How Nevada Residents Can Effectively Use Mediation To Save Their Home

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The program allows homeowners and lenders to sit down with trained mediators to discuss alternatives to foreclosure. The mediations, which are confidential, are required to be conducted within 80 days of a Notice of Default and Election to Sell being recorded by the lender and served on the homeowner.

1) Only owner-occupied homes are eligible under the law

Only owner-occupied homes are eligible under the law and only if a notice of default was recorded on or after July 1, 2009. Once a homeowner elects mediation, the lender must participate. The $400 mediation fee is split equally between the two parties. The Administrative Office of the Courts is administering the program and has established a webpage with a variety of information and forms, including some information in Spanish.

2) Mediators Appointed For Foreclosure Mediation Program

The Nevada Supreme Court initially appointed the first 97 mediators for the Nevada Foreclosure Mediation Program€“ a major step that set the stage for the scheduling of the first mediations. The 97 include former Supreme Court Justice Deborah Agosti and former District Court judges Robert Gaston, Robert Estes, and Leonard Gang. Also on the list are current State Bar of Nevada President Kathy England and former Nevada Supreme Court Clerk Janette Bloom. The list of mediators has increase since then.
3). Homeowners who receive notices have 30 days from the day they received their notice to seek mediation
Homeowners who receive foreclosure notices€“ technically Notices of Default and Election to Sell have 30 days from the day they received their notice to seek mediation under the program that was created by the Nevada Legislature effective July 1, 2009.  We have seen a wave of requests for mediation and the wave is getting larger, said Verise Campbell, Foreclosure Mediation Program Manager.  This is what we expected. We knew, because of the mandated time frames, that it would take some time for the requests for mediation to come rolling in and for the program to come up to speed.
4). Once all submissions are in, cases will be assigned to mediators within 10 days
In the process, homeowners must submit their election of mediation form along with a $200 fee to their lenders within 30 days of receiving foreclosure notices. The lenders then forward the request and the homeowner’€™s funds, along with the lender’€™s $200 payment and other documents, to the Foreclosure Mediation Program. Once all submissions are in, cases will be assigned to mediators within 10 days and mediations will be scheduled within 80 days of the date the foreclosure notice was recorded.
5). Training sessions for the Nevada Foreclosure Mediation Program
The list of individuals selected to attend the first training sessions for the Nevada Foreclosure Mediation Program has been set and the participants have been notified. Those training sessions include Aug. 5 in Reno and Aug. 6-7 in Las Vegas and were designed to provide foreclosure-specific information to experienced mediators.
6). Mediation is an alternative method to help parties resolve disputes by agreement with the help of trained mediators.
The Foreclosure Mediation Program was established as a result of the Assembly Bill 149, passed during the 2009 session of the Nevada Legislature.Its purpose is to address the foreclosure crisis head-on and to help keep Nevada families in their homes. This law establishes a Foreclosure Mediation Program for owner-occupied residential properties that are subject to foreclosure notices formally known as a Notice of Default and Election to Sell€“ filed on or after July 1, 2009. Mediation is an alternative method to help parties resolve disputes by agreement with the help of trained mediators.

7). Lenders must have someone at the mediation or available with the authority to modify a loan

Under the Supreme Court Rules, the homeowner must submit copies of financial records and indicate the amount of a mortgage payment that could be made if a loan modification could be reached. Lenders must submit documents indicating current appraisals of a home’€™s value and estimates of what it could sell for in a so-called short sale. Lenders must have someone at the mediation or available with the authority to modify a loan and provide the original or certified copies of the mortgage note, deed of trust, and any assignments of the mortgage note or deed of trust. The rules require that the parties to mediate in “good faith.”

8). the program will offer homeowners the opportunity to sit down with their lenders, mediation will not be the solution for everyone

In July of 2011 when the program first started, 4,205 foreclosure notices were recorded in Nevada. (15 of 17 counties reporting; That was down from the monthly average of about 7,600 and well below the more than 11,000 filed in June. In addition to the owner-occupied homes eligible for the Foreclosure Mediation Program, the foreclosure notices include commercial properties and residential housing not occupied by the owners.

9). New recording fee for Notices of Default and Election to Sell

The Nevada Foreclosure Mediation Program has also resulted in a new recording fee for Notices of Default and Election to Sell. The new fee, established by Assembly Bill 65, is $50. On this website is an information brochure announcing the new recording fee for the Notice of Default The Election/Waiver of Mediation Form to be served with the Notice of Default and Election to Sell is included along with instructions for the individuals recording the notices involved in the new foreclosure procedures.

10). If there is an agreement, the parties will execute the appropriate documents.

Within 10 days of the mediation, the mediator will prepare the necessary Statement of Agreement or Non-agreement and serve it on the parties. The original will be filed with the Foreclosure Mediation Program Administrator and the mediation will be closed. Within 10 days of the mediation, the mediator will prepare the necessary Statement of Agreement or Non-agreement and serve it on the parties. The original will be filed with the Foreclosure Mediation Program Administrator and the mediation will be closed. If there is an agreement, the parties will execute the appropriate documents. If there is no agreement, the parties will be free to pursue other legal remedies.. If there is no agreement, the parties will be free to pursue other legal remedies.

TIMELINE FOR NEVADA FORECLOSURE
DAY     EVENT
DAY 1 – –    Notice of Default and Election to sell is recorded.
An State of Nevada Election/Waiver of Mediation is sent to homeowner along with copy of Notice of Default and Election to Sell.
Within the Next 10 Days     Notice of Default and Election to Sell must sent out to the Trustor/Owner and all the Lien Holders by U.S. Post Office Certified Mail.
1st Day after Mailing the NOD  – –   A 35 day reinstatement period begins.
DAY 30 – –    Election to Mediate expires 30 days from the date of the Notice of Default and Election to sell.
DAY 35  – –   The right to reinstate expires. Not at midnight but at the end of the working day.
25 Days before Foreclosure     Lender notifies the IRS (if applicable).
DAY 91  – –   The lender has the right to send out a Notice of Trustee’s Sale. From the date of the Notice of Trustee’s Sale it’s 20 days to foreclosure, unless otherwise specified in the notice. Notice of Trustee’s Sale must be sent via U.S. Registered Mail to all parties who require notification. The notice must also be posted within the County where the sale is to be held and where the property is located.
1 Week before Foreclosure     A bid price is typically established at this point. The bid amount includes principal, interest, advances and costs.
DAY 111 – –   Day of Trustee’s Sale also known as the foreclosure day. Anyone interested in buying the property can bid on the property. Only cash or certified funds are accepted. After the sale, a new deed is provided for the new owner. The new owner may be the bank or the winning bidder.

Note: Over the last few years, we saw that many times lenders did not act this quickly in their execution of foreclosures but it is important to note that they have the right to do so.

Quick Facts

–  Judicial Foreclosure Available: Yes

–  Non-Judicial Foreclosure Available: Yes

–  Primary Security Instruments: Deed of Trust, Mortgage

–  Timeline: Typically 120 days

–  Right of Redemption: Yes

–  Deficiency Judgments Allowed: Yes

In Nevada, lenders may foreclose on deeds of trusts or mortgages in default using either a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure process.

Judicial Foreclosure

The judicial process of foreclosure, which involves filing a lawsuit to obtain a court order to foreclose, is used when no power of sale is present in the mortgage or deed of trust. Generally, after the court declares a foreclosure, your home will be auctioned off to the highest bidder.

The borrower has one year (12 months) after the foreclosure sale to redeem the property if the judicial foreclosure process is used.

Non-Judicial Foreclosure

The non-judicial process of foreclosure is used when a power of sale clause exists in a mortgage or deed of trust. A “power of sale” clause is the clause in a deed of trust or mortgage, in which the borrower pre-authorizes the sale of property to pay off the balance on a loan in the event of the their default. In deeds of trust or mortgages where a power of sale exists, the power given to the lender to sell the property may be executed by the lender or their representative, typically referred to as the trustee. Regulations for this type of foreclosure process are outlined below in the “Power of Sale Foreclosure Guidelines”.

Power of Sale Foreclosure Guidelines

If the deed of trust or mortgage contains a power of sale clause and specifies the time, place and terms of sale, then the specified procedure must be followed. Otherwise, the non-judicial power of sale foreclosure is carried out as follows:

  1. A copy of the notice of default and election to sell must be mailed certified, return receipt requested, to the borrower, at their last known address, on the date the notice is recorded in the county where the property is located. Any additional postings and advertisements must be done in the same manner as for an execution sale in Nevada.

    Beginning on the day after the notice of default and election was recorded with the county and mailed to the borrower, the borrower has anywhere from fifteen (15) to thirty five (35) days to cure the default by paying the delinquent amount on the loan. The actual amount of time given is dependent on the date of the original deed of trust.

  2. The owner of the property may stop the foreclosure proceedings by filing an “Intent to Cure” with the Public Trustee’s office at least fifteen (15) days prior to the foreclosure sale and then paying the necessary amount to bring the loan current by noon the day before the foreclosure sale is scheduled.
  3. The foreclosure sale itself will be held at the place, the time and on the date stated in the notice of default and election and must be conducted in the same manner as for an execution sale of real property.

Lenders have three (3) months after the sale to try and obtain a deficiency judgment. Borrowers have no rights of redemption.

NEVADA FORECLOSURE TIMELINE

DAY EVENT
DAY 1 Notice of Default and Election to sell is recorded.
An State of Nevada Election/Waiver of Mediation is sent to homeowner along with copy of Notice of Default and Election to Sell.
Within the Next 10 Days Notice of Default and Election to Sell must sent out to the Trustor/Owner and all the Lien Holders by U.S. Post Office Certified Mail.
1st Day after Mailing the NOD A 35 day reinstatement period begins.
DAY 30 Election to Mediate expires 30 days from the date of the Notice of Default and Election to sell.
DAY 35 The right to reinstate expires. Not at midnight but at the end of the working day.
25 Days before Foreclosure Lender notifies the IRS (if applicable).
DAY 91 The lender has the right to send out a Notice of Trustee’s Sale. From the date of the Notice of Trustee’s Sale it’s 20 days to foreclosure, unless otherwise specified in the notice. Notice of Trustee’s Sale must be sent via U.S. Registered Mail to all parties who require notification. The notice must also be posted within the County where the sale is to be held and where the property is located.
1 Week before Foreclosure A bid price is typically established at this point. The bid amount includes principal, interest, advances and costs.
DAY 111 Day of Trustee’s Sale also known as the foreclosure day. Anyone interested in buying the property can bid on the property. Only cash or certified funds are accepted. After the sale, a new deed is provided for the new owner. The new owner may be the bank or the winning bidder.

Over the last few years, we saw that many times lenders did not act this quickly in their execution of foreclosures but it is important to note that they have the right to do so.

– See more at: http://michaelsrealestate.com/nevada-foreclosure-law/#sthash.CfhtdkBI.dpuf

For more information about foreclosure defense please visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

What California Residents Needs To Know When Faced With Foreclosure Challenges

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What is a foreclosure?
“Foreclosure” is a common term used to describe a trustee’s sale proceeding- the correct terminology to use when describing the procedure for enforcing a lender’s rights once an obligation secured by a Deed Of Trust (or similar instrument) is in default.

What constitutes a breach or a default?
A breach exists when the borrower fails to make the payments of principal and interest when due pursuant to the note secured by deed of trust. If the balance of the note is due, the breach would be the failure to make the principal payment due plus interest, by the maturity date. Most deeds of trust have provisions for default being declared when a senior lien, insurance, taxes and assessments have not been paid, or if the property is transferred without the lenders approval.

Should I forego a foreclosure and take a deed in lieu?
Before you can even consider an alternative, the borrower must be willing to offer a deed in lieu. There are advantages to taking a deed in lieu. It could save you time and money. You should order a preliminary title report and review it carefully to determine if there are any junior liens that would survive the deed in lieu. If you are satisfied with the title report, you would take the deed in lieu subject to a title insurance policy being issued in your favor as reflected in the preliminary report. This procedure would take a lot less time than the approximate four months of foreclosure. The main disadvantages to taking a deed in lieu of foreclosure are the junior liens will not be extinguished and that the borrower may later have a change of heart and seek to have the courts set the deed in lieu aside.

Must the original trustee process a non-judicial foreclosure?
No. The beneficiary may substitute trustees anytime.

Should I notify a senior lender of the existence of my junior lien? Yes. A senior lender may have a provision in his deed of trust that provides for senior priority for additional advances to the borrower. When advances are “obligatory” to protect the lender’s security interest, they are so secured. However, if the advances are “optional” and the senior lender has knowledge of a junior lien, the advances may not be senior to the junior lien of trust. A junior lender, therefore, should give the senior lender notice of their lien. Many lenders would like to reduce their collection efforts by having the junior lienholder advance to their loan. Send the senior lender a notice which tells them that you are willing to reinstate their loan.

Must I give notice of delinquency to a junior lienholder even if I don’t file an NOD?
No. Junior lienholders may request status of senior lien by doing the following:
Under the California civil code section 2924e, a lender is required to send a notice to a junior lienholder within 15 days after the delinquency reaches four months, when certain conditions exist: the borrower must consent; the junior lienholder must submit the request in writing by certified mail along with $40; the property must contain one to four residential units; the request shall be recorded in the county in which the property is situated; and it has not been longer than five years since the original request, unless a renewal payment of $15 has been made.
Junior lenders who acquire interest by assignment, now have the same rights as the original beneficiary to require senior lenders to provide information regarding delinquencies of four months. The new junior beneficiary must pay a processing fee of $15 to the senior beneficiary. See section 2924e(b).

If my loan is in a senior position, when should I start my foreclosure?
You may have to consider various constraints before you can file a notice of default. Is this a standard Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac document? If it is, you must send the borrower a notice of intent to foreclose 30 days prior to the filing of the NOD. You may have sold the loan to some other lender; they may have certain procedures and standards that you must adhere to, such as asking their permission to foreclose after a suitable effort has been made to work with the borrower to encourage repayment. If your loan is insured, you have be required to follow certain steps in order to be allowed to file a claim with the insurer.
The most important consideration when deciding to start a foreclosure is “Am I well secured if I wait?” If there is adequate protection between the value of your loan and the value of the property, delay should cause no loss. If there is inadequate protection, then every day delayed will cost you money. Choose a trustee who will record your NOD without any unnecessary delays and will stand behind their work.

If my loan is in a junior position, when should I start my foreclosure?
If you service a loan for someone else, if it is insured, or it is a standard FNMA/FHLMC document, then you have the same constraints mentioned in the previous question. Being in junior position adds one other very important dimension for your consideration. The senior lender can foreclose you out of your security or certainly diminish your protection as their loan interest balance grows.
If the senior lender begins foreclosure, and neither you nor the borrower bring them current, the lender could very well go to sale and eliminate your security. It is much better for you to initiate foreclosure early, go to auction, acquire the property and sell it, before the senior lender can complete the foreclosure. Of course, if necessary, you may have to reinstate the first lender to allow enough time for you to complete your foreclosure.

Should I reinstate the senior loan which is in foreclosure, or bid at its sale?
Reinstating the senior loan should require considerably less cash than bidding at its sale. If the loan has matured, then you may pay off the loan prior to the sale or bid at the sale.

If the senior lender filed a notice of default several months earlier, you may be able to save time by bidding at the senior’s sale. However there are some pitfalls to this strategy. The senior may delay his foreclosure; you have no control over when they may go to sale. File your own notice of default as soon as possible so that at least you are proceeding to your own sale. If you intend to bid at the senior’s sale, come to the sale early, bring sufficient certified funds to bid the amount of the debt plus your lien. You cannot credit bid the amount owed to you under your deed of trust; your standing as a bidder is the same as any others. If you fail to arrive on time for the sale, your lien may be eliminated.

Do I need the borrower’s permission to foreclose?
No. You already have their permission; they gave it when they signed the note and deed of trust.

What documents do I need to foreclose?
You will need to provide the trustee with the note and deed of trust, any modification or extension agreements, additional notes and any assignments. If an original document is lost, it may be necessary to provide a lost instrument bond. Consult with your trustee. You also need to provide the trustee with certain essential information, such as the unpaid balance of the note, the date to which the interest is paid, the reason for the default (such as failure to make the payment which became due on a certain date), information regarding any advances you have made, the last known residence or business address of the last known owner, and the property address. If you are not using the original trustee, a substitution of trustee must be signed and notarized by the beneficiary.

Why is an accurate “last known address” of the last known owner vital?
Failure to send notice to an accurate business or residence address of the last known owners may invalidate the foreclosure. Search all your records completely and carefully. If the borrower has more than one loan with your firm, review all sets of records. If the borrowers are married and you receive word from one of them that (s)he is no longer residing at the property address and you are provided with a new address, be sure to communicate that information to the trustee as soon as possible.

How long does it take to foreclose?
If there are no delays, a foreclosure will be completed in about four months. After the recording of the NOD there is a mandatory three-month waiting period before the trustee can publish the notice of trustee’s sale. Generally the sale will take place four weeks after the pre-publication period has ended. The date of the sale is influenced by the county where the property is located, the regular schedule of sales for that county and by the frequency of publication of the newspaper in which the trustee is required to publish. The trustee must also consider the newspaper deadlines for advertising and the time-necessary for preparation of the notice of sale and its delivery to the newspaper. The California Civil Code also requires that the notice of sale be posted on the property and a public place at least 20 days prior to the sale; adequate time must be allowed for this to be completed. If the IRS has recorded a federal tax lien at least 30 days before the sale, they require notification at least 25 days before the sale. If the loan is insured by the Veterans Administration, the sale date must be set to allow time enough for them to provide bid instructions.

Who pays the foreclosure fee and costs?
If the borrower brings the loan current or pays it off, the borrower is responsible to the lender for the foreclosure fee and costs. Since the lender is obligated to pay the trustee, the lender should be sure to not overlook these foreclosure expenses. If the property is sold to an outside bidder at the foreclosure auction, the foreclosure expenses will be paid by the bidder. Only when the lender is the successful bidder at the sale will the lender not be able to look to someone else to recover the trustee’s fee and costs. Hopefully, when the property is resold, the lender can expect to recover their foreclosure expenses.

Do all trustees charge the same?
No. The California Civil Code sets the maximum fee that is deemed to be valid and lawful. A trustee need not charge that maximum amount. The quality of service and the trustee’s financial strength should be of primary concern when selecting a trustee.

What is a Declaration of Default?
This document contains the official written instruction from the beneficiary to the trustee. Most deeds of trust require the beneficiary to furnish the trustee with a Declaration of Default. It identifies the deed of trust to be foreclosed, states the breach, and directs the trustee to sell the property to satisfy the indebtedness.

What is the fastest way to record the NOD? You may send the trustee a pre-signed substitution along with the other documents, or the trustee can prepare one and return it to you for your signature. If you are to be regularly using a trustee, you might consider giving the trustee a limited power of attorney authorizing them to sign the substitution of trustee and the notice of default. Sending pre-signed substitutions or giving a limited power of attorney reduces the time between your decision to foreclose and the actual recording of the notice of default to as little as 24 to 48 hours.


What are the most common delays to the foreclosure process?

  • The most common delay comes from the filing of bankruptcy.
  • A temporary restraining order (TRO) is used to preserve the status quo pending a court hearing for a preliminary injunction.
  • A preliminary injunction is used to preserve the status quo pending a final determination of the action on the merits.
  • The beneficiary or his servicer doesn’t send the trustee the most current assignment. The trustee prepares the NOD and the substitution with the wrong beneficiary shown. Several days after the documents are recorded the title company discovers the error. The trustee now must rescind the original NOD and re-record new documents. If there is uncertainty regarding the current beneficiary, ask the trustee handling the foreclosure to check with the title company for current information.
  • The recording information on the deed of trust was incorrect. A copy of the deed of trust has the recording information written incorrectly or the original deed of trust was re-recorded later.
  • The paid-to-date was incorrect.
  • The unpaid balance was incorrect.
  • The last known address was incorrect or incomplete.
  • Money (partial payment) is accidentally accepted from the borrower.
  • Instructions are misunderstood. The beneficiary instructs the trustee to cancel the sale rather than postpone, or postpone rather than sell.
  • The NOD is re-recorded (start-over) because of failure to notify someone.
  • Correspondence requiring response is accidentally filed rather than handled.
  • Opening bid information given to the trustee too late to order a date down of the trustee’s sale guarantee.


What law authorizes foreclosures through a trustee’s power of sale?
There is no law that authorizes a trustee’s non-judicial foreclosure; that power is created by the borrower when he signs that deed to trust, pledging the real property as security. The words used in the deed of trust are; “with power of sale.” There are, however, many laws that regulate the trustee. See California Civil Code section 2924.

How does bankruptcy of the borrower affect the foreclosure?
The filing of a petition of bankruptcy by the borrower, by a lessee (tenant) who has a recorded lease, or by the beneficiary of a junior deed of trust, immediately stops the foreclosure, with or without notice. The trustee may not proceed in any way; he may, however, postpone an already scheduled and noticed sale. If the trustee conducts a sale after a bankruptcy is filed, but without any knowledge of it, the sale is void or voidable depending on circumstances. See section 2924j. Before the trustee can continue the foreclosure, the lender must obtain relief from the bankruptcy court. You should seek legal advice immediately from an attorney who specializes in bankruptcy. Relief must terminate the stay against the property of the debtor and the property of the estate in bankruptcy. Relief as to the debtor is not relief as to the estate. The trustee’s sale cannot be held within seven days after the expiration of the stay in bankruptcy unless the court order so provides. See Civil Code section 2924g(d). Attorneys representing lenders in bankruptcy should include as part of their relief orders a statement that a foreclosure sale may occur immediately upon entry of the bankruptcy relief order.

Could a senior lender get relief from the bankruptcy stay and go to sale while the junior lender is still stayed?
Yes. If you are a junior lienholder, notify your attorney as soon as you get word of a bankruptcy. Assist them in every way to get relief before the senior lender does.

Who is entitled to receive a copy of the Notice of Default?
Within ten business days after the NOD records, notice must be mailed by certified/registered mail to the original trustors at the address shown on the deed of trust; the current owners,if known, at their last known business or residence mailing addresses, and to those who have recorded a request for a copy of a Notice of Default. In addition to the required certified/registered mailings, simultaneous mailings must be made by regular, first class mail to the trustors and current owners. See section 2924b(B)(1).
Within one month after the notice of default is recorded, a copy of the NOD must be mailed certified/registered to those entitled to notice under the California Civil Code section 2924b(c)(1), including the current owner of record and those lienholders with a recorded interest.

Does the borrower need actual notice to have a valid foreclosure?
No. The non-judicial foreclosure sections of the California Civil Code were designed to balance the needs of the borrower and lender. The procedure is supposed to be clear and easy to follow so that there is little reason to go into court to argue issues. The notification procedure provides many opportunities for the borrower to receive notice. If they do not make the effort to keep the lender of the trustee informed, they may lose their property without notice. The trustee has no obligation to search for a lost borrower. The borrower can give constructive notice with their current address. See I.E. Assocs., v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. (1985) 39 C3d 281, 216 CR 438.

What is a Trustee’s Sale Guarantee report?
The Trustee’s Sale Guarantee (TSG) report provides the foreclosing trustee with the information necessary to process your foreclosure and guarantees the correctness of that information. It sets forth the record owners and lists all exceptions of record against the secured property. It provides the names of those who are to receive notices and the name of the newspaper in which the trustee must publish. The TSG is provided by a title company in the county where the property is located. When you receive your copy from the trustee, you should be alert to certain items:

  • New Owners.
  • Delinquent real estate taxes.
  • Notice of defaultrecorded by a senior deed of trust. You should contact the senior beneficiary to determine if their loan is still delinquent.
  • Federal (IRS) tax liens recorded.
  • Bankruptcy.
  • Lis Pendens. This provides constructive notice of pending litigation, the outcome of which will not be affected by the foreclosure.
  • Notice of substandard dwelling.
  • Any irregularities noted therein.


Who should record a request for a copy of a Notice of Default?
If you are a junior lienholder and have changed you address from that shown on the upper left hand corner of your recorded deed of trust, you should record a request for notice pursuant to Civil Code section 2924b(a) showing your current address. Failure to do this may prevent you from receiving notice of a pending foreclosure on a senior deed of trust. Additionally, if you want a copy of a Notice of Default mailed to you within ten business days of its recording, record a request.

When can I refuse reinstatement?
For NOD’s recorded prior to January 1, 1986, reinstatement is allowed by law (unless the loan has reached full maturity) during the first three months; after the first three months you can refuse reinstatement. For Nod’s recorded after January 1,1986, you may not refuse reinstatement until five business days before the date set for sale or a postponed sale; after that you may refuse reinstatement. See Civil Code section 2924c(e). The standard FNMA/FHLMC deed of trust allows reinstatement by the borrower up to five calendar days before the sale date.

Who is entitled to reinstate the loan?
The trustor and any junior lienholder of record have the right to reinstate the loan. The reinstatement amount should be enough to restore the entire loan to its original installment basis and include attorney fee and costs which were necessary to protect the security, foreclosure fee and costs, late charges, and advances. Contact the trustee for updated fees and costs before accepting reinstatement. A partial payment may not cure the default. Accepting partial payment may invalidate the foreclosure. If you believe it is in your best interest to accept partial payments, consult your attorney regarding a written agreement between you and the borrower.

What costs can be included in the reinstatement or payoff amount?
Money advanced to protect the lender’s security, other than improvement of the property, are allowable. For instance, repairing a leaking roof, that would result in damage and decrease the value of the property, would be allowable. Replacing the whole roof would not be allowable. The costs of collection letters and advice from an attorney in certain instances now appear allowable. See Buck v. Barb 147 CA 3rd 920. Additionally, attorney fees and costs incurred while defending yourself in court or seeking relief from bankruptcy are allowable. Check with your attorney before including any questionable items. Also there are regularly allowable trustee’s costs for recording, mailing, publishing, posting, trustee’s sale guarantee, and one postponement fee of $50 upon the written request of the trustor pursuant to section 2924c(c).

How long does the publication period last?
After the three month pre-publication period has ended, a notice of trustee’s sale is prepared and sent to the newspaper for publication. The first ad must run at least 20 days before the scheduled sale date. The time between the first ad and the sale date is the publication period.

Where is the Notice of Sale published and how often?
The Notice of Sale is published in an adjudicated newspaper of general circulation in the city where the property is located.If there is not a paper adjudicated to run legal notices in that city; then a newspaper in the judicial district may be used.
The Notice of Sale must publish once a week for three weeks with the first ad running no later than 20 days before the sale.

Who is entitled to receive the notice of trustee’s sale?
All parties pursuant to Civil Code section 2924b and (b3).

What should the beneficiary do during the publication period?
During this period the lender should assess their equity position in the property to determine if they should bid less than their total debt.

Am I limited to only three postponements?
The lender or the trustee is limited to three discretionary postponements, after which it is necessary to republish the Notice of Sale. The lender may agree with the borrower to any number of postponements; it is best to get this agreement in writing and signed by the borrower. The sale can be postponed any number of times “by operation of law” or one time only for bankruptcy determination. See section 2924g(c). A Notice of Sale is generally considered stale after one year. It would then be best to re-notice the trustee’s sale.

Must I bid the full indebtedness, plus advances and costs?
No. It is not required and there may be good reasons not to. For instance, it you would like to encourage outside bidders, set the opening bid low and credit bid price upward until you reach your total indebtedness. Another reason that you might want to bid less than the full amount would be to allow for a claim to an insurance company for a casualty loss against the property. If you had bid the full indebtedness, the insurance company could claim that your debt had been fully satisfied. There may also be some tax consequences to consider.

Are the trustee’s sales really held on the steps of the county courthouse?
Yes. Most trustees use the same place to conduct their sales. The most common spot is the front entrance to the county courthouse, city hall, or hall or records. The only requirement by law is that it be conducted in a public place.

Is the trustee’s sale conducted orally or by sealed bid?
The sale is conducted verbally. The trustee will essentially announce that they are offering to sell at public auction to the highest bidder all right, title and interest conveyed to and now held by the described deed of trust. The sale will be made, but without covenant or warranty, express or implied, regarding title, possession or encumbrances. After the auctioneer makes an announcement, they will ask if there are any bidders who wish to qualify. If there are, each must show the auctioneer funds in excess of the opening bid. A junior lienholder must qualify as any other bidder and cannot use their lien for bidding purposes. Nomellini Const. Co. v. Modesto Savings & Loan Assoc. (1969) 275CA2d 114,79 CR 717. The auctioneer will note the total amount of funds each bidder possesses, so that they know when a bidder is no longer qualified to enter a bid. If a bidder tries to enter a bid that exceeds their funds, the auctioneer will ask them to requalify. Each bid is an irrevocable bid and replaces the previous bid. If a bidder reneges, they may be liable to the trustee for damages and subject to criminal prosecution and penalties. The successful bidder is the one who enters the final bid that is accepted by the auctioneer. See sections 2924g and 2924h.

Must I attend the sale and enter my own bid?
No. The trustee’s auctioneer will enter your opening bid on your behalf. However, you may attend the sale and enter your own bid. If you wish to bid more than your total debt due you, it would be necessary for you to appear at the sale with certified funds to cover any bids you make over the amount of your debt.

When am I entitled to possession of the property?
The title a successful bidder receives through a trustee’s deed entitles them to immediate possession. The purchaser may allow the previous owners or tenants to stay or they may bring an unlawful detainer action (eviction) to remove them. However, a lease recorded prior to the recording date of the deed of trust entitles the lease to priority over the title received through the foreclosure. A unrecorded lease, where it was reasonable to assume that a lease existed at the same time the deed of trust was recorded, may provide the same priority as a prior recorded lease. Alternately, if the lease is unrecorded and it was not reasonable to assume that a lease existed at the time the deed of trust was recorded or if the lease was recorded subsequent to the deed of trust which has been foreclosed, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale may choose to evict the tenants or allow the tenants to stay.

Is there a redemption period after the sale?
In a non-judicial sale there is no redemption period for the previous owner or junior lienholders. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a 120-day right of redemption, if it had a properly recorded notice of a federal tax lien subsequent to your deed of trust.

What liens or rights may survive the trustee’s sale?
Failure of the trustee to notify a junior lienholder of record (absent his actual knowledge of the sale) may allow the junior lien to survive. It is as yet unclear under California law whether the buyer can claim “bona fide purchase” status to defeat the junior lien’s attachment. In any event, the junior lien could sue for damages if a BFP’s interest eliminated the junior. An IRS tax lien will not be extinguished for 120 days; during that time the IRS has the right to redeem the property. The rights of a plaintiff in a legal action, who has a properly recorded lis pendens, will survive the trustee’s sale. City and county liens, easements, homeowner’s association assessments, and mechanic’s liens, where the work was begun before the foreclosing deed of trust was recorded, may survive the trustee’s sale. Leases that were recorded prior to the foreclosing deed of trust will survive. An unrecorded lease where it was reasonable to assume that a lease existed may survive. If the foreclosing lender subordinated to a subsequent deed of trust, it will survive. Any liens that were recorded prior to the foreclosing deed of trust (which has not subordinated itself to the foreclosing deed of trust) will survive.

Who gets the over bid surplus?
Any moneys that exceed the foreclosing lender’s total indebtedness, including advances and expenses, will go to junior lienholders of record in the order of priority, and finally to the previous owner of record. If the trustee has doubts about where the moneys should be paid, they should commence an action for interpleader to avoid potential liability.

What happens if I feel sorry for the sold out borrower and deed the property back to them?
If your intent is to replace your original deed of trust with a new one having the same priority…BEWARE. The extinguished junior liens will revive; your new deed of trust will be subordinate. See Jensen v. Duke (1925) 71 Cal. App. 210.

When is the trustee’s sale complete?
The sale is final upon the auctioneer saying “sold” and the sale is deemed perfected as of 8am on the day of sale provided the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale is recorded within 15 days of the actual sale date.

To find out how you can effectively challenge and save your home when faced with foreclosure challenges visit http://www.fightforeclosure.net

Using Securitization Audits As An Effective Tool For Foreclosure Defense

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By now, most homeowners in foreclosure proceedings were suddenly realizing that most loans originated in between 2000 and 2010 were securitized without the borrower’s knowledge. This means the lenders pooled the mortgage with thousands of others and sold these pooled loans to investors immediately or very shortly after loan origination. They were paid in full but retained loan “servicing”, the day to day loan administration operations, for which they now received between $25 and $45 per year for each $1,000 of loan value. This may have been on top of a profit in the sale. On a $400,000 loan the servicer’s financial interest is now only $10,000, not the $400,000 they are trying to foreclose on.

What’s more, in the process of investors purchasing the loan, the originating lender had to guarantee that all transfers were as laid out in pooling and servicing agreements which are on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Any violation and the now “master servicing lender” is under obligation to buy back the loan at full price, a guaranteed loss on a now non-performing loan facing foreclosure.

Based on default servicing agreements the servicing lender can use creative loan accounting to essentially position a defaulted loan to where the servicer receives most of all of the property in a foreclosure and the investor owner gets little or nothing, but the loans were insured and T.A.R.P. monies make the investor whole so they don’t miss the property. The servicer sold the loan for payment in full and now gets the property free and clear because the mortgage was not to them, it was to the investor. Is this fair? No, but it is happening every 15 to 20 seconds in the USA.

So how does an attorney you stop this? They use the evidence process in court to introduce findings of a highly qualified expert that is willing to stand behind the issuance and be an expert witness. To keep those costs down in foreclosure and bankruptcy most judges all expert witnesses to appear in a virtual manner, by phone conference or video conference and in so doing enable this type of support in a case at nominal prices.

The evidential findings are based in undisputed facts that are not objectionable because they address genuine material facts pertinent to the case. These facts include showing many defects that prevent foreclosure and bring to light issues the lender foreclosing wants to hide and has misrepresented. Ownership, improper endorsements, subsequent sales, now bankrupt parties, not including real owners as parties in interest, fraudulent use of MERS, fraudulent and collusion on affidavits, robo-signed documents, illegal deed and trustee assignments underlying improper deed enforcement and much more. Basically anything by which the lender can foreclose because that is the only way to sever the risk of lawsuit by the investors. That is why the investors are not being included in the lawsuit. Should they become aware, there could be a class action and because they bought hundreds of thousands of similar problematic loans, the servicer can inherit tremendous risk and potential losses.

The evidence usually turns up facts that conclude the first party ownership is just not there according to law, at least not a secured mortgage anyway. Unsecured the mortgage debt can be crammed down by a bankruptcy Judge or completely discharged after some years in a quiet title action. Those are the legal aspects left up to lawyers and courts.

Faced with losing in court, lenders typically settle and move on. The number of cases winning in this way is a relatively small number. Settlements include loan modifications of terms, acceptance of short sales, waivers of deficiency judgments and having the case dismissed entirely or crammed down by a bankruptcy judge.

The solution? Simple, affordable and fast. – To find out how you can effectively challenge and win your foreclosure defense using Securitization Audit visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

How Robo Signing Violations Can Help Homeowners Save Their Homes

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The Foreclosure process often involves affidavits, which are documents in which someone attests to a set of facts. Foreclosure affidavits typically involve the mortgage servicer confirming that the foreclosure is valid specifically, that the servicer or mortgage holder has a right to foreclose because the mortgagee has defaulted on the mortgage.

Foreclosure Process and Affidavits

Often, mortgage servicers looking to foreclose ask the court for what is called summary judgment, which means they want the court to rule in their favor without need for a trial based on clear evidence that the foreclosure is in order. To show the court that it should order foreclosure, the servicer or mortgage older typically submits affidavits and other proof (such as the mortgage note) showing who in fact owns the mortgage in question. Foreclosure affidavits also include statements about the status of the mortgage account, such as payment history, what is currently owed, when it went into default and how far behind the mortgagee is.

If the borrower does not contest the foreclosure, many foreclosure cases end at this point, with the judge granting summary judgment for the mortgage servicer. This allows the foreclosure to be executed and the property to be sold.

“Robo-signing” and Foreclosure Affidavits

Affidavits are documents submitted to the court in which a person attests to personal knowledge as to what is contained. This means that the person signing a foreclosure affidavit should have verified all information he or she is stating to be true.

The term “robo-signing” has been coined to describe rapid fire signing of foreclosure affidavits without adequately verifying the truth of what the affidavits state. Mortgage servicers who process very high volumes of mortgages in quick succession have been accused of robo-signing to speed up the foreclosure process.

In cases where the mortgage servicer did not review underlying documentation, foreclosure affidavits signed by the servicer may be challenged as inadequate to prove that foreclosure should occur. In some states, foreclosure affidavits must include copies of all documentation on which the affidavits rely. In these states, failure to include such documentation could also be challenged.

Challenging Foreclosure Affidavits

Typically, the mortgagee can challenge the foreclosure affidavits at the point when the bank or mortgage servicer has requested summary judgment. Citing robo-signing to challenge mortgage affidavits is one way to possible stave off summary judgment. Another way to challenge the affidavits is to challenge any inaccurate information about the mortgage and payment history contained in the affidavits.

Though foreclosure affidavits are often perfectly accurate, sometimes they may contain bad information. One example might be if the affidavits state an inaccurate amount owed or payment history. Often, mortgages have been sold many times, with information as to payment potentially lost in the shuffle. Other times, fees may have been attached to the account improperly.

What Happens Next?

Showing that a mortgage servicer’s foreclosure affidavits are inadequate does not resolve the underlying dispute about the property and whether it will be foreclosed. Lenders and mortgage servicers typically rely on affidavits in order to gain summary judgment in foreclosure actions.

In cases where the affidavits are successfully challenged or found lacking by the court, the borrower may not have won a final victory, but has staved off a final decision. Such borrowers then may face the lender or servicer at trial to resolve whether the property, in fact, may be foreclosed and sold.

To Learn How You Can Effectively Use Solid Arguments Such As Robo Signing To Challenge Your Wrongful Foreclosure Visit: http://www.fightforeclosure.net

Why Every Homeowner Needs To Use RESPA to their advantage

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The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), was an act passed by the United States Congress in 1974. It is codified at Title 12, Chapter 27 of the United States Code, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617

RESPA is a consumer protection statute that regulates the real estate settlement process, including servicing of loans and assignment of those loans. See 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (Congressional findings). The statute imposes a number of duties on lenders and loan servicers. Most relevant here are there requirements that borrowers be given notice by both transferor and transferee when their loan is transferred to a new lender or servicer, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(b) and (c), and that loan servicers respond promptly to borrowers’ written requests for information, § 2605(e).

 The details of the requirement for responding to written requests will become relevant here. First, it takes a “qualified written request” to trigger the loan servicer’s duties under RESPA to acknowledge and respond. The statute defines a qualified written request as written correspondence (other than notices on a payment coupon or similar documents) from the borrower or her agent that requests information or states reasons for the borrower’s belief that the account is in error. 12U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B). To qualify, the written request must also include the name and account of the borrower or must enable the servicer to identify them.

Within 60 days after receiving a qualified written re-quest, the servicer must take one of three actions: either(1) make appropriate corrections to the borrower’s account and notify the borrower in writing of the corrections; (2) investigate the borrower’s account and pro-vide the borrower with a written clarification as to why the servicer believes the borrower’s account to be correct; or (3) investigate the borrower’s account and either provide the requested information or provide an explanation as to why the requested information is unavailable. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(e)(2)(A), (B), and (C). No matter which action the servicer takes, the servicer must provide a name and telephone number of a representative of the servicer who can assist the borrower.

During the 60-day period after a servicer receives a qualified written request relating to a dispute regarding the borrower’s payments, “a servicer may not provide information regarding any overdue payment, owed by such borrower and relating to such period or qualified written request, to any consumer reporting agency.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(3).

RESPA provides for a private right of action for violations of its requirements. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f). The provision for a private right of action includes a “safe harbor” provision, which provides in relevant part that a transferee service provider like any lender shall not be liable for a violation of section 2605 if, “within60 days after discovering an error (whether pursuant to a final written examination report or the servicer’s own procedures) and before the commencement of an action under this subsection and the receipt of written notice of the error from the borrower, the servicer notifies the person concerned of the error and makes whatever adjustments are necessary in the appropriate account to ensure that the person will not be required to pay an amount in excess of any amount that the person otherwise would have paid.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(4).

For more info on how you can use RESPA and its provisions to slow or stop your foreclosure proceedings, please visit http://www.fightforeclosure.net

The Effects of “US Bank v. Ibanez” in Mortgage Securitization Cases

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THIS DECISION WAS A GREAT WIN TO HOMEOWNERS!

Background

For those new to the case, the problem the Court dealt with in this case is the validity of foreclosures when the mortgages are part of securitized mortgage lending pools. When mortgages were bundled and packaged to Wall Street investors, the ownership of mortgage loans were divided and freely transferred numerous times on the lenders’ books. But the mortgage loan documentation actually on file at the Registry of Deeds often lagged far behind.

In the Ibanez case, the mortgage assignment, which was executed in blank, was not recorded until over a year after the foreclosure process had started. This was a fairly common practice in Massachusetts, and I suspect across the U.S. Mr. Ibanez, the distressed homeowner, challenged the validity of the foreclosure, arguing that U.S. Bank had no standing to foreclose because it lacked any evidence of ownership of the mortgage and the loan at the time it started the foreclosure.

Mr. Ibanez won his case in the lower court in 2009, and due to the importance of the issue, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court took the case on direct appeal.

The SJC Ruling: Lenders Must Prove Ownership When They Foreclose

The SJC’s ruling can be summed up by Justice Cordy’s concurring opinion:

“The type of sophisticated transactions leading up to the accumulation of the notes and mortgages in question in these cases and their securitization, and, ultimately the sale of mortgaged-backed securities, are not barred nor even burdened by the requirements of Massachusetts law. The plaintiff banks, who brought these cases to clear the titles that they acquired at their own foreclosure sales, have simply failed to prove that the underlying assignments of the mortgages that they allege (and would have) entitled them to foreclose ever existed in any legally cognizable form before they exercised the power of sale that accompanies those assignments. The court’s opinion clearly states that such assignments do not need to be in recordable form or recorded before the foreclosure, but they do have to have been effectuated.”

The Court’s ruling appears rather elementary: you need to own the mortgage before you can foreclose. But it’s become much more complicated with the proliferation of mortgage backed securities (MBS’s) –which constitute 60% or more of the entire U.S. mortgage market. The Court has held unequivocally that the common industry practice of assigning a mortgage “in blank” — meaning without specifying to whom the mortgage would be assigned until after the fact — does not constitute a proper assignment, at least in Massachusetts.

The Case in Review:

On Jan. 7, 2011, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
ruled against U.S. Bancorp and Wells Fargo & Co. in their appeal of a Massachusetts Land Court decision in March 2009 invalidating their foreclosure sales because both banks had failed to make the requisite showing that they were the mortgage holders at the time of the foreclosures. The case made headlines across the country, but turned on the prosaic notion that only the mortgage holder can foreclose on a mortgage.

Documentation provided by the banks in their efforts to prove that they were the present assignees of the mortgages at the time of the notice of foreclosure and subsequent foreclosure sale failed to convince the court that the proper party had initiated the foreclosure.

Because Massachusetts does not require a mortgage holder to obtain judicial authorization to foreclose on Massachusetts property, the decision in U.S. Bank National Association v. Ibanez serves as a forewarning to banks that foreclosures will only be upheld as valid by a showing of strict compliance with the statutory power of sale requirements, that is, that they were the mortgage holder at the time of notice of foreclosure and execution of the foreclosure sale.

Copycat litigation has followed in Massachusetts and elsewhere, but the ramifications of Ibanez could be broader than just an increase in courtroom activity. Legislatures will wrestle with the possibility of increased regulations, and prosecutors will likely scour the files for possible illegal activity concerning the dates of mortgage transfers.

Case Background
In July 2007, U.S. Bank NA and Wells Fargo Bank NA, as trustees of two securitization trusts, foreclosed on the mortgages of the respective properties and purchased the properties at the foreclosure sale. In September and October 2008, U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo brought actions separately in the Massachusetts Land Court seeking among other things, a declaration that title to the two properties was vested in them.

The Land Court heard the two actions together and ruled that the foreclosure sales were invalid because the banks acquired the mortgages by assignment only after the foreclosure sales and therefore had no interest in the mortgages being foreclosed at the time of the publication of the notices of sale or the foreclosure sales.

At issue was whether the banks had shown sufficient documentation that they were in fact the mortgage holders at the time of the sales pursuant to a valid chain of assignments. In U.S. Bank’s case, the original lender was Rose Mortgage Inc., which assigned the mortgage in blank. At some point the blank space was stamped with Option One Mortgage Corp. as assignee, and was recorded on June 7, 2006.

On Jan. 23, 2006, before recording, Option One executed an assignment in blank. U.S. Bank claimed that Option One assigned the mortgage to Lehman Brothers Bank FSB, which assigned it to Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., which assigned it to the Structured Asset Securities Corp., which then assigned the mortgage, pooled with over 1,000 other loans, to U.S. Bank, as trustee, on or around Dec. 1, 2006.

U.S. Bank filed for foreclosure on April 17, 2007, and purchased the property at the foreclosure sale on July 5, 2007. On Sept. 2, 2008, American Home Mortgage Servicing Inc., as successor in interest to Option One, the record holder of the mortgage, executed a written assignment of the mortgage to U.S.Bank, as trustee, which was then recorded on Sept. 11, 2008.

In the Land Court proceeding, however, U.S. Bank failed to put in the record the trust agreement, which it claimed constituted the assignment of the mortgage. U.S. Bank did offer the private placement memorandum, an unsigned offer of mortgage-backed securities to potential investors, which included the representation that mortgages “will be” assigned to the trust. The memorandum also stated that each mortgage would be identified in a schedule attached to the trust agreement. U.S. Bank also did not provide any such schedule identifying the particular loan as among the mortgages assigned to the trust.

In Wells Fargo’s case, the original lender was Option One, which executed an assignment of the mortgage in blank on May 25, 2005. Option One later assigned the mortgage to Bank of America Corp. in a flow sale and servicing agreement, which then assigned it to Asset Backed Funding Corp., which assigned it, pooled with others, to Wells Fargo, as trustee, pursuant to a pooling and servicing agreement.

On July 5, 2007, the day Wells Fargo purchased the property, Option One, the record mortgage holder, executed an assignment of the mortgage to Wells Fargo as trustee, which was recorded on May 12, 2008, but had an effective date of April 18, 2007.

In the Land Court proceeding, Wells Fargo did not provide the flow sale and servicing agreement reflecting the assignment by Option One to Bank of America. Wells Fargo did produce an unexecuted copy of the mortgage loan purchase agreement, which made reference to a schedule listing the assigned mortgages, but failed to provide a schedule showing that the mortgage was among those assigned to Asset Backed Funding Corporation.

Wells Fargo also provided a copy of the pooling and servicing agreement, but this copy was only downloaded from the U.S.Securities and Exchange Commission website, was unsigned and did not contain the loan schedules referenced in the agreement. Wells Fargo produced a schedule that it represented identified the mortgage by the property’s ZIP code and city because the payment history and loan amount matched the loan at issue.

SJC Decision
In Massachusetts, a mortgagee must strictly comply with the statutory power of sale by proving its authority to foreclose and complying with the notice requirement. Only a present holder of the mortgage is authorized to foreclose on the mortgaged property. As highlighted by the SJC in this case, the statutory power is also limited to those who are holders of mortgages pursuant to valid, verifiable assignments at the time of the notice of sale and the subsequent foreclosure sale. U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo failed to prove that they were.

The court rendered U.S. Bank’s foreclosure invalid for several reasons: 1) It failed to produce the document,the trust agreement, which it claimed assigned the mortgage to it; 2) the private placement memorandum described the trust agreement as having only an intent to assign mortgages to U.S. Bank in the future, not as an actual assignment; 3) U.S. Bank did not produce the schedule of loans mortgages that was supposedly attached to the agreement, so it failed to show that the mortgage at issue was among those assigned by that agreement; and 4) U.S. Bank failed to produce any evidence that the assigning party, Structured Asset Securities Corp., ever held the mortgage to be assigned. The court determined that Option One, not U.S. Bank, was the mortgage holder at the time of the foreclosure.

Similarly, the court rendered Wells Fargo’s foreclosure invalid because: 1) While the pooling and servicing agreement reflected a present assignment, the mortgage loan schedule provided by Wells Fargo failed to identify with specificity the mortgage at issue as one of the mortgages assigned; and 2) Wells Fargo did not provide any documentation showing that Asset Backed Funding Corporation held the mortgage that it was purportedly assigning under the pooling and servicing agreement. Because Wells Fargo failed to submit anything demonstrating that the mortgage was ever assigned by Option One to another entity before the notice and sale, the court found that Option One was the mortgage holder.

Ibanez in Practice
The SJC provided insight into the documentation it believes is required to support a valid foreclosure in the case of assignments and securitization trusts. Whether pending and future legislation or regulations change how the court views these matters remains to be seen.

* An assignment does not have to be in recordable form at the time of the notice of sale or the foreclosure sale, though it may be the better practice. An executed agreement that assigns a pool of mortgages along with the schedule that “clearly and specifically” identifies the mortgage at issue may suffice to establish the trustee as mortgage holder.
* A bank must provide proof that the assignment was made by a party that validly held the mortgage. This can be accomplished by providing a chain of assignment linking the bank to the record holder or a single assignment from the record holder of the mortgage.
* An assignment in blank does not constitute a lawful assignment of a mortgage.

* An assignment of a note without an assignment of the underlying mortgage does carry with it an assignment of the mortgage, and therefore does not give the holder of the note sufficient financial interest in the mortgage to permit it to foreclose.
* A mortgage holder may not be permitted to rely on Title Standard No. 58 issued by the Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts for the proposition that an entity that does not hold a mortgage may foreclose on a property and later cure the cloud on title by a later assignment of a mortgage. However, an assignment that is confirmatory of an earlier, valid assignment made prior to publication of notice and execution of sale may be executed and recorded after the foreclosure without defecting title. A confirmatory assignment cannot confirm an assignment that was not validly made earlier, or backdate an assignment being made for the first time.
* A post foreclosure assignment may not be treated as a pre-foreclosure assignment by declaring an “effective date” that precedes the notice of sale and foreclosure.

Retroactive Implications of Ibanez
Because the court found that it was not creating new law, but rather applying tried and true standards, it made its decision retroactive. In his decision, Judge Gants stated, “The legal principles and requirements we set forth are well established in our case law and our statutes. All that has changed is the plaintiffs’ apparent failure to abide by those principles and requirements in the rush to sell mortgage-backed securities.” Thus it is likely that homeowners will seek recovery for homes that were wrongfully foreclosed upon.

But beyond that, questions arise. For example, Massachusetts is not a state that requires judicial approval of foreclosures, whereas about 23 states already require some sort of judicial authorization or judicial intervention in the foreclosure process. Would the facts in Ibanez have allowed a foreclosure to progress as far as it did in a state that required judicial foreclosure? Should there be more regulations around the foreclosure process? The Ibanez court didn’t seem to think so, as it found the existing rules to be relatively straightforward and capable of controlling the situation.

Even so, lawmakers in Massachusetts wasted little time in introducing legislation that appeared to be reactionary to the Ibanez decision. Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley drafted legislation that would reportedly establish standards to ensure that creditors undertake “commercially reasonable efforts to avoid unnecessary foreclosures” and would also codify Ibanez by requiring a creditor to show it is the current mortgage holder before foreclosing and require creditors to record their assignments before commencing foreclosure proceedings.

A violation of this legislation as introduced would constitute a violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act as well. There have been at least 10 other bills introduced in the Massachusetts House and Senate that address various aspects of the foreclosure process, including legislation that would require foreclosure mediations and judicial review of foreclosures.

The great danger may be for an overeager bank official who realizes that the bank’s paperwork suffers from the defects outlined in Ibanez. The temptation to back-date documents and to “fill in the blanks” may be too great for some to resist. Prosecutors and regulators will likely be looking for just such situations as they attempt to make cases.

What the court in Ibanez really ruled is that the banks need to strictly comply with the laws already on the books in proceeding with foreclosures, and in light of the court’s candid opinion, and harsh concurrence by Justice Robert J. Cordy, banks would do well to ensure that they have their ducks in line. Banks would also be wise to educate their staff on Ibanez and how not to react to it.

But when all is said and done, however, what Ibanez may ultimately have done is provided the impetus for legislators, regulators, and prosecutors to change the way foreclosures proceed in Massachusetts, and possibly all over the country, in creating new requirements for banks, and courts, far beyond those at play in Ibanez.

My Analysis of the Case

  • Winners: Distressed homeowners facing foreclosure
  • Losers: Foreclosing lenders, people who purchased foreclosed homes with this type of title defect, foreclosure attorneys, and title insurance companies.
  • Despite pleas from innocent buyers of foreclosed properties and my own predictions, the decision was applied retroactively, so this will hurt Massachusetts homeowners who bought defective foreclosure properties.
  • If you own a foreclosed home with an “Ibanez” title issue, I’m afraid to say that you do not own your home anymore. The previous owner who was foreclosed upon owns it again. This is a mess.
  • The opinion is a scathing indictment of the securitized mortgage lending system and its non-compliance with Massachusetts foreclosure law. Justice Cordy, a former big firm corporate lawyer, chastised lenders and their Wall Street lawyers for “the utter carelessness with which the plaintiff banks documented the titles to their assets.”
  • If you purchased a foreclosure property with an “Ibanez” title defect, and you do not have title insurance, you are in trouble. You may not be able to sell or refinance your home for quite a long time, if ever. Recourse would be against the foreclosing banks, the foreclosing attorneys. Or you could attempt to get a deed from the previous owner. Re-doing the original foreclosure is also an option but with complications.
  • If you purchased a foreclosure property and you have an owner’s title insurance policy, contact the title company right away.
  • The decision carved out some room so that mortgages with compliant securitization documents may be able to survive the ruling. This will shake out in the months to come. A major problem with this case was that the lenders weren’t able to produce the schedules of the securitization documents showing that the two mortgages in question were part of the securitization pool. Why, I have no idea.
  • The decision opens the door for foreclosing lenders to prove ownership with proper securitized documents. There will be further litigation on this. Furthermore, since the Land Court’s decision in 2009, many lenders have already re-done foreclosures and title insurance companies have taken other steps to cure the title defects.
  • We don’t know how other state court’s will react to this ruling. The SJC is one of the most well respected state supreme courts in the country. This decision was well-reasoned and I believe correct given that the lenders couldn’t even produce any admissible evidence they held the mortgages. The ruling will certainly be followed in states (such as California) operating under a non-judicial foreclosure system such as Massachusetts.
  • Watch for class actions against foreclosing lenders, the attorneys who drafted the securitization loan documents and foreclosing attorneys. Investors of mortgage backed securities (MBS) will also be exploring their legal options against the trusts and servicers of the mortgage pools.
  • The banking sector has already dropped some 5% today (1.7.11), showing that this ruling has sufficiently spooked investors.

For more info on how you can use the Valid imperfected Securitization arguements such as the ones used in this case to effectively and successfully challenge and win your Foreclosure Defense, please visit http://www.fightforeclosure.net

The Nuts and Bolts of Mortgage Securitization Process

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The beginnings of the now multi-trillion dollar secondary market for residential mortgage loans date back to the federal government’s creation of Fannie Mae in 1938. Since then, the complexity of the secondary mortgage market has increased, especially as a result of the rapid growth and market acceptance of mortgage backed securities (“MBS”) that began in the 1980s. In contrast, the legal principles and processes by which mortgage-related promissory notes and security instruments (mortgages and deeds of trust) are assigned and transferred have centuries-old origins. Now, in the midst of the worst economic and housing crisis since the 1930s, some are questioning whether the traditional state law principles and processes of assignment and transfer can be fully reconciled with today’s complex holding, assignment and transfer systems for mortgage related promissory notes and security instruments, and what methods are legally effective for participants in the secondary mortgage market to establish, maintain and transfer mortgage notes and security instruments.

This post provides an overview of the legal principles and processes by which promissory notes and related mortgage security instruments are typically held, assigned, transferred and enforced in the secondary mortgage market in connection with loan securitizations and the creation of MBS.

1. Basic Principles
The two core legal documents in most residential mortgage loan transactions are the promissory note and the mortgage or deed of trust that secures the borrower’s payment of the promissory note. The promissory note contains a promise by the borrower to pay the lender a stated amount of money at a specified interest rate (which can be fixed or variable) by a certain date. The typical mortgage or deed of trust contains a grant of a mortgage lien or other security interest in the borrower’s real property to the lender or, in a deed of trust, to a trustee for the benefit of the lender, to secure the borrower’s obligations under the promissory note.
In a typical “private-label” mortgage loan securitization, each mortgage loan, which is evidenced by a mortgage note and secured by a mortgage, is sold, assigned and transferred to a trust through a series of steps:

• The loan originator or a subsequent purchaser sells, assigns and transfers the mortgage loans to a “sponsor,” which is typically a financial services company or a mortgage loan conduit or aggregator.

• The sponsor sells, assigns and transfers the mortgage loans to a “depositor,” which in turn sells, assigns and transfers the mortgage loans to the trustee, which will hold the mortgage loans in trust for the benefit of the certificate holders.

• The trustee issues the MBS pursuant to a pooling and servicing agreement or trust agreement entered into by the depositor, the trustee and a master servicer or servicers.

• The trustee administers the pool assets, typically relying on the loan servicer to perform most of the administrative functions regarding the pool of mortgage loans. In addition, a document custodian is often designated to conduct a review of the mortgage loan documents pursuant to the requirements of the pooling and servicing agreement and to hold
the mortgage loan documents for the loans included in the trust pool.

• In general, the loan documents are assigned and transferred from the depositor to the trustee through the indorsement of the mortgage note and the transfer of possession of the mortgage note to the trustee or a custodian on behalf of the trustee. An assignment of the related mortgage is also typically delivered to the transferee or its custodian, except
in cases where the related mortgage identifies Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”) as the mortgagee. Such assignments generally are in recordable form, but unrecorded, and are executed by the transferor without identifying a specific transferee – a so called assignment in blank.

• In some mortgage loan transactions, MERS becomes the mortgagee of record as the nominee of the loan originator and its assignee in the local land records where the mortgage is recorded, either when the mortgage is first recorded or as a result of the recording of an assignment of mortgage to MERS. This means that MERS is listed as the record title holder of the mortgage. MERS’ name does not appear on the mortgage note, and the beneficial interest in the mortgage remains with the loan originator or its assignee. The documents pursuant to which MERS acts as nominee make clear that MERS is acting in such capacity for the benefit of the loan originator or its assignee. When a mortgage loan is originated with MERS as the nominal mortgagee (or is assigned to MERS post-origination), MERS
tracks all future mortgage loan and loan servicing transfers and other assignments of the mortgage loan unless and until ownership or servicing is transferred (or the loan is otherwise assigned) to an entity that is not a MERS member. In this way, MERS serves as a central system to track changes in ownership and servicing of the loan. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae, among other governmental entities, permit loans that they
purchase or securitize to be registered with MERS.

As part of the loan securitization process detailed above, a mortgage note and a mortgage may be sold, assigned and transferred several times from one entity to another. The legal principles that govern the assignment and transfer of mortgage notes and mortgages are generally determined by state law. See, e.g., In re Cook, 457 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 2006) (state law governed whether transferee had superior interest in promissory note secured by mortgage). As such, these principles can vary depending upon the state in which the assignor of the mortgage notes, the underlying property, or the relevant mortgage-related documents are located. The assignment and transfer of a mortgage note, on the one hand, and of a mortgage, on the other hand, are addressed separately below.

2. Transfer of Promissory Notes Secured by Mortgages
The residential mortgage notes in common use in the secondary mortgage market typically are negotiable instruments. The law of negotiable instruments developed over the centuries as a way to encourage commerce and lending by making such instruments, including negotiable mortgage notes, as liquid and transferable as possible. See, e.g., Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346, 347 (1846) (“[A] negotiable bill or note is a courier without luggage”); 2 Frederick M. Hart & William F. Willier, Negotiable Instruments Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 1.01 (“Negotiable instruments play such an important role in the modern commercial world that it is difficult to realize that the struggle for their existence could be as long and complex as it has been, yet the evolution of the concept took centuries.”). Similarly, the standardization of the forms of mortgage notes and mortgages over the past thirty years or more has contributed to the liquidity and transferability of mortgage notes and the underlying mortgages. See Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 765, 799-800 (2004-2005) (“standardization of mortgage documents created marketable commodities. Once mechanisms were in place for the secondary market to operate, events rapidly moved toward the ultimate goal: the creation of a security which has as its base land [and] yet which will be as freely transferable as stocks and bonds” (internal quotation omitted)).

The Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), which, with state-specific variations, has been adopted as law by all 50 states and the District of Columbia, governs, in significant part, the transfer of mortgage notes.  Article 3 applies to the negotiation and transfer of a mortgage note that is a “negotiable instrument,” as that term is defined in Article 3. See UCC §§ 3-102, 3-201, 3-203 and 3-204; see, e.g., Swindler v. Swindler, 355 S.C. 245, 250 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) (Article 3 governs negotiable mortgage note). In addition, Article 9 applies to the sale of “promissory notes,” a term that generally includes all mortgage notes (both negotiable and nonnegotiable). See UCC §§ 1-201(b)(35) and 9-109(a)(3)

The residential mortgage notes in common use today are typically negotiable instruments for UCC purposes. In addition, as a general matter, the securitization of a loan under a typical pooling and servicing agreement provides both for the negotiation of negotiable mortgage notes (by indorsement and transfer of possession to the securitization trustee or the custodian for the trustee) and for an outright sale and assignment of all of the mortgage notes and related mortgages. Thus, whether the mortgage notes in a given securitization pool are deemed “negotiable” (as we believe most typically are) or “non-negotiable” will have little or no
substantive effect under the UCC on the validity of the transfer of the mortgage notes. The typical securitization process effects valid transfers of the mortgage notes and related mortgages in accordance with the provisions of Articles 3 and 9 of the UCC.

What Constitutes a “Negotiable Instrument?
A “negotiable instrument” is defined as:
an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it:
(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder;

(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and

(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money, but the promise or order may contain (i) an undertaking or power to give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment, (ii) an authorization or power to the holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral, or (iii) a waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection of an obligor.
UCC § 3-104(a).

Reference in a mortgage note to a mortgage does not affect the mortgage note’s status as a negotiable instrument. See UCC § 3-106(b) (“A promise or order is not made conditional [] by a reference to another writing for a statement of rights with respect to collateral, prepayment, or acceleration….”); see also Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Matthews, 321 S.E.2d 545, 547 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (“referring to a mortgage or other collateral [in a mortgage note] does not impair negotiability” of the note); In re AppOnline.com, 285 B.R. 805, 815-16 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002) (reference in mortgage notes to underlying mortgages does not affect the negotiability of the notes).

The fact that a mortgage note contains a variable or adjustable interest rate also does not affect the mortgage note’s status as a negotiable instrument. That is because UCC § 3-112(b) provides that “[i]nterest may be stated in an instrument[7] as a fixed or variable amount of money or it may be expressed as a fixed or variable rate or rates. The amount or rate of interest may be stated or described in the instrument in any manner and may require reference to information not contained in the instrument.” UCC § 3-112(b).

How is a Negotiable Mortgage Note Transferred?
A negotiable mortgage note is transferred when it is “delivered” by a person other than the mortgagor for the purpose of giving the transferee the right to enforce the note. See UCC § 3-203(a). “Delivery” of a mortgage note occurs when there has been a voluntary transfer of possession of the mortgage note. See UCC § 1-201(b)(15). As a general matter, the “[t]ransfer of an instrument, whether or not the transfer is a negotiation, vests in the transferee any right of the transferor to enforce the instrument . . . .” UCC § 3-203(b). Accordingly, a person in possession of the note becomes a “person entitled to enforce” if it can prove that it is the transferee. See UCC § 3-301.

The easiest and most common way to transfer a negotiable mortgage note is through “negotiation.” Article 3 defines “negotiation” as “a transfer of possession, whether voluntary or involuntary, of an instrument by a person other than the issuer to a person who thereby becomes its holder.” UCC § 3-201(a). The “negotiation” of a negotiable mortgage note that is payable to an identified person or entity (such as the entity that originated a mortgage loan and whose name appears as the payee in the mortgage note) – “requires transfer of possession of the instrument and its indorsement by the holder.” UCC § 3-201(b) (emphasis added). As explained below, “indorsement” and “holder” are both defined terms in the UCC.

The “holder” of a negotiable mortgage note is “the person in possession of [the mortgage note] that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession.” UCC § 1-201(b)(21)(A). In other words, upon the closing of a mortgage loan, the “holder” of the mortgage note is the entity that is the payee on the mortgage note and that possesses the note (either actually or constructively). After a negotiable mortgage note has been negotiated, such as in connection with a loan securitization, the “holder” of the mortgage note is the entity that possesses the mortgage note if the mortgage note was indorsed to that entity or if the mortgage note was indorsed in blank or to bearer.

The term “indorsement” is defined to include “a signature . . . that alone or accompanied by other words is made on an instrument [in our case, a negotiable mortgage note] for the purpose of . . . negotiating the instrument.” UCC § 3-204(a). Such an indorsement may be either a “special indorsement” or a “blank indorsement.” See UCC § 3-205. A “special indorsement” is a written indorsement that specifically “identifies a person to whom it makes the instrument payable.” UCC § 3-205(a). A “blank indorsement” is an indorsement that does not identify a person to whom the instrument is payable. See UCC § 3-205(b). Mortgage notes that are transferred in connection with loan securitizations are typically indorsed in blank with language such as “Pay to the order of _____________,” where no name is filled in the blank. The effect of an indorsement in blank is significant: “When indorsed in blank, an instrument becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone until specially indorsed.” UCC § 3-205(b) (emphasis added).10 See also UCC § 3-201(b) (The negotiation of a negotiable mortgage note that is payable to bearer (such as a negotiable mortgage note that has been indorsed in blank) is effected by “transfer of possession alone.”).
The term “possession” is not defined in the UCC. Thus, courts rely on common law definitions of possession to interpret that concept in the context of the negotiation of an instrument such as a mortgage note. See, e.g., In re Kelton Motors, Inc., 97 F.3d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1996) (because Article 3 does not define “possession,” a court must look to the general law of the jurisdiction in determining whether a party is in possession of a negotiable instrument).
Possession can be, and very often is, effected by an agent, nominee or designee, such as the designated custodian for the securitization trust. See, e.g., Midfirst Bank, SB v. C.W. Haynes and Co., Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1304, 1314-15 (D.S.C. 1994) (constructive possession exists when an authorized agent of the owner holds the note on behalf of the owner); Jenkins v. Evans, 31 A.D.2d 597, 598 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept. 1968) (agent had authority to possess instruments for principal). In such cases, while the designated custodian has “physical” possession of the mortgage note, the trustee for which the custodian holds the mortgage note has “constructive” or “legal” possession. See Midfirst Bank, 893 F.Supp. at 1314-15; see also UCC § 9-313 cmt.  (“if the collateral is in [the] possession of an agent of the secured party for the purposes of possessing on behalf of the secured party, and if the agent is not also an agent of the debtor, the secured party has taken actual possession” (emphasis added)).

Who May Enforce A Negotiable Mortgage Note?
The maker of a mortgage note is obligated to pay the note to the “person entitled to enforce the instrument.” UCC § 3-412. The “person entitled to enforce” a negotiable mortgage note includes “(i) the holder of the instrument, [and] (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder.” UCC § 3-301. Accordingly, to enforce a mortgage note against the borrower, a person must generally prove either that it is a “holder” or that it is a transferee with the rights of a holder. See UCC § 3-301. The first category of persons that may enforce a mortgage note is a “holder.” A “holder” of a negotiable mortgage note is “the person in possession of [the mortgage note] that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession.” UCC § 1-201(b)(21)(A). The manner in which one becomes a “holder” is described in the section above.

The second category contemplated by UCC § 3-301– a “nonholder in possession who has the rights of a holder” – is more difficult to define. Under this clause, a person would qualify as a “nonholder in possession” if possession of the mortgage note was transferred to him from the transferor, but the transferor did not indorse the mortgage note. See UCC § 3-203 cmt. In this circumstance, the transferee is entitled to enforce the instrument, but to do so, the transferee must first prove both possession of the unindorsed mortgage note and prove the transfer of the mortgage note by the holder to the transferee. See id. Under both clauses, the person seeking to enforce the mortgage note must have possession of the note.

UCC § 3-301 also permits a person without possession to enforce a mortgage note where the mortgage note has been lost, stolen, or destroyed within the meaning of UCC § 3-309. See UCC § 3-301.12 Courts have consistently affirmed the use of UCC § 3-309 to enforce lost, stolen or destroyed negotiable mortgage notes that a party, such as a securitization trustee, seeks to enforce when the party has proven the terms of the mortgage notes and its right to enforce the mortgage notes (i.e., it has proven the transfer of the mortgage note from the transferee). See, e.g., In re Montagne, 421 B.R. 65, 79 (D. Vt. 2009) (finding that plaintiff who satisfied requirements of UCC § 3-309 could enforce lost mortgage note); Waggoner v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 2003-CA-002666-MR, 2005 WL 2175439, at *1 n.1 (Ky. App. Ct. Sept. 9, 2005) (“The promissory note was proven … by an affidavit concerning a lost or destroyed promissory note.”).

What Rights Against Borrower Defenses are Available to the Holder of a Negotiable Mortgage Note?
A key concept relating to the negotiation of negotiable mortgage notes is the “holder in due course” doctrine. That is because where the “holder” of a negotiable mortgage note is deemed a “holder in due course,” the holder takes the mortgage note subject only to specific limited defenses of the borrower. The following is a brief summary of an expansive area of law. Under UCC § 3-302(a):
[A] “holder in due course” means the holder of an instrument if:
(1) the instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder does not bear such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration or is not otherwise so irregular or incomplete as to call into question its authenticity; and

(2) the holder took the instrument (i) for value, (ii) in good faith, (iii) without notice that the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored or that there is an uncured default with respect to payment of another instrument issued as part of the same series, (iv) without notice that the instrument contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered, (v) without notice of any claim to the instrument described in Section 3-306 [regarding claims of a property or possessory right in the instrument or its proceeds, including a claim to rescind a negotiation and to recover the instrument or its proceeds], and (vi) without notice that any party has a defense or claim in recoupment described in Section 3-305(a).

UCC § 3-302(a).

Under Article 3, a holder in due course of a negotiable mortgage note takes the mortgage note free of (a) all prior claims to or regarding the mortgage note by any person and (b) most defenses to enforceability of the mortgage note that may be raised by parties with whom the holder in due course has not dealt. See UCC §§ 3-305 and 3-306; see also Provident Bank v. Community Home Mortgage Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 558, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). The defenses to which a holder in due course may be subject are found in UCC § 3-305, and
include:

a defense of the obligor based on (i) infancy of the obligor to the extent it is a defense to a simple contract, (ii) duress, lack of legal capacity, or illegality of the transaction which, under other law, nullifies the obligation of the obligor, (iii) fraud that induced the obligor to sign the instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to learn of its character or its essential terms, or (iv) discharge of the obligor in insolvency proceedings.

UCC § 3-305(a)(1).

How Is a Mortgage Note Transferred Under Article 9 of the UCC?
The sale of mortgage notes is also governed, in significant part, by Article 9. Article 9 establishes
(1) whether the interests of a transferee of a mortgage note have both “attached” and become “perfected” so that those interests will prevail over conflicting claims of third parties and (2) the rights of the transferee in and to the underlying mortgage that secures the mortgage note.

Article 9 addresses the sale of mortgage notes, regardless of whether they are negotiable or nonnegotiable. More specifically, Article 9 applies to “a sale of . . . promissory notes.” UCC § 9-109(a)(3). A “promissory note” is defined as “an instrument that evidences a promise to pay a monetary obligation, does not evidence an order to pay, and does not contain an acknowledgment by a bank that the bank has received for deposit a sum of money or funds.” UCC § 9-102(a)(65). Given this broad definition, residential mortgage notes in common use today are typically “promissory notes” for purposes of Article 9.

Under Article 9, the sale of a mortgage note (whether or not the mortgage note is negotiable) is deemed a secured transaction and the transferee’s “security interest” is automatically perfected when it attaches (more on “attachment” and “perfection” below). See UCC § 9-309(4). While security interests are most commonly thought of as the liens obtained by lenders, the UCC defines the term “security interest” to also include “any interest of a . . . buyer of . . . a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to Article 9.” UCC § 1-201(b)(35) (emphasis added). In addition, the definition of “secured party” includes “a person to which . . . promissory notes have been sold.” UCC § 9-102(a)(72)(D).

Before a buyer’s “security interest” in a mortgage note can be perfected under Article 9, the security interest must “attach.” A security interest attaches when (1) value has been given for the sale, (2) the seller has rights in the mortgage note or the power to transfer rights in the mortgage note to the buyer and (3) either (a) the mortgage note is in the possession of the buyer pursuant to a security agreement of the seller or (b) the seller has signed a written or electronic security agreement that describes the mortgage note. See UCC § 9-203(b). Article 9 defines “security agreement” as “an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest,” UCC § 9-102(a)(73), which, in the context of a mortgage loan securitization, would include an agreement pursuant to which mortgages and mortgage notes are sold and transferred from one entity to another. Such an agreement, normally a pooling and servicing agreement or trust agreement, typically will provide that the transfer of the mortgage note pursuant thereto effects a sale of the mortgage note, which would thus, under Article 9, constitute a “security agreement.”

Significantly, the attachment of a security interest in a mortgage note that is itself “secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property is also attachment of a security interest in the security interest, mortgage or other lien.” UCC § 9-203(g) (emphasis added). Similarly, under UCC § 9-308(e), perfection of a security interest in a promissory note “also perfects a security interest in a security interest, mortgage, or other lien on personal or real property securing the right.” UCC § 9-308(e) (emphasis added). In other words, perfection of a security interest (which includes a sale to a buyer) in a mortgage note pursuant to Article 9 also perfects a security interest in the mortgage that secures the note.

Perfection of the interest in the mortgage note is important because it provides the transferee of the mortgage note with a right in the mortgage note and mortgage superior to that of a subsequent lien creditor of the seller. And, perfection provides the transferee of the mortgage note with a right in the mortgage superior to that of a subsequent lien creditor of the mortgagee, which includes a bankruptcy trustee (see UCC § 9-102(a)(52)). See UCC § 9-308 cmt.

Transfer of Mortgage Notes: Conclusion
In summary, under the UCC, the transfer of a mortgage note that is a negotiable instrument is most commonly effected by indorsing the note, which may be a blank or special indorsement, and delivering the mortgage note to the transferee (or the agent acting on behalf of the transferee). As the residential mortgage notes in common usage typically are “negotiable instruments,” this is the most common method of transfer.

In addition, even without indorsement, the assignment can be effected by transferring possession under UCC § 3-203(a). Moreover, the sale of any mortgage note also effects the assignment and transfer of the mortgage under Article 9. The attachment and perfection of the buyer’s interest in the mortgage note attaches and perfects the buyer’s interest in the underlying mortgage that secures the mortgage note. Securitization agreements often
provide both for (a) the indorsement and transfer of possession to the trustee or the custodian for the trustee, which would constitute a negotiation of the mortgage note under Article 3 of the UCC and (b) an outright sale and assignment of the mortgage note. Thus, regardless of whether the mortgage notes in a securitization trust are deemed “negotiable” or “non-negotiable,” the securitization process generally includes a valid transfer of the mortgage notes to the trustee in accordance with the explicit requirements of the UCC.

3. Assignment and Transfer of Ownership of Mortgages
As described above, when a mortgage loan is assigned and transferred as part of the securitization of the loan in the secondary market, both the mortgage note and the mortgage itself are typically sold, assigned, and physically transferred to the trustee that is acting on behalf of the MBS investors or to a trustee-designated document custodian pursuant to a custody agreement. The assignment and transfer are usually documented and performed in accordance with a pooling and servicing agreement.

What is the Relationship Between the Transfer of a Mortgage Note and the Transfer of Ownership of the Mortgage?
When a mortgage note is transferred in accordance with common mortgage loan securitization processes, the mortgage is also automatically transferred to the mortgage note transferee under the UCC and the general common law rule that “the mortgage follows the note.” See, e.g., Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 275 (1873) (“The transfer of the note carries with it the security, without any formal assignment or delivery, or even mention of the latter.”); Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Coakley, 41 A.D.3d 674, 674 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 2007) (“the mortgage . . . passed as an incident to the promissory note”); Restatement (Third) of Property, Mortgages § 5.4(a) (1997) (“A transfer of an obligation secured by a mortgage also transfers the mortgage . . . . ”).

The rule that “the mortgage follows the note” has been codified in the UCC, but the rule’s common law origins date back hundreds of years, long before the creation of the UCC. As stated in the official comments to UCC § 9-203(g), that section “codifies the common-law rule that a transfer of an obligation secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property also transfers the security interest or lien.” UCC §9-203 cmt.

All states follow this rule.16 In addition to the codification of the rule under UCC § 9-203(g), reported court cases in nearly every state and non-UCC statutory provisions in some states make clear that “the mortgage follows the note”:

Alabama: Armour Fertilizer Works v. Zills, 177 So. 136, 138 (Ala. 1937) (“when the note is secured by a mortgage, such mortgage follows the note”).
Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat § 33-817 (“The transfer of any contract or contracts secured by a trust deed shall operate as a transfer of the security for such contract or contracts.”).
Arkansas: Leach v. First Cmty. Bank, No. CA 07-05, 2007 WL 2852599, at *1 (Ark. App. Ct. Oct. 3, 2007) (“Arkansas has long followed the rule that, in the absence of an agreement or a plain manifestation of a contrary intention, the security of the original mortgage follows the note or renewal thereof.”).

California: Cal. Civ. Code § 2936 (“The assignment of a debt secured by mortgage carries with it the security”); In re Staff Mortgage & Invest. Corp., 625 F.2d 281, 284 (9th Cir. 1980) (in California, “[A] deed of trust is a mere incident of the debt it secures and . . . an assignment of the debt ‘carries with it the security.” (internal quotation omitted)).

Colorado: Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 275 (1873) (in an appeal from the Supreme Court of Colorado Territory, the United States Supreme Court stated: “The transfer of the note carries with it the security, without any formal assignment or delivery, or even mention of the latter.”).

Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 49-17 (“When any mortgage is foreclosed by the person entitled to receive the money secured thereby but to whom the legal title to the mortgaged premises has never been conveyed, the title to such premises shall, upon the expiration of the time limited for redemption and on failure of redemption, vest in him in the same manner and to the same extent as such title would have vested in the mortgagee if he had foreclosed, provided the person so foreclosing shall forthwith cause the decree of foreclosure to be recorded in the land records in the town in which the land lies.”); In re AMSCO, Inc., 26 B.R. 358, 361 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982) (“An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it . . . .”).

District of Columbia: Hill v. Hawes, 144 F.2d 511, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (after mortgage note has been cancelled, cancellation of “any mortgage follows as a matter of course and does not require a separate action”).

Florida: Capital Investors Co. v. Ex’rs of Estate of Morrison, 484 F.2d 1157, 1163 n.12 (4th Cir. 1973) (“That the mortgage follows the note it secures and derives negotiability, if any, from the note is the rule in Florida where the land under mortgage in this case was located.” (citing Daniels v. Katz, 237 So.2d 58, 60 (Fla. App. 1970); Meyerson v. Boyce, 97 So.2d 488, 489 (Fla. App. 1957))); Margiewicz v. Terco Properties, 441 So.2d 1124, 1125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (when a note secured by a mortgage is assigned, the mortgage follows the note into the hands of the mortgagee).

Illinois: Federal Nat’l Mort. Ass’n v. Kuipers, 314 Ill. App.3d 631, 635, 732 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000) (“The assignment of a mortgage note carries with it an equitable assignment of the mortgage by which it was secured. The assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor-mortgagee with regard to the rights and interests under the note and mortgage. . . . [I]n Illinois, the assignment of the mortgage note is sufficient to transfer the underlying mortgage.”) (citations omitted).

Indiana: Lagow v. Badollet, 1 Blackf. 416, 1826 WL 1087, at *3 (Ind. 1826) (“a mortgage . . . follows the debt into whose hands soever it may pass”).

Iowa: Bremer County Bank v. Eastman, 34 Iowa 392, 1872 WL 254, at *1 (Iowa 1872) (“The transfer of the note, secured by the mortgage, carried the mortgage with it as an incident to the debt, and the indorsee of the note could maintain an action in his own name, to foreclose the mortgage without any assignment thereon whatever.”).

Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann § 58-2323 (“The assignment of any mortgage as herein provided shall carry with it the debt thereby secured.”); Bank Western v. Henderson, 255 Kan. 343, 354, 874 P.2d 632, 640 (1994) (“[T]he mortgage follows the note. A perfected claim to the note is equally perfected as to the mortgage.”).

Maryland: In re Bird, No. 03-52010-JS, 2007 WL 2684265, at *2-4 (Bankr. D.Md. Sept. 7, 2007) (“The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it . . . .”).

Massachusetts: The transfer of a mortgage note, without the express transfer of the mortgage, vests in the note holder an equitable interest in the mortgage (an interest that can be enforced by the note holder) and the mortgage holder is deemed to hold the mortgage in constructive trust for the benefit of the note holder. See Weinberg v. Brother, 263 Mass. 61, 62 (1928); Barnes v. Boardman, 149 Mass. 106, 114 (1889); Morris v. Bacon, 123 Mass. 58, 59 (1877); First Nat’l Bank of Cape Cod v. North Adams Hoosac Savs. Bank, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 790, 796 (1979); see also In re Ivy Properties, Inc., 109 B.R. 10, 14 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (“[U]nder Massachusetts common law the assignment of a debt carries with it the underlying mortgage, without necessity for the granting or recording of a separate mortgage assignment.”).

Despite the above cited authorities, the Massachusetts Land Court in a recent opinion cast doubt on the “mortgage follows the note” rule:

[E]ven a valid transfer of the note does not automatically transfer the mortgage. . . . The holder of the note may have an equitable right to obtain an assignment of the mortgage by filing an action in equity, but that is all it has. . . . The mortgage itself remains with the mortgagee (or, if properly assigned, its assignee) who is deemed to hold the legal title in trust for
the purchaser of the debt until the formal assignment of the mortgage to the note holder or, absent such assignment, by order of the court in an action for conveyance of the mortgage.
. . . But . . . the right to get something and actually having it are two different things.

U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, Nos. 08 MISC 384283 (KCL), 08 MISC 386755 (KCL), 2009 WL 3297551, at *11 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 14, 2009) (citations omitted).

The Ibanez case appears to stand in stark contrast to the principles embodied in the UCC.
The Ibanez case was affirmed and Judges concurred on appeal before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, that state’s highest court.

Michigan: Prime Fin. Serv. v. Vinton, 279 Mich. App. 245, 257, 761 N.W.2d 694, 704 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (“the transfer of a note necessarily includes a transfer of the mortgage with it”) (citing Ginsberg v. Capitol City Wrecking Co., 300 Mich. 712, 717, 2 N.W.2d 892 (1942)); Jones v. Titus, 208 Mich. 392, 397, 175 N.W. 257, 259 (Mich. 1919) (when a note given with a mortgage was indorsed over to a third party it carried with it the equitable title to the mortgage).

Minnesota: Jackson v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 497 (Minn. 2009) (“Absent an agreement to the contrary, an assignment of the promissory note operates as an equitable assignment of the underlying security interest.”) (emphasis in original).

Mississippi: Holmes v. McGinty, 44 Miss. 94, 1870 WL 4406, at *4 (“[T]he mortgage . . . follows the debt as an incident, and is a security for whomsoever may be the beneficial owner of it.”).

Missouri: George v. Surkamp, 76 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Mo. 1934) (when the holder of the promissory note assigns or transfers the note, the deed of trust is also transferred).

Montana: First Nat’l Bank v. Vagg, 65 Mont. 34, 212 P. 509, 511 (Mont. 1922) (“The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while the assignment of the latter alone is a nullity. The mortgage can have no separate existence.”) (citations omitted).

Nebraska: In re Union Packing Co., 62 B.R. 96, 100 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986) (with or without the
assignment of the mortgage, the assignee of the promissory note has the right to enforce the mortgage securing the note).

New Hampshire: Southerin v. Mendum, 5 N.H. 420, 1831 WL 1104, at *7 (N.H. 1831) (“When a
mortgagee transfers to another person , the debt which is secured by the mortgage, he ceases to have any control over the mortgage. . . . And we are of the opinion, that the interest of the mortgagee passes in all cases with the debt, and that it is not within the statute of frauds, because it is a mere incident to the debt, has no value independent of the debt, and cannot be separated from the debt.”).

New Jersey: In re Kennedy Mort. Co., 17 B.R. 957, 966 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1982) (“Anyone interested in acquiring an interest in the mortgage would be obliged to obtain an interest in the debt.”).

New York: Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Coakley, 41 A.D.3d 674, 838 N.Y.S.2d 622 (App. Div. 2007) (“at the time of the commencement of this action, MERS was the lawful holder of the promissory note (see UCC 3-204[1]; Franzese v. Fidelity N.Y. FSB, 214 A.D.2d 646, 625 N.Y.S.2d 275), and of the mortgage, which passed as an incident to the promissory note (see Payne v. Wilson, 74 N.Y. 348, 354-355; see also Weaver Hardware Co. v. Solomovitz, 235 N.Y. 321, 139 N.E. 353; Matter of Falls, 31 Misc. 658, 660, 66 N.Y.S. 47, aff’d. 66 A. D. 616, 73 N.Y.S. 1134”) (emphasis added); Provident Bank v. Community Home Mortgage Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 558, 564-65 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (applying principle that the mortgage follows the note).

North Carolina: Dixie Grocery Co. v. Hoyle, 204 N.C. 109, 167 S.E. 469 (1933) (“The mortgage follows the debt.”).

Ohio: U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n v. Marcino, 181 Ohio App.3d 328, 337 (2009) (“[T]he negotiation of a note operates as an equitable assignment of the mortgage, even when the mortgage is not assigned or delivered. Kuck v. Sommers (1950), 100 N.E.2d 68, 75, 59 Ohio Abs. 400. Various sections of the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted in Ohio, support the conclusion that the owner of a promissory note should be recognized as the owner of the related mortgage. . . . Thus, although the recorded assignment is not before us, there is sufficient evidence on the record to establish that appellee is the current owner of the note and mortgage at issue in this case, and, therefore, the real party in interest.”) (citations to Ohio’s versions of UCC §§ 9-109(a)(3), 9-102(a)(72)(D) and 9-203(g) omitted).

Oklahoma: Zorn v. Van Buskirk, 111 Okla. 211, 239 P. 151 (1925) (“the mortgage follows the note”).

Pennsylvania: In re Miller, No. 99-25616JAD, 2007 WL 81052, at *6 & n.7 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Jan.
9, 2007) (citing and quoting with approval Gray, Mortgages in Pennsylvania at § 1-3 (1985) (“the
mortgage follows the note”)).

South Carolina: MidFirst Bank, SSB v. C.W. Haynes & Co., Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1304, 1318 (D. S.C. 1994) (“South Carolina recognizes the ‘familiar and uncontroverted proposition’ that ‘the assignment of a note secured by a mortgage carries with it an assignment of the mortgage.’ Hahn v. Smith, 157 S.C. 157, 154 S.E. 112 (1930); Ballou v. Young, 42 S.C. 170, 20 S.E. 84 (1894).”).

Texas: Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Williams, 230 F.2d 330, 333 (5th Cir. 1956) (applying Texas law) (“The rule is fully recognized . . . that a mortgage to secure a negotiable promissory note is merely an incident to the debt, and passes by assignment or transfer of the note.”).

Utah: Smith v. Jarman, 211 P. 962, 966 (Utah 1922) (“The modern doctrine that the mortgage follows the note as an incident was thus long ago recognized by this court . . . .”).

Virginia: Yerby v. Lynch, 3 Gratt. 460, 1847 WL 2384, at *8-10 (Va. 1847) (“the mortgage follows the debt”).

Virgin Islands: UMLI C VP LLC v. Matthias, 234 F. Supp. 2d 520, 523 (D. V.I. 2002) (citing and quoting with approval the “RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PR OPER TY, MORTGAGES § 5.4(a) (1997). The comment to this section further explains that ‘[t]he principle of this subsection, that the mortgage follows the note, … applies even if the transferee does not know that the obligation is secured by a mortgage…. Recordation of a mortgage assignment is not necessary to the effective transfer of the obligation or the mortgage securing it.’ Id. § 5.4 cmt. b (1997). Accordingly, in the Virgin Islands, no separate document specifically assigning and transferring the mortgage which secures a note is required to accompany the assignment of the obligation, because the mortgage automatically follows the note.”).

Washington: Nance v. Woods, 79 Wash. 188, 189, 140 P. 323, 323 (Wash. 1914) (“the mortgage follows the note”).

As mentioned above, the general common law rule that “the mortgage follows the note” is codified in Article 9 of the UCC. Section 9-203(g) of the UCC states: “The attachment of a security interest in a right to payment or performance secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property is also attachment of a security interest in the security interest, mortgage, or other lien.”17 UCC § 9-203(g) (emphasis added). The phrase “security interest” in this provision includes a buyer’s ownership interest because UCC § 1-201(b)(35) defines “security interest” to include “any interest of a . . . buyer of . . . a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to Article 9.” Thus, under Article 9, a sale of a mortgage note means that the buyer’s rights attach not only to the mortgage note itself but also to the mortgage that secures the mortgage note. Moreover, under UCC § 9-308(e), those rights are perfected and can be enforced against third parties. Regarding the impact of these UCC provisions, one treatise states: “Article 9 makes it as plain as possible that the secured party need not record an assignment of mortgage, or anything else, in the real property records in order to perfect its rights in the mortgage.” J. McDonnell and J. Smith, Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code, § 16.09[3][b].

Courts in several states have affirmed and applied the “mortgage follows the note” rule in cases where the mortgage assignment was not recorded by the transferee.19 See, e.g., Nat’l Livestock Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 203 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1906) (citing with approval a decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas for the proposition that “where a mortgage upon real estate is given to secure payment of a negotiable note, and before its maturity the note and mortgage are transferred by indorsement of the note to a bona fide holder, the assignment, if there be a written one, need not be recorded”); Jackson v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 497-98, 500 (Minn. 2009) (applying the “mortgage follows the note” rule where there was no assignment of the mortgage); UMLI C VP LLC v. Matthias, 234 F. Supp. 2d 520, 523 (D. V.I. 2002) (“Recordation of a mortgage assignment is not necessary to the effective transfer of the obligation or the mortgage securing it.”); Federal Nat’l Mort. Ass’n v. Kuipers, 314 Ill. App. 3d 631, 635, 732 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000) (“Because the assignment of the debt, with nothing more, is sufficient to preserve the mortgage lien, it cannot follow that the lien is somehow extinguished for the failure to record the assignment. Therefore, we are persuaded that the mortgage lien and priority position inure to the benefit of the assignee and that recording the assignment is unnecessary to preserve the security for the debt.”); In re Kennedy Mortgage Co., 17 B.R. 957, 964 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982) (“The fact that assignments of mortgages may be recorded does not affect the validity of an assignment of a mortgage which has not been recorded.”).

Courts have also affirmed and applied the “mortgage follows the note” rule even when there was no actual separate written assignment of the mortgage. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 275 (1873) (“The transfer of the note carries with it the security, without any formal assignment or delivery, or even mention of the latter.”); Chase Home Fin., LLC v. Fequiere, 119 Conn. App. 570, 989 A.2d 606, 610-11 (Conn. Ct. App. 2010) (“General Statutes § 49-17 [which codifies the “mortgage follows the note” rule] permits the holder of a negotiable instrument that is secured by a mortgage to foreclose on the mortgage even when the mortgage has not yet been assigned to him.” (emphasis added)); U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n v. Marcino, 181 Ohio App.3d 328, 337 (2009) (holding that bank was the “current owner” of a mortgage note and the related mortgage despite the fact that “there is no evidence on the record that appellee is the current assignee of the note and mortgage,” and finding that “the negotiation of a note operates as an equitable assignment of the mortgage, even when the mortgage is not assigned or delivered” (citing Kuck v. Sommers, 100 N.E.2d 68, 75, 59 Ohio Abs. 400 (1950)); UMLI C VP LLC v. Matthias, 234 F. Supp. 2d 520, 523 (D. V.I. 2002) (the principle “that the mortgage follows the note, . . . applies even if the transferee does not know that the obligation is secured by a mortgage”); In re Union Packing Co., 62 B.R. 96, 100 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986) (with or without the assignment of the mortgage, the assignee of the promissory note has the right to enforce the mortgage securing the note); Morris v. Bacon, 123 Mass. 58, 59 (1877) (note holder that endorsed and delivered mortgage note to bank as security for a loan, but without an assignment of the mortgage, was required by the court to transfer the mortgage to the bank); Bremer County Bank v. Eastman, 34 Iowa 392, 1872 WL 254, at *1 (Iowa 1872) (“The transfer of the note, secured by the mortgage, carried the mortgage with it as an incident to the debt, and the indorsee of the note could maintain an action in his own name, to foreclose the mortgage without any assignment thereon whatever.”); Southerin v. Mendum, 5 N.H. 420, 1831 WL 1104, at *8 (N.H. 1831) (“the right of the mortgagee before foreclosure is . . . assignable by a mere assignment of the debt, without deed or writing”).

Common MBS practices, as described above, are consistent with the general rule that “the mortgage follows the note”: pursuant to the pooling and servicing agreement that governs a mortgage-loan securitization, and the language of assignment typically contained in such an agreement, the mortgage note and the mortgage itself are sold, assigned, transferred and delivered to the trustee, and the transferor also typically delivers a written assignment of the mortgage that is in blank in recordable form. Courts have held that the language of assignment contained in a pooling and servicing agreement, along with the corresponding transfer, sale and delivery of the mortgage note and mortgage, are sufficient to transfer the mortgage to the transferee/trustee or its designee or nominee. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Konover, No. 3:05 CV 1924 (CFD), 2009 WL 2710229, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug. 21, 2009) (MBS pooling agreement vested authority in pool trustee to bring legal action in the event of default); U.S. Bank N.A. v. Cook, No. 07 C 1544, 2009 WL 35286, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2009) (MBS pooling trust agreement effected an assignment of the mortgage at issue to the pool trustee); In re Samuels, 415 B.R. 8, 18 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) (“The [Pooling and Servicing Agreement] itself [by which the MBS loan trust was created], in conjunction with the schedule of mortgages deposited through it into the pool trust, served as a written assignment of the designated mortgage loans, including the mortgages themselves.”); EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Chaudhri FSB, 400 N.J. Super. 126, 141, 946 A.2d 578, 588 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2008) (“any [mortgage] assignment shall pass and convey the estate of the assignor in the mortgaged premises, and the assignee may sue thereon in his own name.’” (citing New Jersey Stat. Ann. § 46:9-9 and Byram Holding Co. v. Bogren, 2 N.J. Super. 331, 336, 63 A.2d 822 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1949)); LaSalle Bank N.A. v. Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 2d 618, 632-33 (D. Md. 2002) (MBS pooling agreement granted trustee authority to bring suit on behalf of trust); LaSalle Bank N.A. v. Nomura Asset Capital Corp., 180 F. Supp. 2d 465, 470-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (language in the pooling and servicing agreement for MBS trust effectually assigned mortgage to the pool trustee).

What is the Relationship Between the UCC and State Real Property Laws?
Article 9 does not apply to “the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real property, . . . except to the extent that provision is made for . . . liens on real property in Sections 9-203 and 9-308.” UCC §9-109(d)(11) (emphasis added). As discussed above, UCC § 9-203(g) provides that, when a security interest in a mortgage note attaches, a security interest in the underlying mortgage also attaches, and UCC § 9-308(e) provides the same regarding the perfection of the security interest. See UCC § 9-203 cmt. 9 (the “mortgage follows the note” rule codified into UCC §§ 9-203(g) and 9-308(e)). In addition, UCC § 9-109(b) makes clear that Article 9 does apply to mortgage notes even though Article 9 does not govern the creation of the mortgage itself:

The application of this article [9] to a security interest [remember that this term is defined to include any interest of a buyer of a promissory note in a transaction subject to Article 9] in a secured obligation [e.g., mortgage note] is not affected by the fact that the obligation [e.g., mortgage note] is itself secured by a transaction or interest [e.g., creation of the
mortgage or deed of trust itself] to which this article does not apply.

UCC § 9-109(b)

The creation of an interest in or lien on real property, including a mortgage, is governed by the non-UCC law of the state in which the property is located. See, e.g., Oregon v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378-79 (1977). Likewise, the enforceability of mortgages (including the right and method to foreclose) is subject to all of the conditions precedent and requirements that are set forth in the particular mortgage itself and in all applicable state and local laws. Those conditions precedent and procedural requirements vary from mortgage to mortgage and from state to state. Thus, ownership of a mortgage (i.e., without notice to the mortgagor or the public, without judicial proceedings (where required), without satisfaction of other conditions precedent or procedural requirements in the mortgage itself or in applicable state law), does not always give the holder of the mortgage the legal ability to foreclose on the mortgage. Though a discussion of the other necessary prerequisites to foreclosure is beyond the scope of this paper, the fact that other steps may need to be taken by the owner of a mortgage note, or the owner of a mortgage, is neither unique nor surprising in our legal and regulatory system and does not diminish an otherwise legally effective transfer of the mortgage note and mortgage.

How Does the Use of MERS Affect These Issues?
The use of MERS as the nominee for the benefit of the trustee and other transferees in the mortgage loan securitization process has been a subject of litigation in recent years. See, e.g., Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 619, 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). Some cases address the authority or ability of MERS or transferees of MERS to foreclose on a mortgage for which MERS is or was the mortgagee of record. See, e.g., Saxon Mort. Serv., Inc. v. Hillery, No. C-08-4357 EMC, 2008 WL 5170180, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2008). As a general matter, the assignment and transfer of a mortgage to MERS as nominee of and for the benefit of the beneficial owner of the mortgage does not adversely impact the right to foreclose on the mortgage.

Decisions in many jurisdictions support this conclusion. See, e.g., In re Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc. (MERS) Litig., No. 2:09-md-2119, 2010 WL 4038788, at *8 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2010) (“Plaintiffs have not cited any legal authority where the naming of MERS . . . was cause to enjoin a non-judicial foreclosure as wrongful.”); Commonwealth Property Advocates, LLC v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 2:10-CV-340 TS, 2010 WL 3743643, at *3 (D. Utah Sept. 20, 2010) (MERS as nominee has authority to foreclose); Taylor v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. 5D09-4035, 2010 WL 3056612, at *3 (Fla. App. Aug. 6, 2010) (“[T]he written assignment of the note and mortgage from MERS to Deutsche Bank properly transferred the note and mortgage. . . . The transfer, moreover, was not defective by reason of the fact that MERS lacked a beneficial ownership interest in the note at the time of the assignment, because MERS was lawfully acting in the place of the holder and was given explicit and agreed upon authority to make just such an assignment.”); Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Bellistri, No. 4:09-CV-731 CAS, 2010 WL 2720802, at *15 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2010) (“[a]s the nominee of the original lender … or the lender’s assigns, MERS has bare legal title to the note and deed of trust securing it, and this is sufficient to create standing” to initiate foreclosure proceedings); Silvas v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, No. CV-09-265-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 4573234, at *8 (D. Ariz. Jan. 5, 2010) (MERS empowered to foreclose where MERS is designated on deed of trust as beneficiary); Diessner v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1187-91 (D. Ariz. 2009) (MERS and trustee under deed of trust are authorized to institute non-judicial foreclosure proceeding); Jackson v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 501 (Minn. 2009) (rejecting argument that transfer of mortgage note to MERS is a transfer that must be recorded before foreclosure); Reynoso v. Paul Financial, LLC, No. 09-3225 SC, 2009 WL 3833298, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2009) (naming of MERS as initial beneficiary under deed of trust, as nominee for the lender, and the subsequent transfer of the deed of trust from MERS to a transferee was effective and did not hinder transferee’s right to foreclose); Blau v. America’s Servicing Co., No. CV-08-773, 2009 WL 3174823, at *8 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2009) (MERS authorized under deed of trust to act on behalf of lender and transfer its interests); Farahani v. Cal-Western Recon. Corp., No. 09-194, 2009 WL 1309732, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2009) (MERS authorized to pursue non-judicial foreclosure action); Vazquez v. Aurora Loan Servs., No 2:08-cv-01800-RCJRJJ, 2009 WL 1076807, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 20, 2009) (loan documents sufficiently demonstrate MERS’ standing “with respect to the loan and the foreclosure”); Pfannenstiel v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., No. CIV S-08-2609, 2009 WL 347716, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2009) (dismissing plaintiff ’s claim that MERS lacked authority to foreclose); Trent v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., 288 Fed. App’x 571, 572 (11th Cir. 2008) (MERS “has the legal right to foreclose on the debtors’ property” and “is the mortgagee”); Peyton v. Recontrust Co., No. TC021868, Notice of Ruling, at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. County of Los Angeles S. Cent. Dist. Oct. 15, 2008) (MERS may foreclose under California law); Johnson v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., 252 Fed. App’x 293, 294 (11th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment for MERS on its action for foreclosure of plaintiff ’s property); In re Smith, 366 B.R. 149, 151 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007) (MERS has standing to conduct foreclosure on behalf of the beneficiary); Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Revoredo, 955 So.2d 33, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“Because, however, it is apparent – and we so hold – that no substantive rights, obligations or defenses are affected by use of the MERS device, there is no reason why mere form should overcome the salutary substance of permitting the use of this commercially effective means of business.”); Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Ventura, CV054003168S, 2006 WL 1230265, at *1 (Conn. Super. Apr. 20, 2006) (MERS is proper party in foreclosure).

There are several minority decisions that, in some form, have taken issue with MERS. But none of these decisions, to our knowledge, has invalidated a mortgage for which MERS is the nominee, and none of these decisions has challenged MERS’ ability to act as a central system to track changes in the ownership and servicing of loans:22 See Rinegard-Guirma v. Bank of Am., Nat’l Ass’n, No. 10-1065-PK , 2010 WL 3945476, at *4 (D. Or. Oct. 6, 2010) (suggesting that MERS may not qualify as a legitimate beneficiary of a deed of trust under Oregon law, and preliminarily enjoining foreclosure action by MERS); In re Allman, No. 08-31282-elp7, 2010 WL 3366405, at *10 (Bankr. D. Or. Aug. 24, 2010) (same); Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289, 297 (Me. 2010); In re Box, No. 10-20086, 2010 WL 2228289, at *5 (Bankr W.D. Mo. June 3, 2010) (finding that MERS, as beneficiary and nominee under the deed of trust lacked authority to assign the mortgage note because it never “held” the note itself);23 In re Hawkins, No. BK -s-07-13593-LBR , 2009 WL901766, at *3 (Bankr. D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2009) (finding that MERS was not a true “beneficiary” under a deed of trust, that, under the UCC, MERS was not entitled to enforce the note, and that “[i]n order to foreclose, MERS must establish there has been a sufficient transfer of both the note and deed of trust, or that it has authority under state law to act for the note’s holder”).

Finally, it is important to recognize that the UCC does not displace traditional rules of agency law.
See UCC § 1-103(b) (“Unless displaced by the particular provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code], the principles of law and equity, including the law [of] . . . principal and agent . . . supplement its provisions.”); see
also UCC § 9-313 cmt. 3 (principles of agency apply for purposes of determining “possession” under Article 9).
Under general agency law, an agent has authority to act on behalf of its principal where the principal “manifests assent” to the agent “that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.” Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006).

Accordingly, the UCC does not prevent MERS or others, including loan servicers, from acting as the agent for the note holder in connection with transfers of ownership in mortgage notes and mortgages. See, e.g., In re Tucker, No. 10-61004, 2010 WL 3733916, at *6 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Sept. 20, 2010) (finding MERS was the “agent for [the lender] under the Deed of Trust from the inception, and MERS became the agent for each subsequent note-holder under the Deed of Trust when each such note holder negotiated the Note to its successor and assign”); King v. Am. Mortgage Network, Inc., No. 1:09CV162 DAK, 2010 WL 3516475, at *3 (D. Utah Sept. 2, 2010) (rejecting argument that note and deed of trust were split because Fannie Mae held the note and MERS was listed as the nominal beneficiary under the deed of trust and finding that both MERS and the authorized loan servicer had authority as agents of the note holder to act on behalf of the note holder, including the initiation of foreclosure proceedings on the underlying property); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204(1)(d) (“The party foreclosing the mortgage is either the owner of the indebtedness or of an interest in the indebtedness secured by the mortgage or the servicing agent of the mortgage.”); Hilmon v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 06-13055, 2007 WL 1218718, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 2007); Caravantes v. California Reconveyance Co., No. 10-cv-1407-IEG (AJB), 2010 WL 4055560, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2010) (“as servicer of the subject loan in this case, JP Morgan had the authority to record the Notice of Default and to enforce the power of sale under the Deed of Trust”); Birkland v. Silver State Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 2:10-CV-00035-KJD-LRL, 2010 WL3419372, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 25, 2010) (“MERS, as nominee on a deed of trust, is granted authority as an agent on behalf of the nominator (holder of the promissory note) as to the administration of the deed of trust, which would include substitution of trustees”). In short, principles of agency law provide MERS and loan servicers another legal basis for their respective roles in the transfer of mortgage notes and mortgages.

4. Conclusion

In summary, the longstanding and consistently applied rule in the United States is that, when a mortgage note is transferred, “the mortgage follows the note.” When a mortgage note is transferred and delivered to a transferee in connection with the securitization of the mortgage loan pursuant to an MBS pooling and servicing agreement or similar agreement, the mortgage automatically follows and is transferred to the mortgage note transferee, notwithstanding that a third party, including an agent/nominee entity such as MERS, may remain as the mortgagee of record. Both common law and the UCC confirm and apply this rule, including in the context of mortgage loan securitizations. The legal principles and processes discussed above provide for – and, if followed, result in – a valid and enforceable transfer of mortgage notes and the underlying mortgages. The transfer and legal effectiveness of mortgage notes and mortgages are not diminished by the fact that the enforceability of mortgages, including the right to foreclose, is subject to the conditions precedent and requirements that are set forth in the particular mortgage itself and in the laws of the state in which the mortgaged property is located.

Footnotes:

1. References to the UCC are to the Official Text of the Model UCC, as revised, issued by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
2. Note that the UCC replaces the more common U.S. spelling of “endorsement” for the less common “indorsement.” The UCC spelling is used throughout this Executive Summary.3. However, in some states, such as Massachusetts and Minnesota, courts have held that the transfer of a mortgage note without an
express transfer of the mortgage vests in the note holder only an equitable interest in the mortgage. This arrangement has been
described as follows: the holder of the mortgage holds the legal title to the mortgage in constructive trust for the benefit of the
mortgage note holder. In both states, however, case law suggests that foreclosure proceedings must be initiated by, or at least in the
name of, the holder of the legal title in the mortgage.
4. In most states, recording of an assignment of mortgage is generally not required to ensure the enforceability of the assignment of mortgage as between the assignor and assignee, and anyone with knowledge thereof. It is beyond the scope of this post to discuss in detail the potential risks to the mortgage transferee of not recording a mortgage assignment.
Those risks might include, among others, delaying the transferee’s ability to foreclose on the mortgage, failing to receive notices that may go to the mortgagee of record, and otherwise leaving the assignee open to negligent or fraudulent actions or inactions by the mortgagee of record that could bind the mortgage transferee and impair the value or enforceability of the mortgage. Similarly, when an assignment of mortgage is not recorded, the assignor may be liable for certain obligations imposed upon a mortgagee of record, such as the obligation to provide a pay-off statement or mortgage release within a designated time period.

5. Issues related to a party’s right to foreclose or to engage in foreclosure-related activities are generally outside the scope of this paper.
6. For ease of reference, “mortgage” will be used throughout much of this post to refer to both mortgages and deeds of trust, and “mortgage note” will be used to refer to a promissory note that is secured by a mortgage.

7. References to the UCC are to the Official Text of the Model UCC, as revised, issued by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws.
8. While Article 9 does not directly govern a mortgage on real property, the fact that a mortgage note is itself secured by a mortgage on real property does not render Article 9 inapplicable to transfers of the mortgage note. See UCC § 9-109(b) (“The application of this article [9] to a security interest in a secured obligation is not affected by the fact that the obligation is itself secured by a transaction or interest to which this article does not apply.”).
9. Note that the UCC eschews the more common U.S. spelling of “endorsement” for the less common “indorsement.” The UCC spelling is used throughout this paper.

10. Article 3 and Article 9 are not mutually exclusive. Article 9 applies to the transfer of all “promissory notes,” which includes negotiable
and non-negotiable instruments. Both Article 3 and Article 9 apply to “negotiable instruments.” With respect to non-negotiable instruments, only Article 9 applies to the transfer.
11. UCC § 3-104(b) defines “instrument” simply as a “negotiable instrument” for purposes of Article 3. As discussed in more detail below, the definition of “instrument” in Article 9 (governing secured transactions) is somewhat more expansive.

12. It is important to note that Article 3 does not concern “ownership” of a mortgage note, but instead provides for the transfer of a mortgage note and the right to enforce such notes. See UCC § 3-301; UCC § 3-203 cmt. 1. A party need not be the “owner” of the mortgage note to enforce it. See UCC § 3-301 (“A person may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument.”). Thus, a party may have the right to enforce the instrument, but not have “ownership” of that instrument. UCC § 3-203 cmt 1. For an example of situations where a party with the right to enforce an instrument is not also the “owner” of the instrument, see UCC 3-203 cmt. 1 and Note 16 infra.
13. Note also that UCC § 3-203(c) provides for the scenario in which an instrument is transferred for value without the indorsement that, as described in the text below, would be needed for the mortgage note to have been “negotiated.” Under that section, if a negotiable mortgage note is transferred for value as part of a loan securitization, but the transferor fails to indorse the note, the transferee of the note has the “specifically enforceable right to the unqualified indorsement of the transferor.” UCC § 3-203(c); see Note 16, infra (discussing distinction between the right to enforce a mortgage note and ownership of the mortgage note).

14. An indorsement is considered to be made “on an instrument” for purposes of negotiation when it is made either on the mortgage note itself or on a separate paper, often referred to as an “allonge,” that is affixed to the note. See UCC § 3-204(a). Once affixed, the allonge becomes “part of the instrument.” Id.
15. As noted above, the right to enforce an instrument and the ownership of that instrument are not necessarily the same. See UCC §3-203 cmt. 1. Thus, a party may have the right to enforce the instrument, but not have “ownership” of that instrument. Id. A party need not be the “owner” of the note to enforce it. See UCC § 3-301 (“A person may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument.”). For example, if X (holder of an instrument payable to X) sells the instrument to Y pursuant to a document conveying all of X’s right, title and interest
in the instrument to Y, but does not deliver immediate possession to Y, Y would have ownership of the instrument under the agreement, but Y generally would not be entitled to enforce the instrument until it obtained possession of the instrument. Id.
16. UCC § 3-301 also permits a person without possession to enforce a mortgage note where, in certain circumstances, there has been mistaken payment as defined in UCC § 3-418(d).

17. Article 9 also applies to the creation of a lien on, or a “less-than-ownership security interest” in, a mortgage note. Because most assignments and transfers of mortgage notes in loan securitizations are of the ownership of the mortgage notes, not a mere lien on or security interest in the notes, this paper addresses only outright sales of mortgage notes under Article 9. The principles discussed below regarding attachment of a buyer’s interest in a sale of mortgage notes are identical to those that apply in the context of the creation of a lien on mortgage notes, and the principles regarding perfection of the interest in the mortgage notes are likewise very similar. “Although . . . Article [9] occasionally distinguishes between outright sales of receivables and sales that secure an obligation, neither . . . Article [9] nor the definition of “security interest” (Section 1-201(37)) delineates how a particular transaction is to be classified. That issue is left to the courts.” UCC § 9-109 cmt 4.
18. Under Article 9, the term “instrument” is defined broadly as “a negotiable instrument or any other writing that evidences a right to the payment of a monetary obligation, is not itself a security agreement or lease, and is of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment.” UCC § 9-102(a)(47).

19. The comments to UCC § 9-203 expressly provide that “Subsection (g) codifies the common-law rule that a transfer of an obligation secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property also transfers the security interest or lien.” UCC § 9-203 cmt. 9; see also Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) § 5.4(a) (1997). The same holds true for UCC § 9-308(e), under which perfection of a security interest in a mortgage note also accomplishes perfection of a security interest in the mortgage. See UCC §9-308 cmt. 6.

20. However, in some states, such as Massachusetts and Minnesota, courts have held that the transfer of a mortgage note without an express transfer of the mortgage vests in the note holder only an equitable interest in the mortgage. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Cape Cod v. North Adams Hoosac Savs. Bank, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 790, 796 (1979); Jackson v. Mortgage Elect. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 497, 500-01 (Minn. 2009). This arrangement has been described as follows: the holder of the mortgage holds the legal title to the mortgage in constructive trust for the benefit of the mortgage note holder. See First Nat’l Bank of Cape Cod, 7 Mass. App. Ct. at 796. In both states, however, case law suggests that foreclosure proceedings must be initiated by, or at least in the name of, the holder of the legal title in the mortgage. See Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 500; U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, Nos. 08 MISC 384283 (KCL), 08 MISC 386755 (KCL), 2009 WL 3297551, at *11 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 14, 2009) (rejecting argument that note holders had authority to foreclose on mortgages for which their status as full mortgagees was in dispute) (currently on appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court).

21. Courts have observed that UCC § 9-203(g) codifies the “mortgage follows the note” rule. See, e.g., U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n v. Marcino, 181 Ohio App.3d 328, 337 (2009) (quoting with approval Official Comment 9 to UCC § 9-203: “subsection (g) [of UCC § 9-203] codifies the common-law rule that a transfer of an obligation secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property also transfers the security interest or lien”).
22. As discussed above, UCC § 9-308(e) provides that “perfection of a security interest in a right to payment or performance also perfects a security interest in a security interest, mortgage, or other lien on personal or real property securing the right.” UCC §9-308(e) (emphasis added).
23. In most states, recording of an assignment of mortgage is generally not required to ensure the enforceability of the assignment of mortgage as between the assignor and assignee, and anyone with knowledge thereof. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail the potential risks to the mortgage transferee of not recording a mortgage assignment. Those risks might include, among others, delaying the transferee’s ability to foreclose on the mortgage, failing to receive notices that may go to the mortgagee of record, and otherwise leaving the assignee open to negligent or fraudulent actions or inactions by the mortgagee of record that could bind the mortgage transferee and impair the value or enforceability of the mortgage. Similarly, when an assignment of mortgage is not recorded, the assignor may be liable for certain obligations imposed upon a mortgagee of record, such as the obligation to provide a pay-off statement or mortgage release within a designated time period.

24. Although the rule is “the mortgage follows the note” when a mortgage note is assigned, some case law indicates that the converse is not true and that the mortgage note does not necessarily follow the mortgage if there is an attempted assignment of the mortgage alone or separate from the mortgage note. See, e.g., Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 619, 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (“An assignment of the deed of trust separate from the note has no ‘force.’”); Saxon Mort. Serv., Inc. v. Hillery, No. C-08-4357 EMC, 2008 WL 5170180, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2008) (“For there to be a valid assignment, there must be more than just assignment of the deed [of trust] alone; the note must also be assigned.”); In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 400-05 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009); Kelley v. Upshaw, 39 Cal.2d 179, 192 (1952) (“In any event, Kelley’s purported assignment of the mortgage without an assignment of the debt which is secured was a legal nullity.”). This is consistent with the longstanding aspect of the “mortgage follows the note” rule that “the note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident.” In re Bird, No. 03-52010-JS, 2007 WL 2684265, at *2-4 (Bankr. D.Md. Sept. 7, 2007).
25. UCC Article 3, which applies to negotiable mortgage notes, does not apply to mortgages themselves because mortgages do not fit the definition of “negotiable instrument” in UCC § 3-104(a).

26. Some investors and loan servicers have sought to lessen the risk of challenges to foreclosure pertaining to MERS by assigning loans out of MERS and to the note holder prior to the initiation of foreclosure.
27. The Court in In re Box expressly noted, but did not decide, the question of whether MERS had authority to assign the note as an agent of the lender or even as “a nominee beneficiary.” In re Box, 2010 WL 2228289 at *4. The same court, in a later case, answered the question directly and found that MERS, as the designated “nominee for the lender and its assigns,” “was the agent for [the lender] under the Deed of Trust from the inception, and MERS became agent for each subsequent note-holder under the Deed of Trust when each such note holder negotiated the Note to its successors and assigns.” In re Tucker, No. 10-61004, 2010 WL 3733916, at *6 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Sept. 20, 2010) (“[w]hen [note-holder] acquired the right to enforce the Note as the note-holder, MERS held the beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust on behalf of [note-holder] and [note-holder] had the right to enforce all the rights granted to [the original lender] and its successors and assigns in the Deed of Trust”). Thus, the Court found that the Note and the Deed of Trust were not split because of MERS’ status as agent for the note holders. Id.

28. Some parties to litigation, and commentators, have relied upon the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 2009), to support the proposition that the identification of MERS as a nominee on a mortgage is improper. However, reliance on the decision in Kesler for that proposition is misplaced and stretches the decision well-beyond its actual holding. In Kesler, the Court merely held that MERS, in its capacity as the nominee for the lender under a second-position mortgage, was not entitled to notice of a foreclosure sale by the holder of the senior mortgage. See id. at 169-70. As the Kansas Appeals Court that considered the case noted, “[w]hether MERS may act as a nominee for the lender, either to bring a foreclosure suit or for some other purpose, is not at issue….” Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 192 P.3d 177, 180 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).

For More Info on How To Effectively Challenge Your Wrongful Foreclosure Using Valid Mortgage Securitization Arguments, UCC and Relevant Case Laws: Visit http://www.fightforeclosure.net

Application of UCC to Mortgage Securitization Process

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In recently times, a lot of issues have been raised on a number of legal theories questioning whether securitization trusts, either those created by private financial institutions or those created by government sponsored enterprises, such as Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, have valid legal title to the seven trillion dollars of mortgage notes in those trusts. In an effort to contribute thorough and well-researched legal analysis to the discussion of these theories. The writing provides a detailed overview of the legal principles and processes by which mortgage loans are typically held, assigned, transferred and enforced in the secondary mortgage market and in the creation of mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”). These principles and processes have centuries-old origins, and they have continued to be sound and validated since the advent of MBS over forty years ago.

While the real property laws of each of the 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia affect the method of foreclosing on a mortgage loan in default, the legal principles and processes discussed in this post result, if followed, in a valid and enforceable transfer of mortgage notes and the underlying mortgages in each of these jurisdictions. To be thorough, this post undertakes a review of both common law and the Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) in each of the 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. One of the most critical principles is that when ownership of a mortgage note is transferred in accordance with common securitization processes, ownership of the mortgage is also automatically transferred pursuant to the common law rule that “the mortgage follows the note.” The rule that “the mortgage follows the note” dates back centuries

and has been codified in the UCC. In essence, this means that the assignment of a mortgage to a trustee does not need to be recorded in real property records in order for it to be a valid and binding transfer. In summary, these traditional legal principles and processes are fully consistent with today’s complex holding, assignment and transfer methods for mortgage loans and those methods are legally effective for participants in the secondary mortgage market to transfer mortgage loans.

1. Basic Principles
The two core legal documents in most residential mortgage loan transactions are the promissory note and the mortgage or deed of trust that secures the borrower’s payment of the promissory note. In a typical “private-label” mortgage loan securitization, each mortgage loan is sold to a trust through a series of steps.

A mortgage note and a mortgage may be sold, assigned and transferred several times between the time the mortgage loan is originated and the time the mortgage loan ends up with the trust. The legal principles that govern the assignment and transfer of mortgage notes and related mortgages are determined, in significant part, by the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), which has been adopted by all 50 states and the District of
Columbia.

The residential mortgage notes in common usage typically are negotiable instruments. As a general matter, under the UCC, a negotiable mortgage note can be transferred from the transferor to the transferee through the indorsement2 of the mortgage note and the transfer of possession of the note to the transferee or a custodian on behalf of the transferee. An assignment of the related mortgage is also typically delivered to the transferee or its custodian, except in cases where the related mortgage identifies the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (“MERS”) as the mortgagee. Such assignments generally are in recordable form, but unrecorded, and are executed by the transferor without identifying a specific transferee – a so-called assignment “in blank.” Intervening assignments, in some cases, may be recorded in the local real estate records.

In some mortgage loan transactions, MERS becomes the mortgagee of record as the nominee of the loan originator and its assignees in the local land records where the mortgage is recorded, either when the mortgage is first recorded or as a result of the recording of an assignment of mortgage to MERS. This means that MERS is listed as the record title holder of the mortgage. MERS’ name does not appear on the mortgage note, and the beneficial interest in the mortgage remains with the loan originator or its assignee. The documents pursuant to which MERS acts as nominee make clear that MERS is acting in such capacity for the benefit of the loan originator or its assignee. When a mortgage loan is originated with MERS as the nominal mortgagee (or is assigned to MERS post-origination), MERS tracks all future mortgage loan and mortgage loan servicing transfers and other assignments of the mortgage loan unless and until ownership or servicing is transferred (or the mortgage loan is otherwise assigned) to an entity that is not a MERS member. In this way, MERS serves as a central system to track changes in ownership and servicing of the mortgage loan. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae, among other governmental entities, permit mortgage loans that they purchase or securitize to be registered with MERS.

2. Transfer of Promissory Notes Secured by Mortgages
The law of negotiable instruments developed over the centuries as a way to encourage commerce and lending by making such instruments, including negotiable mortgage notes, as liquid and transferable as possible. The UCC, with state-specific variations, in significant part governs the assignment and transfer of mortgage notes. Article 3 of the UCC applies to the negotiation and transfer of a mortgage note that is a “negotiable instrument,” as that term is defined in Article 3. In addition, Article 9 of the UCC applies to the sale of “promissory notes,” a term that generally includes mortgage notes.

In addition, as a general matter, the securitization of a loan under a typical pooling and servicing agreement provides both for the negotiation of negotiable mortgage notes (by indorsement and transfer of possession to the securitization trustee or the custodian for the trustee) and for an outright sale and assignment of all of the mortgage notes and mortgages. Thus, whether the mortgage notes in a given securitization pool are deemed “negotiable” (as we believe most typically are) or “non-negotiable” will have little or no substantive effect under the UCC on the validity of the transfer of the notes. The typical securitization process effects valid transfers of the mortgage notes and related mortgages in accordance with the provisions of Articles 3 and 9 of the UCC.

Under the UCC, the transfer of a mortgage note that is a negotiable instrument is most commonly effected by (a) indorsing the note, which may be a blank indorsement that does not identify a person to whom the mortgage note is payable or a special indorsement that specifically identifies a person to whom the mortgage note is payable, and (b) delivering the note to the transferee (or an agent acting on behalf of the transferee). As residential mortgage notes in common usage typically are “negotiable instruments,” this is the most common method to transfer the mortgage note. In addition, even without indorsement, the transfer can be effected by transferring possession under the UCC. Moreover, the sale of any mortgage note also effects the transfer of the mortgage under Article 9. Securitization agreements often provide both for (a) the indorsement and transfer of possession to the trustee or the custodian for the trustee, which would constitute a negotiation of the mortgage note under Article 3 of the UCC and (b) an outright sale and assignment of the mortgage note. Thus, regardless of whether the mortgage notes in a securitization trust are deemed “negotiable” or “non-negotiable,” the securitization process generally includes a valid transfer of the mortgage notes to the trustee in accordance with the explicit requirements of the UCC.

In addition, Article 3 of the UCC permits a person without possession to enforce a negotiable mortgage note where the note has been lost, stolen, or destroyed. Courts have consistently affirmed the use of the salient provisions of the UCC to enforce lost, stolen or destroyed negotiable mortgage notes that are owned by a securitization trust when the trust or its agent has proved the terms of the mortgage notes and their right to enforce the mortgage notes.

3. Assignment and Transfer of Ownership of Mortgages
As stated above, when a mortgage loan is assigned and transferred as part of the securitization of the mortgage loan in the secondary market, both the mortgage note and the mortgage itself are typically sold, assigned, and physically transferred to the trustee that is acting on behalf of the MBS investors or a trustee designated document custodian pursuant to a custody agreement. The assignment and transfer are usually
documented in accordance with a pooling and servicing agreement.
When a mortgage note is transferred in accordance with common mortgage loan securitization processes, the mortgage is also automatically transferred to the mortgage note transferee pursuant to the general common law rule that “the mortgage follows the note.” The rule that “the mortgage follows the note” has been codified in the UCC, but the rule’s common law origins date back hundreds of years, long before the creation of the UCC. As stated in the official comments to UCC § 9-203(g), the section “codifies the commonlaw rule that a transfer of an obligation secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property also transfers the security interest or lien.” UCC § 9-203 cmt. 9. All states follow this rule.

In addition to the codification under UCC § 9-203(g), reported court cases in nearly every state and non-UCC statutory provisions in some states make clear that “the mortgage follows the note.” Regarding the impact of these UCC provisions, one treatise states: “Article 9 makes it as plain as possible that the secured party need not record an assignment of mortgage, or anything else, in the real property records in order to perfect its rights in the mortgage.” J. McDonnell and J. Smith, Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code, § 16.09[3][b]. Indeed, courts in several states have affirmed and applied the “mortgage follows the note” rule in cases where the mortgage assignment was not recorded by the transferee and even when there was no actual separate written assignment of the mortgage.

Common securitization practices are consistent with the general rule that “the mortgage follows the note”: pursuant to the pooling and servicing agreement that governs an MBS, and the language of assignment typically contained in such an agreement, the mortgage note and the mortgage itself are sold, assigned, transferred and delivered to the trustee, and the transferor also typically delivers a written assignment of the mortgage that is in blank in recordable form. Courts have held that the language of sale and assignment contained in a pooling and servicing agreement, along with the corresponding transfer, sale, and delivery of the mortgage note and mortgage, are sufficient to transfer the mortgage to the transferee/trustee or its designee or nominee.

The creation of an interest in or lien on real property, including a mortgage, is governed by the non-UCC law of the state in which the property is located. Likewise, the enforceability of mortgages (including the right and method to foreclose) is subject to all of the conditions precedent and requirements that are set forth in the particular mortgage itself and in all applicable state and local laws. Those conditions precedent and procedural requirements vary from mortgage to mortgage and from state to state. Thus, ownership of a mortgage (i.e., without notice to the mortgagor or the public, without judicial proceedings (where required), without satisfaction of other conditions precedent or procedural requirements in the mortgage itself or in applicable state law), does not always give the holder of the mortgage the legal ability to foreclose on the mortgage. Though a discussion of the other necessary prerequisites to foreclosure is beyond the scope of this Executive Summary and the White Paper, the fact that other steps may need to be taken by the owner of a mortgage note, or the owner of a mortgage, is neither unique nor surprising in our legal and regulatory system and does not diminish an otherwise legally effective transfer of the mortgage note and mortgage.

The use of MERS as the nominee for the benefit of the trustee and other transferees in the mortgage loan securitization process has been a subject of litigation in recent years regarding a mortgage note holder’s right to enforce a mortgage loan registered in MERS. Some cases address the authority or ability of MERS or transferees of MERS to foreclose on a mortgage for which MERS is or was the mortgagee of record. As a general matter, the assignment and transfer of a mortgage to MERS as nominee of and for the benefit of the beneficial owner of the mortgage does not adversely impact the right to foreclose on the mortgage. Decisions in many jurisdictions support this conclusion.

There are several minority decisions that, in some form, have taken issue with MERS. But none of these decisions, to our knowledge, has invalidated a mortgage for which MERS is the nominee, and none of these decisions has challenged MERS’ ability to act as a central system to track changes in the ownership and servicing of mortgage loans.

Finally, it is important to recognize that the UCC does not displace traditional rules of agency law. Under general agency law, an agent has authority to act on behalf of its principal where the principal “manifests assent” to the agent “that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.” Accordingly, the UCC does not prevent MERS or others, including loan servicers, from acting as the agent for the note holder in connection with transfers of ownership in mortgage notes and mortgages. In short, principles of agency law provide MERS and loan servicers another legal basis for their respective roles in the transfer of mortgage notes and mortgages.

4. Conclusion
In summary, the longstanding and consistently applied rule in the United States is that, when a mortgage note is transferred, “the mortgage follows the note.” When a mortgage note is transferred and delivered to a transferee in connection with the securitization of the mortgage loan pursuant to an MBS pooling and servicing agreement or similar agreement, the mortgage automatically follows and is transferred to the mortgage note transferee, notwithstanding that a third party, including an agent/nominee entity such as MERS, may remain as the mortgagee of record. Both common law and the UCC confirm and apply this rule, including in the context of mortgage loan securitizations.

For a more info on how you can use the application of UCC to effectively and successfully challenge and win your Foreclosure Defense, please visit http://www.fightforeclosure.net

Using Decisions Involving Mortgage-Backed Securities to Challenge Your Wrongful Foreclosure

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In recent times, we have seen that many foreclosure cases that were litigated by Homeowners involve Mortgage Backed Securities.

Nevada’s foreclosure stats jumped 334 percent in February from the same month a year ago, leading the nation in year-over-year percentage gains, online foreclosure listing service RealtyTrac reported late Wednesday.

Other states with huge spikes in foreclosure activity include Maryland (319 percent), Washington (172 percent), New York (139 percent) and New Jersey (70 percent).

RealtyTrac showed 15,281 foreclosure filings on U.S. properties in February, a 2 percent increase from the previous month but down 25 percent from a year ago. Foreclosure filings include default notices, scheduled auctions and bank repossessions.

Florida had the nation’s highest foreclosure rate for the sixth straight month with one in every 282 housing units receiving a foreclosure filing, more than three times the national average.

Nevada was No. 2 for the fifth straight month with one in every 320 housing units receiving a filing.

“At a high level, the U.S. foreclosure inferno has been effectively contained and should be reduced to a slow burn in the next two years,” said RealtyTrac Vice President Daren Blomquist. “But dangerous foreclosure flare-ups are still popping up in states where foreclosures have been delayed by a lengthy court process or by new legislation making it more difficult to foreclose outside of the court system.”

When Homeowners are faced with a hurdle of fighting foreclosure to save their homes, some of the argument that has been proven effective in the Courts involves Securitization of the mortgages and the assignments involved in the transfer of the mortgages.

The following cases were some of the cases where valid arguments involving securitizations were used to defeat the Banks and Lenders in the Courts.  Orders to these cases shows that the case was either Dismissed without Prejudice or Summary Judgment that were reversed on Appeal.

CASE STUDIES:

Augenstein v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company,

No. 2009-CA-000058-MR, Kentucky Ct. Appeals 2011

Trust: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-OPT4

Summary judgment for bank vacated and remanded.

“In this case, the complaint was filed on December 17, 2007, but the assignment of mortgage was not executed until January 3, 2008. Thus, Deutsche Bank had no present interest when it filed its complaint and failed to take any steps to correct this. Allowing Deutsche Bank to commence this action at a time when it lacked standing impermissibly allowed litigation to commence based upon mere expectancy of an interest.”

Bank of America v. Kabba,

276 P.3d 1006, 2012 OK 23

Trust: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust Series 2004-BNC2

“In the present case, Appellee has only presented evidence of an indorsed-in-blank note and an “Assignment of Mortgage.” Appellee must prove that it is the holder of the note or the nonholder in possession who has the rights of a holder prior to the filing of the foreclosure proceeding. In the present matter the timeliness of the transfer is in question. Since Bank of America did not file the blank indorsement until it filed its motion for summary judgment it is impossible to determine from the record when Bank of America acquired its interest in the underlying note.”

Bank of New York v. Gindele,

1st Dist. No. C-090251, 2010-Ohio-542

Trust: CWALT Alternative Loan Trust 2006-40T1

“A thorough review of the record reveals that the sole indication of its interest as mortgagee is an after-acquired assignment; and the bank failed to produce any evidence in the trial court affirmatively establishing a preexisting interest. Bank of New York has also asserted both that it had acted as an agent, and that its predecessor in interest had later ratified its foreclosure complaint. But because at the time of filing neither agency nor ratification had been alleged or documented, we will not entertain this argument on appeal.”

Bank of NY v. Cupo,

2012 WL 611849 (N.J.Super.App. Div. 2011

Motion to vacate default judgment was reversed for further findings on issue of standing, suggesting that lack of standing might make a judgment void, rather than treating standing as waived by default judgment.

Bank of New York v. Mulligan,

Index 29399/07 (August 25, 2010)

Trust: CWALT 2006-OC1

Mortgage Amount: $392,000

Bank’s application for an order of reference was denied  without prejudice.

“The Court will grant plaintiff, BNY an order of reference when it presents: an affidavit by either an officer of BNY or someone with a valid power of attorney from BNY, possessing personal knowledge of the facts; an affidavit from EJy Harless clarifying his employment history for the past three years and what corporation he serves as an officer; and, an affidavit by an officer of BNY, explaining why BNY would purchase a nonperforming loan from MERS, as nominee for DECISION ONE.”

Bank of New York v. Myers,

Index 18236/2008 (February 23, 2009)

Trust: CWABS 2006-22

The Bank’s summary judgment motion was denied, but within 60 days of the decision, the Bank was required to submit an Affidavit from Keri Selman explaining her employment history for the past three years and why Selman did not have a conflict of interest as the signor of many entities.

Bank of New York v. Orosco,

2007 NY SLIP OP 31501(U) (November 19, 2007)

Trust: CWABS, Series 2006-SD2

Mortgage Amount: $436,000

“Plaintiff must address a second matter if it applies for an order of reference after demonstrating that the alleged assignment was recorded. Plaintiff’s application is the third application for an order of reference received by me in the past several days that contain an affidavit from Keri Selman. In the instant action, she alleges to be an Assistant Vice-president of the Bank of New York. On November 16,2007, I denied an application for an order of reference in which Keri Selman, in her affidavit of merit claims to be “Vice President of COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, Attorney in fact for BANK OF NEW YORK.” The Court is concerned that Ms. Selman might be engaged in a subterfuge, wearing various corporate hats. Before granting an application for an order of reference, the Court requires an affidavit from Ms. Selman describing her employment history for the past three years.”

Bank of New York v. Raftogianis,

13 A.3d 435 (2010), 418 N.J.Super. 323

Trust: American Home Mort. Investment Trust 2004-4

Mortgage Amount: $1,380,000

“Plaintiff, however, failed to establish that it was entitled to enforce the note as of the time the complaint was filed. In this case, there are no compelling reasons to permit plaintiff to proceed in this action. Accordingly, the complaint has been dismissed. That dismissal is without prejudice to plaintiff’s right to institute a new action to foreclose at any time, provided that any new complaint must be accompanied by an appropriate certification, executed by one with personal knowledge of the circumstances, confirming that plaintiff is in possession of the original note as of the date any new action is filed. That certification must indicate the physical location of the note and the name of the individual or entity in possession.”

Bank of New York v. Silverberg,

86 AD3d 274, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532 (2d Dept 2011)

Trust: CWALT 2007-14-T2

Mortgage Amount: $479,000

“In sum, because MERS was never the lawful holder or assignee of the notes described and identified in the consolidation agreement, the corrected assignment of mortgage is a nullity, and MERS was without authority to assign the power to foreclose to the plaintiff.  Consequently, the plaintiff failed to show that it had standing to foreclose.”

Bank of New York Mellon v. Teague,

Case No. 27-2009-CA-003121, Hernando Co. FL 2012

Trust: Novastar Mortgage Funding Trust 2005-1

“Second, to be entitled to foreclose, Plaintiff had to have been the holder of the Note and Mortgage at the time it filed this lawsuit.  The undisputed, summary judgment evidence before the Court was that Plaintiff was not the holder at the inception of this case as Plaintiff did not have the original Note in its possession when it filed suit and the Note did not contain the requisite endorsement. The fact that Plaintiff filed what it contends is an original note on June 28, 2012 does not change this result, as the endorsement on that Note is to a different company, not Plaintiff, and even if the Note had been properly endorsed, the fact that Plaintiff may have been the holder as of June, 2012 does not change its lack of standing at the inception of this case…

The motion is granted and this case is dismissed without prejudice.” (cites omitted)

Bank of New York v. Trezza,

14 Misc. 3d 1201(A), 2006 NY Slip Op 52367(U)

Trust: CWABS 2004-5

“In support of its motion, the plaintiff submits a purported assignment of the mortgage from MERS to the plaintiff; however, the mortgage does not empower MERS to assign the mortgage to any other entity. Furthermore, there is no proof that the Lender had previously assigned the mortgage to MERS, nor is there any other evidence to establish the plaintiff’s ownership rights under the mortgage.

Based on the foregoing, the plaintiff has failed to establish that it has standing as a plaintiff in this matter.”

Bank of New York v. Singh, 

Index No. 22434/2007, Kings County (December 14,  2007)

Trust: CWABS, Series 2004-6

An order of reference was denied where the mortgage assignment was executed on June 28, 2007, with an antedated effective date of May 31, 2007.  Suit was commenced on June 20, 2007. Judge Kurtz found that such an attempt to retroactively assign the mortgage was insufficient to establish plaintiff’s ownership interest at the time the action was commenced.

Bank of New York v. Torres,

Index No. 31704/2006, Kings County (March 11, 2008)

Trust: CWABS 2005-6

“ORDERED that the plaintiff’s ex parte application for an Order of Reference in Mortgage Foreclosure is denied without prejudice to renew due to plaintiffs failure to demonstrate its ownership of the note and mortgage sufficient to convey standing upon this plaintiff to commence this lawsuit on November 13,2006…”

Beaumont v. Bank of New York Mellon,

81 So.3d 553,554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

Trust: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust 2005-3

Summary judgment for bank reversed and remanded.

“There is no evidence showing that Beaumont was on notice prior to the time his answer was filed that ownership of the note had been transferred from NovaStar to Mellon. In fact, the claimed transfer, alleged to have occurred on the day suit was filed, was either concealed by NovaStar for more than three years while it continued to pursue the action, or NovaStar backdated the assignment it finally produced on July 23, 2010, as justification for substituting Mellon as plaintiff. Under these circumstances, Beaumont may raise lack of standing when suit was filed as a defense.”

Congress v. U.S. Bank,

2100934, AL Ct. Civ. App

Trust: 2007-EMX1

Mortgage Amount: $104,400

“The trial court should have evaluated the issue whether the allonge had been created after the first trial under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. Because it used the higher clear-and-convincing-evidence standard to evaluate Congress’s evidence, this court has no choice but to reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause to the trial court for it to evaluate the evidence adduced at trial under the appropriate standard of proof.”

 

Cutler v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,

Case No. 2D10-5709 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)

Trust: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust, 2006- BNC3

Summary judgment for Bank reversed and remanded.

“Accordingly, a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether U.S. Bank was the proper holder of the note at the time it initiated the foreclosure action. The note includes the allonge endorsed in blank, but the allonge is not dated. If indeed U.S. Bank cannot establish that the allonge took effect prior to the date of the complaint, it did not have standing to bring suit…

Because a genuine issue of material fact remains, the trial court erred in entering a final summary judgment.”

Davenport v. HSBC Bank USA,

739 N.W.2d 383 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007)

“In this case, defendant did not own the mortgage or an interest in the mortgage on October 27, 2005. Nonetheless, defendant proceeded to commence foreclosure proceedings at that time. Quite simply, defendant did not yet own the indebtedness that it sought to foreclose. The circuit court erred by determining that defendant’s noncompliance with the statutory requirements did not nullify the foreclosure proceedings. Because defendant lacked the statutory authority to foreclose, the foreclosure proceedings were void ab initio. We vacate the foreclosure proceedings and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.v. Alemany,

Index: 11677/2007

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 2008)

Trust: Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2006-OPT3

“ORDERED that plaintiffs ex parte application for an Order of Reference is denied without prejudice to resubmit due to plaintiffs failure to provide: … (2) proof on standing to commence this action as it appears plaintiff did not own the note and mortgage when the action was commenced…”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Barnett,

88 A.D.3d 636, 931 N.Y.S.2d 630

Trust: FFMLT 2005-FF11

Summary judgment of foreclosure in favor of bank reversed.

“However, the documentation submitted failed to establish that, prior to commencement of the action, the plaintiff was the holder or assignee of both the note and mortgage. The plaintiff submitted copies of two different versions of an undated allonge which was purportedly affixed to the original note pursuant to UCC 3-202 (2). Moreover, these allonges purporting to endorse the note from First Franklin, a Division of National City Bank of Indiana (hereinafter Franklin of Indiana) to the plaintiff conflict with the copy of the note submitted, which contains undated endorsements from Franklin of Indiana to First Franklin Financial Corporation (hereinafter Franklin Financial), then from Franklin Financial in blank.

“…The plaintiff also failed to establish that the note was physically delivered to it prior to the commencement of this action.”

 

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Bialobrzeski,

3 A.3d 183 (Conn App. Ct. 2010)

Trust: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3

The judgment for the trust was reversed and the case was remanded for a hearing on the motion to dismiss.

“The key to resolving the defendant’s claim is a determination of when the note came into the plaintiff’s possession. We cannot review the claim because Judge Domnarski made no factual finding as to when the plaintiff acquired the note. Without that factual determination, we are unable to say whether Judge Domnarski improperly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Although it is the appellant’s responsibility to provide an adequate record for review; see Practice Book §§ 60-5 and 61-10; that cannot be the end of the matter because it concerns the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Brumbaugh,

2012 OK 3, 270 P.3d 151

Trust: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-1

Summary judgment for bank reversed and remanded.

“To commence a foreclosure action in Oklahoma, a plaintiff must demonstrate it has a right to enforce the note and, absent a showing of ownership, the plaintiff lacks standing… Being a person entitled to enforce the note is an essential requirement to initiate a foreclosure lawsuit. In the present case, there is a question of fact as to when Appellee became a holder, and thus, a person entitled to enforce the note. Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate. If Deutsche Bank became a person entitled to enforce the note as either a holder or nonholder in possession who has the rights of a holder after the foreclosure action was filed, then the case may be dismissed without prejudice and the action may be re-filed in the name of the proper party. We reverse the granting of summary judgment by the trial court and remand back for further determinations as to when Appellee acquired its interest in the note.” (cites omitted)

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Byrams,

2012 OK 4, 275 P.3d 129

Trust: Argent Securities, Inc. ABPT Certs., Series 2006-W2

Mortgage amount: $526,320

Summary judgment of foreclosure in favor of bank reversed and remanded.

“The assignment of a mortgage is not the same as an assignment of the note. If a person is trying to establish it is a nonholder in possession who has the rights of a holder it must bear the burden of establishing its status as a nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder. Appellee must establish delivery of the note as well as the purpose of that delivery. In the present case, it appears Appellee is trying to use the assignment of mortgage in order to establish the purpose of delivery. The assignment of mortgage purports to transfer “the following described mortgage, securing the payment of a certain promissory note(s) for the sum listed below, together with all rights therein and thereto, all liens created or secured thereby, all obligations therein described, the money due and to become due thereon with interest, and all rights accrued or to accrue under such mortgage.” This language has been determined by other jurisdictions to not effect an assignment of a note but to be useful only in identifying the mortgage. Therefore, this language is neither proof of transfer of the note nor proof of the purpose of any alleged transfer.” (cites omitted)

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Cabaroy,

Index: 9245/2007

 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 2008)

Trust: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, 2006-1

“ORDERED that the plaintiffs ex parte application for an Order of Reference in Mortgage Foreclosure is denied without prejudice to resubmit due to plaintiffs failure to provide: (1) proof of plaintiffs standing to commence this action;”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Castellanos,

2008 NY Slip Op 50033(U)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: Argent Mort. Sec., Inc. ABPT Certs., Series 2005-W4

Mortgage Amount: $382,500

“Did Mr. Rivas somehow change employers on July 21, 2006 or he is concurrently a Vice President of both assignor Argent Mortgage Company, LLC and assignee Deutsche Bank? If he is a Vice President of both the assignor and the assignee, this would create a conflict of interest and render the July 21, 2006-assignment void.

Also, Mr. Rivas claims that Argent Mortgage Company, LLC is located at 1100

Town and Country Road, Suite 200, Orange, California, while Deutsche Bank has its offices at One City Boulevard West, Orange, California. Did Mr. Rivas execute the assignment at 100 Town and Country Road, Suite 200, and then travel to One City Boulevard West, with the same notary public, M. Reveles, in tow? The Court is concerned that there may be fraud on the part of Deutsche Bank, Argent Mortgage Company, LLC, and/or MTGLQ Investors, L.P., or at least malfeasance. If plaintiff renews its motion for a judgment of foreclosure and sale, the Court requires a satisfactory explanation by Mr. Rivas of his recent employment history.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Clouden,

Index No. 277/07

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2007)

Trust: Argent Mort. Sec., Inc. ABPT Certs., Series 2005-W3

Mortgage Amount: $382,500

“In the instant action, Argent’s defective assignment to Deutsche Bank affects the standing of Deutsche Bank to bring this action. The recorded assignment from Argent to Deutsche Bank, made by “Tamara Price, as Authorized Agent” on behalf of “AMC Mortgage Services Inc. as authorized agent,” lacks any power of attorney granted by Argent to AMC Mortgage Services, Inc. and/or Tamara Price to act on its behalf.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Benjamin Cruz,

Index No. 31645/06

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-OPT3

“In support of plaintiff’s application, it submits a purported assignment of the mortgage from the original lender to plaintiff. The purported assignment is dated October 27, 2006. However, such an attempt to retroactively assign the mortgage is insufficient to establish plaintiff’s ownership interest at the time the action was commenced.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Yobanna Cruz,

Index No. 2085/07

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2007)

Trust: Long Beach Mort. Loan Trust 2006-2

Mortgage Amount: $382,500

“In support of plaintiffs application, it submits a purported assignment of the mortgage from the original lender to plaintiff. The purported assignment is dated January 18, 2007 and states in pertinent part “effective January 12, 2007.” However, such an attempt to retroactively assign the mortgage is insufficient to establish plaintiff’s ownership interest at the time the action was commenced.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Cuesta,

2012 NY Slip Op 32590(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co.  2012)

Trust: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust,

Series 2007-2

Deutsche Bank’s motion for an order of reference was denied without prejudice, and Deutsche Bank was warned that if it chose to refile, it must include:

“4) Evidentiary proof, including an affidavit from an individual with personal knowledge of the facts as to the proper and timely assignment of the subject note and mortgage or endorsement of the subject note and assignment of the subject mortgage, sufficient to establish that plaintiff was the owner or holder of the subject note and mortgage at the time the action was commenced…

In his affidavit, the plaintiff’s representative has not addressed the particulars of the transfer of the note or the assignment of the mortgage to the plaintiff. Additionally, the assignment dated January 27, 2011, which is referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint, has not been attached to the moving papers.”

Deutsche Bank v. Decker,

Case 09-20548-CI-13 (Pinellas County, Florida, 2010)

Trust: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Cap. PSA dated 5-1- 2001

“However, there remain two concerns.

The first is related to evidence that the Plaintiff had standing at the time the original complaint was initially filed. The “new” assignment does not solve this problem because it was executed on February 17, 2010, and thus does not demonstrate standing in 2009…

The second problem is related to the ownership issue but is focused on the validity of the newly obtained assignment.  At the hearing Defendant’s counsel indicated concerns regarding this document based upon his assertion that the 2010 assignment was from a company that went bankrupt years ago…”

(Dismissal granted of bank/plaintiff’s first amended complaint)

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Ezagui,

Index: 3724/07

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2007)

Trust: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., ABPT

Certificates, Series 2004-R10

Mortgage Amount: $412,250

“According to plaintiff’s application, defendant Ezaguis’ default began with the nonpayment of principal and interest due on September 1, 2006. Yet, more than five months later, plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK was willing to take an assignment of a nonperforming loan from AMERIQUEST. Further, both assignor AMC, as Attorney in Fact for AMERIQUEST, and assignee, DEUTSCHE BANK, have the same address, 505 City Parkway West, Orange, CA 92868. Plaintiff’s “affidavit of amount due,” submitted in support of the instant application for a default order of reference was executed by Tamara Price, on February 16, 2007. Ms. Price states that “I am the Vice President for DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE OF AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC., ASSET-BACKED PASS THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2004-R10, UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT DATED AS OF OCTOBER 1, 2004, WITHOUT RECOURSE (DEUTSCHE BANK).” However, the February 7, 2007 assignment from AMERIQUEST, by AMC, its Attorney in Fact, is executed by Tamara Price, Vice President of AMC. The Tamara Price signatures on both the February 7, 2007 affidavit and the February 16, 2007 assignment are identical. Did Ms. Price change employers from February 7, 2007 to February 16, 2007? The Court is concerned that there may be fraud on the part of AMERIQUEST, or at least malfeasance. Before granting an application for an order of reference, the Court requires an affidavit from Ms. Price, describing her employment history for the past three years. Further, irrespective of her employment history, Ms. Price must explain why DEUTSCHE BANK would purchase a nonperforming loan from AMERIQUEST, and why  DEUTSCHE BANK shares office space in Orange, California, with AMERIQUEST.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Gilbert,

2012 IL App (2d) 120164, No. 2-12-0164 (September  25, 2012)

Trust: GSAMP Trust 2005-WMC2

“Deutsche Bank attempted to rebut this apparent lack of standing by pointing to the Assignment and the Loch affidavit. However, these items lack evidentiary value. Before the trial court, Deutsche Bank argued that the language of the Assignment established that the transfer of the mortgage had occurred years earlier, on November 1, 2005. On appeal, however, Deutsche Bank wisely abandons that argument (which finds no support in the actual language of the Assignment), and now concedes that the Assignment “does not establish anything about when Plaintiff [Deutsche Bank] obtained its interest in the subject loan.” We agree with this statement. Although the Assignment contains two dates—the date of the trust for which Deutsche Bank is a trustee, and the date on which the Assignment was executed and notarized—it does not explicitly state when the mortgage was assigned to Deutsche Bank. All that can be known about when the assignment took place is that it was no later than the date on which the Assignment was executed.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Grant,

Index: 39192/07

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT2

Mortgage Amount: $456,000

“Also, the Court requires an explanation from an officer of plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK as to why, in the middle of our national subprime mortgage financial crisis, DEUTSCHE BANK purchased a non-performing loan [from] OPTION ONE.  The Court wonders if DEUTSCHE BANK violated a corporate fiduciary duty to its stockholders with the purchase of a loan that defaulted more than five months prior to its assignment to DEUTSCHE BANK.”

 

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Haque,

36 Misc. 3d 1203(A)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 2012)

Trust: Home Equity Mortgage Loan Trust, Series INABS

2005-B

Mortgage Amount: $279,200

“In addition, to the extent Plaintiff Deutsche Bank asserts the note was transferred to ”the trust,” pursuant to a “pooling and servicing” agreement between IndyMac ABS, Inc. as depositor, IndyMac Bank SM as seller and “master servicer” and Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, Series INABS 2005-B, issuer, such agreement does not establish that IndyMac assigned the note to plaintiff Deutsche Bank.  Plaintiff Deutsche Bank does not otherwise allege a basis for a valid assignment of the note.” (cites omitted)

 

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Harris,

Index: 35549/07

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Mortgage Amount: $408,000

Deutsche Bank’s Motion was denied without prejudice, with leave to renew, providing the Court:

“…a satisfactory explanation to various questions with respect to: the October 23, 2007 assignment of the instant mortgage to plaintiff, DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY (DEUTSCHE BANK); the employment history of one Erica Johnson-Seck, who executed the affidavit of facts in the instant application as an officer of DEUTSCHE BANK; plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK’S purchase of the instant non- performing loan; and why does INDYMAC BANK, F.S.B., (INDYMAC), MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. (MERS), and plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK all share office space at 460 Sierra Madre Villa, Pasadena, CA 91107.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Maraj,

2008 NY Slip Op 50176 (U)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: INDX 2006-AR6

Mortgage Amount: $440,000

“With the assignor MERS and assignee DEUTSCHE BANK appearing to be engaged in possible fraudulent activity by: having the same person execute the assignment and then the affidavit of facts in support of the instant application; DEUTSCHE BANK’s purchase of a non-performing loan from INDYMAC; and, the sharing of office space in Suite 400/500 in Kansas City, the Court wonders if the instant foreclosure action is a corporate “Kansas City Shuffle,” a complex confidence game…

A Kansas City Shuffle is when everybody looks right, you go left . . .

It’s not something people hear about. Falls on deaf ears mostly . . .

No small matter. Requires a lot of planning. Involves a lot of people. People connected by the slightest of events. Like whispers in the night, in that place that never forgets, even when those people do.

In this foreclosure action is plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK, with its “principal place of business” in Kansas City attempting to make the Court look right while it goes left?”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Marche,

Index: 9156/07

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2009)

Trust: Securitized AB Receivable LLC Trust 2006-FR4

“Why an Order should not be made and entered:

VACATING the order of foreclosure and dismissing the instant action in its entirety upon the grounds that (i) Plaintiff has misrepresented itself by alleging that it is the owner and holder of the mortgage in order to fraudulently commence this action when in fact no valid assignment has been made to Plaintiff from Fremont Investment & Loan; (ii) that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction where Plaintiff is not and has not been the true owner and holder of the note and mortgage at issue; and (iii) that the assignment at issue is champertous in violation of Section 489 of the New York State Judiciary Law because the sole purpose of the defective assignment was to facilitate fraudulent litigation begun by Plaintiff prior to the assignment’s execution.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Matthews,

2012 OK 14, 273 P.3d 43 (2012)

Trust: JP Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH3

Summary Judgment for bank reversed and remanded.

“However, the Assignment of Real Estate Mortgage attached to its motion for summary judgment is executed on June 9, 2009, by a Vice President of Chase Bank USA, N.A. The note attached to its motion for summary judgment, however, shows an allonge from Chase Bank USA, N.A., to Chase Home Finance, LLC. Further, this purported transfer of the note occurred six months after the action was commenced. Deutsche Bank also by its own admission states it acquired its interest in the note and mortgage subsequent to the filing of this action.”

Deutsche Bank v. McCarthy,

Case No. 1:07 3071 (N.D. Ohio) (Judge Dowd)

Trust: Argent Mortgage Securities, ABPT Certs., Series 2005-W5

“The Northern District of Ohio is swamped with foreclosure cases brought in diversity. A large number of these cases are brought by plaintiffs who declare that they are holders of the note and mortgage but who initially supply no proof of that fact. When pressed, it is typically the case, as here, that the plaintiff actually is not the holder of the note and mortgage until some time after the filing of the complaint (often mere days!) and had, therefore, made a false statement to the court. Sometimes that statement of ownership is only in the complaint; sometimes, as in the instant case, it is actually in a sworn affidavit. See Doc. No. 1-4, ¶ 7. This is completely unacceptable, especially because this situation is likely to be repeated if not stopped by Court order.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. McRae

27 Misc.3d 247 (Sup. Ct. Alleghany County 2010)

Trust: not identified.

To establish standing, the bank submitted an additional copy of a note which was different from the one attached to the complaint. The court rejected it, stating: “Obviously, the endorsements…post-date the commencement of this case…and are ineffective.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Mitchell,

27 A.3d 1229 – NJ Appellate Div. 2011

Trust: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3

Mortgage Amount: $150,000

Summary judgment reversed.

“After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and final judgment and vacate the sheriff’s sale, holding that Deutsche Bank did not prove it had standing at the time it filed the original complaint. The assignment was not perfected until after the filing of the complaint, and plaintiff presented no evidence of having possessed the underlying note prior to filing the complaint. If plaintiff did not have the note when it filed the original complaint, it lacked standing to do so, and it could not obtain standing by filing an amended complaint. Given that Deutsche Bank has not demonstrated standing, we cannot decide at this time whether it was a holder in due course of the mortgage.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Nicholls.

Index 2248/07

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: Long Beach Mort. Loan Trust 2005-WL2

“In support of plaintiff’s application, it submits a purported assignment of the mortgage from the original lender to plaintiff. The purported assignment is dated January 24, 2007 and states in pertinent part “[e]ffective January 17, 2007.” However, such an attempt to retroactively assign the mortgage is insufficient to establish plaintiff’s ownership interest at the time the action was commenced. … Plaintiffs attempt to foreclose upon a mortgage in which it had no “legal or equitable interest was without foundation in law or fact…”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Parisella,

VT App. Ct., 2010, Docket No. S0758-09 CnC

Trust: FFMLT Trust 2005-FF11

Homeowner’s Motion to Dismiss granted.

“The court concludes that a plaintiff seeking foreclosure lacks standing unless it can show it was entitled to enforce the mortgage at the time it filed its complaint for foreclosure…

Here, there is no evidence in the record indicating that Deutsche Bank was the assignee of the note when it filed its complaint on June 15, 2009.  Nor is there even an allegation to that effect.  There is an allegation that the mortgage was assigned to Deutsche Bank before it filed its complaint, but since the note is a negotiable instrument, the transfer of the mortgage does not also transfer the note…

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Richardson,

2012 OK 15, __P.3d__

Trust: MASTR 2007-02

Summary Judgment for bank reversed and remanded.

“In the present case, Appellee has presented evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment of an indorsed-in-blank note, and an “Assignment of Mortgage” both arguably obtained after the filing of the petition. Appellee must prove it is the holder of the note or the nonholder in possession who has the rights of a holder prior to the filing of the foreclosure proceeding. In the present matter the timeliness of the transfer is a disputed fact issue. Since Deutsche Bank did not file the blank indorsement until it filed its motion for summary judgment it is impossible to determine from the record when Deutsche Bank acquired its interest in the underlying note.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Ryan,

Index 33315/07 (January 29, 2008)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: Long Beach Mort. Loan Trust 2005-WL1

An order of reference was denied by Judge Kurtz where the bank plead a mortgage assignment executed, September 31, 2007, after the suit was commenced August 31, 2007, but with an attempted backdate to July 30, 2007.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Ryan,

Case No. 2011-12070, Hillsborough Co. Fla. 2012

Trust: Novastar Mortgage Funding Trust, 2006-5

“Second, Plaintiff lacked standing at the inception of this case. Though Plaintiff alleged it had standing, the Note attached to its Complaint lacked an endorsement, and Plaintiff introduced no sworn evidence to overcome Defendant’s affidavit that it lacked standing when it filed suit…

In light of the foregoing, this case is dismissed without prejudice and without leave to amend.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Sampson III,

Index 26320/07 (January 16, 2008)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2009)

Trust: HSBC Bank USA, Inc., Series HASCO 2006-HE1

“The purported assignment is dated August 10, 2007 and states in pertinent part “this assignment is effective as of the 22nd day of June, 2007.” However, such an attempt to retroactively assign the mortgage is insufficient to establish plaintiff’s ownership interest at the time the action was commenced. Plaintiff’s attempt to foreclose upon a mortgage in which it had no “legal or equitable interest was without foundation in law or fact…” (cites omitted)

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Seidlin,

Index:105162/2009 NY County, 2011NY Slip Op

31551(U)

Trust: American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2006-5

Mortgage Amount: $580,000

Bank’s motion granted for leave to voluntarily   discontinue the action “due to the assignment of mortgage being incorrectly and/or incompletely acknowledged” after two years of litigation.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Steele,

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4937 (S.D. Ohio January 8, 2008)

“I cannot tell from the exhibits plaintiff has submitted in support of its motion whether Deutsche Bank owned the note and mortgage when the complaint was filed. Plaintiff alleges ownership in the complaint, but defendants’ answer does not admit the truth of that allegation…The Court cannot grant summary judgment unless Deutsche Bank offers evidence from which a finder could conclude by a preponderance that it owned the note and mortgage when the complaint was filed.  Further, if plaintiff has evidence of ownership, it must explain how that ownership is consistent with the uncontroverted evidence that when the complaint was filed, MERS was the mortgage holder acting on behalf of Mortgageit, Inc.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Vasquez,

Index: 4924/11, 2012 NY Slip Op 31395(U)

Trust: Morgan Stanley ABS Cap. I, Inc. Trust, 2007-HE7

Mortgage Amount: $435,100

“A foreclosure plaintiff has the requisite standing to commence a mortgage foreclosure action if “it is both the holder or assignee of the subject mortgage and the of the underlying note at the time the action is commenced”… In this action plaintiff does not allege that it is an assignee of the Note, but instead, as previously referenced, produced a copy of the original Note between defendants and New Century. They argue that delivery of the unindorsed Note was sufficient to confer standing. On the prior motion the court overlooked the necessity of proper indorsement required to transfer ownership and render the transferee a holder…

Also influencing this court’s determination on reargument are the repeated issues regarding standing which revolve around proper assignments, particularly of mortgage notes which have ensued following creation of the MERS system and the birth of mortgage backed securities.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Williams,

Case No. 11-00632 (D. Hawaii 2011)

Trust: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I, Inc. Trust 2007- NC1

“This evidence presents two problems for Plaintiff. First, if Plaintiff did indeed obtain the Mortgage and Note through a 2007 PSA, then the 2007 PSA is yet another reason why the January 13, 2009 assignment is a nullity and the Complaint’s assertion that Plaintiff obtained the Mortgage and Note from Home 123 is untrue. Second, the evidence presented does not actually establish that Plaintiff received the Mortgage and Note through the PSA — there is no evidence on the record establishing what mortgages were included in the PSA. Thus, although Plaintiff might have obtained the Mortgage and Note through this PSA, there is no evidence showing or even suggesting that this is indeed the case. As a  result, there is no evidence — at least on the record presented before the court –creating a genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff was assigned the Mortgage and Note on which it now seeks to foreclose.”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Wilson,

Case A-1384-09T1, N.J. App. Div. 2011

Trust: WaMu 2007-HEI Trust

Summary judgment of foreclosure was reversed and remanded “to resolve the issue of the bona fides of the assignment.”  The issue regarding the assignment was discussed in Footnote 1:

“The assignment was executed by an individual identified as Laura Hescott who signed the assignment as an assistant vice-president of Washington Mutual Bank. Ms. Hescott has been identified as an employee of Lender Processing Services, Inc. (“LPS”), a servicer of default mortgages. The bona fides of the practices of this service provider have been the subject of increased judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 407 B.R. 618, 623 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009).”

 

Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas v. McCoy,

20 Misc 3d 1202 (A) 2010 NY Slip Op 51664(U)

Trust not disclosed.

“Although the February 28, 2008 assignment states it is “effective January 19, 2008,” such attempt at retroactivity is ineffectual. If an assignment is in writing, the execution date is generally controlling and a written assignment claiming an earlier effective date is deficient, unless it is accompanied by proof that the physical delivery of the note and mortgage was, in fact, previously effectuated…A retroactive assignment cannot be used to confer standing upon the assignee in a foreclosure action commenced prior to the execution of the assignment… (Plaintiff’s failure to submit proper proof, including an affidavit from one with personal knowledge, that the plaintiff was the holder of the note and mortgage at the time the action was commenced, requires denial of the plaintiff’s application for an order of reference. (cites omitted)

Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas v. Peabody,

866 N.Y.S. 2d 91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)

Trust not disclosed.

Mortgage Amount: $320,000

Foreclosure dismissed.

“Again, here, there is no evidence that it took physical delivery of the note and mortgage before commencing this action, and again, the written assignment was signed after the defendant was served. The assignment’s language purporting to give it retroactive effect, absent a prior or contemporary delivery of the note and mortgage, is insufficient to grant it standing.”

Feltus v. U.S. Bank, N.A.

80 So.3d 375 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2011)

Trust: MASTR Adj. Rate Mortgage Trust 2007-3

Summary judgment for bank reversed.

“The properly filed pleadings before the court when it heard U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment were a complaint seeking to reestablish a lost note to which was attached a copy of a note made payable to Countrywide, N.A., Feltus’s answer and affirmative defenses alleging that the note attached to the complaint contradicts the allegation of the complaint that U.S. Bank is the owner of the note, a motion for summary judgment alleging a lost note of which U.S. Bank is the owner, and an affidavit of indebtedness alleging that U.S. Bank was the owner and holder of the note described in the complaint. The endorsed note that U.S. Bank claimed was now in its possession was not properly before the court at the summary judgment hearing because U.S. Bank never properly amended its complaint.2 In addition, the complaint failed to allege that U.S. Bank “was entitled to enforce the instrument when loss of possession occurred, or has directly or indirectly acquired ownership of the instrument from a person who was entitled to enforce the instrument when loss of possession occurred.” § 673.3091(a). The affidavit of indebtedness provided no assistance in this regard because the affiant did not assert any personal knowledge of how U.S. Bank would have come to own or hold the note.” (cites omitted)

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Schwartwald,

Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5017

On October 31, 2012, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the issue of standing in foreclosures.  Although this case did not involve a mortgage-backed trust, it will have a significant impact on foreclosures by trusts because the Court ruled that the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation lacked standing to sue when it obtained the mortgage by an assignment from the real party in interest after the foreclosure suit was commenced. This was yet another case where the note was “not available” at commencement.  Later in the case, Federal Home Loan filed a copy of the note, with undated endorsements.  The motion for summary judgment was supported by an Affidavit signed by well-known Wells Fargo robo-signer John Herman Kennerty.  The appellate court had ruled that Federal Home Loan cured the lack of standing defect by the assignment of the mortgage and transfer of the note prior to entry of judgment. The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed – citing decisions taken by Courts in Connecticut, Florida, Maine, Missouri, Oklahoma and Vermont.

Gascue v. HSBC USA, N.A.,

__So.3d__ (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)

Trust: Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-AB4

Reversal and remand of denial of motion to vacate final judgment of foreclosure.

“There is no evidence on the record indicating that Bank was the holder of the mortgage at the time the complaint was filed. Just as in Rigby, Bank attached a mortgage to its complaint in which it was not listed as the lender, but rather “Pinnacle Direct Funding” was. The only evidence that Bank is the owner and holder of the note is a sworn affidavit. However, this affidavit was filed three years after the complaint and does not establish when Bank became the holder of either the note or the mortgage, much less establish that Bank was the holder of said instruments at the time the complaint was filed. See id. (reversing the trial court in part because the supporting affidavit in that case did not establish the date on which the bank acquired possession of the note).”

Gee v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,

72 So.3d 211 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)

Trust: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-10

“Here, the record does not contain the original Mortgage. To prove its ownership, U.S. Bank filed a copy of the Mortgage as well as two assignments. The first assignment transferred the Mortgage from Advent Mortgage, the original mortgagee, to Option One. The second assignment purported to transfer the mortgage from American Home, as successor in interest of Option One, to U.S. Bank. However, and significant to our consideration, U.S. Bank provided nothing to demonstrate how American Home came to be the successor in interest to Option One.

Incredibly, U.S. Bank argues that “[i]t would be inequitable for [Ms. Gee] to avoid foreclosure based on the absence of an endorsement to [it].” But that argument flies in the face of well-established precedent requiring the party seeking foreclosure to present evidence that it owns and holds the note and mortgage in question in order to proceed with a foreclosure action.” (cites omitted)

(Summary Judgment reversed.)

Gonzalez v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company,

Case No. 2D10-5561 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)

Trust: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust

2006-1

“The problem is that the additional stamp and handwritten notation transferring the note from American Home Mortgage to Deutsche Bank is not dated. Accordingly, Deutsche Bank failed to establish its standing by showing that it possessed the note when it filed the lawsuit. See Country Place Cmty. Ass’n v. J.P. Morgan Mortg. Acquisition Corp., 51 So. 3d 1176, 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“Because J.P. Morgan did not own or possess the note and mortgage when it filed its lawsuit, it lacked standing to maintain the foreclosure action.”). As a result, Deutsche Bank has not refuted Gonzalez’s affirmative defense, and a genuine issue of material fact exists that should have precluded the entry of summary judgment.”

(Summary judgment for Deutsche Bank reversed.)

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Antrobus,

20 Misc 3d 1127(A), 2008 NY Slip Op 51639(U)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-4

Mortgage Amount: $465,000

“Therefore, the instant application for an order of reference is denied without prejudice, with leave to renew. The Court will grant an order of reference to plaintiff HSBC upon presentation to this court of: an affidavit by either an officer of HSBC or someone with a valid power of attorney from HSBC, possessing personal knowledge of the facts; an affidavit from Scott Anderson clarifying his employment history for the past three years and what corporation he serves as an officer; and, an affidavit by an officer of HSBC explaining why HSBC purchased a nonperforming loan from Delta Funding Corporation, and why HSBC, OCWEN, MERS, Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs all share office space in Suite 100.”

HSBC Bank USA v. Beirne,

212-Ohio-1386, Ohio App. Ct. 9th District

Summary judgment for bank reversed.

“In the affidavit that was attached to the supplement to the motion for summary judgment, Mr. Spradling averred that HSBC had been assigned the loan on June 5, 2009, and that “[a] true and correct copy of the Assignment was attached to the Complaint filed by HSBC.”  However, a review of the complaint and the exhibits attached thereto reveals that there was no evidence that the note had been assigned to HSBC.  Moreover, an assignment dated June 5, 2009, could not have been attached to the complaint which was filed on May 11, 2009.”

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Charlevagne,

20 Misc 3d 1128(A), 2008 NY Slip Op 51652(U)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-3

Mortgage Amount: $480,000

“Therefore, the instant application for an order of reference and related relief is denied without prejudice. The Court will grant plaintiff HSBC an order of reference and related relief when it submits an affidavit by either an officer of HSBC, or someone with a valid power of attorney from HSBC, possessing personal knowledge of the facts.”

HSBC Bank USA v. Cherry,

18 Misc3d 1102 (A), 2007 NY Slip Op 52378(U)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-4

“Further, the Court, upon renewal of the application for an order of reference requires a satisfactory explanation to questions with respect to: the assignment of the instant nonperforming mortgage loan from the original lender, Delta Funding Corporation to HSBC Bank; the employment history of one Scott Anderson, who assigned this mortgage to HSBC and then swears to be HSBC’s servicing agent; and the relationship between HSBC, Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB (OCWEN), Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs, who all seem to share office space at Suite 100 of 1661 Worthington Road, West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 (Suite 100).”

HSBC Bank USA v. Cipriani,

Index: 12365-2007

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 2008)

Trust: SG Mort. Sec. Trust 2005-OPT1

Order for reference denied without prejudice. To resubmit, plaintiff must provide “proof on standing to commence this action as it appears that the plaintiff did not own the note and mortgage when the action was commenced.”

HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Jack, 

Index No: 14750/2007

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 2008)

Denied without prejudice due to bank’s failure to provide proof that it had standing to bring the action.

 

HSBC Bank USA v. Palladino,

2011 IL App (2d) No. 08-CH-4548

Trust: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-D

Summary judgment reversed and remanded.

“In the present case, there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether there was an assignment of the mortgage and note from Fremont to HSBC Bank. Although HSBC Bank represents that it produced the assignment, the document on which it relies, by its very terms, was, at worst, not an assignment and, at best, inherently inconsistent as to whether it was an assignment. Indeed, the document states that MERS as nominee for Fremont “did” assign (past tense) the mortgage and note to HSBC Bank prior to November 13, 2008, yet also states that the assignment “is” made (present tense) without recourse and without representation or warranty.

In addition to the purported assignment’s inconsistent terms, the document upon which HSBC Bank relies is vague with respect to the date of the purported assignment. The document has a stamp which appears to reflect that it was recorded on December 17, 2008, but states that the assignment was made “prior to” November 13, 2008. The document itself is undated, as is the notary’s certificate. The date of the assignment is material because standing to sue must exist at the time the action is commenced.” (cites omitted)

HSBC Bank USA v. Perez,

Case No. EQ4970 (Washington County, Iowa 2009)

Trust: Fieldstone Mort. Investment Trust 2005-2

“The Perezs argue that the Pooling and Servicing Agreement for Fieldstone Mortgage Investment Trust Series 2005-2 governs when and how the Trustee in this case, HSBC Bank, the Plaintiff, may acquire notes and mortgages.  Additionally, that agreement governs when and how a mortgage owned by the trust may be foreclosed upon.  The Perezs further state that the agreement prohibits the acquisition of mortgages that are in default…The Plaintiff has also submitted documentation that shows the transfer of interest in the mortgage from Fieldstone to HSBC occurred on February 9, 2009.  Clearly, based upon the Plaintiff’s own documentation, the default occurred prior to the transfer.

According to the Transfer and Servicing Agreement submitted by the Perezs, and allegedly applicable to the Plaintiff, the trust servicer is only allowed to “substitute a defaulted Mortgage Loan with a Qualifying Substitute Mortgage Loan…This document seems to state that the mortgage at issue could only be transferred if it were current on the date it was transferred.  Accordingly, it appears that this mortgage was inappropriately transferred to the Plaintiff as it was in default at the time of transfer.  As such, a question is raised regarding whether the present Plaintiff has standing to bring this foreclosure action.”

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Sene,

34 Misc 3d 1232 (A), 2012 NY Slip Op 50352(U)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2012)

Trust: Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust

2007-HE4

“During the bad faith hearing, two separate notes with attendant assignments were put into evidence by the plaintiff…

This Court emphatically now joins the judicial chorus who have been wary of the paperwork supplied by plaintiffs and their representatives. There is ample reason for Chief Judge’s requirement for an attorney affirmation in residential foreclosure cases. As stated by Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman, “we cannot allow the courts in New York State to stand idly and be party to what we now know is a deeply flawed process, especially when that process involves basic human needs – such as a family home – during this period of economic crisis…

It is clear in this case, without further hearings, that a fraud has been committed upon this Court.  Thus, the only remedy that can be utilized by this Court is to stay these proceedings and any mortgage foreclosure until this matter is cleared up to the satisfaction of this Court.”

James v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,

D. Maine, No. 2:09-cv-84-JHR, January 31, 2011

Trust: BAFC 2006-1

Sanctions were imposed because of an Affidavit  submitted by GMAC employee and exposed robo-signer Jeffrey Stephan:

“In the case at hand, however, GMAC, the party that submitted the affidavit and the affiant’s employer, was on notice that the conduct at issue here was unacceptable to the courts, which rely on sworn affidavits as admissible evidence in connection with motions for summary judgment. In 2006, an identical jurat signed under identical circumstances resulted in the imposition of sanctions against GMAC in Florida. Affidavit of Thomas A Cox (Docket No. 153) ¶ 4 & Exhs. B-D. GMAC’s assertion that these sanctions applied only “within the State of Florida,” Plaintiff and GMAC Mortgage LLC’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Relief Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g) (Docket No. 177) at 7, is specious. It would be clear to any lawyer representing GMAC in any court action, including those involved in the Florida action, that a jurat should not be signed under the circumstances involved in that case or here and that such a jurat will never be acceptable to any court. Stephan’s actions in this case strike at the heart of any court’s procedures, are egregious under the circumstances, and must be deemed worthy of sanctions.

LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Ahearn,

59 A.D.3d 911, 875 N.Y.S. 2d 595 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)

Trust: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities I, LLC,

Series 2004-FR3

Mortgage Amount: $180,000

“Here, the written assignment submitted by plaintiff was indisputably written subsequent to the commencement of this action and the record contains no other proof demonstrating that there was a physical delivery of the mortgage prior to bringing the foreclosure action (see id.). In fact, the language in the amended complaint indicating that the assignment to plaintiff had not yet occurred would clearly contradict any assertion to the contrary. Accordingly, Supreme Court correctly found that plaintiff did not have standing and the amended complaint must be dismissed, without prejudice.”

LaSalle Bank v. Charleus 

Index No. 22733/2007 (January 3, 2008)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

An order of reference was denied by Judge Kurtz where the bank plead a mortgage assignment executed, July 2, 2007, after the suit was commenced June 22, 2007, but with an attempted backdate to June 21, 2007.

 

LaSalle Bank v. Lamy,

12 Misc.3d 1191(A), 824 N.Y.S.2d 769

“The court thus finds that this purported, undated, indorsement by “allonge” to the note by the original lender in favor of the plaintiff and the December 29, 2005 written assignment of the note and mortgage by MERS to the plaintiff failed to pass ownership of the note and mortgage to the plaintiff prior or subsequent to the commencement of this action. Consequently, the original lender remains the owner of both the note and mortgage since no proper assignment of the either the note or the mortgage was ever made by the original lender/owner to the plaintiff or to the plaintiff’s purported assignee. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff has no cognizable claims for the relief demanded in its complaint.”

LaSalle Bank v. Smalls,

Index No. 28128/2007 (January 3, 2008)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

An order of reference was denied by Judge Kurtz where the bank plead a mortgage assignment executed, September 31, 2007, after the suit was commenced August 31, 2007, but with an attempted backdate to July 30, 2007.

McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,

79 So.3d 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)

Trust: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II, Inc.,

Series 2006-ARS

“Nonetheless, the record evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Chase had standing to foreclose at the time the lawsuit was filed. The mortgage was assigned to Chase three days after Chase filed the instant foreclosure complaint. More importantly, the original note contained an undated special endorsement in Chase’s favor, and the affidavit filed in support of summary judgment did not state when the endorsement was made to Chase. Furthermore, the affidavit, which was dated after the lawsuit was filed, did not specifically state when Chase became the owner of the note and mortgage, nor did the affidavit indicate that Chase was the owner of the note and mortgage before suit was filed. Therefore, Chase failed to submit any record evidence proving that it had the right to enforce the note on the date the complaint was filed.” (footnotes omitted)

Naranjo v. SBMC Mortgage,

No. 3:11-cv-02229-L-WVG, Dkt. #20

(S.D. Cal. July 24, 2012)

Trust: WMALT 2006-AR4

Mortgage Amount: $825,000

Defendant Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss Denied in Part.

“The vital allegation in this case is the assignment of the loan into
the WAMU Trust was not completed by May 30, 2006 as required by the Trust Agreement. [*10] This allegation gives rise to a plausible inference that the subsequent assignment, substitution, and notice of default and election to sell may also be improper. Defendants wholly fail to address that issue. (See Defs.’ Mot. 3:16-6:2; Defs.’ Reply 2:13-4:4.) This reason alone is sufficient to deny Defendants’ motion with respect to this issue.”

Pino v. Bank of New York,

76 So. 3d 927 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)

Trust: CWALT 2006-OC8

Mortgage Amount: $162,400

Florida Supreme Court decision pending. The appeal court certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court because “many, many mortgage foreclosures appear tainted with suspect documents.”

“As conveyed by the Fourth District in the decision below, the plaintiffs and now respondents in this Court, the Bank of New York Mellon, et al. (BNY Mellon), commenced an action in the trial court to foreclose a mortgage against the defendant and now petitioner in this Court, Roman Pino. See Pino v. Bank of New York Mellon, 57 So.3d 950, 951 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Thereafter, Pino moved for sanctions, alleging that BNY Mellon had filed a fraudulent assignment of mortgage. Id. In response, BNY Mellon filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the foreclosure action. Id. at 952. Five months later, BNY Mellon refiled an identical action to foreclose the same mortgage. Id. In the original, dismissed action, Pino filed a motion seeking to vacate the voluntary dismissal pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)on the grounds of fraud on the court and requesting dismissal of BNY Mellon’s newly filed action as a consequent sanction. Pino, 57 So.3d at 952. The trial court denied Pino’s motion, essentially holding that because the prior action had been voluntarily dismissed, the court lacked jurisdiction, and thus the authority, to consider any relief. Id.(footnotes omitted)

Richards v. HSBC Bank,

__So.3d__, 2012 WL 2359656 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)

Trust: PHH 2007-2

Summary judgment for bank reversed on appeal.

“While the assignment reflected that the mortgage had been assigned from Century 21 to HSBC, the allonge to the note reflected that Bishops Gate Residential Mortgage Trust was to be the note’s payee…

Thus the allonge was inconsistent with the assignment and contradicted the allegation in the complaint that HSBC was the holder of the note…

Furthermore, the affidavits filed by HSBC did not explain the relationship between HSBC and Bishops Gate Residential Mortgage Trust, nor otherwise aver facts conclusively showing that HSBC was the holder of the note.

 

Rigby v. Wells Fargo, N.A.,

__So.3d__, 2012 WL1108428 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)

Trust: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FXD2

Mortgage Amount: $165,600

“The Bank has not shown that it was holder of the note at the time the complaint was filed. The note containing a special endorsement in favor of the bank was not dated. The assignment of mortgage, dated May 22, 2008, indicates that Bank did not acquire the mortgage until the day after the complaint was filed. Finally, neither the affidavit, nor the technical admissions made by the Rigbys, establishes the date on which Bank acquired possession of the note and there is no evidence in the record establishing that an equitable transfer of the mortgage occurred prior to the date the complaint was filed.”

(Summary judgment reversed and remanded.)

 

Servedio v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,

46 So. 3d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)

Trust: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2007-AHL1

Mortgage Amount: $252,000

“The issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting a final summary judgment of foreclosure where appellee failed to file with the court a copy of the original note and mortgage prior to the entry of judgment.  Because the absence of the original note created a genuine issue of material fact regarding appellee’s standing to foreclose on the mortgage, summary judgment was not proper. We reverse.”

U.S. Bank v. Alexander,

2012 OK 43

Trust: Credit Suisse First Boston HEAT 2005-4

Mortgage Amount: $63,920

“As previously identified, the dispositive issue is whether or not Appellee had standing at the time Appellee filed their first amended petition. We hold that the issue of standing as well as other material issues of fact remain that must be determined by the trial court. Therefore summary judgment was inappropriate.”

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Auguste,

Index: 18695-2007 (November 27, 2007)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2007)

Trust: CSMC Mort. Backed PT Certs., Series 2007-1

“In support of plaintiffs application, it submits a purported assignment of the mortgage from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting as Nominee for First United, to plaintiff. The purported assignment is dated July 9, 2007, and states in pertinent part “this assignment is effective on or before November 22, 2006.” However, such an attempt to retroactively assign the mortgage is insufficient to establish plaintiff’s ownership interest at the time the action was commenced.”

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Baber,

280 P.2d 956 (2012 OK 55)

Trust: Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1

“Being a person entitled to enforce the note is an essential requirement to initiate a foreclosure lawsuit. In the present case, there is a question of fact as to when Appellee became a holder, and thus, a person entitled to enforce the note. Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate. If Deutsche Bank became a person entitled to enforce the note as either a holder or nonholder in possession who has the rights of a holder after the foreclosure action was filed, then the case may be dismissed without prejudice and the action may be re-filed in the name of the proper party. We reverse the granting of summary judgment by the trial court and remand back for further determinations as to when Appellee acquired its interest in the note.”

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Collymore,

68 AD3d 752 (2009), 890 NYS2d 578

“Contrary to the Bank’s contentions, it failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because it did not submit sufficient evidence to demonstrate its standing as the lawful holder or assignee of the subject note on the date it commenced this action. The Bank’s evidentiary submissions were insufficient to establish that MERS effectively assigned the subject note to it prior to the commencement of this action…, and the mere assignment of the mortgage without an effective assignment of the underlying note is a nullityFurthermore, the Bank failed to establish that the note was physically delivered to it prior to the commencement of the action. The affidavit of a vice-president of the Bank submitted in support of summary judgment did not indicate when the note was physically delivered to the Bank, and the version of the note attached to the vice-president’s affidavit contained an undated indorsement in blank by the original lender. Furthermore, the Bank’s reply submissions included a different version of the note and an affidavit from a director of the Residential Funding Corporation which contradicted the affidavit of the Bank’s vice-president in tracing the history of transfers of the mortgage and note to the Bank. In view of the Bank’s incomplete and conflicting evidentiary submissions, an issue of fact remains as to whether it had standing to commence this action.” (cites omitted)

U.S. Bank v. Dellarmo,

94 A.D.3d 746 (2012), 942 N.Y.S.2d 122

Trust: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, 2006-FF2

“However, inasmuch as the complaint does not allege that the note was physically delivered to the plaintiff, and nothing in the plaintiff’s submission in opposition to Dellarmo’s motion could support a finding that such physical delivery occurred, the corrective assignment cannot be given retroactive effect… Moreover, both the unrecorded April 11, 2006, assignment and the recorded corrective assignment indicate only that the mortgage was assigned to the plaintiff. Since an assignment of a mortgage without the underlying debt is a nullity… the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that it had standing to commence this action…

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted Dellarmo’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him for lack of standing.” (cites omitted)

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Duvall,

Cuyahoga App. No. 94714, 2010-Ohio-6478

Trust: CMLTI 2007-WFHE2

Mortgage Amount: $92,000

“Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiff had no standing to file a foreclosure action against defendants on October 15, 2007, because, at that time, Wells Fargo owned the mortgage. Plaintiff failed in its burden of demonstrating that it was the real party in interest at the time the complaint was filed. Plaintiff’s sole assignment of error is overruled.”

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Githira,

17 LCR 697 (2009),  MISC 08-386385 (Essex Co. Mass. 2009)

Trust: Home Equity Asset Trust, Series 2005-9

Plaintiff U.S. Bank was seeking to remove a cloud on its title to a parcel of land stemming from plaintiff’s exercise of the power of sale contained in the mortgage before it received authority to do so under the provisions of the Servicemembers’ Civil Relief Act.  The complaint did not mention any other title defects.

Citing Justice Long’s ruling in Ibanez, Justice Charles W. Trombly, Jr., dismissed plaintiff’s petition to remove the cloud on the title, holding that plaintiff was not even the holder of the mortgage, by record or in fact, on the day of the foreclosure sale.  Specifically, the Court found that the foreclosure auction took place and was recorded prior to the execution and recording of an assignment of mortgage that made plaintiff the holder of the mortgage upon which it had foreclosed.

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Grant,

Index: 11133-2007

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2007)

Trust: Asset Backed Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan

Trust, Series OOMC 2006-HE3

“In support of plaintiffs application, it submits a purported assignment of the mortgage from Option One to plaintiff. The purported assignment is dated July 9, 2007, and states in pertinent part “Effective Date: March 28, 2007.” However, such an attempt to retroactively assign the mortgage is insufficient to establish plaintiff’s ownership interest at the time the action was commenced.”

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Ibanez,

941 N.E. 2d 40, (Mass. 2011)

Trust: Structured Asset Securities Corp. Mortgage PT

Certs., Series 2006-Z

The court in Ibanez rejected application of the “mortgage follows the note” rule, holding that mere possession of properly indorsed negotiable instruments did not give the foreclosing parties authority to conduct a valid non-judicial sale. In other words, one’s status as a party entitled to enforce a note did not satisfy the requirement under state law to be a mortgagee. The court acknowledged that a transferee of a note might have an equitable right to obtain a court order that that the mortgage be transferred to it. However, the potential to assert such a claim did not make the noteholder a “mortgagee.”  The Massachusetts statute required that the foreclosing party have an actual assignment of the mortgage when proceeding to sale., and further held that Assignments in Blank assign nothing and that retroactive assignments are not effective even if it was an industry-wide practice.

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Madero,

80 AD3d 751, 915 N.Y.S. 2d 612

Trust: not identified

Mortgage Amount: $570,000

“Here, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because it did not establish that it had standing, as the lawful holder or assignee of the subject note on the date it commenced this action, to commence the action.” (cites omitted)

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Merino,

16 Misc.3d 209

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 2007)

“First, the assignment from Argent to Ameriquest was executed by Jose Burgos as agent for Argent. On the same date, however, the purported assignment from Ameriquest to the plaintiff was also executed by Mr. Burgos, this time as agent for Ameriquest. In effect, the mortgage was purportedly assigned by Mr. Burgos to Mr. Burgos, and then, in turn, by Mr. Burgos to the plaintiff…The moving papers contain no proof that Mr. Burgos had either entity’s authority to act in a dual agency capacity. Therefore, the court is unable to conclude that the assignments were validly executed, or that the plaintiff had an ownership interest in the subject mortgage at the time of the filing of this action. Since a party has no foundation in law or fact to foreclose upon a mortgage without establishing its legal or equitable interest, the plaintiff’s motion must be denied.”

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Middlekauff,

Case No. 10 19844, Hillsborough Co. Fla. 2012

Trust: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Trust, Series 2005-9

“First, Plaintiff lacked standing at the inception of this case. Although the Note attached to the Amended Complaint contains an allonge, the undisputed summary judgment evidence before the Court establishes that this allonge was created post-filing. As Plaintiff lacked standing when it filed this lawsuit, dismissal is required.” (cite omitted)

U.S. Bank v. Moore,

2012 OK 32

GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-6

Mortgage Amount: $282,000

“It is a fundamental precept of the law to expect a foreclosing party to actually be in possession of its claimed interest in the Note, and to have the proper supporting documentation in hand when filing suit, showing the history of the Note, so that the defendant is duly apprised of the rights of the plaintiff. This is accomplished by showing the party is a holder of the instrument or a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument…”

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Roundtree,

Index: 009148/2007

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 2007)

Trust: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2006-HE1

“Since MERS, Inc. had no ownership interest in said note, it could not assign it to the plaintiff and any assignment purportedly transferring the ownership interest from Fremont Investment and Loan to the plaintiff by a MERS, Inc. assignment of said note is a nullity.” (cites omitted)

… In view of the foregoing, the instant motion (#001) is denied as it is apparent from the documentary submissions of the plaintiff that it was not the owner of the note at the time of the commencement of this action.”

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Villaruel,

Index: 25277/2008

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: SG Mort. Sec. AB Certs., Series 2006-FRE2

“The purported assignment is dated August 3, 2007 and states in pertinent part “[t]his assignment is effective as of the 10th day of June, 2007.” However, such an attempt to retroactively assign the mortgage is insufficient to establish plaintiff’s ownership interest at the time the action was commenced. Plaintiff’s attempt to foreclose upon a mortgage in which it had no “legal or equitable interest was without foundation in law or fact…” (cites omitted)

Verizzo v. Bank of New York,

28 So.3d 976 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)

Trust: Novastar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2006-3

“In addition to the procedural error of the late service and filing of the summary judgment evidence, those documents reflect that at least one genuine issue of material fact exists. The promissory note shows that Novastar endorsed the note to “JPMorgan Chase Bank, as Trustee.” Nothing in the record reflects assignment or endorsement of the note by JPMorgan Chase Bank to the Bank of New York or MERS. Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Bank of New York owns and holds the note and has standing to foreclose the mortgage.”

(Summary judgment reversed and remanded.)

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ford,

418 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2011)

Mortgage Amount: $403,750

“For these reasons, the summary judgment granted to Wells Fargo must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court because Wells Fargo did not establish its standing to pursue this foreclosure action by competent evidence. On the remand, defendant may conduct appropriate discovery, including taking the deposition of Baxley and the person who purported to assign the mortgage and note to Wells Fargo on behalf of Argent.”

 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hampton,

Index: 25957/2007 (January 3, 2008)

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2008)

Trust: Option One Mort. Loan Trust 2007-1

“The purported assignment is dated August 1, 2007 and states in pertinent part “[e]ffective as of June 10, 2007.” However, such an attempt to retroactively assign the mortgage is insufficient to establish plaintiff’s ownership interest at the time the action was commenced. Plaintiff’s attempt to foreclose upon a mortgage in which it had no “legal or equitable interest was without foundation in law or fact…” (cites omitted)

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.  Heath,

212 OK 54

Trust: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4

Standing was not established by the materials attached to Appellee’s petition or motion for summary judgment because there was no attached indorsed note nor was there an assignment of the note. Therefore, we find the trial court based its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law. There existed a substantial issue of material fact that needed to be addressed at trial. Even though the Appellants did not respond to the motion for summary judgment, the trial court should have denied the motion sua sponte.

 

Wells Fargo Bank v. Larace,

941 N.E. 2d 40, (Mass. 2011)

Trust: ABFC 2005-OPT1

See U.S. Bank v. Ibanez above.  These were consolidated cases.

Wells Fargo Bank v. Lupori,

8 A3d 919 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010)

Trust: MLMI Trust, Series 2005-FF6

“On appeal, Wells Fargo cites Mallory for the proposition that a plaintiff’s complaint in foreclosure need not allege the existence of a completed and recorded assignment of the subject mortgage to the plaintiff. We conclude, however, that this Court’s opinion in Mallory is distinguishable from the instant matter. In Mallory, the bank alleged that it was the owner of the subject mortgage and also alleged the existence of a pending assignment of the mortgage to the bank. In contrast, Wells Fargo has failed to do either of those things. Since the complaint contains no mention of the alleged assignment from Corporation to Wells Fargo or any allegation that Wells Fargo was the owner of the Luporis’ mortgage,the complaint does not comply with Rule 1147(a)(1). The alleged April 1, 2005 assignment from Corporation to Wells Fargo was dehors the record as of the time of the default judgment. Since the record did not support entry of the default judgment, the trial court erred in declining to strike the judgment from the record.” (footnote omitted)

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Marchione,

69 AD 3d 204, 887 N.Y.S. 2d 615 (2d Dept 2009)

Trust: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust

“Here, it is clear that the date of the execution of the assignment was after the commencement of the action. If an assignment is in writing, “the execution date is generally controlling and a written assignment claiming an earlier effective date is deficient unless it is accompanied by proof that the physical delivery of the note and mortgage was, in fact, previously effectuated” (LaSalle Bank Natl. Assn., 59 AD3d at 912). While recognizing that in some circumstances parties to an agreement may bind themselves retroactively, “the fiction of retroactivity . . . should not be applied to affect adversely the rights of third persons” (Debreceni v Outlet Co., 784 F2d 13, 20; see also 2 Lord, Williston on Contracts § 6:61, at 893 [4th ed]). Thus, a retroactive assignment cannot be used to confer standing upon the assignee in a foreclosure action commenced prior to the execution of the assignment (see LaSalle Bank Natl. Assn., 59 AD3d 912). We disagree with the contention of Wells Fargo that public policy favors permitting less than strict compliance with the requirement that, in order to commence a foreclosure action, a plaintiff must have a legal or equitable interest in the subject mortgage.

Wells Fargo also argues that if the action were to be dismissed, the result would be a waste of judicial resources, as it would simply commence another action as soon as the original action was dismissed. Wells Fargo might have reached this conclusion earlier in its calculus to commence the lawsuit prior to the execution of the assignment.”

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Mastropaolo,

42 AD3d 239

Trust Amount: $369,000

“Here, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because it did not establish that it had standing, as the lawful holder or assignee of the subject note on the date it commenced this action, to commence the action…” (cites omitted)

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. McNee

2011 NY Slip Op 33325(U)

Trust: BCAP LLC 2007-AA3

Mortgage Amount: $644,566

Plaintiff’s arguments notwithstanding, this Court is not persuaded by Wells Fargo’s laborious interpretation of the myriad of transfer documents or the breadth of the language employed therein to confer standing upon it. “[L]anguage cannot overcome the requirement that the foreclosing party be both the holder or assignee of the subject mortgage, and the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time a foreclosure action is commenced…”  In this case, Wells Fargo has adduced no proof in opposition to McNee’s cross motion(s) sufficient to demonstrate that it was either.

Zervas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

__So.3d__ (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)

Trust: MLMI Trust Series 2005-FM1

Summary judgment for bank reversed.

“We also note that the mortgage and note attached to the complaint show the lender to be Fremont Investment and Loan. On April 1, 2010, approximately six months after the complaint was filed, Wells Fargo filed a lost note affidavit, which alleged that the note was lost by its attorney sometime after the attorney received it on November 2, 2009. In their motion to dismiss, the Zervases alleged, among other grounds, that Wells Fargo did not have standing to bring the foreclosure complaint because it did not have a written assignment of the loan. Then on July 26, 2010, seven days before the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Wells Fargo filed the note as a supplemental exhibit to its complaint. The note contains an endorsement in blank, but there is no evidence in the record establishing that the endorsement in blank was made to Wells Fargo prior to the filing of the foreclosure complaint. See Feltus v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 80 So.3d 375, 377 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (holding that bank was required “to prove the endorsement in blank was effectuated before the lawsuit was filed”).”

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Issues Involving Mortgage-Backed Securities

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This topic examines how you can effectively use Securitization Issues to your advantage when challenging your wrongful foreclosure.

CASE STUDY 1:

Two years ago, an Alabama judge issued a short, conclusory order that stopped foreclosure on the home of a beleaguered family, and also prevents the same bank in the case from trying to foreclose against that couple, ever again. This may not seem like big news — but upon review of the underlying documents, the extraordinarily important nature of the decision and the case becomes obvious.

No Securitization, No Foreclosure

The couple involved, the Horaces, took out a predatory mortgage with Encore Credit Corp in November, 2005. Apparently Encore sold their loan to EMC Mortgage Corp, who then tried to securitize it in a Bear Stearns deal. If the securitization had been done properly, in February 2006 the trust created to hold the loans would have acquired the Horace loan. Once the Horaces defaulted, as they did in 2007, the trustee would have been able to foreclose on the Horaces.

And that’s why this case is so big: the judge found the securitization of the Horace loan wasn’t done properly, so the trustee — LaSalle National Bank Association, now part of Bank of America (BAC) — couldn’t foreclose. In making that decision, the judge is the first to really address the issue, head-on: If a screwed-up securitization process meant a loan never got securitized, can a bank foreclose under the state versions of the Uniform Commercial Code anyway? This judge says no, finding that since the securitization was busted, the trust didn’t have the right to foreclose, period.

Since the judge’s order doesn’t explain, how should people understand his decision? Luckily, the underlying documents make the judge’s decision obvious.

No Endorsements

The key contract creating the securitization is called a “Pooling and Servicing Agreement” (pooling as in creating a pool of mortgages, and servicing as in servicing those mortgages.) The PSA for the deal involving the Horace mortgage is here and has very specific requirements about how the trust can acquire loans. One of the easiest requirements to check is the way the loan’s promissory note is supposed to be endorsed — just look at the note.

According to Section 2.01 of the PSA, the note should have been endorsed from Encore to EMC to a Bear Stearns entity. At that point, Bear could either endorse the note specifically to the trustee, or endorse it “in blank.” But the note produced was simply endorsed in blank by Encore. As a result, the trust never got the Horace loan, explained securitization expert Tom Adams in his affidavit.

But wait, argued the bank, it doesn’t matter if if the trust owns the loan — it just has to be a “holder” under the Alabama version of the UCC (Uniform Commercial Code), and the trust is a holder. The problem with that argument is securitization trusts aren’t allowed to simply take property willy-nilly. In fact, to preserve their special tax status, they are forbidden from taking property after their cut-off dates, which in this case was February 28, 2006. As a result, if the trust doesn’t own the loan according to the PSA it can’t receive the proceeds of the foreclosure or the title to the home, even if it’s allowed to foreclose as a holder.

Holder Status Can’t Solve Standing Problem

Allowing a trust to foreclose based on holder status when it doesn’t own the loan would seem to create yet another type of clouded title issue. I mean, it’s absurd to say the trust foreclosed and took title as a matter of the UCC, but to also have it be true that the trust can’t take title as a matter of its own formational documents. And what would happen to the proceeds of the foreclosure sale? That’s why people making this type of argument keep pointing out that the UCC allows people to contract around it and PSAs are properly viewed as such a contracting around agreement.

I’m sure the bank’s side will claim the judge was wrong, that he disagreed with another recent Alabama case that’s been heavily covered, US Bank vs. Congress. And there is a superficial if flat disagreement: In this case, the judge said the Horaces were beneficiaries of the PSA and so could raise the issue of the loan’s ownership; in Congress the judge said the homeowners weren’t party to the PSA and so couldn’t raise the issue.

But as Adam Levitin explained, the Congress decision was procedurally weird, and as a result the PSA argument wasn’t about standing, as it was in Horace and generally would be in foreclosure cases (as opposed to eviction cases, like Congress). And what did happen to the Congress proceeds? How solid is that securitization trust’s tax status now anyway?

In short, in the only case I can find that has ruled squarely on the issue, a busted securitization prevents foreclosure by the trust that thinks it owns the loan. Yes, it’s just one case, and an Alabama trial level one at that. But it’s still significant.

Homeowners Right to Raise Securitization Issue

As far as right-to-raise-the-ownership issue, I think the Horace judge was just being “belt and suspenders” in finding the homeowners were beneficiaries of the PSA. Why do homeowners have to be beneficiaries of the PSA to raise the issue of the trust’s ownership of their loans? The homeowners aren’t trying to enforce the agreement, they’re simply trying to show the foreclosing trust doesn’t have standing. Standing is a threshold issue to any litigation and the homeowners axiomatically have the right to raise it.

As Nick Wooten, the Horaces’ attorney, said:

“This is just one example of hundreds I have seen where servicers were trying to force through a foreclosure in the name of a trust that clearly had no interest in the underlying loan according to the terms of the pooling and servicing agreement. This conduct is a fraud on the borrower, a fraud on the investors and a fraud on the court. Thankfully Judge Johnson recognized the utter failure of the securitization transaction and would not overlook the fact that the trust had no interest in this loan.”

All that remains for the Horaces, a couple with a special needs child and whose default was triggered not only by the predatory nature of the loan, but also by Mrs. Horace’s temporary illness and Mr. Horace’s loss of overtime, is to ask a jury to compensate them for the mental anguish caused by the wrongful foreclosure.

Perhaps BofA will just want to cut a check now, rather than wait for that verdict. (As of publication BofA had not returned a request for comment.)

No one is suggesting the Horaces get a free house; they still owe their debt, and whomever they owe it to has the right to foreclose on it. Wooten explained to me that the depositor –in this case, the Bear Stearns entity –i s probably that party. Moreover if the Horaces wanted to sell and move, they’d have to quiet title and would be wise to escrow the mortgage pay off amount, if that amount can be figured out. But for now the Horaces get some real peace, even if a larger mess remains.

Much Bigger Than A Single Foreclosure

The Horaces aren’t the only ones affected by the issues in this case.

Homeowners everywhere that are being foreclosed on by securitization trusts — many, many people — can start making these arguments. And if their loan’s PSA is like the Horaces, they should win. At least, Wooten hopes so:

“Judge Johnson stopped a fraud in progress. I am hopeful that other courts will consider more seriously the very serious issues that are easily obscured in the flood of foreclosures that are overwhelming our Courts and reject the systemic and ongoing fraud that is being perpetrated by the mortgage servicers. Until Courts actively push back against the massive documentary fraud being shoveled at them by mortgage servicers this fraudulent conduct will not end.”

The issues stretch past homeowners to investors, too.

Investors in this particular mortgage-backed security, take note: What are the odds that the Horace note is the only one that wasn’t properly endorsed? I’d say nil, and not just because evidence in other cases, such as Kemp from New Jersey, suggests the practice was common. This securitization deal was done by Bear Stearns, which other litigation reveals was far from careful with its securitizations. So the original investors in this deal should speed dial their lawyers.

And investors in bubble-vintage mortgage backed securities, the ones that went from AAA gold to junk overnight, might want to call their attorneys too; this deal was in 2006, and in the securitization frenzy that followed processes can only have gotten worse.

Some investors are already suing, but the cases are at very early stages. Nonetheless, as cases like the Horaces’ come to light, the odds seem to tilt in investors’ favor — meaning they seem increasingly likely to ultimately succeed in forcing banks to buy back securities or pay damages for securities fraud connected with their sale. And that makes the Bank Bailout II scenario detailed by the Congressional Oversight Panel more possible.

The final, very striking feature of this case is what didn’t happen: No piece of paper covered in the proper endorsements –an allonge — magically appeared at the eleventh hour. The magical appearance of endorsements, whether on notes or on allonges, has been a hallmark of foreclosures done in the robosigning era. And investors, as you pursue your suits based on busted securitizations, that’s something to watch out for.

My, but the banks made a mess when they forced the fee-machine of mortgage securitizations into overdrive. The consequences are still unfolding, but one consequence just might be a whole lot of properties that securitization trusts can’t foreclose on.

CASE STUDY 2:

In the fall of 2012, a Michigan state court issued an important decision that may affect thousands of foreclosures, HSBC Bank, USA v. Young, No 11-693 (Cir. Ct. Mich. Oct. 16, 2012). HSBC filed an action for possession of Mary Young’s home after a mortgage foreclosure by advertisement. The district court granted HSBC’s motion for summary disposition and defendant Young was granted leave to appeal. The Court reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order and remanded for further proceedings. HSBC filed a motion for reconsideration.

     Young refinanced her home with Wells Fargo Home Mortgage on April 22, 2004. Young defaulted and received notices of default from Wells Fargo in February, April and August of 2008.  In January 0f 2009, Wells Fargo and Young entered into a Loan Modification Agreement.  The Agreement was on Wells Fargo letterhead and signed by an officer of Wells Fargo which was described as the lender.

     Young did not keep up with her payments.  On March 11, 2010, HSBC commenced foreclosure by advertisement and bought the house at sheriff’s sale.  On November 8, 2010, HSBC filed a complaint for possession in the district court.

     Young argued that HSBC lacked standing because neither the mortgage nor the note had been validly and effectively transferred to HSBC.

     Young claimed that a purported mortgage assignment to HSBC as Trustee for Wells Fargo Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-2, dated October 8, 2008, was void because it did not agree with the terms of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (“PSA”) that governed the trust and because HSBC also did not have an ownership interest in the note.

     Young argued that HSBC did not own the note because HSBC produced a copy of the note in discovery on February 14, 2011, that showed the note was payable to Wells Fargo as lender and there were no endorsements or allonges.  About one month later, HSBC produced another copy of the same note, this one with a stamped and typed endorsement to Wells Fargo, with no date indicating when the endorsement occurred.

     HSBC argued that Young lacked standing to challenge the assignment because Young was not a party to the PSA or a third-party beneficiary, arguing that Michigan law was well-settled. But Circuit Court Judge Melinda Morris found that argument to be erroneous, and the issue undecided by the Michigan Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.  Noting conflicting authority in other jurisdictions, Judge Morris relied on the decision in Butler v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, ___F Supp 2d___, ___; 2012 WL 3518560, *6-7 (D Mass 2012):

Courts in this district are in agreement that a mortgagor lacks standing to challenge the assignment of his mortgage directly if he is neither a party to nor a third-party beneficiary of the assignment contract…

     However, “the question of whether [a mortgagor has] standing to challenge [an] assignment is different form the question of whether [he has] standing to challenge the foreclosure on the basis that [the foreclosing entity] did not properly hold the mortgage at the time of the foreclosure.” …A number of decisions have held that mortgagors have standing to challenge a foreclosure sale as void due to an allegedly invalid assignment…

                                       *       *       *

     Mortgagors challenging foreclosure sales that are void due to invalid assignments have standing to do so because they have demonstrated “a concrete and particularized injury in fact, a causal connection that permits tracing the claimed injury to the defendant’s actions, and likelihood that prevailing in the action will afford some redress for the injury.” …

     I do not, however, hold that a mortgagor has standing to challenge a foreclosure on the basis of just any potentially invalidating deficiency in an assignment.  Massachusetts case law distinguishes between void and voidable assignments…If an assignment is voidable, but has not been avoided, then the assignee has legal title to convey to the purchaser at a foreclosure sale. If an assignment is void, then the assignee was assigned nothing and has nothing to convey to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale.  Where a “grantor has nothing to convey…[t]he purported conveyance is a nullity, notwithstanding the parties’ intent.”…

     Here, however, Butler fails to allege facts or present legal argument sufficient to establish that the assignments to Deutsche Bank were void due to their failure to comply with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement…

     This distinction is very important because in most foreclosure cases, the homeowner is not trying to enforce the PSA, but to present evidence that an assignment was invalid.  The vast majority of foreclosures involve cases with unendorsed notes or with endorsements that are not dated.  Like the Young case, the vast majority of foreclosures by trusts also involve mortgage assignments created years after the trust closing date and an assignment of a non-performing loan.  Assignments after the closing date and assignments of non-performing loans, and particularly the combination – assignment of a non-performing loan after the closing date – are almost always violations of trust PSAs.

     The simple truth is that trusts were established (and sold) with rules to protect investors from such foolhardy action on the part of a trustee such as suddenly acquiring non-performing loans years after the trust closing date.  When trust rules are violated, there can be serious negative tax consequences for the trust: the IRS could decide that the trust does not qualify for favorable REMIC status.

In the vast majority of cases, there is no real underlying financial transaction as reported in the mortgage assignment.  If the records of the loans entering and leaving the loan pool of the trust are examined, they simply do not match up with the assignments.  These later dated assignments were almost always made by document mills, mortgage servicers and foreclosure law firm employees solely to provide some proof to the courts that the trustee has standing to foreclose.  In other words, these later dated assignments are almost always fraudulent.

It is also important to note that these assignments are not just robo-signed, that is, signed by someone with no knowledge of the underlying facts, or signed by someone who is signing his or her (or someone else’s name) several thousand times a day.  These assignments falsely state the date on which the trust acquired the mortgage.

Because most note endorsements are non-existent or non-dated, the only date in most cases involving mortgages claimed by mortgage-backed trusts is the false date on these assignments.

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