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Category Archives: Mortgage Laws

What Homeowners Need to Know About Federal Laws that Govern Mortgage Origination and Servicing

10 Saturday Aug 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Banks and Lenders, Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, RESPA, Your Legal Rights

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Adjustable-rate mortgage, Closed End Credit, Finance, Finance charge, Loan, Security interest, Statute of Limitations, Truth in Lending Act

There are eight (8) major federal laws pertinent to mortgage origination and servicing.

                   Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA); 15 U.S.C. § 1638.

Purpose. TILA is largely a disclosure statute that requires that lenders make certain disclosures to borrowers and potential borrowers. The Act is meant to insure that borrowers are informed of all of the terms of the loan before they take out the loan and can make an informed decision.

Scope. TILA applies to consumer credit – both closed end credit (like mortgages) and open ended credit (like credit cards) – extended by a creditor.

To constitute as “consumer credit” under the statute:
• The consumer must be a natural person.

• Credit is the right to defer payment of debt or to
incur debt and defer payment.

• The credit must be payable, by written agreement, by more than four
installments or subject to finance charges.

Under TILA, a “creditor” is:

• An entity that regularly extends consumer credit. Regularly means six or
more real estate secured loans, two or more high cost loans (or one or
more if made through a broker), or 26 or more in other cases per year.

• The creditor is the entity to which the obligation is payable to on its face.
Arrangers, like brokers, are not covered by TILA.

Exceptions.

• Business, agricultural, organizational and commercial credit.
• Credit over $25,000 unless secured by real estate or a dwelling.
• Public utility credit in some instances.
• Securities or commodities accounts.
• Certain student loans.
• Home fuel budget plans if no finance charge is imposed.

Protections.

Fundamentals. Lenders must disclose the following terms and conditions:

1. Amount Financed The amount financed is the amount of money that the borrower receives for his own benefit. Generally, this would include the proceeds of the loan, the purchase price of the goods/services being purchased, and the amount of pre-existing debts being paid off by consolidation or refinancing. Amount financed is roughly the same as the concept of “principle” but it is distinct from how principle is construed under state usury laws.

2. Finance Charge. Any charge that a consumer pays, directly or indirectly,
that is charged by the creditor, directly or indirectly, as incident to or a condition of the extension of credit. Examples include interest, service charges, points, origination fees, and many other costs associated with credit.

3. Annual Percentage Rate (APR). The cost of credit as a yearly rate.

Required Disclosures for Closed End Credit – Failure to disclose the following terms and conditions gives rise to Statutory Claims.

1. Total Finance Charge. Consists of all finance charges as defined above.

Exceptions
a. Under certain conditions, charges by third parties, closing agent fees,
debt cancellation coverage, and overdraft fees.
b.Application fees so long as they are charged to all applicants, whether or
not credit is extended.
c. Late fees.
d.Certain closing costs, so long as they are bona fide and reasonable.
e. Voluntary credit life, health, accident and loss of income insurance so
long as the voluntary nature, cost and term are disclosed and the consumer
separately agrees to the insurance in writing.
f. Credit property insurance premiums so long as the consumer is aware
that he can purchase insurance elsewhere.
g. Certain security interest related charges.
h.Annual fees or fees periodically charged as a condition to credit.
i. Seller’s points.
j. Interest reductions in time deposits.

2. Amount Financed. The principle part of the loan minus all charges
deemed to be finance charges.

3. Annual Percentage Rate.
4. Payment Schedule.
5. Total Number of Payments.
6. Security Interests.
7. Special Formatting Rules.

The disclosures must be clear, obvious, separate from other information and in a form that the borrower can keep. Disclosures must be provided in a timely manner, in a way that the borrower can keep before the consummation of the loan.

Lenders must also give the borrower a Notice of Right to Cancel, which informs the borrower of his right to rescind and contains the forms that the borrower needs to exercise that right.

Relief and Statute of Limitations. Under TILA, the borrower has an absolute right to rescind for three business days after the consummationof the loan. After three business days, a borrower may have the right to rescind up to three years if the disclosures were not made to the client. Damages and attorney’s fees are recoverable under the statute.

Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA); 15 U.S.C. § 1639

Purpose. HOEPA is designed to protect all borrowers, but especially
borrowers that apply for and take out high cost loans. HOPEA is
associated with TILA and is often considered a part of TILA.

Scope. Same as TILA.

Protections. Special Disclosures for Variable Rate Closed End Loans (like
ARMS)

1. The lender must disclose the maximum interest rate that could be charged over the life of the loan in the loan note.

2. The lender must give the borrower a copy of the ARM brochure that contains generic information about ARMs as well as more specific explanations of the aspects of each variable rate plan that the borrower is considering.

3. These disclosures must be given when the application is furnished
or before the payment of a nonrefundable fee, which ever is first.

4. During the life of the loan, the lender must send rate adjustment
or change notices before the loan rate will change.

HOEPA prohibits prepayment charges and balloon payments in a limited amount of cases, higher interest rates after default, negative amortization, more than two payments being made from the loan proceeds, pattern/practice of extending credit without taking into consideration the borrower’s ability to pay, and payments directly to home improvement contractors.

Relief and Statute of Limitations. A party can recover damages and rescind under HOEPA. Attorney’s fees and costs are also available. The Statutes of limitations for affirmative actions is one year. For rescission, the statutes of limitation is three years.

Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA); 15 U.S.C. § 1691

Purpose. The purpose of the ECOA is to stop discrimination in the lending industry.

Protections. ECOA has three important aspects:

1. First, it prohibits discrimination in any aspect of credit based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, assistance income.

2. Second, the ECOA requires creditors to take specific actions when approving or denying credit, prevents certain factors from being used to determine creditworthiness, mandates when an existing account may be closed, and restricts the ways that information is reported to credit reporting agencies concerning spouses.

3. Third, the Act imposes certain notice requirements on the credit issuer
when a loan application is approved or denied. If the creditor makes a counter offer (for more or less credit), then it must notify the borrower in writing of the new terms.

   How ECOA Protection Can Be Applied to Foreclosure Fraud

Bait and switch tactics may give rise to a claim under the ECOA. If a creditor gives credit in a much larger amount than the borrower requested and never gives the borrower an opportunity to deny the additional amount, then the creditor violated the procedural terms of the ECOA by failing to provide the borrower with written notice of all action taken on the original loan application. This tactic is often used in predatory lending. A creditor will give more credit to pay borrower’s debts that the borrower expressed no interest in paying. The new amount is often disclosed too late in the process for the borrower to feel as if he can object.

Relief and Statute of Limitations. The ECOA allows home owners to pursue relief higher on the food chain than the original lender, and provides for actual and punitive damages (up to $10,000 in an individual action), equitable relief and attorney’s fees. The statute of limitations is one year.

Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (RESPA); 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.

Purpose. The purpose of RESPA is to protect home buyers from
abusive practices in the residential real estate industry. The Act controls
the manner in which settlement services for a residential real estate loan are provided and compensated.

Scope. RESPA applies to federally related mortgages, meaning those made by federally-insured depository lenders, HUD-related loans, loans intendedto be sold on the secondary market to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac or to creditors who make or invest more than a million dollars per year in residentially secured loans. Most home equity loans (as well as refinancings), mobile home purchase loans and construction loans are covered by RESPA. A loan for vacant land is excluded unless a structure will be constructed or a manufactured home will be placed on the property within two years of settlement of the loan. There are some exceptions to RESPA. If a lender makes a loan from its own funds, holds the loan for varying periods of time and then sells the loan on the open market, it is not covered. Also, certain lenders that originate loans through a computer system are generally exempt from RESPA’s requirements.

Protections. RESPA requires that no later than three business days after the application, the consumer must receive a “good faith estimate” of settlement costs (usually via the HUD-1 settlement statement) along with a booklet explaining the costs. At closing, all settlement agents must use the HUD-1 settlement kickbacks and unearned fees. No person shall give or accept any fee, kickback or gift for a referral of a settlement service. Additionally, RESPA requires servicers to notify consumers about the possibility that their mortgages may be transferred and when one is imminent, and to have a mechanism that allows borrowers to make inquiries about their account to a servicer and to have corrections made to
their accounts, if necessary. Servicers have a substantive duty to pay the property taxes, homeowner’s insurance and other escrowed monies to the appropriate recipients as long as the borrower is current. Further, RESPA limits the amount that a lender can require that a borrower place in escrow, and prohibits a lender or servicer from charging the borrower for the preparation of statements required by TILA, the HUD-1 settlement statement, or escrow account statement.

Statute of Limitations. The statute of limitations is one year except for servicer violations which has a 3 year limitation.

                      Fair Housing Act (FHA); 42 U.S.C. § 3605

Purpose. The FHA prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin in the making of
or purchasing of residential real estate loans and any other related financial assistance.

Scope. The FHA applies to loan brokers, financing consultants and anyone else providing financial assistance related to the making of the loan as well as the secondary market in the purchasing of loans, debts or securities, thepooling or packaging of these instruments, and the marketing or the sale of securities issued on the basis of loans or debts.

Protection. To prove discrimination, the consumer must show that the defendants intentionally targeted on the basis of a protected class when trying to obtain credit or that there was a credit-grant policy that had a disparate impact on that basis.

Relief and Statute of Limitations. Under the FHA, the court can award actual and punitive damages, attorney’s fees and costs. The statute of limitations is two years from the occurrence or from the termination of the discriminatory practice for affirmative claims.

                         Federal Trade Commission “Holder” Rule

The FTC’s “Holder” rule, or the FTC Rule on Preservation of Consumers’ Claims and Defenses, allows a consumer to make a claim against a subsequent holder of a loan for the acts of the original lender. The original lender may be judgment proof, and it is unlikely that a consumer would effectively be able to defend against a collection action and bring an affirmative suit against the original lender. The rule creates an incentive for the lending industry to police itself and subsequent holders of a debt are in a better position to sue the original lender than the borrower.

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA); 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.

Purpose. FDCPA restricts debt collector’s efforts to obtain payment and
to choose venue. The Act protects debtors from abusive or harassing
debt collection practices.

Scope. The Act is generally used in the non-mortgage context because mortgage servicers are exempt because they usually acquire servicing rights before the mortgage goes into default. A debt collector generally includes collection agencies, creditors using false names or collecting for other creditors, collection attorneys, purchasers of delinquent debts, repossession companies, and suppliers or designers of deceptive forms, but generally excludes companies collecting their own debts.

Protections. The Act protects the consumer from an invasion of privacy, harassment, abuse, false or deceptive representations, and unfair or unconscionable collection methods. Specific acts that are prohibited include late night or repetitive phone calls, false threats of legal action or criminal prosecution and communications with most third parties regarding the debt.

FDCPA provides the consumer the ability to stop all debt collection action with a letter, makes the collector deal with the consumer’s attorney if the consumer has one, and gives the consumer the right to dispute the existence, legality or amount of the disputed debt.

Relief and Statute of Limitations. The plaintiff can recover actual damages, statutory damages (up to $1000), attorney’s fees and costs and perhaps punitive damages and injunctive relief. Class actions are also authorized and the statute of limitations for all actions is one year for affirmative claims.

Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968

Purpose. RICO can be used to provide a civil remedy to abusive
consumer credit practices.

Scope. Any cause of action under RICO must have the following elements: the existence of an enterprise, the enterprise is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, the defendant has engaged in one or more of four prohibited activities in section 1962, and the prohibited conduct cased injury to the plaintiff’s business or property.

Protections. Every RICO violation involves a collection of an unlawful debt (gambling debts or usury under state or federal law, at a rate at least twice the enforceable usury rate) or a pattern of racketeering activity. RICO can provide a remedy when a lender misrepresents that its rates are better than other lenders’ rates or that its loan will pay off other debts when it will
not. A well-plead allegation may state a claim for mail fraud in a loan flipping case under RICO. A borrower may also successfully plead a claim under RICO when there is a spread premium case where the payment of the premium is not revealed and the cost of the premium is passed onto the borrower in the form of a higher interest rate and where the broker represented that it would provide the lowest available rate, money was exchanged between the broker, the assignee, the funding lender and the title company and mail was used in furtherance of the scheme.

Remedy and Statute of Limitations. A person injured in his business or property can sue for treble damages but no physical or emotional damage claim can be made. The statute of limitations is four years in affirmative cases.

For More Information on How You Can Effectively Use Solid Arguments that are Structured on Your Lender’s Violations of Federal Laws, Which to Your Advantage, Will Subsequently Reduce Your Mortgage Payments and Save Your Home from Foreclosure Visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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Who Has Standing To Foreclose? – A Review of Massachusettes Case & Other Jurisdictions

09 Friday Aug 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Banks and Lenders, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, MERS, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Note - Deed of Trust - Mortgage, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, Securitization, State Court, Your Legal Rights

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Fannie Mae, Foreclosure, Ibanez, Massachusetts, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, U.S. Bancorp, Uniform Commercial Code, US Bank

                                            Introduction

As a result of the collapse of the housing market in this country in or around 2008, the number of residential foreclosures has increased exponentially, putting unprecedented strains on the system.

Although most foreclosures are uncontested, since there is rarely any doubt that the borrower has defaulted in repayment of the debt, in the past several years a cottage industry has developed challenging the creditor’s “standing” to foreclose, sometimes colloquially known as the “show me the Note” defense.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has seen its share of this phenomenon, maybe more than its share.

This post will briefly review the string of Massachusetts judicial decisions over the past several years addressing various aspects of the foreclosure standing question, and will use those cases to “issue-spot” and frame questions that practitioners in every state should consider and perhaps need to answer before moving ahead with foreclosures or to defend past foreclosures in litigation, whether in defense of borrowers’ lawsuits or in eviction proceedings. Other notables decisions will also be surveyed to flesh out the issues and arguments further, without attempting to be exhaustive of the subject or to present the proverbial 50-State survey.

                                   The Massachusetts Story

We begin with the Massachusetts foreclosure story. In early 2009, a judge on Massachusetts specialized Land Court called into question a title standard of the State’s Real Estate Bar Association that had been relied upon by the Massachusetts foreclosure Bar. REBA Title Standard No. 58 said that a foreclosure was not defective so long as an assignment of the mortgage was obtained at any time before or after the foreclosure. In other words, the title could be cleared by obtaining an assignment even after the conduct of the foreclosure auction sale. Land Court Judge Keith Long in U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Ibanez, 2009 WL 795201 (Mass. Land Ct. Mar. 26, 2009), held that the title standard did not correctly state Massachusetts law, and that under the Massachusetts foreclosure statute, M.G.L. c. 244, a creditor had to be the mortgagee to foreclose. In 2011, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637 (2011), affirmed, holding that a foreclosing entity, if not the original mortgagee, must hold an assignment of the mortgage at the time it first published the notice of sale.

If the assignment of the mortgage was obtained after publication of the notice, a subsequently-completed foreclosure is unlawful and void.

Because Massachusetts is a non-judicial foreclosure jurisdiction, the foreclosing creditor does not have available ares judicata defense to a post-foreclosure challenge to title or possession.

Thus, the Massachusetts Court has held that a borrower or other defendant in an eviction action can defend by contesting the validity of a purchaser’s title if it stems from an invalid foreclosure, even if the mortgagor had done nothing to contest the foreclosure itself. Bank of New York v. Bailey, 460 Mass. 327 (2011).

The plaintiffs in Ibanez were securitization trustees and while the evidence in the record was incomplete, contributing to the result, the trustees were presumed to have held the notes in the respective loan pools, including the defendants’ notes, for the benefit of the investors. The Ibanez Court required the mortgagee to hold an assignment, and implicitly found that it would not be sufficient to confer standing to foreclose to hold the note without also holding the mortgage or obtaining an assignment, but nothing in the decision presaged a requirement that the mortgagee possess the note.

The argument that the mortgagee must also hold the note to foreclose was pressed to the Massachusetts high court almost immediately in the wake of Ibanez. This issue arises in Massachusetts because, contrary to the majority and longstanding American rule that the mortgage is mere security for the note and follows the note as a matter of law, Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271 (1872), Massachusetts is a title-theory state that allows for the note and mortgage to be held separately. Under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), a note can be transferred by delivery of possession of an endorsed note, but Massachusetts, as a title theory state, requires a signed instrument to convey a mortgage, “which represents legal title to someone’s home.” Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 649. Comparable to the equity of redemption residing in the mortgagor, to reclaim legal title by repaying the debt and redeeming the mortgage, the owner of the note under Massachusetts law holds beneficial ownership of the mortgage and has the right to compel an assignment of the mortgage by the mortgagee, who holds the mortgage in trust for the holder of the note, in what has been described as a resulting trust implied by law. Id. at 652.

In Eaton v. Fannie Mae, 462 Mass. 569 (2012), the Court laid down a new rule that foreclosing mortgagees must either (a) hold the note, or (b) be acting on behalf of the note holder. In other words, the Court held that “one who, although not the note holder himself, acts as the authorized agent of the note holder,” may exercise the power of sale. Id. at 586. Notably, unlike in Ibanez where the Court rejected entreaties for prospective application of its decision, the Eaton court chose to apply its holding prospectively only to foreclosures noticed after the date of the decision out of “concern for litigants and others who have relied on existing precedents,” this being a “new rule.” Id. at 588.

Massachusetts courts, like courts elsewhere, have also considered the standing of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) to foreclose mortgages and to assign mortgages for foreclosure. MERS, discussed in greater detail below, holds title to mortgages as nominee for MERS Members. The Eaton court discussed MERS in several footnotes, see 462 Mass. 569 nn. 5, 7, 27 & 29, and implicitly accepted MERS’ pre-foreclosure assignment of the mortgage to the mortgage servicer.

In a federal court appeal earlier this year, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Boston held expressly that MERS has the authority to assign mortgages it holds as nominee. Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services, — F.3d —-, 2013 WL 563374 (1st Cir., Feb. 15, 2013). Indeed, in the District Court decision the Court of Appeals affirmed, District Judge William Young remarked that “the MERS system fits perfectly into the Massachusetts model for the separation of legal and beneficial ownership of mortgages.” Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services, 826 F. Supp. 2d 352, 371 (D. Mass. 2011).

The recent Massachusetts mortgage foreclosure decisions were surprising, bordering on shocking, both to lenders and the Massachusetts real estate and foreclosure bars. In Ibanez, the Court disapproved a title standard of the well-respected statewide real estate bar group that conveyancers and others looked to for guidance, and in Eaton the Massachusetts Court for the first time announced a requirement that a foreclosing mortgagee be able to demonstrate its relationship to the mortgage note notwithstanding that there is no requirement under Massachusetts law to record or file notes or note transfers. 462 Mass. at 586;see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. McKenna , 2011 WL 6153419, at *2 n.1 (Mass. Land Ct. Dec. 8, 2011) (“There never has been recording of notes at the registries of deeds at any time. Notes are never recorded—not (as they may be in some other states) when the initial mortgage is recorded, nor at any time after that, including at the time, following the auction sale, when the foreclosure deed and

affidavit are put on at the registry.”). Whether the greater numbers of foreclosures and the perceived financial excesses and highly publicized alleged “sloppiness” of the mortgage industry have caused some courts to be more “pro-consumer,” or it is only that some of the legal doctrines underlying foreclosure standing had not been closely examined in a century or more, the rulings were unexpected. In part, they may represent the challenge of adapting historical, and in some cases ancient, property law to modern commerce, or vice versa. But they point out the critical need to understand state law, and to not take for granted that traditional custom and practice will be upheld, or that courts will not struggle applying that law or those established customs and practice to non-traditional modern mortgage ownership structures.

Mortgage notes, representing the debt for which the mortgages are collateral, will generally qualify as negotiable instruments whose ownership and transfer is governed by the principles of Article 3 of the UCC, adopted largely intact in most American jurisdictions. But despite the efforts of the UCC Commissioners to harmonize the law of security interests, including in some respects in real property, mortgage law and mortgage foreclosure in particular remains predominantly a creature of local state law. Thus, for mortgage foreclosure purposes, where the foreclosing creditor stands, in the legal vernacular, may depend on where the house sits. The discussion below frames some of the key standing inquiries suggested by the Massachusetts experience, and surveys some recent case law from across the country addressing the same or similar questions, and compares and contrasts the judicial precedents.

Although subsidiary questions such as whether the state is a title theory or lien theory jurisdiction, and whether the mortgage is deemed to follow the note as a matter of law, may affect how the questions are answered in any particular state, the core questions remain the same and can generally be framed in the following terms:

1. What relationship must the foreclosing entity have to the mortgage (or to the corresponding deed of trust in jurisdictions that know the security instrument by that terminology), and at what time must it hold or have it?

2. What relationship, if any, must the foreclosing entity have to the promissory note secured by the mortgage (or by the deed of trust), and at what time?

3. Does MERS when it holds the mortgage as nominee (or when it is named as beneficiary under a deed of trust) have standing to foreclose, or the ability to assign the mortgage (or deed of trust) to the lender, trustee or servicer for foreclosure?

4. Who has standing to foreclose in the securitization context, given the legal relationships under the standard Pooling and Servicing Agreement between and among the securitization trustee, the mortgage servicer and, where applicable, MERS as nominee under the mortgage (or deed of trust)?

There is a large body of case law nationwide on all of these questions, with additional decisions being handed down on virtually a daily basis; what follows below is only a representative sampling intended to illustrate the more significant issues and arguments, to inform the analysis of applicable local state law.

        1. Relationship Between Foreclosing Entity and Mortgage.

In U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637 (2011), as discussed above, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a foreclosing entity must hold an assignment of the mortgage at the time of the publication of the notice of sale. Other states differ on whether they require a foreclosing party to hold the mortgage either at the time of the foreclosure sale itself or when notice is issued.

In considering any question of a party’s status in the foreclosure process, it is first important to note whether jurisdictions are judicial or non-judicial jurisdictions:

– Judicial  foreclosure states require the foreclosing party to initiate a court proceeding in order to foreclose. The foreclosure complaint seeks permission from the court to foreclose on the secured property.

– Non-judicial foreclosure jurisdictions do not require court involvement. Instead, the foreclosing entity must follow certain practices as set by state statute, such as mailing notices of acceleration and default, and publishing notice in the local papers. That entity often is the deed of trust trustee, under state law. If the borrower wishes to contest the sale, he or she may seek to enjoin it before the sale occurs.

Twenty-two states are considered judicial foreclosure jurisdictions, whereas 28 are deemed non-judicial.

In New York, where foreclosures are conducted judicially, one court recently stated that “a plaintiff has standing where it is both the holder or assignee of the subject mortgage and the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time the action is commenced.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Wine, 90 A.D.3d 1216, 1217 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2011).

To a similar effect, one Florida court has said a party must “present evidence that it owns and holds the note and mortgage in question in order to proceed with a foreclosure action.” Gee v. U.S. Bank N.A., 72 So. 3d 211, 213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2011). But a different Florida appellate court has held that an assignment of the mortgage may not be necessary at the time a complaint is filed. Standing to bring a judicial foreclosure requires “either an assignment or an equitable transfer of the mortgage prior to the filing of the complaint.” McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., 79 So. 3d 170, 172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2012). Because ownership of a mortgage follows an assignment of the debt under that case, the mortgage does not need to be assigned to the plaintiff before the Complaint is filed if it proves ownership of the note at that time.

New Jersey, also a judicial state, has said that if a foreclosing creditor bases standing to foreclose on assignment of the mortgage, the assignment must precede filing of the foreclosure complaint; however, if the foreclosing creditor held the note at the time of filing the complaint, assignment of the mortgage is unnecessary to establish standing to foreclose. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 222-25 (App. Div. 2011). There, although Deutsche Bank had not proved its standing because the mortgage assignment it relied on was executed a day after it filed its complaint, the Court remanded to allow Deutsche Bank to demonstrate standing by proving that it possessed the note prior to filing the complaint. Contrast state filing rules with the law of a non-judicial state like Michigan, which allows a foreclosing party to be “either the owner of the indebtedness or of an interest in the indebtedness secured by the mortgage or the servicing agent of the mortgage.” MCL 600.3204(1)(d)). Thus, under the statute, a loan servicer is expressly authorized to foreclose regardless of whether it holds the note or mortgage. However, by the date of the foreclosure sale, the mortgage must be assigned to the foreclosing party if it is not the original mortgagee. MCL 600.3204(3).

Where an assignment of the mortgage may be required in order to foreclose, there are differences regarding whether the assignment of mortgage is required to be recorded.

– Massachusetts: In U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637 (2011), although the Court required the foreclosing entity to hold the mortgage, it notably did not require the assignment of mortgage be recorded – or even be in recordable form.

– California, likewise, does not require that assignments of a deed of trust be recorded prior to foreclosure, despite a statutory pre-foreclosure recording requirement for mortgage assignments (mortgages are uncommon in California). Calvo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 199 Cal. App. 4th 118, 122-2 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2011).

– New York, recording is also not required. See, e.g., Bank of NY v. Silverberg, 86 A.D.3d 274, 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 2nd Dep’t 2011) (rejecting contention that absence of recorded assignment allowed inference that plaintiff did not own the note and mortgage; “an assignment of a note and mortgage need not be in writing and can be effectuated by physical delivery”).

But some non-judicial states require that assignments of deeds of trusts or mortgages be recorded before a foreclosure can occur:

– Oregon: Ore. Rev. Stat. § 86.735(1)

– Idaho: Idaho Stat. § 45-1505(1)

– Minnesota: Minn. Stat. § 580.02(3)

– Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 71-1-313(1)

– Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. § 34-4-103(a)(iii)

Regardless of any requirement, assignees typically record mortgage assignments to put the world on notice of their interest. See MetLife Home Loans v. Hansen, 48 Kan. App. 2d 213 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (“The assignment of the Mortgage was merely recorded notice of a formal transfer of the title to the instrument as required by recording statutes, which are primarily designed to protect the mortgagee against other creditors of the mortgagor for lien-priority purposes, not to establish the rights of the mortgagee vis-à-vis the mortgagor.”

                           Need for Correct Corporate Names

When an assignment of mortgage is required, it must also be assigned to the correct corporate entity. Confusion over corporate names can impede foreclosures.

For example, the servicer of a loan filed a judicial foreclosure action alleging that it was the assignee of the original lender. Bayview Loan Servicing, L.L.C. v. Nelson, 382 Ill. App. 3d 1184 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2008). Reversing the trial court’s judgment in favor of the servicer (Bayview Loan Servicing, L.L.C.), the Court of Appeals held that the servicer was not allowed to foreclose because the mortgage was not assigned to it. Rather, the mortgage had been assigned to an affiliated entity, Bayview Financial Trading Group, L.P. Id. at 1187. Without any evidence that the foreclosing entity held the note or mortgage, the fact that it was servicer was insufficient to allow it to foreclose. Id. at 1188.

But the situation was different in a judicial foreclosure filed in the same state by Standard Bank, which was the successor to the originator of the loan as a result of several mergers and name changes. Std. Bank & Trust Co. v. Madonia, 964 N.E.2d 118 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2011). The mortgagors argued that the plaintiff bank was required to show a mortgage assignment or endorsement of the note to it. Rejecting that argument, the Court held that the plaintiff bank retained all of the interests of the originator, including those under the note and mortgage, as a result of the mergers. Id. at 123.

A court may require proof of a merger. The note and mortgage in this case were assigned to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. deBree, 2012 ME 34 (Me. 2012). Upon the borrowers’ default, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. filed a complaint as “Successor by Merger to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.” The trial court granted summary judgment for Wells Fargo Bank. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that Wells Fargo Bank had not proved its ownership of the mortgage note and mortgage because there was no evidence that it, as opposed to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., owned the instruments. Id. at ¶ 9. The Court rejected the Bank’s arguments that the borrowers had waived their argument, and it declined to take judicial notice that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage had merged into Wells Fargo Bank. Id.at ¶¶ 9-10. The showing of ownership was necessary for the Bank to prevail on summary judgment, so the foreclosure judgment was vacated. Id. at ¶ 11.

                 2. Relationship Between Foreclosing Entity and Note

In Eaton v. Fannie Mae, 462 Mass. 569 (2012), discussed above, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court announced a new rule, applicable to foreclosures noticed after June 22, 2012 (the date of the decision), requiring that foreclosing mortgagees must either (a) hold the note; or (b) be acting on behalf of the noteholder, at the time of foreclosure. In other words, the Court held that “one who, although not the note holder himself, acts as the authorized agent of the note holder” may exercise the power of sale.

Various courts in other states are split as to whether a foreclosing entity must hold the note.

California, for example, allows by statute non-judicial foreclosure by the “trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents.” Debrunner v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 204 Cal. App. 4th 433, 440 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 2012) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 2924(a)(1)). The party foreclosing need not have possession of or a beneficial interest in the note because no such prerequisite appears in comprehensive statutory framework. Id. at 440-42.

In Idaho, a non-judicial foreclosure state, the state supreme court expressly rejected the idea that a party must have ownership of the note and mortgage. Trotter v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 152 Idaho 842, 861-62 (2012). Rather, “the plain language of the [deed of trust foreclosure] statute makes it clear that the trustee may foreclose on a deed of trust if it complies with the requirements contained within the Act.” Id. at 862.

Despite these states’ rejections of any requirement to hold the note, some courts in other jurisdictions do seem to require the foreclosing party to also be the noteholder, for example, or perhaps at least an agent or authorized person:

– New York: According to this intermediate appellate division, judicial foreclosure plaintiff must both hold the note and the mortgage at the time the action is commenced. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Wine, 90 A.D.3d 1216, 1217 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2011).

– Florida: In Florida, the holder of a note, or its representative, may foreclose. Gee v. U.S. Bank N.A., 72 So. 3d 211, 213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2011). If the plaintiff is not the payee of the note, it must be endorsed to the plaintiff or in blank. Id.

– Maryland: The transferee of an unendorsed promissory note has the burden of establishing its rights under the note by proving the note’s prior transfer history, especially where the mortgagor requests an injunction to stop foreclosure. Anderson v. Burson, 424 Md. 232, 245 (2011). Thus, the Court held that although the agent of the substitute trustee under the mortgage had physical possession of the note, it was not a holder of the note because there was no valid endorsement; it could nevertheless still enforce the note based on concessions from the mortgagors. Id. at 251-52.

– Oklahoma: “To commence a foreclosure action in Oklahoma, a plaintiff must demonstrate it has a right to enforce the note and, absent a showing of ownership, the plaintiff lacks standing.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Heath, 2012 OK 54, ¶ 9 (Okla. 2012).

– Washington: Under Washington’s non-judicial foreclosure statute, the trustee is required to “have proof that the beneficiary is the owner of any promissory note or other obligation secured by the deed of trust.” RCW61.24.030(7)(a). Note, however, that borrowers cannot bring a judicial action based on a beneficiary or trustee’s failure to prove to the borrower that the beneficiary owns the note. Frazer v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 2012 WL 1821386, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 18, 2012) (“[T]he Washington Deed of Trust Act requires that a foreclosing lender demonstrate its ownership of the underlying note to the trustee, not the borrower.”).

Some jurisdictions more clearly take an either/or approach to foreclosing. In Michigan, for example, the foreclosing entity must be “either the owner of the indebtedness or of an interest in the indebtedness secured by the mortgage or the servicing agent of the mortgage.” Residential Funding Co., LLC v. Saurman, 490 Mich. 909 (2011) (quoting MCL 600.3204(1)(d)). The question in Saurman was whether foreclosures by MERS, as a mortgagee that did not hold the note, were proper. The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the foreclosures because the mortgagee’s interest in the note—even though not an ownership interest—was a sufficient interest in the indebtedness to allow it to foreclose.

There are other state courts that follow the either/or approach as well, for example:

– Ohio: In CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Patterson, 2012 Ohio 5894 (Ohio Ct. App., Cuyahoga County Dec. 13, 2012), the Ohio Court of Appeals held that a party has standing if “at the time it files its complaint of foreclosure, it either (1) has had a mortgage assigned or (2) is the holder of the note.” Id. at ¶ 21. Thus, the plaintiff in Patterson had standing because it possessed the note when it filed its complaint, even though the mortgagewas not assigned until later. Id. at ¶ 22.

– Alabama: In Sturdivant v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, — So.3d —-, 2011 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 361 (Ala. Civ. App. Dec. 16, 2011), the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals ruled that a party lacked standing to foreclose because it was not yet the assignee of a mortgage when it initiated foreclosure. In Perry v. Fannie Mae, 100 So. 3d 1090 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012), the Court explained that the mortgage need not be assigned to a foreclosing party at the time it initiates foreclosure if it is a holder of the note. Because the evidence showed that the foreclosing party held the note at the time it initiated foreclosure proceedings, the foreclosure was proper. Id. at 1094-96.

– New Jersey: As noted in the preceding section, New Jersey recognizes standing to file a complaint to foreclose based on either assignment of the mortgage or possession of the note. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 222 (App. Div. 2011).

MERS is a system for electronically tracking interests in mortgages that are traded on the secondary market. MERS members (approximately 6,000) agree that MERS serves as mortgagee or beneficiary, and when loan ownership or servicing rights are sold from one MERS member to another, MERS remains the titleholder to the security.

                                   3. Standing of MERS

                                         What is MERS?

MERS is a system for electronically tracking interests in mortgages that are traded on the secondary market. MERS members (approximately 6,000) agree that MERS serves as mortgagee or beneficiary, and when loan ownership or servicing rights are sold from one MERS member to another, MERS remains the titleholder to the security instrument as nominee on behalf of whomever owns the loan. MERS is modeled on the “book entry system” used to track ownership in stock exchanges.

The use of nominees predates MERS: “The use of a nominee in real estate transactions, and as mortgagee in a recorded mortgage, has long been sanctioned as a legitimate practice.” In re Cushman Bakery, 526 F. 2d 23, 30 (1st Cir. 1975) (collecting cases). However, the concept of a nominee serving as agent for one member of a group of possible principals—where the principal may change in a way not reflected in the public record—has fostered arange of reactions, from commendation to criticism to confusion, but ultimately MERS (and its members) have repeatedly prevailed in foreclosure challenge litigation.

                               Authority of MERS to Foreclose

Most courts to consider the issue have ruled that MERS may serve as mortgagee or beneficiary and foreclose, for example:

– Texas: Athey v. MERS, 314 S.W. 3d 161, 166 (Tex. App. 2010) (MERS could foreclose, though it never held the note).

– Utah: Burnett v. MERS, 2009 WL 3582294 (D. Utah Oct. 27, 2009) (“MERS had authority under the Deed of Trust to initiate foreclosure proceedings”).

– Nevada: Croce v. Trinity Mortg. Assurance Corp. 2009 WL 3172119, at 3 (D. Nev. Sept. 28, 2009) (collecting cases from Georgia, California, Florida, and Colorado rejecting argument “that MERS does not have standing as a beneficiary under the Note and Deed of Trust, and therefore, is not authorized to participate in the foreclosure proceedings.”); see also Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon,286 P.3d 249, 254 (Nev. 2012) (“The deed of trust also expressly designated MERS as the beneficiary… it is an express part of the contract that we are not at liberty to disregard, and it is not repugnant to the remainder of the contract.”).

– Michigan: Residential Funding Corp. v. Saurman, 805 N.W. 2d 183 (Mich. 2011) held that MERS had a sufficient interest to foreclose because it owned “legal title to a security lien whose existence is wholly contingent on the satisfaction of the indebtedness.”

In addition, at least two states—Minnesota (Minn. Stat. § 507.413) and Texas (Tex. Prop. Code § 51.0001)—have enacted statutes recognizing that MERS can foreclose.

Some state courts, nevertheless, have raised various questions about MERS’s role as it relates to foreclosures.

– Oregon: In Niday v. GMAC Mortg., 284 P. 3d 1157 (Or. App. 2012), the Oregon Court of Appeals ruled that MERS did not meet Oregon’s statutory definition of “beneficiary,” disagreeing with the majority of trial court rulings that had ruled MERS could serve as beneficiary.

Niday is on appeal to the Supreme Court of Oregon; oral argument was heard January 8, 2013.

– Maine: The Maine Supreme Court has ruled that MERS cannot meet its definition of “mortgagee,” and thus had no standing to foreclose judicially. MERS v. Saunders, 2 A. 3d 289 (Me. 2010) (“MERS is not in fact a ‘mortgagee’ within the meaning of our foreclosure statute”).

– Washington: Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Group, Inc., 285 P.3d 34, 46 (Wash. 2012) ruled that MERS did not meet the statutory definition of deed of trust beneficiary, though Bain did not explain whether this impaired foreclosure proceedings.

 Nearly two years ago, MERS changed its rules of membership to provide that the noteholder must arrange for an assignment to be executed from MERS to the foreclosing entity prior to commencement of any foreclosure proceeding, judicial or non-judicial. So, this issue may be a legacy question after all.

                         Authority of MERS to Assign Mortgage

Even before the change in the membership rules, MERS often assigned mortgages to the foreclosing entity so that entity could foreclose. Some borrowers have argued that, as nominee, MERS does not have the power to assign the mortgage. These challenges have been almost universally rejected, as the security instruments expressly authorize MERS, as nominee, to take any action required of its principal and refer to the mortgagee or beneficiary as MERS and its “successors and assigns.” Indeed the First Circuit recently rejected this very argument. See Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services, — F.3d —-, 2013 WL 563374 (1st Cir., Feb. 15, 2013).

Likewise, the fact that an assignment of the security instrument may occur after the transfer of the note is not problematic, and makes sense under the MERS model: “[MERS] members often wait until a default or bankruptcy case is filed to have a mortgage or deed of trust assigned to them so that they can take steps necessary to seek stay relief and/or to foreclose…. [T]he reason they wait is that, if a note is paid off eventually, as most presumably are, MERS is authorized to release the [deed of trust] without going to the expense of ever recording any assignments.”Edelstein, 286 P.3d at 254.

Borrowers have also claimed that MERS lacks authority to assign the note. Since MERS typically does not hold notes, language in MERS assignments referencing the note in addition to the mortgage likely reflects a lack of precision. Insofar as MERS did not hold a note the issue is immaterial.

                             Splitting” the Note and Mortgage

Some borrowers have alleged that the naming of MERS as holder of title to the mortgage, while the lender holds title to the note, separates the note from the security instrument thereby rendering assignments void and the security instrument unenforceable. As one court has colorfully described it, the debt is the cow, and the mortgage the cow’s tail—while the debt can survive without the security instrument, the instrument has no independent vitality without the debt. See Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. MERS, 263 p.3d 397, 403 (Utah App. 2011).

As noted, in Massachusetts, those arguments have been squarely rejected as Massachusetts permits the note and mortgage to be held separately. Indeed the District of Massachusetts remarked that the “MERS system fits perfectly into the Massachusetts model for the separation of legal and beneficial ownership of mortgages.” Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services, 826 F. Supp. 2d 352, 371 (D. Mass. 2011), aff’d — F.3d —-, 2013 WL 563374 (1st Cir. Feb. 15, 2013).

This theory has typically been rejected elsewhere as well, as, if successful, it would “confer[] an unwarranted windfall on the mortgagor.” Id. (citing Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Mortgages § 5.4 cmt. a). In Edelstein, 286 P.3d 249, 255 (Nev. 2012), for example, the court held that in Nevada, “to have standing to foreclose, the current beneficiary of the deed of trust and the current holder of the promissory note must be the same.” However, under the MERS system, the parties agree that MERS holds the security instrument while the note is transferred among its members—as long as the two instruments are united in the foreclosing entity prior to foreclosure, the Nevada court held, the foreclosing entity has standing to foreclose in that state.

Along similar lines, some borrowers allege that operation of MERS makes it impossible to identify who the proper noteholder is, because only the security instrument (not the note) was assigned by MERS. “A ‘show me the note’ plaintiff typically alleges a foreclosure is invalid unless the foreclosing entity produces the original note.” Stein v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 662 F. 3d 976, 978 (8th Cir. 2011). Of course, when the foreclosing entity is able to produce the note, the claim is typically defeated on summary judgment, id., and many courts considering “show me the note” arguments in the MERS context have dismissed them as a matter of law without any inquiry into note ownership. E.g., Diessner v. MERS, 618 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1187 (D. Ariz. 2009) (“district courts have routinely held that Plaintiff’s ‘show me the note’ argument lacks merit”) (collecting cases from California, Nevada, and Arizona) (internal quotations omitted).

                             Unrecorded Assignment Theories

Some states (including Massachusetts after November 1, 2012)statutorily require that, in order to bring a non-judicial foreclosure, all assignments of thesecurity instrument must be recorded.  E.g., ORS 86.735(1) (Oregon) (trustee sale may proceed only if “any assignments of the trust deed by the trustee or the beneficiary … are recorded”). In Oregon, a few borrowers have successfully argued that, because the security follows the debt as a matter of law, transfers of the debt while MERS remains lienholder of record result in assignments that go unrecorded, precluding non-judicial foreclosure.  See Niday, 284 P. 3d at 1169 (“any assignments” language in ORS 86.735(1) includes “assignment by transfer of the note, ” and that all such assignments from the initial lender to subsequent lenders must be recorded prior to commencement of a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding).  Niday is under review by the Supreme Court of Oregon, which heard oral argument on January 8, 2013.

Other courts considering the same argument have rejected it. For instance, Minnesota, Idaho, and Arizona have the same statutory requirement that assignments must be recorded, but have not found note transfers to trigger an obligation to create and record an assignment of the corresponding security instrument. E.g., Jackson v. MERS, 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009) (answering “no” to certified question: “Where an entity, such as defendant MERS, serves as mortgagee of record as nominee for a lender and that lender’s successors and assigns and there has been no assignment of the mortgage itself, is an assignment of the ownership of the underlying indebtedness for which the mortgage serves as security an assignment that must be recorded prior to the commencement of a mortgage foreclosure by advertisement under Minn. Stat. ch. 580?”); Homeyer v. Bank of America, N.A.,2012 WL 4105132, at *4 (D. Idaho Aug. 27, 2012) (“Idaho law does not require recording each assignment of a trust deed based upon transfer of the underlying note.”); Ciardi v. Lending Co., Inc., 2010 WL 2079735, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2010) (“Plaintiffs have failed to cite any Arizona statute that requires the recording of a promissory note or even the assignment of a promissory note.”). These cases ruled that a transfer of a promissory note does not create an “assignment” for purposes of those statutes.

                                         4. Securitization Standing

                                           What is Securitization?

Securitization is the packaging of debt into instruments broadly referred to as “mortgage-backed securities”; one court has described it with analogies: “One could analogize this process to taking raw ingredients and combining them to make bread then selling the slices individually, or putting different kinds of meat into a sausage grinder then selling the individual sausages. What is born from this process are new debt instruments, sold on the open market, that have pooled-and-sliced home loans as their ingredients. Different debt instruments work in different ways, but the basic concept is that home loan debt gets repackaged and sold to other investors rather than being held by the bank that originated the loan.” Bisson v. Bank of America, N.A., — F.Supp.2d —-, 2013 WL 325262, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 15, 2013). The securitization market emerged to facilitate the inflow of capital to fund home loans, and it “allows banks to spread mortgage risk across the financial system rather than hold it all themselves.”  Id.

Although securitization has fallen well off its peak of approximately $1 trillion in originations in 2006, it is projected to rise from $4 billion in 2012 to $25-30 billion in 2013.

There are several parties to a securitization agreement, but the borrower is not one of them. A typical securitization arrangement involves the following parties:

· Originator: The originator is the party identified as “lender” on note and mortgage (or deed of trust).

· Depositor: The depositor is either the originator or someone that buys loans from originators and pools them into securities pursuant to a Pooling and Servicing Agreement (“PSA”) to which the depositor, trustee, and master servicer are parties.

· Trust: Entity into which loans are pooled (e.g., “Structured Asset Securities Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-Z”). Sometimes referred to as a “Special Purpose Vehicle,” “Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit” or “REMIC,” orsimply a “Mortgage-Backed Security.”

· Trustee/Custodian: The trustee of the securitization trust (not to be confused with the trustee of a deed of trust, which conducts non-judicial foreclosure sales in deed of trust states) holds loans on behalf of the individual security holders, receiving the borrower’s payments from the loan servicer.

· Individual Investors: Shares of mortgage-backed securities are purchased by investors who, when loans are paid on schedule, ultimately benefit from borrowers’ mortgage payments.

· Master Servicer: The master servicer under the PSA services the individual loans in the pool, interfacing with borrowers, collecting loan payments and transferring them to the trust, and often handling foreclosures and post-foreclosure property management.

           The Effect of Securitization on Foreclosure

Securitization adds complexity to chain of title to the mortgage, and chain of ownership of the note. See, e.g., In re Almeida, 417 B.R. 140, 142-45 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) (describing chain of title to a mortgage securing a securitized note); In re Samuels, 415 B.R. 8, 16-22 (considering challenge to direct assignment of mortgage from originator to trustee, not including an intervening assignment to the trust).

Some borrowers have claimed that insurance contracts or credit default swap agreements preclude default—i.e., the trust was insured against loss, collected the insurance when the borrower defaulted, and should not be allowed to foreclose as well because such foreclosure would grant a “double recovery.” Larota-Florez v. Goldman Sachs Mortg. Co., 719 F. Supp. 2d 636, 642 (E.D. Va. 2010). These arguments have not gained traction. Horvath v. Bank of N.Y., N.A., 641 F.3d 617, 626 n.2 (4th Cir. 2011) (rejecting argument that trustee of securitization trust “should not have been able to foreclose on his property because they did not suffer any losses from his default,” because “that defense does not allow individuals in default on a mortgage to offset their outstanding obligations by pointing to the mortgagee’s unrelated investment income”); Commonwealth, 2011 UT App 232 ¶¶ 3, 10 (rejecting argument “that defendants, having been paid off in the sale of the loan, could not seek a second payoff by foreclosure of the Trust Deed” as a “mere conclusory allegation” that could not sustain a viable claim).

Other borrowers have commissioned “securitization audits,” which purportedly trace the history of the loan in an attempt to cast doubt upon whether the foreclosing entity has standing. These arguments have also generally failed. E.g., Norwood v. Bank of America, 2010 WL 4642447 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 25, 2010); Dye v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 2012 WL 1340220 (D. Or. Apr. 17, 2012) (granting motion to dismiss despite findings of “Mortgage Securitization Audit”). Still other borrowers have challenged the foreclosing entity’s compliance with the PSA. As noted above, borrowers are not parties to these agreements; as such, courts have generally found that borrowers do not have standing to challenge the foreclosing entity’s compliance or lack thereof with it. See, e.g., In re Correia, 452 B.R. 319, 324 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2011) (stating that debtors, who were not parties to the PSA or third-party beneficiaries thereof, lacked standing to challenge defendants’ compliance with PSA); Sami v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2012 WL 967051, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2012) (rejecting claim “that Wells Fargo failed to transfer or assign the note or Deed of Trust to the Securitized Trust by the ‘closing date,’ and that therefore, ‘under the PSA, any alleged assignment beyond the specified closing date’ is void”).

                       Which Securitization Parties May Foreclose?

As discussed above, there are several parties to a securitization. The parties most likely to be involved in a foreclosure are the trustee and servicer. On occasion, foreclosures have been conducted in the name of MERS.

As the party interfacing with the borrowers on a day-to-day basis, the servicer is often in best practical position to handle foreclosure proceedings, but may be required, under some states’ laws, to demonstrate its entitlement to foreclose on behalf of the securitization trustee. So, for example, in Maine, a judicial foreclosure state, the servicer must show its authority to enforce the note. See Bank of America, N.A. v. Cloutier, 2013 WL 453976, at *3 (Me. Feb. 7, 2013) (foreclosure plaintiff must “identify the owner or economic beneficiary of the note and, if the plaintiff is not the owner, to indicate the basis for the plaintiff’s authority to enforce the note pursuant to Article 3-A of the UCC”).

Most non-judicial states do not apply special requirements to loan servicers; the only significant inquiry is whether the trustee of the deed of trust was properly appointed by the beneficiary of record. In Utah, for example, “the statute governing non-judicial foreclosure in Utah does not contain any requirement that the trustee demonstrate his or her authority in order to foreclose. The court declines to create a requirement where the legislature chose not to include one. Therefore, the court holds that, under the terms of the relevant documents and the current statute, [a trustee] is not required to demonstrate its authority to foreclose before initiating a foreclosure proceeding.” Hoverman v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86968, at *16-17 (D. Utah Aug. 4, 2011); see also Trotter, 275 P.3d at 861 (Idaho 2012) (“A trustee is not required to prove it has standing before foreclosing on a deed of trust” as long as “the Appointment of Successor Trustee, Notice of Default, and Notice of Trustee’s Sale complied with the statutoryrequirements and were recorded as specified in the statute”).

The situation can change, however, if the loan becomes involved in a judicial proceeding, such as a bankruptcy. To move for relief from stay in bankruptcy—even in a deed of trust state—a servicer must somehow show authority to enforce the note, though assignment of the security instrument may not be necessary. E.g., In re Tucker, 441 B.R. 638, 645 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2010) (“even if, as here, the deed of trust is recorded in the name of the original lender…, the holder of the note, whoever it is, would be entitled to foreclose, even if the deed of trust had not been assigned to it.”). And, conversely, failure to show authority to enforce the note can lead to denial of motions for relief from stay. E.g., In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) (denying relief from stay to group of movants that included both servicers and securitization trustees because they presented insufficient proof that they owned the notes in question); In re Mims, 438 B.R. 52, 57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (servicer that held title to themortgage but did not show it had been assigned the note was not a “real party in interest” in proceeding to lift stay).

In addition to the servicer, the trustee is often the foreclosing party. As the party holding title to the loan on behalf of the loan investors, the trustee is certainly a proper party to foreclose—if it has the right to do so under state law, which may require that it have been formally assigned the mortgage.

In Massachusetts, for instance—and as discussed more above—the trustee must also hold an assignment of the mortgage. In Ibanez, the trustee commenced foreclosures before they had been assigned the mortgages, and did not record assignments until after the foreclosure was completed. The trustee argued it had already received the note when the loan had been securitized years earlier, and that gave it all it needed to foreclose. The court rejected that argument—Massachusetts, as a “title theory” state, requires assignment of mortgage to foreclose. Securitization may have showed intent to assign mortgages, but was not an actual assignment.

Lien-theory states often take a different position, and do not require a trustee to also hold the mortgage, which is nothing more than the right to enforce a lien. See, e.g., Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 286 P.3d 249, 254 (Nev. 2012);KCB Equities, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. , 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 4418, at *4-5 (Tex. App.—Dallas).

                                       Conclusion

The recent Massachusetts foreclosure case law is likely some what atypical, driven as it has been by some relatively unusual aspects of Massachusetts law.

But the questions the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has been called upon to answer, concerning the necessary relationship between the lien of the security interest, the debt and the foreclosing creditor, are universal and have been the subject of considerable litigation across the country during the recent “foreclosure crisis.” And the questions are controlled for the most part by state law, and state property and foreclosure law are much less uniform than the law governing the notes themselves as negotiable instruments. This paper has identified the principal issues and arguments so practitioners can ask the right questions and try to determine the law in their particular jurisdiction before proceeding.

For More Information How You Can Use Solid Augments To Effective Challenge and Save Your Home Visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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Understanding Mortgage Fraud ~ A Comprehensive Guide For Homeowners

31 Wednesday Jul 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Banks and Lenders, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, MERS, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Notary, Note - Deed of Trust - Mortgage, Pro Se Litigation, Scam Artists, Securitization, State Court, Your Legal Rights

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Blank endorsement, Business, MER, mortgage, Mortgage loan, Negotiable instrument, Real estate, Securitization

How Homeowners Can Effectively Determine Various Forms of Fraud in their Mortgage Loan With Defective mortgage documents.

A) Why Titles of Home Foreclosure Sale To Buyers Are Often Defective.

                    How Can We Deal With the Problem?

Securitization Flow Chart and Structure

sec1

sec2

B) Transfer of Promissory Note

 – –   Negotiable instrument under Article 3 of the UCC

–  Transferred by:

•   Endorsement

•   Delivery of the instrument

•   Acceptance of delivery

•   Negotiation = Endorsement + Delivery + Acceptance

C) Transfer of Mortgage

– – Mortgage is a real estate instrument

Subject to the statute of frauds

Must comply local real estate law

– Transferred by:

•   Written assignment

•   Delivery of the instrument

•   Acceptance of delivery

•   Recording of transferred mortgage

•   “Assignment” = Written Transfer/Assignment + Delivery + Acceptance + Recording

D)  Notarization Requirements

•   Most state laws require “strict” compliance

•   Signer must admit, by oath or affirmation, in the PRESENCE of notary to having voluntarily signed the document, and signer’s capacity

•   Signer must make the OATH or AFFIRMATION before signing

•   Must identify the signer by a federal or state issued photographic ID

•   Penalties include civil and criminal

•   Felony in most states to take a false acknowledgement

•   Document is invalid with improper notarization

E) The Alphabet Problem With Securitized Transfers

•   The loan closed in the name of the Broker/Lender

•   Broker is funded by Warehouse Line of Credit
Warehouse Lender then sells paper to a Special Investment Vehicle (SIV)

•   SIV then sells paper the Sponsor/Depositor

•   Sponsor or Depositor then transfers to Trust

F)  How Many Transfers

•   A-Transfer: Consumer to Broker

•   B-Transfer: Broker to Warehouse Lender

•   C-Transfer: Warehouse Lender to SIV

•   D-Transfer: SIV to the Depositor or Sponsor

•   E-Transfer: Depositor or Sponsor to Trust

G) How Many Documents

•   Four assignments and deliveries and acceptances of the Mortgage

•   Four endorsements and deliveries of the Note

•   Eight separate notarizations

•   Eight UCC-1 financing statements

•   Four recordings

•   Four filing and transfer fees

H) The Allonge

•   A paper attached to a negotiable note

•   Purpose is to provide written endorsement

•   Only used when back of negotiable instrument is FULL (no room)

•   No need for notarization

•   Simple signature and title sufficient,as with endorsement on note

I) Similar ABCDE Problem With the Mortgage Instrument

•   A. Consumer must sign and deliver to Broker

•   B. Broker must assign and deliver to the Warehouse Lender

•   C. Warehouse Lender must assign and deliver to the SIV

•   D. SIV must assign and deliver to the Depositor

•   E. Depositor must assign and deliver to the Trust

•   And all these assignments must be recorded!

J)  Who Holds the Bearer Paper and Mortgages for the Trust?

•   Normally a third-party bank that provides document custody services to the trust

•   Provides trailing document filings

•   Provides custody chambers for all members

•   Executes assignments for members

•   Execute endorsements for members

•   Executes deliveries and acceptances

•   Provide on-line document status certifications

K) What Does Trust Really Hold?

•   Electronic data with loan numbers & collateral descriptions

•   Electronic image of the original deed of trust

•   Electronic image of the original mortgage note

•   Rights in the documents by way of UCC-1 financing statements and the pooling & servicing agreements

L) The 3d-PartyOutsource Providers

•   Fidelity National Default Services

•   First American National Default Services

•   National Default Exchange, LP(Barrett Burke Owned Entity

•   Promiss Default Solutions(McCalla Raymer Owned Entity)

•   National Trustee Services(Morris Schneider Owned Entity)

•   LOGS Financial Services(Gerald Shapiro Owned Entity)

M) What Do the Outsource Providers Do for the Servicers?

•   Create Assignments

•   Create Allonges

•   Create Endorsements

•   Sign documents as if they were the VP or Secretary of a Bank, SIV, Depositor, Sponsor or the Trust

•   Notarize these documents

•   Create Lost Note Affidavits

•   Create Lost Assignment Affidavits

•   Create Lost Allonge Affidavits

•   Draft court pleadings and notices

•   Draft default correspondence, reports, etc.

N) How to Identify a Defective Endorsement or Allonge

•   Allonge can never be used to transfer a mortgage

•   Allonge can never be used if there is enough room on the original mortgage note for the written endorsement

•   Note is endorsed and not assigned

•   Date of the endorsement is before or after the date of the registration of trust

•   And much more …

O) Defective Endorsements

•   Notary is from Dakota County, Minnesota

•   Notary is from Hennepin County, Minnesota

•   Notary is from Jacksonville, Florida

•   Signor’s company has no offices in notary’s state

•   Date of endorsement and date of notarization are different

•   Signor’s name is stamped –not written in script

•   Signor claims to have signing authority but no authority attached

P) What About the Mortgages?

•   Assignments and delivery follow same model as with the notes

•   MERS is used to avoid registration of each assignment with local register of deeds

•   MERS claims no beneficial interest in the note

•   MERS claims no ownership rights in note or mortgage

•   MERS claims it is nominee for true owner

•   MERS delegates signing authority to all MERS members to sign documents as officers of MERS

•   MERS does not supervise any of it’s designated signors

•   MERS is not registered as a foreign corporation in most states

Q) How Does Trust Establish Lawful Ownership?

•   Unbroken chain of note endorsements and acceptances from A to B, B to C, C to D, and D to E

•   Unbroken chain of mortgage assignments and deliveries and acceptances from A to B, B to C, C to D, and D to E

•   Unbroken chain of UCC-1 financing filings throughout the chain

•   Unbroken chain of recorded mortgage assignments

R) But What Is Filed In a Typical Foreclosure?

•   Complaint alleging that the borrower (A) executed a note and mortgage in favor of the plaintiff (E)

•   Note and mortgage from borrower (A) to originating lender (B) attached

•   Sometimes a purported mortgage assignment from (B) to (E) attached, also purporting to assign the note

•   This assignment always defective, often not recorded

S) The Paper Trail and The Lack of Truth in Labeling

•   Electronic data

•   Fake dates & forged signatures

•   False notarization

•   False assignments

•   Fake endorsements

•   Fraudulent lost note affidavits

•   Recreated documents & records

•   Allonges and more

T)  Is the Trust Really Secured?

•   MAYBE –But it would be very difficult for any securitized trust to produce a valid set of original and unbroken assignments and endorsements

•   Even if the trust produces ALLof the required documents, there is still the issue of the legality of the role of MERS on all required documents for recording

To Learn How You Can Effectively Use Some of These As Solid Arguments to Effectively Defend and Save Your Home Visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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How Pro Se Foreclosure Defense Litigants Can Effectively Defend & Save Their Homes

25 Thursday Jul 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Case Laws, Case Study, Discovery Strategies, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, MERS, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Note - Deed of Trust - Mortgage, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Courts of New York, HSBC Bank USA, Law, Mortgage loan, New York, Plaintiff, Pro se legal representation in the United States, standing, United States

I    General Answer Issues

•   Be sure to raise lack of standing as a defense in the homeowner’s answer if the plaintiff’s ownership of the note and mortgage is questionable. Standing/capacity to sue may be waived if not raised in the answer.

 •  Late Answers: 

 •  Pro se homeowners often do not file answers and do not seek attorneys until they receive notice of the settlement conference. In these circumstances, homeowner attorneys should serve and file a late answer. If the plaintiff rejects the answer, file a motion to compel acceptance of the late answer.

•   A court may permit a defendant to file a late answer “upon a showing of reasonable excuse for delay or default.” CPLR § 3012(d); Cirillo v.Macy’s, Inc., 61 A.D.3d 538, 540, 877 N.Y.S.2d 281, 283 (1st Dep’t 2009).

•   Mortgagor’s belief that foreclosure action was stayed during ongoing settlement negotiations with mortgagee was reasonable excuse for filing late answer. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Cayo, 2011, 34 Misc.3d 850, 934 N.Y.S.2d 792.

•   Courts have routinely permitted service of a late answer where the delay was not willful, the defendant has meritorious defenses, and service of the answer does not unfairly prejudice the plaintiff. See, e.g., Nickell v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 44 A.D.3d 631, 632, 843 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (2d Dep’t 2007); Jolkovsky v. Legeman, 32 A.D.3d 418, 419, 819 N.Y.S.2d 561, 562 (2d Dep’t 2006); Watson v. Pollacchi, 32 A.D.3d 565, 565-66, 819 N.Y.S.2d 612, 613 (3d Dep’t 2006); Nason v. Fisher, 309 A.D.2d 526, 526, 765 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33 (1st Dep’t 2003)

•   Allowance of a late answer is consistent with New York’s strong public policy in favor of a determination of controversies on the merits. See, e.g., Jones v. 414 Equities LLC, 57 A.D.3d 65, 81, 866 N.Y.S.2d 165, 178 (1st Dep’t 2008);Hosten v. Oladapo, 52 A.D.3d 658, 658-59, 858 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916 (2d Dep’t 2008); Kaiser v. Delaney, 255 A.D.2d 362, 362, 679N.Y.S.2d 686, 687 (2d Dep’t 1998).

Where the defendant has answered but not asserted a standing defense, a motion for leave to amend to assert a standing defense should be granted if such amendment causes no prejudice to plaintiff. U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Sharif, 89 A.D.3d 723, 933 N.Y.S.2d 293, 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 07835 (2d Dep’t Nov. 1, 2011) (motions for leave to amend should be freely granted absent prejudice or surprise from the delay in seeking leave; reversing denial of leave and holding that trial court should have dismissed for lack of standing upon plaintiff’s failure to submit either written assignment of note or evidence of physical delivery).

• New York law permits reciprocal attorney’s fees for homeowner’s attorney in defending against foreclosure on residential mortgages: RPL § 282.

 II.  Affirmative Defenses and Counter Claims

A.   Standing and Capacity To Sue

 •    Many documents needed to establish standing were “robo-signed”

•   Sloppiness in assigning mortgages to mortgage securitization trusts often makes it difficult for plaintiff trusts (or servicers) to establish standing.

 1.   The Difference Between Standing and Capacity to Sue

 a.   Standing Is Jurisdictional

•   U.S. Constitution Article III – Case and Controversy Requirement

•   Siegel on New York Practice: “It is the law’s policy to allow only an aggrieved person to bring a lawsuit. One not affected by anything a would-be defendant has done or threatens to do ordinarily has no business suing, and a suit of that kind can be dismissed at the threshold for want of jurisdiction without reaching the merits. When one without the requisite grievance does bring suit, and it’s dismissed, the plaintiff is described as lacking “standing to sue” and the dismissal as one for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”

•   “Standing to sue is critical to the proper functioning of the judicial system. It is a threshold issue. If standing is denied, the pathway to the courthouse is blocked. The plaintiff who has standing, however, may cross the threshold and seek judicial redress….The rules governing standing help courts separate the tangible from the abstract or speculative injury, and the genuinely aggrieved from the judicial dilettante or amorphous claimant.” Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki,   100 N.Y. 801, 766 N.Y.S.2d 654, 798 N.E.2d 1047 (2003)

•   New York courts have treated standing as a common law concept, in contrast to federal approach, where it rests on constitutional and prudential grounds. New York case law tends to blend standing with capacity to sue.

b. Capacity to Sue v. Standing

•   Capacity to sue goes to the litigant’s status, i.e., its power to appear and bring its grievance before the court. For example, a foreign corporation or LLC may not bring an action unless it is registered with the Secretary of State; minors lack legal capacity, etc.

•   Standing requires an inquiry into whether the litigant has an interest in the claim at issue that the law will recognize as a sufficient predicate for determining the issue at the litigant’s request. Is the relief sought in the case properly sought by this plaintiff?

 2. Standing in a Foreclosure Case

 •  Foreclosing plaintiff must own the note and the mortgage at the inception of the action. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Barnett, 88, A.D. 3d 636, 931 N.Y.S. 2d 630, 2011 WL 4600619 (2d Dep’t Oct. 4, 2011); Kluge v. Fugazy ,145 A.D. 2d 537, 536 N.Y. S. 2d 92 (2d Dep’t 1988)

•   Note: represents contractual debt obligation Mortgage: represents collateral security for debt

•   Assignment of the mortgage without assignment of the debt, i.e. the note, is a nullity.

•   Assignment must be complete before foreclosure is commenced

•   Assignment can be by written assignment or by physical delivery of note and mortgage.

•   An indorsed note (to the plaintiff or in blank) is not sufficient: the plaintiff must prove physical delivery before the foreclosure was commenced.

•   If a written assignment involved and has a date, the execution date generally controls.

•   Back dated assignment are ineffective absent proof of prior physical delivery. Wells Fargo v. Marchione, 69 A.D. 3d 204, 887 N.Y. S. 2d 615 (2d Dep’t 2009)

 3. Common Assignment Red Flags in Foreclosure Cases

Assignments that jump over links in the chain of title, including timing.

•  Suspicious or contradictory endorsements and allonges.

•  Assignments from MERS as nominee

•  Robo-signing of assignment documents

•  Mortgage-Backed Securities Investment Vehicles: Pooling and Servicing Agreements and non-compliance with trust closing dates and other terms

 4. MERS and Standing

•  Second Department: assignment from MERS when MERS is designated merely as nominee of lender, and never owned note, is ineffective to confer standing on its assignee.

Bank of New York v. Silverberg, 86 A.D. 3d 274, 926 N.Y.S. 2d 532 (2d Dep’t 2011). See also In re Lippold, 2011 WL 3890540 (SDNY Bkrtcy 2011)(MERS, as assignor, could not legally assign the note as prior holder of note and mortgage only conferred legal rights with respect to the mortgage); In re Agard, 444 B.R. 231 (SDNY Bkrtcy 2011) (mortgage naming MERS as nominee did not authorize it to assign)

•  Issues concerning who executes assignments on behalf of MERS (plaintiff’s counsel, robo-signing servicer employees?)

 5. Waiver of Standing Defenses

•  CPLR 3211(e) only provides that capacity to sue is waived; no mention of standing.

•  Wells Fargo Bank v. Mastropaolo, 42 A.D. 3d 239, 837 N.Y.S. 2d 247 (2d Dep’t 2007); HSBC v. Dammond, 59 A.D. 3d 679, 875 N.Y.S. 2d 490, 875 N.Y. S. 2d 490, (2d Dep’t 2009); Countrywide v. Delphonse, 64 A.D. 3d 624, 883 N.Y. S. 2d 135 (2d Dep’t 2009).

•  Cf. Security Pacific Nat’l Bank v. Evans, 31 A.D. 2d 278, 820 N.Y.S. 2d 2 (1stDep’t 2006) (plaintiff lender commenced action after merging with anotherbank; lack of legal capacity waived; not an issue of standing)

•  Some trial courts have held there is no waiver of standing defense where plaintiff had not appeared or answered altogether. Deutsche Bank v. McRae, 894 N.Y. S. 2d 720 (Allegheny Cty. 2010); Citigroup v. Bowling, 25 Misc. 3d 1244A, 906 N.Y. S. 2d 778 (Kings Cty. 2009).

 6.Leave to Amend Answer to Assert Standing Defense

U. S. Bank, Natl. Assn. v. Sharif, 89 A.D. 3d 723,933 N.Y.S. 2d 293, 2011 NY Slip Op 07835 (2d Dep’t Nov. 1, 2011) (reversing denial of leave to amend to assert standing and denial of motion to dismiss for lack of standing where plaintiff demonstrated no prejudice and failed to establish its standing to foreclose). Aurora v. Thomas, 70 A.D. 3d 986, 897 N.Y.S.2d 140 (2d Dep’t 2010) (affirming grant of motion for leave to amend to assert standing and capacity to sue, finding no waiver where documents relied upon were revealed during discovery); HSBC v. Enobakhare, 2010 Slip Op 31925 (U) (Richmond Cty. 2010) (granting motion for leave to amend answer; amended answer could assert defenses that were arguably waived by failure to assert originally)

• Deutsche Bank v. Ramotar, 30 Misc. 3d 1208(A), 2011 WL 66041 (Kings Cty. 2011) (denying summary judgment and order of reference, granting defendant who had previously answered pro se leave to file amended answer asserting standing and robo-signing defenses)

 7. Standing as a Meritorious Defense to Vacate Default Judgments/Plaintiff’s Motions for Default/Summary Judgment/Order of Reference and Absence of Standing

 •  Prima facie case in a foreclosure case requires showing of ownership of note and mortgage. Campaign v. Barba, 23 A.D. 3d 327, 805 N.Y.S. 86 ( 2d Dep’t  2005)

•  Distinction between moving to dismiss for lack of standing when defense has arguably been waived and opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and order of reference for failure to establish ownership of note (prima facie case)

8. Sua Sponte  Dismissals on Standing Grounds/Robo-signing Concerns

•  Financial Freedom v. Slinkosky, 28 Misc. 3d 1209(a) (Suffolk Cty. 2010) (denying summary judgment where plaintiff failed to submit note and mortgage and failed to demonstrate standing) HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Taher, NY Slip Op 51208(U) (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty., July 1, 2011) (denying order of reference, making detailed analysis of robo-signed assignments and affidavits of merit and amounts due, questioning employment histories of individuals who signed papers on behalf of different entities, determining that plaintiff lacked standing to foreclose because, among other reasons, assignment of mortgage from MERS as nominee, which never owned note, was ineffective, and dismissing with prejudice. In light of frivolous motion for order of reference by HSBC and its counsel, court scheduled hearing on sanctions and ordered chief executive officer of HSBC to personally appear at hearing)

9. Standing as Meritorious Defense (for leave to file untimely answer or to vacate default)

 •   Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Ibaiyo,  20910-08 (Queens Ct. 2009) (meritorious defense criteria for CPLR § 3012 motion to extend defendant’s time to answer)

•  Maspeth Federal Av. & Loan Ass’n v. McGown, 77 A.D. 3d 890, 909 N.Y. S. 2d 642 (2d Dep’t 2010) (trial court has considerable discretion on applications to vacate default and extend time to answer when determining existence of meritorious defense and reasonable excuse for default)

 10. True Capacity to Sue Issues

•  BCL §1372 (prohibits lawsuits by foreign corporations not authorized to do business in NY)

• Exception for foreign banking corporations via BCL § 103(a) and Banking Law § 200(4).

•  Sutton Funding LLC v. Parris,  24 Misc. 3d 889, 878 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Kings Cty. 2009) (dismissing foreclosure where plaintiff was not a foreign bank and was not authorized to do business in NY)

 B.  Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692-1692p

 1. Scope of FDCPA Coverage

a.  Who is covered

•  Applies to debt collectors. § 1692a(6)

•  Debt collector is any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts

•  For §1692f(6) purposes it also includes any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.

 •  Or, any person who regularly collects, directly or indirectly, debts  owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.

 •  Includes debt buyers

 •  Includes attorneys who regularly collect consumer debts.

 •  There used to be an exemption for attorneys collecting on behalf of and in the name of a client. In 1986, Congress repealed this exemption.

b. Who is not covered

 • Original creditors.  § 1692a(6)(F)(ii)

 • It does include any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts. § 1692a(6)

 • Creditors employees or agents collecting in the name of the creditor. § §692a(6)(A)

 • State and federal officials performing their duties, such as the IRS or U.S. Dept. of Education. § 1692a(6)(C)

 • Persons collecting debts not in default, such as some servicers. §1692a(6)(F)(iii)

• Process servers. §1692a(6)(D)

 • At least one court has held that they are covered if they are engaging in sewer service Mel Harris v. Sykes, 757 F.Supp.2d 413 (2010)

 c. What transactions are covered Consumer debts

 •  Consumer is defined in § 1692a(3) as “any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt”

 •  Does not apply to artificial entities, such as corporations Debts are defined in § 1692a(5) as any obligation of a consumer to pay money

 •  underlying transaction must be for money, property, insurance, or services

 •  must be primarily for personal, family or household purposes

 •  no business debts or fines Communications – § 1692a(2)

 •  Means the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium

 •  Also applies to statements and activities during the course of litigation. Heintz v. Jenkins , 514 U.S. 291 (1995)

 •  Recent amendments to FDCPA clarify that a legal pleading

cannot be considered an “initial communication” under FDCPA.

•  Note that this is a narrow amendment; other provisions of FDCPA still apply.

 2. Substantive Consumer Protections

 •  Cease communications. § 1692c

 •  Dispute/verification. § 1692g

 •  Notice within 5 days of initial communication

 •  Right to dispute within 30 days of receiving notice

 •  Once debt collector receives dispute in writing, must stop all debt collection activity (including filing a lawsuit) until it provides “verification” of the debt.

 •  NOTE: Local NYC law expands these dispute rights. Under local law, consumers can request verification at any time. NYC Admin Code § 20-493.2.

 •  Verification must include (1) copy of the contract or other agreement creating the obligation to pay (2) copy of final account statement (3) an accounting itemizing the total amount do, specifying principal, interest, and other charges.

 For each additional charge, the debt collection must state the date and basis for the charge. See  § 2-190 of the Rules of the City of New York.

 3. Prohibited Activities

 •  Communications. §§1692b & 1692c

 •  Contacting consumer after consumer sends cease communication letter

 •  Contacting consumer who is represented by counsel

 •  Contacting third parties about a consumer’s debt

 •  Contacting consumer at work if debt collector has reason to know that consumer’s employer prohibits such communication

 •  Common scenario: Debt collector can’t reach consumer, so calls consumer’s neighbor/family member/employer and leaves telephone number and message for the consumer to call back about an important matter. This is a violation.

 •  Harassment or Abuse. § 1692d

 •  Debt collector may not engage in conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with collection of debt

 •  Includes: threats of violence, use of profanity, repeated telephone calls for purpose of harassment, calling without disclosure of identity (e.g. threats to repossess property)

 •  False or Misleading Representations. § 1692e

•  False representation of character, amount, or legal status of any debt (e.g., suing for more interest and fees than is actually owed)

 •  Threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or is not intended to be taken

 •  Implying that consumer could be arrested or children taken away for nonpayment of debt

 •  Pretending to be attorney, marshal

 •  Making false or inaccurate reports to credit reporting agencies

 •  Unfair Practices. § 1692f

 •  Using unfair or unconscionable means to collect a debt

 •  Collection of any amount (including interest and fees) that is not actually owed

 •  Threatening to take or repossess property (a) without the right; (b) without the intent; (c) if property is exempt

 4. FDCPA Litigation and Remedies

 a. Statute of limitations

 • one year from the date on which the violation occurs – § 1692k(d)

 • No continuing violations doctrine

 b. Jurisdiction

 • May bring in either state or federal court

 • May also bring as a counterclaim in a debt collection suit

 c. Construction

 • Strict liability statute – proof of the debt collector’s intent is not required

 • intent is a factor that can be used when calculating damages

 • Courts apply a “least sophisticated consumer” standard to analyze violations

 d. Remedies

 • Up to $1000 statutory damages

• A majority of courts hold that capped at $1,000 per action no matter how many violations are joined in the lawsuit

 • Per Plaintiff

 • Sometimes per Defendant, depending on the violation

 • Factors used by courts in determining statutory awards:

 • Intent to commit the violation or evade the protections

 • Repetition of the violations

 • Timely correction of the violations

 • Multiple consumers affected by the violations

• Prior violations by the collector for similar acts

 • Actual damages

 • Attorney’s fees

 • Declaratory relief

 • No Injunctive relief

 C. NYS Banking Law Defenses

 1. Banking Law § 6-l

 • Applies to loans made after April 1, 2003.

 • Covers “high – cost home loans”: a first lien residential mortgage loan, not exceeding conforming loan size for a comparable dwelling as established by the Federal National Mortgage Association in which (1) the APR exceeds eight percentage points over the yield on Treasury securities having comparable periods of maturity; or (2) total points and fees exceed 5% of the total loan amount, excluding certain bona fide discount points if total loan is $50,000 or more.

 • Prohibits, inter alia, (1) lending without regard to a borrower’s ability to repay; (2) points and fees in excess of 3% of the loan; (3) loan flipping; (4) kickbacks to mortgage brokers; (5) points and fees when lender refinances its own high-cost loan; (6) balloon payments, negative amortization, and default interest rates.

 • Provides private right of action with 6-year statute of limitations (from origination); actual and statutory damages; attorney fees; possible rescission of the loan.

 • Intentional violation may result in voiding of the loan.

 2. Banking Law § 6-m

 • Covers “sub-prime home loan”: a loan where the fully indexed APR for the first-lien loan exceeds by more than 1.75, or for a subordinate loan by more than 3.75, the average commitment rate for loans in the northeast region with a comparable duration as published in the Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS) in the week prior to the week in which the lender received a completed loan application.

 • Lenders must take reasonable steps to verify that the borrower has the ability to repay the loan, including taxes and insurance.

 • Prohibitions similar to those in Banking Law §6-l.

 • Lenders must disclose charges for taxes and insurance and must escrow such payments after July 1, 2010.

If you are ready to take the battle to these interlopers, in order to defend and save the home that is rightfully yours, visit http://www.fightforeclosure.net

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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What Homeowners Needs to know About Mortgage Assignments and Endorsements

04 Thursday Jul 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, MERS, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Note - Deed of Trust - Mortgage, Your Legal Rights

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IOU, MERS, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Mortgage law, Mortgage loan, Promissory note, Trust deed (real estate), Uniform Commercial Code

When a potential homeowner takes out a loan to purchase a home, you are required to sign two documents: a promissory note and a mortgage (or deed of trust).

Assignments and endorsements are the ways that these documents are transferred between banks. Read on to learn the difference between an assignment of mortgage (or deed of trust) and an endorsement of the note.

How To Understand Mortgage Transactions

To fully understand the difference between an assignment of mortgage (or deed of trust) and endorsement of the note, you must understand the basic terms and documents involved in a residential mortgage transaction.

Mortgagee and mortgagor. A “mortgagee” is the lender. The mortgagee gives the loan to the “mortgagor,” who is the homeowner/borrower.

Loan documents. The loan transaction consists of two main documents: the mortgage (or deed of trust) and a promissory note. The mortgage (or deed of trust) is the document that pledges the property as security for the debt and permits a lender to foreclosure if you fail to make the monthly payments, whereas the promissory note is the IOU that contains the promise to repay the loan. The purpose of the mortgage (or deed of trust) is to provide security for the loan that is evidenced by a promissory note.

Loan Transfers. Banks often sell and buy mortgages from each other. An “assignment” is the document that is the legal record of this transfer from one mortgagee to another. In a typical transaction, when the mortgagee sells the debt to another bank, an assignment is recorded and the promissory note is endorsed (signed over) to the new bank.

These documents are separate and each has its own distinct set of rules that govern how they are exchanged between banks.

Assignments of Mortgage (or Deed of Trust)

An assignment transfers all of the interest the original mortgagee had under the mortgage (or deed of trust) to the new bank. Generally, the mortgage (or deed of trust) is recorded shortly after the mortgagors sign it and, if the mortgage is subsequently transferred, each assignment is to be recorded in the county land records.

The Role of MERS in the Assignment Process

When mortgages are transferred frequently, assignments are sometimes neglected. MERS (the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc.), a company created by the mortgage banking industry, was developed to track ownership of mortgages. This eliminates the need for separate assignments when the loan is transferred. In some mortgage transactions, the mortgage will designate MERS as the mortgagee (solely as a nominee for the lender). These loans are referred to as MERS as Original Mortgagee (MOM) loans. In other cases, the loan may be assigned to MERS (solely as a nominee for the lender) at some point later in its life cycle after the loan closes. MERS then acts as an agent for the owner of the loan, but it never owns the mortgage loan or services it.

Promissory Notes

When a loan changes hands, the promissory note is endorsed (signed over) to the new owner of the loan. In some cases, the note is endorsed in blank which makes it a bearer instrument under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code. This means that any party that possesses the note has the legal authority to enforce it.

Assignments and endorsements prove which bank owns the debt and may bring the foreclosure action. If the documentation was not proper, this can be a defense to foreclosure in some cases.

To find out how you can effectively use solid mortgage assignments and endorsement arguments and case laws for wrongful foreclosure defense visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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Why Every Homeowner Needs To Use RESPA to their advantage

29 Saturday Jun 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Banks and Lenders, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States

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Business, Loan, Loan servicing, Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, RESPA, Title 12 of the United States Code, United States Code, United States Congress

The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), was an act passed by the United States Congress in 1974. It is codified at Title 12, Chapter 27 of the United States Code, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617

RESPA is a consumer protection statute that regulates the real estate settlement process, including servicing of loans and assignment of those loans. See 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (Congressional findings). The statute imposes a number of duties on lenders and loan servicers. Most relevant here are there requirements that borrowers be given notice by both transferor and transferee when their loan is transferred to a new lender or servicer, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(b) and (c), and that loan servicers respond promptly to borrowers’ written requests for information, § 2605(e).

 The details of the requirement for responding to written requests will become relevant here. First, it takes a “qualified written request” to trigger the loan servicer’s duties under RESPA to acknowledge and respond. The statute defines a qualified written request as written correspondence (other than notices on a payment coupon or similar documents) from the borrower or her agent that requests information or states reasons for the borrower’s belief that the account is in error. 12U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B). To qualify, the written request must also include the name and account of the borrower or must enable the servicer to identify them.

Within 60 days after receiving a qualified written re-quest, the servicer must take one of three actions: either(1) make appropriate corrections to the borrower’s account and notify the borrower in writing of the corrections; (2) investigate the borrower’s account and pro-vide the borrower with a written clarification as to why the servicer believes the borrower’s account to be correct; or (3) investigate the borrower’s account and either provide the requested information or provide an explanation as to why the requested information is unavailable. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(e)(2)(A), (B), and (C). No matter which action the servicer takes, the servicer must provide a name and telephone number of a representative of the servicer who can assist the borrower.

During the 60-day period after a servicer receives a qualified written request relating to a dispute regarding the borrower’s payments, “a servicer may not provide information regarding any overdue payment, owed by such borrower and relating to such period or qualified written request, to any consumer reporting agency.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(3).

RESPA provides for a private right of action for violations of its requirements. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f). The provision for a private right of action includes a “safe harbor” provision, which provides in relevant part that a transferee service provider like any lender shall not be liable for a violation of section 2605 if, “within60 days after discovering an error (whether pursuant to a final written examination report or the servicer’s own procedures) and before the commencement of an action under this subsection and the receipt of written notice of the error from the borrower, the servicer notifies the person concerned of the error and makes whatever adjustments are necessary in the appropriate account to ensure that the person will not be required to pay an amount in excess of any amount that the person otherwise would have paid.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(4).

For more info on how you can use RESPA and its provisions to slow or stop your foreclosure proceedings, please visit http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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Application of UCC to Mortgage Securitization Process

22 Saturday Jun 2013

Posted by BNG in Foreclosure Defense, Litigation Strategies, MERS, Mortgage Laws, Pro Se Litigation, Securitization

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Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, MERS, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Mortgage note, Promissory note, UCC, Uniform Commercial Code

In recently times, a lot of issues have been raised on a number of legal theories questioning whether securitization trusts, either those created by private financial institutions or those created by government sponsored enterprises, such as Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, have valid legal title to the seven trillion dollars of mortgage notes in those trusts. In an effort to contribute thorough and well-researched legal analysis to the discussion of these theories. The writing provides a detailed overview of the legal principles and processes by which mortgage loans are typically held, assigned, transferred and enforced in the secondary mortgage market and in the creation of mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”). These principles and processes have centuries-old origins, and they have continued to be sound and validated since the advent of MBS over forty years ago.

While the real property laws of each of the 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia affect the method of foreclosing on a mortgage loan in default, the legal principles and processes discussed in this post result, if followed, in a valid and enforceable transfer of mortgage notes and the underlying mortgages in each of these jurisdictions. To be thorough, this post undertakes a review of both common law and the Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) in each of the 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. One of the most critical principles is that when ownership of a mortgage note is transferred in accordance with common securitization processes, ownership of the mortgage is also automatically transferred pursuant to the common law rule that “the mortgage follows the note.” The rule that “the mortgage follows the note” dates back centuries

and has been codified in the UCC. In essence, this means that the assignment of a mortgage to a trustee does not need to be recorded in real property records in order for it to be a valid and binding transfer. In summary, these traditional legal principles and processes are fully consistent with today’s complex holding, assignment and transfer methods for mortgage loans and those methods are legally effective for participants in the secondary mortgage market to transfer mortgage loans.

1. Basic Principles
The two core legal documents in most residential mortgage loan transactions are the promissory note and the mortgage or deed of trust that secures the borrower’s payment of the promissory note. In a typical “private-label” mortgage loan securitization, each mortgage loan is sold to a trust through a series of steps.

A mortgage note and a mortgage may be sold, assigned and transferred several times between the time the mortgage loan is originated and the time the mortgage loan ends up with the trust. The legal principles that govern the assignment and transfer of mortgage notes and related mortgages are determined, in significant part, by the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), which has been adopted by all 50 states and the District of
Columbia.

The residential mortgage notes in common usage typically are negotiable instruments. As a general matter, under the UCC, a negotiable mortgage note can be transferred from the transferor to the transferee through the indorsement2 of the mortgage note and the transfer of possession of the note to the transferee or a custodian on behalf of the transferee. An assignment of the related mortgage is also typically delivered to the transferee or its custodian, except in cases where the related mortgage identifies the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (“MERS”) as the mortgagee. Such assignments generally are in recordable form, but unrecorded, and are executed by the transferor without identifying a specific transferee – a so-called assignment “in blank.” Intervening assignments, in some cases, may be recorded in the local real estate records.

In some mortgage loan transactions, MERS becomes the mortgagee of record as the nominee of the loan originator and its assignees in the local land records where the mortgage is recorded, either when the mortgage is first recorded or as a result of the recording of an assignment of mortgage to MERS. This means that MERS is listed as the record title holder of the mortgage. MERS’ name does not appear on the mortgage note, and the beneficial interest in the mortgage remains with the loan originator or its assignee. The documents pursuant to which MERS acts as nominee make clear that MERS is acting in such capacity for the benefit of the loan originator or its assignee. When a mortgage loan is originated with MERS as the nominal mortgagee (or is assigned to MERS post-origination), MERS tracks all future mortgage loan and mortgage loan servicing transfers and other assignments of the mortgage loan unless and until ownership or servicing is transferred (or the mortgage loan is otherwise assigned) to an entity that is not a MERS member. In this way, MERS serves as a central system to track changes in ownership and servicing of the mortgage loan. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae, among other governmental entities, permit mortgage loans that they purchase or securitize to be registered with MERS.

2. Transfer of Promissory Notes Secured by Mortgages
The law of negotiable instruments developed over the centuries as a way to encourage commerce and lending by making such instruments, including negotiable mortgage notes, as liquid and transferable as possible. The UCC, with state-specific variations, in significant part governs the assignment and transfer of mortgage notes. Article 3 of the UCC applies to the negotiation and transfer of a mortgage note that is a “negotiable instrument,” as that term is defined in Article 3. In addition, Article 9 of the UCC applies to the sale of “promissory notes,” a term that generally includes mortgage notes.

In addition, as a general matter, the securitization of a loan under a typical pooling and servicing agreement provides both for the negotiation of negotiable mortgage notes (by indorsement and transfer of possession to the securitization trustee or the custodian for the trustee) and for an outright sale and assignment of all of the mortgage notes and mortgages. Thus, whether the mortgage notes in a given securitization pool are deemed “negotiable” (as we believe most typically are) or “non-negotiable” will have little or no substantive effect under the UCC on the validity of the transfer of the notes. The typical securitization process effects valid transfers of the mortgage notes and related mortgages in accordance with the provisions of Articles 3 and 9 of the UCC.

Under the UCC, the transfer of a mortgage note that is a negotiable instrument is most commonly effected by (a) indorsing the note, which may be a blank indorsement that does not identify a person to whom the mortgage note is payable or a special indorsement that specifically identifies a person to whom the mortgage note is payable, and (b) delivering the note to the transferee (or an agent acting on behalf of the transferee). As residential mortgage notes in common usage typically are “negotiable instruments,” this is the most common method to transfer the mortgage note. In addition, even without indorsement, the transfer can be effected by transferring possession under the UCC. Moreover, the sale of any mortgage note also effects the transfer of the mortgage under Article 9. Securitization agreements often provide both for (a) the indorsement and transfer of possession to the trustee or the custodian for the trustee, which would constitute a negotiation of the mortgage note under Article 3 of the UCC and (b) an outright sale and assignment of the mortgage note. Thus, regardless of whether the mortgage notes in a securitization trust are deemed “negotiable” or “non-negotiable,” the securitization process generally includes a valid transfer of the mortgage notes to the trustee in accordance with the explicit requirements of the UCC.

In addition, Article 3 of the UCC permits a person without possession to enforce a negotiable mortgage note where the note has been lost, stolen, or destroyed. Courts have consistently affirmed the use of the salient provisions of the UCC to enforce lost, stolen or destroyed negotiable mortgage notes that are owned by a securitization trust when the trust or its agent has proved the terms of the mortgage notes and their right to enforce the mortgage notes.

3. Assignment and Transfer of Ownership of Mortgages
As stated above, when a mortgage loan is assigned and transferred as part of the securitization of the mortgage loan in the secondary market, both the mortgage note and the mortgage itself are typically sold, assigned, and physically transferred to the trustee that is acting on behalf of the MBS investors or a trustee designated document custodian pursuant to a custody agreement. The assignment and transfer are usually
documented in accordance with a pooling and servicing agreement.
When a mortgage note is transferred in accordance with common mortgage loan securitization processes, the mortgage is also automatically transferred to the mortgage note transferee pursuant to the general common law rule that “the mortgage follows the note.” The rule that “the mortgage follows the note” has been codified in the UCC, but the rule’s common law origins date back hundreds of years, long before the creation of the UCC. As stated in the official comments to UCC § 9-203(g), the section “codifies the commonlaw rule that a transfer of an obligation secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property also transfers the security interest or lien.” UCC § 9-203 cmt. 9. All states follow this rule.

In addition to the codification under UCC § 9-203(g), reported court cases in nearly every state and non-UCC statutory provisions in some states make clear that “the mortgage follows the note.” Regarding the impact of these UCC provisions, one treatise states: “Article 9 makes it as plain as possible that the secured party need not record an assignment of mortgage, or anything else, in the real property records in order to perfect its rights in the mortgage.” J. McDonnell and J. Smith, Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code, § 16.09[3][b]. Indeed, courts in several states have affirmed and applied the “mortgage follows the note” rule in cases where the mortgage assignment was not recorded by the transferee and even when there was no actual separate written assignment of the mortgage.

Common securitization practices are consistent with the general rule that “the mortgage follows the note”: pursuant to the pooling and servicing agreement that governs an MBS, and the language of assignment typically contained in such an agreement, the mortgage note and the mortgage itself are sold, assigned, transferred and delivered to the trustee, and the transferor also typically delivers a written assignment of the mortgage that is in blank in recordable form. Courts have held that the language of sale and assignment contained in a pooling and servicing agreement, along with the corresponding transfer, sale, and delivery of the mortgage note and mortgage, are sufficient to transfer the mortgage to the transferee/trustee or its designee or nominee.

The creation of an interest in or lien on real property, including a mortgage, is governed by the non-UCC law of the state in which the property is located. Likewise, the enforceability of mortgages (including the right and method to foreclose) is subject to all of the conditions precedent and requirements that are set forth in the particular mortgage itself and in all applicable state and local laws. Those conditions precedent and procedural requirements vary from mortgage to mortgage and from state to state. Thus, ownership of a mortgage (i.e., without notice to the mortgagor or the public, without judicial proceedings (where required), without satisfaction of other conditions precedent or procedural requirements in the mortgage itself or in applicable state law), does not always give the holder of the mortgage the legal ability to foreclose on the mortgage. Though a discussion of the other necessary prerequisites to foreclosure is beyond the scope of this Executive Summary and the White Paper, the fact that other steps may need to be taken by the owner of a mortgage note, or the owner of a mortgage, is neither unique nor surprising in our legal and regulatory system and does not diminish an otherwise legally effective transfer of the mortgage note and mortgage.

The use of MERS as the nominee for the benefit of the trustee and other transferees in the mortgage loan securitization process has been a subject of litigation in recent years regarding a mortgage note holder’s right to enforce a mortgage loan registered in MERS. Some cases address the authority or ability of MERS or transferees of MERS to foreclose on a mortgage for which MERS is or was the mortgagee of record. As a general matter, the assignment and transfer of a mortgage to MERS as nominee of and for the benefit of the beneficial owner of the mortgage does not adversely impact the right to foreclose on the mortgage. Decisions in many jurisdictions support this conclusion.

There are several minority decisions that, in some form, have taken issue with MERS. But none of these decisions, to our knowledge, has invalidated a mortgage for which MERS is the nominee, and none of these decisions has challenged MERS’ ability to act as a central system to track changes in the ownership and servicing of mortgage loans.

Finally, it is important to recognize that the UCC does not displace traditional rules of agency law. Under general agency law, an agent has authority to act on behalf of its principal where the principal “manifests assent” to the agent “that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.” Accordingly, the UCC does not prevent MERS or others, including loan servicers, from acting as the agent for the note holder in connection with transfers of ownership in mortgage notes and mortgages. In short, principles of agency law provide MERS and loan servicers another legal basis for their respective roles in the transfer of mortgage notes and mortgages.

4. Conclusion
In summary, the longstanding and consistently applied rule in the United States is that, when a mortgage note is transferred, “the mortgage follows the note.” When a mortgage note is transferred and delivered to a transferee in connection with the securitization of the mortgage loan pursuant to an MBS pooling and servicing agreement or similar agreement, the mortgage automatically follows and is transferred to the mortgage note transferee, notwithstanding that a third party, including an agent/nominee entity such as MERS, may remain as the mortgagee of record. Both common law and the UCC confirm and apply this rule, including in the context of mortgage loan securitizations.

For a more info on how you can use the application of UCC to effectively and successfully challenge and win your Foreclosure Defense, please visit http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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Using Decisions Involving Mortgage-Backed Securities to Challenge Your Wrongful Foreclosure

20 Monday May 2013

Posted by BNG in Appeal, Case Laws, Case Study, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Litigation Strategies, MERS, Mortgage Laws, Pro Se Litigation, Securitization

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Bank of America, Bank of New York, Court, Deutsche Bank, Foreclosure, Nevada, New York, RealtyTrac

In recent times, we have seen that many foreclosure cases that were litigated by Homeowners involve Mortgage Backed Securities.

Nevada’s foreclosure stats jumped 334 percent in February from the same month a year ago, leading the nation in year-over-year percentage gains, online foreclosure listing service RealtyTrac reported late Wednesday.

Other states with huge spikes in foreclosure activity include Maryland (319 percent), Washington (172 percent), New York (139 percent) and New Jersey (70 percent).

RealtyTrac showed 15,281 foreclosure filings on U.S. properties in February, a 2 percent increase from the previous month but down 25 percent from a year ago. Foreclosure filings include default notices, scheduled auctions and bank repossessions.

Florida had the nation’s highest foreclosure rate for the sixth straight month with one in every 282 housing units receiving a foreclosure filing, more than three times the national average.

Nevada was No. 2 for the fifth straight month with one in every 320 housing units receiving a filing.

“At a high level, the U.S. foreclosure inferno has been effectively contained and should be reduced to a slow burn in the next two years,” said RealtyTrac Vice President Daren Blomquist. “But dangerous foreclosure flare-ups are still popping up in states where foreclosures have been delayed by a lengthy court process or by new legislation making it more difficult to foreclose outside of the court system.”

When Homeowners are faced with a hurdle of fighting foreclosure to save their homes, some of the argument that has been proven effective in the Courts involves Securitization of the mortgages and the assignments involved in the transfer of the mortgages.

The following cases were some of the cases where valid arguments involving securitizations were used to defeat the Banks and Lenders in the Courts.  Orders to these cases shows that the case was either Dismissed without Prejudice or Summary Judgment that were reversed on Appeal.

CASE STUDIES:

Augenstein v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company,

No. 2009-CA-000058-MR, Kentucky Ct. Appeals 2011

Trust: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-OPT4

Summary judgment for bank vacated and remanded.

“In this case, the complaint was filed on December 17, 2007, but the assignment of mortgage was not executed until January 3, 2008. Thus, Deutsche Bank had no present interest when it filed its complaint and failed to take any steps to correct this. Allowing Deutsche Bank to commence this action at a time when it lacked standing impermissibly allowed litigation to commence based upon mere expectancy of an interest.”

Bank of America v. Kabba,

276 P.3d 1006, 2012 OK 23

Trust: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust Series 2004-BNC2

“In the present case, Appellee has only presented evidence of an indorsed-in-blank note and an “Assignment of Mortgage.” Appellee must prove that it is the holder of the note or the nonholder in possession who has the rights of a holder prior to the filing of the foreclosure proceeding. In the present matter the timeliness of the transfer is in question. Since Bank of America did not file the blank indorsement until it filed its motion for summary judgment it is impossible to determine from the record when Bank of America acquired its interest in the underlying note.”

Bank of New York v. Gindele,

1st Dist. No. C-090251, 2010-Ohio-542

Trust: CWALT Alternative Loan Trust 2006-40T1

“A thorough review of the record reveals that the sole indication of its interest as mortgagee is an after-acquired assignment; and the bank failed to produce any evidence in the trial court affirmatively establishing a preexisting interest. Bank of New York has also asserted both that it had acted as an agent, and that its predecessor in interest had later ratified its foreclosure complaint. But because at the time of filing neither agency nor ratification had been alleged or documented, we will not entertain this argument on appeal.”

Bank of NY v. Cupo,

2012 WL 611849 (N.J.Super.App. Div. 2011

Motion to vacate default judgment was reversed for further findings on issue of standing, suggesting that lack of standing might make a judgment void, rather than treating standing as waived by default judgment.

Bank of New York v. Mulligan,

Index 29399/07 (August 25, 2010)

Trust: CWALT 2006-OC1

Mortgage Amount: $392,000

Bank’s application for an order of reference was denied  without prejudice.

“The Court will grant plaintiff, BNY an order of reference when it presents: an affidavit by either an officer of BNY or someone with a valid power of attorney from BNY, possessing personal knowledge of the facts; an affidavit from EJy Harless clarifying his employment history for the past three years and what corporation he serves as an officer; and, an affidavit by an officer of BNY, explaining why BNY would purchase a nonperforming loan from MERS, as nominee for DECISION ONE.”

Bank of New York v. Myers,

Index 18236/2008 (February 23, 2009)

Trust: CWABS 2006-22

The Bank’s summary judgment motion was denied, but within 60 days of the decision, the Bank was required to submit an Affidavit from Keri Selman explaining her employment history for the past three years and why Selman did not have a conflict of interest as the signor of many entities.

Bank of New York v. Orosco,

2007 NY SLIP OP 31501(U) (November 19, 2007)

Trust: CWABS, Series 2006-SD2

Mortgage Amount: $436,000

“Plaintiff must address a second matter if it applies for an order of reference after demonstrating that the alleged assignment was recorded. Plaintiff’s application is the third application for an order of reference received by me in the past several days that contain an affidavit from Keri Selman. In the instant action, she alleges to be an Assistant Vice-president of the Bank of New York. On November 16,2007, I denied an application for an order of reference in which Keri Selman, in her affidavit of merit claims to be “Vice President of COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, Attorney in fact for BANK OF NEW YORK.” The Court is concerned that Ms. Selman might be engaged in a subterfuge, wearing various corporate hats. Before granting an application for an order of reference, the Court requires an affidavit from Ms. Selman describing her employment history for the past three years.”

Bank of New York v. Raftogianis,

13 A.3d 435 (2010), 418 N.J.Super. 323

Trust: American Home Mort. Investment Trust 2004-4

Mortgage Amount: $1,380,000

“Plaintiff, however, failed to establish that it was entitled to enforce the note as of the time the complaint was filed. In this case, there are no compelling reasons to permit plaintiff to proceed in this action. Accordingly, the complaint has been dismissed. That dismissal is without prejudice to plaintiff’s right to institute a new action to foreclose at any time, provided that any new complaint must be accompanied by an appropriate certification, executed by one with personal knowledge of the circumstances, confirming that plaintiff is in possession of the original note as of the date any new action is filed. That certification must indicate the physical location of the note and the name of the individual or entity in possession.”

Bank of New York v. Silverberg,

86 AD3d 274, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532 (2d Dept 2011)

Trust: CWALT 2007-14-T2

Mortgage Amount: $479,000

“In sum, because MERS was never the lawful holder or assignee of the notes described and identified in the consolidation agreement, the corrected assignment of mortgage is a nullity, and MERS was without authority to assign the power to foreclose to the plaintiff.  Consequently, the plaintiff failed to show that it had standing to foreclose.”

Bank of New York Mellon v. Teague,

Case No. 27-2009-CA-003121, Hernando Co. FL 2012

Trust: Novastar Mortgage Funding Trust 2005-1

“Second, to be entitled to foreclose, Plaintiff had to have been the holder of the Note and Mortgage at the time it filed this lawsuit.  The undisputed, summary judgment evidence before the Court was that Plaintiff was not the holder at the inception of this case as Plaintiff did not have the original Note in its possession when it filed suit and the Note did not contain the requisite endorsement. The fact that Plaintiff filed what it contends is an original note on June 28, 2012 does not change this result, as the endorsement on that Note is to a different company, not Plaintiff, and even if the Note had been properly endorsed, the fact that Plaintiff may have been the holder as of June, 2012 does not change its lack of standing at the inception of this case…

The motion is granted and this case is dismissed without prejudice.” (cites omitted)

Bank of New York v. Trezza,

14 Misc. 3d 1201(A), 2006 NY Slip Op 52367(U)

Trust: CWABS 2004-5

“In support of its motion, the plaintiff submits a purported assignment of the mortgage from MERS to the plaintiff; however, the mortgage does not empower MERS to assign the mortgage to any other entity. Furthermore, there is no proof that the Lender had previously assigned the mortgage to MERS, nor is there any other evidence to establish the plaintiff’s ownership rights under the mortgage.

Based on the foregoing, the plaintiff has failed to establish that it has standing as a plaintiff in this matter.”

Bank of New York v. Singh, 

Index No. 22434/2007, Kings County (December 14,  2007)

Trust: CWABS, Series 2004-6

An order of reference was denied where the mortgage assignment was executed on June 28, 2007, with an antedated effective date of May 31, 2007.  Suit was commenced on June 20, 2007. Judge Kurtz found that such an attempt to retroactively assign the mortgage was insufficient to establish plaintiff’s ownership interest at the time the action was commenced.

Bank of New York v. Torres,

Index No. 31704/2006, Kings County (March 11, 2008)

Trust: CWABS 2005-6

“ORDERED that the plaintiff’s ex parte application for an Order of Reference in Mortgage Foreclosure is denied without prejudice to renew due to plaintiffs failure to demonstrate its ownership of the note and mortgage sufficient to convey standing upon this plaintiff to commence this lawsuit on November 13,2006…”

Beaumont v. Bank of New York Mellon,

81 So.3d 553,554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

Trust: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust 2005-3

Summary judgment for bank reversed and remanded.

“There is no evidence showing that Beaumont was on notice prior to the time his answer was filed that ownership of the note had been transferred from NovaStar to Mellon. In fact, the claimed transfer, alleged to have occurred on the day suit was filed, was either concealed by NovaStar for more than three years while it continued to pursue the action, or NovaStar backdated the assignment it finally produced on July 23, 2010, as justification for substituting Mellon as plaintiff. Under these circumstances, Beaumont may raise lack of standing when suit was filed as a defense.”

Congress v. U.S. Bank,

2100934, AL Ct. Civ. App. 

Trust: 2007-EMX1

Mortgage Amount: $104,400

“The trial court should have evaluated the issue whether the allonge had been created after the first trial under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. Because it used the higher clear-and-convincing-evidence standard to evaluate Congress’s evidence, this court has no choice but to reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause to the trial court for it to evaluate the evidence adduced at trial under the appropriate standard of proof.”

 

Cutler v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,

Case No. 2D10-5709 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)

Trust: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust, 2006- BNC3

Summary judgment for Bank reversed and remanded.

“Accordingly, a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether U.S. Bank was the proper holder of the note at the time it initiated the foreclosure action. The note includes the allonge endorsed in blank, but the allonge is not dated. If indeed U.S. Bank cannot establish that the allonge took effect prior to the date of the complaint, it did not have standing to bring suit…

Because a genuine issue of material fact remains, the trial court erred in entering a final summary judgment.”

Davenport v. HSBC Bank USA,

739 N.W.2d 383 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007)

“In this case, defendant did not own the mortgage or an interest in the mortgage on October 27, 2005. Nonetheless, defendant proceeded to commence foreclosure proceedings at that time. Quite simply, defendant did not yet own the indebtedness that it sought to foreclose. The circuit court erred by determining that defendant’s noncompliance with the statutory requirements did not nullify the foreclosure proceedings. Because defendant lacked the statutory authority to foreclose, the foreclosure proceedings were void ab initio. We vacate the foreclosure proceedings and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.v. Alemany,

Index: 11677/2007

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 2008)

Trust: Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2006-OPT3

“ORDERED that plaintiffs ex parte application for an Order of Reference is denied without prejudice to resubmit due to plaintiffs failure to provide: … (2) proof on standing to commence this action as it appears plaintiff did not own the note and mortgage when the action was commenced…”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Barnett,

88 A.D.3d 636, 931 N.Y.S.2d 630

Trust: FFMLT 2005-FF11

Summary judgment of foreclosure in favor of bank reversed.

“However, the documentation submitted failed to establish that, prior to commencement of the action, the plaintiff was the holder or assignee of both the note and mortgage. The plaintiff submitted copies of two different versions of an undated allonge which was purportedly affixed to the original note pursuant to UCC 3-202 (2). Moreover, these allonges purporting to endorse the note from First Franklin, a Division of National City Bank of Indiana (hereinafter Franklin of Indiana) to the plaintiff conflict with the copy of the note submitted, which contains undated endorsements from Franklin of Indiana to First Franklin Financial Corporation (hereinafter Franklin Financial), then from Franklin Financial in blank.

“…The plaintiff also failed to establish that the note was physically delivered to it prior to the commencement of this action.”

 

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Bialobrzeski,

3 A.3d 183 (Conn App. Ct. 2010)

Trust: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3

The judgment for the trust was reversed and the case was remanded for a hearing on the motion to dismiss.

“The key to resolving the defendant’s claim is a determination of when the note came into the plaintiff’s possession. We cannot review the claim because Judge Domnarski made no factual finding as to when the plaintiff acquired the note. Without that factual determination, we are unable to say whether Judge Domnarski improperly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Although it is the appellant’s responsibility to provide an adequate record for review; see Practice Book §§ 60-5 and 61-10; that cannot be the end of the matter because it concerns the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Brumbaugh,

2012 OK 3, 270 P.3d 151

Trust: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-1

Summary judgment for bank reversed and remanded.

“To commence a foreclosure action in Oklahoma, a plaintiff must demonstrate it has a right to enforce the note and, absent a showing of ownership, the plaintiff lacks standing… Being a person entitled to enforce the note is an essential requirement to initiate a foreclosure lawsuit. In the present case, there is a question of fact as to when Appellee became a holder, and thus, a person entitled to enforce the note. Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate. If Deutsche Bank became a person entitled to enforce the note as either a holder or nonholder in possession who has the rights of a holder after the foreclosure action was filed, then the case may be dismissed without prejudice and the action may be re-filed in the name of the proper party. We reverse the granting of summary judgment by the trial court and remand back for further determinations as to when Appellee acquired its interest in the note.” (cites omitted)

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Byrams,

2012 OK 4, 275 P.3d 129

Trust: Argent Securities, Inc. ABPT Certs., Series 2006-W2

Mortgage amount: $526,320

Summary judgment of foreclosure in favor of bank reversed and remanded.

“The assignment of a mortgage is not the same as an assignment of the note. If a person is trying to establish it is a nonholder in possession who has the rights of a holder it must bear the burden of establishing its status as a nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder. Appellee must establish delivery of the note as well as the purpose of that delivery. In the present case, it appears Appellee is trying to use the assignment of mortgage in order to establish the purpose of delivery. The assignment of mortgage purports to transfer “the following described mortgage, securing the payment of a certain promissory note(s) for the sum listed below, together with all rights therein and thereto, all liens created or secured thereby, all obligations therein described, the money due and to become due thereon with interest, and all rights accrued or to accrue under such mortgage.” This language has been determined by other jurisdictions to not effect an assignment of a note but to be useful only in identifying the mortgage. Therefore, this language is neither proof of transfer of the note nor proof of the purpose of any alleged transfer.” (cites omitted)

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Cabaroy,

Index: 9245/2007

 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 2008)

Trust: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, 2006-1

“ORDERED that the plaintiffs ex parte application for an Order of Reference in Mortgage Foreclosure is denied without prejudice to resubmit due to plaintiffs failure to provide: (1) proof of plaintiffs standing to commence this action;”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Castellanos,

2008 NY Slip Op 50033(U)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: Argent Mort. Sec., Inc. ABPT Certs., Series 2005-W4

Mortgage Amount: $382,500

“Did Mr. Rivas somehow change employers on July 21, 2006 or he is concurrently a Vice President of both assignor Argent Mortgage Company, LLC and assignee Deutsche Bank? If he is a Vice President of both the assignor and the assignee, this would create a conflict of interest and render the July 21, 2006-assignment void.

Also, Mr. Rivas claims that Argent Mortgage Company, LLC is located at 1100

Town and Country Road, Suite 200, Orange, California, while Deutsche Bank has its offices at One City Boulevard West, Orange, California. Did Mr. Rivas execute the assignment at 100 Town and Country Road, Suite 200, and then travel to One City Boulevard West, with the same notary public, M. Reveles, in tow? The Court is concerned that there may be fraud on the part of Deutsche Bank, Argent Mortgage Company, LLC, and/or MTGLQ Investors, L.P., or at least malfeasance. If plaintiff renews its motion for a judgment of foreclosure and sale, the Court requires a satisfactory explanation by Mr. Rivas of his recent employment history.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Clouden,

Index No. 277/07

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2007)

Trust: Argent Mort. Sec., Inc. ABPT Certs., Series 2005-W3

Mortgage Amount: $382,500

“In the instant action, Argent’s defective assignment to Deutsche Bank affects the standing of Deutsche Bank to bring this action. The recorded assignment from Argent to Deutsche Bank, made by “Tamara Price, as Authorized Agent” on behalf of “AMC Mortgage Services Inc. as authorized agent,” lacks any power of attorney granted by Argent to AMC Mortgage Services, Inc. and/or Tamara Price to act on its behalf.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Benjamin Cruz,

Index No. 31645/06

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-OPT3

“In support of plaintiff’s application, it submits a purported assignment of the mortgage from the original lender to plaintiff. The purported assignment is dated October 27, 2006. However, such an attempt to retroactively assign the mortgage is insufficient to establish plaintiff’s ownership interest at the time the action was commenced.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Yobanna Cruz,

Index No. 2085/07

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2007)

Trust: Long Beach Mort. Loan Trust 2006-2

Mortgage Amount: $382,500

“In support of plaintiffs application, it submits a purported assignment of the mortgage from the original lender to plaintiff. The purported assignment is dated January 18, 2007 and states in pertinent part “effective January 12, 2007.” However, such an attempt to retroactively assign the mortgage is insufficient to establish plaintiff’s ownership interest at the time the action was commenced.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Cuesta,

2012 NY Slip Op 32590(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co.  2012)

Trust: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust,

Series 2007-2

Deutsche Bank’s motion for an order of reference was denied without prejudice, and Deutsche Bank was warned that if it chose to refile, it must include:

“4) Evidentiary proof, including an affidavit from an individual with personal knowledge of the facts as to the proper and timely assignment of the subject note and mortgage or endorsement of the subject note and assignment of the subject mortgage, sufficient to establish that plaintiff was the owner or holder of the subject note and mortgage at the time the action was commenced…

In his affidavit, the plaintiff’s representative has not addressed the particulars of the transfer of the note or the assignment of the mortgage to the plaintiff. Additionally, the assignment dated January 27, 2011, which is referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint, has not been attached to the moving papers.”

Deutsche Bank v. Decker,

Case 09-20548-CI-13 (Pinellas County, Florida, 2010)

Trust: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Cap. PSA dated 5-1- 2001

“However, there remain two concerns.

The first is related to evidence that the Plaintiff had standing at the time the original complaint was initially filed. The “new” assignment does not solve this problem because it was executed on February 17, 2010, and thus does not demonstrate standing in 2009…

The second problem is related to the ownership issue but is focused on the validity of the newly obtained assignment.  At the hearing Defendant’s counsel indicated concerns regarding this document based upon his assertion that the 2010 assignment was from a company that went bankrupt years ago…”

(Dismissal granted of bank/plaintiff’s first amended complaint)

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Ezagui,

Index: 3724/07

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2007)

Trust: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., ABPT

Certificates, Series 2004-R10

Mortgage Amount: $412,250

“According to plaintiff’s application, defendant Ezaguis’ default began with the nonpayment of principal and interest due on September 1, 2006. Yet, more than five months later, plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK was willing to take an assignment of a nonperforming loan from AMERIQUEST. Further, both assignor AMC, as Attorney in Fact for AMERIQUEST, and assignee, DEUTSCHE BANK, have the same address, 505 City Parkway West, Orange, CA 92868. Plaintiff’s “affidavit of amount due,” submitted in support of the instant application for a default order of reference was executed by Tamara Price, on February 16, 2007. Ms. Price states that “I am the Vice President for DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE OF AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC., ASSET-BACKED PASS THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2004-R10, UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT DATED AS OF OCTOBER 1, 2004, WITHOUT RECOURSE (DEUTSCHE BANK).” However, the February 7, 2007 assignment from AMERIQUEST, by AMC, its Attorney in Fact, is executed by Tamara Price, Vice President of AMC. The Tamara Price signatures on both the February 7, 2007 affidavit and the February 16, 2007 assignment are identical. Did Ms. Price change employers from February 7, 2007 to February 16, 2007? The Court is concerned that there may be fraud on the part of AMERIQUEST, or at least malfeasance. Before granting an application for an order of reference, the Court requires an affidavit from Ms. Price, describing her employment history for the past three years. Further, irrespective of her employment history, Ms. Price must explain why DEUTSCHE BANK would purchase a nonperforming loan from AMERIQUEST, and why  DEUTSCHE BANK shares office space in Orange, California, with AMERIQUEST.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Gilbert,

2012 IL App (2d) 120164, No. 2-12-0164 (September  25, 2012)

Trust: GSAMP Trust 2005-WMC2

“Deutsche Bank attempted to rebut this apparent lack of standing by pointing to the Assignment and the Loch affidavit. However, these items lack evidentiary value. Before the trial court, Deutsche Bank argued that the language of the Assignment established that the transfer of the mortgage had occurred years earlier, on November 1, 2005. On appeal, however, Deutsche Bank wisely abandons that argument (which finds no support in the actual language of the Assignment), and now concedes that the Assignment “does not establish anything about when Plaintiff [Deutsche Bank] obtained its interest in the subject loan.” We agree with this statement. Although the Assignment contains two dates—the date of the trust for which Deutsche Bank is a trustee, and the date on which the Assignment was executed and notarized—it does not explicitly state when the mortgage was assigned to Deutsche Bank. All that can be known about when the assignment took place is that it was no later than the date on which the Assignment was executed.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Grant,

Index: 39192/07

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT2

Mortgage Amount: $456,000

“Also, the Court requires an explanation from an officer of plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK as to why, in the middle of our national subprime mortgage financial crisis, DEUTSCHE BANK purchased a non-performing loan [from] OPTION ONE.  The Court wonders if DEUTSCHE BANK violated a corporate fiduciary duty to its stockholders with the purchase of a loan that defaulted more than five months prior to its assignment to DEUTSCHE BANK.”

 

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Haque,

36 Misc. 3d 1203(A)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 2012)

Trust: Home Equity Mortgage Loan Trust, Series INABS

2005-B

Mortgage Amount: $279,200

“In addition, to the extent Plaintiff Deutsche Bank asserts the note was transferred to ”the trust,” pursuant to a “pooling and servicing” agreement between IndyMac ABS, Inc. as depositor, IndyMac Bank SM as seller and “master servicer” and Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, Series INABS 2005-B, issuer, such agreement does not establish that IndyMac assigned the note to plaintiff Deutsche Bank.  Plaintiff Deutsche Bank does not otherwise allege a basis for a valid assignment of the note.” (cites omitted)

 

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Harris,

Index: 35549/07

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Mortgage Amount: $408,000

Deutsche Bank’s Motion was denied without prejudice, with leave to renew, providing the Court:

“…a satisfactory explanation to various questions with respect to: the October 23, 2007 assignment of the instant mortgage to plaintiff, DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY (DEUTSCHE BANK); the employment history of one Erica Johnson-Seck, who executed the affidavit of facts in the instant application as an officer of DEUTSCHE BANK; plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK’S purchase of the instant non- performing loan; and why does INDYMAC BANK, F.S.B., (INDYMAC), MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. (MERS), and plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK all share office space at 460 Sierra Madre Villa, Pasadena, CA 91107.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Maraj,

2008 NY Slip Op 50176 (U)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: INDX 2006-AR6

Mortgage Amount: $440,000

“With the assignor MERS and assignee DEUTSCHE BANK appearing to be engaged in possible fraudulent activity by: having the same person execute the assignment and then the affidavit of facts in support of the instant application; DEUTSCHE BANK’s purchase of a non-performing loan from INDYMAC; and, the sharing of office space in Suite 400/500 in Kansas City, the Court wonders if the instant foreclosure action is a corporate “Kansas City Shuffle,” a complex confidence game…

A Kansas City Shuffle is when everybody looks right, you go left . . .

It’s not something people hear about. Falls on deaf ears mostly . . .

No small matter. Requires a lot of planning. Involves a lot of people. People connected by the slightest of events. Like whispers in the night, in that place that never forgets, even when those people do.

In this foreclosure action is plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK, with its “principal place of business” in Kansas City attempting to make the Court look right while it goes left?”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Marche,

Index: 9156/07

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2009)

Trust: Securitized AB Receivable LLC Trust 2006-FR4

“Why an Order should not be made and entered:

VACATING the order of foreclosure and dismissing the instant action in its entirety upon the grounds that (i) Plaintiff has misrepresented itself by alleging that it is the owner and holder of the mortgage in order to fraudulently commence this action when in fact no valid assignment has been made to Plaintiff from Fremont Investment & Loan; (ii) that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction where Plaintiff is not and has not been the true owner and holder of the note and mortgage at issue; and (iii) that the assignment at issue is champertous in violation of Section 489 of the New York State Judiciary Law because the sole purpose of the defective assignment was to facilitate fraudulent litigation begun by Plaintiff prior to the assignment’s execution.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Matthews,

2012 OK 14, 273 P.3d 43 (2012)

Trust: JP Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH3

Summary Judgment for bank reversed and remanded.

“However, the Assignment of Real Estate Mortgage attached to its motion for summary judgment is executed on June 9, 2009, by a Vice President of Chase Bank USA, N.A. The note attached to its motion for summary judgment, however, shows an allonge from Chase Bank USA, N.A., to Chase Home Finance, LLC. Further, this purported transfer of the note occurred six months after the action was commenced. Deutsche Bank also by its own admission states it acquired its interest in the note and mortgage subsequent to the filing of this action.”

Deutsche Bank v. McCarthy,

Case No. 1:07 3071 (N.D. Ohio) (Judge Dowd)

Trust: Argent Mortgage Securities, ABPT Certs., Series 2005-W5

“The Northern District of Ohio is swamped with foreclosure cases brought in diversity. A large number of these cases are brought by plaintiffs who declare that they are holders of the note and mortgage but who initially supply no proof of that fact. When pressed, it is typically the case, as here, that the plaintiff actually is not the holder of the note and mortgage until some time after the filing of the complaint (often mere days!) and had, therefore, made a false statement to the court. Sometimes that statement of ownership is only in the complaint; sometimes, as in the instant case, it is actually in a sworn affidavit. See Doc. No. 1-4, ¶ 7. This is completely unacceptable, especially because this situation is likely to be repeated if not stopped by Court order.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. McRae

27 Misc.3d 247 (Sup. Ct. Alleghany County 2010)

Trust: not identified.

To establish standing, the bank submitted an additional copy of a note which was different from the one attached to the complaint. The court rejected it, stating: “Obviously, the endorsements…post-date the commencement of this case…and are ineffective.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Mitchell,

27 A.3d 1229 – NJ Appellate Div. 2011

Trust: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3

Mortgage Amount: $150,000

Summary judgment reversed.

“After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and final judgment and vacate the sheriff’s sale, holding that Deutsche Bank did not prove it had standing at the time it filed the original complaint. The assignment was not perfected until after the filing of the complaint, and plaintiff presented no evidence of having possessed the underlying note prior to filing the complaint. If plaintiff did not have the note when it filed the original complaint, it lacked standing to do so, and it could not obtain standing by filing an amended complaint. Given that Deutsche Bank has not demonstrated standing, we cannot decide at this time whether it was a holder in due course of the mortgage.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Nicholls.

Index 2248/07

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: Long Beach Mort. Loan Trust 2005-WL2

“In support of plaintiff’s application, it submits a purported assignment of the mortgage from the original lender to plaintiff. The purported assignment is dated January 24, 2007 and states in pertinent part “[e]ffective January 17, 2007.” However, such an attempt to retroactively assign the mortgage is insufficient to establish plaintiff’s ownership interest at the time the action was commenced. … Plaintiffs attempt to foreclose upon a mortgage in which it had no “legal or equitable interest was without foundation in law or fact…”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Parisella,

VT App. Ct., 2010, Docket No. S0758-09 CnC

Trust: FFMLT Trust 2005-FF11

Homeowner’s Motion to Dismiss granted.

“The court concludes that a plaintiff seeking foreclosure lacks standing unless it can show it was entitled to enforce the mortgage at the time it filed its complaint for foreclosure…

Here, there is no evidence in the record indicating that Deutsche Bank was the assignee of the note when it filed its complaint on June 15, 2009.  Nor is there even an allegation to that effect.  There is an allegation that the mortgage was assigned to Deutsche Bank before it filed its complaint, but since the note is a negotiable instrument, the transfer of the mortgage does not also transfer the note…

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Richardson,

2012 OK 15, __P.3d__

Trust: MASTR 2007-02

Summary Judgment for bank reversed and remanded.

“In the present case, Appellee has presented evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment of an indorsed-in-blank note, and an “Assignment of Mortgage” both arguably obtained after the filing of the petition. Appellee must prove it is the holder of the note or the nonholder in possession who has the rights of a holder prior to the filing of the foreclosure proceeding. In the present matter the timeliness of the transfer is a disputed fact issue. Since Deutsche Bank did not file the blank indorsement until it filed its motion for summary judgment it is impossible to determine from the record when Deutsche Bank acquired its interest in the underlying note.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Ryan,

Index 33315/07 (January 29, 2008)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: Long Beach Mort. Loan Trust 2005-WL1

An order of reference was denied by Judge Kurtz where the bank plead a mortgage assignment executed, September 31, 2007, after the suit was commenced August 31, 2007, but with an attempted backdate to July 30, 2007.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Ryan,

Case No. 2011-12070, Hillsborough Co. Fla. 2012

Trust: Novastar Mortgage Funding Trust, 2006-5

“Second, Plaintiff lacked standing at the inception of this case. Though Plaintiff alleged it had standing, the Note attached to its Complaint lacked an endorsement, and Plaintiff introduced no sworn evidence to overcome Defendant’s affidavit that it lacked standing when it filed suit…

In light of the foregoing, this case is dismissed without prejudice and without leave to amend.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Sampson III,

Index 26320/07 (January 16, 2008)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2009)

Trust: HSBC Bank USA, Inc., Series HASCO 2006-HE1

“The purported assignment is dated August 10, 2007 and states in pertinent part “this assignment is effective as of the 22nd day of June, 2007.” However, such an attempt to retroactively assign the mortgage is insufficient to establish plaintiff’s ownership interest at the time the action was commenced. Plaintiff’s attempt to foreclose upon a mortgage in which it had no “legal or equitable interest was without foundation in law or fact…” (cites omitted)

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Seidlin,

Index:105162/2009 NY County, 2011NY Slip Op

31551(U)

Trust: American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2006-5

Mortgage Amount: $580,000

Bank’s motion granted for leave to voluntarily   discontinue the action “due to the assignment of mortgage being incorrectly and/or incompletely acknowledged” after two years of litigation.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Steele,

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4937 (S.D. Ohio January 8, 2008)

“I cannot tell from the exhibits plaintiff has submitted in support of its motion whether Deutsche Bank owned the note and mortgage when the complaint was filed. Plaintiff alleges ownership in the complaint, but defendants’ answer does not admit the truth of that allegation…The Court cannot grant summary judgment unless Deutsche Bank offers evidence from which a finder could conclude by a preponderance that it owned the note and mortgage when the complaint was filed.  Further, if plaintiff has evidence of ownership, it must explain how that ownership is consistent with the uncontroverted evidence that when the complaint was filed, MERS was the mortgage holder acting on behalf of Mortgageit, Inc.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Vasquez,

Index: 4924/11, 2012 NY Slip Op 31395(U)

Trust: Morgan Stanley ABS Cap. I, Inc. Trust, 2007-HE7

Mortgage Amount: $435,100

“A foreclosure plaintiff has the requisite standing to commence a mortgage foreclosure action if “it is both the holder or assignee of the subject mortgage and the of the underlying note at the time the action is commenced”… In this action plaintiff does not allege that it is an assignee of the Note, but instead, as previously referenced, produced a copy of the original Note between defendants and New Century. They argue that delivery of the unindorsed Note was sufficient to confer standing. On the prior motion the court overlooked the necessity of proper indorsement required to transfer ownership and render the transferee a holder…

Also influencing this court’s determination on reargument are the repeated issues regarding standing which revolve around proper assignments, particularly of mortgage notes which have ensued following creation of the MERS system and the birth of mortgage backed securities.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Williams,

Case No. 11-00632 (D. Hawaii 2011)

Trust: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I, Inc. Trust 2007- NC1

“This evidence presents two problems for Plaintiff. First, if Plaintiff did indeed obtain the Mortgage and Note through a 2007 PSA, then the 2007 PSA is yet another reason why the January 13, 2009 assignment is a nullity and the Complaint’s assertion that Plaintiff obtained the Mortgage and Note from Home 123 is untrue. Second, the evidence presented does not actually establish that Plaintiff received the Mortgage and Note through the PSA — there is no evidence on the record establishing what mortgages were included in the PSA. Thus, although Plaintiff might have obtained the Mortgage and Note through this PSA, there is no evidence showing or even suggesting that this is indeed the case. As a  result, there is no evidence — at least on the record presented before the court –creating a genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff was assigned the Mortgage and Note on which it now seeks to foreclose.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Wilson,

Case A-1384-09T1, N.J. App. Div. 2011

Trust: WaMu 2007-HEI Trust

Summary judgment of foreclosure was reversed and remanded “to resolve the issue of the bona fides of the assignment.”  The issue regarding the assignment was discussed in Footnote 1:

“The assignment was executed by an individual identified as Laura Hescott who signed the assignment as an assistant vice-president of Washington Mutual Bank. Ms. Hescott has been identified as an employee of Lender Processing Services, Inc. (“LPS”), a servicer of default mortgages. The bona fides of the practices of this service provider have been the subject of increased judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 407 B.R. 618, 623 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009).”

 

Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas v. McCoy,

20 Misc 3d 1202 (A) 2010 NY Slip Op 51664(U)

Trust not disclosed.

“Although the February 28, 2008 assignment states it is “effective January 19, 2008,” such attempt at retroactivity is ineffectual. If an assignment is in writing, the execution date is generally controlling and a written assignment claiming an earlier effective date is deficient, unless it is accompanied by proof that the physical delivery of the note and mortgage was, in fact, previously effectuated…A retroactive assignment cannot be used to confer standing upon the assignee in a foreclosure action commenced prior to the execution of the assignment… (Plaintiff’s failure to submit proper proof, including an affidavit from one with personal knowledge, that the plaintiff was the holder of the note and mortgage at the time the action was commenced, requires denial of the plaintiff’s application for an order of reference. (cites omitted)

Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas v. Peabody,

866 N.Y.S. 2d 91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)

Trust not disclosed.

Mortgage Amount: $320,000

Foreclosure dismissed.

“Again, here, there is no evidence that it took physical delivery of the note and mortgage before commencing this action, and again, the written assignment was signed after the defendant was served. The assignment’s language purporting to give it retroactive effect, absent a prior or contemporary delivery of the note and mortgage, is insufficient to grant it standing.”

Feltus v. U.S. Bank, N.A.

80 So.3d 375 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2011)

Trust: MASTR Adj. Rate Mortgage Trust 2007-3

Summary judgment for bank reversed.

“The properly filed pleadings before the court when it heard U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment were a complaint seeking to reestablish a lost note to which was attached a copy of a note made payable to Countrywide, N.A., Feltus’s answer and affirmative defenses alleging that the note attached to the complaint contradicts the allegation of the complaint that U.S. Bank is the owner of the note, a motion for summary judgment alleging a lost note of which U.S. Bank is the owner, and an affidavit of indebtedness alleging that U.S. Bank was the owner and holder of the note described in the complaint. The endorsed note that U.S. Bank claimed was now in its possession was not properly before the court at the summary judgment hearing because U.S. Bank never properly amended its complaint.2 In addition, the complaint failed to allege that U.S. Bank “was entitled to enforce the instrument when loss of possession occurred, or has directly or indirectly acquired ownership of the instrument from a person who was entitled to enforce the instrument when loss of possession occurred.” § 673.3091(a). The affidavit of indebtedness provided no assistance in this regard because the affiant did not assert any personal knowledge of how U.S. Bank would have come to own or hold the note.” (cites omitted)

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Schwartwald,

Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5017

On October 31, 2012, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the issue of standing in foreclosures.  Although this case did not involve a mortgage-backed trust, it will have a significant impact on foreclosures by trusts because the Court ruled that the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation lacked standing to sue when it obtained the mortgage by an assignment from the real party in interest after the foreclosure suit was commenced. This was yet another case where the note was “not available” at commencement.  Later in the case, Federal Home Loan filed a copy of the note, with undated endorsements.  The motion for summary judgment was supported by an Affidavit signed by well-known Wells Fargo robo-signer John Herman Kennerty.  The appellate court had ruled that Federal Home Loan cured the lack of standing defect by the assignment of the mortgage and transfer of the note prior to entry of judgment. The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed – citing decisions taken by Courts in Connecticut, Florida, Maine, Missouri, Oklahoma and Vermont.

Gascue v. HSBC USA, N.A.,

__So.3d__ (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)

Trust: Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-AB4

Reversal and remand of denial of motion to vacate final judgment of foreclosure.

“There is no evidence on the record indicating that Bank was the holder of the mortgage at the time the complaint was filed. Just as in Rigby, Bank attached a mortgage to its complaint in which it was not listed as the lender, but rather “Pinnacle Direct Funding” was. The only evidence that Bank is the owner and holder of the note is a sworn affidavit. However, this affidavit was filed three years after the complaint and does not establish when Bank became the holder of either the note or the mortgage, much less establish that Bank was the holder of said instruments at the time the complaint was filed. See id. (reversing the trial court in part because the supporting affidavit in that case did not establish the date on which the bank acquired possession of the note).”

Gee v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,

72 So.3d 211 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)

Trust: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-10

“Here, the record does not contain the original Mortgage. To prove its ownership, U.S. Bank filed a copy of the Mortgage as well as two assignments. The first assignment transferred the Mortgage from Advent Mortgage, the original mortgagee, to Option One. The second assignment purported to transfer the mortgage from American Home, as successor in interest of Option One, to U.S. Bank. However, and significant to our consideration, U.S. Bank provided nothing to demonstrate how American Home came to be the successor in interest to Option One.

Incredibly, U.S. Bank argues that “[i]t would be inequitable for [Ms. Gee] to avoid foreclosure based on the absence of an endorsement to [it].” But that argument flies in the face of well-established precedent requiring the party seeking foreclosure to present evidence that it owns and holds the note and mortgage in question in order to proceed with a foreclosure action.” (cites omitted)

(Summary Judgment reversed.)

Gonzalez v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company,

Case No. 2D10-5561 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)

Trust: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust

2006-1

“The problem is that the additional stamp and handwritten notation transferring the note from American Home Mortgage to Deutsche Bank is not dated. Accordingly, Deutsche Bank failed to establish its standing by showing that it possessed the note when it filed the lawsuit. See Country Place Cmty. Ass’n v. J.P. Morgan Mortg. Acquisition Corp., 51 So. 3d 1176, 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“Because J.P. Morgan did not own or possess the note and mortgage when it filed its lawsuit, it lacked standing to maintain the foreclosure action.”). As a result, Deutsche Bank has not refuted Gonzalez’s affirmative defense, and a genuine issue of material fact exists that should have precluded the entry of summary judgment.”

(Summary judgment for Deutsche Bank reversed.)

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Antrobus,

20 Misc 3d 1127(A), 2008 NY Slip Op 51639(U)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-4

Mortgage Amount: $465,000

“Therefore, the instant application for an order of reference is denied without prejudice, with leave to renew. The Court will grant an order of reference to plaintiff HSBC upon presentation to this court of: an affidavit by either an officer of HSBC or someone with a valid power of attorney from HSBC, possessing personal knowledge of the facts; an affidavit from Scott Anderson clarifying his employment history for the past three years and what corporation he serves as an officer; and, an affidavit by an officer of HSBC explaining why HSBC purchased a nonperforming loan from Delta Funding Corporation, and why HSBC, OCWEN, MERS, Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs all share office space in Suite 100.”

HSBC Bank USA v. Beirne,

212-Ohio-1386, Ohio App. Ct. 9th District

Summary judgment for bank reversed.

“In the affidavit that was attached to the supplement to the motion for summary judgment, Mr. Spradling averred that HSBC had been assigned the loan on June 5, 2009, and that “[a] true and correct copy of the Assignment was attached to the Complaint filed by HSBC.”  However, a review of the complaint and the exhibits attached thereto reveals that there was no evidence that the note had been assigned to HSBC.  Moreover, an assignment dated June 5, 2009, could not have been attached to the complaint which was filed on May 11, 2009.”

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Charlevagne,

20 Misc 3d 1128(A), 2008 NY Slip Op 51652(U)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-3

Mortgage Amount: $480,000

“Therefore, the instant application for an order of reference and related relief is denied without prejudice. The Court will grant plaintiff HSBC an order of reference and related relief when it submits an affidavit by either an officer of HSBC, or someone with a valid power of attorney from HSBC, possessing personal knowledge of the facts.”

HSBC Bank USA v. Cherry,

18 Misc3d 1102 (A), 2007 NY Slip Op 52378(U)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-4

“Further, the Court, upon renewal of the application for an order of reference requires a satisfactory explanation to questions with respect to: the assignment of the instant nonperforming mortgage loan from the original lender, Delta Funding Corporation to HSBC Bank; the employment history of one Scott Anderson, who assigned this mortgage to HSBC and then swears to be HSBC’s servicing agent; and the relationship between HSBC, Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB (OCWEN), Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs, who all seem to share office space at Suite 100 of 1661 Worthington Road, West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 (Suite 100).”

HSBC Bank USA v. Cipriani,

Index: 12365-2007

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 2008)

Trust: SG Mort. Sec. Trust 2005-OPT1

Order for reference denied without prejudice. To resubmit, plaintiff must provide “proof on standing to commence this action as it appears that the plaintiff did not own the note and mortgage when the action was commenced.”

HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Jack, 

Index No: 14750/2007

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 2008)

Denied without prejudice due to bank’s failure to provide proof that it had standing to bring the action.

 

HSBC Bank USA v. Palladino,

2011 IL App (2d) No. 08-CH-4548

Trust: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-D

Summary judgment reversed and remanded.

“In the present case, there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether there was an assignment of the mortgage and note from Fremont to HSBC Bank. Although HSBC Bank represents that it produced the assignment, the document on which it relies, by its very terms, was, at worst, not an assignment and, at best, inherently inconsistent as to whether it was an assignment. Indeed, the document states that MERS as nominee for Fremont “did” assign (past tense) the mortgage and note to HSBC Bank prior to November 13, 2008, yet also states that the assignment “is” made (present tense) without recourse and without representation or warranty.

In addition to the purported assignment’s inconsistent terms, the document upon which HSBC Bank relies is vague with respect to the date of the purported assignment. The document has a stamp which appears to reflect that it was recorded on December 17, 2008, but states that the assignment was made “prior to” November 13, 2008. The document itself is undated, as is the notary’s certificate. The date of the assignment is material because standing to sue must exist at the time the action is commenced.” (cites omitted)

HSBC Bank USA v. Perez,

Case No. EQ4970 (Washington County, Iowa 2009)

Trust: Fieldstone Mort. Investment Trust 2005-2

“The Perezs argue that the Pooling and Servicing Agreement for Fieldstone Mortgage Investment Trust Series 2005-2 governs when and how the Trustee in this case, HSBC Bank, the Plaintiff, may acquire notes and mortgages.  Additionally, that agreement governs when and how a mortgage owned by the trust may be foreclosed upon.  The Perezs further state that the agreement prohibits the acquisition of mortgages that are in default…The Plaintiff has also submitted documentation that shows the transfer of interest in the mortgage from Fieldstone to HSBC occurred on February 9, 2009.  Clearly, based upon the Plaintiff’s own documentation, the default occurred prior to the transfer.

According to the Transfer and Servicing Agreement submitted by the Perezs, and allegedly applicable to the Plaintiff, the trust servicer is only allowed to “substitute a defaulted Mortgage Loan with a Qualifying Substitute Mortgage Loan…This document seems to state that the mortgage at issue could only be transferred if it were current on the date it was transferred.  Accordingly, it appears that this mortgage was inappropriately transferred to the Plaintiff as it was in default at the time of transfer.  As such, a question is raised regarding whether the present Plaintiff has standing to bring this foreclosure action.”

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Sene,

34 Misc 3d 1232 (A), 2012 NY Slip Op 50352(U)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2012)

Trust: Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust

2007-HE4

“During the bad faith hearing, two separate notes with attendant assignments were put into evidence by the plaintiff…

This Court emphatically now joins the judicial chorus who have been wary of the paperwork supplied by plaintiffs and their representatives. There is ample reason for Chief Judge’s requirement for an attorney affirmation in residential foreclosure cases. As stated by Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman, “we cannot allow the courts in New York State to stand idly and be party to what we now know is a deeply flawed process, especially when that process involves basic human needs – such as a family home – during this period of economic crisis…

It is clear in this case, without further hearings, that a fraud has been committed upon this Court.  Thus, the only remedy that can be utilized by this Court is to stay these proceedings and any mortgage foreclosure until this matter is cleared up to the satisfaction of this Court.”

James v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,

D. Maine, No. 2:09-cv-84-JHR, January 31, 2011

Trust: BAFC 2006-1

Sanctions were imposed because of an Affidavit  submitted by GMAC employee and exposed robo-signer Jeffrey Stephan:

“In the case at hand, however, GMAC, the party that submitted the affidavit and the affiant’s employer, was on notice that the conduct at issue here was unacceptable to the courts, which rely on sworn affidavits as admissible evidence in connection with motions for summary judgment. In 2006, an identical jurat signed under identical circumstances resulted in the imposition of sanctions against GMAC in Florida. Affidavit of Thomas A Cox (Docket No. 153) ¶ 4 & Exhs. B-D. GMAC’s assertion that these sanctions applied only “within the State of Florida,” Plaintiff and GMAC Mortgage LLC’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Relief Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g) (Docket No. 177) at 7, is specious. It would be clear to any lawyer representing GMAC in any court action, including those involved in the Florida action, that a jurat should not be signed under the circumstances involved in that case or here and that such a jurat will never be acceptable to any court. Stephan’s actions in this case strike at the heart of any court’s procedures, are egregious under the circumstances, and must be deemed worthy of sanctions.

LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Ahearn,

59 A.D.3d 911, 875 N.Y.S. 2d 595 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)

Trust: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities I, LLC,

Series 2004-FR3

Mortgage Amount: $180,000

“Here, the written assignment submitted by plaintiff was indisputably written subsequent to the commencement of this action and the record contains no other proof demonstrating that there was a physical delivery of the mortgage prior to bringing the foreclosure action (see id.). In fact, the language in the amended complaint indicating that the assignment to plaintiff had not yet occurred would clearly contradict any assertion to the contrary. Accordingly, Supreme Court correctly found that plaintiff did not have standing and the amended complaint must be dismissed, without prejudice.”

LaSalle Bank v. Charleus 

Index No. 22733/2007 (January 3, 2008)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

An order of reference was denied by Judge Kurtz where the bank plead a mortgage assignment executed, July 2, 2007, after the suit was commenced June 22, 2007, but with an attempted backdate to June 21, 2007.

 

LaSalle Bank v. Lamy,

12 Misc.3d 1191(A), 824 N.Y.S.2d 769

“The court thus finds that this purported, undated, indorsement by “allonge” to the note by the original lender in favor of the plaintiff and the December 29, 2005 written assignment of the note and mortgage by MERS to the plaintiff failed to pass ownership of the note and mortgage to the plaintiff prior or subsequent to the commencement of this action. Consequently, the original lender remains the owner of both the note and mortgage since no proper assignment of the either the note or the mortgage was ever made by the original lender/owner to the plaintiff or to the plaintiff’s purported assignee. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff has no cognizable claims for the relief demanded in its complaint.”

LaSalle Bank v. Smalls,

Index No. 28128/2007 (January 3, 2008)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

An order of reference was denied by Judge Kurtz where the bank plead a mortgage assignment executed, September 31, 2007, after the suit was commenced August 31, 2007, but with an attempted backdate to July 30, 2007.

McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,

79 So.3d 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)

Trust: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II, Inc.,

Series 2006-ARS

“Nonetheless, the record evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Chase had standing to foreclose at the time the lawsuit was filed. The mortgage was assigned to Chase three days after Chase filed the instant foreclosure complaint. More importantly, the original note contained an undated special endorsement in Chase’s favor, and the affidavit filed in support of summary judgment did not state when the endorsement was made to Chase. Furthermore, the affidavit, which was dated after the lawsuit was filed, did not specifically state when Chase became the owner of the note and mortgage, nor did the affidavit indicate that Chase was the owner of the note and mortgage before suit was filed. Therefore, Chase failed to submit any record evidence proving that it had the right to enforce the note on the date the complaint was filed.” (footnotes omitted)

Naranjo v. SBMC Mortgage,

No. 3:11-cv-02229-L-WVG, Dkt. #20

(S.D. Cal. July 24, 2012)

Trust: WMALT 2006-AR4

Mortgage Amount: $825,000

Defendant Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss Denied in Part.

“The vital allegation in this case is the assignment of the loan into
the WAMU Trust was not completed by May 30, 2006 as required by the Trust Agreement. [*10] This allegation gives rise to a plausible inference that the subsequent assignment, substitution, and notice of default and election to sell may also be improper. Defendants wholly fail to address that issue. (See Defs.’ Mot. 3:16-6:2; Defs.’ Reply 2:13-4:4.) This reason alone is sufficient to deny Defendants’ motion with respect to this issue.”

Pino v. Bank of New York,

76 So. 3d 927 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)

Trust: CWALT 2006-OC8

Mortgage Amount: $162,400

Florida Supreme Court decision pending. The appeal court certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court because “many, many mortgage foreclosures appear tainted with suspect documents.”

“As conveyed by the Fourth District in the decision below, the plaintiffs and now respondents in this Court, the Bank of New York Mellon, et al. (BNY Mellon), commenced an action in the trial court to foreclose a mortgage against the defendant and now petitioner in this Court, Roman Pino. See Pino v. Bank of New York Mellon, 57 So.3d 950, 951 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Thereafter, Pino moved for sanctions, alleging that BNY Mellon had filed a fraudulent assignment of mortgage. Id. In response, BNY Mellon filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the foreclosure action. Id. at 952. Five months later, BNY Mellon refiled an identical action to foreclose the same mortgage. Id. In the original, dismissed action, Pino filed a motion seeking to vacate the voluntary dismissal pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)on the grounds of fraud on the court and requesting dismissal of BNY Mellon’s newly filed action as a consequent sanction. Pino, 57 So.3d at 952. The trial court denied Pino’s motion, essentially holding that because the prior action had been voluntarily dismissed, the court lacked jurisdiction, and thus the authority, to consider any relief. Id.” (footnotes omitted)

Richards v. HSBC Bank,

__So.3d__, 2012 WL 2359656 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)

Trust: PHH 2007-2

Summary judgment for bank reversed on appeal.

“While the assignment reflected that the mortgage had been assigned from Century 21 to HSBC, the allonge to the note reflected that Bishops Gate Residential Mortgage Trust was to be the note’s payee…

Thus the allonge was inconsistent with the assignment and contradicted the allegation in the complaint that HSBC was the holder of the note…

Furthermore, the affidavits filed by HSBC did not explain the relationship between HSBC and Bishops Gate Residential Mortgage Trust, nor otherwise aver facts conclusively showing that HSBC was the holder of the note.

 

Rigby v. Wells Fargo, N.A.,

__So.3d__, 2012 WL1108428 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)

Trust: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FXD2

Mortgage Amount: $165,600

“The Bank has not shown that it was holder of the note at the time the complaint was filed. The note containing a special endorsement in favor of the bank was not dated. The assignment of mortgage, dated May 22, 2008, indicates that Bank did not acquire the mortgage until the day after the complaint was filed. Finally, neither the affidavit, nor the technical admissions made by the Rigbys, establishes the date on which Bank acquired possession of the note and there is no evidence in the record establishing that an equitable transfer of the mortgage occurred prior to the date the complaint was filed.”

(Summary judgment reversed and remanded.)

 

Servedio v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,

46 So. 3d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)

Trust: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2007-AHL1

Mortgage Amount: $252,000

“The issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting a final summary judgment of foreclosure where appellee failed to file with the court a copy of the original note and mortgage prior to the entry of judgment.  Because the absence of the original note created a genuine issue of material fact regarding appellee’s standing to foreclose on the mortgage, summary judgment was not proper. We reverse.”

U.S. Bank v. Alexander,

2012 OK 43

Trust: Credit Suisse First Boston HEAT 2005-4

Mortgage Amount: $63,920

“As previously identified, the dispositive issue is whether or not Appellee had standing at the time Appellee filed their first amended petition. We hold that the issue of standing as well as other material issues of fact remain that must be determined by the trial court. Therefore summary judgment was inappropriate.”

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Auguste,

Index: 18695-2007 (November 27, 2007)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2007)

Trust: CSMC Mort. Backed PT Certs., Series 2007-1

“In support of plaintiffs application, it submits a purported assignment of the mortgage from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting as Nominee for First United, to plaintiff. The purported assignment is dated July 9, 2007, and states in pertinent part “this assignment is effective on or before November 22, 2006.” However, such an attempt to retroactively assign the mortgage is insufficient to establish plaintiff’s ownership interest at the time the action was commenced.”

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Baber,

280 P.2d 956 (2012 OK 55)

Trust: Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1

“Being a person entitled to enforce the note is an essential requirement to initiate a foreclosure lawsuit. In the present case, there is a question of fact as to when Appellee became a holder, and thus, a person entitled to enforce the note. Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate. If Deutsche Bank became a person entitled to enforce the note as either a holder or nonholder in possession who has the rights of a holder after the foreclosure action was filed, then the case may be dismissed without prejudice and the action may be re-filed in the name of the proper party. We reverse the granting of summary judgment by the trial court and remand back for further determinations as to when Appellee acquired its interest in the note.”

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Collymore,

68 AD3d 752 (2009), 890 NYS2d 578

“Contrary to the Bank’s contentions, it failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because it did not submit sufficient evidence to demonstrate its standing as the lawful holder or assignee of the subject note on the date it commenced this action. The Bank’s evidentiary submissions were insufficient to establish that MERS effectively assigned the subject note to it prior to the commencement of this action…, and the mere assignment of the mortgage without an effective assignment of the underlying note is a nullity…Furthermore, the Bank failed to establish that the note was physically delivered to it prior to the commencement of the action. The affidavit of a vice-president of the Bank submitted in support of summary judgment did not indicate when the note was physically delivered to the Bank, and the version of the note attached to the vice-president’s affidavit contained an undated indorsement in blank by the original lender. Furthermore, the Bank’s reply submissions included a different version of the note and an affidavit from a director of the Residential Funding Corporation which contradicted the affidavit of the Bank’s vice-president in tracing the history of transfers of the mortgage and note to the Bank. In view of the Bank’s incomplete and conflicting evidentiary submissions, an issue of fact remains as to whether it had standing to commence this action.” (cites omitted)

U.S. Bank v. Dellarmo,

94 A.D.3d 746 (2012), 942 N.Y.S.2d 122

Trust: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, 2006-FF2

“However, inasmuch as the complaint does not allege that the note was physically delivered to the plaintiff, and nothing in the plaintiff’s submission in opposition to Dellarmo’s motion could support a finding that such physical delivery occurred, the corrective assignment cannot be given retroactive effect… Moreover, both the unrecorded April 11, 2006, assignment and the recorded corrective assignment indicate only that the mortgage was assigned to the plaintiff. Since an assignment of a mortgage without the underlying debt is a nullity… the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that it had standing to commence this action…

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted Dellarmo’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him for lack of standing.” (cites omitted)

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Duvall,

Cuyahoga App. No. 94714, 2010-Ohio-6478

Trust: CMLTI 2007-WFHE2

Mortgage Amount: $92,000

“Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiff had no standing to file a foreclosure action against defendants on October 15, 2007, because, at that time, Wells Fargo owned the mortgage. Plaintiff failed in its burden of demonstrating that it was the real party in interest at the time the complaint was filed. Plaintiff’s sole assignment of error is overruled.”

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Githira,

17 LCR 697 (2009),  MISC 08-386385 (Essex Co. Mass. 2009)

Trust: Home Equity Asset Trust, Series 2005-9

Plaintiff U.S. Bank was seeking to remove a cloud on its title to a parcel of land stemming from plaintiff’s exercise of the power of sale contained in the mortgage before it received authority to do so under the provisions of the Servicemembers’ Civil Relief Act.  The complaint did not mention any other title defects.

Citing Justice Long’s ruling in Ibanez, Justice Charles W. Trombly, Jr., dismissed plaintiff’s petition to remove the cloud on the title, holding that plaintiff was not even the holder of the mortgage, by record or in fact, on the day of the foreclosure sale.  Specifically, the Court found that the foreclosure auction took place and was recorded prior to the execution and recording of an assignment of mortgage that made plaintiff the holder of the mortgage upon which it had foreclosed.

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Grant,

Index: 11133-2007

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2007)

Trust: Asset Backed Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan

Trust, Series OOMC 2006-HE3

“In support of plaintiffs application, it submits a purported assignment of the mortgage from Option One to plaintiff. The purported assignment is dated July 9, 2007, and states in pertinent part “Effective Date: March 28, 2007.” However, such an attempt to retroactively assign the mortgage is insufficient to establish plaintiff’s ownership interest at the time the action was commenced.”

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Ibanez,

941 N.E. 2d 40, (Mass. 2011)

Trust: Structured Asset Securities Corp. Mortgage PT

Certs., Series 2006-Z

The court in Ibanez rejected application of the “mortgage follows the note” rule, holding that mere possession of properly indorsed negotiable instruments did not give the foreclosing parties authority to conduct a valid non-judicial sale. In other words, one’s status as a party entitled to enforce a note did not satisfy the requirement under state law to be a mortgagee. The court acknowledged that a transferee of a note might have an equitable right to obtain a court order that that the mortgage be transferred to it. However, the potential to assert such a claim did not make the noteholder a “mortgagee.”  The Massachusetts statute required that the foreclosing party have an actual assignment of the mortgage when proceeding to sale., and further held that Assignments in Blank assign nothing and that retroactive assignments are not effective even if it was an industry-wide practice.

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Madero,

80 AD3d 751, 915 N.Y.S. 2d 612

Trust: not identified

Mortgage Amount: $570,000

“Here, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because it did not establish that it had standing, as the lawful holder or assignee of the subject note on the date it commenced this action, to commence the action.” (cites omitted)

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Merino,

16 Misc.3d 209

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 2007)

“First, the assignment from Argent to Ameriquest was executed by Jose Burgos as agent for Argent. On the same date, however, the purported assignment from Ameriquest to the plaintiff was also executed by Mr. Burgos, this time as agent for Ameriquest. In effect, the mortgage was purportedly assigned by Mr. Burgos to Mr. Burgos, and then, in turn, by Mr. Burgos to the plaintiff…The moving papers contain no proof that Mr. Burgos had either entity’s authority to act in a dual agency capacity. Therefore, the court is unable to conclude that the assignments were validly executed, or that the plaintiff had an ownership interest in the subject mortgage at the time of the filing of this action. Since a party has no foundation in law or fact to foreclose upon a mortgage without establishing its legal or equitable interest, the plaintiff’s motion must be denied.”

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Middlekauff,

Case No. 10 19844, Hillsborough Co. Fla. 2012

Trust: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Trust, Series 2005-9

“First, Plaintiff lacked standing at the inception of this case. Although the Note attached to the Amended Complaint contains an allonge, the undisputed summary judgment evidence before the Court establishes that this allonge was created post-filing. As Plaintiff lacked standing when it filed this lawsuit, dismissal is required.” (cite omitted)

U.S. Bank v. Moore,

2012 OK 32

GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-6

Mortgage Amount: $282,000

“It is a fundamental precept of the law to expect a foreclosing party to actually be in possession of its claimed interest in the Note, and to have the proper supporting documentation in hand when filing suit, showing the history of the Note, so that the defendant is duly apprised of the rights of the plaintiff. This is accomplished by showing the party is a holder of the instrument or a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument…”

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Roundtree,

Index: 009148/2007

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 2007)

Trust: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2006-HE1

“Since MERS, Inc. had no ownership interest in said note, it could not assign it to the plaintiff and any assignment purportedly transferring the ownership interest from Fremont Investment and Loan to the plaintiff by a MERS, Inc. assignment of said note is a nullity.” (cites omitted)

… In view of the foregoing, the instant motion (#001) is denied as it is apparent from the documentary submissions of the plaintiff that it was not the owner of the note at the time of the commencement of this action.”

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Villaruel,

Index: 25277/2008

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: SG Mort. Sec. AB Certs., Series 2006-FRE2

“The purported assignment is dated August 3, 2007 and states in pertinent part “[t]his assignment is effective as of the 10th day of June, 2007.” However, such an attempt to retroactively assign the mortgage is insufficient to establish plaintiff’s ownership interest at the time the action was commenced. Plaintiff’s attempt to foreclose upon a mortgage in which it had no “legal or equitable interest was without foundation in law or fact…” (cites omitted)

Verizzo v. Bank of New York,

28 So.3d 976 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)

Trust: Novastar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2006-3

“In addition to the procedural error of the late service and filing of the summary judgment evidence, those documents reflect that at least one genuine issue of material fact exists. The promissory note shows that Novastar endorsed the note to “JPMorgan Chase Bank, as Trustee.” Nothing in the record reflects assignment or endorsement of the note by JPMorgan Chase Bank to the Bank of New York or MERS. Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Bank of New York owns and holds the note and has standing to foreclose the mortgage.”

(Summary judgment reversed and remanded.)

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ford,

418 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2011)

Mortgage Amount: $403,750

“For these reasons, the summary judgment granted to Wells Fargo must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court because Wells Fargo did not establish its standing to pursue this foreclosure action by competent evidence. On the remand, defendant may conduct appropriate discovery, including taking the deposition of Baxley and the person who purported to assign the mortgage and note to Wells Fargo on behalf of Argent.”

 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hampton,

Index: 25957/2007 (January 3, 2008)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: Option One Mort. Loan Trust 2007-1

“The purported assignment is dated August 1, 2007 and states in pertinent part “[e]ffective as of June 10, 2007.” However, such an attempt to retroactively assign the mortgage is insufficient to establish plaintiff’s ownership interest at the time the action was commenced. Plaintiff’s attempt to foreclose upon a mortgage in which it had no “legal or equitable interest was without foundation in law or fact…” (cites omitted)

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.  Heath,

212 OK 54

Trust: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4

Standing was not established by the materials attached to Appellee’s petition or motion for summary judgment because there was no attached indorsed note nor was there an assignment of the note. Therefore, we find the trial court based its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law. There existed a substantial issue of material fact that needed to be addressed at trial. Even though the Appellants did not respond to the motion for summary judgment, the trial court should have denied the motion sua sponte.

 

Wells Fargo Bank v. Larace,

941 N.E. 2d 40, (Mass. 2011)

Trust: ABFC 2005-OPT1

See U.S. Bank v. Ibanez above.  These were consolidated cases.

Wells Fargo Bank v. Lupori,

8 A3d 919 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010)

Trust: MLMI Trust, Series 2005-FF6

“On appeal, Wells Fargo cites Mallory for the proposition that a plaintiff’s complaint in foreclosure need not allege the existence of a completed and recorded assignment of the subject mortgage to the plaintiff. We conclude, however, that this Court’s opinion in Mallory is distinguishable from the instant matter. In Mallory, the bank alleged that it was the owner of the subject mortgage and also alleged the existence of a pending assignment of the mortgage to the bank. In contrast, Wells Fargo has failed to do either of those things. Since the complaint contains no mention of the alleged assignment from Corporation to Wells Fargo or any allegation that Wells Fargo was the owner of the Luporis’ mortgage,the complaint does not comply with Rule 1147(a)(1). The alleged April 1, 2005 assignment from Corporation to Wells Fargo was dehors the record as of the time of the default judgment. Since the record did not support entry of the default judgment, the trial court erred in declining to strike the judgment from the record.” (footnote omitted)

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Marchione,

69 AD 3d 204, 887 N.Y.S. 2d 615 (2d Dept 2009)

Trust: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust

“Here, it is clear that the date of the execution of the assignment was after the commencement of the action. If an assignment is in writing, “the execution date is generally controlling and a written assignment claiming an earlier effective date is deficient unless it is accompanied by proof that the physical delivery of the note and mortgage was, in fact, previously effectuated” (LaSalle Bank Natl. Assn., 59 AD3d at 912). While recognizing that in some circumstances parties to an agreement may bind themselves retroactively, “the fiction of retroactivity . . . should not be applied to affect adversely the rights of third persons” (Debreceni v Outlet Co., 784 F2d 13, 20; see also 2 Lord, Williston on Contracts § 6:61, at 893 [4th ed]). Thus, a retroactive assignment cannot be used to confer standing upon the assignee in a foreclosure action commenced prior to the execution of the assignment (see LaSalle Bank Natl. Assn., 59 AD3d 912). We disagree with the contention of Wells Fargo that public policy favors permitting less than strict compliance with the requirement that, in order to commence a foreclosure action, a plaintiff must have a legal or equitable interest in the subject mortgage.

Wells Fargo also argues that if the action were to be dismissed, the result would be a waste of judicial resources, as it would simply commence another action as soon as the original action was dismissed. Wells Fargo might have reached this conclusion earlier in its calculus to commence the lawsuit prior to the execution of the assignment.”

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Mastropaolo,

42 AD3d 239

Trust Amount: $369,000

“Here, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because it did not establish that it had standing, as the lawful holder or assignee of the subject note on the date it commenced this action, to commence the action…” (cites omitted)

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. McNee

2011 NY Slip Op 33325(U)

Trust: BCAP LLC 2007-AA3

Mortgage Amount: $644,566

Plaintiff’s arguments notwithstanding, this Court is not persuaded by Wells Fargo’s laborious interpretation of the myriad of transfer documents or the breadth of the language employed therein to confer standing upon it. “[L]anguage cannot overcome the requirement that the foreclosing party be both the holder or assignee of the subject mortgage, and the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time a foreclosure action is commenced…”  In this case, Wells Fargo has adduced no proof in opposition to McNee’s cross motion(s) sufficient to demonstrate that it was either.

Zervas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

__So.3d__ (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)

Trust: MLMI Trust Series 2005-FM1

Summary judgment for bank reversed.

“We also note that the mortgage and note attached to the complaint show the lender to be Fremont Investment and Loan. On April 1, 2010, approximately six months after the complaint was filed, Wells Fargo filed a lost note affidavit, which alleged that the note was lost by its attorney sometime after the attorney received it on November 2, 2009. In their motion to dismiss, the Zervases alleged, among other grounds, that Wells Fargo did not have standing to bring the foreclosure complaint because it did not have a written assignment of the loan. Then on July 26, 2010, seven days before the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Wells Fargo filed the note as a supplemental exhibit to its complaint. The note contains an endorsement in blank, but there is no evidence in the record establishing that the endorsement in blank was made to Wells Fargo prior to the filing of the foreclosure complaint. See Feltus v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 80 So.3d 375, 377 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (holding that bank was required “to prove the endorsement in blank was effectuated before the lawsuit was filed”).”

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Issues Involving Mortgage-Backed Securities

19 Sunday May 2013

Posted by BNG in Foreclosure Defense, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, Mortgage Laws, Pleadings, Securitization, Trial Strategies

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Adam Levitin, Alabama, Bank of America, Foreclosure, Horace, PSA, Securitization, Uniform Commercial Code

This topic examines how you can effectively use Securitization Issues to your advantage when challenging your wrongful foreclosure.

CASE STUDY 1:

Two years ago, an Alabama judge issued a short, conclusory order that stopped foreclosure on the home of a beleaguered family, and also prevents the same bank in the case from trying to foreclose against that couple, ever again. This may not seem like big news — but upon review of the underlying documents, the extraordinarily important nature of the decision and the case becomes obvious.

No Securitization, No Foreclosure

The couple involved, the Horaces, took out a predatory mortgage with Encore Credit Corp in November, 2005. Apparently Encore sold their loan to EMC Mortgage Corp, who then tried to securitize it in a Bear Stearns deal. If the securitization had been done properly, in February 2006 the trust created to hold the loans would have acquired the Horace loan. Once the Horaces defaulted, as they did in 2007, the trustee would have been able to foreclose on the Horaces.

And that’s why this case is so big: the judge found the securitization of the Horace loan wasn’t done properly, so the trustee — LaSalle National Bank Association, now part of Bank of America (BAC) — couldn’t foreclose. In making that decision, the judge is the first to really address the issue, head-on: If a screwed-up securitization process meant a loan never got securitized, can a bank foreclose under the state versions of the Uniform Commercial Code anyway? This judge says no, finding that since the securitization was busted, the trust didn’t have the right to foreclose, period.

Since the judge’s order doesn’t explain, how should people understand his decision? Luckily, the underlying documents make the judge’s decision obvious.

No Endorsements

The key contract creating the securitization is called a “Pooling and Servicing Agreement” (pooling as in creating a pool of mortgages, and servicing as in servicing those mortgages.) The PSA for the deal involving the Horace mortgage is here and has very specific requirements about how the trust can acquire loans. One of the easiest requirements to check is the way the loan’s promissory note is supposed to be endorsed — just look at the note.

According to Section 2.01 of the PSA, the note should have been endorsed from Encore to EMC to a Bear Stearns entity. At that point, Bear could either endorse the note specifically to the trustee, or endorse it “in blank.” But the note produced was simply endorsed in blank by Encore. As a result, the trust never got the Horace loan, explained securitization expert Tom Adams in his affidavit.

But wait, argued the bank, it doesn’t matter if if the trust owns the loan — it just has to be a “holder” under the Alabama version of the UCC (Uniform Commercial Code), and the trust is a holder. The problem with that argument is securitization trusts aren’t allowed to simply take property willy-nilly. In fact, to preserve their special tax status, they are forbidden from taking property after their cut-off dates, which in this case was February 28, 2006. As a result, if the trust doesn’t own the loan according to the PSA it can’t receive the proceeds of the foreclosure or the title to the home, even if it’s allowed to foreclose as a holder.

Holder Status Can’t Solve Standing Problem

Allowing a trust to foreclose based on holder status when it doesn’t own the loan would seem to create yet another type of clouded title issue. I mean, it’s absurd to say the trust foreclosed and took title as a matter of the UCC, but to also have it be true that the trust can’t take title as a matter of its own formational documents. And what would happen to the proceeds of the foreclosure sale? That’s why people making this type of argument keep pointing out that the UCC allows people to contract around it and PSAs are properly viewed as such a contracting around agreement.

I’m sure the bank’s side will claim the judge was wrong, that he disagreed with another recent Alabama case that’s been heavily covered, US Bank vs. Congress. And there is a superficial if flat disagreement: In this case, the judge said the Horaces were beneficiaries of the PSA and so could raise the issue of the loan’s ownership; in Congress the judge said the homeowners weren’t party to the PSA and so couldn’t raise the issue.

But as Adam Levitin explained, the Congress decision was procedurally weird, and as a result the PSA argument wasn’t about standing, as it was in Horace and generally would be in foreclosure cases (as opposed to eviction cases, like Congress). And what did happen to the Congress proceeds? How solid is that securitization trust’s tax status now anyway?

In short, in the only case I can find that has ruled squarely on the issue, a busted securitization prevents foreclosure by the trust that thinks it owns the loan. Yes, it’s just one case, and an Alabama trial level one at that. But it’s still significant.

Homeowners Right to Raise Securitization Issue

As far as right-to-raise-the-ownership issue, I think the Horace judge was just being “belt and suspenders” in finding the homeowners were beneficiaries of the PSA. Why do homeowners have to be beneficiaries of the PSA to raise the issue of the trust’s ownership of their loans? The homeowners aren’t trying to enforce the agreement, they’re simply trying to show the foreclosing trust doesn’t have standing. Standing is a threshold issue to any litigation and the homeowners axiomatically have the right to raise it.

As Nick Wooten, the Horaces’ attorney, said:

“This is just one example of hundreds I have seen where servicers were trying to force through a foreclosure in the name of a trust that clearly had no interest in the underlying loan according to the terms of the pooling and servicing agreement. This conduct is a fraud on the borrower, a fraud on the investors and a fraud on the court. Thankfully Judge Johnson recognized the utter failure of the securitization transaction and would not overlook the fact that the trust had no interest in this loan.”

All that remains for the Horaces, a couple with a special needs child and whose default was triggered not only by the predatory nature of the loan, but also by Mrs. Horace’s temporary illness and Mr. Horace’s loss of overtime, is to ask a jury to compensate them for the mental anguish caused by the wrongful foreclosure.

Perhaps BofA will just want to cut a check now, rather than wait for that verdict. (As of publication BofA had not returned a request for comment.)

No one is suggesting the Horaces get a free house; they still owe their debt, and whomever they owe it to has the right to foreclose on it. Wooten explained to me that the depositor –in this case, the Bear Stearns entity –i s probably that party. Moreover if the Horaces wanted to sell and move, they’d have to quiet title and would be wise to escrow the mortgage pay off amount, if that amount can be figured out. But for now the Horaces get some real peace, even if a larger mess remains.

Much Bigger Than A Single Foreclosure

The Horaces aren’t the only ones affected by the issues in this case.

Homeowners everywhere that are being foreclosed on by securitization trusts — many, many people — can start making these arguments. And if their loan’s PSA is like the Horaces, they should win. At least, Wooten hopes so:

“Judge Johnson stopped a fraud in progress. I am hopeful that other courts will consider more seriously the very serious issues that are easily obscured in the flood of foreclosures that are overwhelming our Courts and reject the systemic and ongoing fraud that is being perpetrated by the mortgage servicers. Until Courts actively push back against the massive documentary fraud being shoveled at them by mortgage servicers this fraudulent conduct will not end.”

The issues stretch past homeowners to investors, too.

Investors in this particular mortgage-backed security, take note: What are the odds that the Horace note is the only one that wasn’t properly endorsed? I’d say nil, and not just because evidence in other cases, such as Kemp from New Jersey, suggests the practice was common. This securitization deal was done by Bear Stearns, which other litigation reveals was far from careful with its securitizations. So the original investors in this deal should speed dial their lawyers.

And investors in bubble-vintage mortgage backed securities, the ones that went from AAA gold to junk overnight, might want to call their attorneys too; this deal was in 2006, and in the securitization frenzy that followed processes can only have gotten worse.

Some investors are already suing, but the cases are at very early stages. Nonetheless, as cases like the Horaces’ come to light, the odds seem to tilt in investors’ favor — meaning they seem increasingly likely to ultimately succeed in forcing banks to buy back securities or pay damages for securities fraud connected with their sale. And that makes the Bank Bailout II scenario detailed by the Congressional Oversight Panel more possible.

The final, very striking feature of this case is what didn’t happen: No piece of paper covered in the proper endorsements –an allonge — magically appeared at the eleventh hour. The magical appearance of endorsements, whether on notes or on allonges, has been a hallmark of foreclosures done in the robosigning era. And investors, as you pursue your suits based on busted securitizations, that’s something to watch out for.

My, but the banks made a mess when they forced the fee-machine of mortgage securitizations into overdrive. The consequences are still unfolding, but one consequence just might be a whole lot of properties that securitization trusts can’t foreclose on.

CASE STUDY 2:

In the fall of 2012, a Michigan state court issued an important decision that may affect thousands of foreclosures, HSBC Bank, USA v. Young, No 11-693 (Cir. Ct. Mich. Oct. 16, 2012). HSBC filed an action for possession of Mary Young’s home after a mortgage foreclosure by advertisement. The district court granted HSBC’s motion for summary disposition and defendant Young was granted leave to appeal. The Court reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order and remanded for further proceedings. HSBC filed a motion for reconsideration.

     Young refinanced her home with Wells Fargo Home Mortgage on April 22, 2004. Young defaulted and received notices of default from Wells Fargo in February, April and August of 2008.  In January 0f 2009, Wells Fargo and Young entered into a Loan Modification Agreement.  The Agreement was on Wells Fargo letterhead and signed by an officer of Wells Fargo which was described as the lender.

     Young did not keep up with her payments.  On March 11, 2010, HSBC commenced foreclosure by advertisement and bought the house at sheriff’s sale.  On November 8, 2010, HSBC filed a complaint for possession in the district court.

     Young argued that HSBC lacked standing because neither the mortgage nor the note had been validly and effectively transferred to HSBC.

     Young claimed that a purported mortgage assignment to HSBC as Trustee for Wells Fargo Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-2, dated October 8, 2008, was void because it did not agree with the terms of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (“PSA”) that governed the trust and because HSBC also did not have an ownership interest in the note.

     Young argued that HSBC did not own the note because HSBC produced a copy of the note in discovery on February 14, 2011, that showed the note was payable to Wells Fargo as lender and there were no endorsements or allonges.  About one month later, HSBC produced another copy of the same note, this one with a stamped and typed endorsement to Wells Fargo, with no date indicating when the endorsement occurred.

     HSBC argued that Young lacked standing to challenge the assignment because Young was not a party to the PSA or a third-party beneficiary, arguing that Michigan law was well-settled. But Circuit Court Judge Melinda Morris found that argument to be erroneous, and the issue undecided by the Michigan Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.  Noting conflicting authority in other jurisdictions, Judge Morris relied on the decision in Butler v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, ___F Supp 2d___, ___; 2012 WL 3518560, *6-7 (D Mass 2012):

Courts in this district are in agreement that a mortgagor lacks standing to challenge the assignment of his mortgage directly if he is neither a party to nor a third-party beneficiary of the assignment contract…

     However, “the question of whether [a mortgagor has] standing to challenge [an] assignment is different form the question of whether [he has] standing to challenge the foreclosure on the basis that [the foreclosing entity] did not properly hold the mortgage at the time of the foreclosure.” …A number of decisions have held that mortgagors have standing to challenge a foreclosure sale as void due to an allegedly invalid assignment…

                                       *       *       *

     Mortgagors challenging foreclosure sales that are void due to invalid assignments have standing to do so because they have demonstrated “a concrete and particularized injury in fact, a causal connection that permits tracing the claimed injury to the defendant’s actions, and likelihood that prevailing in the action will afford some redress for the injury.” …

     I do not, however, hold that a mortgagor has standing to challenge a foreclosure on the basis of just any potentially invalidating deficiency in an assignment.  Massachusetts case law distinguishes between void and voidable assignments…If an assignment is voidable, but has not been avoided, then the assignee has legal title to convey to the purchaser at a foreclosure sale. If an assignment is void, then the assignee was assigned nothing and has nothing to convey to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale.  Where a “grantor has nothing to convey…[t]he purported conveyance is a nullity, notwithstanding the parties’ intent.”…

     Here, however, Butler fails to allege facts or present legal argument sufficient to establish that the assignments to Deutsche Bank were void due to their failure to comply with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement…

     This distinction is very important because in most foreclosure cases, the homeowner is not trying to enforce the PSA, but to present evidence that an assignment was invalid.  The vast majority of foreclosures involve cases with unendorsed notes or with endorsements that are not dated.  Like the Young case, the vast majority of foreclosures by trusts also involve mortgage assignments created years after the trust closing date and an assignment of a non-performing loan.  Assignments after the closing date and assignments of non-performing loans, and particularly the combination – assignment of a non-performing loan after the closing date – are almost always violations of trust PSAs.

     The simple truth is that trusts were established (and sold) with rules to protect investors from such foolhardy action on the part of a trustee such as suddenly acquiring non-performing loans years after the trust closing date.  When trust rules are violated, there can be serious negative tax consequences for the trust: the IRS could decide that the trust does not qualify for favorable REMIC status.

In the vast majority of cases, there is no real underlying financial transaction as reported in the mortgage assignment.  If the records of the loans entering and leaving the loan pool of the trust are examined, they simply do not match up with the assignments.  These later dated assignments were almost always made by document mills, mortgage servicers and foreclosure law firm employees solely to provide some proof to the courts that the trustee has standing to foreclose.  In other words, these later dated assignments are almost always fraudulent.

It is also important to note that these assignments are not just robo-signed, that is, signed by someone with no knowledge of the underlying facts, or signed by someone who is signing his or her (or someone else’s name) several thousand times a day.  These assignments falsely state the date on which the trust acquired the mortgage.

Because most note endorsements are non-existent or non-dated, the only date in most cases involving mortgages claimed by mortgage-backed trusts is the false date on these assignments.

For More Info on How To Challenge Your Wrongful Foreclosure Using Mortgage Securitization Arguments Visit http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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Qualified Written Request For Homeowners

17 Friday May 2013

Posted by BNG in Loan Modification, Mortgage Laws, Pro Se Litigation, Your Legal Rights

≈ Leave a comment

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Escrow, Good faith estimate, Loan, Loan servicing, Mortgage loan, Real estate, Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, RESPA

There are excellent provisions in RESPA dealing with Qualified Written Requests. Today, we are going to elaborate on these provisions. However, they are not all inclusive. Section 6 of RESPA provides borrowers with important consumer protections relating to the servicing of their loans. Under Section 6 of RESPA, borrowers who have a problem with the servicing of their loan (including escrow account questions), should contact their loan servicer in writing, outlining the nature of their complaint. The servicer must acknowledge the complaint in writing within 20 business days of receipt of the complaint. Within 60 business days the servicer must resolve the complaint by correcting the account or giving a statement of the reasons for its position. This does not absolve borrowers from continuing the payments. They are no defense to payments.
The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) is a consumer protection statute, first passed in 1974. RESPA covers loans secured with a mortgage placed on a one-to-four family residential property. These include most purchase loans, assumptions, refinances, property improvement loans, and equity lines of credit.

Loan servicing complaints

A borrower may bring a private law suit, or a group of borrowers may bring a class action suit, within three years, against a servicer who fails to comply with Section 6’s provisions. Borrowers may obtain actual damages, as well as additional damages if there is a pattern of noncompliance. The following is a sample qualified written request from you, the borrower, to a lender.

However, as usual, use of this is not equivalent substitute of a licensed Nevada attorney.
Attention Customer Service:
Subject: [Your loan number]
[Names on loan documents]
[Property and/or mailing address]

This is a “qualified written request” under Section 6 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).
I am writing because:
-Describe the issue or the question you have and/or what action you believe the lender should take.
-Attach copies of any related written materials.
-Describe any conversations with customer service regarding the issue and to whom you spoke recently.
-Describe any previous steps you have taken or attempts to resolve the issue.
-List a day time telephone number in case a customer service representative wishes to contact you.
I understand that under Section 6 of RESPA you are required to acknowledge my request within 20 business days and must try to resolve the issue within 60 business days.

Sincerely,

[Your name]

Here is another example:

Attention Customer Service:
Subject: Loan number xxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx
x xxxxxxx
Xxxxxxxx, CA xxxxx
This is a “Qualified Written Request” under Section 6 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).

I am writing to request:

(1) Copies of all documents pertaining to the origination of my mortgage including my loan application, Right to Cancel, Deed of Trust, note, adjustable rate note, addendum to the note for the interest only payment period, Truth in Lending statements, Good Faith Estimate (GFE), HUD 1, appraisal, and all required disclosures and rate sheets associated with this transaction for the above referenced loan. The copies should be legible and all documents shall be copied in their entirety.

(2) A copy of the loan history including all payments made, all fees incurred, what has been paid out of the escrow account, and how all payments were applied. This information should cover the entire life of the loan.

(3) We have reasons to believe that the loan terms were misrepresented to us at the time of application and further obscured and/or modified prior to signing. I believe that our income was inflated on the application. I also have reason to believe that certain statements were not provided for my approval prior to closing, and that signatures may have been forged on various documents. It is also my /ours belief that certain documents may have not presented at all. Additionally, I believe that a notary was not present to witness my signatures on several pertinent documents and that this transaction did not take place in a legitimate title/escrow/real-estate office with any title/escrow/real-estate professionals therefore leaving us ill advised at the time of closing.

I/we started the process of trying to renegotiate this loan————when I spoke with your HOPE department. On ——-, I faxed a letter of hardship, along with bank statements and pay stubs as she recommended. I was advised that someone would contact me within 7-10 working days and there would be no problem getting assistance to bring the account current and capitalize the negative escrow. On ——-, I called back, as I hadn’t heard from anyone. I was told my payment was going to be ——

Give details, more details, specific facts here about your dealing with your lender on each time you called them.

Most recently you COUNTRYWIDE have sent a demand for payment. This is an enormous amount which just cannot be paid at this time due to very hardship. The situation is urgent. We and COUNTRYWIDE can not drag there feet in this process. We do not want to incur further inflated fees by our home going into foreclosure.

We are very proactive in keeping our family home. This is our primary homes by all means. We do not want to loose it nor do we have to we can make a reasonable payment.

We have been given the runaround by the voice recognition call routing system on numerous occasions.

We have talked to various agents with different versions of what the loan modification process really entails.

We have been re-routed to the wrong department or individual at dozens of times.

We have been disconnected from helpful individuals, when I unsuccessfully tried to call her back I am told it is because she has no extension.

We have been told that the negotiator handling my loan is unavailable to speak to anyone via telephone. All of these calls are documented in your records.

The customer service provided to us has been less than adequate.

We understand that under Section 6 of RESPA you are required to acknowledge our request within 20 business days and must try to resolve the issue within 60 business days.

In closing, we want a payment we know we can live with one that will not get us in trouble again

Sincerely,

REMEMBER: This letter SHOULD NOT be included with your mortgage payment, but should be sent separately to the customer service address.

You SHOULD continue to make the required mortgage and escrow payment until the request is resolved.

You may bring a private right of action under Section 6, if you suffer damages due to the lender’s servicing of the loan. See the RESPA statute and regulations.

Filing a RESPA complaint

Persons who believe a settlement service provider has violated RESPA in an area in which the Department has enforcement authority (primarily sections 6, 8 and 9), may wish to file a complaint. The complaint should outline the violation and identify the violators by name, address and phone number. Complainants should also provide their own name and phone number for follow up questions from HUD. Requests for confidentiality will be honored. Complaints should be sent to:

Director, Office of RESPA and Interstate Land Sales
US Department of Housing and Urban Development
Room 9154
451 7th Street, SW
Washington, DC 20410
Important Tips From HUD:

What Are the Duties of Loan Servicer to Respond to Borrower Inquiries

-(1) Notice of receipt of inquiry
-(A) In general
-If any servicer of a federally related mortgage loan receives a qualified written request from the borrower (or an agent of the borrower) for information relating to the servicing of such loan, the servicer shall provide a written response acknowledging receipt of the correspondence within 20 days (excluding legal public holidays, Saturdays, and Sundays) unless the action requested is taken within such period.
-(B) Qualified written request
For purposes of this subsection, a qualified written request shall be a written correspondence, other than notice on a payment coupon or other payment medium supplied by the servicer, that–
(i) includes, or otherwise enables the servicer to identify, the name and account of the borrower; and
(ii) includes a statement of the reasons for the belief of the borrower, to the extent applicable, that the account is in error or provides sufficient detail to the servicer regarding other information sought by the borrower.
(2) Action with respect to inquiry
Not later than 60 days (excluding legal public holidays, Saturdays, and Sundays) after the receipt from any borrower of any qualified written request under paragraph (1) and, if applicable, before taking any action with respect to the inquiry of the borrower, the servicer shall–
(A) make appropriate corrections in the account of the borrower, including the crediting of any late charges or penalties, and transmit to the borrower a written notification of such correction (which shall include the name and telephone number of a representative of the servicer who can provide assistance to the borrower);
(B) after conducting an investigation, provide the borrower with a written explanation or clarification that includes–
(i) to the extent applicable, a statement of the reasons for which the servicer believes the account of the borrower is correct as determined by the servicer; and
(ii) the name and telephone number of an individual employed by, or the office or department of, the servicer who can provide assistance to the borrower; or
(C) after conducting an investigation, provide the borrower with a written explanation or clarification that includes–
(i) information requested by the borrower or an explanation of why the information requested is unavailable or cannot be obtained by the servicer; and
(ii) the name and telephone number of an individual employed by, or the office or department of, the servicer who can provide assistance to the borrower.
(3) Protection of credit rating
During the 60-day period beginning on the date of the servicer’s receipt from any borrower of a qualified written request relating to a dispute regarding the borrower’s payments, a servicer may not provide information regarding any overdue payment, owed by such borrower and relating to such period or qualified written request, to any consumer reporting agency (as such term is defined under section 1681a of title 15).

(f) Damages and costs
Whoever fails to comply with any provision of this section shall be liable to the borrower for each such failure in the following amounts:
(1) Individuals
In the case of any action by an individual, an amount equal to the sum of–
(A) any actual damages to the borrower as a result of the failure; and
(B) any additional damages, as the court may allow, in the case of a pattern or practice of noncompliance with the requirements of this section, in an amount not to exceed $1,000.
(2) Class actions
In the case of a class action, an amount equal to the sum of–
(A) any actual damages to each of the borrowers in the class as a result of the failure; and
(B) any additional damages, as the court may allow, in the case of a pattern or practice of noncompliance with the requirements of this section, in an amount not greater than $1,000 for each member of the class, except that the total amount of damages under this subparagraph in any class action may not exceed the lesser of–
(i) $500,000; or
(ii) 1 percent of the net worth of the servicer.
(3) Costs
In addition to the amounts under paragraph (1) or (2), in the case of any successful action under this section, the costs of the action, together with any attorneys fees incurred in connection with such action as the court may determine to be reasonable under the circumstances.
(4) Nonliability
A transferor or transferee servicer shall not be liable under this subsection for any failure to comply with any requirement under this section if, within 60 days after discovering an error (whether pursuant to a final written examination report or the servicer’s own procedures) and before the commencement of an action under this subsection and the receipt of written notice of the error from the borrower, the servicer notifies the person concerned of the error and makes whatever adjustments are necessary in the appropriate account to ensure that the person will not be required to pay an amount in excess of any amount that the person otherwise would have paid.
(g) Administration of escrow accounts

If the terms of any federally related mortgage loan require the borrower to make payments to the servicer of the loan for deposit into an escrow account for the purpose of assuring payment of taxes, insurance premiums, and other charges with respect to the property, the servicer shall make payments from the escrow account for such taxes,insurance premiums, and other charges in a timely manner as such payments become due.
(h) Preemption of conflicting State laws

Notwithstanding any provision of any law or regulation of any State, a person who makes a federally related mortgage loan or a servicer shall be considered to have complied with the provisions of any such State law or regulation requiring notice to a borrower at the time of application for a loan or transfer of the servicing of a loan if such person or servicer complies with the requirements under this section regarding timing, content, and procedures for notification of the borrower.

The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) is a consumer protection statute, first passed in 1974. RESPA covers loans secured with a mortgage placed on a one-to-four family residential property. These include most purchase loans, assumptions, refinances, property improvement loans, and equity lines of credit. HUD’s Office of RESPA and Interstate Land Sales is responsible for enforcing RESPA.

Loan servicing complaints

A borrower may bring a private law suit, or a group of borrowers may bring a class action suit, within three years, against a servicer who fails to comply with Section 6’s provisions. Borrowers may obtain actual damages, as well as additional damages if there is a pattern of noncompliance.

The following is a sample qualified written request from you, the borrower, to a lender. Use this format to address complaints under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). Be sure to read more about RESPA, and your rights under this Act, elsewhere on the RESPA site.

Attention Customer Service:
Subject: [Your loan number]
[Names on loan documents]
[Property and/or mailing address]
This is a “qualified written request” under Section 6 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).

I am writing because:
-Describe the issue or the question you have and/or what action you believe the lender should take.
-Attach copies of any related written materials.
-Describe any conversations with customer service regarding the issue and to whom you spoke.
-Describe any previous steps you have taken or attempts to resolve the issue.
-List a day time telephone number in case a customer service representative wishes to contact you.
-I understand that under Section 6 of RESPA you are required to acknowledge my request within 20 business days and must try to resolve the issue within 60 business days.

Sincerely,

[Your name]

For a more comprehensive ‘Trial Ready’ Qualified Written Request that is inclusive in your Foreclosure Defense package, please visit http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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