Category Archives: Litigation Strategies

What Homeowners Must Know About Appeal-able Orders and Judgment from the Federal Courts

01 Thursday Mar 2018

Posted by in Appeal, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, Your Legal Rights

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In order to effectively perfect your Appeal case as a Pro Se Litigator, homeowners must familiarize themselves about Appealing unfavorable decisions.

1. Appeal-able Orders: Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:

(a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Final orders and
judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C. § 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945)).

A magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Perez-Priego v. Alachua County Clerk of Court, 148 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 1998). However, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3), the Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction over an appeal from a final judgment entered by a magistrate judge, but only if the parties consented to the magistrate’s jurisdiction. McNab v. J & J Marine, Inc., 240 F.3d 1326, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2001).

(b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).
Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885-86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judgment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys’ fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998).

(c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Under this section, appeals are permitted from the following types of orders:

i. Orders granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions; However, interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted. McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1472-73 (11th Cir. 1986);

ii. Orders appointing receivers or refusing to wind up receiverships; and

iii. Orders determining the rights and liabilities of parties in admiralty cases.

(d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court’s denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable.

(e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited
exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93
L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Blythe Eastman Paine
Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964).

2. Time for Filing: The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional.
Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:

(a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the order or judgment appealed from is entered. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD – no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below.

(b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): “If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later.”

(c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion.

(d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend or reopen the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time to file an appeal may be reopened if the district court finds, upon motion, that the following conditions are satisfied: the moving party did not receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order within 21 days after entry; the motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered or within 14 days after the moving party receives notice, whichever is earlier; and no party would be prejudiced by the reopening.

(e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution’s internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.

3. Format of the notice of appeal: Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro Se notice of
appeal must be signed by the appellant.

4. Effect of a notice of appeal: A district court lacks jurisdiction, i.e., authority, to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/ “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will show you step-by-step litigation solutions helping you challenge these fraudsters and ultimately saving your home from foreclosure either through loan modification or “Pro Se” litigation visit: https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/

How Homeowners Can Greatly Improve their Chances of Winning on Appeal

24 Wednesday Jan 2018

Posted by in Appeal, Case Laws, Case Study, Discovery Strategies, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Note - Deed of Trust - Mortgage, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, Scam Artists, Title Companies, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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A seasoned Attorney will tell you that trying cases is one of the most exciting things a litigator does during his or her career but it is also certainly one of the most stressful. While in the trenches during trial, many litigators understandably focus all of their energies on winning the case at hand. But a good litigator knows that trial is often not the last say in the outcome of a case. The final outcome often rests at the appellate level, where a successful trial outcome can be affirmed, reversed, or something in between. The likelihood of success many times hinges on the substance of the record on appeal. The below discusses a variety of issues that trial litigators should keep in mind as they prepare and present their case so they position themselves in the best possible way for any appeals that follow.

Prepare Your Appellate Record From The Moment Your Case Begins

Perhaps one of the biggest misconceptions regarding preserving an adequate record on appeal is when a lawyer should start considering what should be in the record. In short, the answer is from the moment the complaint is filed. At that time, counsel should begin to think carefully about the elements of each asserted cause of action, potential defenses and their required elements, and the burden of proof for each. Every pleading should be drafted carefully to ensure that no arguments are waived in the event they are needed for an appeal. For instance, a complaint should allege with specificity all the factual and legal elements necessary to sustain a claim, while an answer should include any and all applicable affirmative defenses to avoid waiver. See, e.g., Travellers Int’l, A.G. v. Trans World Airlines, 41 F.3d 1570, 1580 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The general rule in federal courts is that a failure to plead an affirmative defense results in a waiver.”). Likewise, if you file a motion to dismiss, ensure that the motion contains all the necessary evidence that both a trial court and appellate court would need to find in your favor. Of particular importance in federal court practice is the pre-trial order. Under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 16, the pre-trial order establishes the boundaries of trial. See Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 206 (5th Cir.1998) (“It is a well-settled rule that a joint pre-trial order signed by both parties supersedes all pleadings and governs the issues and evidence to be presented at trial.”). If the pre-trial order does not contain the pertinent claims, defenses or arguments that you wish to present at trial, you are likely also going to be out of luck on appeal.

Later on in the case, as the factual record becomes more fully developed, consider whether amending or supplementing the pleadings or other court submissions are necessary to make the record as accurate as possible. Most states follow the federal practice of allowing liberal amendments. However, these can be contested, particularly late in the process, closer to trial. While appellate review is often for abuse of discretion, formulating a strong motion in favor of or in opposition to an amendment can preserve the issue.

What to Keep in Mind as Your Case Proceeds

As the case develops, consider whether the elements you need to prove your case are sufficiently reflected in the information you obtain during discovery. If not, determine whether there are ways to obtain the information you need well before trial starts. By the time trial arrives, it may be too late to supplement the record to get before the trial judge and the appellate court what you need to win your case. In that regard, anything you have in writing that gets submitted to the court may very well end up being part of the record on review, so make sure it is accurate and understandable. Incomprehensible or incomplete submissions can muddy your appellate record and damage a successful appellate proceeding. In the same vein, make sure anything presented to the court prior to trial that you want to be part of the record is transcribed. Otherwise, there will be an insufficient record on appeal. This is particularly so when it comes to discovery disputes. Although they are common in present day litigation, judges hate discovery disputes. To preserve discovery issues for appeal, be sure to get a ruling, and make sure it is reflected in writing. Moreover, carefully review every pre-trial court order or other judicial communication, including court minutes, to ensure accuracy. Attempting to make corrections during the appellate process may not be possible.

Another significant area for appellate issues is the failure to timely identify experts. This is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, so it is important that one builds a record on the issue, particularly regarding any prejudice suffered by the untimely disclosure.

After Discovery Closes – The Motion in Limine

Once discovery has closed, consider carefully any motions in limine you may want to make. Although motions in limine are not strictly necessary, they are helpful in identifying evidentiary issues for the judge and counsel and increase the chances of a substantive objection, sidebar, and ruling when the issue arises at trial. One potential pitfall – some jurisdictions require a party to renew an objection at trial after a motion in limine has been denied, so make sure to do so if necessary. See, e.g., State ex. Rel Missouri Highway and Transp. Com’n v. Vitt, 785 S.W.2d 708, 711 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1990) (“A motion in limine preserves nothing for review. Following denial of a motion in limine, a party must object at trial to preserve for appellate review the point at issue.”) (internal citation omitted). Also, if the Court delivers its ruling on a motion in limine orally, make sure it is transcribed properly by the court reporter.

Now the Trial – What to Keep in Mind

Above all else, when in doubt, object. Objections should be immediate and specifically describe the basis for the objection so the record is clear. Make the argument to win – every objection should be more than just reciting labels, and should provide sufficient information for the trial judge to decide the issue. The goal is not to be coy with the trial judge and hope for a lucky break, but to be prepared to make an argument to win the issue at trial or, alternatively, on appeal. In addition, if you are the party proffering the evidence, make sure the proffer is on the record and that you expressly state why the evidence is being offered. This may require pressing on the judge to get the full objection on the record. If you fail to do so, you risk the appellate court not reviewing the claim on appeal. See, e.g., National Bank of Andover v. Kansas Bankers Sur. Co., 290 Kan. 247, 274-75 (2010) (observing “purpose of a proffer is to make an adequate record of the evidence to be introduced … [and] preserves the issue for appeal and provides the appellate court an adequate record to review when determining whether the trial court erred in excluding the evidence.”). Also, always be careful of waiving any issues for appeal by agreeing to a judge’s proposed compromise on evidentiary issues.

An important but often overlooked consideration is the courtroom layout and dynamics. Well-thought and timely objections will be for naught if they are not transcribed. Sometimes the courtroom layout can make record preservation difficult. For example, if objections are made at sidebar conferences where the court reporter is not present, those objections may not make their way into the appellate record or be dependent on the after the fact recollections of others. See, e.g., Ohio App. R. 9(c) (describing procedures for preparing statement of evidence where transcript of proceedings is unavailable and providing trial court with final authority for settlement and approval). This should be avoided whenever possible.

Beyond objections, make sure all the evidence you need for your appeal is properly admitted by the trial court before the close of your case. All exhibits that were used at trial should be formally moved into evidence if there is any doubt as to whether they will be needed on appeal. If you had previously moved for summary judgment and lost, make sure you take the necessary steps at trial to preserve those summary judgment issues, especially in jurisdictions that do not allow interlocutory appeals.

Another important aspect of the trial is the jury instructions. Jury instructions should always be complete. Remember that the instructions you propose can be denied without error if any aspect of them is not accurate, so break them into small bites so that the judge can at least accept some parts. Specifically object to any jury instructions as necessary before the jury begins its deliberations. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c). Failure to do so will waive the right to have the instruction considered on appeal. See, e.g., ChooseCo, LLC v. Lean Forward Media, LLC, 364 Fed. Appx. 670, 672 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that defendant’s objection to jury instructions and verdict form during jury deliberations did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c) and noting that the “[f]ailure to object to a jury instruction or the form of an interrogatory prior to the jury retiring results in a waiver of that objection.”).

Additionally, when you lodge your objections, make sure you explain why the jury charge is in error since general objections are insufficient. See, e.g., Victory Outreach Center v. Meslo, 281 Fed. Appx. 136, 139 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that general objection to the court’s jury instructions and proposed alternative instructions, “were insufficient to preserve on appeal all potential challenges to the instructions” and were not in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)(1)). If possible, have a set of written objections to the other side’s jury charges, and get the judge to rule on that, since judges like to hold such conferences off the record. Also, do not overlook the verdict form. Know that when you agree to a particular form (general or special), that will mean that you are probably taking certain risks and waiving certain arguments one way or the other. Give this thought, and make sure that you know the rules of your jurisdiction on verdict forms so you can object if necessary. See, e.g., Palm Bay Intern., Inc. v. Marchesi Di Barolo S.P.A., 796 F.Supp. 2d 396, 409 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (objection to verdict sheet should be made before jury retires); Saridakis v. South Broward Hosp. Dist., 2010 WL 2274955, at *8 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (noting that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(c)(2)(B) states that an objection is timely if “a party objects promptly after learning that the instruction or request will be … given or refused” and that the Eleventh Circuit “require[s] a party to object to a … jury verdict form prior to jury deliberations” or the party “waives its right to raise the issue on appeal.”). (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Finally, pay careful attention to the closing argument. This can be an area where winning at trial by convincing a jury may be at odds with preserving the issue on appeal. On the flip side, many litigators are loath to interrupt a closing argument to object. If you need to object to preserve an issue, do so.

Post-Judgment – Final Things to Consider

First, determine whether certain arguments must be made post-judgment to preserve those arguments for appeal. Some arguments (such as those attacking the sufficiency of the evidence) must be made at that time or they are waived. See, e.g., Webster v. Bass Enterprises Production Co., 114 Fed.Appx. 604, 605 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that failure to challenge back pay award in post-judgment motion waived the issue on appeal absent exceptional circumstances that did not exist). Written motions post-judgment should include all relevant references to trial transcripts and evidence to make as complete and clean a factual record as possible

Second, when the appellate record is being compiled, carefully double check the record to ensure its accuracy. Many times the trial court clerk or court reporter accidentally omits portions of the record. If this is not caught and corrected in a timely manner, you may be stuck with a bad record. Most jurisdictions have procedures in place for supplementing and correcting the record but understand them well in advance so there is adequate time to address any discrepancies before the appellate briefing is due.

Conclusion

Too often even seasoned trial lawyers get tripped up on appeal by not having an orderly and complete record. A litigator must never lose sight of the factual and legal issues in a case and what an appellate court will need to consider in making the desired determinations. As demonstrated above, a winning record requires thought at all stages of the litigation, not just when the notice of appeal is filed. With proper preparation, attention to detail, and forethought, one can ensure that the proper record on appeal is never in doubt.

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/ “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will show you step-by-step litigation solutions helping you challenge these fraudsters and ultimately saving your home from foreclosure either through loan modification or “Pro Se” litigation visit: https://fightforeclosure.net/foreclosure-defense-package/

What Every Homeowner in Foreclosure Need to Know About Bankruptcy Appeals

27 Wednesday Dec 2017

Posted by in Bankruptcy, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies

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Every appeal requires an appellate advocate to understand and follow a series of rules. When an appeal is from a decision by a federal bankruptcy court, there is yet another layer of rules and complexity to consider. This article briefly identifies a dozen important points
about bankruptcy appeals.

1. The Time for Filing a Notice of Appeal in a Bankruptcy Appeal Is Generally Shorter Than in Other Appeals.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rule”) 8002(a), a party seeking to appeal a decision by a bankruptcy court has 10 days to file its appeal.1 This is 20 days less than the 30 days a party generally is given under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (“F.R.A.P.”) to appeal from district court to a federal appellate court.2 As with F.R.A.P. 4(a)(5), the Bankruptcy Rules permit some leeway if an appellant misses its deadline. Under the Bankruptcy Rules, a bankruptcy court may allow an appellant who fails to timely file up to 20 additional days to file where that appellant can demonstrate “excusable neglect.”3 After 30 days, however, a bankruptcy appellant loses its right to appeal even if there is excusable neglect.4 Factors to be considered in determining whether there is excusable neglect include the danger of prejudice to the appellee; the length of delay and its impact on the judicial proceeding; the reason for the delay; whether the delay was in the movant’s control; and the movant’s good faith.5

2. An Appellant May Waive an Issue Not Raised at the Outset of its Bankruptcy Appeal.
Under Bankruptcy Rule 8006, within 10 days of filing its Notice of
Appeal, an appellant must file and serve a designation of the items to be
included in the record on appeal and a statement of issues to be presented
on appeal. If an appellant fails to include an issue in this Statement, the
issue is waived even if this had been raised and/or decided by the bankruptcy
court.6

3. Those Who Ignore Deadlines and Procedural Rules May Forfeit Their Appeal.
Bankruptcy Rule 8001(a) authorizes dismissal of a bankruptcy appeal when a party fails to take any required step other than filing its Notice of Appeal. Courts adjudicating bankruptcy appeals may dismiss appeals when a party fails to take a necessary step, such as filing its record designations, statement of issues or its brief.7
While the Bankruptcy Rules permit dismissal, however, certain circuits require the appellate court to weigh a series of factors before it dismisses a case in its entirety. For example, the Third Circuit requires the balancing of six factors before a case is dismissed. These are:
• The extent of the party’s personal responsibility;
• The prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling
orders;
• A history of dilatoriness;
• Whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad
faith;
• The effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an
analysis of alternative sanctions;
• The meritoriousness of the claim or defense.8

4. In Five Circuits, Bankruptcy Appeals May Be Heard in the First Instance by Two Different Types of Courts.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1), an appellant in an appeal from bankruptcy court may choose in the first instance to appeal either to a district court acting as an appellate court or, if the relevant circuit provides for one, to a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”). Even if the appellant chooses a BAP, however, any other party to the appeal may, no later than 30 days after service of the notice of appeal, ask to have the appeal heard by the relevant district court. The First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits each have a BAP. If an appeal is to a BAP, then the Bankruptcy judge’s decision will be reviewed by fellow sitting bankruptcy judges.

Usually a BAP consists of three sitting bankruptcy judges in the circuit who are assembled for a particular day of argument. By their very nature, BAPs will consist of judges who have special expertise regarding bankruptcy issues, while district courts may not. The BAP may sit in different places in the circuit. For example, the Eighth Circuit BAP conducts hearing in Omaha, St. Louis, Kansas City, and other locations where its bankruptcy courts sit.

5. BAP Rules Vary by Circuit.
Just like the individual federal circuit courts of appeal, the various BAPs each have their own rules. These vary between each circuit. Any party in a BAP appeal, therefore should know the specifics and particularities of the specific BAP’s rules and should follow these.
Among these specialized rules, for example, are that, in the Eighth Circuit BAP, parties are limited to opening briefs of 6500 words.9 The Ninth Circuit BAP Rules provide that only those portions of transcripts included in the excerpts of the record will be considered in an appeal and that these must include excerpts necessary for the BAP to apply the required standard of review to a matter.10 The First Circuit BAPRules generally limit argument to 15 minutes per side.11 The Tenth Circuit BAP requires that a brief include a statement of related cases—i.e., one that includes the same litigants and substantially the same fact pattern or legal issues – that are
pending in any other federal court.12 The Sixth Circuit BAP Rules provide
for a possible pre-argument conference and mediation.13

6. The Bankruptcy Rules Generally Govern Appeals to the District Court.
As noted in the prior section, BAPs have elaborate rules that govern all aspects of appeals before them. By the terms of the Bankruptcy Rules, these specific rules can supersede conflicting terms in the Bankruptcy Rules. However, when an appeal is to the district court, the Bankruptcy Rules generally apply in the absence of a local rule or district court rule specifically addressing bankruptcy appeals, which are much less common.

While not as comprehensive as the F.R.A.P., the Bankruptcy Rules have 20 provisions governing all aspects of appeals.14 These rules addresses appellate issues, including, among others, the filing and service of appellate papers;15 the filing and service of briefs and appendices;16 the form of briefs and their length;17 motions;18 oral argument;19 disposition of the appeal;20 costs;21 and rehearing,22 among others. (These rules also provide for the accelerated filing of district court appeals, as an appellant is to serve and file its brief within 15 days after entry of the appeal on the docket; the appellant is to serve its brief within 15 days after service of the appellant’s brief and the appellant is to serve its reply within 10 days after service of the appellee’s brief.)23 In the absence of rules to the contrary, opening briefs may be up to 50 pages and reply briefs up to 25 pages.
Under Bankruptcy Rule 8012, oral argument is to be generally allowed in all cases. In practice, however, oral argument is much less common before district courts. When an appeal is before district court, there is some question about whether its decision has precedential effect.24

7. Bankruptcy Appeals Often Include an Extra Tier of Review.
Generally, before an appeal reaches a federal circuit court of appeals, it is adjudicated by either a BAP or a district court. The findings of these first tier courts are not binding on the circuit court of appeals and, the appellate court owes no deference to the decisions by the BAP or district court.
Review by the circuit court of appeals is plenary.25 Nonetheless, some circuit courts have noted that the first tier of appeal acts as a helpful filter.26
An appellate court may reach issues brought up before but not decided by the district court or BAP.27

8. Direct Appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals Is Allowed in Limited Instances.
Pursuant to Section 1233 of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”), a circuit court of appeals has discretion to permit a direct appeal frombankruptcy court where there is uncertainty in the bankruptcy court, either due to the absence of a controlling legal decision or a conflicting decision on the issue and the issue is of great importance, or where the court finds it is patently obvious that the bankruptcy court’s decision either was correct or incorrect, such that the first tier of review in the district court or BAP is less efficient and helpful.28

9. At Each Tier of the Appeal, The Bankruptcy Court Is Given the Same Level of Deference and Same Form of Scrutiny.
Courts in bankruptcy appeals review issues of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error.29 Courts of appeal apply the same standard of review as do BAPs and district courts.30 Courts of appeal generally review issues of procedure under an abuse of discretion standard. These include motions to compromise or to lift a stay, for example.31

10. This Is a Greater Threat of Mootness in Bankruptcy Appeals Than in Other Federal Appeals.
A bankruptcy appeal may become constitutionally moot where events may occur that make it impossible for the appellate court to fashion effective relief.32 Thus, for example, if, while an appeal is pending, a plan is confirmed pursuant to which all assets are distributed, all creditors with allowed claims are paid in full, and the bankruptcy case is closed such that the debtor no longer exists, an appeal against that debtor is moot because there is no meaningful relief that may be granted.33 An appeal may also be considered “equitably moot” where a change in circumstances makes it inequitable for a court to consider the merits of an appeal.34
However, if there remains any possibility that an appeal may result in a tangible benefit to the appellant, it is not moot.35

11. Only Those Persons Aggrieved Have Standing to Bring a Bankruptcy Appeal.
Only those whose rights or interests are directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by an order of the bankruptcy court have standing to bring an appeal.36

12. Appellate Courts Take a Broader Notion of “Finality” in Bankruptcy Appeals Than in Other Appeals.
Because of the length of many bankruptcy proceedings and the waste of time and resources that may result if the court denied immediate appeals, federal courts of appeal apply a broader concept of “finality” when considering bankruptcy appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 than in considering non-bankruptcy appeals.37 Courts apply a number of factors in determining whether to assert appellate jurisdiction. These include:
1) the impact on the assets of the bankruptcy estate;
2) the necessity for further fact-finding on remand;
3) the preclusive effect of the court’s decision on the merits in further litigation,
and
4) the interest of judicial economy.38
Each of these issues, of course, could justify an article in itself. I hope
these provide some helpful thoughts and issues to consider when participating
in a bankruptcy appeal.
NOTE
1 Certain types of motions toll this time for filing until the last such motion
is disposed of. See Bankruptcy Rule 8002(b).
2 See F.R.A.P.4(a).
3 Bankruptcy Rule 8002(c)(2); Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b). Of course where
an appeal is from a district court to a federal circuit court on a bankruptcy
issue, F.R.A.P. 4’s 30-day rule applies.
4 See Shareholders v. Sound Radio, Inc., 109 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1997).
The law is unsettled as to whether bankruptcy appellate deadlines are “jurisdictional,”
such that objections to untimeliness may be waived if not promptly
made. See In re Fryer, 2007 WL 1667198 (3d Cir. June 11, 2007) (citing
Kontrick v. Ryan 540 U.S. 443 (2004), and Eberhart v United States, 546 U.S.
12 (2005)).
5 See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’Ship, 507 U.S. 380,
395 (1993).
6 See In re GGM, P.C., 165 F.3d 1026, 1032 (5th Cir. 1999). Of course, one
may not first raise new issues on appeal that were not presented before the
bankruptcy court. See In re Ginther Trusts, 238 F.3d 686, 689 & n.3. (5th Cir.
2001).
7 See, e.g., In re Lynch, 430 F.3d 600 (Cir. 2005); In re Braniff Airways, Inc.,
774 F.2d 1303, 1305 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985).
8 Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d. Cir. 1984).
See also In re Harris, 464 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2006) (failure to include required
transcript of oral argument did not warrant dismissal of appeal where lesser
sanctions were available); In re Beverly Mfg. Corp., 778 F.2d 666, 667 (11th
Cir. 1985) (“Dismissal typically occurs in cases showing consistently dilatory
conduct or the complete failure to take any steps other than the mere filing
of a notice of appeal.”).
9 8th Cir. BAP Rule 8010A.
10 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8006-1.
11 1st Cir. BAP Rule 8012-1.
12 10th Cir. BAP Rule 8010-1.
13 6th Cir. BAP Rule 8080-2.
14 Bankruptcy Rules 8001-8020.
15 Bankruptcy Rule 8008.
16 Bankruptcy Rule 8009.
17 Bankruptcy Rule 8010.
18 Bankruptcy Rule 8011.
19 Bankruptcy Rule 8012.
20 Bankruptcy Rule 8013.
21 Bankruptcy Rule 8014.
22 Bankruptcy Rule 8015.
23 Bankruptcy Rule 8009.
24 See In re Shattuck Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557, 565 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
25 See In re Best Prods. Co., 68 F.3d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1995).
26 See Weber v. United States Trustee, 484 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In many
cases involving unsettled areas of bankruptcy law, review by the district court
would be most helpful. Courts of appeal benefit immensely from reviewing
the efforts of the district court to resolve such questions”).
27 See Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2004).
28 See Weber, 484 F.3d at 157 (citing BAPCPA § 1233, 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(d)(2)(a)(i)-(iii)).
29 See In re ABC-Naco, Inc., 483 F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2007).
30 See In re Senior Cottages of Am., 482 F.3d 997, 1000-1001 (8th Cir. 2002)
31 See In re Martin, 222 Fed. Appx. 360, 362 (5th Cir. 2007).
32 See In re Focus Media Inc., 378 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004).
33 See In re State Line Hotel, Inc., 2007 WL 1961935 (9th Cir. July 5, 2007);
see also Gardens of Cortez v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 585 F.2d 975,
978 (10th Cir. 1978) (dismissal of bankruptcy petition moots appeal to lift
stay).
34 See Ederel Sport v. Gotcha, Int’l, L.P., 311 B.R. 250, 254 (9th Cir. BAP
2004).
35 See In re Howard’s Express, Inc., 151 Fed. Appx. 46 (Oct. 5, 2005) (conversion
from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 did not moot appeal because liquidation
was not complete and preference actions remained to be tried, which
could generate assets to satisfy claims of appellants).
36 See In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 249 (3d Cir. 2000).
37 See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 196, 203 (3d Cir. 2005).
38 Id.

What Homeowners Should Know About Appeals at the 9th Circuit

28 Monday Nov 2016

Posted by in Appeal, Bankruptcy, Fed, Federal Court, Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Landlord and Tenant, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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The Ninth Circuit uses a limited en banc system for en banc matters because of its size, with 11 judges comprising an en banc panel;

The Chief Judge is always one of the 11 en banc judges;

The Ninth Circuit currently has 29 active judges and 15 judges on senior status;

Active judges are expected to hear 32 days of oral arguments per year;

Judges are assigned to hear cases by rotation, and no preference is given for judges from those jurisdictions;

Oral argument are scheduled on certain dates;

Filings for are currently down 3% compared to last year;

Pro Se filings account for 51% of the documents filed with the court;

The largest category of pro se litigants are prisoners;

48% of all immigration appeals in the US are filed in the Ninth Circuit;

From the entry of the final order of the lower court or agency to final Ninth Circuit disposition: 32.6 months
From the filing of the law brief to oral argument or submission on briefs: 8.7 months in the Ninth Circuit (4.1 months nationally);

The court is permitted to move cases up in priority;

Priority is set by a staff attorney who assigns a number to each case based on a point system: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, and 24. Cases assigned 1 or 2 go to the screening panel for disposition. Cases assigned 24 always get oral argument, and involve matters like the death penalty. Cases assigned 3, 5, 7, or 10, will depend on the number of parties, the types of issues, etc. These cases may get oral argument, or be submitted on briefs;

The assignment of the panel of judges is separate from assignment of cases;

Panels are set 1 year in advance;

The clerk’s office assigns cases based on a formula that includes priority 99% of petitions for rehearing en banc are rejected – a judge on the court must initiate the process for en banc rehearing, and a judge may do so even if there is no petition for rehearing en banc filed;

If there is a second appeal to the court in the same case, the case is first presented to the original panel to see if they want to decide the second appeal – usually the panel will take back the case in approximately 1/4 to 1/3 of cases – if you want the same panel, file a motion to ask to have the case assigned to the same panel, but give good reasons why;

Generally, most general civil appeals where the parties are represented by attorneys will get set for oral argument – but about 20-25% that are assigned to oral argument will ultimately be submitted on briefs instead.

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at http://www.fightforeclosure.net “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will show you step-by-step litigation solutions helping you challenge these fraudsters and ultimately saving your home from foreclosure either through loan modification or “Pro Se” litigation visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

What Homeowners Must Know About Jurisprudential Exceptions to the Final Judgment

02 Saturday Apr 2016

Posted by in Appeal, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Manu Homeowners in foreclosure litigations are confused as to what Court Orders should or should not be appealled. This post is designed to help clear those confusions as to what is appealable.

The primary gatekeeper at the door to the federal courts of appeals is the rule that only final judgments are appealable. The final judgment rule has performed this role well, for the most part. In certain cases, however, a trial court’s error on an interlocutory issue is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. To deal with this type of injustice, the courts and Congress have created a patchwork of exceptions to the final judgment rule.

A. Collateral Order Doctrine:

The collateral order doctrine is sometimes called the Cohen collateral order doctrine, named for the landmark United States Supreme Court decision, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). When we talk about an order being final and appealable under the collateral order doctrine, we are still talking about an order that is appealable under section 1291.
The general rule is that “a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered, in which claims of district court error at any stage of the litigation can be ventilated.” Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994). Accordingly, as noted in the preceding section, a decision is ordinarily considered final and appealable under section 1291 only if it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); see Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 863 (quoting Catlin). The Supreme Court has recognized, however, “a narrow class of collateral orders which do not meet this definition of finality, but which are nevertheless immediately appealable under § 1291.” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996). “Since Cohen, [the Supreme Court has] had many opportunities to revisit and refine the collateral-order exception to the final-judgment rule.” Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 276 (1988).

1. Three-prong test for the collateral order doctrine.

The Supreme Court has articulated a threeprong test to determine whether an order that does not finally resolve litigation is nonetheless appealable under section 1291. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
First, the order must “conclusively determine the disputed question.” Id. Second, the order must “resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action.” Id. Third and finally, the order must be “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 431 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468); accord Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 202 (1999) (“[C]ertain orders may be appealed, notwithstanding the absence of final judgment, but only when they ‘are conclusive, . . . resolve important questions separate from the merits, and . . . are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.’” (quoting Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995))); see also Doleac ex rel. Doleac v. Michalson, 264 F.3d 470, 490-91 (5th Cir. 2001) (restating the Cohen test as a four-step analysis: the decision (1) cannot be tentative, informal, or incomplete; (2) must deal with claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action; (3) must be effectively unreviewable on the appeal from final judgment; and (4) must involve an issue too important to be denied review).

Under the first prong—that the order conclusively determine the disputed question—the Supreme Court has observed that there are two kinds of nonfinal orders: those that are “inherently tentative,” and those that, although technically amendable, are “made with the expectation that they will be the final word on the subject addressed.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 n.14 (1983). The latter category of orders meets the first prong of the collateral order doctrine.
Under the second prong—that the issue be separate from the merits—the Court has described it as a “distillation of the principle that there should not be piecemeal review of ‘steps towards final judgment in which they will merge.’” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 12 n.13 (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546). A classic case meeting the third p r o n g of the c o l l a t e r a l o r d e r doctrine—unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment—are denials of immunity from suit. As the Fifth Circuit explained in a recent case involving an appeal from a district court order denying a sheriff’s motion for summary judgment in an “official capacity” suit,

Official-capacity suits, in contrast [to
personal-capacity suits], ‘generally
represent only another way of pleading
an action against an entity of which an
officer is an agent.’” . . . [T]he plea
[here] ranks as a ‘mere defense to
liability’” [rather than immunity from
suit]. Because an erroneous ruling on
liability may be reviewed effectively on
appeal from final judgment, the order
denying the Sheriff’s summary
judgment motion in this “official
capacity” suit was not an appealable
collateral order.

Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 476-77 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); see Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 202. As its stringent requirements indicate, the collateral order doctrine is not to be applied liberally. “Rather, the doctrine “is ‘extraordinarily limited’ in its application.” Pan E. Exploration Co. v. Hufo Oils, 798 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1986). Moreover, appealability under the collateral order doctrine must be determined “without regard to the chance that the litigation might be speeded, or a ‘particular injustice’ averted by a prompt appellate court decision.” Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 868.

2. Examples of orders appealable under the collateral order doctrine.

A. Orders denying claims of immunity from suit asserted in a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment when the order is based on a conclusion of law:

  • Qualified immunity. Swint, 514 U.S. at 42 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)); Gentry v. Lowndes County, 337 F.3d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 2003); Martinez v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 300 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2002).
  • Immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 1999); Stena Rederi A.B. v. Comision de Contratos, 923 F.2d 380, 385-86 (5th Cir. 1991).
  • Absolute immunity. Swint, 514 U.S. at 42 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, and Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982)).
  • Eleventh Amendment immunity. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993); Martinez v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 300 F.3d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 2002); Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 F.3d 974, 976 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Sherwinski v. Peterson, 98 F.3d 849, 851 (5th Cir. 1996) (denial of state’s motion to dismiss is appealable even if the district court’s order is not based on an express finding of no immunity if the end result is the same).
  • Refusal to rule on a claim of immunity from suit. Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1986).
  • Successive appeal of denial of qualified immunity defense. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996) (holding that there can be two interlocutory appeals under the collateral order doctrine of denials of qualified immunity defenses in the same case: one appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss, and a second appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment).
  •  B. Abstention-based stay, dismissal, and remand orders:
  • Under Colorado River abstention. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 9 (abstention-based stay order).
  • Under Burford abstention. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996) (abstention-based remand order).
  • Under Pullman abstention. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 9 & n.8 (citing Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 (1962)).

A district court order abstaining may take the form of an abstention-based stay order or an abstentionbased remand order. The Supreme Court addressed the appealability of abstention-based remand orders in Quackenbush. Most “remand” orders—those remanding removed cases back to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction—are not reviewable by appeal or otherwise because of the bar to appellate review embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 714. If, on the other hand, a district court remands a case to state court for a reason other than lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, for example, in the interest of docket congestion, the bar to review in section 1447(d) does not apply, and the decision is reviewable. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 352-53 (1976).

C. Pre-remand decisions made by a district court if that decision is “separable” from the remand order and independently reviewable through a mechanism such as the collateral order doctrine.

  • Dahiya v. Talmidge Int’l, Ltd., No. 02-31068, 2004 WL 1098838 (5th Cir. May 18, 2004) (citing City of Waco v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 293 U.S. 140 (1934); Heaton v. Monogram Credit Card Bank, 297 F.3d 416, 421 (5th Cir. 2002); Doleac ex rel. Doleac v. Michalson, 264 F.3d 470, 486 (5th Cir. 2001); Arnold v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 277 F.3d 772, 776 (5th Cir. 2001); Linton v. Airbus Industrie, 30 F.3d 592, 597 (5th Cir. 1994); Angelides v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 117 F.3d 833, 837 (5th Cir. 1997)); Soley v. First Nat’l Bank, 923 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1991); see also In re Benjamin Moore & Co., 318 F.3d 626 (5th Cir. 2002) (addressing the separable order doctrine to determine if collateral order doctrine conferred jurisdiction on the court to review the order of remand in a mandamus proceeding).

D. Order denying motions to intervene. Edward v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 992 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). But see Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987) (order granting motion to intervene but conditioning or restricting it is not immediately appealable; appeal must await final judgment).

E. Order deciding that plaintiff is not required to post security for payment of costs. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 547.

F. Order denying appointment of counsel to litigants who cannot afford counsel. Robbins v. Maggio, 750 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1985).

G. Order remanding action to state court pursuant to a contract between the parties. McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters, 944 F.2d
1199 (5th Cir. 1991).

H. Discovery orders directed to third parties. Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11 (1992) (Although discovery orders are normally reviewed by mandamus or on appeal from a contempt order, “A discovery order directed at a disinterested third party is treated as an immediately appealable final order because the third party presumably lacks a sufficient stake in the proceeding to risk contempt by refusing compliance.”).

I. Pre-contempt appeals by the President of the United States to avoid unnecessary constitutional confrontations between two coordinate branches of government. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). (Watch out for the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Cheney v. United States District Court (No. 03-475), in which one of the issues before the Supreme Court is “whether the court of appeals had mandamus or appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s unprecedented discovery orders in this litigation” that, unlike United States v. Nixon, accepted a claim of executive privilege? Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 1391 (2004) (denying motion to recuse); see Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 958 (2003) (No. 03-475) (granting certiorari)).

J. Order requiring turnover of documents claimed to be privileged as attorney work product when the documents are already in the court’s possession because, “if the court already has lawful possession of the documents, a subsequent turnover order will be immediately enforceable without the necessity of holding the subpoenaed party in contempt.” In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 43 F.3d 966, 970 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918)).

K. Turnover order allowing a receiver to take possession of and sell corporate assets of nonparties. Maiz v. Virani, 311 F.3d 334, 339 n.4 (5th Cir. 2002).

L. Order approving receiver’s plan to distribute assets of investment company whose assets were frozen after the SEC investigated it for securities fraud. SEC v. Forex Asset Mgmt. LLC, 242 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 2001).

M. Order refusing to modify a prior consent decree where enforcement of the consent decree ran afoul of the State’s Eleventh Amendment Immunity. Frazar v. Gilbert, 300 F.3d 530, (5th Cir. 2002) (finding order also reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291(a) because it was an order “refusing to dissolve or modify” an injunction), rev’d on other grounds, Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 124 S. Ct. 899 (2004).

N. Order determining that former Department of Justice attorneys were eligible to act as fact and expert witnesses for private party in civil rights suit brought by government. EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 202 F.3d 755, 757 (5th Cir. 2000).

O. Orders affecting the media’s First Amendment rights. United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 913 n.8 (5th Cir. 2001) (orders protecting juror anonymity (citing United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1206-07 (5th Cir. 1977)); Ford v. City of Huntsville, 242 F.3d 235, 240 (5th Cir. 2001) (court closure orders or confidentiality orders (citing Davis v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 78 F.3d 920, 926 (5th Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 2000) (gag order that applied to attorneys, parties, and witnesses and prohibited them from discussing case with any public communications media was appealable under the collateral order doctrine by criminal defendant in whose trial the gag order was issued). But see United States v. Edwards, 206 F.3d 461, 462 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (collateral order doctrine did not apply to criminal defendant’s motion to lift gag order).

3. Examples of orders not appealable under the collateral order doctrine.

A. Order denying a motion to stay or dismiss federal court litigation under Colorado River abstention. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 275 (1988).

B. Order denying summary judgment motion based on Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
Acoustic Sys., Inc. v. Wenger Corp., 207 F.3d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 2000).

C. Order denying claim of immunity from liability (as opposed to immunity from suit). Swint, 514 U.S. at 42 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526).

D. Order denying claim of immunity from suit that turns on factual determinations. Stena Rederi A.B. v. Comision de Contratos, 923 F.2d 380, 385-86 (5th Cir. 1991). But cf. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528 (the resolution of legal issues which are appealable under the collateral order doctrine often will entail some “consideration of the factual allegations that make up the plaintiff’s claim for relief”).

E. Order denying claim of immunity from suit based on sufficiency of the evidence, i.e., whether there is a genuine issue of fact. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995); Kinney v. Weaver, No. 00-40557, 2004 WL 811724, at *6 n.9 (5th Cir. Apr 15, 2004); Martinez v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 300 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2002) (“For a qualified immunity appeal, however, our review of any factual disputes is limited to their materiality, not their genuineness.”).

F. In rare instances, denial of claims of immunity on the eve of trial. Edwards v. Cass County, 919 F.2d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 1990) (“If every denial of a motion for leave to file a summary judgment motion asserting qualified immunity were immediately appealable, defendants would have a guaranteed means of obtaining last-minute continuances. We read Mitchell v. Forsyth as affording defendants a reasonable opportunity to obtain review of their qualified immunity claims without losing part of their immunity rights by having to stand trial. However, Mitchell is not designed as an automatic exemption from the orderly processes of docket control.” “To hold otherwise would be to open the floodgates to appeals by defendants seeking delay by asserting qualified immunity at the last minute (or even, as here, following jury selection).”).

G. Order denying the summary judgment of government officials sued in their personal or individual capacities is not an appealable collateral order. Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 476-77 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Swint, 514 U.S. at 42).

H. Order denying or granting stays pending arbitration. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc. v. Birenbaum, 860 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1988).

I. Order denying certification of a class. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 935 (now appealable by permission under Rule 23(f)).

J. Order denying motion to disqualify counsel. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375 (1981).

K. Order granting motion to disqualify. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985)

L. Order refusing to enforce a settlement agreement claimed by a party to protect it from suit. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994).

M. Order denying a motion to dismiss based on the invalidity of service of process claiming immunity from such process. Van Cauwenberghe v. Baird, 486 U.S. 517, 521 (1988).

N. Orders concerning post-judgment discovery. Piratello v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 360 F.3d 506, 508 (5th Cir. 2004) (order compelling party to appear at a deposition by a particular date, to answer questions regarding assets, and to produce documents requested, over a claim of self-incrimination; no jurisdiction over district court’s order under 1291 or collateral order doctrine; instead, the remedy was by appealing a contempt order)

Piratello, 360 F.3d at 508 (“This court has indicated its agreement with the Fourth Circuit’s view that the availability of an appeal through a contempt order renders the collateral order doctrine inapplicable to discovery orders. See A-Mark Auction Galleries, 233 F.3d at 898-99 (noting, with approval, the holding of MDK, Inc. v. Mike’s Train House, Inc., 27 F.3d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1994)).”). In MDK, the Fourth Circuit said: “Courts have long recognized that a party sufficiently exercised over a discovery order may resist that order, be cited for contempt, and then challenge the propriety of the discovery order in the course of appealing the contempt citation. [citations omitted] Indeed, the Supreme Court has pointed to this path to appellate review as a reason why discovery orders are not appealable under Cohen.” MDK, Inc., 27 F.3d at 121

O. As a general matter, pre-trial discovery orders do not constitute final decisions under § 1291, and therefore, are not immediately appealable. See A-Mark Auction Galleries, Inc. v. Am. Numismatic Ass’n, 233 F.3d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11 (1992)); see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981).
The Supreme Court has held that a party that wishes to immediately appeal a discovery order “must [first] refuse compliance, be held in contempt, and then appeal the contempt order.” Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 18 n.11 (citing United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971)). See infra p. 43 (mandamus may also be available when the discovery order requires disclosure of information claimed to be privileged).

P. Order granting or denying a motion to transfer venue under section 1404(a). Brinar v. Williamson, 245 F.3d 515, 517-18 (5th Cir. 2001); La. Ice Cream Distribs. v. Carvel Corp., 821 F.2d 1031, 1033 (5th Cir. 1987).

Q. Order of civil contempt. FDIC v. LeGrand, 43 F.3d 163, 168 (5th Cir. 1995); Lamar Fin. Corp. v. Adams, 918 F.2d 564, 566 (5th Cir. 1990).

R. Order of an agency review board remanding to an ALJ for further factfinding and consideration before final agency decision is rendered. Exxon Chems. Am. v. Chao, 298 F.3d 464, 469-70 (5th Cir. 2002).

B. Other Common-Law Doctrines of Finality

1. Gillespie “pragmatic finality” doctrine

Under the Gillespie doctrine, the requirement of finality is to be given a practical rather than a technical construction in determining the appealability in marginal cases of an order falling within what the Gillespie decision called the “twilight zone” of finality. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964). Counsel should avoid relying on the Gillespie doctrine.

The Supreme Court has distinguished Gillespie on grounds that, according to Professor Wright and his collaborators, “bury it quietly.” 15A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3913, at 479 (2d ed. 1992). In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, the Supreme Court refused to apply the Gillespie doctrine to permit appeal from an order
decertifying a class action, even on the assumption that the result would be termination of the litigation. Rather than expanding Gillespie, the Court wrote that permitting such appeals under section 1291 would be plainly inconsistent with the policies underlying section 1292(b) and that “[i]f Gillespie were extended beyond the unique facts of that case, § 1291 would be stripped of all significance.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 n.30 (1978) (noting that Gillespie concerned a marginally final order disposing of an unsettled issue of national significance and that review of the issue “unquestionably implemented the same policy Congress sought to promote in §1292(b)”).

In fact, the most recent pronouncement from the Fifth Circuit about the vitality of the Gillespie doctrine is that the Fifth Circuit “no longer recognizes the exception.” Kmart Corp. v. Aronds, 123 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1997); see Sherri A.D. v. Kirby, 975 F.2d 193, 202 n.12 (5th Cir. 1992) (calling practical finality more chimerical than real); United States v. Garner, 749 F.2d 281, 288 (5th Cir. 1985) (pragmatic finality approach has been virtually limited to facts of Gillespie). As the Fifth Circuit explained, Gillespie’s case-by-case approach to determining pragmatic finality is in fundamental conflict with the values and purposes of the final-judgment rule. See Pan E. Exploration Co. v. Hufo Oils, 798 F.2d 837, 841-42 (5th Cir. 1986); Newpark Shipbuilding & Repair, Inc. v. Roundtree, 723 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).

If counsel finds a case supporting finality that sounds like it is based on practical or pragmatic finality, counsel should carefully trace the cases supporting the theory of finality to make sure that Gillespie is not the ultimate source of authority for that theory. An opinion’s pedigree is important. Counsel should make an informed decision about relying on those cases that rely on or are indirect progeny of Gillespie.

2. “Death knell” doctrine

Under the “death knell” doctrine, which is sometimes equated with the Gillespie doctrine, a case is final when a party is “effectively out of court.” Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 (1962); see McKnight v. Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1982). The doctrine provides that any decision forcing a plaintiff to give up his claim, in effect, sounds the “death knell,” making it final for purposes of appeal. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 465-69.

Like the Gillespie doctrine, many commentators have argued that the death knell doctrine is all but a dead letter. Although the Fifth Circuit in the past noted that the Supreme Court did not actually overrule the death knell doctrine in Coopers & Lybrand, see McKnight, 667 F.2d at 479, the Fifth Circuit noted that the U.S. Supreme Court’s post-Cooper decision “in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980), declared that its prior decision in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), sounded the death knell to that doctrine.” Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States Army, 639 F.2d 1100, 1103 n.3 (5th Cir. Feb. 1981).

And, more recently, the Fifth Circuit observed that the Supreme Court did “limit the death knell exception” in Coopers & Lybrand and in its later decision, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 n.11 (1983). See Kmart Corp. v. Aronds, 123 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1997).

In Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court held that Idlewild’s reasoning was limited to abstention or similar doctrines where all or an essential part of the federal suit goes to a state forum. Aronds, 123 F.3d at 300. Further, even in cases involving stays, the Fifth Circuit has stated that while it liberally construed the death knell exception in the past, it could no longer do so because the exception was limited to cases where the stay requires all or essentially all of the suit to be litigated in state court. See Aronds, 123 F.3d at 300 (citing United States v. Garner, 749 F.2d 281, 288 (5th Cir. 1985), and Kershaw v. Shalala, 9 F.3d 11, 14 (5th Cir. 1993)). And even in cases involving abstention doctrines, resort to the death knell doctrine is usually unnecessary; direct reliance may be placed on Moses H. Cone and the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996).

3. Forgay “hardship–irreparable injury” exception

The Forgay doctrine, or, as it is sometimes called the “hardship and irreparable injury” exception to the final-judgment rule, grew out of Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848). Today, the Forgay doctrine—if it has any continuing validity—is viewed a narrow exception to the final-judgment rule; it allows immediate appellate court review of district court orders that adjudicate part of one claim by directing the immediate delivery of property from one party to another, when there is the possibility that the losing party will experience irreparable harm or hardship if appeal of the execution is not allowed. Jalapeno Prop. Mgmt., LLC v. Dukas, 265 F.3d 506, 512 n.8 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Forgay, 47 U.S. at 204); see also 15A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3910, at 328 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that the Forgay doctrine “is likely to be applied only to orders that improvidently direct immediate execution of judgments that involve part of the merits of a claim and are outside the limits of Rule 54(b)”).

Although the Forgay doctrine is occasionally cited, it—like the Gillespie and death knell doctrines—is probably a dead letter. Petties v. Dist. of Columbia, 227 F.3d 469, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[W]e are not at all sure that Forgay has continuing vitality apart from the collateral order doctrine . . . .”); see Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 868 (appealability under the collateral order doctrine must be determined “without regard to the chance that the litigation might be speeded, or a ‘particular injustice’ averted by a prompt appellate court decision”); see, e.g., Maiz v. Virani, 311 F.3d 334, 339 n.4 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that it had appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine over an order directed at two nonparty corporations to turnover property “worth tens of millions of dollars”).
In fact, the two most recent Fifth Circuit cases citing the Forgay doctrine as a possible jurisprudential exception to finality were decided more than a decade ago. Goodman v. Lee, 988 F.2d 619, 626 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Forgay for a narrow proposition, but distinguishing it); Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1107 n.7 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing it in dicta).

The Forgay category of hardship finality is narrow, and according to the Wright & Miller treatise, has not generated a large number of appeals. 15A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3910 (2d ed. 1992). The most common, and the most expansive, jurisprudential exception to the finaljudgment rule is the collateral order doctrine.
Despite its stringent requirements and arguably limited applicability, the collateral order doctrine is the best chance of establishing appellate jurisdiction on a jurisprudential exception. Pan E. Exploration Co. v. Hufo Oils, 798 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1986). But, if the facts of your case fit into the narrow and specific facts of the Forgay doctrine, counsel may wish to consider citing both the collateral order and Forgay doctrines and reviewing the Wright & Miller treatise’s treatment of the doctrine, which argues that “within its restricted sphere it provides a highly desirable elaboration of the final judgment rule.” 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra, § 3910, at 329 (2d ed. 1996).

C. Procedure for Appealing Under the Collateral Order Doctrine

“An appeal taken under the collateral order doctrine is subject to all the usual appellate rules and time periods, including Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.” United States v. Moats, 961 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d 380, 386 (5th Cir. 1999) (“While we said in Moats that appeals taken pursuant to the collateral order doctrine are subject to all of the usual appellate rules governing interlocutory appeals, we also specifically identified Rule 4.”). A party seeking to appeal under the collateral order doctrine should follow the appeal procedures under FED. R. APP. P. 4 that apply to appeals “as of right” from traditional final judgments (e.g., invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction by filing a notice of appeal in the district court within the time specified by FED. R. APP. P. 4).

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at http://www.fightforeclosure.net “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will show you step-by-step litigation solutions helping you challenge these fraudsters and ultimately saving your home from foreclosure either through loan modification or “Pro Se” litigation visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

Effective Use of Injunctions Can Make or Break Homeowner’s Foreclosure Case

02 Saturday Apr 2016

Posted by in Appeal, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Your Legal Rights

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CASE STUDY: 5 F.3d 539 Unpublished Disposition

Effective Foreclosure Defense requires timing. If you time correctly, you can save your home. Homeowners presently in litigation must use injunctions to their advantage. Ignorance will not be to your advantage.

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

In re Evalyn PREBLICH, Debtor.
Evalyn PREBLICH, Appellant,
v.
Kenneth W. BATTLEY; Dennis Sammut, Appellees.

No. 92-36540.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 11, 1993.*
Decided Aug. 24, 1993.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska; No. CV-91-419-HRH, H. Russel Holland, Chief District Judge, Presiding.

D. Alaska

AFFIRMED.

Before PREGERSON, BRUNETTI and RYMER, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM**

Chapter 7 debtor Evalyn Preblich appeals pro se from the district court’s affirmance of a bankruptcy court order authorizing the sale of certain bankruptcy estate property near Hope, Alaska to appellee Dennis Sammut by appellee-trustee Kenneth W. Battley. The district court held that because Preblich had failed to obtain a stay pending appeal, her challenge to the sale was moot under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 363(m). Preblich also petitions this court to stay the present appeal pending resolution by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of an allegedly related matter arising from the same bankruptcy. Sammut, meanwhile, moves this court to strike Preblich’s Reply Brief.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. We affirm the order of the district court, and deny the motions of both parties.

I. MOOTNESS

The district court ruled that Preblich’s challenge to the bankruptcy court’s authorization of the sale of the subject property was moot under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 363(m) because she had failed to obtain a stay pending appeal. Preblich does not dispute the fact that she did not obtain a stay, but instead offers reasons why this situation should be excepted from the stay requirement. After careful consideration of these arguments, we conclude that all of them lack merit.

Section 363(m) provides that an appeal from the bankruptcy court’s authorization of the sale of certain property cannot affect the rights of a good faith purchaser, unless the debtor stays the sale pending an appeal.1 We have applied this statute strictly, and have recognized only two situations in which failure to obtain a stay will not render an appeal moot: “(1) where real property is sold to a creditor subject to the right of redemption and (2) where state law would otherwise permit the transaction to be set aside.” In re Mann, 907 F.2d 923, 926 (9th Cir.1990) (internal citations omitted). We have done so in the interest of promoting finality in bankruptcy. See In re Onouli-Kona Land Co., 846 F.2d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir.1988).

Preblich argues that her appeal of the sale authorization order is not moot because she holds a statutory right of redemption in the subject property which would authorize the setting aside of the sale under state law. Preblich fails, however, to explain either the factual or statutory basis of this claim. Indeed, she cites no Alaska law whatsoever for the proposition that the trustee’s sale of the property in this case may be set aside for any reason. Our own research, reveals that Alaska statutes do recognize a right of redemption, but only where property is sold to satisfy a judgment or other lien. See Alaska Stat. Secs. 09.35.250 (redemption by judgment debtor or successor), 09.45.190 (redemption after foreclosure of lien) (1983). The sale at issue here falls into neither of these categories; it was an ordinary sale of estate assets for the purposes of bankruptcy liquidation.

Preblich also argues that section 363(m) is not applicable to her appeal because Sammut did not purchase the property in “good faith” within the meaning of the statute. Specifically, Preblich contends that the sale price was not adequate, that the auction was not adequately advertised, and that the trustee agreed to pay for unnecessarily expensive environmental cleanup measures. We have defined a lack of good faith under this statute to constitute “fraud, collusion … or an attempt to take grossly unfair advantage of other bidders.” Onouli-Kona Land Co., 846 F.2d at 1173.

After reviewing Preblich’s contentions, we conclude that none are sufficient to establish a lack of good faith on the part of Sammut. First of all, we have explicitly held that good faith does not depend on the value paid for the subject property. Id. at 1174. Preblich’s contentions that Sammut did not pay a sufficiently high purchase price are therefore unavailing. Second, the fact that advertisement of the property was not as extensive as Preblich wished, does not render the sale fraudulent, collusive or unfair. According to the district court, the property was advertised in the Hope-Sunrise area, and was ultimately sold at an auction in which Sammut and one other individual bid against each other. Under these circumstances, we are unable to conclude that the sale lacked good faith. Third, the fact that the trustee may have paid more than necessary for environmental cleanup in connection with the sale is entirely irrelevant to Sammut’s good faith. Although these expenditures may have effectively lowered the purchase price, the inadequacy of that price will not establish that Sammut lacked good faith.

Finally, Preblich argues that her appeal should not be adjudicated moot under section 363(m), because the trustee unlawfully exercised control over the subject property. According to Preblich, the trustee recovered the property from Preblich’s husband and son as a fraudulent conveyance, under a judgment of the bankruptcy court. Preblich contends, however, that the fraudulent conveyance judgment was in error and that the trustee did not have a right to sell the property to Sammut.

However true Preblich’s contentions may be, the fraudulent conveyance issue was the subject of a separate bankruptcy court order which was separately appealable and is not presently before this court. Moreover, a finding that the trustee had improperly recovered the subject property for the bankruptcy estate would not overcome section 363(m). In the absence of a stay, section 363(m) renders moot any action which might affect the rights of a good faith purchaser. Although we have recognized narrow exceptions to this rule, see In re Mann, 907 F.2d at 926, an erroneous fraudulent conveyance holding on the part of the bankruptcy court would satisfy none of them.

II. MOTION TO STAY THE APPEAL

Subsequent to filing the present appeal, Preblich petitioned this court to stay this proceeding pending the resolution of another matter which is pending before the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, BAP No. 92-1861. Preblich contends that “[i]f this case should be decided favorably for the appellant, the Ninth Circuit case would become moot. If it is decided unfavorably, then it will be [appealed] and consolidated with the current appeal so there will be just one appeal.” Preblich, however, gives no description of the issues involved in the BAP case or any explanation of why a favorable BAP decision would render the present appeal moot. For this reason we are not persuaded that staying the present appeal is necessary and accordingly deny Preblich’s motion.2

III. MOTION TO STRIKE

Sammut has moved to strike the Preblich’s Reply Brief on the ground that it raises matters not within the scope of her opening brief and introduces evidence which is not a part of the record. Because we reach the merits of Preblich’s appeal and reject it, we deny Sammut’s motion as moot.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s order authorizing the sale of the subject property, deny Preblich’s motion to stay the present appeal and deny Sammut’s motion to strike Preblich’s Reply Brief.

AFFIRMED.

*The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4
**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3
1 The statute explicitly provides that:

The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authorization to an entity that purchased or leased such property in good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.

11 U.S.C. Sec. 363(m).

2 Sammut suggests that the BAP case referred to by Preblich involves an attempt to reopen the adversary proceeding in which the bankruptcy court held that Preblich’s conveyance of the subject property to her husband and son was fraudulent. As we explained above, however, a finding that the conveyance was not fraudulent would not overcome the strict requirement in section 363(m) that a stay be obtained if an appellate court is to provide any relief affecting the rights of a good faith purchaser

Why Homeowners Must Effectively Use Court Injunctions To Save Their Homes

01 Friday Apr 2016

Posted by in Appeal, Bankruptcy, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, Your Legal Rights

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CASE STUDY: 893 F.2d 1338 Unpublished Disposition

Effective Foreclosure Defense requires timing. If you time correctly, you can save your home. Homeowners presently in litigation must use injunctions to their advantage. Ignorance will not be to your advantage.

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

In re James MILLER, Jr. and Pamala F. Miller,
James MILLER, Jr. and Pamala F. Miller, Appellants,
v.
LINCOLN TITLE COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 88-5687.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 30, 1989.
Decided Jan. 12, 1990.

Before WILLIAM A. NORRIS, REINHARDT and TROTT, Circuit Judges.

I. MEMORANDUM*

1 The Millers (“Debtors”) seek reversal of an order of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) denying the Debtors’ Ex Parte Motion for Order Setting Aside Default Order and dismissing as moot the Debtors’ appeal of the dismissal of their Chapter 11 petition. The Debtors base their appeal on two arguments: (1) the BAP erred in denying the Debtors’ Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the default judgment; and (2) the BAP erred in dismissing the Debtors’ appeal of the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing their Chapter 11 case on the grounds of mootness. We affirm the BAP’s order dismissing the Debtors’ appeal insofar as it relates to the automatic stay and the sale of the property, due to the mootness of that issue, and we remand to the BAP the issues of timeliness of the Debtors’ appeal to the BAP and whether dismissal of the Debtors’ Chapter 11 petition for lack of prosecution of their earlier Chapter 13 petition was proper.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

2 The Debtors filed a Chapter 11 petition on June 12, 1986. On March 9, 1987, the U.S. Trustee filed a motion to dismiss the Chapter 11 case or, alternatively, to convert it to a Chapter 7 case. On March 31, 1987, Lincoln Title Company (“Lincoln”) filed a motion to join in the motion to dismiss and its own motion for dismissal. Lincoln based its motion to dismiss on the Debtors’ previous Chapter 13 case that was dismissed for failure to prosecute.1 Lincoln asked the court to take judicial notice of the fact that the Chapter 13 was dismissed pursuant to section 109(g)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.2 On May 12, 1987, the bankruptcy court dismissed the Debtors’ Chapter 11 case based on the Debtors’ ineligibility to file the Chapter 11 case under section 109(g)(1). The order of dismissal was entered on May 15, 1987, and the Debtors filed their notice of appeal to the BAP on May 28, 1987, two days after the ten-day deadline prescribed by Bankruptcy Rule 8002. The respondent objected on the ground that the appeal was untimely and the BAP filed a conditional order of dismissal on July 22, 1987, inviting the Debtors to file a written explanation showing legal cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. On July 23, 1987, the Debtors filed a motion in opposition to the respondent’s objection. On September 9, 1987, the BAP issued an order denying the motion to dismiss. The order did not specify the BAP’s reasons for denial.
3  While the Chapter 11 case was pending, Creditway of America (“Creditway”) filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay. On September 17, 1986, the bankruptcy court entered an order modifying the automatic stay. This order denied Creditway’s motion to lift the stay subject to the following conditions to be performed by the Debtors: (1) Submission of proof of insurance on the subject property; (2) filing of schedules and statements by August 27, 1986; and (3) filing of a plan and disclosure statement on or before September 29, 1986. The order also stated that if the Debtors failed to perform any of these conditions, Creditway could file a declaration of default or order for relief from stay.
4  The Debtors complied with the first two requirements, but did not file a plan and disclosure statement by the prescribed deadline. However, the Debtors delivered a request for an extension of time to the trustee on September 26, 1986. The Trustee filed the request on September 30, 1986. On October 9, 1986, Creditway filed a document styled, “Declaration of Jeffrey A. Paris and Order Terminating Automatic Stay,” based on the Debtors’ noncompliance with the order to file a plan and disclosure statement by September 29. The Debtors claim to have received this declaration/order on October 20, 1986. On October 24, 1986, the court granted the Debtors’ request for an extension of time to file the plan and disclosure statement until October 27, 1986. On November 24, 1986, Judge Fenning signed Creditway’s proposed order terminating the automatic stay, and on December 16, 1986, entered a default order terminating the stay. The Debtors allege that neither the court nor Creditway provided them with a copy of any signed order. The Debtors did not appeal the November or December order.
5  On January 7, 1987, Creditway conducted a Trustee’s Sale of the property. The property was purchased by an independent third party. The Debtors then filed numerous papers in the state courts as well as the bankruptcy court seeking to set aside the sale. All actions were unsuccessful. In the meantime, the municipal court granted a Writ of Execution, Money Judgment for and Writ of Possession of Real Property on the foreclosed property.
6  On July 27, 1987, the bankruptcy court declined to hear the Debtors’ Complaint to Invalidate Sale of Real Property filed June 1, 1987, due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction since the bankruptcy case had been dismissed. The Debtors then filed with the BAP, on December 2, 1987, an ex parte motion to set aside the default order under Rule 60(b). The BAP denied the Debtors’ motion and dismissed their appeal as moot on January 11, 1988. The panel clarified this order at the request of the Debtors on March 11, 1988, and explained that because the order lifting the automatic stay was never appealed and the property was subsequently sold, the appeal was rendered moot. Debtors then filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit on February 10, 1988.

III. ANALYSIS

7 The court of appeals reviews a decision of the BAP de novo. Both the court of appeals and the BAP apply the same standard of review to the bankruptcy court judgment, reviewing findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard and questions of law de novo. See In re Burley, 738 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.1984).

i. The Automatic Stay.

8 We affirm the order of the BAP denying the Debtors’ Rule 60(b) motion and dismissing their appeal insofar as it affects the automatic stay. The issue of the automatic stay and the sale of the Debtors’ residence has been rendered moot by the sale of the property to an independent third party.
9  This circuit has held that where a stay pending appeal is not requested or is not granted, a party risks losing its ability to realize the benefit of a successful appeal. See In re Combined Metals Reduction Co., 557 F.2d 179 (9th Cir.1977); In re Sun Valley Ranches, Inc., 823 F.2d 1373, 1374 (9th Cir.1987) (“We have generally held that where an automatic stay is lifted, the debtor’s failure to obtain a stay pending appeal renders an appeal moot after assets in which the creditor had an interest are sold.”). Where the property has been sold to an independent third party, this circuit has held that the appeal is moot, because the court cannot grant effective relief, at least in the absence of the third party. See In re Royal Properties, Inc., 621 F.2d 984, 987 (9th Cir.1980) (“Once the orders have been performed, an appeal attacking the order is moot. Nor may the appellants attack the validity of the sale or the deed in this appeal. The purchasers of the property have not been made parties to the appeal, and we cannot grant effective relief in their absence.”).
10  In the instant case, the default order was not appealed and a stay was not requested. The Debtors claim that they did not appeal because they were not served with the signed default order within the time period for appeal. Nonetheless, because the subject property was sold to an independent third party pursuant to a bankruptcy court order, we cannot grant effective relief in a proceeding to which the purchaser is not a party. Thus, we affirm the BAP’s denial of the Debtors’ Rule 60(b) motion and its order dismissing the Debtors’ appeal insofar as it affects the automatic stay.

ii. Dismissal of the Debtors’ Chapter 11 Petition

A. Extent of Property Involved

11 The BAP dismissed the Debtors’ appeal of the order dismissing their Chapter 11 case based on the sale of the Debtors’ residence rendering the appeal moot. However, it appears that the BAP mistakenly believed that the only property involved in the Debtors’ Chapter 11 case was the Debtors’ residence. Because other property appears to be involved, we reverse the BAP’s dismissal. On remand, the BAP should determine whether the Chapter 11 case involved other property.

B. Dismissal Under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 109(g)(1).

12  The bankruptcy court dismissed the Debtors’ Chapter 11 petition under section 109(g)(1). This section bars an individual who was a debtor in a previous Title 11 case pending in the preceding 180 days from being a debtor under Title 11 if the previous case was dismissed “for willful failure to abide by orders of the court, or to appear before the court in proper prosecution.” The Debtors’ earlier Chapter 13 case was dismissed for “failure to prosecute” and their subsequent Chapter 11 petition was filed within 180 days of that dismissal. The appellees argue that the dismissal for lack of prosecution of the Chapter 13 proceeding acts as a bar to the Debtors’ Chapter 11 filing. The appellants vigorously disagree, arguing that the Chapter 13 dismissal was not based on a willful failure to prosecute and that since section 109(g)(1) requires the element of willfulness, they are not barred from filing the Chapter 11 petition. The BAP did not consider this issue because it dismissed the appeal as moot. Thus, on remand if the BAP concludes that the appeal is timely (see section C infra ) and that property other than the house is involved, it should also consider the issue of whether the dismissal of the Debtors’ Chapter 13 case for failure to prosecute served to trigger the 180-day filing bar of section 109(g)(1).

C. Timeliness of the Appeal to the BAP.

13  The untimely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 812 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.1987). However, Bankruptcy Rule 8002 avoids potential hardship by allowing deadline extensions. If a party does not file the notice of appeal or an extension within the ten-day filing period, he may still receive an extension upon request within twenty days of the deadline if he can show “excusable neglect.” 11 U.S.C. Sec. 8002(c). The Debtors did not actually request an extension of time to file the appeal before the BAP and the BAP order did not indicate whether or not the Debtors had shown excusable neglect. Thus, on remand the BAP should reconsider the issue of the timeliness of the Debtors’ appeal or provide an explanation of the basis for its earlier determination.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.
*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3
1  The Millers filed a Chapter 13 petition on November 7, 1985. On November 13, 1985, the court filed an order for the Millers to file a plan and statement, and an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. On December 2, 1985, a show cause hearing was held and the court dismissed the Chapter 13 petition for “failure to prosecute.” The Millers did not attend this hearing
2  Section 109(1)(g) states that an individual may not be a debtor under Title 11 if he has been a debtor in a Title 11 case pending at any time in the preceding 180 days if “the case was dismissed by the court for willful failure of the debtor to abide by orders of the court, or to appear before the court in proper prosecution.” 11 U.S.C. Sec. 109(g)(1)

When Homeowner’s good faith attempts to amicably work with the Bank in order to resolve the issue fails;

Home owners should wake up TODAY! before it’s too late by mustering enough courage for “Pro Se” Litigation (Self Representation – Do it Yourself) against the Lender – for Mortgage Fraud and other State and Federal law violations using foreclosure defense package found at http://www.fightforeclosure.net “Pro Se” litigation will allow Homeowners to preserved their home equity, saves Attorneys fees by doing it “Pro Se” and pursuing a litigation for Mortgage Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title and Slander of Title; among other causes of action. This option allow the homeowner to stay in their home for 3-5 years for FREE without making a red cent in mortgage payment, until the “Pretender Lender” loses a fortune in litigation costs to high priced Attorneys which will force the “Pretender Lender” to early settlement in order to modify the loan; reducing principal and interest in order to arrive at a decent figure of the monthly amount the struggling homeowner could afford to pay.

If you find yourself in an unfortunate situation of losing or about to lose your home to wrongful fraudulent foreclosure, and need a complete package that will show you step-by-step litigation solutions helping you challenge these fraudsters and ultimately saving your home from foreclosure either through loan modification or “Pro Se” litigation visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

Wrongful Mortgage Foreclosure Monetary Awards – Case in Review

30 Wednesday Mar 2016

Posted by in Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, Loan Modification, Non-Judicial States, State Court

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CASE IN REVIEW 1:

Jury awards $5.4 million to couple after finding fraud in foreclosure case

Houston Chronicle  |  December 9, 2015   Jury awards couple $5.4 million in foreclosure case against Wells Fargo and its mortgage servicer.  David and Mary Ellen Wolf were several payments behind on their home mortgage and knew that foreclosure loomed.  They were puzzled, though, when a foreclosure notice came early in 2011 from Wells Fargo because they hadn’t done business with that bank. Click Here to Read More

CASE IN REVIEW 2:

NY Federal judge slams Wells Fargo for forged mortgage docs

Judge Robert Drain has a message for Wells Fargo: “Forged” foreclosure documents don’t cut it in New York’s federal courts. Click Here to Read More

 

 

How Florida Homeowner’s Counsels Can Effectively Use Stay of Proceedings to Delay Monetary Restitution Judgments after Foreclosure Pending Appeal or Wrongful Foreclosure

01 Friday Jan 2016

Posted by in Foreclosure Defense, Litigation Strategies, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Trial Strategies

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What are your options should a money judgment be entered against your client? Aside from payment, there is appeal. But how do you stop the execution of the judgment during the appeal? What are your options if the order is one not solely for the payment of money, or is not a final order? A stay is a tool that the court uses to manage litigation and protect the rights of parties during appeals. This article discusses the use of stays in Florida’s state court system.

Stays Involving Appellate Review

Stays are commonly sought by the losing party either to maintain the status quo during interlocutory appeals or to suspend the execution of money judgments. To determine your options after an order or final judgment has been entered against your client, start with Fla. R. App. P. 9.310. This rule controls all proceedings in the Supreme Court and the district courts of appeal, and all proceedings in which the circuit courts exercise their appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the county courts, “notwithstanding any conflicting rules of procedure.”1

First, you will see Rule 9.310 applies only to orders that are appealed. Stays of orders that are not appealable are not controlled by this rule. Second, this rule divides the universe of appealable orders into those that are judgments solely for the payment of money and all others. The rule opens with the following prescription applicable to all those other orders: “A party seeking to stay a final or non-final order pending review shall file a motion in the lower tribunal, which shall have continuing jurisdiction, in its discretion, to grant, modify, or deny such relief. A stay pending review may be conditioned on the posting of a good and sufficient bond, other conditions, or both.”

Let’s take apart this dense language and examine its pieces.

First, the trial court, the “lower tribunal,” has the power to stay its own orders.2 That makes sense. Florida’s constitution creates the right to appeal orders of various kinds in art. V, §4(b)(1). The party’s right to appeal an order would be empty if orders and judgments could not be stayed pending review.

With limited exception, the decision to grant, modify, deny, or craft the conditions of a stay is a discretionary act entrusted to the trial court, but the discretion is not unfettered. No matter whether the judgment is one for the payment of money, declaratory, or injunctive relief, the lower tribunal cannot require an appellant to file a supersedeas bond as a precondition of the appeal.3 The right to appeal is guaranteed by the state constitution and may not be abridged by a trial court. Rule 9.310(f) gives the appellate court the power to review a trial court’s stay order when an appeal has been commenced. This, too, makes sense. The subject matter of the appellate court’s jurisdiction could be mooted if the parties’ legal positions were inexorably altered by the execution of the judgment before the appeal was concluded.

A wide range of orders is subject to appellate review, and all those orders are subject to Rule 9.310. This includes final orders, the appealable nonfinal orders listed in Fla. R. App. P. 9.130, and orders reviewable by way of petition for writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.

Final orders end the trial court’s labor in an action, and they come in many forms. They may be money judgments, declaratory judgments, or decrees. They can all be stayed. Nonfinal orders that may be immediately appealed, and, therefore, that may be stayed by the operation of Rule 9.310, include orders that concern

• Venue;

• Injunctions;

• The determination of the jurisdiction of the person;

• The determination of the right to immediate possession of property, including orders pertaining to writs of replevin, garnishment, or attachment;

• The determination of the right to immediate monetary relief or child custody in family law matters;

• The determination of the entitlement of a party to arbitration, or to an appraisal under an insurance policy;

• Workers’ compensation immunity;

• The certification of a class;

• Immunity in a civil rights claim arising under federal law;

• Whether a governmental entity has taken action that has inordinately burdened real property;

• The appointment of a receiver.

A stay during the appeal of a nonfinal order may be necessary because “[i]n the absence of a stay, the trial court may proceed with all matters, including trial or final hearing,” provided that no final order may be entered until the appellate proceedings are concluded, pursuant to Rule 9.130(f). Finally, Rule 9.310 empowers the trial court to stay its nonfinal orders that are immediately reviewable by way of a petition for writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus. If the circumstances of your case warrant the filing of such a petition, then they likely would justify the entry of a stay of the challenged order pending appellate review.

Asking the Trial Court for a Stay Pending Appellate Review
If your client’s situation requires a stay of the order while the appellate court reviews it, then you need to fashion a motion for stay and file it with the trial court. The trial court’s order or judgment is not stayed by the mere filing of a notice of appeal or petition for writ of certiorari,4 and, except for money judgments, a stay pending appeal is a matter entrusted to the trial court’s discretion.5 The trial court has the continuing jurisdiction to grant your stay, to lift it, or to modify it. The trial court may impose conditions, and it may alter those conditions in its discretion for the duration of the appellate proceedings.6

There are limits to the trial court’s discretion. The trial court cannot require, as a condition of the stay, the payment of the judgment holder’s attorneys’ fees.7 Only when fees are otherwise recoverable by contract or statute may the trial court condition a stay on the payment of attorneys’ fees in the event the appellant fails to prevail on appeal.

When to Move for a Stay — Timing Is Important

Rule 9.310(a) requires you to file a motion, and the language implies the motion be in writing. In practice, however, strict compliance with the rule may be unworkable. The trial court may issue an order granting relief to your opponent within a time frame shorter than would accommodate the filing and setting of a motion to stay. If you find yourself at a hearing and the judge rules against your client, and you conclude the ruling would cause substantial, irreparable injury to your client, then move ore tenus for a stay. Be sure to get a ruling on the record. Promptly get a written order.

Better yet, be prepared. If you know the hearing may result in an order that your client would appeal, file a conditional motion for stay. Notice it for hearing. Bring alternative proposed orders granting and denying your motion for stay. Head to court and argue for the best outcome, but be prepared to deal with the worst. If the trial court grants immediate relief against your client, then argue your motion for stay then and there. If the trial court denies your motion to stay, make sure you get the ruling on the record and a written order from the court. This will perfect your right to apply to the appellate court for a stay.

Remember, the rule provides for a stay only if you seek appellate review of the order. If you obtain a stay order, but you do not ultimately pursue an appellate remedy, then the authority supporting the stay provided by Rule 9.310 would end. Your opponent would have a very good argument to dissolve the stay that you have obtained because the court’s authority to do so, under this rule, ended on the last day you had to file your notice of appeal or your petition. An order from the lower tribunal staying the effect of its judgment or order is a nullity unless a notice of appeal or petition is actually filed.8

What Justifies Stay of Order Pending Appellate Review

The trial court’s wide discretion in crafting a stay is an invitation to be creative in your request for a stay. The remedy you request must suit your client’s needs, of course. The trial court anticipates that you will suggest a stay that does so. But it will more readily grant your request if the conditions in your proposed stay do no harm to your opponent and do not unduly delay the proceedings. Reasonable conditions may include that you file your notice of appeal or petition promptly, perhaps faster than permitted by the appellate rules; that other aspects of the litigation proceed unabated; or that you protect property, documents, or evidence in your possession from spoliation.

To obtain a stay from the appellate court, you should demonstrate that your client will likely prevail on appeal, and your client will suffer some substantial injury if the order is not stayed.

The appellate court applies this standard when deciding whether to issue a stay order.9 Following this outline makes for a strong argument in the trial court as well. The checklist for your motion to stay should include:

• Informing the trial court that it is empowered by Rule 9.310 to stay the order it has just entered;

• Notice to the court that you intend to file a notice of appeal or petition and the date you intend to file;

• A summary of the legal and factual grounds for the appeal;

• A discussion of the harm that will befall your client should the stay not be granted;

• Evidentiary support in the form of affidavits from your client attesting to any facts justifying the stay;

• A discussion of the effect of the stay on the progress of the case and specific proposals to keep other parts of the case moving forward;

• A demonstration that the stay will not harm your opponent.

A stay motion with these elements would be compelling. The affidavit can be used to authenticate papers, letters, emails, or other documents that you submit in support of your motion. Documents that are unauthenticated are generally not admissible, and the court may find they have no evidentiary weight.10

Finally, move for relief promptly and get a ruling as soon as possible. Although there is no time frame for making a motion to stay set within Rule 9.310, time does matter, and earlier is better than later. Waiting for weeks to ask for a stay undercuts your argument that the order imposes a substantial burden or injury on your client.

If Trial Court Denies Request for a Stay, Ask the Appellate Court

Rule 9.310 gives the trial court the power to issue or deny stays, but it also gives the appellate court the power to review those rulings. You must apply to the trial court first, though.11 If the lower tribunal refuses to grant the motion to stay, then review is sought in the appellate action by motion.12 The appellate court will review the lower tribunal’s order for an abuse of discretion.13 The trial court is presumed to know the case well, and the question to stay usually involves a mixture of fact and legal questions that the trial court is well-suited to decide.

Your appellate motion for stay should be filed as soon as possible, preferably as soon as your appellate case is commenced. To determine what should be included in your motion to the appellate court, consider what would convince the appellate judges that your client deserves a stay. First, they will need to see your trial court motion and the order denying it. They will need a succinct statement of the facts that apprises them of the nature of the appellate case and a discussion of the course of proceedings. They will need to know the legal question that you will ask them to resolve. To warrant issuance of a stay, for the purpose of preserving the status quo during the appellate proceeding, the movant must demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits and the likelihood that harm would result if the stay were not granted.14

You will need to provide the appellate court an appendix of documents from the trial court file that includes the order on appeal, the pertinent hearing transcripts, and the moving and opposition papers related to the stay order. Include a progress docket report from the trial court. Take care to bind the documents with tabs or, better yet, number the pages. Mind the specific court’s requirements for submissions of appendices. You’ll find each district court’s requirements set out on their websites. If you have a question, call the clerk’s office at the appellate court.

Watch your timing. An appellate court cannot consider a motion if no appellate case has yet been commenced. Therefore, the notice of appeal or the filing of the petition must coincide with or precede your filing of the appellate motion to stay. Only once the appellate court establishes its own case are you free to file your motion. Filing a motion in the appellate court does not automatically suspend any order of the trial court, so be aware of your time limitations. If the motion is time-sensitive, say so in the motion, and inform the appellate court of the deadline by which you must act.

When Does the Stay End?

If the order is a final judgment, your stay will remain in effect until the conclusion of all appellate proceedings. Appellate proceedings typically conclude when the appellate court issues its mandate. The appellate clerk issues the mandate 15 days after the court issues its decision or “as may be directed by the [appellate] court.”15 So, if you intend to try an appeal to the Supreme Court, then you must consider whether to ask the appellate court to withhold issuance of its mandate until the Supreme Court either rejects your jurisdictional papers, or takes jurisdiction of the case and completes its review.16 Alternatively, you may ask the trial court to issue a new stay pending completion of Supreme Court proceedings.

Stays Not Involving Appellate Review

A trial court is invested with the power to stay the effect of any of its interlocutory orders, even if they are not appealable.17 But that power is not established by Rule 9.310. Rather, it is part of its inherent power to manage the case. The trial court may grant or deny a stay, and it can craft unique conditions for the stay and modify them as a case management tool. Whether it does so, and what conditions it imposes, is a matter for its broad discretion.18 If your client is on the receiving end of such a stay and objects to it, you may seek appellate review of that stay. But the jurisdiction of the appellate court to do so is not established by Rule 9.310(f), and review is not by motion. Instead, the appellate court reviews the trial court’s stay order by means of a petition for writ of certiorari. By demonstrating to the appellate court that the trial court’s stay has substantially curtailed some important right of your client, you can establish the appellate court’s jurisdiction to review the order. You’ll need to show the order departs from the essential requirements of law (meaning the order lacks a legal or factual basis), and you’ll need to show the stay causes a serious, irreparable injury to your client, one that cannot be remedied on appeal from the final judgment.19

What to Do with a Judgment Solely for Payment of Money

Trial courts have the power to stay execution of money judgments on a showing of “good cause” pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.550(a). This is a discretionary decision, of course. But an automatic stay of a money judgment can be obtained under Fla. R. App. P. 9.310(b). This appellate rule requires the filing of a “good and sufficient bond” issued by a surety company authorized to do so in Florida. Rule 9.310(b) sets the amount of the bond as the principal amount of the judgment, plus two years of interest calculated at the statutory rate.20 Filing the bond dispenses with the need for filing a motion or obtaining a court order.21

Pursuant to Rule 9.310(b)(2), the state, or a public officer in their official capacity, or a board, commission, or other public body seeking review, is entitled to a stay without bond in most circumstances. The right is not absolute, but if you represent a government entity or official, you must keep this valuable right in mind.

A “good and sufficient bond” is one that is issued by an insurer authorized by the Office of Insurance Regulation to do so in Florida. A bond is commonly obtained through a commercial insurance broker. Brokers can be useful intermediaries to guide you through this process. The Office of Insurance Regulation maintains a website listing the scores of sureties authorized to conduct such business in Florida.22 Beware that unless you represent a substantial, established corporation, surety companies generally require posting 100 percent collateral in the form of an irrevocable letter of credit or a cash deposit.

A proper bond will contain the following elements: It will identify the surety, the principal, and the judgment holder, who is the obligee. The face of the bond will recite the surety’s undertaking to be bound to the court for the amount of the judgment, plus the two years of statutory interest up to the amount of the bond. The usual condition stated by the surety on the face of the bond is that if the judgment is satisfied or reversed on appeal, then the bond becomes void. The bond will be signed by both the principal and the surety.

The original bond is filed with the trial court under a notice of filing bond prepared by the lawyer. It is upon the filing of the bond that the automatic stay takes effect. If execution proceedings have already commenced, the filing of the bond does not act to undo the orders or negate the motions already filed or adjudicated. The filing of the bond at that late point only stays further execution.23

This procedure secures the judgment holder’s ability to collect its principal and interest, and it preserves the judgment creditor’s right to appeal. Beware that an automatic stay under this rule may, under certain conditions, be dissolved.24 In general, though, the discretion of the court to modify the terms of a bond is extremely limited. The lower tribunal may not increase or decrease the amount of the bond as set out in the rule or otherwise prejudice the creditor’s realistic chances of recovery at the conclusion of the appeal.25 When the appellate proceedings are concluded and the judgment is paid or reversed, be sure to obtain a written order from the trial court declaring that the bond is void, and the surety’s obligation is released.

Conclusion

The effective litigator will know how to use stays to the client’s advantage. Stays can be used to limit the effect of an order or stop the execution of a judgment. Trial courts have wide discretion in whether to grant or deny a stay and what conditions to put on a stay. Your client needs you to know how to obtain stays from the trial and appellate courts when their judgment day comes.

1 Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.130.

2 Holman v. Ford Motor Co., 239 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1970) (“It seems well settled that interlocutory judgments or orders made during the progress of a case are always under the control of the court until final disposition of the suit, and they may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds at any time before final judgment.”).

3 Fitzgerald v. Addison, 287 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1973).

4 Thames v. Melvin, 370 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1979).

5 Eicoff v. Denson, 896 So. 2d 795, 799 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 2005) (affirming decision of trial court to deny motion to stay a judgment that restrained homeowner from violating restrictive deeds pending appeal).

6 Fla. R. App. P. 9.310(a).

7 City of Coral Gables v. Geary, 398 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981).

8 State v. Budina, 879 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 2004).

9 Perez v. Perez, 769 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1999).

10 Fla. Stat. §90.901 (“Authentication or identification of evidence is required as a condition precedent to its admissibility.”).

11 Mitchell v. Leon County School Board, 591 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1991).

12 So. Fla. Apartment Ass’n v. Dansyear, 347 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977).

13 Fla. R. App. P. 9.310(a). The lower tribunal has “continuing jurisdiction, in its discretion, to grant, modify, or deny such relief.”

14 Perez v. Perez, 769 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1999).

15 Fla. R. App. P. 9.340(a).

16 Fla. R. App. P. 9.310(e).

17 Holman v. Ford Motor Co., 239 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1970) (“It seems well settled that interlocutory judgments or orders made during the progress of a case are always under the control of the court until final disposition of the suit, and they may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds at any time before final judgment.”).

18 REWJB Gas Invs. v. Land O’ Sun Realty, Ltd., 643 So. 2d 1107, 1108 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1994) (granting stay of eviction proceedings pending determination of declaratory judgment action on terms of lease).

19 Verlingo v. Telsey, 801 So. 2d 1009, 1010 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2001).

20 Fla. Stat. §55.03; Florida Department of Financial Services, Statutory Interest Rates, http://www.myfloridacfo.com/aadir/interest.htm (statutory rate of interest).

21 Wintter & Cummings v. Len-Hal Realty, Inc., 679 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1996) (entry of court order is not necessary for bond to become effective as supersedeas bond); Fla. Coast Bank of Pompano Beach v. Mayes, 433 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983), petition for review dismissed, 453 So. 2d 43 (rule applies when the only relief granted is for payment of money).

22 Florida Office of Insurance Regulation, Company Directory, http://www.floir.com/companysearch (search the list of authorized lines of business for sureties).

23 Freedom Insurors, Inc. v. M.D. Moody & Sons, Inc., 869 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2004).

24 Mitchell v. State, 911 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 2005).

25Platt v. Russek, 921 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 2004); see also PS Capital, LLC v. Palm Springs Townhomes, LLC, 9 So. 3d 643 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 2009) (bond must be in the amount set forth in the rule).

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What Maryland Homeowners Needs to Know About Withdrawal Of The Reference Of Bankruptcy Matters From The United States Bankruptcy Court To The United States District Court In Maryland

29 Tuesday Dec 2015

Posted by in Bankruptcy, Federal Court, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation

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This post is intended to be a useful guide to the procedures and practice involved in withdrawal of the reference of bankruptcy matters from the United States Bankruptcy Court to the United States District Court in Maryland. It is, however, not intended to be an exhaustive treatment of the subject and should not be used as a substitute for Pro se Homeowners or attorneys doing their own research and reviewing carefully all applicable statutes, rules and case law.

                                                Background
Congress vested all original jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases in the United States District Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a). Congress further provided that the District Court could refer all cases in bankruptcy and any and all proceedings arising under, in, or related to cases in bankruptcy, to the Bankruptcy Court. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). The United States District Court for the District of Maryland has referred all cases under the Bankruptcy Code and all proceedings arising under the Bankruptcy Code or arising in or related to cases under the Bankruptcy Code to the United States Bankruptcy Court. Rule 402, Rules of the United States District Court (Maryland) (hereinafter referred to as “District Court Local Rule”). Accordingly, until and unless the reference of jurisdiction to the Bankruptcy Court is withdrawn by an Order of the District Court, all jurisdiction over bankruptcy
matters resides with the Bankruptcy Court.

Statutory and Rule Provisions With
Respect to Withdrawal of Reference

28 U.S.C. § 157(d) provides as follows:

(d) The district court may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding referred under this section, on its own motion or on timely motion of any party, for cause shown.
The district court shall, on timely motion of a party, so withdraw a proceeding if the court determines that resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the United States regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce.

As set forth in § 157(d), the District Court has the authority to
withdraw the entire bankruptcy case, or any part thereof, or any proceeding in the bankruptcy case or part thereof. The District Court can exercise its authority to withdraw cases or proceedings on its own motion or on timely motion of any party, for cause shown. This authority is sometimes referred to as discretionary withdrawal of the reference.

28 U.S.C. § 157(d) also provides for what is often called mandatory
withdrawal of the reference. Pursuant to the second sentence of § 157(d), the District Court shall, on timely motion of a party, withdraw a proceeding if the court determines that resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of both the Bankruptcy Code and other federal laws regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce. Note that the mandatory withdrawal of reference is only applicable to proceedings in the bankruptcy case and only on timely motion of a party, not on the District Court’s own motion.

Bankruptcy Rule 5011 (“Withdrawal and Abstention from Hearing a
Proceeding”) provides in pertinent part as follows:

(a) Withdrawal. A motion for withdrawal of a case or proceeding shall be heard by a district judge.

(c) Effect of Filing of Motion for Withdrawal or Abstention.
The filing of a motion for withdrawal of a case or proceeding or for abstention pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1334(c) shall not stay the administration of the case or any proceeding therein before the bankruptcy judge except that the bankruptcy judge may stay, on such terms and conditions as are proper, proceedings pending disposition of the motion. A motion for a stay ordinarily shall be presented first to the bankruptcy judge. A motion for a stay or relief from a stay filed in the district court shall state why it has not been presented to or obtained from the bankruptcy judge. Relief granted by the district judge shall be on such terms and conditions as the judge deems proper.

District Court Local Rule 405 (“Rules of procedure for withdrawal of reference”) provides as follows:

1. General rule. When a case or proceeding has been referred by this Court to the Bankruptcy Court, all documents and pleadings in or related to such case or proceeding shall be filed with the Clerk in the Bankruptcy Court.

2. Withdrawal of reference of bankruptcy case or proceeding.

a. Filing of motion for withdrawal of reference with bankruptcy clerk. A motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) and Bankruptcy Rule 5011 to withdraw the reference of any bankruptcy case, contested matter or adversary proceeding referred to the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and Local Rule 402 shall be filed with the Clerk in the Bankruptcy Court. If the motion requests withdrawal of only a portion of the case, a contested matter, or a portion of an adversary proceeding, the motion shall be accompanied by the filing of a designation of the documents and pleadings filed in the case or proceeding to which the motion relates.

b. Withdrawal of reference of bankruptcy cases. A motion to withdraw the reference of a case to the Bankruptcy Court must be timely filed, and in any event, before the case is closed.

c. Withdrawal of reference of adversary proceeding or contested matter. A motion to withdraw an adversary proceeding or a contested matter in a case which has been referred to the Bankruptcy Court must be filed by the earlier of eleven (11) days before the date scheduled for the first hearing on the merits; and

i. in the case of an adversary proceeding, within twenty (20) days after the last pleading is permitted to be filed pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7012; or
ii. in the case of a contested matter, within twenty

(20) days after the last responsive pleading or memorandum in opposition is permitted to be filed pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-1(b)(3).

3. Filing of pleadings after reference withdrawn.

a. If the reference of an entire case has been withdrawn from the Bankruptcy Court to the District Court, all pleadings and documents in or related to such case shall be thereafter filed with the Clerk in the District Court.

b. Where the reference of only a portion of an entire case has been withdrawn, pleadings and documents with respect to the case (including any parts thereof that have been withdrawn or transferred) shall continue to be filed with the Clerk in the Bankruptcy Court. Any pleadings and documents which relate to any parts of the case which have been withdrawn or transferred to the District Court shall also be filed with the Clerk of the District Court. The Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court
shall keep a separate docket sheet of those pleadings and documents filed in the portion of the case that has been transferred to the District Court.

c. Upon withdrawal or transfer of any complaint to the District Court, the plaintiff may forward to the defendant a notice and request to waive service of summons or the Clerk shall issue a District Court summons pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 4(d) unless either of the aforementioned has already occurred pursuant to the Bankruptcy Rules.

d. This subsection (d) governs personal injury tort and wrongful death claims which must be tried in the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5). Except for the procedures contained within this subsection, personal injury tort and wrongful death proceedings shall be filed with the Clerk in the Bankruptcy Court. However, beneath the bankruptcy number, the pleading or other document shall designate the pleading or document as a “SECTION 157(b)(5) MATTER.” When filing a complaint a completed District Court civil cover sheet (A.O. Form JS-44c) should be submitted beneath the Bankruptcy Court cover sheet required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 7003-1. No summons shall be issued until the proceeding
is transferred to the District Court. Upon filing the complaint, the Clerk in the Bankruptcy Court shall immediately transfer the proceeding to the District Court and plaintiff may send to the defendant(s) a notice and request to waive service of summons pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) or the Clerk of the District Court shall issue a summons.

4. Motions concerning venue in bankruptcy cases and proceedings. All motions concerning venue in cases arising under Title 11 or arising in or related to cases under Title 11 shall be determined by the Bankruptcy Court, except in those cases to be tried in the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5).

See also Local Bankruptcy Rule 5011-2, which provides in pertinent part as
follows:

A motion for withdrawal of reference is governed by Local Rule 405.2 of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.

Filing of Pleadings Before Withdrawal of Reference

In accordance with District Court Local Rules 402 and 405.1, all papers and pleadings in, or related to a bankruptcy case or proceeding, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court. Until an Order is entered by the District Court removing the reference from the Bankruptcy Court for all or part of a matter, the Clerk of the District Court will not accept the filing of any pleadings or papers in any bankruptcy-related matter. Unless the party filing a paper or pleading in the Bankruptcy Court is exempt from electronic filing,1 all papers and pleadings should be filed in the Bankruptcy Court electronically through the CM/ECF system.

Filing of a Motion to Withdraw Reference

A party on timely motion or the District Court upon its own motion may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding pending in the Bankruptcy Court for cause shown. The party’s motion to withdraw the reference must be filed in the Bankruptcy Court. If the motion requests withdrawal of only a portion of the case, contested matter or adversary proceeding, the motion shall be accompanied by the filing of a designation of the documents and pleadings filed in the case or proceeding to which the motion relates. After the filing of a response or the expiration of the response time period, if no response is filed, the Bankruptcy Clerk shall transmit the motion to the District Clerk’s office. The transmittal shall include copies of the motion and any response thereto and the transmittal form for a motion for withdrawal of reference. As set forth in Bankruptcy Rule 5011(a), the motion for withdrawal of reference will be decided by the District Court.

_____________________________

1 Parties who are representing themselves (pro se), other than those who are members of the Bar of the Bankruptcy Court, are exempt from the electronic filing requirements and should file their papers and pleadings with the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court in paper format.

Unless and until the motion for withdrawal of reference is granted by Order of the District Court, the only matter over which the District Court will exercise jurisdiction is the motion for withdrawal of reference. Until the reference is actually withdrawn, the original referral of jurisdiction (District Court Local Rule 402) remains in place. Accordingly, while the motion for withdrawal of reference is pending, pleadings and papers in or related to the bankruptcy case shall continue to be filed with the Bankruptcy Court. After the motion to withdraw reference has been transmitted to the District Clerk, the Bankruptcy Clerk shall send copies of any additional filings concerning the motion to withdraw reference to the District Clerk. Until the reference is withdrawn, the Bankruptcy Court shall continue to handle all matters in the bankruptcy case including adversary proceedings and contested matters in such case.

Timeliness of Motion to Withdraw Reference

As set forth in 28 U.S.C. §157(d) and District Court Local Rule 405.2.b, a party’s motion to withdraw the reference must be timely filed. With respect to motions to withdraw the reference of the bankruptcy case itself, the District Court Local Rule further provides that the motion must be filed before the case is closed. With respect to motions to withdraw the reference of adversary proceedings or contested matters, District Court Local Rule 405.2.c provides that such motion must be filed by the earlier of eleven (11) days before the date scheduled for the first hearing on the merits and, in the case of an adversary proceeding, within twenty (20) days after the last pleading is permitted to be filed pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7012, or, in the case of a contested matter, within twenty (20) days after the last responsive pleading or memorandum in opposition is permitted to be filed pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-1(b)(3).

Mandatory and Discretionary Withdrawal of Reference

As noted above, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), the authority for a District Court to withdraw the reference is divided into two parts, mandatory withdrawal of the reference (“if the court determines that resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of both title 11 [the Bankruptcy Code] and other laws of the United States regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce”) and discretionary withdrawal of the reference (“for cause shown”).

With respect to mandatory withdrawal of the reference, the statutory language appears to be quite broad. Nevertheless, it has been observed that “[t]he great weight of the case law interpreting § 157(d) holds that this seemingly broad language concerning mandatory withdrawal should be narrowly read. . . . The fact that resolution of the matters in question calls merely for consideration or application of both bankruptcy law and other federal laws is plainly insufficient, in that mandatory withdrawal should only be made where substantial and material consideration of non-bankruptcy statutes is necessary in the case.” In re Merryweather Importers, Inc., 179 B.R. 61, 62 (D. Md. 1995). Thus, mandatory withdrawal has been denied in cases involving “straightforward application of federal statutes to a particular set of facts. . . . By contrast, cases involving federal questions that are complex or are of first impression must be withdrawn from reference.” Id. at 62.

With respect to discretionary withdrawal of the reference (sometimes called permissive withdrawal), the statutory test is “for cause shown.” Cases have recognized that the District Court has broad discretion in deciding whether the reference should be withdrawn for cause shown. See In re Millennium Studios, Inc., 286 B.R. 300, 303 (D. Md. 2002). Among the factors to be considered by the court are whether the matter at issue between the parties is “core” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) and “the uniformity of bankruptcy administration, forum shopping and confusion of fora, conservation of creditor and debtor resources, expediency of the bankruptcy proceeding, and the fact that only equitable issues are posed, not requiring a jury trial but falling within the traditional equitable powers of the bankruptcy judge as chancellor.” In re Millennium Studios, Inc., 286 B.R. at 303; In re EquiMed, Inc., 259 B.R. 269, 273 (D. Md. 2001); In re Merryweather Importers, Inc., 179 B.R. at 63. Additional factors identified also include whether withdrawal “would promote judicial economy and the economic use of the parties’ resources.” In re EquiMed, Inc., 254 B.R. 347, 351 (D. Md. 2000). Finally, it has been stated that it is the movant’s burden to show cause for discretionary withdrawal of the reference. See In re Millennium Studios, Inc., 286 B.R. at 303-304.

Procedure in the Event that Entire Matter is Withdrawn

If the District Court grants the motion for withdrawal of reference, it shall enter an order providing for the same. A copy of said order shall immediately be transmitted to the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court. If the reference of jurisdiction for the entire bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding is withdrawn by the District Court’s Order, all pleadings and papers in or related to such case or adversary proceeding shall thereafter be filed exclusively with the Clerk of the District Court. District Court Local Rule 405.3.a.

Procedure in the Event that Part of a Matter is Withdrawn

If the Order of the District Court withdraws the reference for less than the entire case or less than an entire adversary proceeding (for example, resolution of a contested matter), all pleadings and papers with respect to that bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding (specifically including those pleadings relating to the withdrawn matter) must continue to be filed with the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court. In addition, counsel shall electronically file copies of all pleadings and documents relating to any parts of the case which have been withdrawn with the Clerk of the District Court through the CM/ECF system.2 Local District Court Rule 405.3.b.

Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Claims

Any personal injury or wrongful death claim filed in a bankruptcy case, or related to a bankruptcy case, shall be filed in the Bankruptcy Court. Local District Court Rule 405.3.d. The pleading shall contain a designation: “SECTION 157(b)(5) MATTER” and, if such pleading is a complaint, shall be accompanied by both a Bankruptcy Cover Sheet and a District Court Civil Cover Sheet. After docketing the initial pleading, the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court shall forthwith transmit the matter to the Clerk of the District Court including a copy of the pleading, the District Court Civil Cover Sheet and a transmittal form. The Clerk of the District Court shall issue any necessary summons and the matter shall thereafter proceed in the District Court.

Final Orders of the District Court

If the District Court denies the motion to withdraw the reference, the Clerk of the District Court shall docket such order and forthwith transmit a copy of the docketed order to the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court, after which the District Court file shall be closed. The Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court shall docket the order upon receipt from the Clerk of the District Court in the bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding in which the motion was filed.

With respect to a matter where reference has been withdrawn by the District Court, at such time as the District Court by final order decides such matter, the Clerk of the District Court shall docket the order of the District Court and forthwith transmit a copy of the docketed order to the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court. The Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court shall docket the order in the case or adversary proceeding in which the motion to withdraw reference was filed.

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2 The District Court also requires counsel to submit a paper courtesy copy of any document which, including attachments, is fifteen pages or longer.

Jury Adversary Proceedings That Must be
Tried by the District Court

With respect to jury trials, 28 U.S.C. § 157(e) provides as follows:

(e) if the right to a jury trial applies in a proceeding that may be heard under this section by a bankruptcy judge, the bankruptcy judge may conduct the jury trial if specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court and with the express consent of all the parties.

In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1411 (Jury trials) provides as follows:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this chapter and title 11 do not affect any right to trial by jury that an individual has under applicable nonbankruptcy law with regard to a personal injury or wrongful death tort claim.

(b) The district court may order the issues arising under section 303 of title 11 to be tried without a jury.

A discussion of the circumstances in which a right to a jury trial exists in a
particular adversary proceeding or other matter is beyond the scope of this
Memorandum.

With respect to the procedure applicable to jury trials, Bankruptcy Rule 9015(b) provides as follows:

(b) Consent to Have Trial Conducted by Bankruptcy Judge. If the right to a jury trial applies, a timely demand has been filed pursuant to Rule 38(b) F.R.Civ. P., and the bankruptcy judge has been specially designated to conduct the jury trial, the parties may consent to have a jury trial conducted by a bankruptcy judge under 28 U.S.C. § 157(e) by jointly or separately filing a statement of consent within any applicable time limits specified by local rule.

Local Bankruptcy Rule 9015-1 provides as follows:

A statement of consent to have a jury trial conducted by a bankruptcy judge under 28 U.S.C. § 157(e) must be filed before the conclusion of the initial pretrial conference.

With respect to the procedure for requesting a jury trial in a
bankruptcy proceeding, Local District Court Rule 406 (Jury trial) provides as follows:

1. Demand. In any bankruptcy proceeding any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by jury by (1) serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of the action and not later than ten days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue, and (2) filing the demand as required by Bankruptcy Rule 9015. Such demand may be indorsed upon a pleading of the party. If the adversary proceeding is one that has been removed from another court, any demand previously made under the rules of that court shall constitute a demand for trial by jury under this rule.

2. Specification of issues. In the demand a party may specify the issues which the party wishes so tried; otherwise the party shall be deemed to have demanded trial by jury for all the issues so triable. If the party has demanded trial by jury for only some of the issues, any other party within ten days after service of the demand or such lesser time as the Court may order, may serve a demand for trial by jury of any other or all of the issues of fact in the action.

3. Waiver. The failure of a party to serve and file a demand as required by this rule constitutes a waiver by the party of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties.

4. Consent to jury trial before the United States Bankruptcy Judge. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 157(e), with the consent of the parties, a District Judge may designate a Bankruptcy Judge to conduct a jury trial.

A. No Motion to Withdraw Filed.

When an adversary proceeding is filed in which a party rightfully claims a right to trial by jury and the bankruptcy judge is not designated, or the parties have not consented to have the jury trial conducted by the Bankruptcy Judge, unless the complaint is accompanied by a motion to withdraw the reference, all jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding remains with the Bankruptcy Court until the reference is later withdrawn.

Accordingly, all pleadings must continue to be filed with the Clerk of the
Bankruptcy Court and all matters to be resolved within the adversary
proceeding, short of trial, remain before the Bankruptcy Judge. Included in
such matters to be resolved by the Bankruptcy Court, are disputes between
the parties as to the right to trial by jury.

B. Motion to Withdraw Reference Filed, but Denied at Outset of
Adversary Proceeding.

If the complaint or answer is accompanied by a timely filed motion to
withdraw reference under District Court Local Rule 405.2.c, the procedures
discussed above shall be followed for the disposition of the motion to
withdraw reference. An early motion to withdraw the reference may be
denied without prejudice to refiling the motion when the case is trial ready.
See In re Stansbury Poplar Place, Inc., 13 F.3d 122 (4th Cir. 1993); Furniture Rentors of America v. NYNex Information Resources Co., 162 B.R. 728 (D. Md. 1994). If the motion for withdrawal of the reference is denied at an early stage in the adversary proceeding and therefore the adversary
proceeding remains for pre-trial purposes with the Bankruptcy Court, all
jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding remains with the Bankruptcy
Court until a motion is granted withdrawing the reference of the adversary
proceeding.

C. Pre-Trial Phase.

The pre-trial phase of the adversary proceeding shall encompass the
period of time allowed for discovery and the filing of and decision on all
dispositive motions. At the time that discovery has been completed, any
dispositive motions ruled upon, and the adversary proceeding is otherwise
ready to be scheduled for trial, the pre-trial phase of the adversary
proceeding is completed.

D. Withdrawal of Reference for Trial

If the reference has not been withdrawn by Order of the District Court
prior to the completion of the pre-trial phase of the adversary proceeding, at the end of the pre-trial phase of the adversary proceeding the Bankruptcy Court shall issue a summary report and recommendation to the District Court, recommending that the reference be withdrawn so that the trial by jury may go forward in the District Court. This report and recommendation shall be docketed in the adversary proceeding by the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court and a copy transmitted to the Clerk of the District Court for action by the District Court upon the report and recommendation. If the District Court agrees that the reference should be withdrawn at that time, the District Court will enter an Order withdrawing the reference and transmit a copy of the Order to the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court. Upon entry of an Order withdrawing the reference, all jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding shall be in the District Court and the Bankruptcy Court shall have no further authority to act in the adversary proceeding. All pleadings thereafter shall be filed with the Clerk of the District Court.

                                             Miscellaneous

The transmission of a motion for withdrawal of the reference should not be delayed by the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court pending the issuance of any report and recommendation by the Bankruptcy Court. Where it deems it appropriate, the Bankruptcy Court may provide such a report and recommendation to the District Court, or the District Court may request such a report and recommendation from the Bankruptcy Court, for any motion for withdrawal of the reference.

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