Quiet Title Action ~ What Florida Home Owners Need to Know

14 Wednesday Aug 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Banks and Lenders, Federal Court, Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Loan Modification, MERS, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Center for Housing Policy, Florida, Foreclosure, MER, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, RealtyTrac, Securitization, United States

Quiet Title Actions: How to Force the Banks To Prove Up

The Foreclosure Crisis

I. THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS

• ISSUE ONE: Who Owns Your Note?

1. The Securitization Process:
– A. Originator Sells To Nominee (First Sale)
– B. The Nominee Sells To Depositor (Second Sale)
– C. The Depositor Sells to the REMIC Trust
• The REMIC Trust created to hold “pool” of mortgages and sell “shares” in
the REMIC Trust to investors.
• A Trustee is designated to operate the trust (typically a bank).
• The REMIC Trust operates through “Bylaws” and “Pooling and Servicing
Agreements”.
• The Pooling and Servicing Agreement outlines how the income from the
mortgages will be managed and the Servicing Agent who will collect income
and foreclose in the event of default.

The Foreclosure Crisis

• One in every 365 housing units in the United States was branded with a foreclosure notice recorded in December 2011, according to RealtyTrac.com. That means 850,000 Americans got a big lump of coal in their stocking from Uncle Scrooge.
• Over 2,076,764 American homes are now in foreclosure.
• One in every 165 housing units in California (more that twice the national average) received a foreclosure notice in December, for a total of 80,488 properties. In Nevada, the figure was one in every 93 houses.
• USA Today reports that almost 1 in 5 children in Nevada lived or live in owneroccupied homes that were lost to foreclosure or are at risk of being lost. The percentages are 15% in Florida, 14% for Arizona, and 12% for California. That’s about one in eight children in California. Five years into the foreclosure crisis, an estimated 2.3 million children have lived in homes lost to foreclosure.
• RealtyTrac reports that foreclosure and REO (real estate-owned) homes accounted for 24 percent of all residential sales during the fourth quarter of 2011.
• Here in relatively affluent Palm Beach County, homeowners are No. 1 in the state for the average number of loans in foreclosure that are delinquent. It has the fourth highest number of foreclosures, 45,829 with an average delinquency of 623 days.

Florida’s Foreclosure Statistics

• Florida is leading the country in foreclosure rates.
• Florida metro areas dominate the top 25 list for cities with the worst foreclosure rates — including the eight highest in the nation, according to a report released Tuesday.#
• In all, 17 of the top 25 cities with the highest foreclosure rates as of March are Florida cities, according to the Center for Housing Policy, the research arm of the Washington, D.C.-based National Housing Conference. #
• With a 10.9 percent foreclosure rate, Jacksonville is ranked 18th overall, but 14 other Florida cities had higher rates. Miami topped the list with the nation’s highest rate of 18.2 percent. #
• Miami’s conventional mortgage foreclosure rate in March was 14.2 percent, while its subprime rate was 39.1 percent. Jacksonville’s conventional foreclosure rate was 7.8 percent while its subprime rate was 29 percent.
• But given the fact that Florida cities made up 15 of the 25 cities with the highest “serious” mortgage delinquency rates — either behind by 90 days behind or more or now in foreclosure, there could be more foreclosures in the state’s future. And just like on the foreclosure list, Miami was also first, with a delinquency rate of 23.6 percent; and Jacksonville was 18th, with a rate of 15.6 percent.

Who Owns Your House?

• ISSUE ONE: WHO OWNS YOUR HOUSE?
– Promissory Note (the “Note”): Loan Agreement
– Mortgage/Deed of Trust: Power of Sale Document
– Grant Deed: You own until you breach the Promissory Note and
your Lender (or Others) use the Power of Sale Document to
Foreclose
– Before Securitization: Your Lender held your Note was always
the Foreclosing Entity.
– After Securitization: No One Knows Who Owns Your Note

Who Owns Your Note?

ISSUE TWO: Who Owns Your Note?
1. The Securitization Process:
– A. Originator Sells To Nominee (First Sale)
– B. The Nominee Sells To Depositor (Second Sale)
– C. The Depositor Sells to the REMIC Trust
• The REMIC Trust created to hold “pool” of mortgages and sell “shares” in
the REMIC Trust to investors.
• A Trustee is designated to operate the trust (typically a bank).
• The REMIC Trust operates through “Bylaws” and “Pooling and Servicing
Agreements”.
• The Pooling and Servicing Agreement outlines how the income from the
mortgages will be managed and the Servicing Agent who will collect income
and foreclose in the event of default.

• Why Is There a Question?
1. The Securitization Process: No One Knows Who Owns Your
Note
– The Original Lenders Failed to Properly Assign Your Note to
Subsequent Purchasers
– Incompetent Personnel
– No Training: No One Trained to Sell Notes Properly
– Never Occurred Before: Prior to Securitization Didn’t
Transfer or Sell Notes
– Thousands of Assignments Left Blank
– Remic Trusts Never Receive Assignments or Possession of
Notes: Current litigation

2. Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc
1. Created by over 44 Financial Institutions in 1998 to Avoid the
Registration of Securitized Mortgages : Saves Millions of
Dollars in Recordation fees;
2. Presently Being Sued in (5) States for Unlawfully failing to pay
Recording Fees on Securitized Mortgage Transactions
• WHAT IS MERS FUNCTION?
– TO CAMOUFLAGE THE SALE OF YOUR LOAN TO MULTIPLE
ENTITIES IN THE SECURITIZATION PROCESS;
– AVOID RECORDING FEES ON EVERY SALE OF YOUR LOAN
TO SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS.
– ACT AS “BENEFICIARY” OF YOUR DEED OF TRUST OR
“NOMINEE” OF YOUR MORTGAGE

What is MERS?

• “MERS is a mortgage banking ‘utility’ that registers
mortgage loans in a book entry system so that … real
estate loans can be bought, sold and securitized (Similar
to Wall Street’s book entry utility for stocks and bonds is
the Depository Trust and Clearinghouse.”
• MERS is enormous. It originates thousands of loans
daily and is the mortgagee of record for at least 40
million mortgages and other security documents.
• MERS acts as agent for the owner of the note. Its
authority to act should be shown by an agency
agreement. Of course, if the owner is unknown, MERS
cannot show that it is an authorized agent of the owner.

Result: BANKS CAN’T PROVE THEY OWN YOUR LOAN

• The Wall Street Journal Picks Up the Scent
• An article by Nick Timiraos appeared in The Wall Street Journal on June 1, 2011 – “Banks Hit Hurdle to Foreclosures.”
• “Banks trying to foreclose on homeowners are hitting another roadblock,” Timiraos writes, “as some delinquent borrowers are successfully arguing that their mortgage companies can’t prove they own the loans and therefore don’t have the right to foreclose.”
• If you (or I) try to boot a homeowner into the street without any proof that we’re entitled to the property, the cops will lock us up. Stealing is stealing, whether it is somebody’s wallet or their 3-bedroom 2-bath in the suburbs with two dogs and a kid. When a bank tries to steal the bungalow without proof that they have a right to foreclose, it’s a “hurdle” or “another roadblock.”
• Semantics aside, this is good news for all people holding grant deeds. This year, the Journal reports, cases in California, North Carolina, Alabama, Florida, Maine, New York, New Jersey, Texas, Massachusetts and other states have raised questions about whether banks properly demonstrated ownership.
• In some cases, borrowers are showing courts that banks failed to properly assign ownership of mortgages after they were pooled into mortgage-backed securities. In other cases, borrowers say that lenders backdated or fabricated documents to fix those errors.
• “Flawed mortgage-banking processes have potentially infected millions of foreclosures, and the damages against these operations could be significant and take years to materialize,” said Sheila Bair, chairman of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., in testimony to a Senate committee last month.
• In March, an Alabama court said J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. couldn’t foreclose on Phyllis Horace, a delinquent homeowner in Phenix City, Ala., because her loan hadn’t been properly assigned to its owners
– a trust that represents investors – when it was securitized by Bear Stearns Cos. The mortgage assignment showed that the loan hadn’t been transferred to the trust from the subprime lender that originated it.

The Problem With MERS

• Federal bankruptcy courts and state courts have found that MERS and its member banks often confused and misrepresented who owned mortgage notes. In thousands of cases, they apparently lost or mistakenly destroyed loan documents.
• The problems, at MERS and elsewhere, became so severe last fall that many banks temporarily suspended foreclosures.
• Not even the mortgage giant Fannie Mae, an investor in MERS, depends on it these days.
• “We would never rely on it to find ownership,” says Janis Smith, a Fannie Mae spokeswoman, noting it has its own records.
• Apparently with good reason. Alan M. White, a law professor at the Valparaiso University School of Law in Indiana, last year matched MERS’s ownership records against those in the public domain.
• The results were not encouraging. “Fewer than 30 percent of the mortgages had an accurate record in
MERS,” Mr. White says. “I kind of assumed that MERS at least kept an accurate list of current ownership.
They don’t. MERS is going to make solving the foreclosure problem vastly more expensive.”
• The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled last year that MERS could no longer file foreclosure proceedings there, because it does not actually make or service any loans. Last month in Utah, a local judge made the no-lessstriking decision to let a homeowner rip up his mortgage and walk away debt-free. MERS had claimed ownership of the mortgage, but the judge did not recognize its legal standing.
• And, on Long Island, a federal bankruptcy judge ruled in February that MERS could no longer act as an “agent” for the owners of mortgage notes. He acknowledged that his decision could erode the foundation of the mortgage business.
• But this, Judge Robert E Grossman said, was not his fault.
• “This court does not accept the argument that because MERS may be involved with 50 percent of all residential mortgages in the country,” he wrote, “that is reason enough for this court to turn a blind eye to
the fact that this process does not comply with the law.”

Legal Issues

1. SEPARATION OF THE NOTE AND THE DEED
• In the case of MERS, the Note and the Deed of Trust are held by separate entities. This can pose a unique problem dependent upon the court. The prevailing case law illustrates the issue:
• “The Deed of Trust is a mere incident of the debt it secures and an assignment of the debt carries with it the security instrument. Therefore, a Deed Of Trust is inseparable from the debt and always abides with the debt. It has no market or ascertainable value apart from the obligation it secures.
• A Deed of Trust has no assignable quality independent of the debt, it may not be assigned or transferred apart from the debt, and an attempt to assign the Deed Of Trust without a transfer of the debt is without effect. “
• This very “simple” statement poses major issues. To easily understand, if the Deed of Trust and the Note are not together with the same entity, then there can be no enforcement of the Note. The Deed of Trust enforces the Note. It provides the capability for the lender to foreclose on a property. If the Deed is separate from the Note, then enforcement, i.e. foreclosure cannot occur.
The following ruling summarizes this nicely.
• In Saxon vs Hillery, CA, Dec 2008, Contra Costa County Superior Court, an action by Saxon to foreclose on a property by lawsuit was dismissed due to lack of legal standing. This was because the Note and the Deed of Trust were “owned” by separate entities. The Court ruled that when the Note and Deed of Trust were separated, the enforceability of the Note was negated until rejoined.

2. MERS IS A NOMINEE AND NOT THE HOLDER OF THE NOTE
• The question now becomes as to whether a Note Endorsed in Blank and transferred to different entities does allow for foreclosure. If MERS is the foreclosing authority but has no entitlement to payment of the money, how could they foreclose? This is especially true if the true beneficiary
is not known. Why do I raise the question of who the true beneficiary is?
• THE MERS WEBSITE STATES…..
• “On MERS loans, MERS will show as the beneficiary of record. Foreclosures should be commenced in the name of MERS. To effectuate this process, MERS has allowed each servicer to choose a select number of its own employees to act as officers for MERS.
Through this process, appropriate documents may be executed at the servicer’s site on behalf of MERS by the same servicing employee that signs foreclosure documents for non-MERS loans. Until the time of sale, the foreclosure is handled in same manner as non-MERS foreclosures. At the time of sale, if the property reverts, the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale will follow
a different procedure. Since MERS acts as nominee for the true beneficiary, it is important that the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale be made in the name of the true beneficiary and not MERS. Your title company or MERS officer can easily determine the true beneficiary. Title companies have indicated that they will insure subsequent title when these procedures are followed.”

3. MERS IS THE NOMINEE AND NOT THE BENEFICIARY
• To further reinforce that MERS is not the true beneficiary of the loan, one need only look at the following Nevada Bankruptcy case, Hawkins, Case No. BK-S-07-13593-LBR (Bankr.Nev. 3/31/2009) (Bankr.Nev., 2009) – “A “beneficiary” is defined as “one designated to benefit from an appointment, disposition, or assignment . . . or to receive something as a result of
a legal arrangement or instrument.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 165 (8th ed. 2004). But it is obvious from the MERS’ “Terms and Conditions” that MERS is not a beneficiary as it has no rights whatsoever to any payments, to any servicing rights, or to any of the properties secured by the loans. To reverse an old adage, if it doesn’t walk like a duck, talk like a duck, and quack like a duck, then it’s not a duck.”
• When the initial Deed of Trust is made out in the name of MERS as Nominee for the Beneficiary and the Note is made to AB Lender, there should be no issues with MERS acting as an Agent for AB Lender. Hawkins even recognizes this as fact.
• The issue does arise when the Note transfers possession. Though the Deed of Trust states “beneficiary and/or successors”, the question can arise as to who the successor is, and whether Agency is any longer in effect. MERS makes the argument that the successor Trustee is a MERS
member and therefore Agency is still effective, and there does appear to be merit to the argument on the face of it.The original Note Holder, AB Lender, no longer holds the note, nor is entitled to payment. Therefore, that Agency relationship is terminated. However, the Note is endorsed in blank, and no Assignment has been made to any other entity, so who is the true
beneficiary? And without the Assignment of the Note, is the Agency relationship intact?

4. MERS FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES
• There, you have it. Direct from the MERS website. They admit that they
name people to sign documents in the name of MERS. Often, these are
Title Company employees or others that have no knowledge of the actual
loan and whether it is in default or not.
• Even worse, MERS admits that they are not the true beneficiary of the loan.
In fact, it is likely that MERS has no knowledge of the true beneficiary of the
loan for whom they are representing in an “Agency” relationship. They
admit to this when they say “Your title company or MERS officer can
easily determine the true beneficiary.
• Why are the Courts Accepting MERS as a Nominee or Agent of the
“Lenders”? The “beneficiary” term is erroneous. Even MERS states it
is not a “beneficiary”.
• If so, MERS cannot assign deeds of trust or mortgages to third parties
legally.

• ISSUE THREE: Does MERS have the Right to Participate in Your
Foreclosure?
– NO. According to the Majority of Federal Court Opinions and Every State Supreme Court decision which has addressed this Issue: Oregon and Washington Supreme Ct Decisions Pending
– Every Attorney General who has examined the legality of MERS has determined it is illegal business enterprise: New York; Delaware; Oregon, Washington, Idaho; with more to come.
_ Declared Unlawful Business Organization : ( In re: Agard, No. 10-77338, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 488, at 58-59 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb 10, 2011)
_ In California, the federal court determined that MERS has to have a written contract with the new noteholder in order to have the authority to appoint or assign the beneficial interest in the note sufficient to foreclose (In re: Vargas: US Dist Ct, Central Dist of Calif; Case No LA 08-107036-SB).
– Judge Michael Simon of the Oregon Federal Court has found that MERS cannot assign its beneficiary status in a deed of trust to a third party for foreclosure purposes due to the fact that MERS does not under Oregon law have the legal authority to do so (James, et al v Reconstruct Trust, et al: US Dist Ct. Case No: 3:11-cv-00324-ST).

Solutions

QUIET TITLE ACTIONS: Definition
• quiet title action n. a lawsuit to establish a party’s title to real property
against anyone and everyone, and thus “quiet” any challenges or claims to
the title. Such a suit usually arises when there is some question about clear
title, there exists some recorded problem (such as an old lease or failure to
clear title after payment of a mortgage), an error in description which casts
doubt on the amount of property owned, or an easement used for years
without a recorded description. An action for quiet title requires description
of the property to be “quieted,” naming as defendants anyone who might
have an interest (including descendants—known or unknown—of prior
owners), and the factual and legal basis for the claim of title. Notice
must be given to all potentially interested parties, including known and
unknown, by publication. If the court is convinced title is in the plaintiff (the
plaintiff owns the title), a quiet title judgment will be granted which can be
recorded and thus provide legal “good title.“

• QUIET TITLE ACTIONS:
– Purpose: Require All Adverse Claims to Title to Prove to the Court the
Worthiness of Their Claim:
– Mortgages/Deeds Of Trust:
• Who is the Owner of Your Note? Prove It
• Who is the Beneficiary of Your Deed of Trust/Mortgage? The Owner of the
Note
• Who has the Legal Right to Foreclose?
– ONLY THE OWNER OF THE NOTE IS A TRUE BENEFICIARY
– ONLY THE BENEFICIARY OF THE MORTGAGE OR DEED OF
TRUST OR ITS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE CAN FORECLOSE
– MERS IS NOT A BENEFICIARY-According to its own Website
– MERS IS NOT A LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF ANY REMIC TRUST
» No Contract
» At Best MERS has a Contractual Relationship with Original Lender

• FLORIDA QUIET TITLE STATUTES-Civil Practice and Procedure
• 65.061 Quieting title; additional remedy.—
• (1) JURISDICTION.–Chancery courts have jurisdiction of actions by any person or corporation claiming legal or equitable title to any land…. and shall determine the title of plaintiff and may enter judgment quieting the title and awarding possession to the party entitled thereto….
• (2) GROUNDS.–When a person or corporation not the rightful owner of land has any conveyance or other evidence of title thereto, or asserts any claim, or pretends to have any right or title thereto, any person or corporation is the true and equitable owner of land the record title to which is not in the person or corporation because of the defective execution of any deed or mortgage because of the omission of a seal thereon, the lack of witnesses, or any defect or omission in the wording of the acknowledgment of a party or parties thereto, when the person or corporation claims title thereto by the defective instrument and the defective instrument was apparently made and delivered by the grantor to convey or mortgage the real estate and was recorded in the county where the land lies which may cast a cloud on the title of the real owner….
• (4) JUDGMENT.–If it appears that plaintiff has legal title to the land or is the equitable owner thereof based on one or more of the grounds mentioned in subsection (2), or if a default is entered against defendant (in which case no evidence need be taken), the court shall enter judgment removing the alleged cloud from the title to the land and forever quieting the title in plaintiff and those claiming under him or her since the commencement of the action and adjudging plaintiff to have a good fee simple title to said land or the interest thereby cleared of cloud.

DECLARATORY RELIEF
• WHO OWNS THE NOTE? WHO IS ENTITLED TO FORECLOSE?
• FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: RULE 57. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
• 28 U.S.C. §2201. Rules 38 and 39 govern a demand for a jury trial. The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a declaratory judgment that is otherwise appropriate. The court may order a speedy hearing of a declaratory-judgment action.
• The fact that a declaratory judgment may be granted “whether or not further relief is or could be prayed” indicates that declaratory relief is alternative or cumulative and not exclusive or extraordinary. A declaratory judgment is appropriate when it will “terminate the controversy” giving rise to the proceeding. Inasmuch as it often involves only an issue of law
on undisputed or relatively undisputed facts, it operates frequently as a summary proceeding, justifying docketing the case for early hearing as on a motion, as provided for in California (Code Civ.Proc. (Deering, 1937) §1062a), Michigan (3 Comp.Laws (1929) §13904), and Kentucky
(Codes (Carroll, 1932) Civ.Pract. §639a–3).
• The “controversy” must necessarily be “of a justiciable nature, thus excluding an advisory decree upon a hypothetical state of facts.” Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 325, 56 S.Ct. 466, 473, 80 L.Ed. 688, 699 (1936). The existence or nonexistence of any right, duty, power, liability, privilege, disability, or immunity or of any fact upon which such legal relations depend, or of a status, may be declared.

• WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE:
• What is a Wrongful Foreclosure Action?
• A wrongful foreclosure action typically occurs when the lender starts a
judicial foreclosure action when it simply has no legal cause. Wrongful
foreclosure actions are also brought when the service providers accept
partial payments after initiation of the wrongful foreclosure process, and
then continue on w i t h the f o r e c l o s u r e process. These
predatory lending strategies, as well as other forms of misleading
homeowners, are illegal.
• The borrower is the one that files a wrongful disclosure action with the court against the service provider, the holder of the note and if it is a non-judicial foreclosure, against the trustee complaining that there was an illegal, fraudulent or willfully oppressive sale of property under a power of sale contained in a mortgage or deed or court judicial proceeding. The borrower can also allege emotional distress and ask for punitive damages in a wrongful foreclosure action.

• FRAUD CLAIMS
• Mortgage Payments: Have you been paying mortgage payments to the
wrong financial institution?
• JP Morgan Chase: Bought “Assets” of WAMU from FDIC in 2008
– All Mortgage Loans from 2003-2008 were already sold to REMIC Trusts
– What Did Chase Bank Buy? Servicing Contracts?
– Can Chase Bank Foreclose on Notes It Does Not Own?
• One West Bank: Bought “Assets” of IndyMac from FDIC in 2008
– All Mortgage Loans from 2003-2008 were already sold to REMIC Trusts
– What did One West Bank Buy? Servicing Contracts?
– Can One West Foreclose on Notes It Does Not Own?
• Bank of America: Bought “Servicing Contracts” from Countrywide in 2008
– All Mortgage Loans from 2003-2008 were already sold to REMIC Trusts
– What Did Bank of America Buy? Servicing Contracts
– Can Bank of America Foreclose on Notes It Does Not Own?

• QUIET TITLE LITIGATION:
– Potential Outcomes:
• Actual Quiet Title: Removal of All Liens, Encumbrances,
Mortgages:
• Principal Reduction: Mediation or Arbitration Resulting in
Substantial Reduction in Your Mortgage Balance
• Damage Claims against Financial Institutions: Punitive Damages?
• TROS and Injunctions: Stopping the Foreclosure Process
• Did Default Insurance Pay Off My Mortgage
• Declaratory Relief:
– Who Do I Pay My Mortgage To?
– Who Can Foreclose on My House?

Credit Rehabilitation
• Credit Rehabilitation
• The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) gives you the right to contact credit bureaus directly and dispute items on your credit reports. You can dispute any and all items that are inaccurate, untimely, misleading, biased, incomplete or unverifiable (questionable items). If the bureaus cannot verify that the information on their reports is indeed correct, then those items must be deleted.
• PeabodyLaw has created the “Mortgage Audit Plan”:
– Obtain a Securitization Audit from Audit Pros, Inc.
– Peabody Law will utilize the results of your Securitization Audit to file a
court action seeking a court order removing all negative credit reporting
items from your credit history based upon the findings of the audit.
– Upon receipt of Court Judgment rendering the nullification of unlawful
and erroneous credit references, Peabody Law will send a Demand
Letter with the Judgment attachment to each Credit Reporting Agency
demanding retraction and removal of all negative credit references
relating to mortgage payments, foreclosures, short sales, etc.

For a Complete Pro Se “Do It Yourself” Foreclosure Defense Kit With Well Drafted Pleadings and Step By Step Guide For Saving Your Home Visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

What Homeowners Need to Know About Judicial Foreclosure Process

13 Tuesday Aug 2013

Posted by BNG in Appeal, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Foreclosure is the process by which the lender takes control of the property and sells it to raise money to pay the debt. The process varies depending on if your state is a judicial or nonjudicial state.

This post is designed to guide homeowners in Judicial foreclosure States as to how foreclosure process works.

1. The Foreclosure Process

Foreclosure is the process by which the lender takes control of the property which was pledged as collateral for the mortgage debt and sells the property to raise money to pay on the debt created by the Note. The sale extinguishes the borrower’s interest in the property although some states have redemption period after the sale. Other interests are also extinguished if the foreclosure is done properly, including the rights of other owners, spouses, junior mortgages, lienholders, and some taxes. The foreclosure process is very different depending on whether it is judicial or non-judicial. In the US, approximately half of the states permit non-judicial foreclosure. The rest of the states require judicial foreclosure. A few states allow both. However, the process is different in each state; accordingly the material here is intended as a general guide. It is for educational purposes only, and is not legal advice.

2. Interested Parties

In order for the interests of all parties who may have a claim to the property be extinguished, the foreclosure must be done properly, and all interested parties must be given proper notice as detailed by state law. The typical interested parties are other owners of the property, spouses, junior mortgages, lienholders, and some taxes. If the borrower is deceased, his or her heirs and estate are interested parties.

3. Judicial Foreclosure

Judicial foreclosure is a lawsuit, similar to other kinds of lawsuits. It is formal and much more complex, and generally takes longer than non-judicial foreclosure, although this varies by jurisdiction. The point of a judicial foreclosure is for the lender to obtain from the court a judgment in foreclosure, and the right to hold a sale of the mortgaged property. The court is involved in the foreclosure process all the way through. So, if a borrower feels there is something wrong or improper occurring, he or she can raise those issues within the judicial foreclosure proceeding.

4. Notice of Default and Acceleration

Most mortgage and most states’ laws require the lender to give a borrower advance notice that a foreclosure is about to start, and an opportunity to cure the default. The cure period is typically between 20 and 60 days, depending on the mortgage document and state law.

5. Service of Process

Lawsuits are begun by service of process. All states have laws that govern exactly how this has to work to be valid. In most states, it means that the Summons and Complaint (see below) must be handed directly to you or to an adult member of your household. However, all states have laws to cover situations where you avoid service of process or cannot be served personally. Service of process must be done properly in accordance with the law of the state in question to be valid. These days we see many examples of improper service of process. If process is not served properly, this issue MUST be raised before any other defensive pleadings or it is waived.

6. Summons and Complaint

This is usually the first evidence that a borrower in a judicial state sees that his or her property is being subjected to foreclosure. A Complaint is filed by the lender or its agent, the loan servicer, with the Clerk of the court having jurisdiction over foreclosures in that county. The Clerk issues a Summons, and that, with the Complaint, is then delivered personally to the borrower and any other interested parties (other property owners, spouses, junior mortgages and liens, condominium and homeowners’ associations). Service of the Summons and Complaint starts the clock ticking for the party served to defend if he, she or it is going to do so. The party suing is the Plaintiff, the parties being sued are Defendants. The Complaint asks that the court accelerate the obligation to pay the entire mortgage debt in full, with all accrued costs, fees, advances and expenses.

7. Response

If a borrower or other interested party has any reason to contest a foreclosure, he she or it needs to file a Response to the Complaint unless there is a defective process service issue (see above). There are many different kinds of responses, and it is critical that the right one be utilized at the right time. Motions and other objections normally deal with preliminary matters of some kind, including technical defects in the Complaint, technical defects in service of process, etc. There are various kinds of preliminary motions. Most applicable usually to foreclosure, depending on the facts, are Motions to Quash Service, Motions to Dismiss, Motions to Strike, and often there are others, depending on the specific law and procedure of the state in question.

8. Response – Answer

Answers fully address the allegations of the Complaint. In most cases, if issues exist which can be raised by Motion or Objection, this is waived if an Answer is filed first. Answers raise legal issues which are defenses to foreclosure (See Guide – Defenses to Foreclosure). The amount of time allowed for a Response is governed by state law, usually 20 or 30 days. Many people try to file their own “Answer”. This is normally a very dangerous move. The filing of an Answer generally extinguishes the right to file preliminary motions, which can be critical to the correct handling of a defense case. The only things which should be contained in an Answer are legal defenses to foreclosure. These are rarely what you would expect. Typically, the sorts of things people file talk about their financial difficulties, about the fact that they are trying to get the mortgage company to work with them, or trying to get a better job, and that they need more time.

9. Default

If a Defendant does not file a response within the time allowed by law, the Plaintiff can cause default to be entered against that Defendant, which precludes his or her being able to raise defenses. In some states, it also allows the foreclosure to proceed without any further notice to defaulting defendants.

10. Counterclaim

If a borrower has been wronged by the mortgage lender or servicer, he or she may file a counterclaim. A counterclaim is just that – a suit within a suit, where the Borrower is suing the Lender or Servicer.

11. Discovery

Interrogatories, Requests for Production, Requests for Admission, Depositions – These are tools which can be used by any party to a lawsuit to obtain more information to prove or disprove his, her or its case. Interrogatories are written questions which one party serves on the other, demanding information. Requests for Production are requests for tangible things, such as documents, files, objects, etc. Requests for Admissions are used by attorneys to attempt to compel the other side to admit or deny issues. Depositions are in-person testimony, under oath, all of which is taken down by a court reporter. Cases may involve all or any combination of these, however each jurisdiction has specific rules as to when discovery can be propounded, how long the other side has to respond, and how to handle a failure to respond or to respond properly. Properly done discovery is usually the key to a successful outcome in a lawsuit.

12. Burden of Proof

Normally, whichever party raises an issue has the burden of proving it. This means that if I say you owe me money, I have to be able to prove it. If I say I own the mortgage on your home, I have to be able to prove it. As mentioned above, well-done discovery will allow your attorney to find out whether I can prove it or not. As an example, if you claim that the mortgage company did not apply payments correctly, you have to be able to prove it. You may be able to do this with your records, but it would also be of tremendous use to get the mortgage company’s records of what payments they applied to see if their records are right. So, in a Judicial Foreclosure, the Plaintiff has the burden of proving its right to foreclose, the amount of the debt and the existence and details of default. The defendant has the burden of proving any affirmative defenses he she or it raises.

13. Summary Judgment

Either party has the right to ask the court to grant summary judgment in its favor. Normally, the Motion for Summary Judgment is supported by affidavits from potential witnesses supporting their claims. If granted, that ends the case – it means the moving party wins. Summary judgment is the goal of foreclosure plaintiffs. Technically, it means that the court is convinced that there is no reason for a trial, that the pleadings and issues raised in the case by the parties demonstrate that the party requesting summary judgment does not have to do any more to prove its case. If a defendant does not raise issues which constitute defenses to foreclosure, and does not establish that there are issues that need to be sorted out at trial, the court is likely to grant summary judgment, since that removes one more case from the court’s swollen caseload.

14. Summary Judgement (Cont.)

If a defendant has been defaulted, the way to summary judgment for the Plaintiff is wide open. If a defendant has filed a homemade “answer” telling the court that he, she or it can’t pay right now, is trying to get a modification, is trying to get a better job, needs more time, likewise the way to summary judgment for the Plaintiff is wide open. If the defendant has properly raised legitimate issues, there is a chance of surviving summary judgment and if a summary judgment is improperly granted anyway, that may be a basis for appeal. The Order granting Summary Judgment normally itemizes the entire amount claimed to be due at that point – the entire mortgage debt in full, with all accrued costs, fees, advances and expenses. Once Summary Judgment is granted, the next step normally is the scheduling of a foreclosure sale.

15. Trial

If neither party is able to obtain Summary Judgment, and unless the dispute is settled by agreement, the next step is trial. Trial is a full scale proceeding. Some states allow for trial by jury, others do not, but most mortgage documents contain a jury trial waiver which the borrower consented to at closing. At trial a judge with or without a jury hears and rules on all the evidence presented, hears the arguments of counsel and makes a decision. If a Counterclaim has been filed and has not been disposed of via Summary Judgment, the counterclaim may allow for trial by jury. At the conclusion of the trial, if the Plaintiff wins, then it proceeds to set a sale (see below). If it loses, it will be unable to proceed any further with the foreclosure process. If it did lose, depending on the reason why, it may be possible for another Plaintiff to bring an action for foreclosure.

16. Foreclosure Sale

In order for a foreclosure sale to be held in a judicial foreclosure, the actual lawsuit must be over, either through Summary Judgment or after trial, and all that remains are the final details of getting the property sold. Again the process and details vary by state, but all entail setting a date for sale. Notice of the date is given to all interested parties and in many states also provided publicly in the newspaper and often now by posting on the web sites of Courts, Clerks of Court or other similar locations. The foreclosure sale is handled by a judicial officer – in some states it is the Sheriff, in some states it is the Clerk of Courts, in some states a referral is made to a court-appointed master. The date is set, notice is given, and then the actual sale occurs. It is generally in the form of an auction.

17. Foreclosure Sale (cont.)

The foreclosing lender sends a representative to bid. Its bid is usually the total amount due it, although sometimes if the property is underwater, the lender will reduce its bid in the hope that it will be outbid by a third party. If a junior lienholder or third party is the high bidder, it is the successful purchaser. However, in many places now, when the mortgage debt equals or exceeds the current value of the property, there are no other bidders, and so the mortgage company wind up as the high bidder. Normally the entire bid amount must be paid right away in full. There is some time period after the sale before the sale is confirmed. This varies by state. Once the sale is confirmed, a document is issued to the buyer conveying title. Depending on the state, it might be a Sheriff’s Deed, a Certificate of Title or some other instrument, but the practical effect is to convey title. Once the new buyer owns the property, they can do what they want, subject to right of redemption.

18. Deficiency Judgments

Many states provide a mechanism for a foreclosing Plaintiff to recover a deficiency judgment, usually consisting of the shortfall between the total owed by the borrower and the value of the property it recovers if it buys it at the foreclosure sale. In those states that permit this, a borrower is not done with the obligation simply because he she or it allows a foreclosure to be completed. It is very important to understand whether or not you may be exposed for a deficiency judgment before you decide whether to oppose foreclosure or to consider bankruptcy. For details of how deficiency judgments work in Florida, check my Legal Guide on deficiency judgments. While the guide is geared to Florida, the concept is similar in other states that permit it, although the details and time-frames vary. Some states do not allow deficiency judgments under some circumstances.

For Your Complete Judicial Foreclosure Kit With Well Structured Pleadings and Step by Step Guide For Your Wrongful Foreclosure Defense Visit:http://www.fightforeclosure.net

How Pro Se Foreclosure Defense Litigants Can Effectively Defend & Save Their Homes

25 Thursday Jul 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Case Laws, Case Study, Discovery Strategies, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, MERS, Mortgage Laws, Non-Judicial States, Note - Deed of Trust - Mortgage, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Courts of New York, HSBC Bank USA, Law, Mortgage loan, New York, Plaintiff, Pro se legal representation in the United States, standing, United States

I General Answer Issues

• Be sure to raise lack of standing as a defense in the homeowner’s answer if the plaintiff’s ownership of the note and mortgage is questionable. Standing/capacity to sue may be waived if not raised in the answer.

• Late Answers:

• Pro se homeowners often do not file answers and do not seek attorneys until they receive notice of the settlement conference. In these circumstances, homeowner attorneys should serve and file a late answer. If the plaintiff rejects the answer, file a motion to compel acceptance of the late answer.

• A court may permit a defendant to file a late answer “upon a showing of reasonable excuse for delay or default.” CPLR § 3012(d); Cirillo v.Macy’s, Inc., 61 A.D.3d 538, 540, 877 N.Y.S.2d 281, 283 (1st Dep’t 2009).

• Mortgagor’s belief that foreclosure action was stayed during ongoing settlement negotiations with mortgagee was reasonable excuse for filing late answer. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Cayo, 2011, 34 Misc.3d 850, 934 N.Y.S.2d 792.

• Courts have routinely permitted service of a late answer where the delay was not willful, the defendant has meritorious defenses, and service of the answer does not unfairly prejudice the plaintiff. See, e.g., Nickell v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 44 A.D.3d 631, 632, 843 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (2d Dep’t 2007); Jolkovsky v. Legeman, 32 A.D.3d 418, 419, 819 N.Y.S.2d 561, 562 (2d Dep’t 2006); Watson v. Pollacchi, 32 A.D.3d 565, 565-66, 819 N.Y.S.2d 612, 613 (3d Dep’t 2006); Nason v. Fisher, 309 A.D.2d 526, 526, 765 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33 (1st Dep’t 2003)

• Allowance of a late answer is consistent with New York’s strong public policy in favor of a determination of controversies on the merits. See, e.g., Jones v. 414 Equities LLC, 57 A.D.3d 65, 81, 866 N.Y.S.2d 165, 178 (1st Dep’t 2008);Hosten v. Oladapo, 52 A.D.3d 658, 658-59, 858 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916 (2d Dep’t 2008); Kaiser v. Delaney, 255 A.D.2d 362, 362, 679N.Y.S.2d 686, 687 (2d Dep’t 1998).

Where the defendant has answered but not asserted a standing defense, a motion for leave to amend to assert a standing defense should be granted if such amendment causes no prejudice to plaintiff. U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Sharif, 89 A.D.3d 723, 933 N.Y.S.2d 293, 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 07835 (2d Dep’t Nov. 1, 2011) (motions for leave to amend should be freely granted absent prejudice or surprise from the delay in seeking leave; reversing denial of leave and holding that trial court should have dismissed for lack of standing upon plaintiff’s failure to submit either written assignment of note or evidence of physical delivery).

• New York law permits reciprocal attorney’s fees for homeowner’s attorney in defending against foreclosure on residential mortgages: RPL § 282.

II. Affirmative Defenses and Counter Claims

A. Standing and Capacity To Sue

• Many documents needed to establish standing were “robo-signed”

• Sloppiness in assigning mortgages to mortgage securitization trusts often makes it difficult for plaintiff trusts (or servicers) to establish standing.

1. The Difference Between Standing and Capacity to Sue

a. Standing Is Jurisdictional

• U.S. Constitution Article III – Case and Controversy Requirement

• Siegel on New York Practice: “It is the law’s policy to allow only an aggrieved person to bring a lawsuit. One not affected by anything a would-be defendant has done or threatens to do ordinarily has no business suing, and a suit of that kind can be dismissed at the threshold for want of jurisdiction without reaching the merits. When one without the requisite grievance does bring suit, and it’s dismissed, the plaintiff is described as lacking “standing to sue” and the dismissal as one for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”

• “Standing to sue is critical to the proper functioning of the judicial system. It is a threshold issue. If standing is denied, the pathway to the courthouse is blocked. The plaintiff who has standing, however, may cross the threshold and seek judicial redress….The rules governing standing help courts separate the tangible from the abstract or speculative injury, and the genuinely aggrieved from the judicial dilettante or amorphous claimant.” Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 100 N.Y. 801, 766 N.Y.S.2d 654, 798 N.E.2d 1047 (2003)

• New York courts have treated standing as a common law concept, in contrast to federal approach, where it rests on constitutional and prudential grounds. New York case law tends to blend standing with capacity to sue.

b. Capacity to Sue v. Standing

• Capacity to sue goes to the litigant’s status, i.e., its power to appear and bring its grievance before the court. For example, a foreign corporation or LLC may not bring an action unless it is registered with the Secretary of State; minors lack legal capacity, etc.

• Standing requires an inquiry into whether the litigant has an interest in the claim at issue that the law will recognize as a sufficient predicate for determining the issue at the litigant’s request. Is the relief sought in the case properly sought by this plaintiff?

2. Standing in a Foreclosure Case

• Foreclosing plaintiff must own the note and the mortgage at the inception of the action. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Barnett, 88, A.D. 3d 636, 931 N.Y.S. 2d 630, 2011 WL 4600619 (2d Dep’t Oct. 4, 2011); Kluge v. Fugazy ,145 A.D. 2d 537, 536 N.Y. S. 2d 92 (2d Dep’t 1988)

• Note: represents contractual debt obligation Mortgage: represents collateral security for debt

• Assignment of the mortgage without assignment of the debt, i.e. the note, is a nullity.

• Assignment must be complete before foreclosure is commenced

• Assignment can be by written assignment or by physical delivery of note and mortgage.

• An indorsed note (to the plaintiff or in blank) is not sufficient: the plaintiff must prove physical delivery before the foreclosure was commenced.

• If a written assignment involved and has a date, the execution date generally controls.

• Back dated assignment are ineffective absent proof of prior physical delivery. Wells Fargo v. Marchione, 69 A.D. 3d 204, 887 N.Y. S. 2d 615 (2d Dep’t 2009)

3. Common Assignment Red Flags in Foreclosure Cases

Assignments that jump over links in the chain of title, including timing.

• Suspicious or contradictory endorsements and allonges.

• Assignments from MERS as nominee

• Robo-signing of assignment documents

• Mortgage-Backed Securities Investment Vehicles: Pooling and Servicing Agreements and non-compliance with trust closing dates and other terms

4. MERS and Standing

• Second Department: assignment from MERS when MERS is designated merely as nominee of lender, and never owned note, is ineffective to confer standing on its assignee.

Bank of New York v. Silverberg, 86 A.D. 3d 274, 926 N.Y.S. 2d 532 (2d Dep’t 2011). See also In re Lippold, 2011 WL 3890540 (SDNY Bkrtcy 2011)(MERS, as assignor, could not legally assign the note as prior holder of note and mortgage only conferred legal rights with respect to the mortgage); In re Agard, 444 B.R. 231 (SDNY Bkrtcy 2011) (mortgage naming MERS as nominee did not authorize it to assign)

• Issues concerning who executes assignments on behalf of MERS (plaintiff’s counsel, robo-signing servicer employees?)

5. Waiver of Standing Defenses

• CPLR 3211(e) only provides that capacity to sue is waived; no mention of standing.

• Wells Fargo Bank v. Mastropaolo, 42 A.D. 3d 239, 837 N.Y.S. 2d 247 (2d Dep’t 2007); HSBC v. Dammond, 59 A.D. 3d 679, 875 N.Y.S. 2d 490, 875 N.Y. S. 2d 490, (2d Dep’t 2009); Countrywide v. Delphonse, 64 A.D. 3d 624, 883 N.Y. S. 2d 135 (2d Dep’t 2009).

• Cf. Security Pacific Nat’l Bank v. Evans, 31 A.D. 2d 278, 820 N.Y.S. 2d 2 (1stDep’t 2006) (plaintiff lender commenced action after merging with anotherbank; lack of legal capacity waived; not an issue of standing)

• Some trial courts have held there is no waiver of standing defense where plaintiff had not appeared or answered altogether. Deutsche Bank v. McRae, 894 N.Y. S. 2d 720 (Allegheny Cty. 2010); Citigroup v. Bowling, 25 Misc. 3d 1244A, 906 N.Y. S. 2d 778 (Kings Cty. 2009).

6.Leave to Amend Answer to Assert Standing Defense

U. S. Bank, Natl. Assn. v. Sharif, 89 A.D. 3d 723,933 N.Y.S. 2d 293, 2011 NY Slip Op 07835 (2d Dep’t Nov. 1, 2011) (reversing denial of leave to amend to assert standing and denial of motion to dismiss for lack of standing where plaintiff demonstrated no prejudice and failed to establish its standing to foreclose). Aurora v. Thomas, 70 A.D. 3d 986, 897 N.Y.S.2d 140 (2d Dep’t 2010) (affirming grant of motion for leave to amend to assert standing and capacity to sue, finding no waiver where documents relied upon were revealed during discovery); HSBC v. Enobakhare, 2010 Slip Op 31925 (U) (Richmond Cty. 2010) (granting motion for leave to amend answer; amended answer could assert defenses that were arguably waived by failure to assert originally)

• Deutsche Bank v. Ramotar, 30 Misc. 3d 1208(A), 2011 WL 66041 (Kings Cty. 2011) (denying summary judgment and order of reference, granting defendant who had previously answered pro se leave to file amended answer asserting standing and robo-signing defenses)

7. Standing as a Meritorious Defense to Vacate Default Judgments/Plaintiff’s Motions for Default/Summary Judgment/Order of Reference and Absence of Standing

• Prima facie case in a foreclosure case requires showing of ownership of note and mortgage. Campaign v. Barba, 23 A.D. 3d 327, 805 N.Y.S. 86 ( 2d Dep’t 2005)

• Distinction between moving to dismiss for lack of standing when defense has arguably been waived and opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and order of reference for failure to establish ownership of note (prima facie case)

8. Sua Sponte Dismissals on Standing Grounds/Robo-signing Concerns

• Financial Freedom v. Slinkosky, 28 Misc. 3d 1209(a) (Suffolk Cty. 2010) (denying summary judgment where plaintiff failed to submit note and mortgage and failed to demonstrate standing) HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Taher, NY Slip Op 51208(U) (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty., July 1, 2011) (denying order of reference, making detailed analysis of robo-signed assignments and affidavits of merit and amounts due, questioning employment histories of individuals who signed papers on behalf of different entities, determining that plaintiff lacked standing to foreclose because, among other reasons, assignment of mortgage from MERS as nominee, which never owned note, was ineffective, and dismissing with prejudice. In light of frivolous motion for order of reference by HSBC and its counsel, court scheduled hearing on sanctions and ordered chief executive officer of HSBC to personally appear at hearing)

9. Standing as Meritorious Defense (for leave to file untimely answer or to vacate default)

• Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Ibaiyo, 20910-08 (Queens Ct. 2009) (meritorious defense criteria for CPLR § 3012 motion to extend defendant’s time to answer)

• Maspeth Federal Av. & Loan Ass’n v. McGown, 77 A.D. 3d 890, 909 N.Y. S. 2d 642 (2d Dep’t 2010) (trial court has considerable discretion on applications to vacate default and extend time to answer when determining existence of meritorious defense and reasonable excuse for default)

10. True Capacity to Sue Issues

• BCL §1372 (prohibits lawsuits by foreign corporations not authorized to do business in NY)

• Exception for foreign banking corporations via BCL § 103(a) and Banking Law § 200(4).

• Sutton Funding LLC v. Parris, 24 Misc. 3d 889, 878 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Kings Cty. 2009) (dismissing foreclosure where plaintiff was not a foreign bank and was not authorized to do business in NY)

B. Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692-1692p

1. Scope of FDCPA Coverage

a. Who is covered

• Applies to debt collectors. § 1692a(6)

• Debt collector is any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts

• For §1692f(6) purposes it also includes any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.

• Or, any person who regularly collects, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.

• Includes debt buyers

• Includes attorneys who regularly collect consumer debts.

• There used to be an exemption for attorneys collecting on behalf of and in the name of a client. In 1986, Congress repealed this exemption.

b. Who is not covered

• Original creditors. § 1692a(6)(F)(ii)

• It does include any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts. § 1692a(6)

• Creditors employees or agents collecting in the name of the creditor. § §692a(6)(A)

• State and federal officials performing their duties, such as the IRS or U.S. Dept. of Education. § 1692a(6)(C)

• Persons collecting debts not in default, such as some servicers. §1692a(6)(F)(iii)

• Process servers. §1692a(6)(D)

• At least one court has held that they are covered if they are engaging in sewer service Mel Harris v. Sykes, 757 F.Supp.2d 413 (2010)

c. What transactions are covered Consumer debts

• Consumer is defined in § 1692a(3) as “any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt”

• Does not apply to artificial entities, such as corporations Debts are defined in § 1692a(5) as any obligation of a consumer to pay money

• underlying transaction must be for money, property, insurance, or services

• must be primarily for personal, family or household purposes

• no business debts or fines Communications – § 1692a(2)

• Means the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium

• Also applies to statements and activities during the course of litigation. Heintz v. Jenkins , 514 U.S. 291 (1995)

• Recent amendments to FDCPA clarify that a legal pleading

cannot be considered an “initial communication” under FDCPA.

• Note that this is a narrow amendment; other provisions of FDCPA still apply.

2. Substantive Consumer Protections

• Cease communications. § 1692c

• Dispute/verification. § 1692g

• Notice within 5 days of initial communication

• Right to dispute within 30 days of receiving notice

• Once debt collector receives dispute in writing, must stop all debt collection activity (including filing a lawsuit) until it provides “verification” of the debt.

• NOTE: Local NYC law expands these dispute rights. Under local law, consumers can request verification at any time. NYC Admin Code § 20-493.2.

• Verification must include (1) copy of the contract or other agreement creating the obligation to pay (2) copy of final account statement (3) an accounting itemizing the total amount do, specifying principal, interest, and other charges.

For each additional charge, the debt collection must state the date and basis for the charge. See § 2-190 of the Rules of the City of New York.

3. Prohibited Activities

• Communications. §§1692b & 1692c

• Contacting consumer after consumer sends cease communication letter

• Contacting consumer who is represented by counsel

• Contacting third parties about a consumer’s debt

• Contacting consumer at work if debt collector has reason to know that consumer’s employer prohibits such communication

• Common scenario: Debt collector can’t reach consumer, so calls consumer’s neighbor/family member/employer and leaves telephone number and message for the consumer to call back about an important matter. This is a violation.

• Harassment or Abuse. § 1692d

• Debt collector may not engage in conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with collection of debt

• Includes: threats of violence, use of profanity, repeated telephone calls for purpose of harassment, calling without disclosure of identity (e.g. threats to repossess property)

• False or Misleading Representations. § 1692e

• False representation of character, amount, or legal status of any debt (e.g., suing for more interest and fees than is actually owed)

• Threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or is not intended to be taken

• Implying that consumer could be arrested or children taken away for nonpayment of debt

• Pretending to be attorney, marshal

• Making false or inaccurate reports to credit reporting agencies

• Unfair Practices. § 1692f

• Using unfair or unconscionable means to collect a debt

• Collection of any amount (including interest and fees) that is not actually owed

• Threatening to take or repossess property (a) without the right; (b) without the intent; (c) if property is exempt

4. FDCPA Litigation and Remedies

a. Statute of limitations

• one year from the date on which the violation occurs – § 1692k(d)

• No continuing violations doctrine

b. Jurisdiction

• May bring in either state or federal court

• May also bring as a counterclaim in a debt collection suit

c. Construction

• Strict liability statute – proof of the debt collector’s intent is not required

• intent is a factor that can be used when calculating damages

• Courts apply a “least sophisticated consumer” standard to analyze violations

d. Remedies

• Up to $1000 statutory damages

• A majority of courts hold that capped at $1,000 per action no matter how many violations are joined in the lawsuit

• Per Plaintiff

• Sometimes per Defendant, depending on the violation

• Factors used by courts in determining statutory awards:

• Intent to commit the violation or evade the protections

• Repetition of the violations

• Timely correction of the violations

• Multiple consumers affected by the violations

• Prior violations by the collector for similar acts

• Actual damages

• Attorney’s fees

• Declaratory relief

• No Injunctive relief

C. NYS Banking Law Defenses

1. Banking Law § 6-l

• Applies to loans made after April 1, 2003.

• Covers “high – cost home loans”: a first lien residential mortgage loan, not exceeding conforming loan size for a comparable dwelling as established by the Federal National Mortgage Association in which (1) the APR exceeds eight percentage points over the yield on Treasury securities having comparable periods of maturity; or (2) total points and fees exceed 5% of the total loan amount, excluding certain bona fide discount points if total loan is $50,000 or more.

• Prohibits, inter alia, (1) lending without regard to a borrower’s ability to repay; (2) points and fees in excess of 3% of the loan; (3) loan flipping; (4) kickbacks to mortgage brokers; (5) points and fees when lender refinances its own high-cost loan; (6) balloon payments, negative amortization, and default interest rates.

• Provides private right of action with 6-year statute of limitations (from origination); actual and statutory damages; attorney fees; possible rescission of the loan.

• Intentional violation may result in voiding of the loan.

2. Banking Law § 6-m

• Covers “sub-prime home loan”: a loan where the fully indexed APR for the first-lien loan exceeds by more than 1.75, or for a subordinate loan by more than 3.75, the average commitment rate for loans in the northeast region with a comparable duration as published in the Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS) in the week prior to the week in which the lender received a completed loan application.

• Lenders must take reasonable steps to verify that the borrower has the ability to repay the loan, including taxes and insurance.

• Prohibitions similar to those in Banking Law §6-l.

• Lenders must disclose charges for taxes and insurance and must escrow such payments after July 1, 2010.

If you are ready to take the battle to these interlopers, in order to defend and save the home that is rightfully yours, visit http://www.fightforeclosure.net

How Pro Se Litigants Can Effectively Conduct Discovery for Their Court Cases

16 Tuesday Jul 2013

Posted by BNG in Discovery Strategies, Fed, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Pro Se Litigation, State Court, Trial Strategies

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Deposition (law), Discovery, Expert witness, Interrogatories, Law, Lawsuit, Legal case, Request for admissions

Discovery is the pre-trial phase in a court case during which each party can use certain methods to obtain information and facts and gather evidence about the case in preparation for trial. It is the principal fact-finding method in the litigation process.

Almost all trial courts allow a wide scope for discovery, the theory being that all parties should go to trial with as much knowledge as possible, and that the parties should not be able to keep secrets from each other. This broad right can involve the discovery of any material relevant to the case excepting privileged information that is privileged or information that is the work product of the lawyers for the other side.

This is different from what you’ve seen on television and in the movies where there is a surprise witness or a missing document is found. The goal of discovery is to avoid surprises and for all parties to go to trial with as much information as possible. Not surprisingly, many cases will settle during the discovery phase as a result of what is discovered and what would be unwise to disclose in discovery.

In practice, the majority of civil cases settle after or during discovery. After discovery, both sides usually are in agreement about the strength and weaknesses of their cases, which may lead to a settlement that eliminates the expense and risks of a trial. The use of discovery is sometimes criticized as favoring the wealthier side as one tactic is to make requests of information that are expensive and time-consuming for the other side to fulfill.

Types of Discovery
The most common types of discovery include:

Required Disclosures. Parties are required to disclose certain information regarding four kinds of core information without a discovery request that concerns witnesses, documents, damages, and insurance. Parties must also disclose information about any expert witnesses who may be used at trial to present evidence. Any report written by an expert retained to give testimony must also be disclosed. Before trial, the parties must disclose witnesses who will be called at trial and those who may be called at trial including those witnesses who will be presented through depositions. In addition, the parties must disclose a list of exhibits that will be presented at trial and exhibits that may be presented at trial.
Depositions. A device by which one party asks oral questions of the other party or of a witness for the other party. The deposition is taken under oath outside of the courtroom, usually in one of the attorney’s offices. The deposition is transcribed by a court reporter and a copy of the transcript is provided to both parties. The transcript of a deposition may be used as evidence at trial.
Written interrogatories. A set of written questions about the case submitted by one party to the other party, witness, or other person having information of interest which must be answered under oath, and the answers to which must be provided to the requesting party within a set period of time.
Production of documents and tangible things. A written request asking the other party to produce specified documents or things relevant to the case. An early request to view documents and other evidence allow for a viewing of evidence that might deteriorate over time. It will also prevent many instances of the disposing of such evidence.
Physical and mental examinations. A written request submitted to the other party requesting that a physical and/or mental examination be made of a party.
Requests for admission. Written statements of facts concerning the case that are submitted to the other party that the party is required to admit or deny. Statements that are admitted will be treated by the court as having been established and need not be proven at trial.

All discovery requests must be reasonably complied with, answered, or objected to in the proper amount of time. If discovery requests are not answered or objected to, and sometimes if they are improperly answered or an improper objection is made, the side requesting the discovery may ask the court to compel proper responses, including the production of the requested discovery. The court may assess sanctions against a party not responding properly to discovery requests.

Conducting Discovery Once an answer to a lawsuit is filed, the time for conducting discovery begins. The timing and methods for conducting discovery will vary from state to state and from court to court. There are substantial and numerous rules governing discovery in each case. You should check your state rules and court rules for conducting discovery. Although there is a broad scope of what may be requested in discovery, there are strict deadlines for requesting discovery and responding to discovery requests. It is very important to be aware of and follow the deadlines because of the potentially serious consequences for non-compliance.

Discovery is conducted by sending written requests in a proscribed form to the opposing party specifically listing the type of discovery sought, the manner in which it will be obtained, and the time for complying with the request. Check your state and local rules for the required form of these requests.

Each state’s rules will include versions of the following rules:

Written Interrogatories
Demands for Inspection
Requests for Admission
Propounding Party (party making the discovery request)
- Format of the discovery request;
- On whom the request should be served;
- Which party retains custody of the original discovery request; and
- Filing requirement (most discovery is not required to be filed with the court unless pertinent to a motion heard before the court).

Responding Party
- Format of written response;
- Effect of failure to respond in timely fashion;
- Objections to the discovery request;
- Verification (responding party must sign the responses under oath);
- On whom the responses should be served; and
- Filing requirement (most discovery is not required to be filed with the court unless pertinent to a motion heard before the court).
Each state will have its own rules as to when a plaintiff and when a defendant may serve notice of taking a deposition that is initiated by serving notice on the other party in the required format. The notice will indicate whose deposition will be taken, when it will be taken, and where it will be taken. There will also be rules concerning compelling a person or party to be deposed and steps to take to compel attendance at a deposition.

Each state will have its own rules as to the production of documents and tangible things. The party requesting the production must serve notice of the request in the required format. The notice will indicate which documents and things are to be produced, and when and where they are to be produced. There will also be rules for steps to take to compel production.

It is a general rule that all parties involved in civil litigation, whether represented by an attorney or not, should be civil to each other. One of the things encompassed within this requirement for civility is the accommodation of each other’s schedules within reason and is particularly important with discovery because of the tremendous amount of information being obtained and exchanged. If either party reasonably requests to change a time for a deposition or the time for exchange of documents, the other party should be accommodating. If the other party seems to make a practice of requesting changes, not complying with discovery requests, or only partially complying, it might be time to go to court and request sanctions.
For More Information How You Can Effectively Use Correct Discovery Procedures To Your Advantage in Winning Your Wrongful Foreclosure Litigation Visit http://www.fightforeclosure.net

Pro Se Guide To Civil Litigation

16 Tuesday Jul 2013

Posted by BNG in Appeal, Discovery Strategies, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Litigation Strategies, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, Trial Strategies, Your Legal Rights

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Civil Procedure Outline

I. The Adversarial System

A. Four Lessons

1. Doctrine

a. Formal rules of litigation (FRCP)

2. Strategy

a. Practical considerations (time, money principle)

3. Theory

a. Different frameworks for understanding the civil litigation system

4. Skills

a. Actual practice (drafting a complaint, answer, negotiation)

B. Theories of Adjudication − FRCP 1: Rules shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. FRCP 1 does not provide much guidance. Therefore, the three theories below are applied

1. Fair Fight

a. Judge is passive referee that simply follows and enforces the rules

b. The only interests are those party to the litigation.

c. Mitchell v. A&K − Truck on the premises

2. Justice Between the Parties

a. Judge is active and corrects for disparities between the parties

b. Only interests are those party to the litigation

c. Conley − Black workers’ complaint lacks sufficiency but is accepted because need discovery

3. Greater Good

a. Judge is active and considers larger interests of society

b. Takes into account third parties (other interest than just those before the court)

c. Band’s Refuse − Judge called own witnesses and introduced own evidence

II. Initiating the Lawsuit

A. Plaintiff’s Claim (Complaint)

1. Process

a. File − FRCP 3: Action is started by filing the complaint with the court

b. Serve − Complaint is given to the opposing party or parties

2. Rules for assessing a complaint

a. FRCP 8(a) − A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain

· 8(a)(1) − A short plain statement of the grounds upon with the court’s jurisdictions depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds for jurisdiction to support it;

· 8(a)(2) − Short, plain statement of a claim showing pleader is entitled to relief; and

§ Flaws to avoid

§ Missing an element

i. Concerns include

· Δ cannot answer

· Notice to the court

· Flush out meritless claims

§ Negating an element

§ Establishing an affirmative defense

· When flawed − Subject to motion to dismiss

§ Particularity

§ Beyond reasonable doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts to establish claim Connely = Mere possibility

§ Particular enough that can draw fair inference
Sutliff = fair inference

· 8(a)(3) − a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks; relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded

b. Background rules

· Allegations taken as true

· Allegations considered on their face (no evidence) Mitchell v. A&K

· No legal argument Sutliff

3. Notice Pleading − level of detail or specificity

a. FRCP 12(b)(6) − complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of claim

i. Mere possibility
Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief

1. Conely v. Gibson − Black union members sue for discrimination, defendant moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim, court holds for plaintiff

ii. Fair inference
Complaint must contain either direct allegations on every material point necessary to sustain a recovery or allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence of material points will be introduced at trialSutliff v. Donovan

iii. Specific facts
Not good law Gillispie

b. FRCP 12(e) – Request for the Π to give a more definite statement of the allegations in the complaint

i. Board of Harbor Commissioners
Facts: Oil discharged into waterway. Unclear who did it. D moves for more definite statement in order to frame an appropriate response pursuant to Rule 7. Court held for P.
Rule: Leans toward the fair inference standard. Information is specific enough b/c all of the elements are addressed.
(If P gives more definite statement that is still not specific enough can follow up with motion to dismiss)

c. FRCP 12(f) − Motion to strike redundant, immaterial, impertinent and scandalous matter

4. Policy considerations for determining whether the complaint is specific enough (background policy considerations for borderline cases)

a. Sufficient notice to the D

b. Allows investigation

c. Provides early assessment of the merits

d. Prevents a fishing expedition

e. Who has access to the additional info

f. Harm is worthy of the litigation

5. Pleading in the alternative

a. FRCP 8(e)(2): A party may set forth 2 or more statements of claim or defense alternately or hypothetically

i. If by the nature of the circumstance the P would not know which allegations are right

ii. Lack of knowledge – pleading in alternative is OK

iii. If facts should be known – pleading in the alternative not OK

iv. Can only collect on one of the claims

b. McCormick v Kopmann (Car Crash Case)
Facts: McCormick dies in head on collision. Wife sues (1) bar owner (Huls) for over-serving alcohol and (2) driver (Koppman) for crossing over the center line, causing the collision with her husband. Koppmann moves to dismiss b/c of contradicting allegations. Denied.
Rule: Pleading in the alternative is allowed where the P lacks knowledge about the key facts in good faith
Policy: Look at the models of adjudication

i. Justice between the parties − Should not be able to plead in the alternative if she knows the truth

ii. Fair fight − Should be able to use the evidence b/c it could be used against her

6. Heightened Pleading Standard

a. FRCP 9(b)– In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge and other condition of the mind of a person may be averred generally

i. Strong inference standard

b. PSLRA(Private Securities Litigation & Reform Act) − State with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that D acted with required state of mind

i. 2nd Circuit – Strong Inference Standard (majority approach)

· P must show motive and opportunity to commit fraud

ii. 9th Circuit – Great Detail Standard

· P must plead with great detail for deliberately reckless OR conscious misconduct (allegations in detail of who, what, when, where, how)

c. Background policies for general particularity and heightened pleading

i. Giving notice to the D and the court

ii. Sometime giving the court the ability to assess the merits

iii. Preventing fishing expeditions

iv. Being attentive to who has the factual information

d. Ross v. Robins (Faulty Birth Control Case) – 2nd Circuit
Facts: Ross purchases shares of Robins. Robins did not report safety and efficiency problems with the Dalkon Shield, but knew about them. After FDA made a public disclosure of the problem, stock prices fell. D moves to dismiss under 12(b)(6) for failure to comply with 9(b). Move to dismiss granted. P appeals.
Rule: Cases involving the Private Securities & Litigation Reform Act must meet a heightened pleading standard. . . strong inference standard.

e. Cash Energy v. Weiner (Environmental Cleanup Case)
NOT GOOD LAW
Facts: Cash Energy engaged in storage and/or transfer of chemical solvents on a site adjacent to Weiner’s property. Weiner believes his land has been contaminated as a result of this activity. D moves to dismiss under 12(b)(6) for failure to comply with 9(b). Court grants motion to dismiss. P appeals.
Rule: Court holds cases involving CERCLA to heightened pleading standard, but this is not the law.

f. Leathermann v.Tarrant County (Drug Bust Case)
GOOD LAW
Facts: Tarrant Co. obtains search warrants. Homeowners claimed assault. Rule: Rule 9(b) only applies to cases involving fraud, mistake or PSLRA. Rule 8(a)(2) still stands otherwise. Cash Energy is NOT the law. Rely on Leatherman.

7. Voluntary dismissal

a. FRCP 41(a)(1) − P can dismiss the case unilaterally as long as it is before service of an answer or a motion for summary judgment. If after the answer or motion, must have stipulation of both parties.

b. FRCP 41(a)(2) − If parties are not in agreement, will need dismissal by order of the court

i. First time dismissed without prejudice

ii. Second time dismissed with prejudice

iii. If court doesn’t otherwise say, it is dismissed without prejudice.

c. Reasons for voluntary dismissal

i. To file in another jurisdiction (don’t like the judge)

ii. A way to avoid sanctions under Rule 11

iii. If judge may grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12, might want to pre-empt the ruling

iv. The SOL may be running so just decide to go away quietly

B. Defendant’s Response

1. RULE 12 MOTIONS

a. Rule 12(a) − Timing to file responsive pleading

i. 12(a)(1)(A) − Answer complaint w/in 20 days

ii. 12(a)(4)(A) − After filing and serving 12(b)(6) motion, wait to hear back from court

iii. 12(a)(4)(A) − 12(b)(6) denied then must answer within 10 days

iv. 12(a)(4)(A) − If court postpones ruling on 12(b)(6), must answer withing 10 days

v. If court grants motion to dismiss do not need to answer

vi. 12(a)(1)(A) − Grants leave to amend, court will specify timing

vii. 12(a)(4)(A) − If court denies motion to strike then must answer within 10 days

viii. 12(a)(4)(B) − If court grants motion to strike then must answer within 10 days

Timing under 12(a)	Within 20 days	Within 10 days	Never
Answer complaint	12(a)(1)(A)
File and serve a 12(b)(6) motion			12(a)(4)(A) wait for court to rule
12(b)(6) motion is denied		12(a)(4)(A)
Court postpones ruling on 12(b)(6) motion		12(a)(4)(A) after notice by court
12(b)(6) motion is granted			Never
Grants leave to amend		12(a)(1)(A) Once P has amended, court will specify timing
Denies 12(e) motion for more definite statement		12(a)(4)(A)
Grants 12(e) motion for more definite statement		12(a)(4)(B) after P fixes complaint

b. Rule 12(b)
(b)(1) − Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit
(b)(2) − Court lacks proper jurisdiction over D
(b)(3) − Court is not the proper location for the suit; improper venue
(b)(4) − Insufficiency of process
(b)(5) − Insufficiency of service of process
(b)(6) − Failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

i. Motion to dismiss flaws

1. Missing an element

2. Negating an element

3. Establishing an affirmative defense

ii. Use Conely and Sutliff standards to assess whether 12(b)(6) should be granted

iii. Court is limited to the four corners of the complaint and must take all of the allegations as true

(b)(7) − Failure to join a party

c. Rule 12(c) − Motion for judgment on the pleadings (after the complaint and answer are done)

i. Vehicle for the D to answer

ii. For failure to state a claim

iii. Motion by the P if the Δ admits all of the relevant allegations

iv. Can be just like motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but is normally after the answer; same analysis

v. Must be brought forward without undue delay

d. Rule 12(e) − Motion for a more definite statement

i. Usually used b/c unintelligible, not for want of detail

ii. If you understand what the P is saying but want more detail, some courts grant the motion; others don’t (e.g. US v. Board of Harbors)

e. Rule 12(f) − Motion to strike

f. Rule 12(g) − All then available Rule 12 motions must be consolidated into one pleading. All defenses not brought are waived except as under 12(h)

g. Rule 12(h): Waiver or preservation of certain defenses

i. 12(h)(1) − Disfavored defenses

· Lack of personal jurisdiction – 12(b)(2)

· Improper venue – 12(b)(3)

· Insufficiency of process – 12(b)(4)

· Insufficiency of service of process – 12(b)(5)

ii. 12(h)(2) − Favored defenses

· Failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted – 12(b)(6)

· Failure to join a party – 12(b)(7)

iii. 12(h)(3) − Most favored defenses

· Lack of subject matter jurisdiction – 12(b)(1)

Rule	Rule Explanation	Defenses	Timing
12(b)(1)	Lack of subj matter jurisdiction	Most favored 12(g), 12(h)(3)	Bring at any time
12(b)(6)	Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted	Favored 12(g), 12(h)(2)	Can be made in any pleading or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at trial on merits
12(b)(7)	Failure to join a party	Favored 12(g), 12(h)(2)	Can be made in any pleading or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at trial on merits
12(b)(2)	Lack of personal jurisdiction	Disfavored 12(g), 12(h)(1)	Will be waived forever if you did not bring it with other Rule 12 motions
12(b)(3)	Improper venue	Disfavored 12(g), 12(h)(1)	Will be waived forever if you did not bring it with other Rule 12 motions
12(b)(4)	Insufficiency or process	Disfavored 12(g), 12(h)(1)	Will be waived forever if you did not bring it with other Rule 12 motions
12(b)(5)	Insufficiency of service or process	Disfavored 12(g), 12(h)(1)	Will be waived forever if you did not bring it with other Rule 12 motions

2. DEFAULT

a. FRCP 55(a) − Default entry by the clerk when the Δ has failed to respond

b. FRCP 55(b) − Default judgment by
(b)(1) − Clerk if the award amount is certain; have to give 3 days notice
(b)(2) − Court, P must show damages

c. FRCP 55(c) − Setting aside entry of default for good cause shown; if judgment has been entered, may likewise set aside under Rule 60(b)

d. FRCP 60(b) − relevant grounds for setting aside default judgment would be mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, surprise; this is more likely to not be set aside because it is that much more in the process

e. Three factors courts use to evaluate setting aside (Shepard Claims)

i. Non-defaulting party will not be prejudiced

· Witnesses, evidence, SOL

ii. Defaulting party has meritorious defense

iii. No culpable conduct by defaulting party

· If no prejudice and has meritorious defense, then culpable conduct must be willful for default to the set aside

f. Shepard v. Darrah
Facts: Shepard (independent claims adjuster) alleges that Darrah (insurance broker) failed to pay him for services rendered. After delivery of the complaint Darrah’s attorney misses filing date for answer due to confusion about extension
Rule: Default judgment will be set aside if P is not prejudiced, D has a meritorious defense and the conduct was not willful

3. ANSWER

a. Admitting or Denying

i. Admit an allegation as true

ii. Deny

iii. Lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief

iv. Hybrid- give more particular responses, combo of above

b. Rules

i. FRCP 8(b) − D shall respond to each averment by either (1) admit, (2) deny or (3) lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief

· LKISFB is treated as a denial

· If it is found that you have sufficient knowledge or info, then LKISFB is treated as an admission (David v. Crompton & Knowles)

ii. FRCP 8(d) − Failure to deny – All averments are taken as admitted when not denied. All averment to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided

iii. FRCP 10(b) − Form of pleadings. Each claim or defense should be in a separate numbered paragraph; one allegation per paragraph

c. Purpose of the answer

i. Respond to the allegations

ii. Assert defenses

iii. Provide any counter or cross claims

d. David v. Crompton & Knowles
Facts: David was injured by a shredding machine in a factory. Δ says they don’t have sufficient knowledge to respond an allegation, then want to move to amend the answer to a denial. Motion to amend denied.
Rule: If you claim lack of knowledge and are found to have knowledge, could have acquired the knowledge (“Should have known”) or the info was within your control (“Only one who could have known”), then you have improperly used lack of knowledge answer and your answer will be deemed admitted instead of denied.

e. Affirmative Defenses (shield)

i. FRCP 8(c) − Affirmative Defenses (list is not exhaustive)

· D must include in answer, answer to amended complaint, or motion to dismiss or lose them FRCP 12(h)(1)

· D must raise the issue and the D must prove it

· SOL is a common affirmative defense

· 15(a) says you may amend an answer to insert affirmative defense

f. Counter Claim and Cross Claim (sword)

i. FRCP 13(a) − Compulsory Counterclaims must be brought or lost

· Must arise from same T&O weigh following factors

§ Logical relationship between the claims for them to be compulsory (liberal view)

§ Substantially the same evidence/facts – If the same evidence would substantially dispose of the issues raised by the opposing claims then the counterclaims are compulsory; if not, then they are permissive

§ Substantially same law applies

ii. FRCP 13(b) − Permissive Counterclaims may be brought but do not have to; different T&O

iii. FRCP 13(g) − Cross-Claim against Co-Party may be brought if same T&O as any of claims or counter-claims

iv. Purpose

· Judicial efficiency − same jury, same case load

· Consistency − Courts could rule differently on the same case or issue if raised at different times in different courts

· Destroys P’s image

Type of Claim	Against	Same T&O	Different T&O
Counter	Opposing Party	Compulsory 13(a) Must be brought	Permissive 13(b) May be brought
Cross	Co-party	13(g) May be brought	13(g) Cannot bring

v. Wigglesworth v. Teamster’s Union
Facts: During union meetings, Wigglesworth was prevented from exercising his free speech rights. After the complaint was filed, Wigglesworth holds a press conference at which he accused the union of being mafia run and that certain union elections had been fixed. Δ files counterclaim. Δ files motion to dismiss under 12(b)(1). Motion to dismiss granted.
Rule: Test for same Transaction and Occurrence:
Logical relationship between the claims for them to be compulsory (liberal view)
Substantially the same evidence/facts – If the same evidence would substantially dispose of the issues raised by the opposing claims, then the counterclaims are compulsory; if not, then they are permissive
Substantially same law applies
NOTE: All of the above factors do not need to be met for there to be same transaction and occurrence

C. Amended Pleadings

1. Process for amending

a. FRCP 15(a) − Party allowed to amend once as of right

i. Before a responsive pleading is served or

ii. If no responsive pleading is permitted, the party may amend within 20 days after it is served

Otherwise may only amend by:

(1) leave of the court or

(2) stipulation of the parties.

Leave shall be freely given as justice so requires

b. FRCP 15(b) − When issues not raised in the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of both parties, they shall be treated as if they are part of the pleadings. Amended pleading allowed, but not required

c. If a disfavored Rule 12 motion is not brought in the answer, you can still amend the answer to include this Rule 12 motion so long as it is in the 20 day period

2. Standard for the court to allow a party to amend

a. Leave to amend will be given freely when justice so requires

3. Factors the court will take into account in denying leave to amend:

a. Undue delay

b. Bad faith

c. Prejudice to the opposing party

4. Relation back of an amended pleading

a. FRCP 15(c) − Relation back of amendment

i. 15(c)(2) − Relation back of a claim – amending to add a new claim when the statute of limitations has run from the original service of the pleading, must be same T&O (T&O test as above)

ii. 15(c)(3) − Relation back of a party − changing a party’s name or adding a party

· Change the D or the name of the D

· Name T&O (T&O test as above)

· Timing of notice – date of filing of original complaint + 120 days (Rule 4(m))

· Form of notice

§ Can be informal, just need to notify the party

· D is aware that but for a mistake of identity, he would have been named

§ Some jurisdictions say ignorance is not a mistake

iii. Swartz v. Gold Dust Casino
Facts: Swartz falls down stairs at the Gold Dust Casino. She alleges that the stair were thread bare, worn and slippery. Also, the stair violates the building code. Π files and serves a complaint against Gold Dust and Does I through V for negligence. Δ answers by denying the allegations. After discovery and interrogatories, Π discovered the true identity of Doe I and requests leave to amend their complaint. Δ files motion for summary judgment. Judge denies the motion for summary judgment. Motion for leave to amend is granted. Amended complaint is filed and served upon John Cavanaugh. Δ Cavanaugh raises 2-year statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in answer to amended complaint and moves for judgment on the pleadings.
Rule: Meets requirements for relation back

· Changing the party or changing the name of the party − Yes, Doe I becomes Cavanaugh

· Same transaction and occurrence − Yes, same day, same woman, same stairs (facts and evidence are the same); they are both negligence claims (doesn’t have to be the exact same claim)

· Timing of the notice − Notice (not filing) within 120 days of the filing of the complaint; ONLY NOTICE OF THE COMPLAINT IS REQUIRED, NOT FILING

· Form of notice − Cavanaugh got the amended complaint in the motion for leave to amend, also companies are so overlapped it is reasonable to assume that Cavanaugh would have known of the action

· But for a mistake about identity − Cavanaugh knew but for a mistake of identity that they would have been sued
Cavanaugh would argue wasn’t a mistake, it was ignorance

iv. David v. Crompton & Knowles
Rule: Meets the requirements for relation back

· Change the defendant − Yes, change Crompton to Hunter

· Same T&O − Yes, same accident, law, etc.

· Timing of notice − Maybe, Hunter is a division of Crompton (overlap of corporate entities)

· Form of notice − yes

· But for a mistake − Hunter would recognize that they would be on the hook for the machine; David thought Crompton was the manufacture. Maybe a mistake about ownership rights, not who is the manufacturer

D. Rule 11

1. FRCP 11(a) − Failure to sign a pleading, written motion or other written paper

2. FRCP 11(b) − In representations to the court attorney is certifying that he has made a reasonable inquiry and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief

a. No improper purpose

b. Claims, defenses or other legal contentions are supported by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for the extension of existing law

c. Allegations have evidentiary support

d. Denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief

3. FRCP 11(c) − Sanctions

4. FRCP 11(d) − Rule 11 sanctions do not apply to discovery (Rules 26-37)

5. Rule 11 Sanctions Process – 11(b)

a. Basis under 11(b)(1)-(4)

i. 11(b)(1) − Improper purpose, including delay

ii. 11(b)(2) − No basis in existing law
(two components, only have to meet one)

· Subjective − must believe had legal argument

· Objective − must actually have legal argument

iii. 11(b)(3) − No basis in evidence for the allegation or assertion

iv. 11(b)(4) − No basis in evidence for the denial

v. Creates standards/duty

vi. Notwithstanding your good faith if knowledge or information was not reasonably researched, subject to sanctions

b. Initiating Process − by motion or by court (no safe harbor when court initiates)

i. Serve motion on party who then has 21 days to correct problem or motion is filed in court

ii. Motion has to describe conduct

iii. Motion has to be separate from any other motion

c. Decision Process

i. Court has to give party chance to respond

ii. Describe conduct explicitly

iii. Describe basis for sanctions

d. Discretion

i. Can violate the basis and not be sanctioned

e. Type of Sanctions

i. Designed to deter not to compensate, because court was using as cost shifting mechanism

ii. Only strong enough sanction to deter conduct

iii. Court can refer to state bar, or to go to school, reprimand

iv. A represented party can be sanctioned

· Not monetary if basis is 11(b)(2) because client is not expected to know the law

v. Attorney’s fees and costs only available on motion

f. Target

i. Attorney

ii. Firm

iii. Party

Identify the action

Basis for sanction

Initiation

Decision

Process

Discretion

Types of Sanctions

Target of Sanction

Signing

11(a): Failure to sign paper

Notify party, court

N/A

Shall. 11(a)

No other option

Strike

N/A

Signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating position with…

-improper purpose (b)(1)

-no basis in law (b)(2)

-no basis in evidence for allegation or assertion (b)(3)

-no basis in evidence for denial (b)(4)

Sanctioned if frivolous either:

-subjectively (belief) or

-objectively (no reasonable inquiry; frivolous legal argument) 11(b)

Party’s motion:

-serve 21 days before filing (safe harbor)

-describe conduct

-only if not corrected

-not combine with other motion 11(c)(1)(A)

Court:

-order to show cause (OSC)

-describe conduct at issue 11(c)(1)(B)

Notice and opportunity to respond 11(c)

Order:

-describe conduct

-explain basis for sanction 11(c)(3)

May. 11(c) Can use discretion

Goal: Deter, not compensate 11(c)(2)

Options:

-nonmonetary directive (go to classes)

-monetary fine to court

pay other side’s attorney’s fees or costs 11(c)(2)

Restrictions:

-represented party not pay money under (b)(2). 11(c)(2)(A)

-attorney’s fees and costs only if on motion. 11(c)(2)

-no monetary sanction on court’s initiative unless OSC before voluntary dismissal or settlement. 11(c)(2)(B)

Party, attorney, law firm, or combination. 11(c)

6. Zuk
Facts: Zuk, psychologist, had EPPI record therapy sessions for rental. Writes books that has transcripts from session and gets copyright. Zuk furloughed (fired). Zuk requests copies of the tapes. EPPI ignores the requests. Requests them again 1994. Requests are denied.
Rule:

DISCOVERY

III. Discovery

A. Analyze

1. Proper use of device

a. Must be described with reasonable particularity

2. Responsive

a. Did the party ask for it?

3. Relevance − Rule 26(b)(1)

a. Reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence pertaining to claim or defense

i. Merits

ii. Background

iii. Impeach/Corroborate

iv. Clues

Ø If relevant to claim or defense do not need to make showing

Ø If relevant to subject matter, burden of proof shifts to party seeking discovery (need court order and good cause shown)

4. Protected

a. Privacy − Rule 26(c)

i. Annoyance, embarrassment

ii. Undue burden or expense − Rule 26(b)(2)

· Other means, source for same information

· Already been ample opportunity for discovery

· Rule 26(b)(2)(iii)

§ How much is it in controversy

§ What are parties’ resources

§ Needs of case

§ How relevant

§ What are important issues

§ Are there alternative sources of information

§ Consider models of adjudication

iii. Trade secrets − Rule 26(c)(7)

· Economic detriment

· Secret not generally known

· Injury has to be clearly defined, serious injury

· Competitive disadvantage

· Balance between harm of disclosure and necessity to litigation

b. Protective Order − Rule 26(c)

5. Privilege

a. Elements

i. With client (or prospective client)

· Upjohn − Modified control group test which stated that only those in corporation who are in a position to control or even take a substantial part in decision about any action which the corporation may take upon advice of attorney

§ Modification to protect parties (lower and mid-level employees) who disclose and in corporation will need lower level employees to disclose in order to find out what happened

ii. Legal advice

iii. Legal advisor

iv. Relate to advice

v. In confidence

6. Product − Rule 26(b)(3)

a. Prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial

b. By or for another party, or by of for that other party’s representative (including attorney)

· Party may obtain discovery of ORDINARY WORK PRODUCT (but not opinion work product) if:

i. Substantial need

ii. Party cannot get the substantial equivalent without undue hardship

· In ordering discovery of such materials, court shall protect against disclosure of mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of attorney or other representative (OPINION WORK PRODUCT)

§ Courts generally abide by this and protect against disclosure of opinion work product

§ 9th Circuit (minority view) − Allows discovery of opinion work product if (1) pivotal issue and (2) compelling need (not applied to attorney opinion work product)

v Must list in privilege log

B. Discovery Devices

1. Initial Disclosures − Rule 26(a)(1)

a. 26(a)(1)(A) − Party must disclose (provide or describe) what she is going to use to support her claim or defense (do not have to provide that which is harmful at this stage)

i. Potential witnesses (name, address, telephone)

ii. Documents

iii. Damages

iv. Insurance

2. Depositions − Rule 30

a. Testimony under oath that is recorded

b. Reasonable notice

c. Limited to 10 depositions

d. One day, seven hours per depositions

e. Only get to depose person once

f. Third parties can be deposed (special rules apply)

g. Rule 30(b)(6) − Describe in reasonable terms the category of person you want to depose, other side must provide the person that fits that category

h. Objections to form

i. Compound

ii. Confusing/Unintelligible

iii. Vague or ambiguous

iv. Misleading

v. Asked and answered

vi. Argumentative

vii. Mischaracterized witness testimony/Assumes facts not in evidence

· If objections not made at deposition, waive right for answer not to be admitted into evidence later

· Even after objection witness may answer, objections only serve to make answer inadmissible later

· Rule 30(d)(1)

§ Instruct not to answer

§ Privilege

§ Protective order in place or going to seek one

§ Any objection must be state concisely, speaking objections not permitted

3. Request for production (RFPs) − Rule 34

a. Describe a category with reasonable particularity

b. 30 days to respond (written response including objections)

c. Rule 34(b) − Produce those documents that are in producing party’s protection, control or custody (as kept or in categories, but not scrambled)

d. Rule 26(b)(5) − Privilege or work product

i. Materials that are attorney-client privilege

ii. Work product in preparation of litigation

· Privilege log − Must create a log of those items that are privileged, describe in general terms with objection

4. Interrogatories (Rogs) − Rule 33

a. Limited to 25 in number including subparts

b. 30 days to respond

i. Written answers by attorney and signed off by party

ii. Obligation to answer if reasonably obtainable

· Rule 33(d) − If have to look through a large amount of records can just give other party records in lieu of answering (shift burden to requesting party)

c. Contention interrogatories − Identify every fact (or all evidence) that supports your contention that X

i. Most courts will not allow early on

ii. Used to prove negative (to prove other side has no evidence of X)

5. Exams − Rule 35

a. Parties or those in care, custody or control of party (read narrowly)

b. Must be “in controversy”

c. Good cause shown

d. Must have stipulation by parties or court order

6. Request for admission (RFAs) − Rule 36

a. Extension of pleadings

C. Limitations on discovery

1. Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) − Undue burden

a. Outweighs likely benefits

b. Needs of case

c. Amount in controversy

d. Parties’ resources

e. Importance of the issue at stake

f. Importance of proposed discovery in resolving the issue

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

IV. Summary Judgment

A. Rule 56(a)

1. Claimant can move 20 days after commencement of action or after opposing party moves for summary judgment

B. Rule 56(b)

1. Defending party can move for summary judgment at any time

C. Rule 56(c)

1. Motion must be served at least 10 days before hearing (most courts require at least 21 days)

2. Standard − Summary judgment shall be granted if moving party makes showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

a. What is fact at issue and why is it material?

i. Material if relevant to an element or affirmative defense

b. Is there a genuine issue about it?

i. Is it plausible that could come out either way?

· Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.

§ Key fact − Was there police officer in store?

§ Material to whether there was a conspiracy

§ D did not come up with enough evidence to initiate

§ D cannot do nothing in moving for SJ, must make some kind of showing (vague as to what this requires)

· Celotex v. Catrett

§ Key fact − Was P exposed to D’s product?

§ Material to causation

§ Rather than showing through affirmative evidence, D made showing that absence of evidence on other side (contention interrogatories often used)

§ Absence of evidence − Courts are split on moving party’s burden

Ø Point out there is no evidence (just state)

Ø Point to evidence in record to show lack of evidence

D. Rule 56(f)

1. Not enough chance for discovery on issue (premature)

E. Burden of production − Whether party has sufficient evidence to go to trial

F. Burden of persuasion − Which party must convince trier of fact

G. Party with burden of proof moves

1. Every reasonable jury would conclude that it is more likely than not that moving party is right

2. Ex. − Every reasonable jury would conclude that it is more likely than not that Jacques threw the rock

a. Required to make initial showing

b. Only if initial showing is strongly supported does opposing party have to respond

i. Burden of opposing party is to provide enough evidence to undermine moving party’s evidence sufficiently such that a reasonable jury could conclude that moving party is not more likely than not right

H. Party who does not have burden of proof moves

1. No reasonable jury would conclude that more likely than not that party opposing summary judgment is right

2. Ex. − No reasonable jury would conclude that it is more likely than not that Jacques threw the rock

a. Initial showing − Logically would make sense not to require initial showing, but if this were the case could be used as a weapon too easily

· Celotex − Ambiguous which of two standard applies

o Either merely point out that other side has no evidence

o Or must do discovery to show that other side has no evidence

i. Burden of opposing party is to provide enough evidence that a reasonable jury could conclude that it is more likely than not right

ii. Note that since party opposing summary judgment will have burden of persuasion at trial, if moving party has met its burden, simply attacking the moving party’s evidence will not suffice to survive summary judgment

For More information How You Can Use Some of These Pro Se Civil Litigation Guidelines To Effectively Challenge and Successfully Win Your Wrongful Foreclosure and Save Your Home Visit http://www.fightforeclosure.net

What Homeowners Needs To Know About MERS

03 Wednesday Jul 2013

Posted by BNG in Affirmative Defenses, Appeal, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Litigation Strategies, MERS, Non-Judicial States, Pleadings, Securitization, Trial Strategies

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Lien, MERS, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Mortgage law, Mortgage loan, Promissory note, Real property, United States

In 1993, key residential mortgage lending industry participants1 gathered in order to bring then current developments in technology to the forefront in the establishment of a central, electronic registry for tracking interests in mortgage loans, thereby facilitating the transfer, acquisition and identification of those interests for custodians, servicers, investors and other participants in the industry. The goal was to eliminate the need and administrative expense for paper assignments of various mortgage-related rights as much as possible. The result of these efforts was the creation of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, known as the MERS® System.2

Prior to the development of the MERS® System, when an interest in a mortgage loan was transferred, the parties would often change the mortgagee by assigning and recording the security instrument in the land records.3 Mortgage loans were frequently originated in the name of one lender and then transferred to aggregators, which might transfer contractual servicing rights to still another party. In each case, an assignment was recorded so that the purchaser or servicer would appear in the land records4 so that they would receive service of process and other legal notices as the lienholder in the public land records. To complicate matters further, when the servicing remained with the seller, the seller often remained mortgagee of record. If servicing changed hands, the land records were updated only if the new servicer wanted to receive service of process.5 This process could take a long time to complete—up to six months for a modest loan portfolio. County recorder offices struggled to manage the volume of filings, which threatened the integrity of the land title recordation system and jeopardized the ability of consumers to obtain residential mortgage loans. Error rates as high as 33% were common, with assignments recorded in the wrong sequence or missing altogether—clouding title to properties.6

The founders of the MERS® System intended for it to be a system that was open and available to mortgage industry participants, applying information technology to reduce costs and streamline the process, similar to implementation by the securities industry of book entry systems.

The stated benefits of the initially proposed MERS® System concept7 were:

a. Elimination of the need for subsequent assignments of the mortgage lien following closing of a loan.

b. Significant simplification of the loan tracking process.

c. Improvement of the lien release process.

d. Assistance in fraud reduction.

e. Simplification of procedures for delivering legal notices to mortgagees by providing an accurate database of beneficial owners of mortgage rights.

f. Cost reduction through voluntary immobilization of the mortgage note.8

The MERS® System was put into effect with the organization of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS Inc.”), which serves as “mortgagee”, “grantee” or “beneficiary” (depending on state law; we will use the term “mortgagee” to refer to all three) in the security instrument, as nominee for the original lender and subsequent beneficial owners of the secured note. MERS Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of MERSCORP Holdings, Inc. (“MERSCORP Holdings”), which is owned by certain member financial institutions that utilize its services. The industry leaders, having worked hard to develop and achieve these laudable and practical goals, clearly had no idea what would befall the residential mortgage industry, nor how their motives and intentions would be twisted and vilified by critics in the current economic downturn.9

The Principles of MERS

The principles behind the MERS® System were derived from similar principles governing the establishment and function of the book entry registration and transfer system for securities established by The Depository Trust Company (“DTC”). Like the MERS® System, DTC is a member-owned institution that was created for the benefit of broker-dealer participants to facilitate transfers of securities in the securities markets. The benefits to the efficiency of securities transfers brought about by DTC have been clearly demonstrated and widely accepted.10 Much as “Cede & Co.” (the nominee holder of title to securities for DTC) does for beneficial owners of securities in the securities markets, MERS Inc. acts as the nominee of the lender (and its successors and assigns), who are beneficial owners of mortgage loans in the mortgage industry. In so doing, MERS Inc. becomes the mortgagee or beneficiary of record for the related mortgages and/or deeds of trust, for the benefit of the lender participants in the MERS® System.

To understand how the MERS® System operates, it is important to clarify the basic elements of a mortgage loan, which typically consists of two documents: (i) a promissory note between the lender and the borrower that sets forth the terms of the loan and establishes the obligation of the borrower to repay the loan secured by real property; and, (ii) a security instrument, which may be called a “mortgage,” “deed of trust” or a “security deed” (depending on state law; we will use the term “mortgage” to refer to all three), evidencing the pledge of the purchased or refinanced property as collateral or security for the loan. The mortgage is recorded in the real property records in order to provide public notice to third parties of the security interest encumbering the property. Sometimes the terms “note” and “mortgage” have been used interchangeably, resulting in confusion. They represent two different documents with separate but interrelated functions. For that reason, as discussed below and based on long-standing case law and regulations, it is not necessary that both documents be in the name of the same person or entity.

It is also important to understand what the MERS® System is and what it is not. Under the MERS® System, MERS Inc. and its parent, MERSCORP Holdings, serve two distinct functions. First, MERSCORP Holdings owns, operates and maintains the MERS® System, which is an electronic database or registry of mortgage loans that tracks changes in servicing rights and beneficial ownership interests in residential mortgage loans. Second, MERS Inc. serves as the mortgagee or beneficiary of record, or holder of the mortgage lien, in the public land records for the benefit of its members.

MERS Inc. claims no right to retain payments made on the promissory notes. It is not a mortgage banker. MERS Inc. does not take applications, underwrite loans, make decisions on whether to extend credit, collect mortgage payments, hold escrows for taxes and insurance or provide any loan servicing functions. MERS Inc. does not lend money or acquire the right to receive payments on mortgage loans. MERS Inc. does not receive compensation from consumers, just fees from its members.11

The bifurcation of roles and parties was not instituted by MERS Inc., rather it has a long history in mortgage finance and other developing commercial operations and in fact has been incorporated into state laws and regulations as will be discussed below.12 Where the mortgage (or an assignment thereof) names MERS Inc. as the mortgagee (or assignee of the mortgagee), then MERS Inc. has legal title13 to the real estate interest serving as collateral for the repayment of the loan, and the owner(s) of the note owns the beneficial interest in the loan secured by the mortgage. In such capacity, MERS Inc. remains the mortgagee of record, and pursuant to its contractual agreements with its members who are owners of the notes or servicers acting on behalf of the owners, any transfer of ownership or servicing must be communicated to the MERS® System to enable it to track such changes in order to provide the owner and servicer with filings and communications that MERS Inc. receives in its capacity as mortgagee of record. The borrower deals with the loan servicer—not MERS Inc.—in all matters of payment, modification or default on the loan.

In mortgage (non-deed of trust) states, the operative document defining MERS Inc.’s rights and functions is the mortgage. MERS Inc. is neither a party to, nor named in, the promissory note. Representative language can be found in a typical form of mortgage naming MERS Inc. as the original mortgagee14, which identifies three parties: the borrower, the lender and MERS Inc. MERS Inc. is further described as a separate corporation that is acting as mortgagee solely as a nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns. Under the mortgage, the borrower mortgages, grants and conveys to MERS Inc. (solely as nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns) and to the successors and assigns of MERS Inc., the property described therein. Furthermore, the mortgage includes an acknowledgment from the borrower that MERS Inc. holds only legal title15 to the interests granted by the borrower, but if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS Inc. (as nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the rights to foreclose and sell the mortgaged property; and to take any action required of the lender, including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling the mortgage. Thus, the express language of the mortgage instrument authorizes MERS Inc. to act on behalf of the lender in serving as the legal titleholder and exercising any of the rights granted to the lender thereunder.

In deed of trust states, the operative document defining MERS Inc.’s rights and functions is the deed of trust. Representative language can be found in a typical form of deed of trust naming MERS Inc. as the original beneficiary16, which identifies four parties: the borrower, the lender, the trustee and MERS Inc. MERS Inc. is described as a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns. In addition, MERS Inc. and the successors and assigns of MERS Inc. are further designated as the beneficiary of the deed of trust (solely as nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns). Under the deed of trust, the borrower grants and conveys to the trustee, in trust, with power of sale, the property described therein. Furthermore, the deed of trust includes an acknowledgment from the borrower that MERS Inc. holds only legal title to the interests granted by the borrower, but if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS Inc. (as nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the rights to foreclose and sell the property; and to take any action required of the lender, including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling the deed of trust. Thus, the express language of the deed of trust also authorizes MERS Inc. to act on behalf of the lender in serving as the legal titleholder and exercising any of the rights granted to the lender thereunder.

The Myths of MERS

In this section, we will address some of the more prevalent myths surrounding the MERS® System that have been perpetuated by various MERS’ critics and we will explain the facts and legal analysis that clarify and dispel such myths.

MYTH: The MERS® System is fraudulent and illegal.

FACT: The MERS® System is based upon sound legal principles and its legal validity has been upheld by a vast majority of the courts.17 The MERS® System relies on established principles of real property law, the law of negotiable instruments, and basic contract law that will be discussed herein.18 Rules governing security interests in personal property under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) also support the legal model for the MERS® System.19 Courts have long recognized the validity of using a nominee or agent as mortgagee as may appear in the mortgage instrument for recording purposes on behalf of the note owner.20 Agency relationships may be established by private contract, and common law principles of principal and agent shall supplement the rules governing secured transactions pursuant to UCC §1-103(b). Under Article 9 of the UCC, it is not necessary to record a mortgage assignment when the mortgage note is transferred or sold.21 Moreover, under real estate law, legal title can remain in a mortgagee (such as MERS Inc.) without invalidating the security instrument even though another party owns or holds the related promissory note.22 Significantly, the original recorded mortgage remains in place and provides sufficient notice of the lien to third parties, which is the primary purpose of such lien recording provisions.23

State legislatures have also recognized the validity and appropriateness of the MERS® System. For example, as a result of questions raised about the MERS® System, the Minnesota Legislature passed an amendment to the Minnesota Recording Act that expressly permits nominees to record “[a]n assignment, satisfaction, release, or power of attorney to foreclose.”24 The amendment, frequently called “the MERS statute,” went into effect on August 1, 2004.25

The Minnesota “MERS statute” provides that:

“An assignment, satisfaction, release, or power of attorney to foreclose is entitled to be recorded in the office of the county recorder or filed with the registrar of titles and is sufficient to assign, satisfy, release, or authorize the foreclosure of a mortgage if:

(1) a mortgage is granted to a mortgagee as nominee or agent for a third party identified in the mortgage, and the third party’s successors and assigns;

(2) a subsequent assignment, satisfaction, release of the mortgage, or power of attorney to foreclose the mortgage, is executed by the mortgagee or the third party, its successors or assigns; and

(3) the assignment, satisfaction, release, or power of attorney to foreclose is in recordable form.”26

In addition, under the Texas Property Code, the definition of “mortgagee” expressly includes a “book entry system,” which is defined as a national book entry system for registering a beneficial interest in a security instrument that acts as a nominee for the grantee, beneficiary, owner, or holder of the security instrument and its successors and assigns. 27 The definition of “book entry system” has been construed by several Texas courts to specifically include the MERS® System.28

MYTH: MERS Inc. lacks authority to act as mortgagee/beneficiary of record.

FACT: The authority of MERS Inc. to act as mortgagee/beneficiary of record is delegated by MERS’ members pursuant to well-established principles of property and agency law. Under general agency law, an agent has authority to act on behalf of its principal where the principal “manifests assent” to the agent “that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests or otherwise consents to so act.”29 Under the terms of the FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Security Instrument form of mortgage, MERS Inc. has the right to exercise any or all rights of the lender and its successors and assigns, including, but not limited to, the rights to foreclose and sell the mortgaged property, and to take any action required of the lender including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling the mortgage. Courts throughout the country have recognized that a lender who holds the beneficial interest in a loan may lawfully designate MERS Inc. as its nominee to hold legal title to the mortgage and serve as mortgagee of record, and have routinely enforced the provisions of mortgages in which MERS Inc. is named the mortgagee of record.30

MYTH: MERS Inc. does not have standing or authority to foreclose or seek relief from an automatic stay in bankruptcy.31

FACT: The concept of standing means that a party must have a legal interest or claim or the right to seek judicial enforcement of an obligation or action for relief in order to initiate a lawsuit or proceed in a legal action. Numerous courts have considered whether MERS Inc. is a real party in interest with standing to foreclose on a property or to move for relief from the automatic stay in bankruptcy (which prohibits creditors from pursuing any remedies upon a debtor’s bankruptcy filing). MERS Inc. has such interest and authority both (1) by express contractual terms, and (2) by law. First, the form of mortgage that appoints MERS as mortgagee and the MERS member agreement each grants MERS Inc. the authority to take action on behalf of a lender and its successors and assigns, including the enforcement of the rights and remedies under the mortgage. Specifically, the express language of a typical mortgage (where MERS Inc. is the mortgagee) provides that “if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS Inc. (as nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the [mortgaged property]; and to take any action required of lender including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this [mortgage].” Second, Section 5.4(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) specifically provides that “[a] mortgage may be enforced only by, or on behalf of, a person who is entitled to enforce the obligation the mortgage secures”.32 Courts throughout the country have routinely and consistently held that MERS Inc. has both standing and authority to foreclose and seek relief on behalf of the beneficial owners of mortgage loans.33 The court in In re Huggins identified four reasons why MERS Inc. has standing to seek relief from an automatic stay in bankruptcy. “First, MERS is acting as nominee for [the noteholder], which holds the note . . . second, MERS is the record mortgagee under the Mortgage with the powers expressly set forth therein, including the power of sale . . . third, the Massachusetts foreclosure statute expressly authorizes the exercise of sale powers by a mortgagee, or person authorized to sell, precisely the position occupied by MERS . . . finally, a denial of MERS foreclosure right as mortgagee would lead to anomalous and perhaps inequitable results, to wit, if MERS cannot foreclose though named as mortgagee, then either [the noteholder] can foreclose though not named as a mortgagee or no one can foreclose, outcomes not reasonably or demonstrably intended by the parties.”34

However, there are also several minority decisions that, in some form, have taken issue with MERS Inc.’s authority to foreclose.35 None of them, to our knowledge, has invalidated a mortgage for which MERS is the nominee, and none of these decisions has challenged MERS Holdings’ ability to operate as a central system to track changes in the ownership and servicing of loans. Several decisions adverse to MERS Inc. have been reversed upon appeal, vacated or clarified by other court decisions.36

Notwithstanding the foregoing, in July 2011, MERS revised its Rules of Membership to prohibit the initiation of foreclosures in the name of MERS Inc. Under the revised rule37, MERS members are required to cause MERS Inc., through a MERS signing officer, to execute an assignment of the mortgage lien from MERS Inc. to the servicer, investor or a third party, prior to the initiation of a foreclosure proceeding or the commencement of an action for relief of an automatic stay in bankruptcy.

MYTH: The MERS® System creates an impermissible “split” between the mortgage and the note.

FACT: There is no “split” between the mortgage and the note because MERS Inc. holds the mortgage as mortgagee and nominee or agent for the Lender and its successors and assigns.38 MERS Inc. only appears in the security instrument and acts as a mortgagee of record in a nominee or agency capacity for the beneficial owner of the note.39

While litigants and critics continue to raise the issue that the use of MERS Inc. results in a purported impermissible split of the note from the mortgage, thereby rendering both unenforceable, their arguments have been consistently rejected by the courts. For example, in a recent Ninth Circuit case, Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc., et al.,40 the plaintiff class alleged conspiracies by their respective lenders and others to use MERS Inc. to commit fraud as a sham beneficiary, among other things. The court found that plaintiffs failed to identify any representations made about the MERS® System and its role in their loans that were false and material; none of the plaintiffs’ allegations indicated that they were misinformed either about MERS Inc.’s role as a beneficiary or the possibility that their loans would be resold and tracked through the MERS® System; and they failed to show that the designation of MERS Inc. as beneficiary caused them any injury by, for example, affecting the terms of their loans, their ability to repay the loans or their obligations as borrowers.41 The court reviewed the express language of the documents the borrowers signed containing the substance of disclosure explained above and found that by executing the documents the plaintiffs agreed to the terms and were on notice of their content.42 “[T]he notes and deeds [mortgages] are not irreparably split: the split only renders the mortgage unenforceable if MERS or the trustee, as nominal holders of the deeds, are not agents of the lenders.”43 This distinction goes to the crux of the argument and the MERS critics. If a debt represented by a note is secured by collateral, then such collateral may not be separated from the note; although it may be held in the name of a different party as nominee or agent for the owner of the note; that is, the security follows the debt and in fact is released upon payment in full of such debt. MERS Inc. does not contend it acts in any capacity other than as mortgagee holding as agent or nominee for the lender. In a similar vein, recently a multi-district litigation (MDL) case involving MERS Inc. in Arizona was dismissed, citing in part the plaintiffs’ express agreement in the mortgages that MERS Inc. is the lienholder of record as agent for the lender and its assigns.44

The use of an agent to hold legal title in the mortgage while another holds a beneficial interest in the mortgage loan has a long history in the residential housing industry. For example, starting in the 1930s, mortgage lenders would originate and sell mortgage loans to investors under the Federal Housing Administration’s (“FHA”) insured loan program. The originating lenders would service and hold the mortgage loans, as mortgagee of record on behalf of the beneficial owners, whose names were not recorded in the county land records. Prior to the advent of residential mortgage securitization in the 1960s, it was common for two or more savings and loan associations to acquire a portfolio of mortgage loans and take participation interests therein. The participated mortgage loans were typically serviced by a mortgage loan servicer, as mortgagee of record on behalf of the various participants, whose names were also not recorded in the county land records. With the development of residential mortgage securitization in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Ginnie Mae, under its guarantee agreement, became the equitable owner of pooled loans while the originator or aggregator of the loans either remained or became the mortgagee of record and serviced the loans as an independent contractor for the benefit of investors in the Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed securities.45 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac followed suit using a similar model.

In addition, the Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) confirms that an agent may be used to enforce a mortgage on behalf of a note owner and even instructs that “[c]ourts should be vigorous in seeking to find such [an agency] relationship, since the result is otherwise likely to be a windfall for the mortgagor and the frustration of [the note owner’s] expectation of security.”46

Moreover, even the U.S. Bankruptcy Code accounts for this bifurcated structure by making it clear that a mortgage that is recorded in the name of a servicer that becomes a debtor in bankruptcy while it holds bare legal title to the mortgage does not become an asset of that servicer/debtor’s bankruptcy estate: “property in which a debtor holds . . . only legal title and not an equitable interest, such as a mortgage secured by real property, or an interest in such mortgage, sold by the debtor but as to which the debtor retains legal title to service or supervise . . . becomes property of the estate . . . only to the extent of the debtor’s legal title to such property, but not to the extent of any equitable interest in such property that the debtor does not hold.”47

MYTH: A transfer of the note requires a corresponding assignment of the mortgage.

FACT: A transfer of the mortgage note does not require a corresponding assignment of the mortgage. Under the MERS® System, MERS Inc. is named in the mortgage as nominee for the lender and its successors and assigns. The UCC, which has been adopted, with slight variations, by all 50 states, governs the transfer or sale of notes (whether they are determined to be negotiable or non-negotiable).48 However, the recordation of mortgages and requirements for their enforcement are governed by real estate law. This bifurcation of applicable law does not render their application mutually exclusive; rather, both the UCC and applicable real estate law in the respective jurisdiction must be complied with in order to have an enforceable note representing an obligation to pay, and an enforceable lien on the real property that is collateral for the note.

Under the UCC, a note sale or transfer is effective and enforceable upon meeting three criteria: (i) the buyer giving value, (ii) to a seller with rights in the note and (iii) execution of a security or purchase agreement that either describes the note or is accompanied by possession of the note.49

Once the note is sold or transferred such that the conveyance is enforceable or “attaches” as described above, there is a corresponding automatic transfer of the seller’s interest in the mortgage to the buyer. Section 9.203(g) of the UCC states “The attachment of a security interest [which includes the right of a buyer of the note] in a right to payment or performance secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property is also attachment of a security interest in the security interest, mortgage or other lien.”50 These UCC rules do not address priorities of the security interest in the underlying property, enforcement of the mortgage, or the impact of filing or non-filing.51 Those issues are governed by the real estate law of the jurisdiction in which the property is located. But it is clear that under the UCC, the transfer or sale of the note includes conveyance of seller’s interest in the underlying mortgage.52 In order for the buyer of the note to be comfortable about its ability to foreclose or take any other necessary steps to realize on the collateral, it must have a contractual relationship with the mortgagee of record. Under the MERS® System, that contractual relationship exists, and MERS Inc. has been granted the right and authority to act on behalf of the owner(s) of the note as well as the servicer of the note. The roles are outlined by contract among the parties which specifies their duties and responsibilities under both the UCC framework as well as the real property recordation system.

MYTH: The MERS® System makes it harder for home owners to identify the servicer and beneficial owners of their mortgage loans.

FACT: The MERS® System actually makes it easier for home owners to identify the servicer and beneficial owner of loans that are registered on the MERS® System. The servicer is the party primarily responsible for negotiating loan modifications and conducting foreclosure proceedings. If a mortgage loan has been securitized, the “owner” of the mortgage loan will typically be a trust, which under the terms of the related pooling and servicing agreement, has delegated all loan servicing authority to the servicer. Consequently, the servicer is the crucial contact for homeowners seeking to modify or renegotiate the terms of their loans due to financial hardships, and the identity of the servicer is readily available to troubled borrowers if their mortgage loan is registered with the MERS® System. The MERS® System maintains a toll-free number (888.679.6377) and an Internet website (www.mers-servicerid.org) that enable borrowers to identify the servicer, and in most cases, the beneficial owner of their mortgage loan, if their mortgage loan is registered on the MERS® System.53 New servicers and beneficial owners of a loan are required to identify themselves on the MERS® System within days of the actual transfer of interests.

In addition, homeowners have other statutorily-mandated access to such information. Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)54, mortgage loan servicers are required to notify borrowers when the servicing of their loan changes, and under recent changes to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)55, transferees of mortgage loans are now required to notify borrowers when the ownership of their mortgage loan changes. This seems axiomatic since otherwise the borrower would not know where to send payments. Furthermore, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act56 amended RESPA to require mortgage loan servicers to respond to qualified written requests from borrowers for the identity and address of the owner, or assignee, of their loan within ten business days after receipt thereof.57 These legislative and regulatory provisions validate and preserve the goals and intent of the original MERS system concept.

MYTH: MERS signing officers lack authority to act on behalf of MERS Inc.

FACT: MERS Inc. is a Delaware corporation and its actions are governed by its bylaws and the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). Under the DGCL, there is no requirement that an officer of a corporation be an employee of that corporation.58 In addition, under the DGCL, there is no requirement that individuals serving as officers of a corporation be employed or compensated by that corporation.

Under Delaware law, a corporation may by board resolution appoint officers to carry out the corporation’s business.59 In addition, Section 142(a) of the DGCL provides that “any number of offices may be held by the same person unless the certificate of incorporation or bylaws otherwise provide.”

Since MERS Inc. has no employees, a majority of the actions taken by MERS Inc. in its capacity as mortgagee under mortgages and/or deeds of trust are taken by designated officers commonly referred to as “certifying or signing officers.” The signing officers are generally officers of MERS’ members that are responsible for carrying out servicing functions on behalf of such MERS members.

The MERS Inc. signing officers are appointed pursuant to a corporate resolution, duly adopted pursuant to authority granted by the Board of Directors of MERS Inc. Pursuant to the corporate resolution, these signing officers are appointed as assistant secretaries, assistant vice presidents and vice presidents of MERS Inc. and their authority is limited to: (1) executing lien releases, (2) executing mortgage assignments, (3) executing foreclosure documents, (4) executing proofs of claims and other bankruptcy related documents (e.g., motions for relief of the automatic stay), (5) executing modification and subordination agreements needed for refinancing activities, (6) endorsing over checks made payable to MERS Inc. (in error) by borrowers, (7) taking such other actions and executing documents necessary to fulfill the MERS member’s servicing duties, and (8) taking such ministerial actions and, in such ministerial capacity, executing and delivering all such instruments and documents as the officer(s) of MERS Inc. deem necessary or appropriate in order to effectuate fully the purpose of each and all of the foregoing powers, in each case only with respect to the loan owned by the related member.60 In order to be eligible for appointment as a signing officer of MERS Inc., a person must demonstrate a basic knowledge of the MERS® System and pass an annual certifying examination administered by MERSCORP Holdings.

We are not aware of any relevant case law that would suggest that the MERS Inc. business model of appointing signing officers is either inappropriate or illegal. In fact, several courts have upheld the MERS Inc. signing officer business model.61

The propriety of the MERS Inc. signing officer business model has also been upheld in an ethics opinion from the New York State Bar Association62 which found that no conflict of interest exists in violation of New York state bar professional conduct rules when an attorney serves as an officer of the mortgagee of record/assignor for the purpose of executing a mortgage assignment and also represents the assignee in the prosecution of the subsequent foreclosure action.

Courts have consistently upheld the authority of MERS Inc., in its capacity as mortgagee, to assign mortgages.63 When plaintiffs have challenged the authority of MERS Inc. signing officers to execute assignments in connection with foreclosure or bankruptcy proceedings, courts have consistently found that such plaintiffs lack standing to challenge such assignments because they are not parties thereto and are not the intended beneficiaries thereof.64 Significantly, such plaintiffs have failed to articulate any correlation between the alleged lack of authority and a resulting harm to the plaintiff occasioned thereby.

MYTH: The MERS® System creates a cloud on real estate titles.

FACT: The servicer (acting on behalf of the beneficial owner(s) of the note) is the entity responsible for initiating and completing foreclosure actions and, as such, the servicer (not MERS Inc.) is the entity that is responsible for assuring that mortgage assignments and mortgage notes are properly assigned to the real party in interest (i.e., the servicer or the note owner) prior to the commencement of foreclosure proceedings. MERS® System members have a substantial interest in providing accurate and current information because they rely on the MERS® System to obtain current information about note owners and servicers, as well as to obtain or receive legal notices served on MERS Inc. as mortgagee of record.65 Using MERS Inc. as the mortgagee of record actually reduces the possibility of missed or incorrect assignments that would create an unclear “chain of title” as to who is the actual mortgagee or beneficiary of the security instrument. When MERS Inc. serves as mortgagee, the recorded chain of title to the mortgage starts with MERS Inc. at origination and ends with MERS Inc. when it either releases the lien or assigns the lien to another entity.66 The MERS® System also streamlines the lien release process, reducing research time and recording fees.

MYTH: The MERS® System usurps the function of local recording officials to track changes in ownership of real property.

FACT: The land records have never been an authoritative source for who owns beneficial interests in and servicing rights to mortgages.67 The primary purpose of land records was not to track mortgage loan ownership rights, but to provide public notice of liens filed against the property in order to protect the lienholder (and not the debtor).68 A mortgage and any assignment of mortgage is typically recorded to protect the lienholder, and is generally not required by the county; rather there are incentives to record and disincentives for not recording.69 When a loan is registered on the MERS® System, the MERS member is required to record the mortgage (or assignment of mortgage) in the name of MERS Inc., at the loan owner’s expense, in the appropriate recording office.70 Thus, the public is placed on notice that MERS Inc. is the mortgagee of record for the benefit of its members, and MERS Inc., in its capacity as lienholder, holds a perfected security interest in the real property that is valid against other lenders, judgment creditors or potential purchasers of the mortgaged property. More importantly, the role of the MERS® System is not to record or track changes in ownership of real property; rather the MERS® System tracks non-recordable contract interests in servicing rights and ownership of promissory notes secured by the related property for the benefit of MERS Inc. members. Consequently, the land records system continues to perform the services of recording ownership changes without usurpation by MERS Inc., and MERS Inc. performs the functions its members designed and created, both of which facilitate real estate ownership and financing by fulfilling their separate but interrelated roles.

One court considering the allegation of usurpation of a government function concluded: “Since the law does not require payment of a recording fee when new assignments are not recorded, and since the public is not using the ‘MERS private recording system’ to determine the true nature of encumbrances upon real estate, MERS is not usurping any governmental authority or power.”71

MYTH: The MERS® System is a revenue evasion tool that deprives counties of needed revenues.

FACT: Recording fees are paid upon filing the original mortgage naming MERS Inc. as mortgagee. The MERS® System merely reduces the need to pay additional recording fees associated with subsequent transfers of mortgage loans or mortgage loan servicing rights among MERS members. Avoidance of these fees (which is not illegal) does not constitute revenue evasion. Fees are paid in exchange for a service. If the service is not required or necessary, then there is no “lost” revenue.72 As even one of the most vocal critics of MERS acknowledges, the real property records have become voluminous and difficult and expensive to search.73 Many county recording offices have not kept up with advances in technology or efficiency as other industries have, and simply were unable to efficiently and effectively handle the increasing volume of mortgage transactions as access to capital markets gave more consumers the ability to buy homes. Thus spawned the innovations and creativity of the private market and the development of the MERS® System. However, it is also important to note that the transaction volume for which county recorders would receive a fee should not decrease due to the use of the MERS® System from pre-securitization levels. MERS facilitates transfers of the note from originator to aggregator to depositor to trust—a minimum of three transfers in a short period of time—that did not occur prior to the development of the securitization market. A new mortgage or a release of mortgage must still be recorded any time that the borrower refinances or pays off her mortgage. Therefore, filing fees will still be paid for the several ongoing transactions requiring a filing in the public records. In a recent case brought against MERS Inc. by a county to recover damages for alleged intentional failure to record assignments and claiming unjust enrichment and civil conspiracy, the District Court held that, “There is simply no requirement to record assignments under Iowa law. To the extent the County’s claims rely on such a requirement, they fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”74

MYTH: The MERS® System created or enabled securitization.

FACT: Securitization existed long before the development of the MERS® System. The earliest securitized transactions date back to the early 1970s and were the sales of pooled mortgage loans by the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae). These transactions were followed by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) in the early 1980s. The MERS® System did not originate until the mid-1990s. It is true that the MERS® System has facilitated the ease and efficiency with which securitization transactions are conducted, and this has been positive for bringing affordable financing options to more people. Securitization itself is not an evil to be vilified or destroyed. As Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said in announcing the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) in February 2009, “No financial recovery plan will be successful unless it helps restart securitization markets for sound loans made to consumers and businesses.”75

The Merits of MERS

To hear some commentators characterize the MERS® System,76 one might think that it is a nefarious scheme of the financial oligarchy to obfuscate real property records, deprive tax-paying citizens of knowledge concerning the ownership of their mortgage loans and divest overburdened county recorders of direly needed revenue from recording fees. That is simply not the case. The MERS® System is a perfectly legal and valid system for the electronic registration and tracking of beneficial ownership of mortgage loans and servicing rights. It was created by some of the leading participants in the mortgage industry77 for the purpose of facilitating the operation of the secondary mortgage market. It has substantially increased the efficiency of mortgage loan transfers within the secondary mortgage market, and has played a significant role in establishing the U.S. housing market, despite recent troubles, as the envy of the free market world.78

Since its inception in 1995, the MERS® System has become a critical component of the American mortgage finance industry.79 More than 74 million mortgages have been recorded in the name of MERS Inc., of which 27 million are currently active. The MERS® System has streamlined the way residential and commercial mortgage loans are sold, traded and securitized by eliminating the need to prepare and record separate assignments of the mortgage lien. By doing so, the MERS® System has saved consumers, investors, and the mortgage industry millions of dollars each year in recording fees and related costs as well as reduced the problems and errors associated with multiple filings, and reduced delays in transactions.80

In addition to providing an electronic registration and tracking system to track conveyances of mortgage loans and servicing rights in the secondary market, the MERS® System creates accountability and transparency, helps reduce recordation costs (which may ultimately benefit the borrower), reduces the risk of errors in recordkeeping, eliminates breaks in the chain of title and makes it easier to keep track of liens as loans are sold to other investors.81 In addition, the MERS® System fills an information void that county recorders cannot provide—the identity of the current servicer and beneficial owner of the mortgage loan. Furthermore, the current and easily accessible information on the MERS® System assists homeowners, lenders and title insurers in arranging for consolidations, loan modifications, payoff statements, deeds in lieu of foreclosure, short sales and releases.

The MERS Mortgage Identification Number, or “MIN”, which assigns a unique identifying number to each loan for the life of the loan, and the MERS® System have been fully integrated into the U.S. mortgage loan industry, and together they are the single most important existing tools for tracking loan level data in the home loan process.82 Through its use of MIN, the MERS® System helps:

Identify for homeowners the servicer and, in most cases, the beneficial owner of their mortgage loans;
Investors and credit rating agencies analyze the credit quality of mortgaged-backed securities;
Regulators monitoring compliance with the law;
Public agencies track housing and economic trends;
Local governments identify the parties responsible for maintaining vacant properties in connection with neighborhood preservation efforts;83
Keep distressed borrowers in their homes by speeding up the modification process; and
Law enforcement officials fight fraud by tracking down criminals who attempt to obtain multiple loans secured by the same property.

Conclusion

While the recent recession brought one of the worst economic calamities experienced in several generations, it is disingenuous to attribute its cause, even in part, to a process and structure designed to facilitate efficiency and home ownership and bring about modernization long overdue in the mortgage finance industry, particularly one that had been modeled after a similar system successfully implemented by DTC in the securities industry. Homeowners who are facing foreclosure for failure to pay their respective mortgage loans may present a sympathetic cause, but the fact of the matter is that many participants in the residential mortgage process share in the blame for an overheated and unsustainable market. But none of this should overshadow the legitimate benefits brought to the mortgage industry by the MERS® System.

In sum, through thousands of lawsuits, many of which were held to be without merit, MERS Inc. has established that the process and structure of the MERS® System are based upon sound legal principles. Mistakes have been made, and improvements to the process have been implemented to ensure that the MERS® System will continue to serve and advance the goal of providing efficient and effective mortgage tracking. But those detractors who allege deceptive practices, flawed systems, and conspiracies have been, and will continue to be, proven without merit. In some cases, they seem to be more interested in obfuscating the issue of a lender pursuing its rightful claim to collateral upon default of a loan rather than bringing transparency or improvement to a process that, while not perfect, functioned fairly well. In those areas where deficiencies have been discovered or improvements identified, MERS Inc. and its members have been quick to respond. We would all do well to learn the lessons from the recent fiscal calamity and work to bring about prudent and appropriate changes to rebuild a vibrant and transparent mortgage finance market that continues to include, and benefit from, the MERS® System.

1. Participants included the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).

2. See Phyllis K. Slesinger & Daniel McLaughlin, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 31 Idaho Law Review 805 (1995).

3. Allen H. Jones, Setting the Record Straight on MERS, MORTGAGE BANKING 34 (May 2011).

4. Slesinger & Mclaughlin, supra note 2, at 809.

5. Jones, supra note 3 at 36.

6. R.K. Arnold, Yes, There is Life on MERS, 11 PROB. & PROP. 33, 34 (1997); Jones, supra note 3, at 36.

7. Slesinger & Mclaughlin, supra note 2, at 817.

8. Id. Under the initial MERS concept, the mortgage note would be immobilized through the development of standardized document custodian eligibility requirements or ratings to increase confidence in any particular custodian. Due to resistance by mortgage loan servicers, this aspect of the MERS concept was eliminated.

9. See Christopher L. Peterson, Two Faces: Demystifying the Mortgage Electronic Registration System’s Land Title Theory, 53 William and Mary Law Review 1 (October 2011); see also, Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 University of Cincinnati Law Review 4 (Summer 2010); David. E. Woolley and Lisa D. Herzog, MERS: The Unreported Effects of Lost Chain of Title on Real Property Owners, 8 Hastings Business Law Journal, 365 (Summer 2012).

10. According to its website (www.dtcc.com/about/business), DTC provides custody and asset servicing for more than 3.6 million securities issues from the United States and 121 other countries and territories, valued at US$36.5 trillion. In 2010, DTC settled nearly US$1.66 quadrillion in securities transactions.

11. See Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance, 704 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Neb. Oct. 21, 2005).

12. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.

13. As described below, in deed of trust states, the trustee technically holds legal title to the property, in trust, and MERS Inc. is named as beneficiary in the deed of trust, in a nominee capacity for the owner of the note. For purposes of this discussion, it is important to understand that one party may hold legal title to a mortgage while another party owns the beneficial interest therein. See infra note 15 and notes 38-47 and accompanying text.

14. A sample form of the FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Instrument with MERS as original mortgagee is available on the FHLMC’s website at http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifmers.html.

15. According to BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), “legal title” is “a [form of] title that evidences apparent authority but does not necessarily signify full and complete title or beneficial interest” in property. This differs from equitable title, or beneficial ownership, which gives the holder thereof the right to the use and economic benefit of the property.

16. A sample form of the FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Instrument with MERS as original beneficiary is available on the FHLMC’s website at http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifmers.html.

17. See, e.g., MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81 (N.Y. 2006) (N.Y. court of appeals found that recording MERS instruments did not violate New York recording statutes and ordered the county clerk to accept MERS mortgages, MERS assignments and other MERS instruments); Jackson v. Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009) (court held that case law establishes that a party can hold legal title to the security instrument without owning the promissory note; the cases demonstrate that an assignment of only the promissory note, which carries with it an equitable assignment of the security instrument, is not an assignment of legal title that must be recorded for purposes of a foreclosure [under the Minnesota statutory foreclosure scheme]); In re Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) Litigation, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1029 (D. Ariz. 2010) (court dismissed plaintiff’s claims alleging that the MERS system was fraudulent and that the MERS system facilitated fraudulent activity); In re Tucker, 441 B.R. 638 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2010) (finding that the language of the deed of trust clearly authorized MERS to act on behalf of the lender in serving as the legal title holder); Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc., et. al., 656 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011) (court upheld that MERS is a legitimate system for tracking transfers of home mortgage loans and that MERS’ interposition as record title holder to the deed of trust does not invalidate the transaction); Taylor v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 44 So. 3d 618 (Fla. 5th DCCA 2010) (found that the mortgage granted to MERS legal status as mortgagee, which MERS could assign to the foreclosing bank under the UCC); Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Bellestri, 2010 WL 2720802 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (finding that Bellistri’s failure to provide notice to MERS violated MERS’ constitutional due process rights); Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Traxler, 2010-Ohio-3940 (court recognized MERS’ authority to assign mortgage when designated as both nominee and mortgagee); Fuller v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys. Inc., United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division (Case No. 3:11-cv-1153-J-20MCR) (June 27, 2012) (court found that “MERS has not committed an unlawful act, or a lawful act by unlawful means” and that “the Florida courts have consistently affirmed the use of MERS as the designated mortgagee of record and the principle that MERS may serve as mortgagee or as nominee for the lender and the lender’s successors and assigns.”); Smith v. Saxon Mortgage, 446 Fed. Appx. 239 (11th Cir. 2011) (appellate court found that district court correctly held that the Security Deed granted MERS the power of sale and the authority to assign the security deed); Volkes v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, 2012 WL 642673 (appellate court found that district court correctly held that the MERS assignment was valid).

18. Clark and Clark, MERS Under Attack: Perspective on Recent Decisions from Kansas and Minnesota, CLARKS’ SECURED TRANSACTIONS MONTHLY, February 2010, at p.2.

19. Id.

20. Id. at 2, citing In re Cushman Bakery, 526 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 937 (1976). See also, Residential Funding Co., v. Saurman, 490 Mich. 909; 805 N.W.2d 183 (Mich. 2011) (“It has never been necessary that the mortgage should be given directly to the beneficiaries. The security is always made in trust to secure obligations, and the trust and the beneficial interest need not be in the same hands. The choice of a mortgagee is a matter of convenience.”) (quoting Adams v. Niemann, 46 Mich. 135, 137 (Mich. 1881)); Jackson v. MERS, Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009) (“A party can hold legal title to the security instrument without holding an interest in the promissory note.”); Boruchoff v. Ayvasian, 323 Mass. 1, 10 (Mass. 1948) (“[W]here a mortgage and the obligation secured thereby are held by different persons, the mortgage is regarded as an incident to the obligation, and, therefore, held in trust for the benefit of the owner of the obligation.”); First Nat’l Bank v. Nat’l Grain Corp., 131 A. 404, 406-07 (Conn. 1925) (“[A] mortgage may be held for the security of the real creditor, whether he is the party named as mortgagee or some other party, for the provisions of a mortgage are not necessarily personal to the mortgagee named. The real party in interest may be an assignee of the mortgagee or someone subrogated to his rights under the mortgage, or even a third person not answering either of these descriptions.”); Commercial Germania Trust and Sav. Bank v. White, 81 SO. 753, 754 (La. 1919) (“a mortgagor may make a mortgage in favor of a nominal . . . mortgagee”); Ogden State Bank v. Barker, 40 P. 769, 769 (Utah 1895) (“The mere fact that the mortgagee was not the real owner of the notes, but was simply a trustee or agent for the owners, does not affect the validity of the mortgage.”); Lawrenceville Cement Co. v. Parker, 15 N.Y.S. 577, 578 (Sup.Ct. 1891) (holding that bank official could hold mortgage, as mortgagee, for bank, which held the underlying promissory note).

21. See §9-203(g) of the UCC, which codifies the common law principle that the “mortgage follows the note.” In addition, by analogy, §9-310(c) of the UCC provides that if a secured party assigns a perfected security interest, an Article 9 filing is not required to continue the perfected status of the security interest against creditors from the original debtor. The original filing provides sufficient notice of the lien.

22. See infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.

23. See Clark and Clark, supra note 18, at p. 3; Plymouth County, Iowa v. Merscorp, Inc. et. al. (Case No. C-12-4022-MWB) (U.S. Dist. Ct., No. Dist. of Iowa, Western Div.) (Aug. 21, 2012) (there is no statute in Iowa that requires the recording of mortgages or assignments of mortgages, but the failure to record will render the mortgage or assignment void in favor of subsequent purchasers and existing creditors who are without notice). See also infra note 68 and accompanying text.

24. Act of Apr. 6, 2004, ch. 153, §2, 2004 Minn. Laws 76, 76-77 (codified at Minn. Stat. §507.413 (2008)).

25. Id.

26. Minn. Stat. §507.413(a).

27. See Tex. Prop. Code §§51.0001(4) and 51.0001(1).

28. See e.g., Richardson v. CitiMortgage, 2010 WL 4818556 (E.D.Tex. Nov. 22, 2010).

29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §1.01 (2006).

30. See, e.g., Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 97 (MERS is a “proper mortgagee” and MERS Mortgages are “proper conveyance[s]’ for purposes of the recording statute.”); Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pietranico, 928 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cty. 2011) (The mortgage “expressly grants MERS the right to act on behalf of the lender as required by law and custom, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the property and the right to take any action required of the Lender such as releasing and canceling the mortgage.”); U.S. Bank N.A. v. Flynn, 897 N.Y.S.2d 855, 857 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cty. 2010) (“MERS is acting as the nominee of the owner of the note and mortgage in which MERS is additionally designated as the mortgagee of record.”); Trent v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., Inc., 288 F. Appx. 571 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[MERS] is the mortgagee.”); In re MERS Litig., 744 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1027 (D. Ariz. 2010) (“”[F]rom the very language of the deeds of trust, to which Plaintiffs agreed in entering into their home loan transaction, MERS is still acting as the nominee for the current holder of the promissory note . . . Nevada case law universally holds that [MERS security instruments] are enforceable.”); Calif. ex. rel. Bates v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., 2011 WL 892646, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011) (The mortgage is “recorded in the public land records, making MERS the mortgagee of record.”); In re Tucker, 441 B.R. 638, 645 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2010) (“The language of the recorded Deed of Trust clearly authorizes MERS to act on behalf of the Lender in serving as the legal title holder to the beneficial interest under the Deed of Trust and exercising any of the rights granted to the Lender thereunder.”); Wade v. Meridias Cap., Inc., 2011 WL 997161, at *2 (D. Utah Mar. 17, 2011) (“MERS was appointed as the beneficiary and nominee for the Lender and its successors and assigns and granted power to act in their stead.”); Ciardi v. Lending Co., 2010 WL 2079735, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2010) (“To the extent Plaintiffs rely on a theory that the beneficiary must have an interest in the actual note, Plaintiffs have failed to cite any law so requiring.”).

31. As of July 22, 2011, MERS formally amended and implemented its Rules of Membership to provide that members are no longer authorized to initiate foreclosures in the name of MERS Inc. and an assignment of the mortgage from MERS Inc. to the foreclosing party must be recorded (informally suspended in February 2011).

32. Supra note 29 (emphasis added).

33. See, e.g., Eaton v. Federal National Mortgage Association, SJC-11041, 2012 WL 2349008 (Mass. June 22, 2012) (In order to exercise the statutory power of sale in Massachusetts, a mortgagee must either be the holder of the underlying promissory note or be acting under the authority of the note holder; physical possession of the mortgage note is not required in order to foreclose); Residential Funding Co. v. Saurman, 490 Mich. 909; 805 N.W.2d 183 (2011) (MERS Inc. is the owner of an interest in the indebtedness secured by the mortgage for purposes of Michigan statutory requirements and may thus conduct nonjudicial foreclosures by advertisement); Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1149, at 1156-57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (The court concluded that even if there was a legal basis for an action to determine if MERS had the authority to initiate foreclosure, the language in the deed of trust granted MERS authority to initiate a nonjudicial foreclosure); Payette v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. PC-2009-5875 (R.I. Supp. Ct. Aug. 22, 2011) (As a matter of contract, the mortgage signed by plaintiffs recognized MERS’ rights to act as nominee for IndyMac and for IndyMac’s “successors and assigns”); In re Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc. (MERS) Litig., No. 2:09-md-2119, 2010 WL 4038788, at *8 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2010) (“Plaintiffs have not cited any legal authority where the naming of MERS . . . was cause to enjoin a non-judicial foreclosure as wrongful.”); Commonwealth Property Advocates, LLC v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., Nos. 10-4182, 10-4193, 10-4215, 2011 WL 6739431, at *7 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2011) (affirming that MERS may foreclose as nominee for lender and its successors and assigns); Trent v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., Inc., 288 Fed. Appx. 571, 572 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Under the mortgage contracts, [MERS] has the legal right to foreclose on the debtors’ property. [MERS] is the mortgagee.”); Johnson v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., Inc., 252 Fed. Appx. 293, 294 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming summary judgment to MERS on foreclosure of plaintiff’s property); Nicholson v. OneWest Bank, 2010 WL 2732325, at *4 (N.D. Ga. April 20, 2010) (“[T]he nominee of the lender has the ability to foreclose on a debtor’s property even if such nominee does not have a beneficial interest in the note secured by the mortgage.”); Orzoff v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 2009 WL 4643229, at *9-10 (D. Nev. March 26, 2009) (“This Court has previously determined that MERS does have such standing [to participate in foreclosure proceedings, and] . . . Courts around the country have held the same.”); Swanson v. EMC Mort. Corp., Case No. CV F 09-1507 LJO DLB (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2009) (“MERS correctly notes that as [deed of trust] beneficiary, MERS is empowered to commence foreclosure proceedings . . .”); In re: Sina, No. A06-200, 2006 WL 2729544, at *2 (Minn. App., Sept. 26, 2006) (“Because MERS is the record assignee of the mortgage, we conclude that MERS had standing to foreclose); Silvas v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, No. CV-09-265-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 4573234, at *8 (D. Ariz. Jan. 5, 2010) (MERS empowered to foreclose where MERS is designated on deed of trust as beneficiary); Diessner v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1187-91 (D. Ariz. 2009) (MERS and trustee under deed of trust are authorized to institute non-judicial foreclosure proceeding); Reynoso v. Paul Financial, LLC, No. 09-3225 SC, 2009 WL 3833298, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2009) (naming of MERS as initial beneficiary under deed of trust, as nominee for the lender, and the subsequent transfer of the deed of trust from MERS to a transferee was effective and did not hinder transferee’s right to foreclose); Blau v. America’s Servicing Co., No. CV-08-773, 2009 WL 3174823, at *8 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2009) (MERS authorized under deed of trust to act on behalf of lender and transfer its interests); Farahani v. Cal-Western Recon. Corp., No. 09-194, 2009 WL 1309732, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. May, 2009) (MERS authorized to pursue non-judicial foreclosure action); Vazquez v. Aurora Loan Servs., No 2:08-cv-01800-RCJRJJ, 2009 WL 1076807, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 20, 2009) (loan documents sufficiently demonstrate MERS’ standing “with respect to the loan and the foreclosure”); Pfannenstiel v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., No. CIV S-08-2609, 2009 WL 347716, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2009) (dismissing plaintiff ’s claim that MERS lacked authority to foreclose); Trent v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., Inc., 288 Fed. Appx. 571, 572 (11th Cir. 2008) (MERS “has the legal right to foreclose on the debtors’ property” and “is the mortgagee”); Peyton v. Recontrust Co., No. TC021868, Notice of Ruling, at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. County of Los Angeles S. Cent. Dist. Oct. 15, 2008) (MERS may foreclose under California law); Johnson v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., 252 Fed. Appx. 293, 294 (11th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment for MERS on its action for foreclosure of plaintiff ’s property); In re Smith, 366 B.R. 149, 151 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007) (MERS has standing to conduct foreclosure on behalf of the beneficiary); Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Revoredo, 955 So.2d 33, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“Because, however, it is apparent – and we so hold – that no substantive rights, obligations or defenses are affected by use of the MERS device, there is no reason why mere form should overcome the salutary substance of permitting the use of this commercially effective means of business.”); Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Ventura, CV054003168S, 2006 WL 1230265, at *1 (Conn. Super. Apr. 20, 2006) (MERS is proper party in foreclosure); King v. American Mortgage Network, et. al., Case No. 1:09-CV-125 TS (D. Utah, Aug. 16, 2010) (court, interpreting the language of the deed of trust, held that MERS had the authority to initiate foreclosure proceedings, appoint a trustee and foreclosure and sell the mortgaged property); Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Coakley, 41 A.D.3d 674 (NY App. 2007) (court held that MERS had right to foreclose pursuant to the clear and unequivocal terms of the mortgage instrument).

34. 357 B.R. 180, 183 (Bank. D.Mass. 2006).

35. See Niday v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, Case No. A147430 (Or. Ct. App., Jul. 18, 2012) (appellate court held that, in connection with a non-judicial foreclosure, Oregon law requires a beneficiary of a trust deed to be a party to whom the underlying loan repayment obligations is owed) (Editor’s Note: as of the date of this article, the Niday case is on appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court); Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Graham, 44 Kan. App. 2d 547, 229 P.3d 420 (Kan. App. 2010) (having suffered no injury, MERS lacked standing to bring a foreclosure action); Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289, 297 (Me. 2010) (finding that MERS could not enforce the note and that the substitution of Deutsche Bank for MERS was proper); In re Box, No. 10-20086, 2010 WL 2228289, at *5 (Bankr W.D. Mo. June 3, 2010) (finding that MERS, as beneficiary and nominee under the deed of trust lacked authority to assign the mortgage note because it never “held” the note itself); In re Hawkins, No. BK-S-07-13593-LBR, 2009 WL 901766, at *3 (Bankr. D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2009) (finding that MERS was not a true “beneficiary” under a deed of trust, that, under the UCC, MERS was not entitled to enforce the note, and that “[i]n order to foreclose, MERS must establish there has been a sufficient transfer of both the note and deed of trust, or that it has authority under state law to act for the note’s holder”); Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage Group, Inc. et. al. and Selkowitz v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP et. al. (No. 86206-1) (Wash. August 16, 2012). The Washington Supreme Court held that MERS Inc. is not a lawful beneficiary under the Washington Deed of Trust Act because it is not “the holder of the instrument or document evidencing the obligations secured by the deed of trust” as required thereunder; that is, if MERS Inc. never held the note, then it is not a lawful beneficiary. However, in response to MERS Inc.’s argument that lenders and their assigns may name it as their agent, the court stated, “That is likely true and nothing in this opinion should be construed to suggest that an agent cannot represent the holder of a note. Washington law, and the deed of trust act itself, approves of the use of agents.” No doubt that point will be made forcefully when the lower court proceeding resumes.

36. See, e.g., Residential Funding Corporation v. Saurman, 292 Mich. App. 321, 807 N.W.2d 412 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2011) (court held that MERS did not meet the requirements to non-judicially foreclose by advertisement because MERS did not own an “interest in the indebtedness” as required by the foreclosure statute), rev’d, 490 Mich. 909, 805 N.W.2d 183 (Mich., 2011); Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. v. George Azize, et. al., NO. 2D05-4544 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. Sept. 19, 2005) (trial court held that MERS was not a proper party to bring a foreclosure action), rev’d, 965 So.2d 151 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. Feb. 21, 2007); Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. v. Oscar Revoredo, et. al., NO. 3D05-2572 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. Nov. 4, 2005) (trial court held that MERS must establish ownership of the note in order to have standing to foreclose), rev’d, 955 So.2d 33 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. Mar 14, 2007); U.S. Bank National Association v. Salazar, 448 B.R. 814 (S.D. Ca. Apr. 12, 2011) (bankruptcy court concluded a foreclosure sale was void because MERS, as record deed of trust beneficiary, failed to record a deed of trust assignment to U.S. Bank prior to the foreclosure sale and U.S. Bank was identified on the trustee’s deed as the “foreclosing beneficiary”), rev’d, 470 B.R. 557 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2012); In re Agard, 444 B.R. 231 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb 10, 2011) (bankruptcy court found that the language of the mortgage document itself and MERS role as mortgagee did not provide MERS with the authority to “effectuate a valid assignment of mortgage”), vacated in part by Agard v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 2012 WL 1043690 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2012); see also, U.S. Bank v. Howie, infra note 43 (interpreting the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler).

37. See MERSCORP, Inc. Rules of Membership, Rule 8 – Required Assignments for Foreclosure and Bankruptcy, Section 1(e).

38. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROPERTY (MORTGAGES), §5.4, comment e (1997). See also Residential Funding Co. v. Saurman, 490 Mich. 909; 805 N.W.2d 183 (2011) (Michigan Supreme Court held that a mortgage and note are to be construed together and that “the trust and the beneficial interest need not be in the same hands . . . The choice of mortgagee is a matter of convenience.”); Horvath v. Bank of New York, N.A., et al., No. 1:09-cv-1129, Dkt No. 38 (E.D. Va. Jan. 29, 2010) (aff’d., 4th Cir., No. 10-1528, May 19, 2011) (court held that “the ‘split’ of [Plaintiff’s] promissory notes from the deeds of trust does not render the deeds of trust unenforceable. The deeds of trust continue to grant a promissory note holder security . . .”).

39. See Joyce Palomar, 3 Patton & Palomar on Land Titles §5.67.50 (3d ed. 2009) (“[C]ourts have accepted MERS as reconciling modern lending practices with traditional real property law” and “recognize the entity serving as nominee or agent as the record holder of the encumbrance.”).

40. 656 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011).

41. Id. at 1042.

42. Id.

43. Id. at 1044, citing Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158, 167 (Kan. 2009). See also, U.S. Bank v. Howie, No. 106,415 (Kans. App. June 8, 2012) in which an appellate court interpreted the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in Landmark as supporting MERS Inc.’s role as agent of the lender under the plain language of the mortgage. The Howie court further held that because MERS Inc. was acting as agent of the lender, the mortgage and the note were never severed and the lender, as present holder of both the note and mortgage, was entitled to foreclose on the mortgage. Some people misunderstand the term “unenforceable” as confirming fraudulent or illegal behavior on the part of the lender. But this is not necessarily the case. A mortgage may be declared unenforceable due to a mistake or unanticipated occurrence without fault by the lender, with the inequitable result that the lender/creditor who lent money to the borrower secured by a mortgaged property would be unable to foreclose and realize on its collateral.

44. In re MERS Litigation, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D. Ariz. 2010); see also Martinez v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. (In re Martinez), 444 B.R. 192 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2011) (the court found that the language in the mortgage, the MERS membership agreement, and the affidavit of MERS’ treasurer, were sufficient to establish that MERS was clearly acting as an agent for Countrywide at all relevant times while holding the mortgage; the mortgage and the note were never split and remained enforceable); Drake v. Citizens Bank of Effingham (In re Corley), 447 B.R. 375 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011) (the note and the mortgage were not split; they were executed together at inception and remain linked via the language in the documents that contemplate the agency relationship formed by the designation of MERS as nominee).

45. See, e.g., Consol. Mortg. & Fin. Corp. v. Landrieu, 493 F. Supp. 1284, 1286-87 (D. D.C. 1980) (discussing the Mortgage Backed Securities Program and Ginnie Mae’s role).

46. Supra note 38.

47. See U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §541(d).

48. See UCC §§9.109(b); 3.102 and 3.201-204.

49. See UCC §9.203. For a thorough review of the issues under the UCC discussing rights of the “owner” of a note, the party entitled to enforce the note, transfer of the note, and the impact of transfer on the underlying mortgage, see Report of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code ― Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to Selected Issues Relating to Mortgage Notes (Nov. 14, 2011), Amer. Law Institute and National Conf. on Uniform State Laws.

50. UCC §9.203(g) (emphasis added); See also UCC §9.308(e), providing the same rule for perfection.

51. See Official Comment 6 to UCC §9.308.

52. For an excellent discussion and survey of relevant state case law on this issue, see Transfer and Assignment of Residential Mortgage Loans in the Secondary Market, ASF White Paper Series (November 16, 2011) at http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF_White_Paper_11_16_10.pdf.

53. Although the disclosure of the identity of the note owner is optional, 97% of the over 3,000 MERS® System members make such disclosure.

54. See 24 C.F.R. §3500.21(d).

55. See 12 C.F.R. §226.39.

56. Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173.

57. See 12 U.S.C. §2605(k) (1) (D).

58. See Haft v. Dart Group Corp., 841 F. Supp. 549, 572 (D.Del. 1993).

59. Del. Code. Ann. Title 8, Sections 122 and 142.

60. Exercise of authority granted under clauses (3) and (4) is subject to rule changes effective July 22, 2011, limiting the member’s ability to initiate foreclosures and make filings in bankruptcy proceedings in the name of MERS Inc.

61. See Bain v. Metro Mortg. Grp., 2010 WL 891585, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2010) (holding that MERS’s designation of Members’ employees as “vice president” and “assistant vice president” was not deceptive within the meaning of the Washington State Consumer Protection Act). See also Jackman v. Hasty, 2011 WL 5599075, at *3 (N.D. Ga., Nov. 15, 2011) (Defendants “were appointed as agents of MERS by a corporate resolution . . . According to the resolution, [Defendants] have authority to, among other things, “[a]ssign the lien of any mortgage loan registered on the MERS® System’ . . . and “[e]xecute any and all documents necessary to foreclose upon the property securing any mortgage loan registered on the MERS® System’ . . . The evidence thus shows that Defendants . . . although not employees of MERS, were duly appointed agents of MERS who had authority to assign the Security Deed to LaSalle on behalf of MERS. LaSalle thus had legal authority to foreclose on the Property.”); Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC v. Kroening, 2011 WL 5130357, at *5 (D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2011) (“The assignment was executed for MERS by Scott Anderson. Anderson is an employee of Ocwen, but was designated by Corporate Resolution as an assistant secretary and vice president of MERS, and as such had the authority to assign any mortgage naming MERS as the mortgagee.”).

62. New York State Bar Association, Committee on Professional Ethics, Formal Opinion #847 (12/21/2010).

63. See, e.g., Davis v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2012 WL 642544 (Nev. Feb. 24, 2012); Bertrand v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., 2011 WL 1113421, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 23, 2011) (stating that the language in the Deed of Trust “grants MERS the power to initiate foreclosure and to assign its beneficial interest . . .”); Wade v. Meridias Cap., Inc., 2011 WL 997161, at *2 (D. Utah Mar. 17, 2011) (“Under the plan terms of the Trust Deed, . . . MERS was appointed as the beneficiary and nominee for the Lender and its successors and assigns and granted power to act in their stead, including making assignments and instituting foreclosure.”) (emphasis in original); Germon v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 2011 WL 719591, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011) (stating that under the Deed of Trust “MERS had the legal right to initiate nonjudicial foreclosures and could assign such right.”); Saxon Mortg Servs., Inc. v. Coakley, 921 N.Y.S.2d. 552, 553 (App. Div. 2011) (rejecting foreclosure defendant’s contention that MERS’s assignment of mortgage was improper); Perry v. Nat’l Default Serv’g Corp., 2010 WL 3325623, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2010) (observing that numerous courts have held that “MERS had the right to assign its beneficial interest to a third party.”); Rogan v. CitiMortgage, Inc. (In re Jessup), 2010 WL 2926050, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. July 22, 2010) (MERS had authority to execute an assignment as nominee of lender because “the language in the Lender’s own instrument is sufficient to identify MERS as such.”); GMAC Mortg., LLC v. Reynolds, 2010 WL 7746836, at *2 (Mass. Land Ct. Nov. 30, 2010) (“MERS, as mortgagee of record, has the authority to assign the mortgage.”); In re Relka, 2009 WL 5149262, at *4-5 (Bankr. D. Wyo. Dec. 22, 2009) (The Deed of Trust granted MERS “the right to assign the mortgage.”); Taylor v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 44 So. 3d 618, 623 (Fla. 5th DCCA 2010) (The mortgage granted MERS the “explicit and agreed upon authority to make . . . an assignment.”).

64. See, e.g., Williams v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2011 WL 2293260 at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 9, 2011) (“To the extent Plaintiffs challenge any assignment from MERS to U.S. Bank, Plaintiffs lack standing to do so because they were not a party to those assignments.”); Bridge v. Aames Capital Corp., 2010 WL 3834059, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2010) (“Courts have routinely found that a debtor may not challenge an assignment between an assignor and assignee”); Livonia Prop. Holdings, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 724, 735 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (“Borrower disputes the validity of the assignment [of mortgage] documents. But, as a non-party to those documents, it lacks standing to attack them.”).

65. Jones, supra note 3, at 36.

66. Jones, supra note 3, at 36, 38.

67. Id.

68. See Amoskeag Bank v. Chagnon, 572 A2d 1153, 1155 (N.H. 1990) (“The purpose then of the recording statutes…is to provide notice to the public of a conveyance of or encumbrance on real estate.”); Corpus v. Arriaga, 294 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. App. 2009) (“The purpose of recording statutes in Texas is to give notice to persons of the existence of the instrument.”); Burnett v. County of Bergen, 968 A.2d 1151 (N.J. 2009) (“The very purpose of recording and filing [assignments of mortgages, deeds, discharges of mortgages, and other public records] is to place the world on notice of their contents.”).

69. See Fuller v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., (U.S. Dist. Ct., Middle District of Fla.,Jacksonville Div.) (Case No. 3:11–CV–1153–J–20MCR) (June 27, 2012) at p. 3, fn. 1.

70. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc. Rules of Membership, Rule 2 – Registration on the MERS System, Section 5(a).

71. See Fuller, supra note 69, at pp. 18-19.

72. Joe Murin, MERS: Myths, Misconceptions and Realities, July 22, 2010 (available at http://mortgagenewsdaily.com/channels/voiceofhousing/164078.aspx); see also Fuller, supra note 69 and accompanying text.

73. Peterson, Foreclosures and MERS, supra note 9 at 1365-66.

74. Plymouth County, supra note 23 at p. 17.

75. Remarks of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner Introducing the Financial Stability Plan, February 10, 2009 (available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg18.aspx).

76. See Christopher L. Peterson articles, supra note 9.

77. MERS’ principal owners are the Mortgage Bankers Association, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase Bank, HSBC, CitiMortgage, GMAC, American Land Title Association and Wells Fargo Bank.

78.See, http://www.aei.org/article/economics/financial-services/housing-finance/housing-affordability-us-is-the-envy-of-the-developed-world; see also http://absalonproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Harvard-Lea-110v5.pdf.

79. Jones, supra note 3, at 40.

80. For an excellent discussion of the background, issues and certain case law developments regarding the MERS® System, see Beau Phillips, MERS: The Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 63 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 262 (Fall Winter 2009).

81. Murin, supra note 72.

82. Id.

83. Over 600 government institutions (cities, municipalities and states) utilize the MERS System free of charge to locate property preservation contacts for loans registered on the MERS System.

How Robo Signing Violations Can Help Homeowners Save Their Homes

30 Sunday Jun 2013

Posted by BNG in Discovery Strategies, Federal Court, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Judicial States, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Notary, Trial Strategies

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Business, Court, Foreclosure, Mortgage law, Mortgage loan, Mortgage servicer, Real estate, United States

The Foreclosure process often involves affidavits, which are documents in which someone attests to a set of facts. Foreclosure affidavits typically involve the mortgage servicer confirming that the foreclosure is valid specifically, that the servicer or mortgage holder has a right to foreclose because the mortgagee has defaulted on the mortgage.

Foreclosure Process and Affidavits

Often, mortgage servicers looking to foreclose ask the court for what is called summary judgment, which means they want the court to rule in their favor without need for a trial based on clear evidence that the foreclosure is in order. To show the court that it should order foreclosure, the servicer or mortgage older typically submits affidavits and other proof (such as the mortgage note) showing who in fact owns the mortgage in question. Foreclosure affidavits also include statements about the status of the mortgage account, such as payment history, what is currently owed, when it went into default and how far behind the mortgagee is.

If the borrower does not contest the foreclosure, many foreclosure cases end at this point, with the judge granting summary judgment for the mortgage servicer. This allows the foreclosure to be executed and the property to be sold.

“Robo-signing” and Foreclosure Affidavits

Affidavits are documents submitted to the court in which a person attests to personal knowledge as to what is contained. This means that the person signing a foreclosure affidavit should have verified all information he or she is stating to be true.

The term “robo-signing” has been coined to describe rapid fire signing of foreclosure affidavits without adequately verifying the truth of what the affidavits state. Mortgage servicers who process very high volumes of mortgages in quick succession have been accused of robo-signing to speed up the foreclosure process.

In cases where the mortgage servicer did not review underlying documentation, foreclosure affidavits signed by the servicer may be challenged as inadequate to prove that foreclosure should occur. In some states, foreclosure affidavits must include copies of all documentation on which the affidavits rely. In these states, failure to include such documentation could also be challenged.

Challenging Foreclosure Affidavits

Typically, the mortgagee can challenge the foreclosure affidavits at the point when the bank or mortgage servicer has requested summary judgment. Citing robo-signing to challenge mortgage affidavits is one way to possible stave off summary judgment. Another way to challenge the affidavits is to challenge any inaccurate information about the mortgage and payment history contained in the affidavits.

Though foreclosure affidavits are often perfectly accurate, sometimes they may contain bad information. One example might be if the affidavits state an inaccurate amount owed or payment history. Often, mortgages have been sold many times, with information as to payment potentially lost in the shuffle. Other times, fees may have been attached to the account improperly.

What Happens Next?

Showing that a mortgage servicer’s foreclosure affidavits are inadequate does not resolve the underlying dispute about the property and whether it will be foreclosed. Lenders and mortgage servicers typically rely on affidavits in order to gain summary judgment in foreclosure actions.

In cases where the affidavits are successfully challenged or found lacking by the court, the borrower may not have won a final victory, but has staved off a final decision. Such borrowers then may face the lender or servicer at trial to resolve whether the property, in fact, may be foreclosed and sold.

To Learn How You Can Effectively Use Solid Arguments Such As Robo Signing To Challenge Your Wrongful Foreclosure Visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

The Effects of “US Bank v. Ibanez” in Mortgage Securitization Cases

24 Monday Jun 2013

Posted by BNG in Appeal, Case Laws, Case Study, Foreclosure Defense, Fraud, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, Non-Judicial States, Notary, Note - Deed of Trust - Mortgage, Pleadings, Pro Se Litigation, Securitization, Trial Strategies

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Bank of America, Foreclosure, Ibanez, Massachusetts, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, U.S. Bancorp, US Bank, Wells Fargo

THIS DECISION WAS A GREAT WIN TO HOMEOWNERS!

Background

For those new to the case, the problem the Court dealt with in this case is the validity of foreclosures when the mortgages are part of securitized mortgage lending pools. When mortgages were bundled and packaged to Wall Street investors, the ownership of mortgage loans were divided and freely transferred numerous times on the lenders’ books. But the mortgage loan documentation actually on file at the Registry of Deeds often lagged far behind.

In the Ibanez case, the mortgage assignment, which was executed in blank, was not recorded until over a year after the foreclosure process had started. This was a fairly common practice in Massachusetts, and I suspect across the U.S. Mr. Ibanez, the distressed homeowner, challenged the validity of the foreclosure, arguing that U.S. Bank had no standing to foreclose because it lacked any evidence of ownership of the mortgage and the loan at the time it started the foreclosure.

Mr. Ibanez won his case in the lower court in 2009, and due to the importance of the issue, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court took the case on direct appeal.

The SJC Ruling: Lenders Must Prove Ownership When They Foreclose

The SJC’s ruling can be summed up by Justice Cordy’s concurring opinion:

“The type of sophisticated transactions leading up to the accumulation of the notes and mortgages in question in these cases and their securitization, and, ultimately the sale of mortgaged-backed securities, are not barred nor even burdened by the requirements of Massachusetts law. The plaintiff banks, who brought these cases to clear the titles that they acquired at their own foreclosure sales, have simply failed to prove that the underlying assignments of the mortgages that they allege (and would have) entitled them to foreclose ever existed in any legally cognizable form before they exercised the power of sale that accompanies those assignments. The court’s opinion clearly states that such assignments do not need to be in recordable form or recorded before the foreclosure, but they do have to have been effectuated.”

The Court’s ruling appears rather elementary: you need to own the mortgage before you can foreclose. But it’s become much more complicated with the proliferation of mortgage backed securities (MBS’s) –which constitute 60% or more of the entire U.S. mortgage market. The Court has held unequivocally that the common industry practice of assigning a mortgage “in blank” — meaning without specifying to whom the mortgage would be assigned until after the fact — does not constitute a proper assignment, at least in Massachusetts.

The Case in Review:

On Jan. 7, 2011, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
ruled against U.S. Bancorp and Wells Fargo & Co. in their appeal of a Massachusetts Land Court decision in March 2009 invalidating their foreclosure sales because both banks had failed to make the requisite showing that they were the mortgage holders at the time of the foreclosures. The case made headlines across the country, but turned on the prosaic notion that only the mortgage holder can foreclose on a mortgage.

Documentation provided by the banks in their efforts to prove that they were the present assignees of the mortgages at the time of the notice of foreclosure and subsequent foreclosure sale failed to convince the court that the proper party had initiated the foreclosure.

Because Massachusetts does not require a mortgage holder to obtain judicial authorization to foreclose on Massachusetts property, the decision in U.S. Bank National Association v. Ibanez serves as a forewarning to banks that foreclosures will only be upheld as valid by a showing of strict compliance with the statutory power of sale requirements, that is, that they were the mortgage holder at the time of notice of foreclosure and execution of the foreclosure sale.

Copycat litigation has followed in Massachusetts and elsewhere, but the ramifications of Ibanez could be broader than just an increase in courtroom activity. Legislatures will wrestle with the possibility of increased regulations, and prosecutors will likely scour the files for possible illegal activity concerning the dates of mortgage transfers.

Case Background
In July 2007, U.S. Bank NA and Wells Fargo Bank NA, as trustees of two securitization trusts, foreclosed on the mortgages of the respective properties and purchased the properties at the foreclosure sale. In September and October 2008, U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo brought actions separately in the Massachusetts Land Court seeking among other things, a declaration that title to the two properties was vested in them.

The Land Court heard the two actions together and ruled that the foreclosure sales were invalid because the banks acquired the mortgages by assignment only after the foreclosure sales and therefore had no interest in the mortgages being foreclosed at the time of the publication of the notices of sale or the foreclosure sales.

At issue was whether the banks had shown sufficient documentation that they were in fact the mortgage holders at the time of the sales pursuant to a valid chain of assignments. In U.S. Bank’s case, the original lender was Rose Mortgage Inc., which assigned the mortgage in blank. At some point the blank space was stamped with Option One Mortgage Corp. as assignee, and was recorded on June 7, 2006.

On Jan. 23, 2006, before recording, Option One executed an assignment in blank. U.S. Bank claimed that Option One assigned the mortgage to Lehman Brothers Bank FSB, which assigned it to Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., which assigned it to the Structured Asset Securities Corp., which then assigned the mortgage, pooled with over 1,000 other loans, to U.S. Bank, as trustee, on or around Dec. 1, 2006.

U.S. Bank filed for foreclosure on April 17, 2007, and purchased the property at the foreclosure sale on July 5, 2007. On Sept. 2, 2008, American Home Mortgage Servicing Inc., as successor in interest to Option One, the record holder of the mortgage, executed a written assignment of the mortgage to U.S.Bank, as trustee, which was then recorded on Sept. 11, 2008.

In the Land Court proceeding, however, U.S. Bank failed to put in the record the trust agreement, which it claimed constituted the assignment of the mortgage. U.S. Bank did offer the private placement memorandum, an unsigned offer of mortgage-backed securities to potential investors, which included the representation that mortgages “will be” assigned to the trust. The memorandum also stated that each mortgage would be identified in a schedule attached to the trust agreement. U.S. Bank also did not provide any such schedule identifying the particular loan as among the mortgages assigned to the trust.

In Wells Fargo’s case, the original lender was Option One, which executed an assignment of the mortgage in blank on May 25, 2005. Option One later assigned the mortgage to Bank of America Corp. in a flow sale and servicing agreement, which then assigned it to Asset Backed Funding Corp., which assigned it, pooled with others, to Wells Fargo, as trustee, pursuant to a pooling and servicing agreement.

On July 5, 2007, the day Wells Fargo purchased the property, Option One, the record mortgage holder, executed an assignment of the mortgage to Wells Fargo as trustee, which was recorded on May 12, 2008, but had an effective date of April 18, 2007.

In the Land Court proceeding, Wells Fargo did not provide the flow sale and servicing agreement reflecting the assignment by Option One to Bank of America. Wells Fargo did produce an unexecuted copy of the mortgage loan purchase agreement, which made reference to a schedule listing the assigned mortgages, but failed to provide a schedule showing that the mortgage was among those assigned to Asset Backed Funding Corporation.

Wells Fargo also provided a copy of the pooling and servicing agreement, but this copy was only downloaded from the U.S.Securities and Exchange Commission website, was unsigned and did not contain the loan schedules referenced in the agreement. Wells Fargo produced a schedule that it represented identified the mortgage by the property’s ZIP code and city because the payment history and loan amount matched the loan at issue.

SJC Decision
In Massachusetts, a mortgagee must strictly comply with the statutory power of sale by proving its authority to foreclose and complying with the notice requirement. Only a present holder of the mortgage is authorized to foreclose on the mortgaged property. As highlighted by the SJC in this case, the statutory power is also limited to those who are holders of mortgages pursuant to valid, verifiable assignments at the time of the notice of sale and the subsequent foreclosure sale. U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo failed to prove that they were.

The court rendered U.S. Bank’s foreclosure invalid for several reasons: 1) It failed to produce the document,the trust agreement, which it claimed assigned the mortgage to it; 2) the private placement memorandum described the trust agreement as having only an intent to assign mortgages to U.S. Bank in the future, not as an actual assignment; 3) U.S. Bank did not produce the schedule of loans mortgages that was supposedly attached to the agreement, so it failed to show that the mortgage at issue was among those assigned by that agreement; and 4) U.S. Bank failed to produce any evidence that the assigning party, Structured Asset Securities Corp., ever held the mortgage to be assigned. The court determined that Option One, not U.S. Bank, was the mortgage holder at the time of the foreclosure.

Similarly, the court rendered Wells Fargo’s foreclosure invalid because: 1) While the pooling and servicing agreement reflected a present assignment, the mortgage loan schedule provided by Wells Fargo failed to identify with specificity the mortgage at issue as one of the mortgages assigned; and 2) Wells Fargo did not provide any documentation showing that Asset Backed Funding Corporation held the mortgage that it was purportedly assigning under the pooling and servicing agreement. Because Wells Fargo failed to submit anything demonstrating that the mortgage was ever assigned by Option One to another entity before the notice and sale, the court found that Option One was the mortgage holder.

Ibanez in Practice
The SJC provided insight into the documentation it believes is required to support a valid foreclosure in the case of assignments and securitization trusts. Whether pending and future legislation or regulations change how the court views these matters remains to be seen.

* An assignment does not have to be in recordable form at the time of the notice of sale or the foreclosure sale, though it may be the better practice. An executed agreement that assigns a pool of mortgages along with the schedule that “clearly and specifically” identifies the mortgage at issue may suffice to establish the trustee as mortgage holder.
* A bank must provide proof that the assignment was made by a party that validly held the mortgage. This can be accomplished by providing a chain of assignment linking the bank to the record holder or a single assignment from the record holder of the mortgage.
* An assignment in blank does not constitute a lawful assignment of a mortgage.

* An assignment of a note without an assignment of the underlying mortgage does carry with it an assignment of the mortgage, and therefore does not give the holder of the note sufficient financial interest in the mortgage to permit it to foreclose.
* A mortgage holder may not be permitted to rely on Title Standard No. 58 issued by the Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts for the proposition that an entity that does not hold a mortgage may foreclose on a property and later cure the cloud on title by a later assignment of a mortgage. However, an assignment that is confirmatory of an earlier, valid assignment made prior to publication of notice and execution of sale may be executed and recorded after the foreclosure without defecting title. A confirmatory assignment cannot confirm an assignment that was not validly made earlier, or backdate an assignment being made for the first time.
* A post foreclosure assignment may not be treated as a pre-foreclosure assignment by declaring an “effective date” that precedes the notice of sale and foreclosure.

Retroactive Implications of Ibanez
Because the court found that it was not creating new law, but rather applying tried and true standards, it made its decision retroactive. In his decision, Judge Gants stated, “The legal principles and requirements we set forth are well established in our case law and our statutes. All that has changed is the plaintiffs’ apparent failure to abide by those principles and requirements in the rush to sell mortgage-backed securities.” Thus it is likely that homeowners will seek recovery for homes that were wrongfully foreclosed upon.

But beyond that, questions arise. For example, Massachusetts is not a state that requires judicial approval of foreclosures, whereas about 23 states already require some sort of judicial authorization or judicial intervention in the foreclosure process. Would the facts in Ibanez have allowed a foreclosure to progress as far as it did in a state that required judicial foreclosure? Should there be more regulations around the foreclosure process? The Ibanez court didn’t seem to think so, as it found the existing rules to be relatively straightforward and capable of controlling the situation.

Even so, lawmakers in Massachusetts wasted little time in introducing legislation that appeared to be reactionary to the Ibanez decision. Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley drafted legislation that would reportedly establish standards to ensure that creditors undertake “commercially reasonable efforts to avoid unnecessary foreclosures” and would also codify Ibanez by requiring a creditor to show it is the current mortgage holder before foreclosing and require creditors to record their assignments before commencing foreclosure proceedings.

A violation of this legislation as introduced would constitute a violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act as well. There have been at least 10 other bills introduced in the Massachusetts House and Senate that address various aspects of the foreclosure process, including legislation that would require foreclosure mediations and judicial review of foreclosures.

The great danger may be for an overeager bank official who realizes that the bank’s paperwork suffers from the defects outlined in Ibanez. The temptation to back-date documents and to “fill in the blanks” may be too great for some to resist. Prosecutors and regulators will likely be looking for just such situations as they attempt to make cases.

What the court in Ibanez really ruled is that the banks need to strictly comply with the laws already on the books in proceeding with foreclosures, and in light of the court’s candid opinion, and harsh concurrence by Justice Robert J. Cordy, banks would do well to ensure that they have their ducks in line. Banks would also be wise to educate their staff on Ibanez and how not to react to it.

But when all is said and done, however, what Ibanez may ultimately have done is provided the impetus for legislators, regulators, and prosecutors to change the way foreclosures proceed in Massachusetts, and possibly all over the country, in creating new requirements for banks, and courts, far beyond those at play in Ibanez.

My Analysis of the Case

Winners: Distressed homeowners facing foreclosure
Losers: Foreclosing lenders, people who purchased foreclosed homes with this type of title defect, foreclosure attorneys, and title insurance companies.
Despite pleas from innocent buyers of foreclosed properties and my own predictions, the decision was applied retroactively, so this will hurt Massachusetts homeowners who bought defective foreclosure properties.
If you own a foreclosed home with an “Ibanez” title issue, I’m afraid to say that you do not own your home anymore. The previous owner who was foreclosed upon owns it again. This is a mess.
The opinion is a scathing indictment of the securitized mortgage lending system and its non-compliance with Massachusetts foreclosure law. Justice Cordy, a former big firm corporate lawyer, chastised lenders and their Wall Street lawyers for “the utter carelessness with which the plaintiff banks documented the titles to their assets.”
If you purchased a foreclosure property with an “Ibanez” title defect, and you do not have title insurance, you are in trouble. You may not be able to sell or refinance your home for quite a long time, if ever. Recourse would be against the foreclosing banks, the foreclosing attorneys. Or you could attempt to get a deed from the previous owner. Re-doing the original foreclosure is also an option but with complications.
If you purchased a foreclosure property and you have an owner’s title insurance policy, contact the title company right away.
The decision carved out some room so that mortgages with compliant securitization documents may be able to survive the ruling. This will shake out in the months to come. A major problem with this case was that the lenders weren’t able to produce the schedules of the securitization documents showing that the two mortgages in question were part of the securitization pool. Why, I have no idea.
The decision opens the door for foreclosing lenders to prove ownership with proper securitized documents. There will be further litigation on this. Furthermore, since the Land Court’s decision in 2009, many lenders have already re-done foreclosures and title insurance companies have taken other steps to cure the title defects.
We don’t know how other state court’s will react to this ruling. The SJC is one of the most well respected state supreme courts in the country. This decision was well-reasoned and I believe correct given that the lenders couldn’t even produce any admissible evidence they held the mortgages. The ruling will certainly be followed in states (such as California) operating under a non-judicial foreclosure system such as Massachusetts.
Watch for class actions against foreclosing lenders, the attorneys who drafted the securitization loan documents and foreclosing attorneys. Investors of mortgage backed securities (MBS) will also be exploring their legal options against the trusts and servicers of the mortgage pools.
The banking sector has already dropped some 5% today (1.7.11), showing that this ruling has sufficiently spooked investors.

For more info on how you can use the Valid imperfected Securitization arguements such as the ones used in this case to effectively and successfully challenge and win your Foreclosure Defense, please visit http://www.fightforeclosure.net

Issues Involving Mortgage-Backed Securities

19 Sunday May 2013

Posted by BNG in Foreclosure Defense, Legal Research, Litigation Strategies, Mortgage Laws, Pleadings, Securitization, Trial Strategies

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Adam Levitin, Alabama, Bank of America, Foreclosure, Horace, PSA, Securitization, Uniform Commercial Code

This topic examines how you can effectively use Securitization Issues to your advantage when challenging your wrongful foreclosure.

CASE STUDY 1:

Two years ago, an Alabama judge issued a short, conclusory order that stopped foreclosure on the home of a beleaguered family, and also prevents the same bank in the case from trying to foreclose against that couple, ever again. This may not seem like big news — but upon review of the underlying documents, the extraordinarily important nature of the decision and the case becomes obvious.

No Securitization, No Foreclosure

The couple involved, the Horaces, took out a predatory mortgage with Encore Credit Corp in November, 2005. Apparently Encore sold their loan to EMC Mortgage Corp, who then tried to securitize it in a Bear Stearns deal. If the securitization had been done properly, in February 2006 the trust created to hold the loans would have acquired the Horace loan. Once the Horaces defaulted, as they did in 2007, the trustee would have been able to foreclose on the Horaces.

And that’s why this case is so big: the judge found the securitization of the Horace loan wasn’t done properly, so the trustee — LaSalle National Bank Association, now part of Bank of America (BAC) — couldn’t foreclose. In making that decision, the judge is the first to really address the issue, head-on: If a screwed-up securitization process meant a loan never got securitized, can a bank foreclose under the state versions of the Uniform Commercial Code anyway? This judge says no, finding that since the securitization was busted, the trust didn’t have the right to foreclose, period.

Since the judge’s order doesn’t explain, how should people understand his decision? Luckily, the underlying documents make the judge’s decision obvious.

No Endorsements

The key contract creating the securitization is called a “Pooling and Servicing Agreement” (pooling as in creating a pool of mortgages, and servicing as in servicing those mortgages.) The PSA for the deal involving the Horace mortgage is here and has very specific requirements about how the trust can acquire loans. One of the easiest requirements to check is the way the loan’s promissory note is supposed to be endorsed — just look at the note.

According to Section 2.01 of the PSA, the note should have been endorsed from Encore to EMC to a Bear Stearns entity. At that point, Bear could either endorse the note specifically to the trustee, or endorse it “in blank.” But the note produced was simply endorsed in blank by Encore. As a result, the trust never got the Horace loan, explained securitization expert Tom Adams in his affidavit.

But wait, argued the bank, it doesn’t matter if if the trust owns the loan — it just has to be a “holder” under the Alabama version of the UCC (Uniform Commercial Code), and the trust is a holder. The problem with that argument is securitization trusts aren’t allowed to simply take property willy-nilly. In fact, to preserve their special tax status, they are forbidden from taking property after their cut-off dates, which in this case was February 28, 2006. As a result, if the trust doesn’t own the loan according to the PSA it can’t receive the proceeds of the foreclosure or the title to the home, even if it’s allowed to foreclose as a holder.

Holder Status Can’t Solve Standing Problem

Allowing a trust to foreclose based on holder status when it doesn’t own the loan would seem to create yet another type of clouded title issue. I mean, it’s absurd to say the trust foreclosed and took title as a matter of the UCC, but to also have it be true that the trust can’t take title as a matter of its own formational documents. And what would happen to the proceeds of the foreclosure sale? That’s why people making this type of argument keep pointing out that the UCC allows people to contract around it and PSAs are properly viewed as such a contracting around agreement.

I’m sure the bank’s side will claim the judge was wrong, that he disagreed with another recent Alabama case that’s been heavily covered, US Bank vs. Congress. And there is a superficial if flat disagreement: In this case, the judge said the Horaces were beneficiaries of the PSA and so could raise the issue of the loan’s ownership; in Congress the judge said the homeowners weren’t party to the PSA and so couldn’t raise the issue.

But as Adam Levitin explained, the Congress decision was procedurally weird, and as a result the PSA argument wasn’t about standing, as it was in Horace and generally would be in foreclosure cases (as opposed to eviction cases, like Congress). And what did happen to the Congress proceeds? How solid is that securitization trust’s tax status now anyway?

In short, in the only case I can find that has ruled squarely on the issue, a busted securitization prevents foreclosure by the trust that thinks it owns the loan. Yes, it’s just one case, and an Alabama trial level one at that. But it’s still significant.

Homeowners Right to Raise Securitization Issue

As far as right-to-raise-the-ownership issue, I think the Horace judge was just being “belt and suspenders” in finding the homeowners were beneficiaries of the PSA. Why do homeowners have to be beneficiaries of the PSA to raise the issue of the trust’s ownership of their loans? The homeowners aren’t trying to enforce the agreement, they’re simply trying to show the foreclosing trust doesn’t have standing. Standing is a threshold issue to any litigation and the homeowners axiomatically have the right to raise it.

As Nick Wooten, the Horaces’ attorney, said:

“This is just one example of hundreds I have seen where servicers were trying to force through a foreclosure in the name of a trust that clearly had no interest in the underlying loan according to the terms of the pooling and servicing agreement. This conduct is a fraud on the borrower, a fraud on the investors and a fraud on the court. Thankfully Judge Johnson recognized the utter failure of the securitization transaction and would not overlook the fact that the trust had no interest in this loan.”

All that remains for the Horaces, a couple with a special needs child and whose default was triggered not only by the predatory nature of the loan, but also by Mrs. Horace’s temporary illness and Mr. Horace’s loss of overtime, is to ask a jury to compensate them for the mental anguish caused by the wrongful foreclosure.

Perhaps BofA will just want to cut a check now, rather than wait for that verdict. (As of publication BofA had not returned a request for comment.)

No one is suggesting the Horaces get a free house; they still owe their debt, and whomever they owe it to has the right to foreclose on it. Wooten explained to me that the depositor –in this case, the Bear Stearns entity –i s probably that party. Moreover if the Horaces wanted to sell and move, they’d have to quiet title and would be wise to escrow the mortgage pay off amount, if that amount can be figured out. But for now the Horaces get some real peace, even if a larger mess remains.

Much Bigger Than A Single Foreclosure

The Horaces aren’t the only ones affected by the issues in this case.

Homeowners everywhere that are being foreclosed on by securitization trusts — many, many people — can start making these arguments. And if their loan’s PSA is like the Horaces, they should win. At least, Wooten hopes so:

“Judge Johnson stopped a fraud in progress. I am hopeful that other courts will consider more seriously the very serious issues that are easily obscured in the flood of foreclosures that are overwhelming our Courts and reject the systemic and ongoing fraud that is being perpetrated by the mortgage servicers. Until Courts actively push back against the massive documentary fraud being shoveled at them by mortgage servicers this fraudulent conduct will not end.”

The issues stretch past homeowners to investors, too.

Investors in this particular mortgage-backed security, take note: What are the odds that the Horace note is the only one that wasn’t properly endorsed? I’d say nil, and not just because evidence in other cases, such as Kemp from New Jersey, suggests the practice was common. This securitization deal was done by Bear Stearns, which other litigation reveals was far from careful with its securitizations. So the original investors in this deal should speed dial their lawyers.

And investors in bubble-vintage mortgage backed securities, the ones that went from AAA gold to junk overnight, might want to call their attorneys too; this deal was in 2006, and in the securitization frenzy that followed processes can only have gotten worse.

Some investors are already suing, but the cases are at very early stages. Nonetheless, as cases like the Horaces’ come to light, the odds seem to tilt in investors’ favor — meaning they seem increasingly likely to ultimately succeed in forcing banks to buy back securities or pay damages for securities fraud connected with their sale. And that makes the Bank Bailout II scenario detailed by the Congressional Oversight Panel more possible.

The final, very striking feature of this case is what didn’t happen: No piece of paper covered in the proper endorsements –an allonge — magically appeared at the eleventh hour. The magical appearance of endorsements, whether on notes or on allonges, has been a hallmark of foreclosures done in the robosigning era. And investors, as you pursue your suits based on busted securitizations, that’s something to watch out for.

My, but the banks made a mess when they forced the fee-machine of mortgage securitizations into overdrive. The consequences are still unfolding, but one consequence just might be a whole lot of properties that securitization trusts can’t foreclose on.

CASE STUDY 2:

In the fall of 2012, a Michigan state court issued an important decision that may affect thousands of foreclosures, HSBC Bank, USA v. Young, No 11-693 (Cir. Ct. Mich. Oct. 16, 2012). HSBC filed an action for possession of Mary Young’s home after a mortgage foreclosure by advertisement. The district court granted HSBC’s motion for summary disposition and defendant Young was granted leave to appeal. The Court reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order and remanded for further proceedings. HSBC filed a motion for reconsideration.

Young refinanced her home with Wells Fargo Home Mortgage on April 22, 2004. Young defaulted and received notices of default from Wells Fargo in February, April and August of 2008. In January 0f 2009, Wells Fargo and Young entered into a Loan Modification Agreement. The Agreement was on Wells Fargo letterhead and signed by an officer of Wells Fargo which was described as the lender.

Young did not keep up with her payments. On March 11, 2010, HSBC commenced foreclosure by advertisement and bought the house at sheriff’s sale. On November 8, 2010, HSBC filed a complaint for possession in the district court.

Young argued that HSBC lacked standing because neither the mortgage nor the note had been validly and effectively transferred to HSBC.

Young claimed that a purported mortgage assignment to HSBC as Trustee for Wells Fargo Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-2, dated October 8, 2008, was void because it did not agree with the terms of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (“PSA”) that governed the trust and because HSBC also did not have an ownership interest in the note.

Young argued that HSBC did not own the note because HSBC produced a copy of the note in discovery on February 14, 2011, that showed the note was payable to Wells Fargo as lender and there were no endorsements or allonges. About one month later, HSBC produced another copy of the same note, this one with a stamped and typed endorsement to Wells Fargo, with no date indicating when the endorsement occurred.

HSBC argued that Young lacked standing to challenge the assignment because Young was not a party to the PSA or a third-party beneficiary, arguing that Michigan law was well-settled. But Circuit Court Judge Melinda Morris found that argument to be erroneous, and the issue undecided by the Michigan Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. Noting conflicting authority in other jurisdictions, Judge Morris relied on the decision in Butler v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, ___F Supp 2d___, ___; 2012 WL 3518560, *6-7 (D Mass 2012):

Courts in this district are in agreement that a mortgagor lacks standing to challenge the assignment of his mortgage directly if he is neither a party to nor a third-party beneficiary of the assignment contract…

However, “the question of whether [a mortgagor has] standing to challenge [an] assignment is different form the question of whether [he has] standing to challenge the foreclosure on the basis that [the foreclosing entity] did not properly hold the mortgage at the time of the foreclosure.” …A number of decisions have held that mortgagors have standing to challenge a foreclosure sale as void due to an allegedly invalid assignment…

* * *

Mortgagors challenging foreclosure sales that are void due to invalid assignments have standing to do so because they have demonstrated “a concrete and particularized injury in fact, a causal connection that permits tracing the claimed injury to the defendant’s actions, and likelihood that prevailing in the action will afford some redress for the injury.” …

I do not, however, hold that a mortgagor has standing to challenge a foreclosure on the basis of just any potentially invalidating deficiency in an assignment. Massachusetts case law distinguishes between void and voidable assignments…If an assignment is voidable, but has not been avoided, then the assignee has legal title to convey to the purchaser at a foreclosure sale. If an assignment is void, then the assignee was assigned nothing and has nothing to convey to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Where a “grantor has nothing to convey…[t]he purported conveyance is a nullity, notwithstanding the parties’ intent.”…

Here, however, Butler fails to allege facts or present legal argument sufficient to establish that the assignments to Deutsche Bank were void due to their failure to comply with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement…

This distinction is very important because in most foreclosure cases, the homeowner is not trying to enforce the PSA, but to present evidence that an assignment was invalid. The vast majority of foreclosures involve cases with unendorsed notes or with endorsements that are not dated. Like the Young case, the vast majority of foreclosures by trusts also involve mortgage assignments created years after the trust closing date and an assignment of a non-performing loan. Assignments after the closing date and assignments of non-performing loans, and particularly the combination – assignment of a non-performing loan after the closing date – are almost always violations of trust PSAs.

The simple truth is that trusts were established (and sold) with rules to protect investors from such foolhardy action on the part of a trustee such as suddenly acquiring non-performing loans years after the trust closing date. When trust rules are violated, there can be serious negative tax consequences for the trust: the IRS could decide that the trust does not qualify for favorable REMIC status.

In the vast majority of cases, there is no real underlying financial transaction as reported in the mortgage assignment. If the records of the loans entering and leaving the loan pool of the trust are examined, they simply do not match up with the assignments. These later dated assignments were almost always made by document mills, mortgage servicers and foreclosure law firm employees solely to provide some proof to the courts that the trustee has standing to foreclose. In other words, these later dated assignments are almost always fraudulent.

It is also important to note that these assignments are not just robo-signed, that is, signed by someone with no knowledge of the underlying facts, or signed by someone who is signing his or her (or someone else’s name) several thousand times a day. These assignments falsely state the date on which the trust acquired the mortgage.

Because most note endorsements are non-existent or non-dated, the only date in most cases involving mortgages claimed by mortgage-backed trusts is the false date on these assignments.

For More Info on How To Challenge Your Wrongful Foreclosure Using Mortgage Securitization Arguments Visit http://www.fightforeclosure.net

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Category Archives: Trial Strategies

Quiet Title Action ~ What Florida Home Owners Need to Know

What Homeowners Need to Know About Judicial Foreclosure Process

1. The Foreclosure Process

2. Interested Parties

3. Judicial Foreclosure

4. Notice of Default and Acceleration

7. Response

8. Response – Answer

9. Default

10. Counterclaim

11. Discovery

13. Summary Judgment

16. Foreclosure Sale

17. Foreclosure Sale (cont.)

18. Deficiency Judgments

How Pro Se Foreclosure Defense Litigants Can Effectively Defend & Save Their Homes

How Pro Se Litigants Can Effectively Conduct Discovery for Their Court Cases

What Homeowners Needs To Know About MERS

How Robo Signing Violations Can Help Homeowners Save Their Homes

The Effects of “US Bank v. Ibanez” in Mortgage Securitization Cases

Issues Involving Mortgage-Backed Securities

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1. The Foreclosure Process

2. Interested Parties

3. Judicial Foreclosure

4. Notice of Default and Acceleration

7. Response

8. Response – Answer

9. Default

10. Counterclaim

11. Discovery

13. Summary Judgment

16. Foreclosure Sale

17. Foreclosure Sale (cont.)

18. Deficiency Judgments

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