How Nevada Homeowners Can Effectively Plead Foreclosure Fraud and Misrepresentation

20 Friday Dec 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Your Legal Rights

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Dingwall, Federal Court, Foreclosure, Fraud, Legal burden of proof, Nevada Bell, Plaintiff, Reno Air

This post is designed to guide homeowners in wrongful foreclosure litigation when pleading their Fraud and Misrepresentation cases in State and Federal Courts.

Fraudulent or Intentional Misrepresentation

Elements:

Standard Intentional Misrepresentation

(1) defendant made a false representation,
(2) with knowledge or belief that the representation was false or without a sufficient basis for making the representation,
(3) the defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting on the representation,
(4) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the representation, and
(5) the plaintiff was damaged as a result of his reliance.

J.A. Jones Const. Co. v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc., 120 Nev. 277, 290–91, 89 P.3d 1009, 1018 (2004);

Fraud By Omission
With respect to the false representation element, the suppression or omission ” ‘of a material fact which a party is bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false representation, since it constitutes an indirect representation that such fact does not exist.’ Nelson v. Heer, 123 Nev. 217, 163 P.3d 420 (Nev. 2007) (quoting Midwest Supply, Inc. v. Waters, 89 Nev. 210, 212-13, 510 P.2d 876, 878 (1973).

Example Cases:

Foster v. Dingwall, — P.3d —, 2010 WL 679069, at *8 (Nev. Feb. 25, 2010) (en banc); Jordan v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety, 121 Nev. 44, 75, 110 P.3d 30, 51 (2005);J.A. Jones Const. Co. v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc., 120 Nev. 277, 290–91, 89 P.3d 1009, 1018 (2004); Chen v. Nev. State Gaming Control Bd.,116 Nev. 282, 284, 994 P.2d 1151, 1152 (2000); Albert H. Wohlers & Co. v. Bartgis, 114 Nev. 1249, 1260, 969 P.2d 949, 957 (1998); Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 114 Nev. 441, 956 P.2d 1382 (1998); Blanchard v. Blanchard, 108 Nev. 908, 911, 839 P.2d 1320, 1322 (1992); Bulbman, Inc. v. Nevada Bell, 108 Nev. 105, 110–11, 825 P.2d 588, 592 (1992); Collins v. Burns, 103 Nev. 394, 397, 741 P.2d 819, 821 (1987); Epperson v. Roloff, 102 Nev. 206, 211, 719 P.2d 799, 802 (1986); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Rogers, 96 Nev. 576, 580 n.1, 613 P.2d 1025, 1027 n.1 (1980); Lubbe v. Barba, 91 Nev. 596, 540 P.2d 115 (1975).

Proof

“The intention that is necessary to make the rule stated in this Section applicable is the intention of the promisor when the agreement was entered into. The intention of the promisor not to perform an enforceable or unenforceable agreement cannot be established solely by proof of its nonperformance, nor does his failure to perform the agreement throw upon him the burden of showing that his nonperformance was due to reasons which operated after the agreement was entered into. The intention may be shown by any other evidence that sufficiently indicates its existence, as, for example, the certainty that he would not be in funds to carry out his promise.” REST 2d TORTS § 530, comment d.

A plaintiff has the burden of proving each element of fraud claim by clear and convincing evidence. Albert H. Wohlers & Co. v. Bartgis, 114 Nev. 1249, 1260, 969 P.2d 949, 957 (1998);Bulbman, Inc. v. Nevada Bell, 108 Nev. 105, 110–11, 825 P.2d 588, 592 (1992); Lubbe v. Barba, 91 Nev. 596, 540 P.2d 115 (1975).

“Whether these elements are present in a given case is ordinarily a question of fact.” Epperson v. Roloff, 102 Nev. 206, 211, 719 P.2d 799, 802 (1986).

“Further, ‘[w]here an essential element of a claim for relief is absent, the facts, disputed or otherwise, as to other elements are rendered immaterial and summary judgment is proper.’ Bulbman, 108 Nev. at 111, 825 P.2d at 592.” Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 114 Nev. 441, 447, 956 P.2d 1382, 1386 (1998).

“‘[f]raud is never presumed; it must be clearly and satisfactorily proved.’” J.A. Jones Const. Co. v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc., 120 Nev. 277, 291, 89 P.3d 1009, 1018 (2004) (quoting Havas v. Alger, 85 Nev. 627, 631, 461 P.2d 857, 860 (1969)).

“the essence of any misrepresentation claim is a false or misleading statement that harmed [the plaintiff].” Nanopierce Techs., Inc. v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 123 Nev. 362, 168 P.3d 73, 82 (2007).

False Representations:

Estimates and opinions are not false representations. Commendatory sales talk (puffing) isn’t either.

“Nevada Bell’s representations to Bulbman about the cost of Centrex and the installation time are estimates and opinions based on past experience with the system. As such, these representations are not actionable in fraud. See Clark Sanitation v. Sun Valley Disposal, 87 Nev. 338, 487 P.2d 337 (1971). Nevada Bell’s representations as to the reliability and performance of the system constitute mere commendatory sales talk about the product (‘puffing’), also not actionable in fraud. See e.g., Coy v. Starling, 53 Or.App. 76, 630 P.2d 1323 (1981). Furthermore, in his deposition, Gerald Roth, Jr., testified that he did not believe Nevada Bell had intentionally lied to him about its Centrex system. Rather, Roth stated that Nevada Bell might have been ‘more careful’ in making certain representations, particularly with respect to how long it would take to install a Centrex system. Roth’s testimony establishes the absence of fraudulent intent on the part of Nevada Bell.” Bulbman, Inc. v. Nev. Bell, 108 Nev. 105, 111, 825 P.2d 588, 592 (1992).

“An estimate is an opinion and an estimate of value is an opinion as to value upon which reasonable and honorable men may hold differing views. This is the basis for the frequently announced rule that a charge of fraud normally may not be based upon representations of value. Frankfurt v. Wilson, 353 S.W.2d 490 (Tex.Civ.App.1961); Burke v. King, 176 Okl. 625, 56 P.2d 1185 (1936).” Clark Sanitation, Inc. v. Sun Valley Disposal Co., 87 Nev. 338, 341, 487 P.2d 337, 339 (1971).

“Story, in his work on contracts, in discussing the various questions presented by the misrepresentations of the vendor, lays down the rule as follows: ‘If the seller fraudulently misrepresents facts, or states facts to exist which he knows not to exist, his fraud would vitiate the contract, provided the misstatements were in respect to a material point.’ (Section 636.) But where a statement is not made as a fact, but only as an opinion, the rule is quite different. Thus a false representation as to a mere matter of opinion * * * does not avoid the contract. * * * Ordinarily, a naked statement of opinion is not a representation on which a buyer is legally entitled to rely, unless, perhaps, in some special cases where peculiar confidence or trust is created between the parties. The ground of this rule is, probably, the impracticability of attempting to discover by means of the rules of law the real opinion of the party making the representation, and also because a mere expression of opinion does not alter facts, though it may bias the judgment. Mere expressions of opinion are not, therefore, considered so tangible a fraud as to form a ground of avoidance of a contract, even though they be falsely stated. * * * Yet, where a representation is made, going to the essence of a contract, the party making it should be careful to state it as an opinion, and not as a fact of which he has knowledge, or he may be liable thereon. The question whether a statement was intended to be given as an opinion, and was so received, is, however, one for a jury to determine, upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. But whenever a belief is asserted, as in a fact, which is material or essential, and which the person asserting knows to be false, and the statement is made with an intention to mislead, it is fraudulent and affords a ground of relief.’” Banta v. Savage, 12 Nev. 151, 0–4 (1877).

Fraudulent or Intentional Misrepresentation

Pleading Standards

Standard

In actions involving fraud, the circumstances of the fraud are required by Nev.R.Civ.P. 9(b) to be stated with particularity. The circumstances that must be detailed include averments to the time, the place, the identity of the parties involved, and the nature of the fraud or mistake.”
Brown v. Kellar, 97 Nev. 582, 583-84, 636 P.2d 874, 874 (Nev. 1981).

Allegations of fraud upon “information or belief” must be backed up with reasons for the belief

[i]t is not sufficient to charge a fraud upon information and belief…without giving the ground upon which the belief rests or stating some fact from which the court can infer that the belief is well founded.
Tallman v. First Nat. Bank of Nev., 66 Nev. 248, 259, 208 P.2d 302, 307 (Nev. 1949).

Requirements for pleading fraud generally: The “Relaxed Standard”

The federal district court found that the plaintiffs’ allegations did not meet the strict requirement of FRCP 9(b), but it also found that “[w]here a plaintiff is claiming . . . to have been injured as the result of a fraud perpetrated on a third party, the circumstances surrounding the transaction are peculiarly within the defendant’s knowledge.”[22] Therefore, the court applied the relaxed standard and, pointing to the above facts, allowed the plaintiffs to conduct discovery and to amend their complaint to meet FRCP 9(b)’s pleading requirements.[23]

This exception strikes a reasonable balance between NRCP 9(b)’s stringent requirements for pleading fraud and a plaintiff’s inability to allege the full factual basis concerning fraud because information and documents are solely in the defendant’s possession and cannot be secured without formal, legal discovery. Therefore, we adopt this relaxed standard in situations where the facts necessary for pleading with particularity “are peculiarly within the defendant’s knowledge or are readily obtainable by him.”[24]

In addition to requiring that the plaintiff state facts supporting a strong inference of fraud, we add the additional requirements that the plaintiff must aver that this relaxed standard is appropriate and show in his complaint that he cannot plead with more particularity because the required information is in the defendant’s possession. If the district court finds that the relaxed standard is appropriate, it should allow the plaintiff time to conduct the necessary discovery.[25] Thereafter, the plaintiff can move to amend his complaint to plead allegations of fraud with particularity in compliance with NRCP 9(b).[26] Correspondingly, the defendant may renew its motion to dismiss under NRCP 9(b) if the plaintiff’s amended complaint still does not meet NRCP 9(b)’s particularity requirements.

Rocker v. KMPG LLP, 122 Nev. 1185, 148 P.3d 703, (2006) (overruled on other grounds Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 181 P.3d 670 (Nev.2008)).(emphasis added).

Particular pleading

NRCP 9(b) requires that special matters (fraud, mistake, or condition of the mind), be pleaded with particularity in order to *473 afford adequate notice to the opposing party.
Ivory Ranch, Inc. v. Quinn River Ranch, Inc., 101 Nev. 471, 73, 705 P.2d 673 (Nev. 1985).

Particular pleading

NRCP 8(a) requires that a pleading contain only a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. In actions involving fraud, the circumstances of the fraud are required by NRCP 9(b) to be stated with particularity. The circumstances that must be detailed include averments to the time, the place, the identity of the parties involved, and the *584 nature of the fraud or mistake. 5 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure s 1297 at p. 403 (1969). Malice, intent, knowledge and other conditions of the mind of a person may be averred generally. NRCP 9(b); see Occhiuto v. Occhiuto, 97 Nev. 143, 625 P.2d 568 (1981).

Brown v. Kellar, 97 Nev. 582, 584, 636 P.2d 874 (Nev. 1981).

Damages

Damages must have been proximately caused by the reliance and must be reasonably foreseeable

“with respect to the damage element, this court has concluded that the damages alleged must be proximately caused by reliance on the original misrepresentation or omission. Collins, 103 Nev. at 399, 741 P.2d at 822 (determining that an award of damages for intentional misrepresentation based on losses suffered solely due to a recession was inappropriate). Proximate cause limits liability to foreseeable consequences that are reasonably connected to both the defendant’s misrepresentation or omission and the harm that the misrepresentation or omission created. See Goodrich & Pennington v. J.R. Woolard, 120 Nev. 777, 784, 101 P.3d 792, 797 (2004); Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum, 114 Nev. 1468, 1481, 970 P.2d 98, 107 (1998).” Nelson v. Heer, 123 Nev. 26, 426, 163 P.3d 420 (2007).

“Chen’s skill in playing blackjack, rather than his misrepresentation of identity, was the proximate cause of his winnings. The false identification allowed Chen to receive $44,000 in chips, but it did not cause Chen to win. Thus, we hold that the Gaming Control Board’s determination that Chen committed fraud is contrary to law because the Monte Carlo did not establish all of the elements of fraud.” Chen v. Nev. State Gaming Control Bd., 116 Nev. 282, 285, 994 P.2d 1151, 1152 (2000).

“Appellants contend they should recover all their losses throughout the life of the business. We cannot agree. The district court found subsequent operating losses were solely due to a recession that devastated the Carson City area in the early 1980’s. The trial court’s determination of a question of fact will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous or not based on substantial evidence. Ivory Ranch v. Quinn River Ranch, 101 Nev. 471, 472, 705 P.2d 673, 675 (1985); NRCP 52(a).

Since there is substantial evidence in the record indicating a severe economic recession in the period following the sale of the store, we will not disturb the district court’s finding that the economic climate caused subsequent losses. Collins v. Burns, 103 Nev. 394, 399, 741 P.2d 819, 822 (1987).

Defenses

‘As a general rule, it is not sufficient to charge a fraud upon information and belief (and here there is not even an allegation of ‘information’) without giving the ground upon which the belief rests or stating some fact from which the court can infer that the belief is well founded.’ Bancroft Code Pleading, Vol. 1, page 79. See also-Dowling v. Spring Valley Water Co., 174 Cal. 218, 162 P. 894.
Tallman v. First Nat. Bank of Nev., 66 Nev. 248, 259, 208 P.2d 302, 307 (Nev. 1949).

Misrepresentations may be implied

“a defendant may be found liable for misrepresentation even when the defendant does not make an express misrepresentation, but instead makes a representation which is misleading because it partially suppresses or conceals information. See American Trust Co. v. California W. States Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal.2d 42, 98 P.2d 497, 508 (1940). See also Northern Nev. Mobile Home v. Penrod, 96 Nev. 394, 610 P.2d 724 (1980); Holland Rlty. v. Nev. Real Est. Comm’n, 84 Nev. 91, 436 P.2d 422 (1968).” Epperson v. Roloff, 102 Nev. 206, 212–13, 719 P.2d 799, 803 (1986).

False statement may be conveyed through an agent

“a party may be held liable for misrepresentation where he communicates misinformation to his agent, intending or having reason to believe that the agent would communicate the misinformation to a third party. See generally W. Prosser, supra, § 107 at 703; Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 533 (1977).” Epperson v. Roloff, 102 Nev. 206, 212, 719 P.2d 799, 803 (1986).

There is a duty to disclose where the defendant alone has knowledge of material facts not accessible to the plaintiff

“Finally, with regard to the leakage problem, respondents argue that no affirmative representation was ever made that the house was free of leaks. At least implicitly, they argue that an action in deceit will not lie for nondisclosure. This has, indeed, been described as the general rule. Seediscussion, W. Prosser, supra, § 106, at 695-97. An exception to the rule exists, however, where the defendant alone has knowledge of material facts which are not accessible to the plaintiff. Under such circumstances, there is a duty of disclosure. Thus, in Herzog v. Capital Co., supra, the court upheld a jury’s award of damages to the purchaser of a leaky house, holding under the circumstances of that case, that the jury correctly found that the vendor had a duty to reveal ‘the hidden and material facts’ pertaining to the leakage problem. Id. at 10. In numerous other cases, involving analogous facts, a jury’s finding of a duty of disclosure has been upheld. See, e.g., Barder v. McClung, 93 Cal.App.2d 692, 209 P.2d 808 (1949) (vendor failed to disclose fact that part of house violated city zoning ordinances); Rothstein v. Janss Inv. Corporation, 45 Cal.App.2d 64, 113 P.2d 465 (1941) (vendor failed to disclose fact that land was filled ground).” Epperson v. Roloff, 102 Nev. 206, 213, 719 P.2d 799, 803–804 (1986).

Intent to Induce the Plaintiff to Act or Refrain from Acting

The intent to defraud must exist at the time the promise is made.

“The mere failure to fulfill a promise or perform in the future, however, will not give rise to a fraud claim absent evidence that the promisor had no intention to perform at the time the promise was made. Webb v. Clark, 274 Or. 387, 546 P.2d 1078 (1976).” Bulbman, Inc. v. Nev. Bell, 108 Nev. 105, 112, 825 P.2d 588, 592 (1992).

“Intent must be specifically alleged.” Jordan v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety, 121 Nev. 44, 75, 110 P.3d 30, 51 (2005); see also Tahoe Village Homeowners v. Douglas Co., 106 Nev. 660, 663, 799 P.2d 556, 558 (1990) (upholding the dismissal of an intentional tort complaint that failed to allege intent).

‘[F]raud is not established by showing parol agreements at variance with a written instrument and there is no inference of a fraudulent intent not to perform from the mere fact that a promise made is subsequently not performed. 24 Am.Jur. 107; 23 Am.Jur. 888.” Tallman v. First Nat’l Bank of Nev., 66 Nev. 248, 259, 208 P.2d 302, 307 (1949).

“It is only when independent facts constituting fraud are first proven that parol evidence is admissible. ‘Our conception of the rule which permits parol evidence of fraud to establish the invalidity of the instrument is that it must tend to establish some independent fact or representation, some fraud in the procurement of the instrument, or some breach of confidence concerning its use, and not a promise directly at variance with the promise of the writing. We find apt language in Towner v. Lucas’ Ex’r, 54 Va. (13 Grat.) 705, 716, in which to express our conviction: ‘It is reasoning in a circle, to argue that fraud is made out, when it is shown by oral testimony that the obligee contemporaneously with the execution of a bond promised not to enforce it. Such a principle would nullify the rule: for conceding that such an agreement is proved, or any other contradicting the written instrument, the party seeking to enforce the written agreement according to its terms, would always be guilty of fraud. The true question is, Was there any such agreement? And this can only be established by legitimate testimony. For reasons founded in wisdom and to prevent frauds and perjuries, the rules of the common law exclude such oral testimony of the alleged agreement; and as it cannot be proved by legal evidence, the agreement itself in legal contemplation cannot be regarded as existing in fact. Neither a court of law or of equity can act upon the hypothesis of fraud where there is no legal proof of it.’’ Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass’s v. Pendergrass, 4 Cal.2d 258, 48 P.2d 659, 661.” Tallman v. First Nat’l Bank of Nev., 66 Nev. 248, 258–59, 208 P.2d 302, 307 (1949).

Justifiable Reliance

The false representation must have played a material and substantial role in the plaintiff’s decisionmaking, and made him make a decision he would not otherwise have made.

“In order to establish justifiable reliance, the plaintiff is required to show the following:’The false representation must have played a material and substantial part in leading the plaintiff to adopt his particular course; and when he was unaware of it at the time that he acted, or it is clear that he was not in any way influenced by it, and would have done the same thing without it for other reasons, his loss is not attributed to the defendant.’ Lubbe v. Barba, 91 Nev. 596, 600, 540 P.2d 115, 118 (1975) (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts, 714 (4th ed. 1971)) (emphasis added).” Blanchard v. Blanchard, 108 Nev. 908, 911, 839 P.2d 1320, 1322 (1992).

If the plaintiff made independent investigations and discovered facts that he is now claiming the defendant disclosed, he cannot be said to have justifiably relied on any of the defendant’s statements.

“Generally, a plaintiff making ‘an independent investigation will be charged with knowledge of facts which reasonable diligence would have disclosed. Such a plaintiff is deemed to have relied on his own judgment and not on the defendant’s representations.’ Id. at 211, 719 P.2d at 803 (citingFreeman v. Soukup, 70 Nev. 198, 265 P.2d 207 (1953)). However, we also recognize that ‘an independent investigation will not preclude reliance where the falsity of the defendant’s statements is not apparent from the inspection, where the plaintiff is not competent to judge the facts without expert assistance, or where the defendant has superior knowledge about the matter in issue.’ Id. 102 Nev. at 211-12, 719 P.2d at 803 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).” Blanchard v. Blanchard, 108 Nev. 908, 912, 839 P.2d 1320, 1323 (1992).

Where falsity of defendant’s statements is not apparent from the inspection, the plaintiff will not be charged with this knowledge.

“We have previously held that a plaintiff who makes an independent investigation will be charged with knowledge of facts which reasonable diligence would have disclosed. Such a plaintiff is deemed to have relied on his own judgment and not on the defendant’s representations. See Freeman v. Soukup, 70 Nev. 198, 265 P.2d 207 (1953). Nevertheless, an independent investigation will not preclude reliance where the falsity of the defendant’s statements is not apparent from the inspection, where the plaintiff is not competent to judge the facts without expert assistance, or where the defendant has superior knowledge about the matter in issue. See Stanley v. Limberys, 74 Nev. 109, 323 P.2d 925 (1958); Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal.2d 744, 192 P.2d 935 (1948).” Epperson v. Roloff, 102 Nev. 206, 211–12, 719 P.2d 799, 803 (1986).

There is only a duty to investigate where there are red flags–where the hidden information is patent and obvious, and when the buyer and seller have equal opportunities of knowledge.

“Lack of justifiable reliance bars recovery in an action at law for damages for the tort of deceit. Pacific Maxon, Inc. v. Wilson, 96 Nev. 867, 870, 619 P.2d 816, 818 (1980). However, this principle does not impose a duty to investigate absent any facts to alert the defrauded party his reliance is unreasonable. Sippy v. Cristich, 4 Kan.App.2d 511, 609 P.2d 204, 208 (1980). The test is whether the recipient has information which would serve as a danger signal and a red light to any normal person of his intelligence and experience. Id. It has long been the rule in this jurisdiction that the maxim of caveat emptor only applies when the defect is patent and obvious, and when the buyer and seller have equal opportunities of knowledge. Fishback v. Miller, 15 Nev. 428, 440 (1880). Otherwise, a contracting party has a right to rely on an express statement of existing fact, the truth of which is known to the party making the representation and unknown to the other party. Id. The recipient of the statement is under no obligation to investigate and verify the statement. Id.” Collins v. Burns, 103 Nev. 394, 397, 741 P.2d 819, 821 (1987).

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will help you challenge these fraudsters and save your home from foreclosure visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

What Homeowners Must Know About Pleading their Wrongful Foreclosure Cases in the Courts

12 Thursday Dec 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Aurora Loan Services of Nebraska, Deeds of Trust, Foreclosure, Fraud, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Motions, Pleading

This post is to assist homeowners in wrongful foreclosure understand principles and theories that must be well plead before their case can survive a motion to dismiss which are usually brought by the foreclosure mills in order to cover their fraud and quickly foreclose using demurrer (Motion to Dismiss), without answering the complaint.

Rules for Pleading Fraud: The elements of a fraud cause of action are (1) misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of the falsity or scienter, (3) intent to defraud—that is, induce reliance, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damages. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) These elements may not be pleaded in a general or conclusory fashion. (Id. at p. 645.) Fraud must be pled specifically—that is, a plaintiff must plead facts that show with particularity the elements of the cause of action.

Homeowners should be careful here as foreclosure mill counsels may sometimes allege that in their demurrer, that facts establishing detrimental reliance were not alleged.

Homeowners should plead each cause of action such that only the essential elements for the claim are set forth without reincorporation of lengthy `general allegations’.

Homeowners should avoid pleading allegation is a general allegation of reliance and damage, but should rather identify the particular acts homeowners took because of the alleged forgeries that resulted to injury to homeowners. If you did not plead that way even if you forgot to identify the action you took, the court will conclude that similarly, you did not identify any acts that did not take because of your reliance on the alleged forgeries, and therefore will conclude that your conclusory allegation of reliance is insufficient under the rules of law that require fraud to be pled specifically. See (Lazar v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 645.)

In other words, the `facts’ that homeowners must pleaded are those upon which liability depends i.e., `the facts constituting the causes of action’ homeowners will alleged in their complaint.

When homeowners finds themselves in a situation where they have already made such arguments, they need to do a damage control by arguing in their subsequent pleadings that they could amend to allege specifically the action they took or did not take because of their reliance on the alleged forgeries.

Wrongful Foreclosure by a Nonholder of the Deed of Trust The theory that a foreclosure was wrongful because it was initiated by a nonholder of the deed of trust has also been phrased as (1) the foreclosing party lacking standing to foreclose or (2) the chain of title relied upon by the foreclosing party containing breaks or defects. (See Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 764; Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th 1366 [Deutsche Bank not entitled to summary judgment on wrongful foreclosure claim because it failed to show a chain of owner ship that would establish it was the true beneficiary under the deed of trust ]; Guerroro v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. (9th Cir. 2010) 403 Fed.Appx. 154, 156 [rejecting a wrongful foreclosure claim because, among other things, plaintiffs “have not pleaded any facts to rebut the unbroken chain of title”].)

In Barrionuevo v. Chase Bank, N.A. (N.D.Cal. 2012) 885 F.Supp.2d 964, the district court stated: “Several courts have recognized the existence of a valid cause of action for wrongful foreclosure where a party alleged not to be the true beneficiary instructs the trustee to file a Notice of Default and initiate nonjudicial foreclosure.” (Id. at p. 973.)

Homeowners should be careful here when pleading their cases because numerous courts though had agreed with this statement of law, but sometimes believe that properly alleging a cause of action under this theory requires more than simply stating that the defendant who invoked the power of sale was not the true beneficiary under the deed of trust.

When that happens the courts usually concluded that [plaintiff failed to plead specific facts demonstrating the transfer of the note and deed of trust were invalid].)

Therefore, a plaintiff Homeowner asserting this theory must allege facts that show the defendant who invoked the power of sale was not the true beneficiary. (See Herrera v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1506

One basis for claiming that a foreclosing party did not hold the deed of trust is that the assignment relied upon by that party was ineffective. Courts have held that when a borrower asserts an assignment was ineffective, a question often arises about the borrower’s standing to challenge the assignment of the loan (note and deed of trust) — an assignment to which the borrower is not a party. (E.g., Conlin v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (6th Cir. 2013) 714 F.3d 355, 361 [third party may only challenge an assignment if that challenge would render the assignment absolutely invalid or ineffective, or void]; Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services of Nebraska (1st Cir. 2013) 708 F.3d 282, 291 [under Massachusetts law, mortgagor has standing to challenge a mortgage assignment as invalid, ineffective or void]; Gilbert v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (E.D. Cal., May 28, 2013, No. 1:13 – CV – 265 AWI SKO) 2013 WL 2318890.)

California‟s version of the principle concerning a third party‟s ability to challenge an assignment has been stated in a secondary authority as follows:

“Where an assignment is merely voidable at the election of the assignor,
third parties, and particularly the obligor, cannot … successfully challenge
the validity or effectiveness of the transfer.” (7 Cal.Jur.3d (2012) Assignments, § 43.)

This statement implies that a borrower can challenge an assignment of his or her note and deed of trust if the defect asserted would void the assignment. (See Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank Nation al Trust Co. (5th Cir. 2013) ___ F.3d ___ [2013 WL 3480207 at p.*3] [following majority rule that an obligor may raise any ground that renders the assignment void, rather than merely voidable].)

Therefore Homeowners should craft the allegations to present a theory under which the challenged assignments are void, not merely voidable, because numerous courts have rejected the view that a borrower’s challenge to an assignment must fail once it is determined that the borrower was not a party to, or third party beneficiary of, the assignment agreement. The courts held that cases adopting that position “paint with too broad a brush.” See (Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services of Nebraska, supra, 708 F.3d at p. 290.) The deciding court held that instead, courts should proceed to the question whether the assignment was void.

On the Tender Rule, for wrongful foreclosure, many foreclosure mills had plead that cancellation of instruments and quiet title are defective because homeowners failed to allege that the made a valid and viable tender of payment of the indebtedness. (See Karlsen v. American Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 112, 117 [“valid and viable tender of payment of the indebtedness owing is essential to an action to cancel a voidable sale under a deed of trust”].)

Tender is not required where the foreclosure sale is void, rather than voidable,

such as when a plaintiff proves that the entity lacked the authority to foreclose on the property. (Lester v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, supra, ___ F.Supp.2d____, [2013 WL 633333, p. *8]; 4 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2003) Deeds of Trust, § 10:212, p. 686.)

See generally, Annotation, Recognition of Action for Damages for Wrongful Foreclosure—Types of Action (2013) 82 A.L.R.6th 43 (claims that a foreclosure is “wrongful” can be tort – based, statute – based, and contract – based) Claims of misrepresentation or fraud related to robo-signing of foreclosure documents is addressed in Buchwalter, Cause of Action in Tort for Wrongful Foreclosure of Residential Mortgage, 52 Causes of Action Second, supra, at pages 147 to 149.

In ruling on Foreclosure Mills request for judicial notice of there worthless fraudulent foreclosure documents, the trial courts has stated that it could only take judicial notice that certain documents in the request, including the assignment of deed of trust, had been recorded, but it could not take judicial notice of factual matters stated in those documents. This ruling is correct and unchallenged on appeal.

So the courts may take judicial notice of the existence and recordation of a document with the county such as assignment, but the court “do not take notice of the truth of matters stated therein.” (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1375.) In most cases, the assignment of deed of trust does not establish that foreclosure mill was, in fact, the holder of the beneficial interest in the said deed of trust that the assignment states was transferred to it. The courts has further held that similarly, it does not establish that foreclosing bank in fact became the owner or holder of that beneficial interest. So because the document does not establish these facts for purposes of this demurrer, (Motion to Dismiss – Objection), it does not cure breaks in the chains of ownership that homeowners may allege. When plead correctly, these tips usually help homeowners in the litigation to survive the motion to dismiss brought by the Foreclosure Mills who cannot explain their documents and therefore allow homeowners wrongful foreclosure claims to advance from the pleading stage to discovery without being dismissed outright.

Why Homeowners Need to Shift the Burden of Proof To Foreclosure Mills

05 Thursday Dec 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Bank of America, Borrower, Foreclosure, MERS, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Ohio, U.S. Bancorp, US Bank

CASE STUDY:

This case brings to mind why homeowner MUST shift the burden of proof to foreclosure mills in order to save their homes or the courts will ‘assume’ that the burden rests on the homeowner. (Which it does not). Borrower has no burden of proof as the burden of proof is squarely shouldered by the illegal entity bringing a judicial or non judicial foreclosure proceeding against the homeowner, in order for them to show that either they owns the Note or had the rights of enforcement on the Note. Even if they “own the Note,” they might not have the “right to enforce it”, even if they are “holder of the note, and does not own it“, they might not have “standing to bring the action“, per UCC. (That is the law of negotiable instruments – and your “Note” is a negotiable instrument just like a “Check”.

SO FOLKS! DO YOUR HOMEWORK AND MAKE THEM PROVE IT! DO NOT LOSE YOUR DREAM HOME BASED ON MERE IGNORANCE!

U.S. BANK NATL. ASSN. v. SPICERNo. 9-11-01

2011 Ohio 3128 U.S. Bank National Association, As Trustee On Behalf of the Home Equity Asset Trust 2007-3 Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-3, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Gregory M. Spicer, Defendant-Appellant, and
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, Marion County.
Date of Decision: June 27, 2011.

OPINION

SHAW, J.

{¶1} Appellant, Gregory M. Spicer (“Spicer”) appeals the December 9, 2010 judgment of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas overruling his “Motion for Rule 60(B) to Vacate Judgment and Motion to Stay Sheriff’s Sale.”

{¶2} On November 22, 2006, Spicer executed a promissory note with Intervale Mortgage Corporation (“Intervale”) for a mortgage loan in the amount of $212,000.00 to purchase a residence located at 1517 Eagle Links Drive in Marion, Ohio. The loan documents identified Decision One LLC (“Decision One”) as Intervale’s servicing agent and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as Intervale’s nominee for matters related to Spicer’s loan. The mortgage was recorded in the Marion County Recorder’s office on December 1, 2006.

{¶3} In February of 2007, Spicer received a letter from Select Portfolio Servicing (“SPS”) notifying him that the servicing of his mortgage loan had been transferred from Decision One to SPS and that, as of March 1, 2007, SPS would be the entity receiving his mortgage payments.

{¶4} On September 22, 2008, Bill Koch, an assistant secretary for MERS, issued a “corporate assignment of mortgage,” which evidenced that MERS, as nominee for Intervale, assigned Spicer’s mortgage to Appellee, U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee, on behalf of the holders of the Home Equity Asset Trust 2007-3 Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-3 (“U.S. Bank”). This assignment of Spicer’s mortgage was subsequently recorded in the Marion County Recorder’s office.

{¶5} On September 25, 2008, U.S. Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure against Spicer alleging the note to be in default because Spicer failed to make the monthly payments on the note since April 28, 2008, and the default had not been cured. The complaint alleged that a balance of $208,865.11, plus interest remained outstanding on the promissory note. U.S. Bank requested judgment against Spicer for this amount, plus late charges, advances made for the payment of taxes, assessments, insurance premiums, or cost incurred for the protection of the mortgaged premises. U.S. Bank also requested the trial court to order a foreclosure and sale of the property. The record demonstrates that Spicer was properly served with the complaint on October 21, 2008.

{¶6} Spicer failed to appear or otherwise enter into the action and on January 5, 2009, U.S. Bank filed a motion for default judgment which was subsequently granted by the trial court. On January 12, 2009, the trial court entered a decree in foreclosure and ordered the property to be sold. The property was scheduled for a Sheriff’s sale on April 17, 2009.

{¶7} On April 13, 2009, Spicer sent an ex parte letter to the trial court requesting a stay in the sale proceedings. Spicer’s letter was placed in the record with a “received” stamp, but was not “file-stamped” by the clerk of courts. Moreover, there is no evidence that Spicer served this letter on counsel for U.S. Bank or that U.S. Bank was otherwise made aware of the existence of this letter.

{¶8} On April 23, 2009, U.S. Bank filed a “Motion to Vacate Order for Sale and Withdraw Property from Sale” with the trial court. In this motion, U.S. Bank informed the court that “Plaintiff and the borrower have entered into a loss mitigation agreement.” On April 24, 2009, the trial court granted U.S. Bank’s motion to withdraw the property from the scheduled Sheriff’s sale.

{¶9} On June 23, 2009, U.S. Bank filed an “Alias Praecipe for Order for Sale” requesting an order of sale and for the Sheriff to appraise, advertise, and sell the property.

{¶10} On August 10, 2009, a notice of sale was filed. The sale was scheduled to take place on September 18, 2009. U.S. Bank subsequently filed another “Motion to Vacate Order for Sale and Withdraw Property from Sale” stating that the parties “have entered into a forbearance agreement.” The trial court subsequently granted U.S. Bank’s motion to vacate the order of sale.

{¶11} On March 31, 2010, U.S. Bank filed a second “Alias Praecipe for Order for Sale” requesting an order of sale on the property and notice of sale was subsequently filed, scheduling the sale of the property. On June 22, 2010, U.S. Bank then filed a third “Motion to Vacate Order for Sale and Withdraw Property from Sale.” The reason cited for this motion was that the parties “are in the process of negotiating a loss mitigation agreement.”

{¶12} On July 12, 2010, the trial court granted U.S. Bank’s motion to withdraw the property from the Sheriff’s sale; however, the court also noted in its order that “No further withdrawals of sale will be allowed.”

{¶13} On July 15, 2010, U.S. Bank filed a “Pluries Praecipe for Order for Sale without Reappraisal” requesting that another order of sale be issued on the property. Sale of the property was scheduled for November 19, 2010.

{¶14} On October 21, 2010, nineteen months after the trial court issued its decree in foreclosure on the property, Spicer filed a “Motion for Rule 60(B) to Vacate Judgment and Motion to Stay Sheriff’s Sale.” Notably, this is the first formal appearance entered by Spicer in this action. In this motion, Spicer argued that he was never given the original loan documents evidencing his loan with Intervale, and that his original loan had been “shuffled around and assigned to various parties.” Spicer further alleged that there is no proof U.S. Bank was properly assigned the promissory note and mortgage. Spicer also claimed that he is a victim of “robo-signing”¹ by SPS, the servicing agent for his mortgage loan. In support of his motion, Spicer attached several internet articles and blogs, which generally discussed the alleged misconduct of some mortgage companies.

{¶15} In this motion, Spicer also requested that the trial court stay the Sheriff’s sale until it can be proven “who has actual position [sic] and ownership of the original mortgage and standing to foreclose on the mortgage.” However, he failed to specifically claim in this motion that he is entitled to relief pursuant to any of the enumerated grounds listed in Civ.R. 60(B) with respect to his instant case, or otherwise attempt to satisfy any the requirements a movant must prove in order to be entitled to Civ.R. 60(B) relief from judgment.

{¶16} On October 25, 2010, Spicer filed a supplement to his “Motion for Rule 60(B) to Vacate Judgment and Motion to Stay Sheriff’s Sale” and attached several more unauthenticated articles and documents about MERS and Intervale, which were not of direct relevance to his case.

{¶17} On October 28, 2010, Spicer filed another supplement to his “Motion for Rule 60(B) to Vacate Judgment and Motion to Stay Sheriff’s Sale,” attaching an amicus brief written by the Ohio Attorney General, which was filed in relation to a Cuyahoga County case, a separate and distinct case from Spicer’s case. Spicer argued that this other case was of particular relevance to his case because it involved U.S. Bank and its counsel of record in the case sub judice. Spicer urged the trial court to impute to his case any misconduct alleged against U.S. Bank in the Cuyahoga County case. Spicer also filed more internet articles generally examining the causes of the mortgage crisis, specifically the role of “robo-signing” by lenders in foreclosure actions.

{¶18} On November 4, 2010, Spicer filed a third supplement to his “Motion for Rule 60(B) to Vacate Judgment and Motion to Stay Sheriff’s Sale,” now arguing that U.S. Bank had no standing to bring the underlying foreclosure action because the original mortgage lender, Intervale, did not have authority to execute mortgages in Ohio. Spicer further argued that U.S. Bank did not sign the original promissory note and does not have the original “wet ink” promissory note in its possession. Spicer also identified, for the first time, the two individuals who signed affidavits in support of the foreclosure proceedings from MERS and SPS,² and accused them of being “robo-signers” who “lack personal knowledge of the facts herein.” (Supp. Mot. Nov. 4, 2010 at 2).

{¶19} Notably, in each of his supplements to his “Motion for Rule 60(B) to Vacate Judgment and Motion to Stay Sheriff’s Sale,” Spicer again failed to identify any grounds on which he is entitled to relief pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B).

{¶20} On November 8, 2010, U.S. Bank filed its memorandum in opposition to Spicer’s “Motion for Rule 60(B) to Vacate Judgment and Motion to Stay Sheriff’s Sale.” U.S. Bank argued that Spicer failed to satisfy the burden required to be shown by a movant that he or she is entitled to relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B). Specifically, U.S. Bank asserted that Spicer failed to identify what grounds, if any, exist for vacating the judgment, provide any operative facts or admissible evidence in support of such grounds, failed to identify a meritorious defense to the foreclosure proceedings—i.e. why the loan is not in default for Spicer’s non-payment, and that his Civ.R. 60(B) motion was not timely.

{¶21} U.S. Bank further asserted that it is the real party in interest to bring the foreclosure proceedings and argued that Spicer had waived this issue by failing to raise it until nineteen months after the decree in foreclosure was entered by the trial court.

{¶22} On November 15, 2010, Spicer filed a “Reply Brief” to U.S. Bank’s memorandum in opposition to his “Motion for Rule 60(B) to Vacate Judgment and Motion for Stay of Sheriff’s Sale.” In his response, Spicer urged the trial court to follow a procedural rule adopted by the Cuyahoga Court of Common Pleas requiring plaintiffs to follow certain directives in filing complaints for foreclosure in that court. Spicer also, for the first time, alleged that he is entitled to relief on one of the grounds listed in Civ.R. 60(B), specifically Civ.R. 60(B)(5), which is the “catch-all” provision under the rule, permitting the court to vacate a judgment “for any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.” Civ.R. 60(B)(5). Spicer argued that U.S. Bank “is perpetrating a fraud upon this court” and asserted several unsubstantiated allegations to support his position. Spicer also maintained that his motion is timely because Civ.R. 60(B)(5) does not state a specific timeframe to bring the motion, but rather requires the motion to be filed within a “reasonable time.”

{¶23} U.S. Bank filed a response to Spicer’s “Reply Brief” on November 19, 2010, and attached several documents refuting Spicer’s various allegations, including that it was not the real party in interest under Civ.R. 17(A) to file the foreclosure action.

{¶24} On November 22, 2010, U.S. Bank filed a fourth “Motion to Vacate Order for Sale and Withdraw Property from Sale” requesting the trial court to temporarily refrain from executing the sale in order for U.S. Bank to comply with recent directives issued by the U.S. Treasury Department.

{¶25} On December 9, 2010, the trial court issued its decision overruling Spicer’s “Motion for Rule 60(B) to Vacate Judgment and Motion for Stay of Sheriff’s Sale.” Specifically, the trial court determined that Spicer failed to timely raise the defense that U.S. Bank was not the real party in interest under Civ. R. 17(A). The trial court also concluded that Spicer failed to satisfy his burden demonstrating he is entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5). Furthermore, the trial court found the following with respect to Spicer’s allegations of misconduct by SPS:

As no misconduct has been alleged against [SPS], Defendant Gregory Spicer has not shown sufficient grounds [for] the granting of relief from judgment in this action. This is particularly true since said Defendant did nothing to object to the original judgment being rendered in this action, and did nothing to attempt to obtain relief from judgment until 21 [sic] months after the Judgment was rendered in this action. Said Defendant has made absolutely no showing that he had not failed to make his mortgage payments as agreed under the promissory note.

(JE, Dec. 9, 2010 at 4).

{¶26} Spicer subsequently filed this appeal, asserting the following assignments of error.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THAT FORECLOSURE IN THIS ACTION WAS FILED ON JANUARY 12, 2009, AND THAT DEFENDANT GREGORY SPICER DID NOT FILE HIS MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT UNTIL OCTOBER 21, 2010. THIS 21-MONTH DELAY IS WELL BEYOND THE ONE YEAR TIME LIMIT. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT NOTHING IN THE RECORD OF THIS ACTION SHOWING THAT THE SERVICER OF THE MORTGAGE QUESTIONED, SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC., OR THAT BILL KOCH HAS ENGAGED IN ANY OF THE MISCONDUCT.

{¶27} For ease of discussion, we elect to address Spicer’s assignments of error together.

{¶28} In his first assignment of error, Spicer claims that the trial court erred when it found that he did not file his Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment until twenty-one months after the trial court rendered judgment on the foreclosure action.³ Spicer appears to argue that his April 13, 2009 ex parte letter to the trial court served as a functional equivalent for a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment and, therefore, his motion should be considered timely because it was sent to the court only three months after it rendered its foreclosure judgment.

{¶29} First, we observe that in his April 13, 2009 letter, Spicer simply requests the trial court to stay the Sheriff’s sale. In reviewing this letter, we note that Spicer fails to mention Civ.R. 60(B), let alone make any statement that can be construed as a request for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B). In addition, Spicer neglects to cite any legal authority which supports his position that his ex parte letter, which does not contain the contents required by Civ.R. 60(B) in substance or in form, should be construed by the trial court as a timely filed motion for relief from judgment.

{¶30} Moreover, pursuant to App.R. 16(A)(7) we are not required to address arguments that have not been sufficiently presented for review or supported by proper authority. Therefore, it is well within our purview to disregard this assignment of error. See App.R. 12(A)(2). Nevertheless, in reviewing this issue we find no authority supporting Spicer’s contention that the trial court erred when it determined that he failed to file his Civ.R. 60(B) motion until twenty-one months after the foreclosure judgment was entered.

{¶31} Spicer also argues under this assignment of error that the trial court erred in determining that he is not entitled to relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B)(5). Initially, we note that in order to prevail on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion, a party must show 1) a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; 2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the five enumerated grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and 3) the motion is made within the required timeframe. In re Whitman, 81 Ohio St.3d 239, 242, 690 N.E.2d 535, 1998-Ohio-466; Douglas v. Boykin (1997), 121 Ohio App.3d 140, 145, 699 N.E.2d 123.

{¶32} The elements entitling a movant to Civ.R. 60(B) relief “are independent and in the conjunctive; thus, the test is not fulfilled if any one of the requirements is not met.” Strack v. Pelton, 70 Ohio St.3d. 172, 174, 637 N.E.2d 914, 1994-Ohio-107. “The decision to grant or deny a motion to vacate judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” Id. An abuse of discretion means that the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140.

{¶33} On appeal, Spicer argues that he is entitled to relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B)(5), which is the “catch-all” provision of the rule permitting a court to relieve a party from a final judgment for “any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.” This provision of the rule is not subject to the one-year limitation in filing as motions filed under Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2), and (3).⁴ Rather, motions filed on the grounds of Civ.R. 60(B)(5) are required to be filed in a reasonable time.

{¶34} In support of his position, Spicer argues that U.S. Bank is not the real party in interest to bring these foreclosure proceedings and that U.S. Bank and its servicing agent SPS had committed a “fraud upon the court.” The trial court addressed both of these issues in its judgment entry overruling his “Motion for Rule 60(B) to Vacate Judgment and Motion to Stay Sheriff’s Sale.”

{¶35} First, with respect to Spicer’s argument that U.S. Bank is not the real party in interest to bring these foreclosure proceedings, we note that the trial court concluded that Spicer waived this argument because he failed to timely assert it. Civil Rule 17(A) provides, in pertinent part:

Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. * * * No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest.

{¶36} The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that “[t]he purpose behind the real party in interest rule is to enable the defendant to avail himself of evidence and defenses that the defendant has against the real party in interest, and to assure him finality of the judgment, and that he will be protected against another suit brought by the real party at interest on the same matter.” Shealy v. Campbell (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 23, 24, 485 N.E.2d 701.

{¶37} As previously noted by this Court, a majority of appellate courts infer that the defense that a party is not the real party in interest can be raised after an initial responsive pleading, and if it is not raised in a timeframe relative to that initial pleading stage in the proceedings, then the defense is waived. First Union Natl. Bank v. Hufford, 146 Ohio App.3d 673, 677, 2001-Ohio-2271, ¶13, 767 N.E.2d 1206 citing Travelers Indemn. Co. v. R.L. Smith Co. (Apr. 13, 2001), 11th Dist. No. 2000-L-014, Hang-Fu v. Halle Homes, Inc. (Aug. 10, 2000), 8th Dist. No. 76589, Robbins v. Warren (May 6, 1996), 12th Dist. No. CA95-11-200; see also Mid-State Trust IX v. Davis, 2nd Dist. No. 07-CA-31, ¶58 (affirming this principle on similar facts and concluding that the issue of standing for the real party in interest defense is waived if not timely asserted).

{¶38} Here, the record demonstrates that Spicer failed to enter a formal appearance in this action until more than nineteen months after the trial court entered its decree in foreclosure on the property. Spicer provides neither the trial court nor this Court with any explanation why he was unable to make any appearance in the underlying foreclosure proceedings, let alone timely raise this issue during the initial pleading phase. Rather, Spicer simply makes blanket assertions that U.S. Bank is not the real party in interest without submitting any evidence to substantiate his claim. Moreover, Spicer cites no legal authority to support his position. Accordingly, we do not find the trial court’s determination that Spicer failed to timely assert a real-party-in-interest defense to be an abuse of discretion.

{¶39} Spicer’s second basis that he is entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5) is his assertion that U.S. Bank and SPS have committed a “fraud on the court.” In making this argument Spicer relies solely on Coulson v. Coulson, (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 12, 448 N.E.2d 809. In Coulson, an attorney represented to the court that he was counsel for the Plaintiff in a divorce action at the same time he was colluding with the Defendant in the action, by drafting a separation agreement on the behalf of the Plaintiff at the direction and upon the terms dictated by the Defendant. Id. at 13. The domestic relations court relied on the attorney’s representation and approved the separation agreement and incorporated it into its judgment, unaware of the attorney’s prior arrangement with the Defendant. Id. The Supreme Court of Ohio determined that the attorney’s actions in this instance constituted a “fraud upon the court.” Id. at 16-17.

{¶40} As explained by the Supreme Court, fraud upon the court embraces the “`species of fraud which does or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by the officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication.'” Coulson, 5 Ohio St.3d at 15 quoting MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE (2 Ed.1971) 515, paragraph 60.33.

{¶41} As the basis for his claim that U.S. Bank and SPS committed a fraud upon the trial court, Spicer alleges that Bill Koch, the individual who effectuated the assignment of Spicer’s mortgage between Intervale and U.S. Bank, is a “robo-signer.” However, Spicer provided the trial court with no evidence to substantiate this claim other than unauthenticated internet articles discussing the alleged misconduct of mortgage lenders in the industry. There is nothing in these articles or Spicer’s unsupported allegations that can be construed as a “fraud upon the court.” Spicer simply failed to provide any relevant evidence to demonstrate misconduct on the part of U.S. Bank or its servicing agent, SPS in this matter.

{¶42} In addition, we note that Civ.R. 60(B)(5) applies only when a more specific provision of the rule does not apply. Strack v. Pelton (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 174, 637 N.E.2d 914, 1994-Ohio-107. Moreover, Civ.R. 60(B)(5) is not intended to be used as a substitute for any of the other more specific provisions of Civ.R. 60(B). Caruso-Ciresi, Inc. v. Lohman (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 64, 448 N.E.2d 1365. Here Spicer’s allegations of misconduct against U.S. Bank and SPS are more akin to the traditional legal concept of fraud, which is specifically addressed by Civ.R. 60(B)(3). However, as previously mentioned, a motion filed pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(3) must be filed within one year from the entry of the judgment the movant seeks to vacate. Spicer’s “Motion for Rule 60(B) to Vacate Judgment” was filed several months after the expiration of this timeframe. Accordingly, for all these reasons we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Spicer is not entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B) and overruled his “Motion for Rule 60(B) to Vacate Judgment and Motion for Stay of Sheriff’s Sale.”

{¶43} Based on the foregoing, Spicer’s first and second assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Judgment Affirmed

ROGERS, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur.

FootNotes

1. Here, Spicer is referring to media reports covering the alleged widespread misconduct by mortgage servicers and banks during foreclosing procedures. Such alleged misconduct includes employees of these entities signing affidavits purporting to have knowledge of the contents of foreclosure files that the employees never actually reviewed and, therefore, have no personal knowledge of relative to the foreclosure proceedings.2. SPS is also the servicer for U.S. Bank on Spicer’s mortgage.3. As a point of clarification, Spicer filed his “Motion for Rule 60(B) to Vacate Judgment and Motion for Stay of Sheriff’s Sale” nineteen months after the trial court entered its judgment of foreclosure. However, Spicer’s initial filing of his motion was captioned as a Civ.R. 60(B) motion, but contained none of the required substance of such a motion. It was not until two months later, twenty-one months after the trial court’s foreclosure judgment, that Spicer actually included Civ.R. 60(B) elements in his “Reply Brief.”4. Civil Rule 60(B) specifically provides, “On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (B) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.”

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

What Florida Homeowners Need to Know About Mortgage Assignments

05 Thursday Dec 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Banks and Lenders, Case Laws, Case Study, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, MERS, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, Your Legal Rights

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Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, Assignment (law), Business, Florida Supreme Court, Promissory note, Securitization, UCC, Uniform Commercial Code

Today, a mortgage originator might make hundreds of loans and assign them as collateral to borrow money from a bank in a “mortgage warehouse facility.” The borrowed money is used to originate more mortgages. A mortgage warehouse is often only temporary, so the mortgages might be transferred from one facility to another. When the mortgage originator has a sufficiently large pool of mortgages, it may permanently “securitize” them by assigning them to a newly formed company that issues securities that are then sold to investors. In the end, the company owns the mortgages, and the investors receive payments on the securities which are based on the collections from the mortgage pool. In this manner, mortgages are effectively packaged as securities, which can more easily be traded than individual mortgages — hence the name “securitization.”

The recorded form assignment I prepared as a young associate is not well-suited to use in these transactions. Because transactions involve the assignment of hundreds or even thousands of mortgages, there is a temptation to skip the step of recording an assignment in the public records, particularly when the assignment is only a temporary collateral assignment. Transactions sometimes take the form of nothing more than an unrecorded pledge of the mortgages in bulk to the bank, together with delivery of the original notes to the bank for perfection. In many instances, even the task of holding possession of the notes is outsourced to a bailee who holds the notes for the bank’s benefit. The mortgages might be transferred many times by unrecorded assignment in bulk without physically moving the notes, but with the bailee simply signing a receipt changing the name of the lender for whom it holds the notes.

The attorneys who pioneered these transactions were comforted that the structure would work by legal conclusions they drew from Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the Official Comments to the UCC (Comments),² and favorable case law.³ The law was clear enough that attorneys were able to give legal opinions concerning perfection, but as the amount of securitized mortgages reached into the trillions of dollars, the uniform law commissioners decided to revisit Article 9 and make it safe for securitizations by officially sanctioning these practices.

It is useful to observe the simplicity of a mortgage assignment in its purest form. F.S. §673.2031(1) (2010), governing negotiable instruments, states that “[a]n instrument is transferred when it is delivered by a person other than its issuer for the purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument.” Even before the UCC, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that a mortgage can be transferred without a written assignment simply by delivering the note with intent to assign it.⁴ So at its core, between the parties to the assignment, assigning a mortgage is very much like selling a used lawn mower. What makes it more complex in practice is the potential for disputes and the precautions that must be taken to protect the parties. There are a number of contexts in which mortgage assignments might be considered:

1) The rights of a mortgage assignor and assignee vis-a-vis each other;

2) The rights of a mortgage assignee relative to the rights of its creditors, including lien creditors and bankruptcy trustees;

3) The rights of a mortgage assignee relative to the rights of a subsequent assignee;

4) The obligation of a mortgagor to make payment to the mortgage holder;

5) The right of the mortgage holder to foreclose in the event of default; and

6) The rights of a person acquiring an interest in the real estate.

The drafters of Article 9 focused primarily on problems one through three because these related to the issues that most concerned securitization participants and their attorneys. The rules the drafters set up treated mortgages as personal property that could be transferred without regard to the real estate records.⁵ Article 9 extends to sales of promissory notes, as well as assignments for security purposes.⁶ Although Article 9 recognizes some differences between collateral assignments and sales of notes, the UCC does not provide rules to distinguish a collateral assignment from an absolute assignment.⁷ Thus, the term “secured party” includes a collateral assignee as well as a purchaser of promissory notes,⁸ and the term “debtor” includes both an assignor of promissory notes for security and a seller of promissory notes.⁹

Problem 1 — Attachment
Article 3 governs the transfer of negotiable instruments. Article 9 governs security interests in and sales of both negotiable and nonnegotiable promissory notes. Thus, there is some overlap. The principal effect of extending Article 9 to sales of promissory notes was to apply the perfection and priority rules to those transactions.

F.S. §679.2031 (2010) determines when an assignment “attaches” or in other words, when it becomes effective between the assignor and assignee. That section requires that a) value be given; b) the debtor has rights in the collateral; and c) either the debtor has “authenticated a security agreement” describing the collateral or the secured party is in possession of the collateral pursuant to the security agreement.¹⁰

In the case of an assignment of a promissory note, the promissory note is the “collateral”¹¹ and the assignment is the “security agreement.”¹² Thus, the assignment becomes enforceable between the assignor and assignee when value is given, the assignor has assignable rights in the promissory note, and the assignor has either executed a written assignment describing the promissory note or the assignee has taken possession pursuant to the agreement of the assignor to assign the promissory note. Attachment of the security interest to the promissory note also constitutes attachment of the security interest to the mortgage, effectively adopting the pre-Article 9 case law that the mortgage follows the promissory note.¹³

A written assignment of the promissory note will satisfy the “security agreement” requirement whether the assignment is made pursuant to a sale or for the purpose of collateral. Similarly, an indorsement pursuant to Article 3 should satisfy that requirement.¹⁴ However, the implication of F.S. §§673.2031 and 679.2031 (2010), and of Johns v. Gillian, 184 So. 140 (Fla. 1938), is that the security agreement need not be in writing, so long as there is intent to assign and the promissory note is delivered to the assignee.¹⁵

Problem 2 — Perfection
Third parties lacking notice are not bound merely because the assignor and assignee have agreed among themselves that the mortgage has been transferred to the assignee. To protect the assignee from claims of third parties dealing with the assignor, the assignment must be perfected. Perfection of the security interest in the promissory note operates to perfect a security interest in the mortgage.¹⁶ The assignee may perfect its rights against the conflicting rights of a lien creditor (including a judgment lien holder, bankruptcy trustee, or receiver)¹⁷ by taking possession of the original promissory note¹⁸ or by filing a financing statement in the applicable filing office¹⁹ (which for a debtor located in Florida is the Florida Secured Transactions Registry).²⁰ Possession may be effected by means of a bailee, provided that the bailee authenticates a writing acknowledging that it holds possession for the benefit of the secured party.²¹ However, not all modes of perfection are equal. As discussed below in connection with priority, possession of the promissory note generally offers more protection than filing a financing statement. All modes of perfection, however, provide protection against the rights of a subsequent lien creditor.²²

In the case of a sale of the promissory note (as opposed to a collateral assignment), perfection is automatic upon attachment.²³ Thus, neither possession nor filing is needed to perfect against the rights of subsequent lien creditors, provided that the assignment is a true sale rather than a secured transaction. However, for several reasons, absolute assignees often perfect by possession of the promissory note and/or filing, even though perfection is automatic in the case of a sale.²⁴

Problem 3 — Priority
The question of whether an assignee prevails over another assignee is one of priority. Pursuant to F.S. §679.322(1)(a) (2010), if both assignments are perfected, then priority is generally determined by the time of filing or perfection. Perfection is accomplished by filing automatically in the case of sales, or by possession of the promissory note. However, §679.322(3) refers to F.S. §679.330 (2010), which states in part: “[A] purchaser of an instrument has priority over a security interest in the instrument perfected by a method other than possession if the purchaser gives value and takes possession of the instrument in good faith and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party.”

Regardless of whether the assignee receives absolute ownership pursuant to a true sale or merely an assignment for the purpose of security, the assignee is considered a “purchaser.”²⁵ If the second assignee takes possession for value in good faith and without knowledge that it violates the first assignee’s rights, then the second assignee takes priority over an assignment perfected without possession. Mere filing of a financing statement by the first assignee (and even actual knowledge by the second assignee of such a filing) is not enough to charge the second assignee with a lack of good faith or knowledge that the second assignment violated the first assignee’s rights.²⁶ It is not clear precisely what facts might disqualify the assignee in possession from relying on §679.330(4) for its priority, but F.S. §671.201(20) (2010) provides a general definition of “good faith,” which requires honesty in fact (an actual knowledge standard), and observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. Given this nebulous standard, the party who perfects by filing or automatically should assume that it will not be protected against a subsequent assignee who takes possession.

The foregoing principles are demonstrated in American Bank of the South v. Rothenberg, 598 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). In that case, the bank took a security interest in a note and mortgage, perfected by possession. The assignor then sold the same note to a second assignee. The second assignee recorded his assignment in the public records before the bank did, but received only a copy of the note. The court held that though he recorded first, the second assignee lost because the bank had possession. Although the case did not involve a UCC filing by the losing assignee, that would not have changed the result since possession generally trumps a UCC filing. In fact, because the mortgage was sold (rather than assigned as collateral), the second assignee’s interest was perfected automatically. However, like filing, automatic perfection does not generally protect the assignee from a conflicting assignment perfected by possession.

If the assignment is intended only as secondary collateral on unspecific assets, then possibly the assignee would be satisfied with such ethereal rights as are created by merely filing, but if the assignee is giving new value to acquire specific mortgages, then greater protection is usually required — namely, possession of the promissory note.

Problem 4 — Who Does the Mortgagor Pay?
Comment 6 to UCC §9-308 explains that Article 3 (not Article 9) dictates who the maker of a negotiable instrument must pay. F.S. §673.6021(1) (2010) states that with limited exceptions (knowledge of injunction or theft, etc.), the instrument is discharged upon payment to “a person entitled to enforce the instrument.”

F.S. §673.3011 (2010) states:

The term “person entitled to enforce” an instrument means:

(1) The holder of the instrument;

(2) A nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder; or

(3) A person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to s. 673.3091 or s. 673.4181(4).

A person may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument.

In general, it is the “holder” who is entitled to enforce the instrument. “The person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession” is a “holder.”²⁷ In some instances, a nonholder may enforce the instrument. The comment to UCC §3-301 states that a “person who under applicable law is a successor to the holder or otherwise acquires the holder’s rights” can enforce the instrument under subsection (2), even though not a holder. This would include an assignee from the holder who for some reason did not become a holder, perhaps because it did not receive a proper indorsement.²⁸ Subsection (3) would include an assignee who is not a holder because the instrument was lost.

One might wonder whether these provisions make any sense. The mortgagor cannot be expected to ascertain the holder by demanding exhibition of the promissory note whenever it makes a payment,²⁹ nor would the lender likely accommodate such a demand, even if made. Usually, the note expressly waives presentment, so that the original need not be exhibited on demand for payment.³⁰ In the real world, the mortgagor simply pays whomever the note says should be paid (often a servicer), until the mortgagor receives a notice to pay someone else. The law of contract and agency will often lead a court to give effect to payments made in this manner, despite Article 3.³¹ Nevertheless, unless the parties have expressly or impliedly agreed otherwise, Article 3 requires the mortgagor to ascertain the status of the payee as holder by demanding exhibition of the promissory note, and the holder must comply as a condition for demanding payment.

Article 3 does not control payment of nonnegotiable notes.³² The common law of contract generally applies. The common law rule is that payment of a nonnegotiable promissory note can be made to the payee without demanding delivery of the original promissory note, and will be effective so long as the maker does not have notice that the payee has transferred the promissory note to a third person.³³ In other words, the result is not very different from the “real world” practice of making payment on a negotiable promissory note, as described above.

Problem 5 — Who Has Standing to Foreclose the Mortgage?
The provisions of Article 3 speak in terms of who is entitled to “enforce” an instrument. Thus, the solution to problem four must also be the solution to problem five. Unlike problem four, however, there are a number of reported cases concerning standing in foreclosures that must be considered. It should come as no surprise that the holder of the promissory note has standing to maintain a foreclosure action.³⁴ Further, an agent for the holder can sue to foreclose.³⁵ The holder of a collateral assignment has sufficient standing to foreclose.³⁶

Failure to file the original promissory note or offer evidence of standing might preclude summary judgment.³⁷ Even when the plaintiff files the original, it might be necessary to offer additional evidence to show that the plaintiff is the holder or has rights as a nonholder. In BAC Funding Consortium, Inc. v. Jean-Jacques, 28 So. 3d 936 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), for example, the court reversed a summary judgment of foreclosure, saying the plaintiff had not proven it held the note. The written assignment was incomplete and unsigned. The plaintiff filed the original note, which showed an indorsement to another person, but no indorsement to the plaintiff. The court found that was insufficient. Clearly, a party in possession of a note indorsed to another is not a “holder,” but recall that Johns v. Gillian holds that a written assignment is not needed to show standing when the transferee receives delivery of the note. The court’s ruling in BAC Funding Consortium was based on the heavy burden required for summary judgment. The court said the plaintiff did not offer an affidavit or deposition proving it held the note and suggested that “proof of purchase of the debt, or evidence of an effective transfer” might substitute for an assignment.³⁸

In Jeff-Ray Corp. v. Jacobson, 566 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), the court held that an assignment executed after the filing of the foreclosure case was not sufficient to show the plaintiff had standing at the time the complaint was filed. In WM Specialty Mortgage, LLC v. Salomon, 874 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), however, the court distinguished Jeff-Ray Corp., stating that the execution date of the written assignment was less significant when the plaintiff could show that it acquired the mortgage before filing the foreclosure without a written assignment, as permitted by Johns v. Gilliam.³⁹

When the note is lost, a document trail showing ownership is important. The burden in BAC Funding Consortium might be discharged by an affidavit confirming that the note was sold to the plaintiff prior to foreclosure. Corroboratory evidence of sale documents or payment of consideration is icing on the cake, but probably not needed absent doubt over the plaintiff’s rights. If doubt remains, indemnity can be required if needed to protect the mortgagor.⁴⁰

In the case of a defaulting mortgagor, someone presumably has a right to foreclose. Excessively strict standing requirements might result in a windfall to the mortgagor at the expense of the lender. At the same time, courts must ensure that the mortgagor is not subjected to double liability. A review of the cases shows that while there are a few cases in which mortgagors paid the wrong party and were later held liable to the true holder, there is a dearth of cases in Florida where a mortgagor was foreclosed by one putative mortgagee, and later found liable to another who was the true holder. The lack of such nightmare cases is a testament to the fine job courts have done in enforcing the standing requirements, but it also begs the question whether the risk of double liability may be overstated. Given the long foreclosure process in Florida, a defaulting borrower is unlikely to remain unaware of conflicting demands long enough to complete a foreclosure. It seems that in such an event, either the borrower must have ignored conflicting demands, or one of the putative mortgagees sat on its rights. While both are plausible scenarios, they each present clear equities that should assist a court in positioning the loss.

Problem 6 — Real Estate Transactions
The UCC deals with problems one through five, but the Article 9 Comments expressly disclaim intent to deal with problem six because it is an issue of real estate law beyond Article 9’s scope.⁴¹ In Florida, a mortgage is not an interest in real estate, but rather personal property.⁴² On the other hand, the statutes permit persons taking an interest in real estate to rely on the real estate records to determine ownership of a mortgage without regard to the UCC. F.S. §701.02 (2010) says in part:

701.02. Assignment not effectual against creditors unless recorded and indicated in title of document; applicability

(1) An assignment of a mortgage upon real property or of any interest therein, is not good or effectual in law or equity, against creditors or subsequent purchasers, for a valuable consideration, and without notice, unless the assignment is contained in a document that, in its title, indicates an assignment of mortgage and is recorded according to law.

(2) This section also applies to assignments of mortgages resulting from transfers of all or any part or parts of the debt, note or notes secured by mortgage, and none of same is effectual in law or in equity against creditors or subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice, unless a duly executed assignment be recorded according to law.

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(4) Notwithstanding subsections (1), (2), and (3) governing the assignment of mortgages, chapters 670-680 of the Uniform Commercial Code of this state govern the attachment and perfection of a security interest in a mortgage upon real property and in a promissory note or other right to payment or performance secured by that mortgage. The assignment of such a mortgage need not be recorded under this section for purposes of attachment or perfection of a security interest in the mortgage under the Uniform Commercial Code.

(5) Notwithstanding subsection (4), a creditor or subsequent purchaser of real property or any interest therein, for valuable consideration and without notice, is entitled to rely on a full or partial release, discharge, consent, joinder, subordination, satisfaction, or assignment of a mortgage upon such property made by the mortgagee of record, without regard to the filing of any Uniform Commercial Code financing statement that purports to perfect a security interest in the mortgage or in a promissory note or other right to payment or performance secured by the mortgage, and the filing of any such financing statement does not constitute notice for the purposes of this section. For the purposes of this subsection, the term “mortgagee of record” means the person named as the mortgagee in the recorded mortgage or, if an assignment of the mortgage has been recorded in accordance with this section, the term “mortgagee of record” means the assignee named in the recorded assignment.

One can accept that a person taking an interest in real estate should be charged with notice only of what appears from the real estate records. However, the statute seems overly broad in that it says an assignment must be recorded to be effectual against creditors and purchasers. Subsections (1) and (2) seem to contradict the rules of Article 9, which permit perfection against lien creditors merely by taking possession of the note or filing a financing statement. Also, under Article 9, a good faith purchaser with possession takes free of a prior assignment, even if recorded. Although subsection (4) says the statute does not alter the perfection requirements of Article 9, what does the statute mean if not that an unrecorded assignment of mortgage is not enforceable against creditors of the assignor?

One might argue that §701.02 means that an absolute assignment must be recorded in the real estate records, while a collateral assignment need not be recorded.⁴³ Subsection (4) discusses perfection of a “security interest,” but it does not specifically mention a sale of the mortgage.However, the term “security interest” in the UCC includes an assignment pursuant to a sale,⁴⁴ and the term “assignment” in subsections (1) and (2) is not, on its face or in the case law, limited to absolute assignments.⁴⁵ Such a limitation would undercut the §701.02 protections given to real estate purchasers (particularly considering the case law holding that a collateral assignee in possession may enforce the mortgage). Likewise, requiring a sale to be recorded in the real estate records for validity against subsequent purchasers from the mortgagee would undermine the protections for purchasers of mortgages under the UCC. Clearly, the statute says that an assignment need not be recorded to be perfected under the UCC, but that does not necessarily mean that an unrecorded assignment will be effective against a person taking an interest in the realty in reliance on the real estate records.

Perhaps the term “creditors” refers only to creditors of the fee title owner of the land — not to creditors of the mortgage assignor. There is no need to protect creditors of a mortgage assignor with this statute. The priority of a lien creditor of the assignor is adequately addressed by Article 9. By contrast, creditors of the fee title owner are not protected by Article 9 and might rely on the real estate records in acquiring an interest in or lien on the real estate.⁴⁶ Also, the subsection (5) phrase “purchaser of real property” supports that interpretation. There is no mention of purchasers of the mortgage.

If that is the intent of the statute, then the unqualified use of the term “creditors” is unfortunate. The statute should say the protection extends to creditors, purchasers, or other persons acquiring an interest in the real property, but not to persons acquiring a mortgage from the mortgagee (whose rights are determined instead by the UCC). Even though it could be clearer, the foregoing interpretation is not plainly refuted by the statutory language. Moreover, there is case law support. In American Bank of the South v. Rothenberg, 598 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), also discussed above, the bank received a collateral assignment and took possession of the note. However, the note was sold to a second assignee who recorded first in the real estate records and argued that §701.02 gave him better title. The court disagreed, stating:

The confusion in this case arises from the failure of both parties to recognize that section 701.02…is inapplicable. This case, involving as it does the competing interests of successive assignees of a note and mortgage, is governed by negotiable instruments law, not the recording statute. Section 701.02 was enacted to protect a creditor or subsequent purchaser of land who has relied on the record satisfaction of a prior mortgage, which satisfaction was executed by the mortgagee after he made an unrecorded assignment of the same mortgage. Manufacturers’ Trust Co. v. People’s Holding Co., 110 Fla. 451, 149 So. 5 (Fla. 1933).⁴⁷

The court’s reading is unduly narrow in that §701.02 protects more than just persons relying on mortgage satisfactions, but the idea that it governs only real estate transactions seems correct.⁴⁸

However, some courts have confused the rules applicable to problem six with those applicable to problems one through five. In JP Morgan Chase v. New Millennial, LC, 6 So. 3d 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), rev. dism., 10 So. 3d 632 (Fla. 2009), for example, the closing agent in a real estate transaction telephoned AmSouth Bank concerning two mortgages that it appeared to own of record and was told they had been paid. AmSouth Bank faxed a printout to the closing agent showing a balance of $0 and stating “PD OFF.” In fact, AmSouth Bank had merely sold the loans to JP Morgan, which failed to record an assignment. The transaction closed in reliance on the fax. Later, JP Morgan sought to foreclose, and the purchaser argued that JP Morgan’s unrecorded assignment was ineffective under §701.02. JP Morgan argued that §701.02 protected only assignees of the mortgagee, not grantees of the land owner, and the court agreed.⁴⁹ In other words, the court’s interpretation was exactly opposite that in American Bank of the South. Yet, the idea that persons acquiring the land may rely on §701.02 seems required by the statute and the case law.⁵⁰

Although JP Morgan Chase’sinterpretation of §701.02 seems wrong,one might argue the case was correct for another reason. The court said the closing agent never received a satisfaction, but simply relied on the fax. Although F.S. §701.04 (2010) permits the purchaser to rely on an estoppel letter, the court said the fax did not qualify for that protection. Arguably, the true holding of JP Morgan Chase is that the party relying on the real estate records must obtain a satisfaction, and informal assurances are inadequate. Nevertheless, JP Morgan Chase will add to the confusion until the Florida Supreme Court rules decisively on the meaning of §701.02.

Even if one accepts the interpretation in American Bank of the South, one must admit there is inherent tension between §701.02 and Article 9. The tension is demonstrated in Rucker v. State Exchange Bank, 355 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). In that case, South 41 Corp. gave a mortgage to Harrell and deeded the land to Rucker. Harrell assigned the mortgage to the bank as collateral, which recorded the assignment, but did not notify Rucker. Rucker then paid the mortgage to Harrell. After not receiving payment, the bank foreclosed on Rucker. On appeal, Rucker argued the collateral assignment was not perfected under Article 9. The court erroneously said that Article 9 does not govern a collateral assignment, but came to an arguably correct result, affirming the judgment of foreclosure.

A threshold issue not discussed was whether Rucker, having acquired the real estate from South 41 Corp., was entitled to rely on the real estate records, or whether she simply paid the mortgage pursuant to the UCC. Clearly, Rucker did acquire the real estate, but that was months earlier, so perhaps by the time of payment, the real estate records were no longer relevant.

The Rucker court seemed to rely on both problems one through five and problem six rules. The court said that Rucker did not demand surrender of the mortgage,⁵¹ which is irrelevant under §701.02. However, the court also relied on the assignment recorded in the real estate records, which is not important to problems one through five, but is important to problem six. Even though the court did not clearly state which rules applied, it came to the correct result. Rucker lost because she did not comply with either set of rules. She would have become aware of the assignment to the bank if she had checked the real estate records, and she would have (presumably) discovered that Harrell did not have the note, if she had demanded surrender of the note. The court did not discuss when it is that a person acquiring an interest in the land (entitled to rely on the real estate records) ceases to be such a person and becomes instead a person acquiring or paying the promissory note who must follow the UCC, but the case shows the issue will inevitably arise, creating tension between §701.02 and the UCC.

Summarizing, the UCC attempts to solve problems one through five and §701.02 attempts to solve problem six. There is some overlap and potential for conflict, causing confusion in the cases. Courts should interpret those statutes so that they are consistent, limiting the protection of §701.02 to persons taking an interest in the real estate, and the protection of the UCC to persons taking an interest in the promissory note and mortgage.

Conclusion
Ironically, while the drafters of Article 9 sought to make mortgage assignments as simple and foolproof as possible, the handling of mortgage assignments is now at the center of the foreclosure crisis that has gripped the nation’s financial system. To be fair, the changes to Article 9 did not really cause the problem. In fact, the changes mostly codified existing case law and served to lessen the chaos by eliminating uncertainty. However, the revisions to Article 9 fostered confidence that the “simple, foolproof” rules intended to protect parties’ rights in mortgages would in fact do so. The false sense of certainty led to an increase in the number of transactions accomplished with minimal documentation designed to meet the attachment and perfection requirements of Article 9, but not the standing requirements in foreclosures. Moreover, missing or irregular indorsements or lost instruments compounded the problem by leaving gaps even in this minimal documentation. The result was a deluge of disputed cases fortuitously stopping or delaying foreclosures while the mortgagees struggled to reconstruct a document trail proving ownership.

Despite the sloppy practices of the mortgage industry, attorneys practicing in this area should not find themselves on the losing end of a court decision holding that their client does not have standing to foreclose. The question of whether the client has standing should be addressed before filing the case. If the documentation is inadequate, then missing documents should be located, or if necessary, re-executed before filing suit. An attorney unavoidably faced with ambiguous documentation might take comfort that, as shown by Johns v. Gillian and the UCC, Florida law concerning standing is not very demanding. Nevertheless, the requirements for standing must be proved, and the attorney should determine before filing that these requirements can be met.

¹SeeFla. Stat. §673.2041 (2010).

²See National Bank of Sarasota v. Dugger, 335 So. 2d 859, 860-861 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1976), cert. den., 342 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1976) (citing Comments as interpretive guide).

³ Florida has long held an assignment of a note includes an assignment of the mortgage. See Taylor v. American Nat. Bank, 57 So. 678, 685 (Fla. 1912); First Nat. Bank of Quincy v. Guyton, 72 So. 460 (Fla. 1916); Collins v. W.C. Briggs, Inc., 123 So. 833 (Fla. 1929); Miami Mortgage & Guaranty Co. v. Drawdy, 127 So. 323 (Fla. 1930); and Warren v. Seminole Bond & Mortgage Co., 172 So. 696, 697 (Fla. 1937). Thus, a recorded assignment seemed surplusage. By contrast, a mortgage assignment without the note has been held ineffectual. Sobel v. Mutual Development, Inc., 313 So. 2d 77, 78 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1975).

⁴Johns v. Gillian, 184 So. 140, 143 (Fla. 1938).

⁵Fla. Stat. §679.1091(4)(k)(1) (2010) (Article 9 extends to a transfer of a lien in real property).

⁶Fla. Stat. §679.1091(1) (2010).

⁷See UCC §9-109, Comment 5.

⁸Fla. Stat. §679.1021(1)(sss) (2010).

⁹Fla. Stat. §679.1021(1)(bb) (2010).

¹⁰Fla. Stat. §679.2031(2) (2010).

¹¹Fla. Stat. §679.1021(1)(l) (2010).

¹²Fla. Stat. §679.1021(1)(ttt) (2010) and §671.201(38) (2010) (“security interest” includes the interest of a buyer of a promissory note).

¹³Fla. Stat. §679.2031(7) (2010).

¹⁴Fla. Stat. §673.2041(1) (2010), defining “indorsement.” Fla. Stat. §673.2011 (2010) requires an indorsement for a transferee to become a “holder,” if the instrument is payable to a specific person, but even a nonholder transferee may often enforce the instrument. SeeFla. Stat. §673.2031(2) (2010).

¹⁵ The delivery requirement has also been weakened by some cases. See Beaty v. Inlet Beach, 9 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1942); Harmony Homes, Inc. v. United States, 936 F. Supp. 907, 913 (M.D. Fla. 1996), aff’d,124 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 1997).

¹⁶Fla. Stat. §679.3081(5) (2010).

¹⁷Fla. Stat. §679.1021(1)(zz) (2010).

¹⁸Fla. Stat. §679.3131(1) (2010). Florida law applies to a security interest perfected by possession if the promissory note is located in Florida. SeeFla. Stat. §679.3011(2) (2010).

¹⁹Fla. Stat. §679.3121(1) (2010) (perfection by filing where the collateral is instruments). The term “instrument” under Article 9 includes non-negotiable promissory notes, unlike the same term defined in Article 3. CompareFla. Stat. §679.1021(1)(uu) (2010) withFla. Stat. §673.1041(2) (2010), and see Comment 5(c) to UCC §9-102.

²⁰Fla. Stat. §679.5011(1)(b) (2010). A registered organization organized in Florida is deemed “located” in Florida. SeeFla. Stat. §679.3071(5) (2010).

²¹Fla. Stat. §679.3131(3) (2010).

²²Fla. Stat. §679.3171(1)(b) (2010) (security interest is junior to the rights of a person who became a lien creditor prior to perfection).

²³Fla. Stat. §679.3091(4) (2010). This is one of the few areas wherein collateral assignments and sales are different. Purchasers of promissory notes had not in the past been required to file financing statements, and the drafters of Article 9 wanted to continue that practice. See Comment 4 to UCC §9-309.

²⁴ First, the priority rules determine if the assignee prevails over another assignee, and possession is more protective than automatic perfection. Second, courts may find what appears to be a sale is actually security that cannot be perfected automatically. See, e.g., Torreyson v. Dutton, 198 So. 796 (Fla. 1940); Hulet v. Denison, 1 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1941); Howard v. Goodspeed, 135 So. 294 (Fla. 1931). Also, the assignee usually wants possession to ensure standing to foreclose. See Abbott v. Penrith, 693 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1997); Pastore-Borroto Development, Inc. v. Marevista Apartments, M.B., Inc., 596 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1992); Figueredo v. Bank Espirito Santo, 537 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1989).

²⁵See definitions of “purchase” and “purchaser” at Fla. Stat. §§671.201(32) and (33) (2010).

²⁶See Comment 7 to UCC §9-330 (“a purchaser who takes even with knowledge of the security interest qualifies for priority under subsection (d) if it takes without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the holder of the security interest”). Fla. Stat. §679.3171(2) (2010) seems to adopt a different rule, saying that a “buyer, other than a secured party” takes free of a security interest if the buyer gives value and takes delivery “without knowledge of the security interest” and before it is perfected. However, a “buyer, other than a secured party” under Fla. Stat. §679.3171(2) (2010) is not a “purchaser” under Fla. Stat. §679.330(4) (2010). Comment 6 to UCC §9-317 says that unless the sale is excluded from Article 9, the buyer is a “secured party,” and §679.3171(2) does not apply, adding “[r]ather, the priority rules generally applicable to competing security interests apply.”

²⁷Fla. Stat. §671.201(21)(a) (2010).

²⁸C.f., Ederer v. Fisher, 183 So. 2d 39, 42 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1965) (unauthorized indorsement deprived plaintiff of holder in due course status, thus, permitting defense on instrument). As in Ederer, inability to prove holder status does not necessarily mean the plaintiff lacks standing under Fla. Stat. §673.3011 (2010), but may expose the plaintiff to additional defenses.

²⁹SeeFla. Stat. §673.5011(2)(b)(1) (2010), permitting the maker to make such demand.

³⁰SeeFla. Stat. §673.5041(1) (2010), giving effect to such waivers.

³¹See, e.g., Scott v. Taylor, 58 So. 30 (Fla. 1912) (payment effective if made to authorized agent); McChesney v. Herman, 176 So. 565 (Fla. 1937); Posey v. Hunt Furniture Co., Inc., 43 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1949); Fla. Stat. §671.103 (2010) (UCC does not displace law of agency).

³²Fla. Stat. §673.1041 (2010) determines negotiability. See, e.g., Locke v. Aetna Acceptance Corp., 309 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1975) (note stating “pay to seller” not negotiable because not payable to order of seller); City Bank, N.A. v. Erickson, 18 FLW Supp. 283 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2011) (home equity agreement not negotiable where amount not fixed); Holly Hill Acres, Ltd. v. Charter Bank, 314 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1975) (note incorporating terms of mortgage not negotiable).

³³Johnston v. Allen, 22 Fla. 224 (Fla. 1886).

³⁴Philogene v. ABN AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc., 948 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2006); Fla. Stat. §673.3011(1) (2010).

³⁵Juega v. Davidson, 8 So. 3d 488 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 2009); Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Revoredo, 955 So. 2d 33, 34, fn. 2 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 2007) (stating that MERS was holder, but not owner and “We simply don’t think that this makes any difference. See Fla. R.Civ. P. 1.210(a) (action may be prosecuted in name of authorized person without joining party for whose benefit action is brought)”).

³⁶Laing v. Gainey Builders, Inc., 184 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1966) (collateral assignee was a holder); Cullison v. Dees, 90 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 1956) (same, except involving validity of payments rather than standing to foreclose).

³⁷See Fla. Stat. §673.3091(2) (2010); Servedio v. US Bank Nat. Ass’n, 46 So. 3d 1105 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2010).

³⁸BAC Funding Consortium, Inc. v. Jean-Jacques, 28 So. 3d at 938-939 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 2010). See also Verizzo v. Bank of New York, 28 So. 3d 976 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 2010) (Bank filed original note, but indorsement was to a different bank). But seeLizio v. McCullom, 36 So. 3d 927 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2010) (possession of note is prima facie evidence of ownership).

³⁹See also Glynn v. First Union Nat. Bank, 912 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2005), rev. den., 933 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2006) (note transferred before lawsuit, even though assignment was after).

⁴⁰Fla. Stat. §673.3091(2) (2010); Fla. Stat. §69.061 (2010).

⁴¹See Comment 6 to UCC §9-308.

⁴²Shavers v. Duval County, 73 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1954); City of Gainesville v. Charter Leasing Corp., 483 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1986); Southern Colonial Mortgage Company, Inc. v. Medeiros, 347 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1977).

⁴³See, e.g.,Thomas E. Baynes, Jr., Florida Mortgages (Harrison Co. 1999), §7-2 (West pocket part for 2009), stating “[s]ection 4 was added to establish that perfection of a security interest in a mortgage…would be governed by the Florida Uniform Commercial Code…. This type of assignment of mortgage, sometimes characterized as a ‘collateral assignment,’ does not need to be recorded under F.S. §701.02.”

⁴⁴Fla. Stat. §671.201(38) (2010).

⁴⁵See, e.g., Gardner v. McPherson, 151 So. 390 (Fla. 1933) (dismissing foreclosure by unrecorded collateral assignee where mortgage had been satisfied by record mortgagee); Williams, Salomon, Kanner & Damian, as Trustee v. American Bankers Life Assurance Co., 379 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1979) (subordination unenforceable where recorded collateral assignee had not agreed). However, these cases predated subsection (4).

⁴⁶See, e.g., Manufacturers’ Trust Co. v. People’s Holding Co., 149 So. 5 (Fla. 1933).

⁴⁷American Bank of the South v. Rothenberg, 598 So. 2d at 290 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1992).

⁴⁸See also Chandler v. Davis, 190 So. 873 (Fla. 1939) (assignee from record mortgagee took subject to holder in possession of note); Karn v. Munroe, 6 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1942) (subsequent assignee with possession prevailed over first); Vance v. Fields, 172 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1965) (first assignee recorded first, but took possession of wrong note; court correctly ruled for the second assignee with possession without discussing distinction between a real estate transaction and note sale). CompareTamiami Abstract & Title Co. v. Berman, 324 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1976), cert. den., 336 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1976) (purchaser of original mortgagee’s assets did not own mortgage assigned of record to another by collateral assignment that later became absolute upon default). Because the buyer purchased the mortgage (not the real estate), the court should have applied rules regarding transfer of the mortgage as personal property, but focused instead on the land records. Yet the court said the defendant “claimed outright possession of said mortgage,” which left the possibility that his claim also arose from possession. Otherwise, it seems at odds with Cullison, cited in fn. 36.

⁴⁹ The court cited Kapila v. Atlantic Mortgage & Investment Corp. (In re Halabi), 184 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 1999), and Bradley v. Forbs, 156 So. 716 (Fla. 1934). In Kapila, 184 F.3d at 1338, the court held the assignee’s failure to record did not render the mortgage unperfected in the mortgagor’s bankruptcy. The court said §701.02 protects only an assignee of the mortgagee, not a person acquiring the real estate. However, the question of who owns a mortgage is distinct from whether it is perfected against grantees of the real estate owner. Bradley includes some ambiguous language, but stands primarily for the proposition that a purchaser cannot rely on informal assurances by the record mortgagee, but must obtain a satisfaction. See Bradley, 156 So. at 717. The Kapila court also said the Florida Supreme Court may have implicitly receded from Bradley in Hulet v. Denison, 1 So. 2d 467, 468-469 (Fla. 1941), presumably because it discussed the statute as though it applied to persons acquiring the land, even though its decision was on other grounds, i.e., actual notice. The purchasers relied on a satisfaction by the mortgage assignee of record. However, the original mortgagee’s surviving widow claimed the assignment was for collateral and had been discharged. The court said the purchasers had “actual notice,” but cited the failure of the purchaser to demand surrender of the note as the basis. If that is what is meant by “actual notice,” then what is the point of the recording statute?

⁵⁰ In addition to American Bank of the South v. Rothenberg, Gardner v. McPherson, Bradley v. Forbs, and Manufacturers’ Trust Co. v. People’s Holding Co., see Housing Authority v. Macho, 181 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1966).

⁵¹Rucker v. State Exchange Bank, 355 So. 2d at 172 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978). The court spoke of surrender of the mortgage, but it is surrender of the promissory note that is important under the UCC. See also Perry v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 888 So. 2d 725, 726 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 2004).

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

What Texas Homeowners Needs to Know About Foreclosure in Texas

03 Tuesday Dec 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Banks and Lenders, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, Your Legal Rights

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Fannie Mae, Foreclosure, Internal Revenue Service, Lien, Notice of default, Real estate, Tax lien, Texas

Foreclosures may be judicial (ordered by a court following a judgment in a lawsuit) or non-judicial (“on the courthouse steps”). Most foreclosures in Texas are nonjudicial. These are governed by chapter 51 of the Property Code and are held on the first Tuesday of each month between 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. at a designated spot at the county courthouse. The effect of foreclosure is to cut off and eliminate junior liens, including mechanic’s liens, but not tax obligations.

The remedy of foreclosure is available in the event of a borrower’s monetary default (nonpayment) or technical default (e.g., failure to pay taxes or keep the property insured). In order to determine if there has been a default, the loan documents–the note, the deed of trust, the loan agreement, and so forth–should be carefully examined. Notice and opportunity to cure requirements contained in these documents must be strictly followed if a foreclosure is to be valid.

Notices of foreclosure sales must be filed with the county clerk and posted (usually on a bulletin board in the lobby of the courthouse) at least 21 calendar days prior to the intended foreclosure date. Notices are entitled “Notice of Trustee’s Sale” or “Notice of Substitute Trustee’s Sale.” They provide information about the debt, the legal description of the property, and designate a three-hour period during which the sale will be held. In larger metropolitan areas there are foreclosure listing services which publish a monthly list of properties posted for foreclosure.

Required Notices to the Borrower

Notices to the defaulting borrower must be given in accordance with Property Code sections 51.002 et seq. and the deed of trust. The content of foreclosure notices is technical and must be correct to insure a valid foreclosure that cannot later be attacked by a wrongful foreclosure suit. Clients often protest when their lawyer advises re-noticing the debtor–”But I’ve already sent them an email telling them they are in default.” Not good enough.

Usually, two certified mail notices to the borrower are required, the first being a “Notice of Default and Intent to Accelerate” which gives formal notice of the default and affords an opportunity for the borrower to cure it (at least 20 days for a homestead, although if the deed of trust is on the FNMA form, 30 days must be given). Note that S.B. 766 and S.B. 472, which did not make it out of committee in the 81^st Legislature, would have extended the 20-day period. This legislation may be revived in the future. Many lawyers consider it best to routinely give a 30-day notice.

After the cure period has passed, a “Notice of Acceleration and Posting for Foreclosure” must be sent at least 21 days prior to the foreclosure date. This second letter must also specify the location of the sale and a three-hour period during which the sale will take place. A notice of foreclosure sale should be enclosed. This notice is also filed with the county clerk and physically posted at the courthouse. If there is going to be a change in trustees it is also necessary to file a written appointment of substitute trustee. Notices are addressed to the last known address of the borrower contained in the lender’s records (this is the legal requirement), but it is wise for the lender to double-check this to avoid later claims by the borrower that notice was defective. It is prudent to send notices by both first-class and certified mail. Why? The reason has to do with Texas’s mailbox rule, i.e., that a notice properly deposited in the U.S. mail is presumed to be delivered. “Common sense . . . dictates that regular mail is presumed delivered and certified mail enjoys no [such] presumption unless the receipt is returned bearing an appropriate notation.” McCray v. Hoag, 372 S.W.3d 237, 243 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2012, no pet. h.). A careful lender will send notices to all likely addresses where the borrower may be found.

Other lienholders (whether junior or senior) are not entitled to notice. Depending on the first lienholder’s strategy, however, it may be useful to discuss the issue with them.

If the borrower is able to cure, a reinstatement agreement should be executed unless the terms of the debt have been changed (e.g., payments have been lowered) in which case a hybrid reinstatement/modification agreement or even a new note may be appropriate.

Notice to the IRS

The best practice is to do a title search prior to foreclosure to determine if there is an IRS tax lien or other federal lien. If so, notice must be given to the IRS and/or the U.S. Attorney at least 25 days prior to the sale, not including the sale date. 26 U.S.C. § 7425(c)(1). If this is not done, any IRS tax lien on the property will not be extinguished by the sale. Note that the IRS also has 120 days following the sale to redeem the property, although this seldom happens. The successful bidder on an IRS-liened property is therefore not entitled to breathe a sigh of relief until the 121^st day.

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.) requires that a borrower be given 30 days to request and obtain verification of the debt. The lender may give notice of default, accelerate the debt, and even post for foreclosure in less time, but the foreclosure sale itself should not be conducted until the 30-day debt verification period has expired.

There is also an equivalent state statute (the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act) contained in Finance Code chapter 392. Failure to provide verification of the debt when the borrower has requested it in writing has serious penalties under both laws.

Due Diligence by the Investor Prior to Foreclosure

Buying property at foreclosure sales is a popular form of investment but it contains traps for the unwary. The investor’s goal is to acquire instant equity in the property by paying a relatively modest sum at the foreclosure sale. However, apparent equity can evaporate if the property is loaded down with liens. It is advisable, therefore, to check the title of the property that will be sold. Is the lien being foreclosed a second or third lien? If so, then the first lien (usually a purchase-money lien held by a mortgage company) will continue in force. First liens are king. They are not extinguished by foreclosure on an inferior lien. What about IRS liens? Improvement liens? Liens imposed by homeowners associations? Any or all of these could consume whatever equity might otherwise have existed in the property. If an investor is unsure as to which liens will be wiped out in a foreclosure sale, then copies of each lien document should be pulled and taken to the investor’s real estate attorney for review. As far as researching title is concerned, every professional investor should ultimately acquire the skills to go to the real property records in the county clerk’s office and do this unaided. One should obtain copies of the warranty deed and any deeds of trust or other lien instruments. Alternatively, a down-date report from a title company may be requested.

If more information is needed about the property itself, one can contact the trustee named in the Notice of Trustee’s Sale. Trustees vary in their level of cooperation but are often willing to provide additional information if they have it. They may have a copy of an inspection report on the property which they may be willing to share. One might even be able to arrange to view the property if it is unoccupied.

The investor should also check the military status of the borrower, since Property Code section 51.015 prohibits non-judicial foreclosure of a dwelling owned by active duty military personnel or within 9 months after active duty ends. Knowingly violating this law is a Class A misdemeanor.

Property Condition

It goes without saying that the investor should physically inspect the property if at all possible, although one should not trespass on occupied property to do this. It is legal, however, to stand in the street (public property) and take photos.

When one buys at a foreclosure sale, it is “as is.” Property condition is therefore important. When buying residential properties in particular, an investor should be especially curious about condition of the foundation (learn to recognize signs of settlement), whether the property is flood-prone, and whether or not there may be environmental contamination (generally not a problem if the house is in a restricted subdivision). It is usually best to avoid any property that suffers from one or more of these deficiencies. Other items that involve significant expense are the roof and the HVAC system.

The past or continuing presence of hazardous substances can impose huge potential liability (particularly on commercial properties) since both Texas and federal law provide that any owner of property (including the investor) is jointly and severally liable with any prior owner for cleanup costs. The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”) maintains a web site at www.tceq.state.tx.us where the environmental history of a property can be researched.

Valuation

It is, of course, important not to bid more than the equity in the property (fair market value less the total dollar amount of the liens, if any, that will survive the foreclosure sale). So how does one discover fair market value? Again, it is a question of getting the right information. One of the best ways to do this is to obtain a comparative market analysis or broker price opinion (BPO) from a realtor.

Last-Minute Bankruptcies

Foreclosures can be rendered void by last-minute bankruptcy filings. Some professional investors will check with the bankruptcy clerk’s office the morning of the sale to make sure that the borrower has not filed under any chapter of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code before they bid on the property. Note that the bankruptcy clerk’s office opens at 9 a.m. and bidding commences at 10 a.m. Checking bankruptcy filings is a wise precaution if the borrower has previously filed or threatened bankruptcy. It can be cumbersome and inconvenient to get money back from a trustee on a void sale.

Conduct of the Sale

Foreclosure sales in the larger counties can seem chaotic, with many sales going on at once. There are two general types: sales by trustees (usually attorneys) for individual and institutional lenders and sales by the county sheriff for unpaid taxes. Sales are held at the location designated by the commissioners of the county where the property is located–often the courthouse steps or close by.

The sale is conducted by the named trustee unless a substitute trustee has been duly appointed and notice of the appointment has been filed of record. As a practical matter, the foreclosing trustee is usually the attorney for the lender.

There is no standard or required script for a trustee to follow in auctioning property, although trustees usually recite the details of the note and lien, the fact that the note went into default, proper notice was given, the note was subsequently accelerated, and the property is now for sale to the highest cash bidder. The trustee has a duty to conduct the sale fairly and impartially and to not discourage bidding in any way (this can result in “chilled bidding,” which is a defect). A trustee may set reasonable conditions for conducting the foreclosure sale and may set the terms of payment (e.g., by cash or cashier’s check). However, these conditions and terms must be stated prior to the opening of bidding for the first sale of the day held by that trustee.

Bidding at the Sale

The investor should remain in motion, talking to the trustees, until finding the right trustee with the right property. Caution: do not let the excitement of the sale cause you to exceed your preestablished maximum bid.

The lender often bids the amount of the debt plus accrued fees and costs, so this bid can be anticipated. If the sale generates proceeds in excess of the debt, the trustee must distribute the excess funds to other lienholders in order of seniority and the remaining balance, if any, to the borrower.

If the investor is the successful bidder, he or she should be prepared to make payment “without delay” or within a mutually agreed-upon time. In order to be prepared, seasoned bidders carry with them some cash plus an assortment of cashier’s checks in different amounts made payable to “Trustee.” If the high bidder is for any reason unable to complete the purchase, then the trustee will reopen the bidding and auction the property again. The successful bidder will, within a reasonable time, receive a trustee’s deed or substitute trustee’s deed which conveys the interest that was held by the borrower in the property–no more, no less.

Property Code section 51.009 states that a buyer at a foreclosure sale “acquires the foreclosed property ‘as is’ without any expressed or implied warranties, except as to warranties of title, and at the purchaser’s own risk; and is not a consumer.” The “consumer” part of that statement is meant to prevent any DTPA claims.

Elapsed Time

Compared to other states, Texas has a streamlined non-judicial foreclosure process that is nearly as quick as an eviction. The minimum amount of time from the first notice to the day of foreclosure is 41 days, unless the deed of trust is a FNMA form, in which case the time is 51 days, although it is never wise to cut these deadlines that close. Why risk a void sale or give the borrower a possible wrongful foreclosure claim?

The advantage of a foreclosure over an eviction is that there are no effective defenses to the foreclosure process except for the borrower to block it with a temporary restraining order or file bankruptcy. For either option, the buyer needs money and probably an attorney.

Deficiency Suits

In the event that proceeds of the foreclosure sale exceed the amount due on the note (including attorney’s fees and expenses), then surplus funds must be distributed to the borrower. More often, however, the price at which the property is sold is less than the unpaid balance on the loan, resulting in a deficiency. A suit may be brought by the lender to recover this deficiency any time within two years of the date of foreclosure. Tex. Prop. Code § 51.003. Federally insured lenders have four years. As part of a defense to a deficiency suit, the borrower may challenge the foreclosure sales price if it is below fair market value, and receive appropriate credit if it is not. Any money received by a lender from private mortgage insurance is credited to the account of the borrower. One case states that the purpose of this “is to prevent mortgagees from recovering more than their due.”

For borrowers, deficiencies can be as significant a loss as the foreclosure itself since the IRS deems the deficiency amount to be taxable ordinary income.

Servicemembers Civil Relief Act

The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”), 50 U.S.C. app. § 501, which was passed in 2003 completely rewrites the existing 1940 law by expanding protections for those serving in the armed forces. Except by court order, a landlord may not evict a servicemember or dependents from the homestead during military service. The SCRA provides criminal sanctions for persons who knowingly violate its provisions.

Right of Redemption

There is no general right of redemption by a borrower after a Texas foreclosure. The right of redemption is limited to:

(1) Sale for unpaid taxes. After foreclosure for unpaid taxes, the former owner of homestead or agricultural property has a two-year right of redemption (Tax Code section 34.21a). The investor is entitled to a redemption premium of 25% in the first year and 50% in the second year of the redemption period, plus recovery of certain costs that include property insurance and repairs or improvements required by code, ordinance, or a lease in effect on the date of sale. For other types of property (i.e., nonhomestead), the redemption period is 180 days and the redemption premium is limited to 25%.(2) HOA foreclosure of an assessment lien. Prop. Code section 209.011 provides that a homeowner may redeem the property until no “later than the 180^th day after the date the association mails written notice of the sale to the owner and the lienholder under section 209.101.” A lienholder also has a right of redemption in these circumstances “before 90 days after the date the association mails written notice . . . and only if the lot owner has not previously redeemed.” These provisions are part of the Texas Residential Property Owners Protection Act designed to reign in the once arbitrary power of HOAs (Chapter 209 of the Code). Note that an HOA is not permitted to foreclose on a homeowner if its lien is solely for fines assessed by the association or attorney fees.

An investor should be prepared to hold the property and avoid either making substantial improvements to it or reselling it until after any applicable rights of redemption have expired.

Postforeclosure Eviction

Foreclosure gives the new owner title; the next step is to obtain possession, and the procedure for doing this is outlined in the previous chapter. It is generally necessary to give the usual 3-day notice to vacate and file a forcible detainer petition in justice court. After judgment, the new owner must wait until the constable posts a 48 hour notice on the door and then forcibly removes a former borrower if that person is otherwise unwilling to leave.

An investor should build eviction costs into the budget from the beginning. It is advisable to hire an attorney for the first couple of evictions, after which an investor will likely be prepared to handle them solo. Never, however, attempt to conduct an eviction appeal to county court without an attorney.

As discussed in the chapter on evictions, there are both state and federal protections for tenants. Both Property Code section 24.005(b) and the federal Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 require at least 90 days’ notice to vacate so long as a tenant continues to pay rent.

Stopping a Foreclosure Sale

It is a myth that lawyers can wave a wand and, with a phone call or nasty letter, stop foreclosure. Attorneys have no such power. It is a fact that foreclosure can be stopped, but the only sure way to do so is to file a lawsuit and successfully persuade a judge to issue a temporary restraining order prior to the foreclosure sale. After the sale occurs, the remedy that remains–a suit for wrongful foreclosure–is slightly different. Relief may be limited to a money judgment if the property was sold at foreclosure to a third party for cash (a bona fide purchaser or “BFP”). If a BFP is in the mix, the possibility that the property itself can be recovered by the borrower is near zero.

Clients will often report that they have been engaged in reinstatement negotiations with the lender, usually consisting of numerous phone calls and messages, and ask if that is sufficient to avoid a scheduled foreclosure. The answer is a resounding no. Unless there is payment of the arrearage and a signed reinstatement agreement, the foreclosure will almost certainly go forward, even if the client was talking settlement with the lender just the day before. Note that reinstatement agreements must be in writing and signed by both parties. Phone calls mean nothing in this business.

Clients will sometimes state that they don’t want to sue the lender; they just want to get a restraining order to stop the foreclosure. The lawyer must reply “Sorry, it doesn’t work that way, you can’t split the two.” A restraining order is an ancillary form of relief, meaning that it arises from an underlying suit. In other words, there must be an actual lawsuit in place to provide a basis for requesting a TRO. Fortunately, the suit and application for the TRO can be filed simultaneously and a hearing obtained usually within a day.

There is an additional issue: a borrower must have grounds for legal action or possibly face penalties for filing a frivolous suit. Some clients have difficulty understanding this. “Why,” they ask, “can’t you just go and get a TRO for me?” The answer is that the lawyer must give the judge at least some credible basis for granting equitable relief.

So why don’t more people sue to stop a foreclosure? Money. A person in financial distress will have difficulty coming up with cash. Here is the blunt truth: if a borrower or investor cannot readily write a substantial retainer check to an attorney for purposes of suing a lender, then that person has no business in the expensive world of litigation.

Wrongful Foreclosure Suits

After the sale, a suit for wrongful foreclosure can be filed if there are grounds for alleging that the loan documents (e.g., the note and deed of trust) were defective in some way; if the notices leading up to the foreclosure were done incorrectly; or if there was some alleged impropriety in the sale itself. Note that there is no requirement that the sales price be fair. A sale cannot be set aside because the consideration paid is allegedly inadequate because it is less than market value. Sauceda v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 268 S.W.3d 135, 139 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.). To prevail in a wrongful foreclosure suit based on inadequate sale price, three elements must be proven: (1) grossly inadequate consideration; (2) defective foreclosure notices or sale; and (3) a causal connection between the defect and the inadequate consideration. If the notices and sale were correctly done, then the sale will be valid even though the sales price was lower than market value.

As a general rule, it is far better for a borrower to obtain a restraining order to stop a foreclosure than it is to bring suit after the fact. Texas law favors the finality of foreclosures, making wrongful foreclosure suits an uphill battle. If the property was sold to a third party who has no knowledge of any claims or alleged defects there is little chance that the borrower will get the property back. The third party is a protected BFP, and any remedy for the borrower will therefore likely be limited to monetary damages. Bottom line? If in doubt about whether or not a foreclosure is going to occur, file suit and attempt to get a temporary restraining order to stop it. “Wait and see” is the worst possible strategy in this case, since it is always more difficult to correct the situation after the foreclosure sale has occurred. The judge will likely ask without much sympathy, “Why, since you knew about these various alleged defects, did you not take action to stop the foreclosure?”

If a wrongful foreclosure suit is being considered, it should be filed quickly so that notice of the suit (a notice of lis pendens) can be filed in the real property records. If the lender was the successful bidder, this notice may effectively prevent the lender from transferring the property to a BFP.

Note that the action available under Property Code section 51.004 (discussed above) is different from a wrongful foreclosure remedy per se. Relief is granted if the court finds that the fair market value is greater than the sale price, but only in the context of a deficiency claimed by the lender.

The cruel fact for borrowers is that wrongful foreclosure suits face challenges from the beginning. Is that fair? You decide. It is, however, undoubtedly the bias of Texas judges, whether one approves or not.

A plaintiff can realistically expect the following in a wrongful foreclosure lawsuit: (1) The lender will not rush to settle, since lenders pay high fees to large litigation firms to fight tooth and nail to avoid doing the right thing; (2) written discovery (interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admission) from the plaintiff will be nearly entirely objected to by lender’s counsel, so extensively as to make the responses essentially useless (a deposition will therefore be required); (3) lender’s counsel will remove the case from state court to federal court where judges are more conservative and lenders can use Federal Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the case. This rule permits dismissal if the borrower’s complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” which happens more often than one might think. A change of courts can also create complications for the attorney representing the borrower, who may be accustomed to practicing in state rather than federal court. The attorney may be an experienced state court lawyer, but may not even be licensed in federal court. This is common as federal practice becomes more of a specialty among lawyers.

Prolonged Negotiations for a Modification

Homeowners often report that they were engaged in prolonged negotiations to modify their existing loan prior to the foreclosure sale. Of course, these communications were conducted by phone and there is no signed written agreement binding the lender to stop the sale, so there is likely no basis for a wrongful foreclosure suit. Do lenders pursue this strategy intentionally, so as to make it appear that they are willing to be reasonable, when in fact it is in their interest to foreclose instead? Opinions vary.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

How Homeowners Can Spot Fraudulent Mortgage Documents

02 Monday Dec 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Fraud, Judicial States, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Florida, MERS, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, National City Bank, Texas, Trust deed (real estate), United States, Wall Street

This post is designed to assist struggling homeowners who find themselves in an unfortunate situation of wrongful foreclosure by illegal entities who are foreclosing without legitimate documents. Most securitized loans are being wrongfully foreclosed by entities who does not have any interest in the properties they are foreclosing.

If MERS is listed on your Deed of Trust there’s a better chance than not that there is fraud involved in your mortgage documents. MERS was used by the Wall Street Banks to avoid paying county recorder fees and real estate transfer tax fees. You will need to visit your County Recorder’s office to obtain copies of all of your real property records from the first filing on your current loan up to today.

1. The Mortgage or Deed of Trust is assigned from the Originator directly to the Trustee for the Securitized Trust.

2. The Mortgage or Deed of Trust is assigned months and sometimes years after the date of the origination of the underlying mortgage note.

3. The Mortgage or Deed of Trust is assigned from the initial aggregator directly to the Securitized Trust with no assignments to the Depositor or the Sponsor for the Trust.

4. The Mortgage or Deed of Trust is executed, dated or assigned in a manner inconsistent with the mandatory governing rules of Section 2.01 of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.

5. The assignment of the Mortgage or Deed of Trust is executed by a legal entity that was no longer in existence on the date the document was executed.

6. The assignment of the mortgage or Deed of Trust is executed by an entity whose name is different than the entity named in the original document (i.e., National City Bank Corporation in lieu of ABC Corporation as a division of National City Bank).

7. The assignment was executed by a party pursuant to a Power of Attorney but no Power of Attorney is attached to the instrument or filed with the instrument or otherwise recorded with local land registry.

8. The mortgage note is allegedly transferred in a single document along with the Mortgage or Deed of Trust (i.e., “Assignment of the Note and Mortgage”). You cannot “assign” a mortgage note. You can only “negotiate” a mortgage note under Article 3 of the UCC.

9. The assignment is executed by a party who claims to be an “attorney in fact” for the assignor.

10. The assignment is notarized by a notary in Dakota County, Minnesota.

11. The assignment is notarized by a notary in Hennepin County, Minnesota.

12. The assignment is notarized by a notary in Duval County, Florida.

13. The assignment is executed by an officer or secretary of MERS.

14. The assignment is notarized by a secretary or paralegal employed by the attorney for the mortgage servicer.

15. The assignment is executed or notarized by an employee of MR Default Services, Promiss Solutions LLC, National Default Exchange, LP, LOGS Financial Services, or some similar third-party.

16. The endorsement on the note is actually on an allonge affixed to the note. In most states, an allonge cannot be used if there is a sufficient amount of room at the “foot” or the “bottom” of the original note for the endorsement.

17. The allonge is not “permanently” affixed to the original note. The term permanent excludes the use of staples and tape and as a result you must use a sold fastener such as glue. Allonges are commonly referred to “in the business” as “tear-off fraud papers.”

18. The note proffered in evidence is not the original but a copy of the “certified copy” provided to the debtors at the closing.

19. The note is endorsed in blank with no transfer and delivery receipts. It is fine to endorse a note in blank, in which case it becomes “bearer” paper under the UCC. However, in order to prove a true sale from the Sponsor to the Depositor you must have written delivery and transfer receipts and proof of pay outs and pay in transactions.

20. The note proffered in evidence is not endorsed at the foot of the note or on an affixed allonge.

21. The assignment of the mortgage or deed of trust post-dates the filing of the court pleading.

22. The assignment of the mortgage or deed of trust is executed after the filing of the court pleadings but claims to be “legally effective” before the filing. For example, the deed of trust is assigned on June 1, 2009, with an effective date of May 1, 2007.

23. The parties who executed the assignment and who notarized the signature are in fact the same parties.

24. The signor states that he or she is an “agent” for the executing entity.

25. The signor states that he or she is an “attorney in fact” for the executing entity.

26. The signor states that he or she is an employee of the executing entity but claims to have custody and control of the records of the entity.

27. The signor of the document makes statements about the status of the mortgage debt based on his or her review of the “records of the plaintiff” or the “records of the moving party.”

28. The proponent of the original note files an Affidavit of Lost Note.

29. The signor claims that the allegations in the court pleading are correct but the assignment of the mortgage and/or delivery and transfer of the note occurs after the law suit or the motion for relief from stay was filed.

30. One or more of the operative documents in the case is signed by one of the attorneys for the mortgage servicer.

31. The default payment history filed in the case is prepared by the attorney for the mortgage servicer or a member of his or her staff.

32. The affidavit filed in support of legal fees is not signed by an attorney with the firm involved in the case.

33. The name of one or more of the signors is stamped on the document.

34. The document is a form with standard “fill-in-the-blanks” for names and amounts.

35. The signature of one or more parties on the document is not legible and looks like something a three year old might have done.

36. The document is dated and signed years before the document is actually filed with the register of real estate documents or deeds or mortgages.

37. The proffered document has the word C O P Y stamped on or embedded in the document.

38. The document is executed by a notary in Denton County, Texas.

39. The document is executed by a notary in Collin County, Texas.

40. The document includes a legend “Hold for” a named law firm after recording.

41. The document was drafted by a law firm representing the mortgage servicer in the pending case.

42. The document includes any type of bar code that was not added by the local register or filing clerk for such instruments.

43. The document includes a reference to an “instrument number.”

44. The document includes a reference to a “form number.”

45. The document does not include any reference to a Master Document Custodian.

46. The document is not authenticated by any officer or authorized agent of a Master Document Custodian.

47. The paragraph numbers on the document are not consistent (the last paragraph on page one is 7 and the first paragraph on page two starts with number 9).

48. The endorsement of the note is not at the “foot” or “bottom” of the last page of the note. For example, a few states allow an endorsement on the back of the last page of the note but the majority requires it at the foot of the note.

49. The document purports to assign the mortgage or the deed of trust to the Trustee for the Securitized Trust before the Trust was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. This type of registration is normally referred to as a “shelf registration.”

50. The document purports to transfer the note to the Trustee for the Securitized Trust before the date the Trust provides for the origination date of instruments in the Trust. The Prospectus, the Prospectus Supplement and the Pooling and Servicing Agreement will clearly state that the pool of notes includes those originated between date X and date Y.

51. The document purports to transfer the note to the Trustee for the Securitized Trust after the cut-off date for the creating of such instruments for the Trust.

52. The origination date on the mortgage note is not within the origination and cut-off dates provided for the by terms of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.

53. The “Affidavit of a Lost Note” is not filed by the Master Document Custodian for the Trust but by the Servicer or some other third-party.

54. The document is signed by a “bank officer” without any designation of the office held by the said officer.

55. The affidavit includes the following language on the bottom of each page: ”This is an attempt to collect a debt. Any information obtained will be used for that purpose.”

56. The document is signed by a person who identifies himself or herself as a “media supervisor” for the proponent.

57. The document is signed by a person who identifies himself or herself as a “media coordinator” for the proponent.

58. The document is signed by a person who identifies himself or herself as a “legal coordinator” for the movant.

59. The date of the signature on the document and the date the signature was notarized are not the same.

60. The parties who signed the assignment and who notarized the signature are located in different states or counties.

61. The transferor and the transferee have the same physical address including the same street and post office box numbers.

62. The assignor and the assignee have the same physical address including the same street and post office box numbers.

63. The signor of the document states that he or she is acting “solely as nominee” for some other party.

64. The document refers to a power of attorney but no power of attorney is attached.

65. The document bears the following legend: ”This is not a certified copy.”

66. The document is signed by: (these are just a few names, do site search from more robo-signers)

Jose Aguilar

Joseph Alvarado

Felix Amenumey

Natalie Anderson

Pam Anderson

Scott Anderson or by Scott W. Anderson

Pamela Ariano

Leticia Arias

Chris Arndt

Aimee Austin

Gina Avila

Katrina Bailey

Fern Baker

Janice M. Baker

Lorraine Balara

Steve Ballman

Steve Bashmakov

Michael Bender

Jamie Bilot

Marnessa Birckett

Sarah Block

Janette Boatman

Michele Boiko

Sheri Bongaarts

Beth Borse

Christie Bouchard

Diane Bowser

Christopher Bray

Tammy Brooks-Saleh or Tammy Saleh

Sandy Broughton

Jenny Brouwer

Jacqueline Brown

Paul Bruha

Lins Bryce

Rita Bucolo

Judy Buseman

Butler & Hosch, P.A.

Becky Byrne

Rodney Cadwell

Robin Callahan

Carolyn Cari

Jeffrey P. Carlson

Nancy L. Carlson

Richard J. Carlson

Robin Carmody

Marvell Carmouche

Amy Jo Cauthern-Munoz

Kristi M. Caya

Kim Chambers

Carol Chapman

Keith Chapman

Hari Charagundla

Debra Chieffe

Christina Ching

Dave Chiodo

Jim Clark

Tara Clayton

John Cody

Robyn Colburn

Rebecca Colgan

Karen Cook

Frank Coon

Julie Coon

Julie Cordova

Jeremy Cox

Cathy Crawford

Kevin Crecco

Dave Cunningham

Michael Curry

Nanci Danekar

Amie Davis

Vickie Day

Yvette Day

Teresa DeBaker

Jody Delfs

Richard Delgado

Mike Dian

Dulce Diaz

Larry Dingmann

Kathleen Doherty

Jason Dreher

Jennifer Duncan

Kimbretta Duncan

Ronald Durant

Neil E. Dyson

Shirley Eads

Salena Edwards

Judy Faber

Sue Filiczkowski

Donna Fitton

Sean Flanagan

Angela L. Freckman

Verdine A. Freeman

Eric Friedman

Fedelis Fondungallah

Barb Frost

LeAllen Frost

Fanessa Fuller

Laura Furrick

Sarah Gacek

Judi Gambrel

Elizabeth Geretschlaeger

Peggy Glass

Dory or Dorey Goebel

Alma Gonzales

Eileen J. Gonzales

Kathleen Gowan

Kelly Graham

Steven Y. Green

Steven Grout

Cathy Hagstrom

Michelle Halyard

Craig Hanlon

Michael Hanna

Donna Harkness

Michael Hebling

Renee L. Hensley

May Her

Jim Herman

Laura Hescott

Dave Hillen

Joseph P. Hillery

Craig Hinson

Bob Hora

Teddi Horan

Robert L. Horn

Chrys Houston

JK Huey

Paul Hunt

Vickie Ingamells

Cassandra Inouye

Andrea Jenkins

Ashley Johnson

Mary B. Johnson

Janet Jones

Tina Jones

Peggy Jordon

Etsuko Kabeya

Jamil Kahin

Robert E. Kaltenbach

Pam Kammerer

Gloria Karau

Vishal Karingada

Rhonda Kastli

Andrew Keardy

Patricia Kelleher

Scott Keller

Bryan Kerr

John Kerr

Kim Kinney

Sandy Kinnunen

LeeAnne Kramer

Mutru Kumar

Martha Kunkle

Margie Kwaitanowski

Vicki Kyle

Sukhada Lad

Brian J. LaForest

Diane LaFrance

Patricia Lambengco

Kyurstina Lawton

Toccoa Lenair

Bharati Lengade

Lindsey Lesch

Whitney Lewis

Marie Lockwood

Stephanie Lowe

Todd Luckey

Michele Luszcz

Joseph Lutz

Hang Luu

Frank Madden

Lisa Magnuson

William Maguire

Michael G. Mand

Silvia Marchan

Charmaine Marchesi

Brock Martin

Joel Martinson

Denise A. Marvel

Mary Maxwell

Christopher Mayall

Patrick McClain

Mary McGrath

Hattie McLaughlin

Noel McNally

Donna McNaught

Michael Mead

Marcia Medley

Susan Meier

Marisa Menza

Pamela Michael

Linda Miller

Steve Moe

Nancy Mooney

Joanne Moore

Melody Moore

Taylor Moore

Ruth Morgan

Michael H. Moreland

Treva Moreland

Annmarie Morrison

Melissa Mosloski

Kim Mullins

Patricia Murray

Ginny Neidert

Steve A. Nielsen

Susan Nightingale

Colleen O’Donnell

Richard Olasande

Mitchell Oringer

Clothilde Ortega

Amy Payment

Dawn Peck

Bonnie Pelletier

Patte Peloquin

Joseph Pensabene

Kenneth R. Perkins

Jennifer Peters

Charity Peterson

Joyce Petty

Ann Pinto

Ingrid Pittman

Bernadette Polux

Tamara Price

Erika Puentes

Beverly Quaresima

Shivani L. Ram

Antonia Ramirez

Rona Ramos

Myron Ravelo

Peter Read

Keith S. Reno

Anthony N. Renzi

Dawn L. Reynolds

Jeff Rivas

Jose Rivera

Bill Rizzo

Paula Rosato

Margery A. Rotundo

Sarah Rubin or Sara Rubin

Paige Sahr

Tammy Saleh

Kendall Sanders

Cindy Sandoval

Dianna Sandoval

Kimberly Sanford

Josephine Sciarrino

Stephanie Scott

Jenee Simon

Laura Siess

Gregory Smallwood

Rosalie Solano

Erika Spencer

Joseph Spicer

Renae Stanton

Jeffrey Stephan

Maya Stevenson

Richard Stires

Judith Stone

September Stoudemire

Roy Stringfellow

Anne Sutcliffe

Rachel Switzer

Emmanuel Tabot

Mary Taylor

Varsha Thakkar

Bernice Thell

Keith Torok

Deb Twining

Kenneth Ugwuadu

R.P. Umali

Keo Maney Kue Vang

Jason Vecchio

Rebecca Verdeja

Vinod Vishwakarma

Fifi Volgarakis

Janet Vollmer

Kim Waldroff

Linda Walton

Lisa Watson

John Wesley

Katrina Whitfield-Bailey or by Katrina Whitfield or by Katrina Bailey

Joanne Wight

Cathy Williams

Paul Williams

Kristine Wilson

Mary Winbauer

Rebecca Wirtz

Danielle Woods

Janine Yamoah

Jerry Yang

Elizabeth Yeranosian

Mellisa Ziertman

Jan Zimmerman

Stephen Zindler

Katie Zrust

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

Florida Homeowner’s Guide to a Civil Lawsuit

02 Saturday Nov 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Discovery Strategies, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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This post is intended to offer a general introduction to, and overview of, the course of a “typical” civil lawsuit for homeowners wishing to fight their foreclosure in other to save their homes. Because of the vast array of actions that may be pursued in Florida courts, an exhaustive discussion of the rights, remedies, and procedures available is beyond the scope of this post.

Moreover, this post will focus mainly on the pretrial proceedings, which tend to be more “mysterious” and less publicized than the actual trial. Indeed, pretrial proceedings can be a valuable way of savings your home as many banks and lenders who were in the business of illegal wrongful foreclosure with fraudulently manufactured sets of mortgage documents never take homeowners serious until it gets to that stage. The reason why they take a homeowner serious from that point on is that Banks and lenders will then start making major expenses on legal fees to attorneys retained to respond to the wrongful foreclosure complaints filed by homeowners. With an average wrongful foreclosure litigation lasting between 2 to 5 years, and many homeowners living in their homes mortgage free throughout the litigation period without making a dime in mortgage payments, most smart Lenders and Banks try to cut their loses by quickly modifying mortgage loans with terms most favorable to homeowners in order for homeowners to remain in their rightfully owned dream homes. This fit would not have been accomplished by simply asking the banks to modify a mortgage loan as most loans have been securitized to investors. Lenders and banks from that point on serves only as “servicers” (Not Owners) to the securitized investment trusts From that point after the securitization, they are no longer owners of the mortgage loans, but simply servicers of the trust, unless they later repurchase it after default. They may try to trick homeowners into thinking that they still own their mortgage loans, absolutely not! That’s why they are giving homeowners run around in order to foreclose and steal the home right behind your nose. Folks! they can’t modify mortgage loans for the simple fact that “they cannot modify what they don’t own” period! There are thousands of investors that own the mortgage pools. Mortgage pools are controlled by PSA (Pooling and Servicing Agreement) and they must obtain consent authorizations from all investors (Real Owners), in order to modify any loans in the securitized pools that is why it is nearly impossible to modify most loans unless you take them to Court to prove their ownership, which they cannot do. Then and only then will the Lenders and Banks get those consent from investors as investors do not want to lose assets and in most times the loans will simply be repurchased from the trust by your lender after default before modification. Once repurchased, your loan is ‘get this’, “no longer a secured debt” but an unsecured debt and your “home” is no longer used as a collateral to your mortgage loan debt. Your mortgage loan may also have been paid off by forced place insurance your lender placed on your loan when you took out your loan, as that is taken out to cover their loses in the event of your default on the mortgage loan. That this why they are charging you the forced placed insurance premium when you took out your mortgage loan, in order to collect large sums of money that reduces your mortgage debt and in most cases, “pays off your entire mortgage loan” when you default. But they will still try to foreclose on you as if your loan is still a secured debt which it is not. They perpetrate those fraud due to your ignorance. That’s of course if you keep quite and let them steal your home right under your nose.

While many homeowners are familiar with the general procedures applicable in criminal cases, they may be less familiar with civil proceedings. For example, unlike criminal defendants, civil litigants enjoy no constitutional speedy trial rights. As a result, civil proceedings may seem unduly lengthy, particularly in counties where the court dockets are especially congested. Courts try to speed up the process and encourage extra-judicial resolution of disputed claims, for example, through court-annexed mediation or arbitration.

I. The Pleadings

A. The Complaint
B. Answer
C. Responsive Motions
D. Counterclaims
E. Crossclaims and Third-Party Claims
F. Amendment

II. Pretrial Procedure

A. Discovery
B. Discovery Methods
C. Protective Orders
D. Sanctions

III. Dismissal

A. Voluntary Dismissal
B. Involuntary Dismissal
C. Summary Judgment

IV. Non-Judicial Methods of Resolution

A. Mediation
B. Arbitration
C. Offers of Judgment

V. Trial

A. Demand for Jury
B. Jury Selection
C. Opening Statements
D. Motion for Directed Verdict
E. Closing Argument
F. Jury Instructions
G. Verdict

VI. Conclusion
————————–

I. The Pleadings.

The term “pleadings” often is used synonymously (and incorrectly) to refer to any documents filed with the court. However, this term has a more limited and technical meaning. The “pleadings” in a lawsuit are simply those filings that set forth either (a) the complaining party’s allegations and causes of action; or (b) the defending party’s responses to those allegations along with any defenses or causes of action the defending party may assert. This becomes significant only when the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure distinguish between “pleadings” and other documents. For example, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is directed solely to the “pleadings” and the court may not consider any other filings, such as exhibits, deposition testimony, interrogatory answers, etc.

A. The Complaint.

A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint or petition. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.050. This initial pleading filed by the complaining party generally consists of factual allegations, a description of the legal claims based on those allegations, and a request for relief. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b). Some pleadings are subject to special rules. For example, in actions alleging injury or death arising out of medical malpractice, the pleadings are required to include a certificate that counsel has conducted “a reasonable investigation as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant.” Fla. Stat. Sec. 766.104(1) (2003). “Good faith” may be demonstrated by a written expert opinion that there is evidence of medical negligence. Id. Failure to comply with this section may subject the party to an award of fees and costs. Id. These special pleading rules are in addition to the pre-suit notice requirements applicable to medical malpractice claims. See Fla. Stat. Sec. 766.106 (2003). A lawsuit may involve one defendant, multiple defendants, or even a class of defendants. The procedures and requirements for certifying a class of plaintiffs or defendants are found in Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220. Similarly, the lawsuit may involve multiple plaintiffs or a class of plaintiffs.

A complaint may assert more than one count. It may state different causes of action, even if they are inconsistent. This common practice is called pleading “in the alternative.” Sometimes the conduct complained about may support more than one cause of action, depending on what discovery reveals. For example, Adam contracts to sell a piece of commercial real estate to Bob. Adam decides to accept a better offer from Charles. Bob brings a lawsuit against Adam after Adam reneges on their agreement. Bob may seek monetary damages because he will have to incur additional expenses in finding another suitable property. However, Bob also may sue in the alternative, for “specific performance,” which simply means that the original contract between Bob and Adam would be enforced and Adam would be required to sell the property to Bob, instead of paying Bob money damages.

Therefore, a party often does not have to choose initially which theory it will proceed on; however, the party ultimately can recover only once. Therefore, Bob cannot have both remedies and will have to choose which one he wants.

A party also may plead claims that are inconsistent with each other. As one court has noted, this is because “the pleadings in a cause are merely a tentative outline of the position which the pleader takes before the case is fully developed on the facts.” Hines v. Trager Constr. Co., 188 So. 2d 826, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 194 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1966). This rule applies equally to defendants. Therefore, a defendant may raise defenses that are inconsistent with each other.

The relief most commonly sought is money damages. Compensatory damages are intended to compensate the injured party for its loss. Punitive or exemplary damages are awarded beyond the actual loss and are intended to punish the wrongdoer and to deter similar conduct by others. The availability of punitive damages is limited by statute and court rule. See Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.72 (2003). This statute prevents a party from even including a claim for punitive damages in the complaint until that party has presented record evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict for punitive damages. This is important because the party seeking punitive damage is not entitled to the discovery of information concerning the other party’s financial net worth until the court is satisfied that a triable claim for punitive damages has been established. Id. In 2003, these requirements were incorporated into Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(f).

A party also may seek injunctive relief, i.e., an order by the court directing a party to do some act (positive) or to refrain from doing some act (negative). Once such an order is entered by a court, noncompliance with that order may be punishable as contempt of court.

One form of injunctive relief frequently requested is “specific performance,” which is essentially a direction to a party to perform its contract. Specific performance may be requested in land sales contracts and non-compete agreements. However, this remedy is not available to enforce certain types of contracts, such as personal service contracts.

A party also may seek declaratory relief. The trial courts have jurisdiction “to declare rights, status, and other equitable or legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” Fla. Stat. Sec. 86.011 (2003). This may include the interpretation and declaration of rights under “a statute, regulation, municipal ordinance, contract, deed, will, franchise, or other article, memorandum, or instrument in writing.” Fla. Stat. Sec. 86.021 (2003). The declaration may be affirmative or negative and “has the force and effect of a final judgment.” Fla. Stat. Sec. 86.011 (2003). For example, declaratory judgment proceedings frequently are initiated by insurance companies seeking a determination of their obligation to defend against another action.

B. Answer.

After being served with the initial pleading, the defendant (or respondent) must respond to it. A defendant has a couple of options at this stage.

Typically the defendant files an answer, which responds to each allegation of the complaint and which may set forth one or more defenses. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(c). Under the rules of civil procedure, “affirmative defenses” must be asserted in a responsive pleading or motion to dismiss or they will be waived. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d). Affirmative defenses are those defenses that “avoid” rather than deny. For example, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. By raising this defense, the defendant asserts that even if the defendant committed all of the horrible acts alleged by the plaintiff, the plaintiff has no cause of action because the action was not filed in a timely fashion. In that respect the claim is “avoided,” rather than denied.

C. Responsive Motions.

In lieu of, or in addition to, filing an answer, the defendant may move to challenge the legal sufficiency of the claims raised by the plaintiff. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140. These rules apply equally to counterclaims, crossclaims, and third-party claims. This motion is not a “pleading.” The defendant may argue that the complaint “fails to state a claim,” that is, even assuming that the facts alleged in the complaint are true, the law does not recognize a cause of action. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(6). For example, a store patron sues the grocery store for damages after he is assaulted by a third person in the vacant lot next door. The grocery store will move to dismiss, claiming that the store patron has failed to state a cause of action because it has no duty to protect customers off the premises. An out-of-state defendant might argue that the court lacks “personal jurisdiction” over him or her Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(2). because he or she lacks sufficient “contacts” with the state, such as an office or business transactions in the state. This is based on the federal due process clause. Before a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, that defendant must possess “certain minimum contacts with the state” so that “maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’.” Walt Disney Co. v. Nelson, 677 So. 2d 400, 402 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

Other defenses that might be raised at this stage include failure to join an indispensable party, Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(7). lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(1). Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the court’s authority or competence to preside over certain matters. For example, by statute, circuit courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear matters involving amounts less than $15,000.00. The subject matter for such actions is vested in the county courts. See Fla. Stat. Sec. 34.01(1)(c) (2003). improper venue, Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(3). Venue is governed by Fla. Stat. Ch. 47 (2003), except where the Legislature has provided for special venue rules. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Sec. 770.05 (2003) (limiting choice of venue in actions involving “libel or slander, invasion of privacy, or any other tort founded upon any single publication, exhibition, or utterance”). and insufficiency of process Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(4). “Insufficiency of process” refers to the actual document which is served. To determine if the process is adequate, one should examine it to determine that it is signed by a clerk of court or the clerk’s deputy, it bears the clerk’s seal, a correct caption, the defendant’s correct name, the name of the appropriate state, the return date, the name and address of the party or lawyer causing process to be issued, and the name of any defendant organization. If it is not a summons, it should comply with the statute or rule that authorizes its issuance. See H.

Trawick, Florida Practice & Procedure Sec. 8-22, at 170-72 (1999). or service of process. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(5). A defect in the “service of process” claims that the defendant was not served appropriately: for example, he or she was not served personally, when required. Service of process is governed by Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.070 and by Fla. Stat. Chs. 48, 49 (2003). Certain defenses are waived if not raised either by an answer (or other responsive pleading) or by motion to dismiss, such as personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficiency of process or service of process. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(h)(1).

A defendant also may move for “a more definite statement” if the pleading is so vague or ambiguous that the defendant cannot frame a sufficient response to it Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(e). or it may move to “strike” portions as “redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(f).

D. Counterclaims.

In addition to its responsive pleading, a defendant may file a counterclaim, which operates like a complaint, except that the defendant is now the counterclaim plaintiff. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170. Thus, a counterclaim sets out factual allegations, legal claims, and a request for relief, just like a complaint. Id. A counterclaim requires a response by the “counterclaim defendant,” who was the plaintiff in the initial complaint. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.100(a) and 1.110(c).

Counterclaims may be “permissive” or “compulsory.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a), (b). A counterclaim is “compulsory” and, therefore, must be raised in he current action if it “arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a). On the other hand, a counterclaim is “permissive” if it does not arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(b). This designation determines whether the counterclaim must be raised at this time or whether the defendant/counterclaim plaintiff can bring a separate action on the counterclaim. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a), (b).

E. Crossclaims and Third-Party Claims.

A defendant may file a crossclaim against another defendant Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(g). or may file a third-party complaint against a nonparty. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(h). Crossclaims and third-party claims include factual allegations, legal claims, and requests for relief. They also require a response by the crossclaim or third-party defendants. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.100(a). In practice, the pleadings can become quite complicated because of the number of possible claims which may be asserted. For example, a crossclaim defendant can assert a counterclaim against the crossclaim plaintiff and can assert a third-party claim against other nonparties. Multiple plaintiffs who are subject to a counterclaim can assert cross-claims against each other or third-party claims against other nonparties. There may be fourth party complaints. Understanding the availability of crossclaims, counterclaims and third-party claims by various parties aids in comprehension when one is faced with a lengthy caption identifying one party as a defendant, a counterclaim plaintiff, a crossclaim defendant, and a third-party plaintiff, all at the same time.

F. Amendment.

A party may amend the pleading once as a matter of right if there has been no responsive pleading. Otherwise, leave of court or written consent of the other side is required. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a). Leave of court is “given freely when justice so requires.” Id. Frequently a party will amend the pleading to cure any deficiencies addressed by a motion to dismiss. Amendments may be allowed even after trial under certain circumstances. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(b).

II. Pretrial Procedure.

After responsive pleadings or motions are due, the court may schedule a case management conference to try to expedite and streamline litigation, for example, by scheduling service of papers, coordinating complex litigation, addressing discovery issues, pretrial motions and settlement issues, requiring the parties to file stipulations, etc. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.200(a).
Later, the court may schedule a pretrial conference to address simplification of issues, amendments, admissions by one party, experts, etc. The failure of a party or its attorney to cooperate in these conferences may result in sanctions. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.200(b), (c); Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.75(1) (2003).

A. Discovery.

Discovery occupies a large part of most civil lawsuits because Florida courts do not favor trial “by ambush.” Therefore, the rules of civil procedure encourage, indeed mandate, complete discovery. In practice, however, discovery disputes occupy a large amount of attorney and judge time.

Generally, discovery is allowed of “any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1). In this context, “relevance” has a very broad meaning. Information is discoverable if it “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id.

The goals of discovery are several. Each party desires to know what the other party intends to present at trial so as to avoid any nasty surprises. Each party also seeks to obtain evidence either to support its claims and/or defenses or rebut the opposing party’s claims and/or defenses, whether directly or through impeachment. Discovery permits a party to obtain information concerning what documents the other side intends to introduce, what that party’s experts and other witnesses will say and how that party intends to prove its claims and/or defenses. In cases in which punitive damages legitimately have been sought, the plaintiff may obtain financial worth information from the alleged wrongdoer. However, keep in mind that punitive damages only may be requested with prior permission of the court. See Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.72 (2003).

While discovery is very broad, it is not without limitation. For example, the other side generally cannot discover privileged information. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1). Examples of evidentiary privileges recognized by statute are: journalist’s privilege, Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.5015 (2003); attorney-client communications, Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.502 (2003); psychotherapist-patient communications, Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.503 (2003); sexual assault counselor-victim communications, Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.5035 (2003); domestic violence advocate-victim communications, Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.5036 (2003); husband-wife communications, Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.504 (2003); communications to clergy, Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.505 (2003); accountant-client communications, Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.5055 (2003); and trade secrets, Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.506 (2003). The rules also restrict a party’s ability to obtain documents and tangible things prepared “in anticipation of litigation” by the other side. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(3). This is also known as the “work-product” privilege. The rules severely limit a party’s ability to discover information concerning experts who have been retained by the other side in anticipation of litigation but who are not expected to testify at trial. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(4)(B).

B. Discovery Methods.

There are several mechanisms for obtaining discovery. To a large extent, the type of discovery method employed and its timing depend on the information desired and the particular style of the legal practitioner.

1. Depositions.

A “deposition” is an oral examination of a person under oath that is recorded by a stenographer and may be videotaped or audiotaped. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.310. A party deponent may be required to produce documents during the examination. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(5). Depositions of parties may be used by the other side for any purpose. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.330(a)(2). Depositions may be taken by telephone. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(7). Depositions frequently are used to impeach subsequent testimony. Sometimes, depositions may be taken prior to the filing of a civil action or during appeal to preserve testimony. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.290. Depositions may or may not be transcribed, depending upon the wishes of the parties. Depositions also may be conducted on written questions. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.320. This method is not used frequently.

2. Interrogatories.

“Interrogatories,” another common discovery method, are written questions that are served on a party Although the rules allow for any person to be deposed, interrogatories and requests for admission may be directed only to parties. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.340(a) (“a party may serve upon any other party written interrogatories”) and 1.370(a) (“[A] party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission of the truth of any matters within the scope of rule 1.280(b)”). and that require written responses within thirty (30) days. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.340(a). The rules limit the number of questions to thirty (30) without court approval. Id. Form interrogatories pre-approved by the Florida Supreme Court must be used if applicable. Id. Interrogatories must be answered separately, fully, in writing, and under oath unless objections are made. Id. Like deposition testimony, interrogatory answers frequently are used to impeach subsequent testimony.

A party may produce records in lieu of answering an interrogatory if the answer may be derived from those records and if it is equally burdensome for the party to determine the answer as it is for the party seeking the information. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.340(c).

3. Production of Documents and Things by Parties.

A party may be required to produce documents or other tangible things for inspection and/or copying by the other side. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.350(a). “Documents” are defined broadly to include writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, phono-records and other “data compilations” from which information may be obtained or translated. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.350. The party seeking the information may test and sample the tangible items. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.350(a)(2). A party may request to enter upon designated land or property to inspect some object or operation. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.350(a)(3).

4. Production of Documents and Things by Nonparties.

A party also may obtain documents from nonparties by issuing a subpoena directing production of documents or things without deposition. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.351(a). Other parties must be notified at least ten (10) days before the subpoena issues so that they may object. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.351(b). If another party objects, this method of nonparty discovery becomes unavailable. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.351(c). If there is no objection, the nonparty may comply with the subpoena by providing copies of the documents or things sought. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.351(e).

5. Mental and Physical Examinations.

In certain circumstances, a party may request that a qualified expert conduct a physical or mental examination of a party, or a person in that party’s control or custody. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.360(a). This discovery method is utilized most often in personal injury cases and otherwise when a person’s physical or mental condition is in controversy. The party requesting the examination must demonstrate good cause. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.360(a)(2).

6. Request for Admissions.

An important, but often under-utilized, form of discovery is the “request for admissions.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370. One party serves upon another party a written request that the party admit to the truth of certain matters, including statements or opinions of fact or the application of law to fact, or the genuineness of documents. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370(a). If the other side fails to respond or object within thirty (30) days, the facts are considered admitted, which means that they are conclusively established. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370(b). The requesting party also may move to determine the sufficiency of the responses. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370(a). If the court decides that a response does not comply with the rule, the matter may be deemed admitted or an amended answer required. Id. If a party fails to admit a matter and the other side later proves that matter, the party may have to pay the costs incurred by the other side in making that proof. Id. Recently, the Florida Supreme Court revised the rules of civil procedure to limit the number of requests for admissions to thirty (30).Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370(a).

C. Protective Orders.

At any time, a party or nonparty from whom discovery is sought may ask the court to enter a protective order to protect that person from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c). Such a protective order may prohibit discovery, limit its scope, or effectuate other protective measures. Id.

D. Sanctions.

A party who is dissatisfied with the other side’s cooperation in discovery may seek an order compelling discovery. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.380(a). If a motion to compel is granted, the opposing party shall pay the moving party’s expenses incurred in obtaining the order, which may include attorney’s fees, unless the opposition to the motion was justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.380(a)(4). Similarly, if the motion is denied, the moving party shall pay the nonmoving party’s expenses unless the motion was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Id.

If the court orders discovery, failure to obey that order may be punishable as contempt. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b). The court has many available sanctions for discovery violations, particularly when the recalcitrant person is a party. Certain matters may be deemed established or a party may be prevented from opposing or supporting claims or defenses or from introducing evidence. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b)(2). The court may strike pleadings, dismiss the action, or enter a default judgment. Id. However, the failure to submit to a physical or mental examination is not punishable by contempt. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b)(2)(E).

III. Dismissal.

Frequently, civil actions are dismissed before a trial on the merits of the underlying claims. In addition to settlement, dismissal of a civil action may come about under a number of circumstances.

A. Voluntary Dismissal.

A party’s ability to dismiss its own action is limited by the rules of civil procedure. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420. The dismissal rules also apply to counterclaims, crossclaims, and third-party claims. A party may dismiss its lawsuit voluntarily without a court order prior to trial, as long as no motion for summary judgment has been heard or one has been denied and the case has not been submitted to the fact-finder. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(1)(A). An action may be dismissed by stipulation of the parties. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(1)(B). If the plaintiff previously has dismissed a similar case, this second dismissal will operate as an adjudication on the merits and the plaintiff will not be permitted to refile the action. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(1). Otherwise, the plaintiff may be able to refile the action. However, the plaintiff may be required to pay costs before bringing a similar action against the same party. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(d).

B. Involuntary Dismissal.

The court may enter an order of dismissal as a sanction for failure to comply with court rules or orders. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b). In evaluating whether the compliance merits this drastic sanction, the court considers the intent of the noncompliant party, the existence of previous sanctions, the involvement of the client, the degree of prejudice to the other side, and any justification for noncompliance. See H. Trawick, Florida Practice & Procedure Sec. 21-5, at 335-37 (1999).

If a case is tried to the court (i.e., without a jury), a party may seek involuntary dismissal if the other side, after completing its presentation of evidence, has failed to show a right to relief. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b).
Unless the order states that the dismissal is without prejudice, an involuntary dismissal under this rule is an adjudication on the merits and precludes the plaintiff from refiling the action. See, e.g., Drady v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 193 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967), cert. denied, 210 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1968).

An action shall be dismissed by the court for failure to prosecute if there has been no record activity for one year unless the court has stayed the action or a party shows good cause prior to the hearing. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e). In practice, this rule is strictly enforced.

C. Summary Judgment.

After the lawsuit has been filed, either party may move for summary judgment, subject to certain time restrictions. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510. Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment does more than challenge the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Of course, a summary judgment motion may be directed to a counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim in the same manner. In moving for a summary judgment, one argues that the opposing party cannot present evidence that would be sufficient to demonstrate a “genuine issue as to any material fact” and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c). Orders granting summary judgment are scrutinized closely on appeal.

The motion for summary judgment may be supported or opposed by competent affidavits made on personal knowledge that set forth admissible facts. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a), (b), (e). The parties also may rely upon depositions and answers to interrogatories. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e). However, in evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a trial judge may not weigh evidence or assess credibility. If the material facts are in dispute, summary judgment may not be entered and the litigation continues.

IV. Non-Judicial Methods of Resolution.

There are several ways in which a case may be resolved by the parties before trial, with the assistance of “alternative dispute resolution” techniques.

A. Mediation.

Mediation is “a process whereby a neutral third person called a mediator acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of a dispute between two or more parties. It is an informal and nonadversarial process with the objective of helping the disputing parties reach a mutually acceptable and voluntary agreement.” Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.1011(2) (2003). The parties also may stipulate to mediation. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.710(b). Mediation does not suspend the discovery process. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.710(c).

Some civil actions are never ordered to mediation, including bond estreatures, habeas corpus and extraordinary writs, bond validations, criminal or civil contempt proceedings, or any other matters specified by the chief judge of that court. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.710(b).

The mediator may be chosen by the parties or may be appointed by the court. The chief judge maintains a list of mediators who have been certified by the Florida Supreme Court. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.102(5) (2003). When possible, qualified individuals who have volunteered their time to serve as mediators shall be appointed. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.102(5)(a) (2003). Often parties agree on a particular mediator in order to select someone with specialized knowledge or expertise in the area under consideration.

Parties who fail to appear at mediation without good cause are subject to sanctions. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b). The mediator controls the mediation process. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.720(d). Counsel are permitted to communicate privately with their clients. Id. If the parties and mediator agree, mediation can proceed without counsel. Id. The mediator can meet privately with the parties or their counsel. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.720(e).

If the mediation results in no agreement, the mediator reports this to the court without comment or recommendation. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.730(a). The mediator also may identify pending motions or outstanding legal issues, discovery process or other actions whose resolution could facilitate the possibility of a settlement. Id. If an agreement is reached, it is reduced to writing and signed by the parties and their counsel. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.730(b). Mediation proceedings are privileged, subject to limited exceptions. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.102(3) (2003). Written communications in mediation are also exempt from Florida’s Public Records Act.Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.102(3) (2003).

B. Arbitration.

There are generally two types of court-ordered arbitration: mandatory non-binding arbitration and voluntary binding arbitration. In addition, arbitration often is ordered when the parties previously have agreed contractually to submit their claims to arbitration. See Fla. Stat. Sec. 682.02 (2003).

1. Mandatory (Non-Binding) Arbitration.

The court may direct the parties to participate in mandatory, non-binding arbitration. See Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.103(2) (2003). Unlike mediation, which is relatively informal, arbitration is similar to a mini-trial because arbitrators may administer oaths, take testimony, issue subpoenas and apply to the court for orders compelling attendance and production. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.103(4) (2003). The arbitrator (or arbitration panel) renders a written decision that will become final if the parties do not submit a timely request for a trial de novo. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.103(5) (2003). If a party requests a trial de novo and does not achieve a result that is more favorable than the arbitration award, that party may be assessed costs, including fees. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.103(6) (2003).

2. Voluntary (Binding) Arbitration.

The parties also may agree in writing to submit their action to binding arbitration, except when constitutional issues are involved. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.104(1) (2003). The parties may agree on the selection of one or more arbitrators; otherwise, they will be appointed by the court. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.104(2) (2003). As in mandatory non-binding arbitration, the arbitrator has the power to administer oaths, issue subpoenas, etc. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.104(7) (2003). A majority of the arbitrators may render a decision. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.104(8) (2003). The Florida Rules of Evidence apply to voluntary binding arbitration proceedings. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.104(9) (2003). Appeals to the circuit court are limited to statutorily defined issues, such as failure of the arbitrators to comply with procedural or evidentiary rules, misconduct, etc. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.104(10) (2003). Disputes involving child custody, visitation, or child support, or the rights of a nonparty to the arbitration are non-arbitrable. Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.104(14) (2003). In addition, the court may require the parties in a medical malpractice action to submit to non-binding arbitration before a panel of arbitrators consisting of a plaintiff’s attorney, a health care practitioner or defense attorney, and a trial attorney. See Fla. Stat. Sec. 766.107(1) (2003). The panel considers the evidence and decides the issues of liability, amount of damages, and apportionment of responsibility among the parties, but may not award punitive damages. Fla. Stat. Sec. 766.107(3)(b) (2003). Voluntary binding arbitration is also available in medical malpractice actions. See Fla Stat. Sec. 766.207 (2003).

C. Offers of Judgment.

Before trial, a party may submit a written “offer of judgment” that offers to settle a claim on specified terms, e.g., for a specified amount, etc. Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.79(1) (2003). The other side has thirty (30) days to accept the offer in writing. If the plaintiff rejects an offer by a defendant under this section and ultimately obtains a judgment of no liability or at least twenty-five percent (25%) less than the offer, the plaintiff will be responsible for costs and fees from the date of the filing of the offer. Id. Likewise, if the defendant rejects a demand for judgment by the plaintiff under this section, and the plaintiff subsequently obtains a judgment that is at least twenty-five percent (25%) greater than the offer, the defendant will be responsible for plaintiff’s fees and costs incurred after the date of the filing of the demand. Id. An offer or demand may be withdrawn in writing at any time prior to its acceptance. Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.79(5) (2003). Another statute provides for the assessment of costs and fees against a party whose rejection of an offer of settlement subsequently is determined by the court to have been “unreasonable.” Unlike Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.79 an award of fees and costs under this section is not mandatory. However, this section does not apply to causes of action which accrue after October 1, 1990 and, therefore, the statute is all but obsolete. See Fla. Stat. Sec. 45.061 (2003). Given the availability of fees and costs under this section, it is a powerful mechanism for encouraging parties to consider settlement offers seriously.

V. Trial.

Although the majority of civil cases are resolved without a trial, many still proceed to trial. Once all motions directed to the last “pleading” Recall that “pleading” has a specialized meaning and refers to complaint and answer, counterclaim and response to counterclaim, crossclaim and response to crossclaim, etc.have been resolved of or, if no such motions were served, within twenty (20) days of the service of the last pleading, an action is “at issue,” and a party may notify the court that it is ready to be set for trial. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.440(b). Typically, the court directs the parties to mediation if mediation already has not occurred. Otherwise, a trial date may be scheduled.

A. Demand for Jury.

The right to a jury trial in a civil case is not absolute and, in fact, may be waived if it is not demanded in a timely fashion. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.430(d).

Typically, the demand for a jury trial is appended to the plaintiff’s complaint. A plaintiff may choose, however, for strategic purposes or otherwise, not to assert its jury trial right. However, both parties enjoy the right to a jury trial Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.430(a); Art. I, Sec. 22, Fla. Const. and a defendant who desires a jury trial typically will demand one in its answer or other responsive pleading. If a jury trial is not demanded within the time limits imposed by the rules of civil procedure, it is deemed waived. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.430(d). If a jury trial is demanded, the demand thereafter may not be withdrawn without consent of the parties. Id.

A matter may be tried completely or partially to a jury. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.430(c). However, parties are not entitled automatically to a jury trial in all cases because some matters, such as injunction proceedings, are not triable to a jury.

B. Jury Selection.

Assuming that a jury trial has been demanded, the first step in the trial process is jury selection. Prospective jurors may be provided with a questionnaire to determine any legal disqualifications (e.g., felony conviction). Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(a)(1). Fla. Stat. Sec. 40.013 (2003), disqualifies from jury service (1) those individuals who have been convicted of a felony and (2) the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Cabinet officers, clerk of court, and judges. Fla. Stat. Sec. 40.013(1), (2)(a) (2003). This chapter also permits other individuals to be excused upon request, including law enforcement officers and their investigative personnel, expectant mothers and non-full-time employed single parents of children under six years old, practicing attorneys and physicians, the physically infirm, individuals over seventy (70) years old, individuals who demonstrate hardship, extreme inconvenience, or public necessity, and persons who care for certain incapacitated individuals. Id. Jurors also may be provided with questionnaires to assist in voir dire, or the oral examination of prospective jurors. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(a)(2). The parties have the right to examine jurors orally on voir dire. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(b). The court also may question prospective jurors. Id.

The parties may challenge any prospective juror “for cause,” i.e., if the juror is biased, incompetent, or related to a party or attorney for a party or has some interest in the action. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(c)(1). There is no limit to the number of “for cause” challenges that may be raised. On the other hand, a party generally is limited to three (3) “peremptory” challenges, which do not require that the party establish cause, or any other reason for that matter. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(d). However, there are constitutional limitations on peremptory challenges. For example, a party may not utilize its peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors in a racially discriminatory manner. See, e.g., State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Laidler v. State, 627 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).

After the trial jury is selected, the court may provide for the selection of alternate jurors, and the parties generally are allowed one peremptory challenge for this process. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(g). Alternate jurors are selected in the same manner as trial jurors, and are in all respects identical except that they are discharged if they are not needed when the jury retires to deliberate. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(g)(1).

C. Opening Statements.

After a jury is selected, the parties present opening statements. Opening statements are not supposed to be arguments; rather, the parties should advise the jury of what the evidence will prove. After opening statements, the parties or the court may “invoke the rule,” which simply means that nonparty witnesses are excluded from the courtroom while others are testifying. Fla. Stat. Sec. 90.616 (2003). In addition, the witnesses are directed not to discuss the case with anyone other than the attorneys. H. Trawick, Florida Practice & Procedure Sec. 22-7, at 356 (1999).

D. Motion for Directed Verdict.

After the plaintiff presents its case-in-chief, the defendant may move for a directed verdict on the grounds that the plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to justify submission of the case to the jury. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.480(a). If the action is being tried to the court without a jury, the proper motion is a motion for involuntary dismissal under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b), as discussed earlier. If the motion is denied or reserved, the case proceeds, subject to the defendant’s ability to renew the motion at the close of the evidence. However, in a nonjury trial, renewal of the motion for involuntary dismissal at the close of the evidence is not authorized.

Orders granting directed verdict are unusual and scrutinized closely on appeal. Courts commonly “reserve ruling” on a motion for directed verdict and allow the case to proceed to the jury. This is a preferred approach because if the trial court grants a directed verdict and does not submit the case to the jury, and the directed verdict is overturned on appeal, the entire case must be retried. On the other hand, if the judge reserves ruling on the motion for directed verdict, the judge may override a subsequent plaintiff’s verdict and if that decision is overturned on appeal, the verdict may simply be reinstated without the necessity of a new trial.

After the plaintiff presents its case and any motions for directed verdict by either side are addressed, the defendant presents its case-in-chief. At the close of the defendant’s case, either party may move for a directed verdict. The plaintiff may present rebuttal evidence.

E. Closing Argument.

After the close of all the evidence, each side has an opportunity to present closing arguments. Because the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, the plaintiff is permitted to argue first and last (i.e., in rebuttal to defendant’s argument). The attorneys are required to confine their closing arguments to the evidence presented, along with its reasonable inferences. Alford v. Barnett Nat’l Bank, 137 Fla. 564, 188 So. 322 (1939). Case law restricts the types of arguments that may be presented in closing argument. For example, an attorney may not express a personal belief in his client or his client’s case. Miami Coin-O-Wash, Inc. v. McGough, 195 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). He may not request that the jury place itself in his client’s shoes, i.e., the so-called “Golden Rule” argument. Bullock v. Branch, 130 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961).

F. Jury Instructions.

If the judge does not direct a verdict following the parties’ respective presentations, the case is submitted to a jury. Prior to the close of evidence, the parties must submit requested jury instructions. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.470(b). These may include numerous form instructions pre-approved by the Florida Supreme Court. Additional instructions may need to be drafted and often there will be great debate between the parties on their wording.

The judge instructs the jurors on the manner in which they are expected to deliberate and the law that they must follow. Finally, the jurors retire to deliberate. Id. Frequently, the jury has questions during the deliberation process. The parties and their attorneys are notified of such questions. There may be some discussion or debate on how such questions are to be answered and the attorneys may object on the record to the answers ultimately provided to the jury.

G. Verdict.

Once the jury’s deliberations are complete, the verdict is announced in open court. A verdict may be either a “general” verdict or a “special” verdict. A general verdict “finds for a party in general terms on all issues within the province of the jury to determine.” H. Trawick, Florida Practice & Procedure Sec. 24-2, at 399 (1999). On the other hand, the court might employ a “special verdict,” which asks the jury to answer specific questions that determine the disputed facts. H. Trawick, Florida Practice & Procedure Sec. 24-3, at 400 (1999). For example, a special verdict form in a negligence action might require the jury to determine whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff. If the answer to this question were negative, the court would enter judgment for the defendant because duty is an essential element of a negligence claim. A general verdict, on the other hand, might simply ask whether the jury’s verdict was for the plaintiff and, if so, for how much. Regardless of the form of verdict that is used, a separate verdict on each count must be required if requested by either party. H. Trawick, Florida Practice & Procedure Sec. 24-2, at 399 (1999). The verdict form is written and signed by the foreperson.

In negligence actions, the verdict is required to be itemized according to economic loss, noneconomic loss, and punitive damages (if awarded). Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.77(1) (2003). “Economic damages” refers to “past lost income and future lost income reduced to present value; medical and funeral expenses; lost support and services; replacement value of lost personal property; loss of appraised fair market value of real property; costs of construction repairs, including labor, overhead, and profit; and any other economic loss which would not have occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of action.” Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.81(1) (2003). In addition, damages must be itemized further into past and future damages. Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.77(2) (2003). Economic damages are computed before and after reduction to present value, but no other damages are reduced to present value. Id. After the verdict is read, either party may request that the individual jurors be polled. Each juror is asked then to confirm that the verdict read is his or her verdict. Once the requested polling is complete, the jury is discharged.

VI. Conclusion.

This post provides a general overview of the route of a civil lawsuit. Every lawsuit is different and the steps often vary dramatically. Pretrial proceedings frequently are overlooked as a valuable source of information. Although access to various components of the pretrial process is beyond the scope of this post, homeowners should view this post as a guide for successful wrongful foreclosure defense. Hopefully, this post will serve to “demystify” the pretrial process and assist homeowners gearing up to fight the wrongful foreclosure shops that are illegally snatching away their dream homes.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and needed solutions to defend or reclaim your home please visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

Nevada Foreclosure Rate Tops U.S. Again

25 Wednesday Sep 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Foreclosure Crisis, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, Your Legal Rights

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August, Florida, Foreclosure, Las Vegas, Nevada, Percentage, Real estate, RealtyTrac, Reno

Last month Nevada once again secured the top spot as the state with the nation’s highest foreclosure rate due to spikes in default notices and scheduled foreclosure auctions.

According to a report by the Irvine-based real estate analytics company, RealtyTrac, in August one out of every 359 Nevada housing units was the subject of a new foreclosure filing. This number reflects more than two-and-a-half times the national average.

RealtyTrac defines foreclosure filings as:

“Including notices of default, notices of pending trustee sales and repossessions by banks.”

Additionally, RealityTrac stated that last month with one filing for every 323 housing units, Las Vegas was ranked third for the nation’s highest foreclosure rate among large metropolitan areas. Nevada’s foreclosure filings have increased over 100 percent compared to the previous month and nearly 11 percent percent over August 2012, due to the 226 percent increase in default notices and a 96 percent jump in scheduled foreclosure auctions compared with July.

RealtyTrac Vice President Daren Blomquist attempts to explain the recent jump in Nevada foreclosures saying:

“The foreclosure floodwaters have receded in most parts of the country, but lenders and communities continue to clean up the damage left behind, which means the recent uptick in bank repossessions is a trend that will likely continue into next year,” he said. “Meanwhile foreclosure flash floods will continue to hit some markets over the next few months as delayed foreclosure starts are quickly pushed into the pipeline.

Another explanation for Nevada’s increase in foreclosures is due to the possibility that bankers have identified how to operate under the new Assembly Bill 300 law that is supposed to make it easier for banks to seize homes from delinquent borrowers.

Under AB300, a bank’s affidavit no longer has to be based on personal knowledge of a home’s mortgage-document history before they foreclose. Instead, the bank’s affidavit can be founded on an assessment of internal lending records and either title paperwork or filings with the local county recorder.

For More Information on How To Effectively Challenge Your Lender/Bank In Order to Save Your Home Even If Foreclosure has taken place, Visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

A Guide to California Homeowners Defending Post-Foreclosure Evictions

24 Saturday Aug 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Landlord and Tenant, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Your Legal Rights

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Eviction, Foreclosure, HAP, Leasehold estate, Los Angeles, PTFA, Real estate, Sacramento

Elements of a Post-foreclosure Eviction
– Notice Requirements
– Compliance with CC 2924
– Present Right to Possession
Unlawful Detainer Litigation

Notice Requirements

Former Borrowers v. Tenants

– Former borrowers
3 days’ notice
– Tenants
90 days’ notice (in most cases)

Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (Section 702)

– All bona fide tenants
Must be given at least 90 days’ notice
– Bona fide tenants with more than 90 days remaining on lease
Entitled to stay until the end of the lease, if lease entered into before “notice of foreclosure”

– EXCEPTION: lease may be terminated with a 90-day notice if purchaser will occupy unit as primary residence or if lease terminable at will under state law

Bona Fide Tenancy (PTFA)

A lease or tenancy is bona fide only if:
– Tenant is not the mortgagor or the mortgagor’s child, spouse, or parent; and
– Lease was the result of an arms length transaction; and
– Rent is not substantially less than fair market rent (unless the reduction is due to governmental subsidy)

HCV (Section 8) Tenants

– Section 8 tenants are deemed to be bona fide tenants. 74 Fed. Reg. 30108
– New owner takes title subject to both the Section 8 lease and the HAP contract

– EXCEPTION: Lease may be terminated with a 90 day notice if new owner will occupy unit as primary residence
– Any eviction notices must also be sent to the Housing Authority. 24 CFR 982.310(e)(2)(ii).

State Law Notice Requirements

CCP 1161b
– 60-day notice requirement for all tenants
– AB 2610 (effective 1/1/13):
– 90-day notice requirement for all tenants
– lease protections
– CCP 1161c
– Cover sheet requirement for post-foreclosure eviction notices

Service of Notice

Cal. law (CCP 1162):
– Personal service;
– Substitute service; or
– Posting and mail
– Does actual receipt cure service defects?
– Compare Valov v. Tank (1985) 168 CA3d 867 with Culver Ctr. Partners E #1 LP v. Baja Fresh Westlake Village, Inc. (2010) 185 CA4th 744

3/60/90 Day Notices

– Invalid? Alta Cmty. Invs. III v. Ottoboni, No. 1370195 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 29, 2010) (holding that 3/30/60/90 day notice is fatally ambiguous)

Post-FC Evictions in Just-Cause Jurisdictions

Just cause for eviction required
– Nonpayment of Rent
– 90-day notice required? PNMAC Mortg. v. Stanko, No. 11U04495, 2012 WL 845508 (Los Angeles, Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2012) (yes)
– AB 1953 (effective 1/1/13):
– Cannot demand rent accrued before compliance with CC 1962
– Breach of Lease
– 90-day notice required?

Compliance with CC 2924

CCP 1161a

A person who holds over . . . may be removed therefrom as prescribed in this chapter:
– (3) Where the property has been sold in accordance with Section 2924 of the Civil Code, under a power of sale contained in a deed of trust executed by such person, or a person under whom such person claims, and the title under the sale has been duly perfected.
“Title” issues may be litigated in post-foreclosure UDs
– Malkoskie v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 188 Cal. App. 4th 968 (2010)

Properly Conducted Sale

Trustee must have authority to conduct sale
– Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Detelder-Collins, No. APP10000325 (Riverside Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 28, 2012) (UD judgment reversed because plaintiff failed to provide substitution of trustee to show that trustee had authority to conduct sale)
Sale void if conducted in breach of loan mod.
– Barroso v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 208 Cal. App. 4th 1001 (2012) (permanent modification)

Failure to provide proper foreclosure notices
– JP Morgan Chase v. Callandra, No. 1371026 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Barbara Co. Oct. 21, 2010) (tenant may challenge foreclosure based on failure to post NTS)
– But tender/prejudice requirement for former homeowners

Right to Possession – Present Right to Possession

Expiration of Notice Period?
– Expiration of Bona Fide Lease?
– Must still satisfy 90-day notice requirement

UD Litigation – Unlawful Detainer Process

Service of Summons and Complaint
– Personal;
– Substitute; or
– Nail and mail with court approval (after reasonable diligence)
– Five days to answer
– Pre-answer motions:
– Delta motion to quash (prejudgment claimant?)
– Demurrer (defect must appear on face of complaint)
– Answer
– Summary Judgment
– Trial

60-Day “Curtain” (CCP 1161.2)

Limited civil UDs are masked for the first 60 days
– Unmasked after 60 days unless tenant prevails within the 60 days

Except for post-foreclosure cases
– Permanently masked unless plaintiff prevails against all defendants after trial within 60 days

Unnamed Occupants

“Doe” occupants
– Must intervene in case by filing prejudgment claim of right to possession within 10 days of service
– BUT see AB 2610 (effective 1/1/13):
– PJCRTP form may be filled out and presented at any time, even after judgment

Appeal

Notice of appeal – 30 days after notice of entry of judgment
– No automatic stay of the writ of possession
– Ask for stay
– Trial court
– Writ proceeding in appellate division
– Appeal bond
– Little case law for post-foreclosure UD issues
21

Hypo

Tom Tenant’s 3-BR home in Sacramento, CA was sold at foreclosure sale on October 1. Tom’s existing lease expires on November 1, 2013. Under this lease, he pays $1,600 in rent each month under the lease, but the surrounding homes rent for about $2,300 per month. On October 5, Ivan Investor, who purchased the property at the trustee sale, served Tom with a 60-day notice to quit. Is the notice correct?

– What if Tom was a Section 8 HCV tenant?
– Or if Tom lived in Oakland instead of Sacramento?

Homeowners who finds themselves in a situation where their lender is fraudulently trying to use cooked up documents to steal their most prized possessions “their homes”, needs to do whatever is necessary to stop these interlopers from stealing their homes. To do this, homeowners need to fight them to the finish in order to avoid the situation of change of status from “borrowers to tenants” as described above. Homeowners in wrongful foreclosures should do their best to reclaim what is rightfully theirs even if the lenders initially succeeded in foreclosing using fraudulent documents. It can reversed and dismissed by the courts through vigorous litigation, that’s where http://www.fightforeclosure.net comes in.

To learn how you can effectively use well structured (Pro Se “Self Representation”) litigation pleadings to effectively challenge and reclaim your status as a homeowner instead of a tenant, visit http://www.fightforeclosure.net

What Homeowners in Foreclosure Defense Needs to Know About the Issues of “Standing vs. Capacity to Sue”

18 Sunday Aug 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

≈ 1 Comment

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Court, Lawsuit, Mastropaolo, Motion (legal), New York, Plaintiff, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Bank

Homeowners in Judicial foreclosure states need to realize that Banks claim of ownership of the note is not an issue of standing but an element of its cause of action which it must plead and prove

The term “standing” has been applied by the courts to two legally distinct concepts. The first is legal capacity, or authority to sue. The second is whether a party has asserted a sufficient interest in the outcome of a dispute.

Standing and capacity to sue are related, but distinguishable legal concepts. Capacity requires an inquiry into the litigant’s status, i.e., its “power to appear and bring its grievance before the court”, while standing requires an inquiry into whether the litigant has “an interest in the claim at issue in the lawsuit that the law will recognize as a sufficient predicate for determining the issue.”

Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, Nat. Ass’n v Mastropaolo, 42 AD3d239, 242 (2d Dept 2007) (internal citations omitted). Both concepts can result in dismissal on a pre answer motion by the defendant and are waived if not raised in a timely manner.

In some Jurisdictions such as New York, an action may be dismissed based on the grounds that the Plaintiff lacks the legal capacity to sue. CPLR 3211(a)(3) It governs no other basis for dismissal. CPLR 3211(e) provides that a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3) is waived if not raised in a pre-answer motion or a responsive pleading.

Many decisions treat the question of whether the Plaintiff in a foreclosure action owns the note and mortgage as if it were a question of standing and governed by CPLR 3211(e).

Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp. v. Randolph Bowling , 25 Misc 3d 1244(A), 906 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty 2009); Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Youkelsone, 303 AD2d546, 546—547 (2d Dept 2003);
Nat’l Mtge. Consultants v. Elizaitis, 23 AD3d 630, 631 (2dDept 2005);
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Marchione, 2009 NY Slip Op 7624, (2d Dept 2009)

There is a difference between the capacity to sue which gives the right to come into court, and possession of a cause of action which gives the right to relief. Kittinger v Churchill Evangelistic Assn Inc., 239 AD 253, 267 NYS 719 (4th Dept 1933). Incapacity to sue is not the same as insufficiency of facts to sue upon. Ward v Petri, 157 NY3d 301 (1898)

In the case of Ohlstein v Hillcrest, a defendant moved to dismiss a complaint in part based on lack of legal capacity to sue where plaintiff had assigned her stock. The Court denied that branch of the motion holding that even if plaintiff had assigned her stock, “the defect to be urged is that the complaint does not estate [sic] a cause of action in favor of the one who is suing, the alleged assignor – not that the plaintiff does not have the legal capacityto sue. Legal incapacity, as properly understood, generally envisages a defect in legal status,not lack of a cause of action in one who is sui juris.” Ohlstein v Hillcrest, 24 Misc 2d 212,214, 195 NYS2d 920, 922 (Sup Ct NY Co 1959).

The difference was articulated by the Court in the case of Hebrew Home for Orphans v Freund, 208 Misc. 658, 144 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup Ct Bx 1955). The plaintiff in that case sought a judgment declaring that an assignment of a mortgage it held was valid. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that since the assignment was not accompanied by delivery of the bond and mortgage to plaintiff, plaintiff did not own the bond and mortgage and thus had no legal capacity to sue or standing to maintain the action. The Court denied the motion, stating:

The application to dismiss the complaint on the alleged ground that the plaintiff lacks legal capacity to sue rests upon a misapprehension of the meaning of the term. See Gargiulo v.Gargiulo, 207 Misc. 427, 137 N.Y.S.2d 886. Rule 107(2) of the Rules of Civil Practice relates to a plaintiff’s right to come into Court, and not to his possessing a cause of action. Idat 660-661, 610.

The Court then quotes Kittinger v Churchill for the principle that,

“The provision for dismissal of the complaint where the plaintiff has not the capacity to sue (Rules of Civil Practice, rules 106, 107) has reference to some legal disability, such as infancy, or lunacy, or want of title in the plaintiff to the character in which he sues. There is a difference between capacity to sue, which gives the right to come into court, and possession of a cause of action, which gives the right to relief in court.
Ward v. Petrie, 157 NY 301, 51 N.E. 1002; Bank of Havana v. Magee,
20 NY 355; Ullman v. Cameron, 186 NY 339, 78 N.E.1074. The plaintiff is an individual suing as such. He is under no disability, and sues in norepresentative capacity. He is entitled to bring his suits before the court, and to cause a summons to be issued, the service of which upon the defendants brings the defendants in to court. There is no lack of capacity to sue.

The other meaning of standing involves whether the party bringing the suit has a sufficient interest in the dispute. Some cases have held that in this context, standing is jurisdictional, reasoning that where there is no aggrieved party, there is no genuine controversy, and where there is no genuine controversy, there is no subject matter jurisdiction.
Stark v Goldberg, 297 AD2d 203, 204(1st Dept 2002); xelrod v New York StateTeachers’ Retirement Sys., 154 AD2d 827, 828 (3rd Dept 1989).

Some courts have held that the jurisdiction of the court to hear the controversy is not affected by whether the party pursuing the action is, in fact, a proper party.They have held that if not raised in the answer or pre-answer motion to dismiss, the defense that the a party lacks standing is waived. Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, Nat. Ass’n v. Perez,70 AD3d 817, 818, 894 N.Y.S.2d 509, 510 (2nd Dept 2010), Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.v. Delphonse, 64 AD3d 624, 625, 883 N.Y.S.2d 135 (2nd Dept 2009),
HSBC Bank, USA v. Dammond, 59 AD3d 679, 680, 875 N.Y.S.2d 490 (2nd Dept 2009)

The issue of whether a Plaintiff owns the mortgage and note is a different question from whether it has an interest in the dispute. Whether a party has a sufficient interest in the dispute is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint, not whether Plaintiff can prove the allegations.
Wall St. Associates v. Brodsky, 257 AD2d 526, 684 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1st Dept1999), Kempf v. Magida, 37 AD3d 763, 764, 832 N.Y.S.2d 47, 49 (2nd Dept 2007). For the purpose of determining whether a party has sufficient interest in the case the allegations areassumed to be true.

It is important to note that This issue is not analogous to the issue of whether citizens have standing to seek judicial intervention in response to what they believe to be governmental actions which would impair the rights of members of society, or a particular group of citizens, (e.g. Schulz v. State, 81 NY2d 336, 343, 615 N.E.2d 953, 954 (1993), or whether registered voters have standing to challenge the denial of the right to vote in a referendum pursuant to Section 11 of Article VII of the State Constitution, or whether commercial fishermen have standing to complain of the pollution of the waters from which they derive their living, see also Leo v. Gen. Elec. Co., 145 AD2d 291, 294, 538 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 (2nd Dept 1989). The issue of standing in these types of cases turn on whether the claimants have an interest sufficiently distinct from societyin general.

Foreclosure actions implicate a concrete interest specific to a plaintiff, and the determination must be made as to whether it has been aggrieved and is therefore entitled to receive monetary damages for the alleged breach of the law.

Therefore homeowners needs to realize that when Banks pled that it owns the note and mortgage and asserts the right to foreclose on the mortgage which it asserts is in default. If it is successful in proving its claims, then usually it is entitled to receive the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property. Homeowners should understand that the objection that the Plaintiff in fact does not own the note and mortgage is not a defense based on a lack of standing. Courts will usually claim homeowners “does not say” (insufficient facts were alleged). But that the homeowner’s argument is that the facts alleged are not true. It is not a question of whether the Bank has alleged a sufficient interest in the dispute, but of whether the Bank can prove its prima facie case.

In Judicial States where the Banks are the plaintiff; unlike standing, denial of the Plaintiff’s claim that it owns the note and mortgage is not an affirmative defense because it is usually a denial of an allegation in the complaint that is an element of the Plaintiff’s cause of action.

In a Judicial foreclosure case, the Plaintiff must plead and prove as part of its prima facie case that it owns the note and mortgage and has the right to foreclose. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 80AD3d 753, 915 N.Y.S.2d 569 (2d Dept 2011); Argent Mtge. Co., LLC v. Mentesana, 79AD3d 1079, 915 N.Y.S.2d 591 (2d Dept 2010); Campaign v Barba , 23 AD3d 327, 805 NYS2d 86 (2nd Dept 2005).

However, it is usually not enough for the Defendant (Homeowner) to filed a pro se “answer” containing a “general denial”, which is a denial of all of “Plaintiff’s allegations”.

In Hoffstaedter v. Lichtenstein , 203 App.Div. 494, 496, 196 N.Y.S. 577 (1st Dept 1922),the First Department held that the general denial put the allegations in the plaintiff’scomplaint in issue. In that case, the defendant executed a note in favor of the plaintiff as a promise to pay for certain goods. When plaintiff brought an action to recover on the note, the defendant answered with a general denial. It went on to state that “[i]t is elementary that under a general denial a defendant may disprove any fact which the plaintiff is required to prove to establish a prima facie cause of action.” Id., at 578.

The Court of Appeals cited Hoffstaedter v. Lichtenstein in holding that a general denial puts in issue those matters already pled.
Munson v. New York Seed Imp. Co-op., Inc., 64 NY2d 985, 987, 478 N.E.2d 180, 181 (1985).The general denials contained in the answer enable defendant to controvert the facts upon which the plaintiff bases her right to recover. Strook Plush Company v. Talcott, 129 AD 14, 113 NYS 214 (2nd Dept 1908). A generaldenial is sufficient to challenge all of the allegations in a complaint. Bodine v. White , 98 NYS232, 233 (App. Term 1906).The Second Department in Gulati v. Gulati, 60 AD3d 810, 811-12, 876 N.Y.S.2d 430, 432-33 (2nd Dept 2009), held it was that where a claim would not take the plaintiff by surprise and “does not raise issues of fact not appearing on the face of the complaint”, a denial of the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint was sufficient. It heldthat where the plaintiff alleged as an element of her prima facie case that the defendant abandoned the marital residence without cause or provocation, and the defendant denied these allegations in his answer, defendant did not need to further allege abandonment as an affirmative defense

The Fourth Department in Stevens v. N. Lights Associates, 229 AD2d 1001, 645 N.Y.S.2d 193, 194 (4th Dept 1996), found that a denial by defendant that it was in control of the premises where plaintiff fell did not need to be separately pled as a defense, as the denialof control did not raise any issue of fact which had not already been pled in the complaint.See also
Scully v. Wolff, 56 Misc. 468, 107 N.Y.S. 181 (App. Term 1907), Bodine v. White,98 N.Y.S. 232 (App. Term 1906).

In this case, Defendant’s contesting Plaintiff’s claim in the complaint that it owns the note and mortgage could not take the Plaintiff by surprise as a general denial contests Plaintiff’s factual allegations in the complaint itself, and does not rely upon extrinsic facts. Since ownership of the note was pled in the complaint and is an element of the Plaintiff’s cause of action, Defendant did not waive the defense that Plaintiff did not own the note, because he made a general denial to the factual allegations contained in the complaint.

In fact, the identity of the owner of the note and mortgage is information that is often in the exclusive possession of the party seeking to foreclose. Mortgages are routinely transferred through MERS, without being recorded. The notes underlying the mortgages, as negotiable instruments, are negotiated by mere delivery without a recorded assignment or notice to the borrower. A defendant has no method to reliably ascertain who in fact owns the note, within the narrow time frame allotted to file an answer.

In jurisdictions such as New York, CPLR 3018(b) provides that an affirmative defense is any matter “which if not pleaded would be likely to take the adverse party by surprise” or “would raise issues of fact not appearing on the face of a prior pleading”.

CPLR 3018(b) also lists some common affirmative defenses, although the list is not exhaustive. The list of affirmative defenses in CPLR 3018(b) are those which raise issues such as res judicata or statute of limitations which are based on facts not previously alleged in the pleadings.

“The defendant has the burden of proof of affirmative defenses, which in effect assume the truth of the allegations of the complaint and present new matter in avoidance thereof.” 57 NY Jur. 2d Evidence and Witnesses 165″.

To survive motion to dismiss or Summary Judgement, it is important that Pro Se Homeowners using “Standing” as a foreclosure defense also review their PSA in order to include missing or lack of assignments.

This defense will be based on “Conveyance from the Depositor to the Trust”.

Homeowners arguments under these defense will be based that the Trustee violated the terms of the trust by acquiring the note directly from the sponsor’s successor in interest rather than from the Depositor, for instance ABC, as required by the PSA.

In Article II, section 2.01 Conveyance of Mortgage Loans, the PSA requires that the Depositor deliver and deposit with the Trustee the original note, the original mortgage and an original assignment . The Trustee is then obligated to provide to the Depositor an acknowledgment of receipt of the assets before the closing date. PSA Article II, Section 2.01.

The rationale behind this requirement is to provide at least two intermediate levels of transfer to ensure the assets are protected from the possible bankruptcy by the originator which permits the security to be provided with the rating required for the securitization to be saleable.
Deconstructing the Black Magic of Securitized Trusts, Roy D. Oppenheim Jacquelyn K. Trask-Rahn 41 Stetson L. Rev. 745 Stetson Law Review (Spring 2012).

So to further the arguement, homeowners should argue that the assignment of the note and mortgage from original lender to Trustee which is called (A-D), rather than from the Depositor ABC violates section 2.01 of the PSA which requires that the Depositor deliver to and deposit the original note, mortgage and assignments to the Trustee.

In most cases, “if homeowner’s pleadings are in order”, meaning (The evidence submitted by homeowner that the note was acquired after the closing date and that assignment was not made by the Depositor), is sufficient to raise questions of fact in the court as to whether the Bank owns the note and mortgage, and usually will Deny motion to Dismiss(in non-juidical States) or preclude granting Bank’s summary judgment (in Judicial States).

The courts will usually find and conclude that the assignment of the homeowner’s note and mortgage, having not been assigned from the Depositor to the Trust, is therefore void as in being in contravention of the PSA.

For More Info How You Can Use Well Structured Pleadings Containing Facts and Case Laws Necessary To Win Your Foreclosure Defense Visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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Category Archives: Affirmative Defenses

How Nevada Homeowners Can Effectively Plead Foreclosure Fraud and Misrepresentation

Proof

False Representations:

Pleading Standards

Damages

Defenses

Intent to Induce the Plaintiff to Act or Refrain from Acting

Justifiable Reliance

What Homeowners Must Know About Pleading their Wrongful Foreclosure Cases in the Courts

Why Homeowners Need to Shift the Burden of Proof To Foreclosure Mills

OPINION

FootNotes

What Florida Homeowners Need to Know About Mortgage Assignments

What Texas Homeowners Needs to Know About Foreclosure in Texas

How Homeowners Can Spot Fraudulent Mortgage Documents

Florida Homeowner’s Guide to a Civil Lawsuit

Nevada Foreclosure Rate Tops U.S. Again

A Guide to California Homeowners Defending Post-Foreclosure Evictions

What Homeowners in Foreclosure Defense Needs to Know About the Issues of “Standing vs. Capacity to Sue”

Proof

False Representations:

Pleading Standards

Damages

Defenses

Intent to Induce the Plaintiff to Act or Refrain from Acting

Justifiable Reliance

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OPINION

FootNotes

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