angelides v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 117 F.3d 833, 837 (5th Cir. 1997)); Soley v. First Nat’l Bank, 923 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1991); see also In re Benjamin Moore & Co., 318 F.3d 626 (5th Cir. 2002) (addressing the separable order doctrine to determine if collateral order doctrine conferred jurisdiction on the court to review the order of remand in a mandamus proceeding).

D. Order denying motions to intervene. Edward v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 992 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). But see Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987) (order granting motion to intervene but conditioning or restricting it is not immediately appealable; appeal must await final judgment).

E. Order deciding that plaintiff is not required to post security for payment of costs. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 547.

F. Order denying appointment of counsel to litigants who cannot afford counsel. Robbins v. Maggio, 750 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1985).

G. Order remanding action to state court pursuant to a contract between the parties. McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters, 944 F.2d
1199 (5th Cir. 1991).

H. Discovery orders directed to third parties. Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11 (1992) (Although discovery orders are normally reviewed by mandamus or on appeal from a contempt order, “A discovery order directed at a disinterested third party is treated as an immediately appealable final order because the third party presumably lacks a sufficient stake in the proceeding to risk contempt by refusing compliance.”).

I. Pre-contempt appeals by the President of the United States to avoid unnecessary constitutional confrontations between two coordinate branches of government. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). (Watch out for the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Cheney v. United States District Court (No. 03-475), in which one of the issues before the Supreme Court is “whether the court of appeals had mandamus or appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s unprecedented discovery orders in this litigation” that, unlike United States v. Nixon, accepted a claim of executive privilege? Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 1391 (2004) (denying motion to recuse); see Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 958 (2003) (No. 03-475) (granting certiorari)).

J. Order requiring turnover of documents claimed to be privileged as attorney work product when the documents are already in the court’s possession because, “if the court already has lawful possession of the documents, a subsequent turnover order will be immediately enforceable without the necessity of holding the subpoenaed party in contempt.” In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 43 F.3d 966, 970 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918)).

K. Turnover order allowing a receiver to take possession of and sell corporate assets of nonparties. Maiz v. Virani, 311 F.3d 334, 339 n.4 (5th Cir. 2002).

L. Order approving receiver’s plan to distribute assets of investment company whose assets were frozen after the SEC investigated it for securities fraud. SEC v. Forex Asset Mgmt. LLC, 242 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 2001).

M. Order refusing to modify a prior consent decree where enforcement of the consent decree ran afoul of the State’s Eleventh Amendment Immunity. Frazar v. Gilbert, 300 F.3d 530, (5th Cir. 2002) (finding order also reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291(a) because it was an order “refusing to dissolve or modify” an injunction), rev’d on other grounds, Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 124 S. Ct. 899 (2004).

N. Order determining that former Department of Justice attorneys were eligible to act as fact and expert witnesses for private party in civil rights suit brought by government. EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 202 F.3d 755, 757 (5th Cir. 2000).

O. Orders affecting the media’s First Amendment rights. United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 913 n.8 (5th Cir. 2001) (orders protecting juror anonymity (citing United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1206-07 (5th Cir. 1977)); Ford v. City of Huntsville, 242 F.3d 235, 240 (5th Cir. 2001) (court closure orders or confidentiality orders (citing Davis v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 78 F.3d 920, 926 (5th Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 2000) (gag order that applied to attorneys, parties, and witnesses and prohibited them from discussing case with any public communications media was appealable under the collateral order doctrine by criminal defendant in whose trial the gag order was issued). But see United States v. Edwards, 206 F.3d 461, 462 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (collateral order doctrine did not apply to criminal defendant’s motion to lift gag order).

3. Examples of orders not appealable under the collateral order doctrine.

A. Order denying a motion to stay or dismiss federal court litigation under Colorado River abstention. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 275 (1988).

B. Order denying summary judgment motion based on Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
Acoustic Sys., Inc. v. Wenger Corp., 207 F.3d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 2000).

C. Order denying claim of immunity from liability (as opposed to immunity from suit). Swint, 514 U.S. at 42 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526).

D. Order denying claim of immunity from suit that turns on factual determinations. Stena Rederi A.B. v. Comision de Contratos, 923 F.2d 380, 385-86 (5th Cir. 1991). But cf. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528 (the resolution of legal issues which are appealable under the collateral order doctrine often will entail some “consideration of the factual allegations that make up the plaintiff’s claim for relief”).

E. Order denying claim of immunity from suit based on sufficiency of the evidence, i.e., whether there is a genuine issue of fact. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995); Kinney v. Weaver, No. 00-40557, 2004 WL 811724, at *6 n.9 (5th Cir. Apr 15, 2004); Martinez v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 300 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2002) (“For a qualified immunity appeal, however, our review of any factual disputes is limited to their materiality, not their genuineness.”).

F. In rare instances, denial of claims of immunity on the eve of trial. Edwards v. Cass County, 919 F.2d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 1990) (“If every denial of a motion for leave to file a summary judgment motion asserting qualified immunity were immediately appealable, defendants would have a guaranteed means of obtaining last-minute continuances. We read Mitchell v. Forsyth as affording defendants a reasonable opportunity to obtain review of their qualified immunity claims without losing part of their immunity rights by having to stand trial. However, Mitchell is not designed as an automatic exemption from the orderly processes of docket control.” “To hold otherwise would be to open the floodgates to appeals by defendants seeking delay by asserting qualified immunity at the last minute (or even, as here, following jury selection).”).

G. Order denying the summary judgment of government officials sued in their personal or individual capacities is not an appealable collateral order. Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 476-77 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Swint, 514 U.S. at 42).

H. Order denying or granting stays pending arbitration. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc. v. Birenbaum, 860 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1988).

I. Order denying certification of a class. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 935 (now appealable by permission under Rule 23(f)).

J. Order denying motion to disqualify counsel. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375 (1981).

K. Order granting motion to disqualify. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985)

L. Order refusing to enforce a settlement agreement claimed by a party to protect it from suit. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994).

M. Order denying a motion to dismiss based on the invalidity of service of process claiming immunity from such process. Van Cauwenberghe v. Baird, 486 U.S. 517, 521 (1988).

N. Orders concerning post-judgment discovery. Piratello v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 360 F.3d 506, 508 (5th Cir. 2004) (order compelling party to appear at a deposition by a particular date, to answer questions regarding assets, and to produce documents requested, over a claim of self-incrimination; no jurisdiction over district court’s order under 1291 or collateral order doctrine; instead, the remedy was by appealing a contempt order)

Piratello, 360 F.3d at 508 (“This court has indicated its agreement with the Fourth Circuit’s view that the availability of an appeal through a contempt order renders the collateral order doctrine inapplicable to discovery orders. See A-Mark Auction Galleries, 233 F.3d at 898-99 (noting, with approval, the holding of MDK, Inc. v. Mike’s Train House, Inc., 27 F.3d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1994)).”). In MDK, the Fourth Circuit said: “Courts have long recognized that a party sufficiently exercised over a discovery order may resist that order, be cited for contempt, and then challenge the propriety of the discovery order in the course of appealing the contempt citation. [citations omitted] Indeed, the Supreme Court has pointed to this path to appellate review as a reason why discovery orders are not appealable under Cohen.” MDK, Inc., 27 F.3d at 121

O. As a general matter, pre-trial discovery orders do not constitute final decisions under § 1291, and therefore, are not immediately appealable. See A-Mark Auction Galleries, Inc. v. Am. Numismatic Ass’n, 233 F.3d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11 (1992)); see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981).
The Supreme Court has held that a party that wishes to immediately appeal a discovery order “must [first] refuse compliance, be held in contempt, and then appeal the contempt order.” Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 18 n.11 (citing United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971)). See infra p. 43 (mandamus may also be available when the discovery order requires disclosure of information claimed to be privileged).

P. Order granting or denying a motion to transfer venue under section 1404(a). Brinar v. Williamson, 245 F.3d 515, 517-18 (5th Cir. 2001); La. Ice Cream Distribs. v. Carvel Corp., 821 F.2d 1031, 1033 (5th Cir. 1987).

Q. Order of civil contempt. FDIC v. LeGrand, 43 F.3d 163, 168 (5th Cir. 1995); Lamar Fin. Corp. v. Adams, 918 F.2d 564, 566 (5th Cir. 1990).

R. Order of an agency review board remanding to an ALJ for further factfinding and consideration before final agency decision is rendered. Exxon Chems. Am. v. Chao, 298 F.3d 464, 469-70 (5th Cir. 2002).

B. Other Common-Law Doctrines of Finality

1. Gillespie “pragmatic finality” doctrine

Under the Gillespie doctrine, the requirement of finality is to be given a practical rather than a technical construction in determining the appealability in marginal cases of an order falling within what the Gillespie decision called the “twilight zone” of finality. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964). Counsel should avoid relying on the Gillespie doctrine.

The Supreme Court has distinguished Gillespie on grounds that, according to Professor Wright and his collaborators, “bury it quietly.” 15A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3913, at 479 (2d ed. 1992). In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, the Supreme Court refused to apply the Gillespie doctrine to permit appeal from an order
decertifying a class action, even on the assumption that the result would be termination of the litigation. Rather than expanding Gillespie, the Court wrote that permitting such appeals under section 1291 would be plainly inconsistent with the policies underlying section 1292(b) and that “[i]f Gillespie were extended beyond the unique facts of that case, § 1291 would be stripped of all significance.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 n.30 (1978) (noting that Gillespie concerned a marginally final order disposing of an unsettled issue of national significance and that review of the issue “unquestionably implemented the same policy Congress sought to promote in §1292(b)”).

In fact, the most recent pronouncement from the Fifth Circuit about the vitality of the Gillespie doctrine is that the Fifth Circuit “no longer recognizes the exception.” Kmart Corp. v. Aronds, 123 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1997); see Sherri A.D. v. Kirby, 975 F.2d 193, 202 n.12 (5th Cir. 1992) (calling practical finality more chimerical than real); United States v. Garner, 749 F.2d 281, 288 (5th Cir. 1985) (pragmatic finality approach has been virtually limited to facts of Gillespie). As the Fifth Circuit explained, Gillespie’s case-by-case approach to determining pragmatic finality is in fundamental conflict with the values and purposes of the final-judgment rule. See Pan E. Exploration Co. v. Hufo Oils, 798 F.2d 837, 841-42 (5th Cir. 1986); Newpark Shipbuilding & Repair, Inc. v. Roundtree, 723 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).

If counsel finds a case supporting finality that sounds like it is based on practical or pragmatic finality, counsel should carefully trace the cases supporting the theory of finality to make sure that Gillespie is not the ultimate source of authority for that theory. An opinion’s pedigree is important. Counsel should make an informed decision about relying on those cases that rely on or are indirect progeny of Gillespie.

2. “Death knell” doctrine

Under the “death knell” doctrine, which is sometimes equated with the Gillespie doctrine, a case is final when a party is “effectively out of court.” Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 (1962); see McKnight v. Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1982). The doctrine provides that any decision forcing a plaintiff to give up his claim, in effect, sounds the “death knell,” making it final for purposes of appeal. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 465-69.

Like the Gillespie doctrine, many commentators have argued that the death knell doctrine is all but a dead letter. Although the Fifth Circuit in the past noted that the Supreme Court did not actually overrule the death knell doctrine in Coopers & Lybrand, see McKnight, 667 F.2d at 479, the Fifth Circuit noted that the U.S. Supreme Court’s post-Cooper decision “in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980), declared that its prior decision in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), sounded the death knell to that doctrine.” Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States Army, 639 F.2d 1100, 1103 n.3 (5th Cir. Feb. 1981).

And, more recently, the Fifth Circuit observed that the Supreme Court did “limit the death knell exception” in Coopers & Lybrand and in its later decision, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 n.11 (1983). See Kmart Corp. v. Aronds, 123 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1997).

In Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court held that Idlewild’s reasoning was limited to abstention or similar doctrines where all or an essential part of the federal suit goes to a state forum. Aronds, 123 F.3d at 300. Further, even in cases involving stays, the Fifth Circuit has stated that while it liberally construed the death knell exception in the past, it could no longer do so because the exception was limited to cases where the stay requires all or essentially all of the suit to be litigated in state court. See Aronds, 123 F.3d at 300 (citing United States v. Garner, 749 F.2d 281, 288 (5th Cir. 1985), and Kershaw v. Shalala, 9 F.3d 11, 14 (5th Cir. 1993)). And even in cases involving abstention doctrines, resort to the death knell doctrine is usually unnecessary; direct reliance may be placed on Moses H. Cone and the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996).

3. Forgay “hardship–irreparable injury” exception

The Forgay doctrine, or, as it is sometimes called the “hardship and irreparable injury” exception to the final-judgment rule, grew out of Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848). Today, the Forgay doctrine—if it has any continuing validity—is viewed a narrow exception to the final-judgment rule; it allows immediate appellate court review of district court orders that adjudicate part of one claim by directing the immediate delivery of property from one party to another, when there is the possibility that the losing party will experience irreparable harm or hardship if appeal of the execution is not allowed. Jalapeno Prop. Mgmt., LLC v. Dukas, 265 F.3d 506, 512 n.8 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Forgay, 47 U.S. at 204); see also 15A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3910, at 328 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that the Forgay doctrine “is likely to be applied only to orders that improvidently direct immediate execution of judgments that involve part of the merits of a claim and are outside the limits of Rule 54(b)”).

Although the Forgay doctrine is occasionally cited, it—like the Gillespie and death knell doctrines—is probably a dead letter. Petties v. Dist. of Columbia, 227 F.3d 469, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[W]e are not at all sure that Forgay has continuing vitality apart from the collateral order doctrine . . . .”); see Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 868 (appealability under the collateral order doctrine must be determined “without regard to the chance that the litigation might be speeded, or a ‘particular injustice’ averted by a prompt appellate court decision”); see, e.g., Maiz v. Virani, 311 F.3d 334, 339 n.4 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that it had appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine over an order directed at two nonparty corporations to turnover property “worth tens of millions of dollars”).
In fact, the two most recent Fifth Circuit cases citing the Forgay doctrine as a possible jurisprudential exception to finality were decided more than a decade ago. Goodman v. Lee, 988 F.2d 619, 626 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Forgay for a narrow proposition, but distinguishing it); Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1107 n.7 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing it in dicta).

The Forgay category of hardship finality is narrow, and according to the Wright & Miller treatise, has not generated a large number of appeals. 15A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3910 (2d ed. 1992). The most common, and the most expansive, jurisprudential exception to the finaljudgment rule is the collateral order doctrine.
Despite its stringent requirements and arguably limited applicability, the collateral order doctrine is the best chance of establishing appellate jurisdiction on a jurisprudential exception. Pan E. Exploration Co. v. Hufo Oils, 798 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1986). But, if the facts of your case fit into the narrow and specific facts of the Forgay doctrine, counsel may wish to consider citing both the collateral order and Forgay doctrines and reviewing the Wright & Miller treatise’s treatment of the doctrine, which argues that “within its restricted sphere it provides a highly desirable elaboration of the final judgment rule.” 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra, § 3910, at 329 (2d ed. 1996).

C. Procedure for Appealing Under the Collateral Order Doctrine

“An appeal taken under the collateral order doctrine is subject to all the usual appellate rules and time periods, including Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.” United States v. Moats, 961 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d 380, 386 (5th Cir. 1999) (“While we said in Moats that appeals taken pursuant to the collateral order doctrine are subject to all of the usual appellate rules governing interlocutory appeals, we also specifically identified Rule 4.”). A party seeking to appeal under the collateral order doctrine should follow the appeal procedures under FED. R. APP. P. 4 that apply to appeals “as of right” from traditional final judgments (e.g., invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction by filing a notice of appeal in the district court within the time specified by FED. R. APP. P. 4).

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at http://www.fightforeclosure.net “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will show you step-by-step litigation solutions helping you challenge these fraudsters and ultimately saving your home from foreclosure either through loan modification or “Pro Se” litigation visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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Effective Use of Injunctions Can Make or Break Homeowner’s Foreclosure Case

02 Saturday Apr 2016

Posted by BNG in Appeal, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Your Legal Rights

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Tags

automatic stay, injunction, injunctive, motion, relief, stay, stay pending appeal

CASE STUDY: 5 F.3d 539 Unpublished Disposition

Effective Foreclosure Defense requires timing. If you time correctly, you can save your home. Homeowners presently in litigation must use injunctions to their advantage. Ignorance will not be to your advantage.

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

In re Evalyn PREBLICH, Debtor.
Evalyn PREBLICH, Appellant,
v.
Kenneth W. BATTLEY; Dennis Sammut, Appellees.

No. 92-36540.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 11, 1993.*
Decided Aug. 24, 1993.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska; No. CV-91-419-HRH, H. Russel Holland, Chief District Judge, Presiding.

D. Alaska

AFFIRMED.

Before PREGERSON, BRUNETTI and RYMER, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM**

Chapter 7 debtor Evalyn Preblich appeals pro se from the district court’s affirmance of a bankruptcy court order authorizing the sale of certain bankruptcy estate property near Hope, Alaska to appellee Dennis Sammut by appellee-trustee Kenneth W. Battley. The district court held that because Preblich had failed to obtain a stay pending appeal, her challenge to the sale was moot under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 363(m). Preblich also petitions this court to stay the present appeal pending resolution by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of an allegedly related matter arising from the same bankruptcy. Sammut, meanwhile, moves this court to strike Preblich’s Reply Brief.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. We affirm the order of the district court, and deny the motions of both parties.

I. MOOTNESS

The district court ruled that Preblich’s challenge to the bankruptcy court’s authorization of the sale of the subject property was moot under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 363(m) because she had failed to obtain a stay pending appeal. Preblich does not dispute the fact that she did not obtain a stay, but instead offers reasons why this situation should be excepted from the stay requirement. After careful consideration of these arguments, we conclude that all of them lack merit.

Section 363(m) provides that an appeal from the bankruptcy court’s authorization of the sale of certain property cannot affect the rights of a good faith purchaser, unless the debtor stays the sale pending an appeal.1 We have applied this statute strictly, and have recognized only two situations in which failure to obtain a stay will not render an appeal moot: “(1) where real property is sold to a creditor subject to the right of redemption and (2) where state law would otherwise permit the transaction to be set aside.” In re Mann, 907 F.2d 923, 926 (9th Cir.1990) (internal citations omitted). We have done so in the interest of promoting finality in bankruptcy. See In re Onouli-Kona Land Co., 846 F.2d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir.1988).

Preblich argues that her appeal of the sale authorization order is not moot because she holds a statutory right of redemption in the subject property which would authorize the setting aside of the sale under state law. Preblich fails, however, to explain either the factual or statutory basis of this claim. Indeed, she cites no Alaska law whatsoever for the proposition that the trustee’s sale of the property in this case may be set aside for any reason. Our own research, reveals that Alaska statutes do recognize a right of redemption, but only where property is sold to satisfy a judgment or other lien. See Alaska Stat. Secs. 09.35.250 (redemption by judgment debtor or successor), 09.45.190 (redemption after foreclosure of lien) (1983). The sale at issue here falls into neither of these categories; it was an ordinary sale of estate assets for the purposes of bankruptcy liquidation.

Preblich also argues that section 363(m) is not applicable to her appeal because Sammut did not purchase the property in “good faith” within the meaning of the statute. Specifically, Preblich contends that the sale price was not adequate, that the auction was not adequately advertised, and that the trustee agreed to pay for unnecessarily expensive environmental cleanup measures. We have defined a lack of good faith under this statute to constitute “fraud, collusion … or an attempt to take grossly unfair advantage of other bidders.” Onouli-Kona Land Co., 846 F.2d at 1173.

After reviewing Preblich’s contentions, we conclude that none are sufficient to establish a lack of good faith on the part of Sammut. First of all, we have explicitly held that good faith does not depend on the value paid for the subject property. Id. at 1174. Preblich’s contentions that Sammut did not pay a sufficiently high purchase price are therefore unavailing. Second, the fact that advertisement of the property was not as extensive as Preblich wished, does not render the sale fraudulent, collusive or unfair. According to the district court, the property was advertised in the Hope-Sunrise area, and was ultimately sold at an auction in which Sammut and one other individual bid against each other. Under these circumstances, we are unable to conclude that the sale lacked good faith. Third, the fact that the trustee may have paid more than necessary for environmental cleanup in connection with the sale is entirely irrelevant to Sammut’s good faith. Although these expenditures may have effectively lowered the purchase price, the inadequacy of that price will not establish that Sammut lacked good faith.

Finally, Preblich argues that her appeal should not be adjudicated moot under section 363(m), because the trustee unlawfully exercised control over the subject property. According to Preblich, the trustee recovered the property from Preblich’s husband and son as a fraudulent conveyance, under a judgment of the bankruptcy court. Preblich contends, however, that the fraudulent conveyance judgment was in error and that the trustee did not have a right to sell the property to Sammut.

However true Preblich’s contentions may be, the fraudulent conveyance issue was the subject of a separate bankruptcy court order which was separately appealable and is not presently before this court. Moreover, a finding that the trustee had improperly recovered the subject property for the bankruptcy estate would not overcome section 363(m). In the absence of a stay, section 363(m) renders moot any action which might affect the rights of a good faith purchaser. Although we have recognized narrow exceptions to this rule, see In re Mann, 907 F.2d at 926, an erroneous fraudulent conveyance holding on the part of the bankruptcy court would satisfy none of them.

II. MOTION TO STAY THE APPEAL

Subsequent to filing the present appeal, Preblich petitioned this court to stay this proceeding pending the resolution of another matter which is pending before the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, BAP No. 92-1861. Preblich contends that “[i]f this case should be decided favorably for the appellant, the Ninth Circuit case would become moot. If it is decided unfavorably, then it will be [appealed] and consolidated with the current appeal so there will be just one appeal.” Preblich, however, gives no description of the issues involved in the BAP case or any explanation of why a favorable BAP decision would render the present appeal moot. For this reason we are not persuaded that staying the present appeal is necessary and accordingly deny Preblich’s motion.2

III. MOTION TO STRIKE

Sammut has moved to strike the Preblich’s Reply Brief on the ground that it raises matters not within the scope of her opening brief and introduces evidence which is not a part of the record. Because we reach the merits of Preblich’s appeal and reject it, we deny Sammut’s motion as moot.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s order authorizing the sale of the subject property, deny Preblich’s motion to stay the present appeal and deny Sammut’s motion to strike Preblich’s Reply Brief.

AFFIRMED.

*The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4
**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3
1 The statute explicitly provides that:

The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authorization to an entity that purchased or leased such property in good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.

11 U.S.C. Sec. 363(m).

2 Sammut suggests that the BAP case referred to by Preblich involves an attempt to reopen the adversary proceeding in which the bankruptcy court held that Preblich’s conveyance of the subject property to her husband and son was fraudulent. As we explained above, however, a finding that the conveyance was not fraudulent would not overcome the strict requirement in section 363(m) that a stay be obtained if an appellate court is to provide any relief affecting the rights of a good faith purchaser

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Why Homeowners Must Effectively Use Court Injunctions To Save Their Homes

01 Friday Apr 2016

Posted by BNG in Appeal, Bankruptcy, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, Your Legal Rights

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

automatic stay, injunction, injunctive relief, motion, stay, stay pending appeal

CASE STUDY: 893 F.2d 1338 Unpublished Disposition

Effective Foreclosure Defense requires timing. If you time correctly, you can save your home. Homeowners presently in litigation must use injunctions to their advantage. Ignorance will not be to your advantage.

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

In re James MILLER, Jr. and Pamala F. Miller,
James MILLER, Jr. and Pamala F. Miller, Appellants,
v.
LINCOLN TITLE COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 88-5687.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 30, 1989.
Decided Jan. 12, 1990.

Before WILLIAM A. NORRIS, REINHARDT and TROTT, Circuit Judges.

I. MEMORANDUM*

1 The Millers (“Debtors”) seek reversal of an order of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) denying the Debtors’ Ex Parte Motion for Order Setting Aside Default Order and dismissing as moot the Debtors’ appeal of the dismissal of their Chapter 11 petition. The Debtors base their appeal on two arguments: (1) the BAP erred in denying the Debtors’ Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the default judgment; and (2) the BAP erred in dismissing the Debtors’ appeal of the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing their Chapter 11 case on the grounds of mootness. We affirm the BAP’s order dismissing the Debtors’ appeal insofar as it relates to the automatic stay and the sale of the property, due to the mootness of that issue, and we remand to the BAP the issues of timeliness of the Debtors’ appeal to the BAP and whether dismissal of the Debtors’ Chapter 11 petition for lack of prosecution of their earlier Chapter 13 petition was proper.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

2 The Debtors filed a Chapter 11 petition on June 12, 1986. On March 9, 1987, the U.S. Trustee filed a motion to dismiss the Chapter 11 case or, alternatively, to convert it to a Chapter 7 case. On March 31, 1987, Lincoln Title Company (“Lincoln”) filed a motion to join in the motion to dismiss and its own motion for dismissal. Lincoln based its motion to dismiss on the Debtors’ previous Chapter 13 case that was dismissed for failure to prosecute.1 Lincoln asked the court to take judicial notice of the fact that the Chapter 13 was dismissed pursuant to section 109(g)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.2 On May 12, 1987, the bankruptcy court dismissed the Debtors’ Chapter 11 case based on the Debtors’ ineligibility to file the Chapter 11 case under section 109(g)(1). The order of dismissal was entered on May 15, 1987, and the Debtors filed their notice of appeal to the BAP on May 28, 1987, two days after the ten-day deadline prescribed by Bankruptcy Rule 8002. The respondent objected on the ground that the appeal was untimely and the BAP filed a conditional order of dismissal on July 22, 1987, inviting the Debtors to file a written explanation showing legal cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. On July 23, 1987, the Debtors filed a motion in opposition to the respondent’s objection. On September 9, 1987, the BAP issued an order denying the motion to dismiss. The order did not specify the BAP’s reasons for denial.
3  While the Chapter 11 case was pending, Creditway of America (“Creditway”) filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay. On September 17, 1986, the bankruptcy court entered an order modifying the automatic stay. This order denied Creditway’s motion to lift the stay subject to the following conditions to be performed by the Debtors: (1) Submission of proof of insurance on the subject property; (2) filing of schedules and statements by August 27, 1986; and (3) filing of a plan and disclosure statement on or before September 29, 1986. The order also stated that if the Debtors failed to perform any of these conditions, Creditway could file a declaration of default or order for relief from stay.
4  The Debtors complied with the first two requirements, but did not file a plan and disclosure statement by the prescribed deadline. However, the Debtors delivered a request for an extension of time to the trustee on September 26, 1986. The Trustee filed the request on September 30, 1986. On October 9, 1986, Creditway filed a document styled, “Declaration of Jeffrey A. Paris and Order Terminating Automatic Stay,” based on the Debtors’ noncompliance with the order to file a plan and disclosure statement by September 29. The Debtors claim to have received this declaration/order on October 20, 1986. On October 24, 1986, the court granted the Debtors’ request for an extension of time to file the plan and disclosure statement until October 27, 1986. On November 24, 1986, Judge Fenning signed Creditway’s proposed order terminating the automatic stay, and on December 16, 1986, entered a default order terminating the stay. The Debtors allege that neither the court nor Creditway provided them with a copy of any signed order. The Debtors did not appeal the November or December order.
5  On January 7, 1987, Creditway conducted a Trustee’s Sale of the property. The property was purchased by an independent third party. The Debtors then filed numerous papers in the state courts as well as the bankruptcy court seeking to set aside the sale. All actions were unsuccessful. In the meantime, the municipal court granted a Writ of Execution, Money Judgment for and Writ of Possession of Real Property on the foreclosed property.
6  On July 27, 1987, the bankruptcy court declined to hear the Debtors’ Complaint to Invalidate Sale of Real Property filed June 1, 1987, due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction since the bankruptcy case had been dismissed. The Debtors then filed with the BAP, on December 2, 1987, an ex parte motion to set aside the default order under Rule 60(b). The BAP denied the Debtors’ motion and dismissed their appeal as moot on January 11, 1988. The panel clarified this order at the request of the Debtors on March 11, 1988, and explained that because the order lifting the automatic stay was never appealed and the property was subsequently sold, the appeal was rendered moot. Debtors then filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit on February 10, 1988.

III. ANALYSIS

7 The court of appeals reviews a decision of the BAP de novo. Both the court of appeals and the BAP apply the same standard of review to the bankruptcy court judgment, reviewing findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard and questions of law de novo. See In re Burley, 738 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.1984).

i. The Automatic Stay.

8 We affirm the order of the BAP denying the Debtors’ Rule 60(b) motion and dismissing their appeal insofar as it affects the automatic stay. The issue of the automatic stay and the sale of the Debtors’ residence has been rendered moot by the sale of the property to an independent third party.
9  This circuit has held that where a stay pending appeal is not requested or is not granted, a party risks losing its ability to realize the benefit of a successful appeal. See In re Combined Metals Reduction Co., 557 F.2d 179 (9th Cir.1977); In re Sun Valley Ranches, Inc., 823 F.2d 1373, 1374 (9th Cir.1987) (“We have generally held that where an automatic stay is lifted, the debtor’s failure to obtain a stay pending appeal renders an appeal moot after assets in which the creditor had an interest are sold.”). Where the property has been sold to an independent third party, this circuit has held that the appeal is moot, because the court cannot grant effective relief, at least in the absence of the third party. See In re Royal Properties, Inc., 621 F.2d 984, 987 (9th Cir.1980) (“Once the orders have been performed, an appeal attacking the order is moot. Nor may the appellants attack the validity of the sale or the deed in this appeal. The purchasers of the property have not been made parties to the appeal, and we cannot grant effective relief in their absence.”).
10  In the instant case, the default order was not appealed and a stay was not requested. The Debtors claim that they did not appeal because they were not served with the signed default order within the time period for appeal. Nonetheless, because the subject property was sold to an independent third party pursuant to a bankruptcy court order, we cannot grant effective relief in a proceeding to which the purchaser is not a party. Thus, we affirm the BAP’s denial of the Debtors’ Rule 60(b) motion and its order dismissing the Debtors’ appeal insofar as it affects the automatic stay.

ii. Dismissal of the Debtors’ Chapter 11 Petition

A. Extent of Property Involved

11 The BAP dismissed the Debtors’ appeal of the order dismissing their Chapter 11 case based on the sale of the Debtors’ residence rendering the appeal moot. However, it appears that the BAP mistakenly believed that the only property involved in the Debtors’ Chapter 11 case was the Debtors’ residence. Because other property appears to be involved, we reverse the BAP’s dismissal. On remand, the BAP should determine whether the Chapter 11 case involved other property.

B. Dismissal Under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 109(g)(1).

12  The bankruptcy court dismissed the Debtors’ Chapter 11 petition under section 109(g)(1). This section bars an individual who was a debtor in a previous Title 11 case pending in the preceding 180 days from being a debtor under Title 11 if the previous case was dismissed “for willful failure to abide by orders of the court, or to appear before the court in proper prosecution.” The Debtors’ earlier Chapter 13 case was dismissed for “failure to prosecute” and their subsequent Chapter 11 petition was filed within 180 days of that dismissal. The appellees argue that the dismissal for lack of prosecution of the Chapter 13 proceeding acts as a bar to the Debtors’ Chapter 11 filing. The appellants vigorously disagree, arguing that the Chapter 13 dismissal was not based on a willful failure to prosecute and that since section 109(g)(1) requires the element of willfulness, they are not barred from filing the Chapter 11 petition. The BAP did not consider this issue because it dismissed the appeal as moot. Thus, on remand if the BAP concludes that the appeal is timely (see section C infra ) and that property other than the house is involved, it should also consider the issue of whether the dismissal of the Debtors’ Chapter 13 case for failure to prosecute served to trigger the 180-day filing bar of section 109(g)(1).

C. Timeliness of the Appeal to the BAP.

13  The untimely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 812 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.1987). However, Bankruptcy Rule 8002 avoids potential hardship by allowing deadline extensions. If a party does not file the notice of appeal or an extension within the ten-day filing period, he may still receive an extension upon request within twenty days of the deadline if he can show “excusable neglect.” 11 U.S.C. Sec. 8002(c). The Debtors did not actually request an extension of time to file the appeal before the BAP and the BAP order did not indicate whether or not the Debtors had shown excusable neglect. Thus, on remand the BAP should reconsider the issue of the timeliness of the Debtors’ appeal or provide an explanation of the basis for its earlier determination.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.
*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3
1  The Millers filed a Chapter 13 petition on November 7, 1985. On November 13, 1985, the court filed an order for the Millers to file a plan and statement, and an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. On December 2, 1985, a show cause hearing was held and the court dismissed the Chapter 13 petition for “failure to prosecute.” The Millers did not attend this hearing
2  Section 109(1)(g) states that an individual may not be a debtor under Title 11 if he has been a debtor in a Title 11 case pending at any time in the preceding 180 days if “the case was dismissed by the court for willful failure of the debtor to abide by orders of the court, or to appear before the court in proper prosecution.” 11 U.S.C. Sec. 109(g)(1)

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at http://www.fightforeclosure.net “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will show you step-by-step litigation solutions helping you challenge these fraudsters and ultimately saving your home from foreclosure either through loan modification or “Pro Se” litigation visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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  • How Homeowners Can Set Aside Foreclosure Sale
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